

THE
SLAVONIC
(AND EAST EUROPEAN)
REVIEW

A Survey of the Slavonic Peoples,
Their History, Economics, Philology and Literature

VOLUME ELEVEN

PUBLISHED BY EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE (PUBLISHERS) LTD.
6 GREAT NEW STREET, LONDON, E.C.4
FOR THE
SCHOOL OF SLAVONIC AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

1932-33

Printed in Great Britain by
Eyre & Spottiswoode, Limited,
East Harding Street, E.C.4

EDITORS:

BERNARD PARES, R. W. SETON-WATSON, NORMAN B. JOPSON

AMERICAN CONTRIBUTING EDITORS:

SAMUEL N. HARPER, ROBERT J. KERNER, GEORGE R. NOYES

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

BAIKALOV, ANATOLE.
BARKER, VERNON D.
BATHER, F. A.
BERNATSKY, M.
BITTNER, LUDWIG.
BOROWY, WACLAW.

MARSHALL, F. H.
MEDLICOTT, W. N.
MUDIE, DORIE.

NOYES, GEO. RAPALL

CASEY, F. P.
CIECHANOWSKA, ZOFJA.
CLARK, ELIZABETH MONK.
CLARKE, JAMES F.
COLTON, ETHAN.
COPELAND, FANNY S.
ČURČIN, MILAN.

ODLOŽILÍK, OTAKAR
ONOU, ALEXANDER.

PARES, BERNARD.
PATTERSON, L.
PEACOCK, MARJORIE B.

DOBB, MAURICE.
DOBBIE-BATEMAN, A. F.
DURST, DORIS.

SETON-WATSON, R. W.
SMIRNOV, MICHAEL.
STRUVE, GLEB.
STRUVE, PETER.
SUMNER, B. H.

GOŃSKI, KONRAŁ.
GRZEBIENIOWSKI, TADEUSZ.

HALECKI, O.
HANS, N.
HILL, ELIZABETH.

TOMPKINS, STUART R.
TURIN, S. P.

JANDÁSEK, LADISLAV.
JARYC, MARC.
JERROLD, MAUD F.
JOPSON, N. B.

VÁŠA, PAVEL.
VOSTROTIN, S. V.

KERENSKY, ALEXANDER.
KUSKOVA, KATHERINE.

WARRINER, DOREEN.

LASCARIS, MICHAEL.

ZENKOVSKY, V.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
The Policy of the Provisional Government of 1917. By ALEXANDER KERENSKY	I
A Russian View of Manchuria. By S. V. VOSTROTIN	20
The Test of Communist Economic Resources. By ETHAN COLTON	37
The Second Five Year Plan. By S. P. TURIN	58
The Sokol Movement in Czechoslovakia. By LADISLAV JANDÁSEK	65
The Polish Cause in England a Century Ago. By TADEUSZ GRZEBIENIOWSKI	81
Greece and Serbia during the War of 1885. By MICHAEL LASCARIS	88
A Greek Community in Minorca. By F. H. MARSHALL	100
The Memoirs of Count N. Ignatyev (iii). By ALEXANDER ONOU	108
Goethe and Serbo-Croat Ballad Poetry. By MILAN ČURČIN ...	126
Slav Verdicts on Goethe. I. By THOMAS G. MASARYK ...	139
II. By A. V. LUNACHARSKI	142
Leopold Staff. By WACŁAW BOROWY	145
The Problem of Soviet Finance. By M. BERNATSKY	288
The Fall of the Dinar. By "DANAS"	304
Czechoslovakia and Central European Tariffs, I, II. By DOREEN WARRINER	314, 543
Siberia since 1894. By ANATOLE V. BAIKALOV	328
Ignatyev at Constantinople, I, II. By B. H. SUMNER ...	341, 536
The Recognition of Roumanian Independence, I, II. By W. N. MEDLICOTT	354, 572
Admiral Kolchak. By M. I. SMIRNOV	373
Foundations of Magyar Society. By VERNON D. BARKER ...	388
Walter Scott and Russia. By PETER STRUVE	397
Poland and Goethe. By ZOFJA CIECHANOWSKA	411
The Art of Ivan Bunin. By GLEB STRUVE	423
A 17th Century Roumanian Catechism. By L. PATTERSON ...	437
The New Crisis in Russia. By BERNARD PARES	489
Is Russian Communism Taking Root? By KATHERINE KUSKOVA	503
Problems of Soviet Finance. By MAURICE DOBB	522

	PAGE
The Press in Soviet Russia. By MARC JARYC	530
Witte as Minister of Finance. By STUART R. TOMPKINS ...	590
Archibald Cary Coolidge. By BERNARD PARES	607
Wyspiański. By WACŁAW BOROWY	617
Slovene Myths. By FANNY S. COPELAND	631

Katie. From the Slovak of JÉGÉ	159
Ad Leones. From the Polish of C. K. NORWID	163
Stewed Pumpkin. From the Bulgarian of ELIN-PELIN ..	172
Protesilaus and Laodamia. From the Polish of STANISŁAW WYSPIAŃSKI	249, 667
The Knave of Diamonds. From the Russian of LEONID LEONOV	264
Wallenstein's Tomb. From the Czech of JAROSLAV DURYCH ..	269
Slovene Fairy Tales	651
Straight and Crooked. A Russian Fairy Tale	658
Captain George. From the Greek of ARGYRIS EFTALLOTIS ...	661

POEMS.

The Building of Skadar (Serbo-Croat Ballad)	176
Marko's Pipe (Serbo-Croat Ballad)	182
Who will Remember? From the Polish of SIEMIENSKI ...	286
To Two Sisters, and Verses. From the Russian of TYUTCHEV ...	287

Obituary	187-191, 447-454
Soviet Agricultural Legislation	192-206, 440-446
Reviews	212-217, 458-485, 718-730
Bibliography of Russian Publications	485
Publications by Staff	218
Theses in School	221
Books Received	211, 457
Chronicle	207, 454, 715
Slavic Courses in U.S.A.	210

- Ad Leones, by C. K. Norwid, 163.
Albanian Folkstories, by Margaret Hasluck, 483
Alice in Wonderland in Czech, 485
 Argenti, P. A., *The Massacres of Chios*, 727
- BAIKALOV, A. V., *Siberia since 1894*, 328, *Soviet Agricultural Legislation* (iv) 192, (v) 440, (vi) 692.
 Bather, F. A., review of *Ochrona Zabytków Sztuki*, 730
 BARKER, V. D., *Foundations of Magyar Society*, 388.
 Beazley, Sir Raymond, *The Road to Ruin in Europe*, 458
 BERNATSKY, M., *The Problem of Soviet Finance*, 288.
 Bibliography, Russian, 485
 Bittner, L., review of Seton-Watson, *The Role of Bosnia*, 460.
 Books Received, 211, 457
 Biggs, M. P., *George D. Herron* 475.
Bonfire Stories out of Soviet Russia, edited by S. Kononov, 478.
 Borowy, W., Leopold Staff, 145;
 Polish Linguaphone Course, 481;
 Reviews, 725, 726
 Bunin, The Art of Ivan, by Gleb Struve, 423.
- Captain George, by A. Eftaliotis, 661
 Casey, F. P., translation from Czech, 269.
 Cecil, Algernon, *Metternich*, 721
Chios, Massacres of, P. A. Argenti, 727
 Chronicle, Russian, 207, 455, 715.
 CIECHANOWSKA, ZOFJA, Poland and Goethe, 411
 Cisar, Jaroslav, *Alice in Wonderland in Czech*, 485.
 CLARKE, JAMES F., Dimitar Mishev, 452
 COLTON, ETHAN, *The Test of Communist Economic Resource*, 37
 Coolidge, A. C., by Bernard Pares, 607.
 COPELAND, FANNY S., *Slovene Myths*, 631.
 ČURČIN, MILAN, Goethe and Serbo-Croat Ballad Poetry, 126.
 Czechoslovakia, Sokol Movement in, by L. Jandásek, 65
 Czechoslovakia and Central European Tariffs, I, II, by Doreen Warriner, 314, 543
- "Danas," The Fall of the Dinar, 304
 Dinar, The Fall of, by "Danas," 304
 Dobb, Maurice, *Soviet Russia and the World*, 467.
 DOBB, MAURICE, Problems of Soviet Finance, 522.
- DOBBIE-BATEMAN, A. F., M. Pokrovsky, 187
 DURYCH, JAROSLAV, Wallenstein's Tomb, 269
- EFTALIOTIS, ARGYRIS, Captain George, 661
 ELIN-PELIN, Stewed Pumpkin, 172
 Evening Discourse, by Adam Mickiewicz, 183
- Five Year Plan, the Second*, by S. P. Turn, 58.
 Florinsky, Michael, *End of the Russian Empire*, 718
 Florovsky, G. V., *Vizantiyskie Otsy*, 720
François Ferdinand, by M. Muret, 723
- Goethe and Serbo-Croat Ballads, by Milan Čurčin, 126.
 Goethe, Slav Verdicts on, 139, 142.
 Goethe and Poland, by Z. Ciechanowska, 411
 Gorski, Konrad, review of *Vhiv Mickiewiczów*, 726
 Greece and Serbia in 1885, by M. Lascaris, 88.
 Greek Community in Minorca, by F. H. Marshall, 100.
 GRZEBIENIOSKI, T., The Polish Cause in England a Century Ago, 81.
- Halecki, O., review of *Queen Jadwiga*, Hasluck, Margaret, *Albanian Folk Stories*, 483.
 Hans, N., review of *Ocherki po Istorii Russkoy Kultury* (P. N. Milyukov), 462.
 Heidenreich, J., *Vhiv Mishkiewiczów na českou literaturu*, 726
 Herman, E., *Litauisch-Deutsches Gesprächsbuchlein*, 215.
 Hill, Elizabeth, translation by, 658
 Howard, H. N., *The Partition of Turkey*, 470.
Husitství a Cizina, F. M. Bartoš, 216.
- Ignatyev at Constantinople, by B. H. Sumner, 341, 556.
 Ignatyev, Memoirs of Count N. (iii), by Alexander Onou, 108.
- Jadwiga, Queen of Poland*, by Charlotte Kellogg, 477
 JANDÁSEK, L., The Sokol Movement in Czechoslovakia, 65; Joseph Scheiner, 189
 JARYC, MARC, The Press in Soviet Russia, 530
 JÉGÉ, Katie, from Slovak of, 159.

- Jerrold, Maud F., translation from Russian, 287.
- Jopson, N B., translations from Bulgarian, 172, from Polish, 157; from Slovak, 159; from Russian, 264; Reviews, 479, 482, 483.
- Katie, by Jégé, 159.
- Kellogg, Charlotte, *Queen Jadwiga*, 477.
- KERENSKY, ALEXANDER, The Policy of the Provisional Government of 1917, 1.
- Knave of Diamonds, by Leonid Leonov, 264.
- Kolchak, Admiral, by M I. Smirnov, 373.
- Konovalov, S., editor of *Bonfire*, 478.
- KUSKOVA, KATHERINE, Is Russian Communism Taking Root? 503
- LASCARIS, MICHAEL, Greece and Serbia in 1885, 88.
- Ledbetter, Eleanor, *Polish Literature in English*, 485.
- LEONOV, LEONID, The Knave of Diamonds, 264.
- Lichtträger, Florian, *Immer Wieder Serbien*, 728.
- Linguaphone Course in Polish, 48.
- Litauisch-Deutsches Gesprächsbuchlern*, by E. Herman, 215.
- Logio, G. Clinton, *Roumania*, 474.
- LUNACHARSKY, A V., Slav Verdicts on Goethe, 142.
- Magyar Society, Foundations of, by Vernon D. Barker, 388.
- Manchuria, A Russian View of, by S. V. Vostrotin, 20.
- Manning, Clarence A., *Marko the King's Son*, 485.
- Marko's Pipe, 182.
- Marko the King's Son*, Clarence A. Manning, 485.
- MARSHALL, F. H., A Greek Community in Minorca, 100.
- MASARYK, T. G., Slav Verdicts on Goethe, 139.
- MEDLICOTT, W. N., Recognition of Roumanian Independence, I, 354; II, 572.
- Meyendorff, A F., review of G. T. Robinson, *Rural Russia*, 214.
- Mettermich*, A. Cecil, 721.
- Mickiewicz, Adam, Evening Discourse, 183; Pilgrim's Song, 185.
- Milyukov, P N., *Ocherki po Istorii Russkoy Kultury*, 463.
- Minorca, A Greek Community in, 100.
- Mishev, Dimiter, by J. F. Clarke, 452.
- Mudie, Doris, translation by, 658.
- Muret, M., *François Ferdinand*, 733.
- NORWID, C. K., Ad Leones, 163.
- Novotný, Václav by O. Odložilík, 450.
- Noyes, Geo. Rapall, translations from Polish, 249, 286.
- Obituary: M. Pokrovsky, 187; D. Mishev, 453; V. Novotný, 450; Adolf Stransky, 447; Max. Voloshin, 691.
- Odložilík, O., review of Bartoš, *Husitství a Cizina*, 216.
- ONOU, ALEXANDER, Memoirs of Count N. Ignatyev (III), 108.
- Opočenský, J., *Umsturz in Mitteleuropa*, 729.
- PARES, BERNARD, The New Crisis in Russia, 489.
- Partition of Turkey*, H. N. Howard, 470.
- PATTERSON, L., A Roumanian Catechism, 437.
- Peacock, Eliz. M., translation from Polish, 286.
- Pilgrim's Song, by Adam Mickiewicz, 185.
- Poland and Goethe, by Z. Ciechanowska, 411.
- Polish Cause in England a Century Ago*, by T. Grzebieńowski, 81.
- Polish Linguaphone Course, 481.
- Polish Literature in England*, C E. Ledbetter, 485.
- Protesilaus and Laodamia, by S. Wyspiański, 249, 667.
- Provisional Government of 1917, Policy of, by Alexander Kerensky, 1.
- Publications by Members of Staff - (1922-32), 218.
- Puryear, V. J., *England, Russia and the Straits*, 462.
- Ramovš, F., *Dialektološka Karta Slovenskega Jezika*, 482.
- Riker, T. W., *The Making of Roumania*, 472.
- Road to Ruin in Europe*, Sir R. Beazley, 458.
- Robinson, Geroid T., *Rural Russia under Old Regime*, 214.
- Rouček, J. S., *Contemporary Roumania*, 474.
- Roumania, Making of*, T. W. Riker, 472.
- Roumanian Catechism, A., by L. Patterson, 437.
- Roumanian Independence, Recognition of, by W. N. Medlicott, I, 354; II, 572.
- Rural Russia under the Old Regime*, G. T. Robinson, 214.
- Russia, The New Crisis in, by Bernard Pares, 489.
- Russian Communism, Is it taking Root? by Katherine Kuskovalova, 503.
- Russian Grammar and Self-Educator*, L. Segal, 479.
- Scheiner, Joseph, 189.
- Scholars in USSR, Treatment of, 710.

- Scott, Walter, and Russia, by Peter Struve, 397.
- Segal, L., *Russian Grammar and Self-Educator*, 479.
- Serbo-Croat Ballads, Goethe and, by Milan Curčin, 126.
- Seton-Watson, R. W., *The Role of Bosnia in International Politics*, 460.
- SETON-WATSON, R. W., *The Building of Skadar*, 176; *Marko's Pipe*, 182; *Reviews of Road to Ruin* (Beazley), 458; *England, Russia and the Straits* (Puryear), 468; *Partition of Turkey* (Howard), 470; *Making of Roumania* (Riker), 472; *Roumania and her Problems* (Rouček), 474; *Roumania* (Logio), 474; Geo. D. Heron (Biggs), 475; *Metternich* (Cecil), 721; *François Ferdinand* (Muret), 723; *Massacres of Chios* (Argenti), 727; *Immer Wieder Serbien*, 728; *Umsturz in Mitteleuropa* (Opočensky), 729.
- Siberia since 1894, by A. V. Baikalov, 328.
- SIEMIENSKI, Who will Remember?, 286.
- Skadar, *The Building of*, 176.
- Slav Anthology*, edited by E. W. Underwood, 479.
- Slav Verdicts on Goethe, by Thomas G. Masaryk, 139, by A. V. Lunacharsky, 142.
- Slavic Courses in U.S.A., 210.
- Slonimski, A., *Moja Pedroš de Mosi*, 724.
- Slovene Myths, by Fanny S. Copeland, 631.
- SMIRNOV, M. I., *Admiral Kolchak*, 373.
- Sokal, F., 191.
- Sokol Movement in Czechoslovakia*, *The*, by L. Jandásek, 65.
- Sokolnikov, G. Y., *Soviet Policy in Finance*, 212.
- Soviet Agricultural Legislation (iv) 193, (v) 440.
- Soviet Finance, Problems of, by M. Bernatsky, 288; by M. Dobb, 522.
- Soviet Policy in Finance*, G. Y. Sokolnikov, 212.
- Soviet Russia, Press in, by M. Jaryc, 530.
- Staff, Leopold, by W. Borowy, 145.
- Stewed Pumpkin, by Elin-Pelin, 172.
- Straight and Crooked, 658.
- STRUVE, GLEB, *The Art of Ivan Bunin*, 423; *Max Voloshin*, 691.
- STRUVE, PETER, *Walter Scott and Russia*, 397.
- SUMNER, B. H., *Ignatyev at Constantinople*, I, 341, II, 556.
- Tenth Sister, *The*, 654.
- Test of Communist Economic Resources*, by Ethan Colton, 37.
- Theses, *Preparation in the School* (1922-32), 221.
- TOMPKINS, STUART R., *Witte as Finance Minister*, 590.
- Translations from: Czech, 269; Polish, 169, 249, 286, 667; Russia, 264, 287, 658; Slovak, 159; Slovene, 651.
- TURIN, S. P., *The Second Five Year Plan*, 58; *Russian Bibliography*, 485; *Review of Dobb, Soviet Russia and the World*, 467.
- TYUTCHEV, *Poems*, 287.
- Umsturz in Mitteleuropa*, J. Opočensky, 729.
- Underwood, Edna W., *Slav Anthology*, 479.
- VÁŠA, PAVEL, *Adolf Stránský*, 447.
- VOSTROTIN, S. V., *A Russian View of Manchuria*, 20.
- Wallenstein's Tomb, by Jaroslav Durych, 269.
- WARRINER, DOREEN, *Czechoslovakia and Central European Tariffs*, I, 314; II, 543.
- Witte as Finance Minister, by Stuart R. Tompkins, 590.
- Wyspiański, by W. Borowy, 617.
- WYSPIAŃSKI, S., *Protesilaus and Laodamia*, 249, 667.
- Zaleski, Z. I., *Attitudes et Destinées*, 726.
- Zlatorog, from the Slovene, 651.



A SLAV HOMAGE TO GOETHE

FROM

IVAN MEŠTROVIĆ

THE SLAVONIC AND EAST EUROPEAN REVIEW.

VOL. XI. No. 31.

JULY, 1932.

THE POLICY OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF 1917*

FIFTEEN years after the fall of the Monarchy in Russia and the beginning of the Revolution there, it is already time to form an objective estimate of the movements and events directly connected with that epoch. If in those fifteen years Russia had built up a new and firm foundation of her State life, the March Revolution, the short period of the Provisional Government, would for us by now be only history. But that is not what has happened. The revolutionary process of the transformation of the autocratic Russian State into a democratic, which began on 12 March, 1917, was interrupted in its very initial stage by the reaction of a Bolshevik dictatorship in November of the same year. But, as in England, the great charter of liberties (Magna Charta), after all the experiences of history, has become the foundation of State life, as in France the root principles of 1789 have conquered Jacobinism, Bonapartism and Restoration, so Russia, too, is bound to return to the programme of March 1917, to the building up of the State on the principles of democracy.

It seems to me that the longer there last attempts of every kind to find some sort of more or less workable form for the Bolshevik dictatorship—"militant Communism," the "Nep," the "Five Year Plan"—the clearer for any objective observer becomes the absolute inevitability that the very system of dictatorship by a party oligarchy must fall in Russia.

* This article is, so far as we know, the clearest and frankest defence which has appeared of the Russian Provisional Government of 1917 and is therefore a most valuable contribution to the discussion of a question which is necessarily the subject of much controversy.—ED.

That is why the development of political events in Russia creates a certain historical paradox : the longer the Bolshevik dictatorship goes on, the more real, the more attractive to Russian minds becomes the idea of freedom, that is, the root idea which was the strength of the March Revolution. And that is why, in spite of the last fifteen years, not only Russians, but foreigners interested in Russia and her future should take account of what was the policy, both internal and external, of the Provisional Government—a government which for eight months of revolution expressed the free opinion of the country and rested only on it.

When we analyse the experiment of creating a strictly democratic State in the historic surroundings of a prolonged war of attrition, we shall inevitably come to the conclusion that it was precisely the war, and only the war, and not any “incapacity of the Asiatic nature of Russians to adopt a principle of European State civilisation”—that it was only the war with all its material and psychological consequences, that provoked the collapse of the democratic revolution.

I know that very many foreigners are acquainted with the history of the March Revolution and with the work of its government only through pamphlets of the defenders of a dictatorship of the Right or of the Left or by the narratives of adherents of the fallen monarchy. There is a whole repertory of legends hostile to March : “Army Order No. 1,” the “dualism” of the government and the soviets, Kerensky’s “weak will,” his “betrayal of General Kornilov,” and very many other similar fancies. It would not be in place or possible for me to dwell upon them here. I wish in the shortest possible way to establish in this article what was the actual content of the policy of the Provisional Government, and to fix the independence of this policy and the historic background which surrounded our work.

As I have already written in the pages of this *Review* two years ago, in an article, “Why the Russian Monarchy Fell,”¹ it is impossible to judge of the March Revolution in general or of the policy of the Provisional Government in particular if one does not know, or if one forgets, certain incontestable historical facts. Before all, we have to remember that the fall of the Monarchy was not a consequence of the Revolution but, on the contrary, its cause.² We

¹ Vol. VIII, No. 24, March 1930, pp. 496–513.

² We believe that most objective onlookers who were present will confirm in full this statement, which is of primary importance. It is all the more necessary because of widespread and complete misapprehensions on this point.—ED.

cannot forget that it was not measures of the revolutionary government that broke up the whole administrative apparatus of the Monarchy, but that this apparatus came to a complete crash in the three days of anarchy which preceded the formation of the Provisional Government. And, lastly, we must give full importance to that peculiarity of the Russian Revolution which sharply distinguishes it from the French Revolution of 1789 or from the German of 1918. The French Revolution preceded the epoch of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars; the German Revolution was a consequence of a war already finished, though unsuccessful. Our revolution broke out in the very heat of military operations, and psychologically the most immediate occasion for it was the fear of a separate peace, that is, it was bent on the continuation of war in the name of national defence ³

It cannot be said that the historical facts which I have just mentioned and which preceded and accompanied the work of the Provisional Government were some kind of peculiar secret history and that no one except those specially initiated had to know about them. On the contrary, these facts, one would say, were before the eyes of every one. But—such is the inertia of the human mind—people find it easier and less troublesome to discuss historical events by principles established once for all, ignoring those peculiarities of the given occasion which call for independent and intensive thought.

It is hard, for instance, to find two currents of historical events more opposite to each other than the French Revolution of 1789 and the Russian of March, 1917. Meanwhile, with the average European, and often even with well-informed persons, the study of the phenomena of the Russian Revolution in their detail and logical connection is replaced by empty analogies with the Girondins, the Jacobins, the Dantons, the Marats, Thermidors and Brumaires.

If we are really to seek for historical parallels and analogies for the Russian Revolution, we shall sooner find them in the German of 1918. For instance, often very liberal Russian "historians" and many writers and public men among our former allies are to this day indignant at the appearance of soviets on the first day of the

³ The historical accuracy of this view would seem more than open to question. As far as the leaders of the public were concerned, it would, we think, be largely true if the initiative of the Revolution had at all been in their hands; but surely the outbreak was entirely without leadership and resulted from a grave shortage of food, the firing of the police on an unarmed crowd, and the consequent indignation of a colossal garrison of troops still in training for the front.—Ed.

Revolution, at the formation of soviets among the soldiers in the army, the interference of these "revolutionary mobs" of workers and soldiers in the administrative and legislative work of the "weak and will-less" government. Such reflections, which are still to be heard now after fifteen years, are simply ridiculous, since the German Revolution has passed before our eyes and we are even till now still watching its consequences. I repeat: the German Revolution broke out at the moment of the end of the war, when the Left extremists lost at once their chief weapon of propaganda, immediate peace at any cost. And yet the German Revolution on its road to the Weimar Constituent Assembly lived through a period of just such an absolute domination of the soviets, even with "People's Commissaries" at its head instead of democratic Ministers, as was never known from the first to the last day of its existence by our March Revolution.

Now we see, not in the ninth month (as with Bolshevism in our case), but in its fourteenth year, the German Revolution, shaken no longer by the war itself, but by its consequences, is subjected to an open attack of Bolsheviks of the Right (the Hitlerites) who, in the conditions of a country which has long since been at peace, are bringing into action all the Bolshevik methods of civil war, including the creation of their own army in proportions of which our Bolsheviks could never dream before November, 1917.

And the famous Kapp Putsch in 1920, both in its idea and in its execution, was extremely like the move of General Kornilov! Surely, if this Putsch had taken place while the war was still on, and instead of a little dummy officer had been openly headed by Ludendorff or Hindenburg, would it not have opened the door to the power of the Spartacists, as Kornilov did for Lenin and his followers? A parallel study of the opening phases of the Russian and German Revolutions could considerably facilitate for foreigners an understanding of the events of 1917 in Russia. But here, of course, I will not stay to dwell on it. I only think that it is long since time to cease to conceive of our March Revolution as outside time and place. It is time that we threw away all book theories of revolution built on a simple generalisation of historical precedents and considered it in its organic inseparability from the process of the transformation of all social and economic connections called forth by the world war and till this day reflected in the post-war history of all States.

If we take up this more international, world-wide point of view which greatly extends our outlook, we shall see that the exceptional

force of anti-democratic tendencies with which the March Revolution had to contend, was not at all a peculiarity of the national psychology of "uncivilised" Russia, but has become an extremely acute malady of the political consciousness of almost the whole of Europe. As we know, this psychosis of dictatorship, besides seizing on Poland, the Balkans, Italy and Spain, has poisoned with Hitlerism nearly one-half of civilised Germany and almost the whole of her university students. The well-known Spanish public man, Cambo, asserts in his interesting work on dictatorships that the spread since the war of various kinds of dictatorships in Europe coincides with the limits of agricultural countries, little industrialised, where horse transport is much more developed than steam transport. The example of Germany must introduce a very considerable amendment into Cambo's theory. It seems to me that the epidemic of dictatorship is the consequence of a fundamental change in the economic structure of certain countries. The process of military and economic tension and subsequent exhaustion has everywhere had a tendency to weaken the economic rôle of the middle classes. During war-time there took place everywhere a kind of polarisation of economic forces. As is known, even before the war the economic structure of Russia was distinguished by an extreme economic weakness of the middle classes, a weakness of economic development of that town middle class which serves as the foundation of the democratic system, as ballast keeping the balance of the ship of State. In Germany the middle classes, before the war very organised and economically powerful, have, as is known, since the war, and especially since the famous years of inflation, lost at least two-thirds of their influence on the economic and, therefore, on the political life of the State. It is just in this declassed middle bourgeoisie that Hitler now finds his chief support. Lenin, on the other hand, in the very heat of the war—and this was his trump card, which is not and will not be in the hands of Hitler—could penetrate the economic defences of the middle classes, quite devastated by three years of blockade, without resistance and turn them into an experimental station for Left extremism, both political and economic.

The struggle against dictatorship in the economic field is before everything the restoration of well-being, the raising of the standards of existence of the average mass man, who is the majority of the population and on whom alone a democratic order can rest. That, it may be mentioned, is why Stalin, defending party dictatorship from the consequences of the economic evolution of the Nep, was bound to explode that same Nep and in the form of

a Five Year Plan subject the whole country to compulsory pauperisation.

It goes without saying that a prolonged war, every day persistently further weakening any power of resistance in the rural and urban producing forces in Russia, did not give the Provisional Government the most effective weapon for combating the dictatorial and anti-democratic tendencies which attacked the March Revolution from both sides—from the Right the military dictatorship, and from the Left the proletariat.

After these few short excursions into the philosophy of history, which free me from setting down on these pages all the details of the historical background on which the State authority of the March Revolution had to function, I will try to set forth here the actual substance of the policy of the Provisional Government.

As we have seen, fate left to the decision of eleven persons—who, unexpectedly for themselves, became the holders of the sovereign power of a world empire which was also conducting the most difficult war in all its history—a three-fold task : (i) to re-establish from the bottom the destroyed machinery of State administration ; (ii) to continue the war ; and (iii) to bring to life the radical social and political reforms which had been called for by the collapse of the Monarchy.

One might assert, without fear of being refuted by history, that not one of the contemporary governments of the Great Powers had to face such crushing, or let me say such superhuman difficulties. Each of the above-named three tasks, if taken alone by itself, might have served to exhaust the programme of a most energetic and active Cabinet.

Let us bear in mind that during the war, in England, in France, and in Germany—States which retained in full their economic and administrative apparatus and were bound in time to introduce a series of social and political reforms—any political conflict, even any criticism of the government, was removed from any wide circulation, and the governments could assert quietly and authoritatively, like Clemenceau : “ It is only we who are directing the war.” Meanwhile, the Provisional Government was still also directing the war. It was doing so while engaged in an intense struggle with a whole hurricane of anarchy and also while realising with all possible energy—as was then said, “ by way of revolution ”—the age-long political and social aspirations of a people which had got tired of expecting any kind of useful reforms from the fallen régime.

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF 1917. 7

The question arises whether the organisers and workers in the first Cabinet of the Provisional Government gave themselves any full account of what awaited them and what an almost intolerable burden they had assumed when they accepted office on 15 March. I have already written in these pages, while explaining the causes of the fall of the Monarchy, of how the whole of politically-conscious Russia—beginning with the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief (the Emperor Nicholas II), and the President of the Imperial Duma, and going down to the average member of a zemstvo or town council—how all Russia was clearly aware that Rasputin and his fellow-workers were leading Russia to a catastrophe and to a separate peace. It is usually said that all political prophecies, especially of coming calamities, are not realised. In December 1916, Prince Lvov, the future head of the Provisional Government, and at that time the generally recognised leader of the town and county councils of Russia, wrote, while summing up the common mood of the whole country, some unforgettable words which have once more proved that historical forecasts and political prophecies are quite possible: "No matter if later misfortune shall drown our country, no matter if great Russia is to become a tributary of the Germans, so long as they (he alluded to the group of Protopopov and Vyrubova) preserve their personal property. . . . By breaking the unity of the nation and sowing faction, they are constantly preparing the soil for a disgraceful peace. And so we must now say to them: 'You are the worst enemies of Russia and of the throne; you have brought us to the ruin which is now facing the Russian people.'" And Prince Lvov ends: "What are we to do? We must take account of our strength and of our duty to the country *at the mortal hour of its existence.*"

At the mortal hour of the existence of Russia, on the eve of ruin, in expectation of a disgraceful peace, Prince Lvov and his fellow-thinkers in the winter of 1916, trying to avert an outburst of anarchy or revolution, urged the Imperial Duma to fight for full control of power and demanded the removal of influences on the Emperor from the all-powerful but quite irresponsible group of fanatics and adventurers who had conquered the will of the unhappy sick Empress. They even aimed at a palace revolution to save the country from chaos, but—they were too late.

What took place was the break up not only of the Monarchy, but of the State itself. By now the mortal hour had come. It was already impossible to avert the ruin. It was only possible to try to arrest it. Every member of the Provisional Government was

fully and clearly conscious of the double task which had fallen on its shoulders, the revolution and the war.

Theoretically, of course, it cannot be disputed that war and revolution are incompatible, that they are exclusive of each other. However, practically the Provisional Government did not and could not have any choice between the war and the revolution; for the revolution itself, with the very miracle to be achieved of transforming an anarchical explosion into an organised State movement, had been created by a high enthusiasm of patriotism which flatly refused any thought of the possibility of a separate peace.

Here I would like to dwell on a mistake generally accepted in Europe when criticising the March Revolution from the point of view of the military interests of Russia's other allies at the time. When comparing the externally good position at the Russian front in the last winter before the fall of the Monarchy with the rapid fall of the military efficiency of our army at the beginning of the Revolution, historians and writers of memoirs among our late allies apparently arrive at a faultless conclusion: the March Revolution, destroying the efficiency of the Russian army, spoilt the strategic plan of the allies and prolonged the war for an extra year.

As a matter of fact, by preventing an inevitable separate exit of Russia (though against the personal will of Nicholas II) from the war of the coalition in the spring of 1917, the March Revolution made the victory of the Central Powers impossible, though perhaps at the price of a certain prolongation of military operations, let us say, even for a year.⁴ Such a result of the March Revolution was not a mere chance, but was the result of the military policy of the Provisional Government which, it may be mentioned, in this, as in all its actions, simply carried out the will of the country.

The whole military policy of the Provisional Government fell, of course, into two parts: the purely military and strategical on one side, and international war policy on the other. This policy might in general be summed up as follows: to carry out the military and strategical tasks which corresponded to the measure of ability of the weakened front, and by diplomatic action to bring nearer as speedily as possible the conclusion of a general peace.

What was our strategical task? Both Russian and allied military experts, concentrating their attention on what were, of course, quite

⁴ In this connection may be quoted a remark of the British Ambassador Sir George Buchanan, during this period: "I think if we can help to keep them in line till the autumn, some day they will be grateful to us at home." And Hindenburg writes in a similar connection in *Out of My Life*, p. 271: "Once more, we were robbed of the brightest prospect of victory."—ED.

indefensible and cruel deficiencies in the organisation and leadership of the army after the Revolution, to this day write almost exclusively of the break-up, of the excesses of the soldiers against their officers, of the growing desertion up to the summer of 1917, of the "failure of a foolishly undertaken offensive," etc. It has often been said that the judgments of specialists are partial and one-sided. This, of course, is applicable also to military experts, and it would be ridiculous to condemn the professional character of their opinions and estimates. The very severest professional criticism of the state of the Russian army after the fall of the Monarchy is, of course, just. But that does not yet mean anything at all from the point of view of State policy or even of strategy.

What was the task of the Russian army in the campaign of 1917? Did it consist in offensive operations to reach Constantinople, Budapest or Berlin? Clearly, no. These territorial objectives, which had proved to be unreachable for the Russian army in the course of the whole war up to the Revolution, could not become attainable after the catastrophe through which the army had passed. The strategical task which the Provisional Government set itself was more modest, but, on the other hand, it corresponded to the forces available, namely, by restoring as far as possible the efficiency of the army, to retain on the Russian front till the conclusion of the campaign of 1917 the largest possible number of enemy troops. This strategical task would, in the first place, deprive General Ludendorff of the possibility of freely manœuvring on the Western Front, that of our allies, and, secondly, it deferred the decisive conflict between the forces of the two coalitions to the spring of 1918. It made it possible for the United States actually to enter the war and give our allies on the Western Front that help which proved decisive.

It is with a feeling of great satisfaction that every member of the Provisional Government can say: "The strategical task which was the object of all the military policy of the Government of the March Revolution was realised in full." More than that, in view of the moral effects of the Russian Revolution on the Slav and even on the Turkish troops of the coalition of the Central Powers, the German High Command had to throw these troops over to the Western Front and fill the gap on ours with German troops in larger quantities than had ever been the case up to March 1917. The greatest number of German divisions throughout the war was concentrated on the Russian front during the summer of 1917. The German High Command began transferring back its divisions on to the Western Front only from the end of September, when on our front

the disintegrating psychological effects on our army of the conspiracy of General Kornilov against the Provisional Government had sufficiently declared themselves.

I must here observe that that tendency to dictatorship of which I have written above, infected during the war persons who would have seemed to have been fully guaranteed against this psychosis. I quite understand the personal, human, most torturing experiences on the front, which urged Russian commanders and the officers generally into an unfortunate adventure which was hopeless from the first. But for myself even till now remain quite inexplicable the motives which induced some of the military representatives of our principal allies, both in Petersburg and at headquarters, to give active support to the general movement against that government which was directing operations important for our allies at the front. Surely by supporting the conspiracy these foreign representatives promoted a new break of discipline in the army, exactly at the time when that army was successfully completing the execution of its principal strategical task. Even if we must admit that the failure of the March Revolution heavily compromised the military position of the allies, part of the responsibility for that failure must fairly be accepted by some of their official representatives.

Now, considering the diplomatic side of the military policy of the Provisional Government, we shall see that the task which we set ourselves, namely, the earliest conclusion of a general peace, was almost attained, and the war would not have dragged on to November 1918 if the unfortunate attempt to establish the dictatorship of General Kornilov had not opened the door to the dictatorship of Lenin.

Perhaps the unfavourable attitude towards the Provisional Government of some extremely important foreign circles of our then allies is to be explained by those new objects of the war which Russia set herself after the March Revolution, and which were only too foreign to the psychology of the time in France and England, at least for official France and England. The formula of a democratic peace, which was later developed in the famous Fourteen Points of the declaration of President Wilson, but was then for the first time proclaimed in a condensed form in the April declaration of the Provisional Government, seemed to many in the west inadmissibly doctrinaire at the time of the war and revolution and almost as criminally Germanophil.

In its solemn manifesto on the objects of the war the Provisional Government declared that, defending its frontiers, the free and

democratic Russian people did not want to seize foreign territory, would not impose contributions on its enemies, and aimed at the quickest possible general and just peace on the basis of the self-determination of peoples.

Now, in 1932, for English public opinion which so clearly understands all the imperfections of the Treaty of Versailles, it is difficult to imagine with what keen apprehension and often unconcealed irritation diplomatists in 1917 received our formula of a "democratic peace." However, for the Provisional Government the formulating of new and extremely democratic war aims was not only a demand of "revolutionary idealism," but even a practical necessity; the renunciation of "imperialist war aims," the declaration of defence of one's own country as the only cause for the continuation of military operations, was the obligatory first psychological condition of restoring the efficiency of the front.

Besides that, the new war diplomacy of the Provisional Government, resting on these new war aims, made it possible to prepare the exit from the war of some of the allies of Germany, particularly Bulgaria and Turkey. I have already mentioned the psychological effect which the March Revolution had on the Slavonic troops and partly on the Turkish (in consequence of the renunciation of Constantinople) in the armies of the coalition of the Central Powers. A similar favourable effect for us and our allies the March Revolution produced also on the civil population of the Slav parts of Austria, of Bulgaria and of Turkey. Therefore it is not surprising that the result of the ardent work of our Foreign Minister, M. I. Tereshchenko, together with the diplomatic representatives of the United States, which were not at war with Bulgaria and Turkey, was that both these States were quite ready to go out of the war even without the agreement of Berlin and Vienna. They were preparing to go out about November 1917. It will be understood of itself what really decisive importance would have resulted from the opening in war-time of the Dardanelles for Russia and for her allies. Now—and the whole world now knows what the Provisional Government knew then, alas! on the eve of Lenin's rising of 7 November—the world now knows, that Vienna just before the Bolshevik Revolution had definitely decided to conclude peace, even a separate peace, at whatever cost.

Thus, the new international war policy of Russia after the fall of the Monarchy was adapted to the circumstances and at any rate fully carried out the first requisites of a war-time diplomacy; it

contributed to the success of the war, it brought its end nearer, and it did not weaken the efficiency of our own front.

I do not in the slightest doubt that the real history which will be written when the passions of contemporary political strife sink down and die with us—that this history will make the following conclusions: the world war would not have lasted so long if the natural post-revolution internal process of restoring the ties of State and of society in Russia had not been interrupted by a premature attempt to establish a personal dictatorship by civil war.

To prevent a civil war was the whole object of the internal policy of the Provisional Government.

As I have written above, after the collapse of the Monarchy the Provisional Government was bound in conditions of war (i) to restore, that is, from top to bottom, the administrative apparatus of the State, and (ii) to fix the foundations of a new State and social order. Two conditions, independent of any human will, excluded the application, for the attainment of the two above-named objects of internal policy, of a dictatorial or, as they liked to say at that time, of a "strong" government. First of all, for a "strong" government, in the dictatorial sense of the word, that is, for a government which did not direct and govern, but commanded and punished, it was first necessary to have in one's hands a highly-organised and accurately functioning administration and police. Such a machinery, or even the most distant suggestion of it, the Provisional Government after the collapse of the Monarchy did not possess at all. It had to be created anew with the greatest difficulties and imperfections. But till it was established, the Government had to replace police compulsion by moral conviction. We see that later on Lenin, too, for his counter-revolutionary *coup d'état*, utilised the military and administrative apparatus established by the Provisional Government, planting everywhere, among the troops, in government institutions, in the soviets, and in the town councils, his militant cells.

The second condition which decided the internal policy of the Provisional Government was the war, which by its very nature not only in Russia, which had been so extremely weakened, but even in all the other States at war demanded the very closest and most real national unity. Such a sacred alliance of all parties and classes finally created for the needs of the war a government which by external signs was all-powerful, a kind of dictatorial government, or even a quasi-dictatorship "of a strong personality." The first of

these we saw in England at the time of the War Cabinet with Lloyd George, the second in France with Clemenceau.

Finally, at the front itself there was not only a mass of more than ten million soldiers highly agitated, recognising a certain authority only of the Left socialist parties. At the front there were also thousands of officers whose efficiency it was also necessary to maintain in conditions which were for them peculiarly tragical. The enormous majority of the officers, especially of the regular officers, and especially in the Higher Command, in the main recognised the political authority of the bourgeois parties. Of these parties, that of the Cadets or Constitutional Democrats, led by Professor Milyukov, was in a kind of monopoly. This party, which up to the fall of the Monarchy had represented the liberal-radical wing of the bourgeois opposition, at the time of the March Revolution, with the disappearance of the conservative parties from the open political stage, covered the whole Right political sector.

All that has just been said fixed, I will repeat, the main lines of all the internal policy of the Provisional Government, which did not change throughout the whole time of its existence, in spite of frequent alterations in its composition. The main line of our internal policy consisted in a continuous attempt to unite all the live creative forces of the country in order (i) to re-establish the functioning of the State apparatus, (ii) to create the bases of a new post-revolutionary political and social order, and (iii) to continue the defence of the country. The only way of opposing the forces of disruption which were driving the country into the chaos of civil war, was to draw into responsible government work the leading representatives of all political parties without exception, whether bourgeois or socialist, which recognised the new order and the supreme authority of the Constituent Assembly, which had to be summoned, even in spite of the war, at the earliest possible date.

It must be said that the sudden crash of the Monarchy came about so unexpectedly for the socialist parties that their leaders did not at once understand their own rôle in the new political conditions when suddenly the masses of the people—workers, peasants and soldiers—obtained an overwhelming weight in the life of the State. In the first days of the Revolution it seemed to the leaders of the Left parties that henceforward the deciding rôle in the administration of the State had passed into the hands of the Liberals and that the socialist parties ought to help the government, though not participating in it, in so far as it did not act to the disprofit of the interests of the working classes. However strange it may seem, the

cause of the so-called dualism of government and soviets in the first two months of the March Revolution was exactly this failure of the socialist parties to appreciate their importance and the part that they would have to play after the Revolution. Conscientiously executing the part of a kind of responsible opposition to the government, the soviets never measured their own pressure by the weakness of resistance both of the broken administrative machinery and of the bourgeois classes, crushed by the weight of the fall of the Monarchy.

In spite of a generally-held opinion, it is precisely the strictly bourgeois original composition of the Provisional Government—where, out of eleven Ministers, I was the only representative of the non-bourgeois democracy—that was in office in the period of the greatest “weakness of authority” of that government. But besides that—and here again we have a paradox—it was just this Cabinet that carried out “by way of revolution” all the programme of those radical political and social reforms for which afterwards, at the time of the psychological preparation of General Kornilov’s *coup d’état*, the blame was thrown on Kerensky and his “having finally fallen under the power of the soviets.”

As a matter of fact, it was just this first “capitalist” Cabinet of the Provisional Government which, besides a number of decrees on freedom of speech, assembly, inviolability of person, etc., worked out the great agrarian reform (the abolition of non-labouring land tenure and landed property), prepared the law on self-government of county and town councils on the basis of proportional, universal suffrage without distinction of sex, introduced workers’ control into factories and workshops, gave wide powers to workers’ trade unions, introduced the eight-hour working day in all government works, laid down the principles of co-operative legislation, gave soldiers all rights of citizens apart from their service in the ranks, laid down the principle of the transformation of the Empire into a federation of free peoples, drew up the principles of the electoral law for the Constituent Assembly, etc. And all this vast legislative work, which transformed the whole political and social system of Russia, the Provisional Government carried out without any pressure “from the soviet democracy.” Of its own free will it realised, with great enthusiasm and full class-abnegation, the social and political ideas of the whole Russian liberation movement, liberal and revolutionary, which had had the services of many generations from the time of Novikov and Radishchev.

To tell the truth, the legislative work by way of decrees was the

easiest of all for us. The hardest was the administration in the narrow sense of the word, government work which in the chaos of the revolutionary explosion demanded an extremely strong administrative and police apparatus, which it was still necessary to create. We had to create the technical machinery, and we had to establish the authority of the government. For this last task, the government had to possess the confidence of those new strata of the population which, up to the Revolution, were only an object and not a subject of power. The whole administrative apparatus was also restored in the first two months of the revolution, but more on paper than in reality. For the new government did not know how to give orders and the population did not wish to submit, often demanding for the dispositions of the government confirmation from this or that soviet.

Thus, not only the conditions of war, but also the public mood, shaken by the Revolution, demanded the presence in the Provisional Government of representatives of all parties. After some resistance, both from the Petersburg leaders of soviets and from an insignificant minority in the Provisional Government which believed in illusions of the hegemony of the bourgeoisie, and after a brief convulsion of street fighting, representatives of the soviets and socialist parties entered the government. From the middle of May and right up to the Bolshevik counter-revolution, the Provisional Government throughout remained the government of a bourgeois-socialist coalition, including representatives of all those parties which, accepting the revolution that had taken place as final, refused all forms of dictatorship, whether personal, party, or class.

A policy of national union, of softening of class antagonisms, of averting civil war, which was always possible in the first months of the Revolution, of course, excluded all that struck the chord of the need of a "strong authority." A policy of co-operation in the administration of the State by many parties with the most various programmes is, of course, as is well known in Europe, a policy of compromise. But a policy of compromise, a policy of agreements and mutual concessions, is for a government the most difficult and unpopular, for parties the most unpleasant and irritating for the self-esteem of committees, and for the country, or more properly for the wide masses of the population not always clear and intelligible.

It may be said that war conditions fixed for Russia after the Revolution a system of the formation of government, the coalition system, which is the most difficult of all. We know that even in time of peace in countries with a prolonged experience of parliamentarism, coalitions in the government delay and complicate the

government work and soon alienate public opinion. The leading members of the Provisional Government who remained in it to the end—and there were only two such—very clearly saw the objectionable sides of coalition in the government in a period of revolution; but, apart from civil war and an immediate separate peace, we had no choice whatever.

Usually the history of the March Revolution is told as a continually growing collapse at the front and a continually increasing anarchy in the country. In actual fact the history of this Revolution represents a curve of slow rise and, later, sharp fall—after the revolt of General Kornilov.

Of the essence of the war policy of the Provisional Government which rested on a coalition, I have already spoken. The essence of its internal policy was not so clear, but just as definite. This is most indisputably confirmed by the actual attempt, by way of a *coup d'état*, to replace the coalition authority of the Provisional Government by the personal dictatorship of a general. As we know, this attempt took place only after the Provisional Government had suppressed the July rising of the Bolsheviks. The summer months which preceded the movement of Kornilov were the time of the greatest fall of Bolshevik influence, in the soviets, in the factories, and at the front. At the front the commanders, together with the commissaries of the War Minister, from the time of the July offensive were able to employ disciplinary measures, including the application of military force, that is, including shooting. The authority of the commanders, which had fallen after the collapse of the Monarchy almost to nil, towards the middle of the summer had been sufficiently re-established for the chiefs of the military conspiracy to feel assured that the troops would execute their orders and that the breaking up of the soviets and the overthrow of the Provisional Government would not call forth any serious mutiny in the ranks of the army. As we know, these calculations proved to be extremely exaggerated; the attempted revolt of generals again smashed all discipline in the army and killed the authority not only of the High Command, but of the Provisional Government itself. But these consequences of their "patriotic exploit," which the reckless generals had not foreseen, in no way weaken my assertion: it was only when they again felt a certain authority in their hands that the adherents of a personal dictatorship at the head of the army and among the liberal and conservative politicians, decided on their unhappy adventure. And we know it was just the same in Germany. The famous attempt of Kapp and Ludendorff to repeat in 1920 Kornilov's march of

1917 also took place only after the German democracy had conquered anarchy on the Left, suppressed the Spartacists, and re-established the military and administrative machinery of the State.

But apart from a proof drawn from the other side, namely, from the attempt at a military pronunciamiento, there are also positive evidences of the correctness of the coalition policy of the Provisional Government. The anarchy which broke out in March at the works and factories and reached the greatest excesses, gradually towards autumn died down, to break out again with new force only before the actual *coup d'état* of the Bolsheviks. In the country districts the number of acts of violence of the peasants on the lands of the squires was falling. Transport was being re-established. The food position of the towns was improving. The town and country self-government was reviving. Towards the end of August, in most of the towns there were already at work town councils elected by universal suffrage. Country self-government was being restored, though more slowly than in the towns. The organs of local self-government based on universal suffrage were weakening the authority of the soviets and diminishing their part in the local life. *Izvestia* itself, then the central organ of the Congress of the Soviets (which were not yet Bolshevik) wrote on 25 October : " The Soviets of soldiers' and workmen's deputies as a whole organisation of proportions all-Russian as to the ground covered and all-democratic as to their social composition, are passing through an evident crisis. The department of the central executive committee for other towns, at the time of the highest development of soviet organisation, reckoned 800 local soviets. Many of them no longer exist, still more exist only on paper. The net of soviet organisation has in many places been broken, in others it has weakened and in others again it has begun to decay. The soviets were an excellent organisation for the fight with the old régime, but they are quite incapable of taking on themselves the building up of a new régime ; they have no specialists, no experience, no understanding of business, and, finally, even no organisation."

The summons of the Constituent Assembly, fixed for the month of November, would finally have reduced to nothing the part of the soviets in the history of post-revolutionary Russia. The watchword of the Bolshevik counter-revolution, " All power to the Soviets," already in October appeared simply a demagogic cover for the dictatorial plans of Lenin.

I will not here enter into a consideration of the economic and financial policy of the Provisional Government. At a time of war,

and even in conditions of blockade, with profound social changes going on in the country itself, everything in this domain had a temporary and conditional character. But even then there was already felt an immediate need of a better planned direction of the whole economic life of the country, for which there was created by us a Higher Council of National Economy, such as after the war also sprang up in Germany and later in other countries, too.

In general, all that I have written on the policy of the Provisional Government, in the first place is far from exhausting the whole subject and, secondly, in no way pursues any objects of self-defence or self-justification. Up to this time I still do not see by what other road than that of co-operation of the whole nation it was possible to try to save Russia from civil war and a separate peace "at the mortal hour of her existence," to quote once more the prophetic phrase of Prince Lvov. Even now it seems to me that the main lines of military and internal policy of the Provisional Government were correctly traced. I entirely agree that in the weakness of our personal strength and ability, we were not able to carry out this policy properly. But then, the realisation of our government programme was interrupted by those who for some reason thought that they would know better than the Provisional Government how to govern Russia. Meanwhile, at the time when the government of the March Revolution began to be attacked from the Right in the name of dictatorship, there were absolutely no objective data for reckoning the cause of the saving of Russia and the re-establishment of her internal strength as lost. We must further bear in mind that, as opposed to dictatorships of any kind, the Provisional Government did not devise its policy out of its own head, but for the whole time of its existence accurately expressed resolutions freely adopted by all parties, except the Bolsheviks, that had any weight at all in the country.

In the course of its existence of eight months, the Provisional Government lived through four Cabinet crises. Each time, all the members of the Government, without exception, declared their agreement or even their wish to leave the Cabinet, if this was desired by the parties that entered into the coalition. I personally, the member most responsible for the work of the Provisional Government, resigned, both before Kornilov's attempt at a *coup d'état* and before the November counter-revolution. Each time I proposed to those persons and parties which considered themselves as having a better claim than ourselves to the government of the State, openly to take on themselves the responsibility for the future of the country

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF 1917. 19

and, according to their discretion, to form a Cabinet. Neither the politicians responsible for the tragic escapade of General Kornilov nor the adherents of a Bolshevik dictatorship decided to respond to this. They knew that all the organised and quite free public opinion of Russia was against any kind of dictatorship, against changes of the system of government till the summons of the Constituent Assembly. Only by way of conspiracy, only by way of a treacherous armed struggle was it possible to break up the Provisional Government and stop the establishment of a democratic system in Russia after the Revolution. However, apart from the path chosen by the Provisional Government, no one had any other road but the terrible road of civil war.

In October 1917, the adherents of a personal dictatorship of some or other General, after their own disaster, impatiently awaited the overthrow of the Provisional Government by Lenin. "Let the Bolsheviks only finish with them, and then we in three weeks will establish a powerful national authority." Instead of three weeks, we have the third "five years" of the dictatorship of the Bolsheviks. The experience of the Bolshevik dictatorship has lasted infinitely longer than all the dictatorships of gallant admirals and generals, whether in Siberia or in South Russia. But in both places the result for Russia was just the same.

What are we to conclude from this? It is only by establishing a national government, only by making the government subject to the free will of the people, only by returning to the fundamental ideas of the March Revolution, that Russia will issue from her ruin, will recover internal peace, and will become a source of peace for the whole world.

ALEXANDER KERENSKY.

A RUSSIAN VIEW OF MANCHURIA

Mr. S. V. Vostrotin, a prominent business man and member for Siberia in the Russian Duma, has lived till recently in Harbin, and gives here the view of many of the Russian emigrants in Manchuria on present-day questions there. We are glad to give publicity to this view, but we may remind our readers that the Editors are only responsible for the views expressed in unsigned articles.—ED.

THE Far East has for the last year attracted the attention of the whole world. During this time, on Chinese territory in Manchuria, a number of events have taken place of which the immediate result is the appearance of a new State, Man-chou Kuo. The international position in the Far East was always extremely complicated, and now it threatens to produce events of the highest importance, whose dimensions and consequences cannot be estimated.

In Manchuria there converge the most diverse national interests, in the first place those of China, Japan and Russia. Up to the building of the Chinese Eastern Railway thirty years ago, it was not only *terra incognita*, but was even regarded as a forbidden country for any kind of colonisation, even Chinese, which was prohibited for many generations by the Manchu dynasty reigning in China. The whole population at that time hardly exceeded five million, who for the most part had settled in the southern part. The extent of Manchuria is equivalent to France plus Italy, and is three times the territory of Japan. Administratively it was divided into three eastern provinces, Tsitsihar or Hei Lung Kiang, Kirin, and Mukden or Liao Ning.

By the Treaty of Shimonoseki, in April, 1895, Japan was to have permanent possession of the whole peninsula of Liao-Tung, with Port Arthur and Talienwan (later called Dalny or Dairen). But in May of the same year, under pressure from Russia, Germany and France, Japan was compelled to give this up. These events coincided with the building by Russia of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was to unite Russia and Siberia with the Pacific. This project was of enormous importance; for not only did it bring Siberia, with its immeasurable sleeping riches into the world economy, but with the laying of the last pair of rails on the shores of the Pacific, it represented the completion of the last link in a belt of steel girding the whole earth. The Siberian main line at once became an enterprise of enormous international importance. In the time limit of

ten to twelve days, the Far East was united with the extreme West by uninterrupted railway communication.

Even the most cursory glance at the map, which shows in the Russian frontier a great bend to the north along the Amur, will make it quite clear that the constructors of the line were bound to think of taking it through Northern Manchuria, at that time an almost wild and desolate country which served as a place of banishment for Chinese criminals. Thus, when the *de facto* ruler of China, Li Hung-chang, came in 1896 to the coronation of Nicholas II, the Russian Minister, Witte, negotiated successfully with him for a railway concession. The Chinese statesman saw that this would attract numberless Chinese cultivators and would turn a wilderness into a flourishing province.

Witte had no thought at all of any kind of aggression on Chinese territory, to which he was throughout steadily opposed. The Chinese Government was only asked to consent to the alienation of a narrow zone necessary for the maintenance of the railway. But later, under the influence of a handful of irresponsible adventurers, Bezobrazov, Abaza, and others, who exploited the Tsar's interest in the Far East, Russia passed to a risky policy of imperialism, and in 1897 China was forced to cede to her the Liao-Tung Peninsula, with Port Arthur and Talienwan, which Japan only two years previously had been compelled under pressure to restore to China, and was allowed to construct a branch railway southwards from the Trans-Siberian to Port Arthur. Russia's further efforts to acquire a dominating interest also in Korea and to obtain timber concessions on the Yalu, inevitably led to the Russo-Japanese War, which resulted in her losing Port Arthur, the Liao-Tung Peninsula and the branch railway linking these with the Trans-Siberian.

The section of the Trans-Siberian which runs through Northern Manchuria is known as the Chinese Eastern Railway, and is an essential link without which the Trans-Siberian loses all its world-importance. Its construction fully justified the hopes of Li Hung-chang and Witte, leading to a rapid economic growth of Siberia and a still more astonishing advance of Manchuria. Both countries were brought into the world exchange, and the volume of traffic in both directions, from the Far East to Western Europe and back, reached its culminating point at the height of the World War. Nowhere did it bring about greater alterations than in Manchuria. The land there suitable for agriculture covers as much as 25 per cent. of the whole and has the most fertile soil, and these conditions have attracted an enormous stream of colonisation from the

agricultural population of China, short of land and harassed by incessant civil war, to Manchuria, where after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War peace and order were maintained by detachments of civil militia and police. How rapid was this settlement is shown by the following figures. In 1907 the whole population of Manchuria was 16,778,000; in 1930 it was 29,180,000. We have to note an exceptional flow of emigrants from China to Manchuria since 1928, exceeding a million a year.

For the construction of the railway a special company was created and the alienated zone was put under its full control. The company was allowed to maintain its own police, militia, administration, justice, and a special system of town government. It was to work the railway for eighty years, after which the line was to pass without payment to the Chinese Government, which, however, had an option of purchasing it after thirty-six years.

The work of the company gradually developed. Trade and industry arose, and the town settlements along the line showed an astonishing development, especially Harbin, built on the site of an insignificant Chinese village, which in 1930 already numbered a population of 384,585 (Chinese, 309,253; Japanese and Koreans, 5,332; other nationalities, chiefly Russian, 70,000). Public order was maintained and the raids of the Hung-hu-tzū, formerly so devastating, became quite rare.

So things continued up to the fall of the Russian Empire. In the first years after this event, 1918-20, the prevailing feature in Manchuria was Allied intervention. In their declaration of 14 March, 1919, the Allied Powers announced that, inspired by a sincere desire to help the Russian people, they had decided to organise and restore the successful movement of transport on the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Siberian line. The policing of the line was entrusted to Allied military forces, which were to be withdrawn at the end of the foreign intervention. The Allies promised military help, a movable staff, materials, etc., such as should be required for improving the condition and efficiency of the line. According to their assurance, the plan of help which they introduced was to be carried out without violating any sovereign rights whatever of the Russian people and in the fullest collaboration with the Russian railway staff. For the execution of this plan were founded an Inter-Allied Council and a Technical Committee, at the head of which stood the well-known American engineer Stevens, the constructor of the Panama Canal. At the end of the declaration, signed by the representatives of China, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and

the United States, were the words : " We are convinced that the Russian people, recognising the vital necessity of the immediate restoration of movement on the railways, will accept with full confidence the friendly help offered by the Allies and will collaborate with the newly-created organisations in their efforts to improve the present state of things on the Chinese Eastern and Siberian Railways."

By the autumn of 1920 the intervention ceased and the Allies, with the exception of Japan, withdrew their forces from the limits of Siberia and the Far East ; but the Inter-Allied Council still continued to function, and Stevens, the head of the committee, continued to live in Harbin.

After the collapse of the government of Kolchak, the Chinese Government quickly, by unilateral decrees and acts of the President of the Chinese Republic, repealed one after another the agreements and treaties which had been concluded at various times between the Russian and Chinese Governments. The first step of Chinese aggression was the strike movement on the railway at the beginning of 1920, planned by arrangement between the Chinese authorities and the Russian Red Strike Committee. This purely political strike was directed by the Red organisations exclusively against the Russian administration and made it possible for the Chinese authorities to proceed to a systematic removal of the Russian control of the railway. The Russian military institutions were seized in March 1920 by Chinese military bands led by their officers on instructions from the highest Chinese authorities, and the Russian national flag was removed from the buildings. In September of the same year the Chinese Foreign Office proposed to the former Russian Minister in Peking that he should take on himself the initiative for terminating the work of the Russian mission and consulates. The liquidation of these and afterwards also of the Russian law courts in the alienated zone destroyed all Russian extra-territorial rights. All Russians became subject to the jurisdiction of Chinese law.

On 23 September, 1920, was published a decree of the President of the Chinese Republic on the cessation of Chinese recognition of the Russian mission and consulates ; and the former Ambassador, Prince Kudashev, in his communication of 24 September, 1920, to the Chinese Foreign Minister, expressed the hope that, as regarded Russian citizens, who remained without any official protection, the Chinese Government would see to the careful execution of the order of the President, contained in his decree, as to taking " active steps

for the protection of peaceful Russian citizens and their rights of person and property." At the end of his note, Prince Kudashev enumerated all the violations of Russo-Chinese treaties which had been allowed for the past three years up to the moment of his departure by unilateral acts of the Chinese Government and decrees of the President. On more than one occasion the sense and spirit of the regulations of the contract of 1896 for the construction of the railway had been broken; and on 2 October, 1920, the Chinese Government had concluded a supplementary agreement with representatives of the Russo-Asiatic Bank, as shareholders of the Chinese Eastern Railway, on a joint administration of the railway, which in no degree answered to the spirit of the original treaty of 1896. Chinese elements were systematically introduced into the Government administration and various branches of service in disregard of all limitations in the original treaty, the statutes of the company, and even the last supplementary agreement.

In this period of pressure and aggression from China, none of the allied States came to the defence of Russian rights or gave support to the Russian administration. The Inter-Allied Council continued to remain an indifferent spectator, though the fact of the existence of international organs showed that the Powers which had taken part in their creation regarded the Chinese Eastern Railway as an enterprise of international significance.

Great hopes were placed in the Washington Conference of 1922. Preparations were made for it both by the various State institutions which had arisen in the Far East, and by the political and social groups and trade organisations beyond the Russian frontier, whether in Western Europe or on Chinese or Japanese territory. By sending delegates and memoranda, they hoped and believed that they would succeed in influencing the decisions of the Conference in the interests of a national Russia. These hopes received special encouragement in the declaration of President Harding that "questions relating to Russia would be considered with exactly as much justice as if Russia had her own delegates at this Conference." The common *motif* of all these delegations, memoranda, protests, etc., was an appeal to the Allies not only to prevent any exploitation of the temporary weakness of Russia, but completely to maintain the principle of the inviolability of treaties founded on bilateral agreements, in the name of international law and justice. The Chinese Eastern Railway should remain as heretofore a free Russian road connecting Russia with the Pacific. Russians at Harbin already saw the persistent tendency of China to seize the railway, which

would lead to a break in the Siberian main line and would inevitably cause disorder and chaos on it, as troubles with the Hung-hu-tzū were in China a common phenomenon. They would wreck the line and private trade, and they could not possibly be held at bay by the Chinese guard and police.

Any kind of transference, even temporary, of the Russian line to whatever outside foreign hands, the Russian public in the Far East regarded as extremely dangerous and undesirable, and therefore found that the best way out would be to continue the internationalisation or neutralisation of the line as it had been during the intervention in Siberia of the Inter-Allied Powers, which regarded the Chinese Eastern Railway as a Russian enterprise. As a matter of course, this internationalisation would have to be accompanied by a definite guarantee and declaration, as was done when the allied Powers entered Siberian territory. Only the Allies could organise an efficient guard of the railway, improve the technical side and introduce principles of order into the life of the foreign and Russian population. Only with internationalisation could the Chinese Eastern Railway be guaranteed from seizure by one State or another and preserved as a national possession of Russia.

As far as is known, it was on these lines that the American engineer, Stevens, drafted a corresponding plan for the temporary internationalisation of the railway, after setting up a financial committee for technical help to the line. But this draft did not receive serious support, and the actual resolutions of the Washington Conference concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway were of the nature of a very vague compromise. The Washington Conference left everything as it was, by a special resolution assigning to China the duties and responsibilities of a kind of guardian of the railway.

The Chinese Government, even after the Washington Conference, continued to exploit this favourable position with a haste which was not justified by the nature of its preparations to meet the new responsibilities involved. It abolished the Russian organs of self-government in Harbin and along the line, which had been recognised and ratified by the foreign States. There was a continuation of the disorderly pressure on the railway, its finances, the personnel of the railway, private enterprise in trade and industry, on all that made up the nucleus of Russian activity in the Far East. To prove this we have only to give here some facts and figures taken from reports presented to the Washington Conference by official Russian institutions and the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The finances of the Russian line were heavily burdened with

expenditure of the general administration of China. The costs of running the railway, the village police, judicial and administrative institutions which the Chinese authorities had taken into their own hands were laid on the finances of the railway. In general, the expenses of the line for the upkeep of purely Chinese Government institutions and troops rapidly reached the enormous sum of 6½ million gold roubles a year and had a tendency to grow every year, while formerly these expenses had been covered out of the Russian State Treasury. In consequence of the extremely poor organisation of the policing of the railway by the Chinese there was a considerable growth in organised raids on the line, stations, trains and timber supply; the Hung-hu-tzū seized whole numbers of railway servants, demanding that the railway should pay their ransom. From 1 February to 1 September, 1921, only nine months in all, as is stated by an official memorandum presented to the Conference, there were recorded 126 such raids, of which 29 resulted in pillage, 14 in wounding of railway servants, 9 in murders of them, 18 in plunder of railway property, 8 in burning of bridges, 17 in extortions, and 6 in damage to the line. Thus the railway, apart from its direct expenses, had to carry large indirect extra costs in replacing the losses, ransoming captive employees, assisting the victims, etc

For guarding the timber concessions of the railway, private contractors were required by the Chinese Government to contribute a sum of some 100,000 roubles, with threats that in case of non-payment their contract would be given to others or they would be arrested, which happened several times. The position created for private property, especially Russian, became impossibly burdensome, and all who did not have long contracts tried to get rid of their business and leave Manchuria. But it was not only by material losses that blows were struck at the Russian population of the zone. The chronicle of the railway is full of conflicts between the lower employees, serving in difficult work in new and unaccustomed conditions of lawlessness, and Chinese soldiers who did not understand the language and the existing regulations. The intervention of the officers did not help, as the soldiers did not listen to them. All this meant that there was an absence of all respect for person, with constant insults, and inevitable hostility in Russo-Chinese relations.

If the Government had no great difficulty in annulling Russian rights, the position of the Chinese Eastern Railway, a commercial organisation mixed up with the interests of other Powers and put under the charge of China as moral guardian by the Washington

Conference, was the most difficult to deal with for the Chinese chauvinists. But in this respect the Moscow Commissariat of Foreign Affairs rendered it invaluable service, first by its declaration to the governments of the Northern and Southern Chinese Republics, in which the Soviet Government pledged itself to renounce all treaties concluded between former Russian Imperial governments and China and to return unconditionally and without compensation to permanent Chinese possession all rights, concessions and leased territories acquired by Russian capitalists or by Tsarist governments. The Chinese Government was not likely to hold out against such attractive and flattering assurances of permanent friendship, but all the same it did not risk accepting this gift, namely, the Chinese Eastern Railway in full possession. It limited itself to a half share in the railway, organising the administration and personnel exclusively on principles of parity for citizens of the U.S.S.R. and Chinese subjects in accordance with the treaties of Peking and Mukden of 1924 on the Chinese recognition of the Soviet Government.

On the coming of representatives of the Soviets to administer the railway, the opinions of the Russian population of the zone were at first divided. Some were ready to see in these representatives anyhow a Russian authority, which would raise the fallen prestige of the Russian name, defend it from insults and injuries and guard Russian institutions from further seizure. More far-sighted were those who asserted that what was coming was not a Russian government, but a government of the Third International, which would only pursue its own objects, namely, destructive propaganda. To the Soviet Government the railway was valuable only for its rails, by which it could penetrate deep into Manchuria and China in order to light the flame of world revolution at the other end of the world. In fact, it was soon clear that it had set itself two main tasks: to fight the Russian Whites on the railway and in China, and to conduct the widest possible propaganda of Communism everywhere in the East, wherever it seemed possible for the Red Soviet agents to penetrate.

By a special order of the new railway administration it was announced that all Russian railway servants who did not by a certain date accept citizenship either of U.S.S.R. or of China would be removed. The position of railway servants in Harbin and along the line became intolerable. All were put under inspection (there appeared worker correspondents, police bloodhounds, spies, and even members of the G.P.U.). Any of the former railway employees that had saved any money, not wishing to accept citizenship either

of the U.S.S.R. or of China, gave up their work, but the vast majority who had families and no savings accepted citizenship either of the one or of the other. The gaps in the service were made good from Soviet Russia by actual Communists and agents of the G P U. Even the heads of the administration were to a considerable extent replaced by persons who had had nothing to do with railway work and whose qualifications were exclusively confined to their revolutionary past. The result of all this was soon seen everywhere.

The first Soviet director of the railway, Ivanov, made himself famous by the stoppage of all movement along the line in 1926 at a most difficult moment for the Manchurian Governor Chang-Tso-lin, when Kuo Sung-ling, one of his brigadier-generals, attacked Mukden with the object of overthrowing his government. This attack had the support of the "Christian General" Fêng-Yü-hsiang, who had several times received important help in arms and money from the U.S.S.R. Ivanov stopped the movement on the line in order to hold up the transfer of reliable Chinese troops stationed in the zone. This was the first open blow from behind at Chang Tso-lin, and ended with the arrest of Ivanov. The attack was, in the end, suppressed, and Kuo Sung-ling and others who had taken part in it were executed. The searches and arrests which followed at the Soviet Embassy in Peking, the Consulate at Harbin, and the trade unions, gave abundant documentary proofs of corruptive work by the Bolsheviks, not only among the servants and workmen of the line, whether Russian or Chinese, but among the Chinese troops and population. Enormous sums from the revenue of the line were spent on propaganda in China. At last even the eyes of the Chinese authorities were opened to their serious danger from this partner to whom they were indebted for the free gift of a half-share in the railway and who had so strongly assured them of his permanent friendship. It must be assumed that they decided at the first opportunity to get rid of this partner and finally seize the whole railway. As they had received from their diplomatic representatives by no means accurate information, to the effect that the U.S.S.R. was weak and was passing through an internal crisis and not in a state to accept an armed conflict, and as they had met with opposition from the Soviet half of the administration in establishing complete parity as to railway servants and workmen on the line according to the treaties of 1924, the Chinese authorities, at the first new appearance of seditious work of Communists, sent them off under convoy to the U.S.S.R. frontier and handed them over there. This circumstance led, in 1929, to the first *de facto* war

between the U.S.S.R. and China, without declaration, which ended, as is known, unfavourably for China and with the return of the Soviet representatives to the administration of the line on the old conditions. This war lasted more than six months, during which time the work of the railway was entirely interrupted, and the line itself received serious damage, with great sufferings to the local population. The stopping of a sector of world communication which had connected Eastern Asia and Europe for so long a period had a very bad effect on trade and agriculture in Manchuria.

All these events had an unfavourable result on Russian affairs in Manchuria. Up to the Great War and the Revolution, Russian trade in Manchuria had flourished. Many goods of Russian industry were in great demand with the local population, were valued highly for their quality, and penetrated not only into Southern Manchuria and Mongolia, but into China. The Germans, in order to enter the markets of Northern Manchuria, counterfeited Russian goods, supplying them with Russian trade marks. There was an end not only of trade in articles of Russian industry, but almost entirely also of the local Russian industry created by twenty years of hard work of Russian business men. Till the transfer of power in Russia to the Soviets, the Russians predominated in Harbin and the zone in house-owning, banking, stock exchange, export, milling, timber works, machinery, distilling, soap, tallow, furs, the wheat market, and other fields. The most important branches of industry in Northern Manchuria are milling, timber, and oils (of soya beans), on which had been expended many millions of Russian money. In these last years all these enterprises collapsed or passed into foreign hands, Chinese or Japanese. Many private steamship companies on the Amur and the Sungari, which had reached proportions of many millions of roubles in their expenditure and turnover, with the establishment of the Bolshevik power in the Russian Far East, were compelled, in order to save themselves from confiscation, to transfer their work on to the Sungari in Chinese territory and to Harbin, and to work for a time in local communications only. With the publication of the decree of the Soviet Government prohibiting navigation of the Sungari under the Russian flag, the owners of Russian steamships had to sell their steamers at the lowest price to the Chinese and themselves go and work as captains and officers with the Chinese steamship companies. The steamers belonging to the Chinese Eastern Railway, which were valued at as much as 5,000,000 gold roubles, were nationalised by the Chinese Government without any kind of compensation.

It would be possible to make an endless list of wrecked Russian enterprises which either perished or passed into Chinese or Japanese hands. The big trading firms which formerly worked in the towns and villages along the line are, since the nationalisation of Russian industry in Russia, trading in foreign goods. As to the middle and small Russian trade, that has long since passed into Chinese hands or is transferring its operations to other towns less dangerous to trade, for instance, to the foreign concessions in Mukden, Tientsin, Tsingtao, and Shanghai. Such towns, which not long ago had a few hundreds of Russians, now have many thousands; in Shanghai the Russians are reckoned to be 15,000, a number which is constantly increasing. Meanwhile, whole streets in Harbin have passed to the Japanese or Chinese. The Chinese offer every opposition to Russians in selling their real property to any foreigners except Chinese.

Who, then, has replaced Russian trade and industry? Firstly, Chinese and Japanese with various foreigners, and recently Germans. In Northern Manchuria there are great export and import firms of many countries (British, American, French, Danish, German, Czechoslovak, etc.) which do a great deal of business in export, chiefly of soya beans, bean oil, oil cakes, wheat, oats, meat, wool, leather, raw material of all kinds, and import their own goods. The Gostorg of U.S.S.R. has begun to try to introduce into Manchuria the textile trust, the petrol trust and others, and sells its goods at a loss, to obtain credits. Of healthy Russian enterprises in Northern Manchuria there has still so far remained only the Chinese Eastern Railway, but it is working now like a simple cabman carrying produce and goods which chiefly belong not to Russian, but foreign merchants. In the last ten years, in spite of enormous expenditure on the Chinese police made by the railway, not only has there been no improvement whatever as to security of life, but things have even got worse. The raids of the Hung-hu-tzū are unchecked everywhere; robberies, murders, arson, the carrying away into captivity of numbers of Chinese and Russian citizens to be ransomed have become of common occurrence. Even in the big towns the Hung-hu-tzū, having connections with the local administration, have robbed the population with impunity, and side by side with this the Chinese authorities have continued to seize and appropriate not only Russian institutions of the railway, such as the educational or land departments, but also higher educational institutions created by private initiative, museums, hospitals of the Red Cross, etc. The inspirers of the extinction of Russian influence have to a considerable extent been the numerous Russian Com-

munists who have appeared along the line. As if opposed to all that was nationally Russian, they have instigated the Chinese intelligentsia and masses against the representatives of the Russian administration in various institutions, against the Russian priests, military, railway men, merchants, preferring to have to do with Chinese officials rather than with the Russian inhabitants of the country.

It will be seen in how difficult a position were placed those Russians who did not profess Communist ideas. They were all the time under heavy blows from the Chinese and the Soviets, between the anvil and the hammer. Manchuria was for the Bolsheviks so desirable a base for the spread of revolutionary views in a great Asiatic country, that for this sake they were ready to sacrifice the last remains of Russian influence. The Soviet administrators on their return to power on the railway after their conflict with China, set themselves to fill its ranks as quickly as possible with active workers of revolt and men in military service. According to the local Press, a whole Communist railway brigade was attached to various services on the line and in the central institutions of the railway, for which reason to secure vacancies there were merciless dismissals of even that portion of the old Russian employees which had all along shown loyalty to the Soviet Government.

Another result of the conflict was a further deterioration of the financial position of the railway. It has been explained that from the moment when a half-share in the line was ceded without compensation to China, the Soviet and Chinese Governments also began to share the receipts from the line. The latter drew money from the Treasury even when there was no revenue, compelling the railway to hold up payments on contracts and orders and to refuse payments to discharged employees, which completely ruined these unhappy people. As a result, all purchases for the needs of the railway were gradually curtailed, the contractors were compelled to stop work almost completely, and new constructions and repairs were cut short. The Soviets began supplying materials for the needs of the line from the U.S.S.R., with goods which were sold at the very lowest price, destroying the local market. Trade in Manchuria began to fall and, one after another, foreign businesses, export firms and offices began to close down, dismissing numerous Russian employees.

The bases of the former existence of the Russian population in Manchuria were the power of the Russian State, the work of the Russian railway, trade with Russia and local Russian trading

enterprises. All these bases of a sound economic foundation and their political support have vanished in these last years. The Russians have spent all their former means of existence; and the horror of Russian service on this foreign soil consists in the gradual rise in the numbers of the Russian population through the passage across the frontier of refugees from the Soviet paradise at the very time when the means of existence are vanishing. The almost fabulous cheapness of Chinese labour in Manchuria makes any kind of competition impossible. The conditions of work there are not the same as in Europe. The Russian population is threatened with complete ruin if these conditions are maintained in the future. As an addition to all these misfortunes the Russians have, in fact, been deprived of any free movement about the country through complicated formalities as to visas.

Thus, at the outset of the recent events in Manchuria, the once powerful Russian colony was represented by international Communist adventurers, bankrupt Russian enterprises and former railway employees who were wearing out the office steps in their applications for their plundered savings. As to the creation of the new State of Man-chou Kuo, the overwhelming mass argue as follows:—We Russians have nothing to fear from what is happening, because without it Russian interests are already condemned to ruin. Not indulging in any illusions or deceiving ourselves with unfounded hopes that any political forces will unselfishly do anything towards a restoration of Russian influence, in the endless distress of our position in this country we have nothing to fear from the work of organisation which is in progress and no need to be downhearted about it.

“On the contrary, if we watch carefully how this work is proceeding and the new State is being shaped, new perspectives may open for us too. Therefore, we must not lose any opportunity and must utilise anything to restore the economic and preserve the cultural basis of Russian influence in the country.” Thus speaks the report of a business committee on the economic rôle of Russians in Manchuria, which was read at Harbin on 24 March, 1932, at a meeting uniting representatives of numerous Russian social organisations to discuss the new conditions which are being created for the Russian emigration in connection with the formation of the new State with the help and support of Japan. In the opinion of the overwhelming majority in the Far East it is only neighbouring Japan who can restore and maintain peace and order in Manchuria. The new State, retaining the principle of the open door and of equal

possibilities, promises to level in rights all nationalities living in Manchuria, including the Russian.

These assurances of equal rights give new hopes to the Russians ; there has appeared a vigorous and optimistic tone in the resolutions and decisions of the emigrant mass. Thus it is permissible and not without interest to give here in short a few extracts from the wishes and decisions of the report mentioned above and to compare them with those of the same kind expressed in the memorandum of the national committee in Paris presented to the Washington Conference in 1922. "However hard our position, there is still much that we have," says the report, "a peaceful, industrious, steady Russian population of 150,000 in Manchuria, whose help can be of importance in forming the new State simply because it has a high level of culture. Through a number of causes the Russian population in Manchuria has formed an accumulation of trained men, consisting of persons who have received a considerable academic, technical or business preparation. Among them are many railway experts, technicians, doctors, lawyers, administrators and teachers. Many of them know the local languages. The experience which they had in their own home can be applied with great advantage to various branches of state, social and private work in the service of a country which does not possess a supply of trained cultural workers. Through their hostility to disturbances these Russian elements are the chief bulwark of order and calm. They can be very useful intermediaries for economic work in the mass of the local population. It is not by accident that foreign firms working in Manchuria often apply to Russian intermediaries in their relations with the population. Besides this, they are cheaper than foreigners and are often of great use ; many of them have preserved abundant connections with Chinese and Mongolian circles and show great understanding in maintaining relations with foreign peoples. Among them there are clever artisans, and industrious cultivators. Some have preserved real property and some kinds of industrial enterprises. All of them have had a common status in connection with the railway and experience in its working. Besides this, there is a background, the vast Russia, which is at present dangerous to humanity, but in the future will be necessary to all and powerful. And finally, we have belief in ourselves, hardened by experience, which has carried us through all the misfortunes of the heavy years of conflict and exile."

Thus calmly and firmly they wish to take part in the creation of the new State and to do all that is possible to maintain the historic interests of Russia in Manchuria. For the realisation of this hope

they see also what are the nearest possible measures, of which the chief are as follows : the settling of as large a number as possible of Russian cultivators on the land with the right to acquire it as property ; freedom for Russians of the right of service in state and social institutions on an equality with other nationalities ; equality of rights with others in the mining industry ; the right of land-ownership and house-ownership in the towns should be precisely defined and maintained ; the right of renting should be extended to the right of property ; the burdens of taxation for Russians should not be heavier than for other nationalities ; equal right to settle anywhere in the new State, to conduct trade or work in any branch of industry ; all former limitations of freedom of movement, such as visas within the State, should be abolished. All these measures of local significance can be granted and regulated on the lines of an attitude of good will on the part of the State toward the peoples inhabiting Manchuria, including the Russians, and this is already its declared policy. It goes without saying that the Russians do not dream of obtaining any superiority ; they aim simply at a just and useful co-operation in the country on the principles of strict equality with all the native and foreign population.

Among the local measures which have been enumerated stands in the first place, as always, the all-important question of the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway. It has been noted earlier how the Far Eastern Russian public regarded this question when it was brought before the Washington Conference in 1922. The best way out of all the evils which were then threatening the railway was considered to be its temporary internationalisation or neutralisation by the Allies, in the possibility of which the Russians at that time believed and laid their chief hopes. The same conviction prevails at the present time, but now without belief and hope that such an internationalisation can be realised.

All the same, the Russian Manchurian public continues to maintain that, " however complicated relations may be between the Manchurian and Soviet Governments, we shall firmly maintain our conviction that the agreements of Peking and Mukden with the Bolsheviks were a one-sided and illegal violation of the incontestable Russian rights to the railway, a thoughtless opening of the door to the organisation of disorder and riotous plots, and a robbery of the shareholders and other investors in the line, such as could not be allowed by any State which founded its system on private property. The treaty of 1896 must be restored in all its full force, with a temporary administration of the line, if necessary, by the authorities

of the Manchurian State." The Russians, who made the railway, must take part in its direction and service, as was the case at the time of the general Allied intervention. It is now clear to all that China has proved an untrustworthy guardian. She has shown her great interest in the property entrusted to her and her readiness to seize the line entirely. It would seem to be the duty of the nine Powers which took part in the Washington Conference to reconsider the question of the railway and take it under their own guardianship or give a mandate for its administration to one of the Powers taking part in the Conference or to a new State under the control of the rest until the restoration of a national government in Russia. The Chinese Eastern Railway will then have an exceptional importance. It will contribute to a rapid recovery of the economic life of Siberia and Russia. This railway is also valuable to any other State which might be able to get hold of it; but then it would cease to serve the interests of the Russian people.

From the time of John the Terrible, the Russian people has strained eastward. Over the tundras of Siberia, through the impassable virgin forest, over the innumerable mountain crests and rivers, the daring seekers of new land have pressed forward in an elemental stream to the unknown far ocean. The Russian people finally reached this ocean and made the shortest through road to it for the service of the world in general. The dream of many generations was realised. The Chinese Eastern Railway is the broad gateway, the key to the road from the Pacific to the innumerable and untouched riches of Siberia. The possession of these gates of Siberia in the hands of any other Power than Russia might act like a cork, destroying the balance of power on the Pacific and becoming the source of constant misunderstandings and great convulsions.

In its memorandum handed in to the Washington Conference ten years ago, the Russian National Committee in Paris wrote: "The extent of the territory of Siberia and the wide development which awaits it demand the possibility of free relations with the outside world. This is still more necessary because Russia will undoubtedly welcome the wide co-operation of its native industry with foreign capital and enterprise. These conditions equally demand a free outlet to the Pacific, which would serve as a natural prolongation and completion of the great Siberian railway. . . . One of the essential tasks before the Washington Conference is to create such conditions within the basin of the Pacific as would guarantee a peaceful and calm internal development of the countries on its shores and remove any occasion for friction, conflicts, mutual

interference and aggressions, secret or open, whether economic or territorial. Whatever may be the beneficent results of the Conference in this direction, its task will always remain incomplete if it decides contrary to the vital interests of Russia, which has so long been one of the great Pacific Powers."

The question of the fate of the Chinese Eastern Railway, wrongly and indefinitely settled at the Washington Conference ten years ago, has come up again with a new clearness and demands a careful consideration and settlement. We cannot but express the wish that the special delegation of the League of Nations under the presidency of Lord Lytton, which is examining the position created in Manchuria in connection with the Sino-Japanese conflict, will in its conclusions take also into account the weak voice of the Russian public in the Far East and in Europe, as to Russian interests in Manchuria and the international importance of the Chinese Eastern Railway, whose future is so closely bound up with the recovery of Siberia and Russia. The recovery of Russia will mean the consolidation of peace both in the Far East and in Europe. It will contribute in an exceptional degree to the economic recovery of the whole world. The co-operation of Russia, Japan, China, Manchuria, and other Powers will lead to the general prosperity of the East. Our Russian salvation will be the salvation of all.

S. VOSTROTIN.

THE TEST OF COMMUNIST ECONOMIC RESOURCE

IN every country masses of men are moving simultaneously, if not together, in the direction of securing for themselves what they consider will be a fairer share in the distribution of the material goods of life. Few people of intelligence have much doubt about their getting it. All will be glad, if in the days ahead the common man secures a better economic life and what goes with it. The concern of most serious men and women centres on how the result is to be attained.

For this generation and the next no economic fact has equal significance with these mass aspirations and strivings. Here is an area of life in which beyond question, in the language of General Smuts: "Civilisation has struck its tents and the caravan of humanity is on the march."

The leaders of Soviet Russia present an arresting front to the rest of the world in the robust confidence they display that their system, in this fifteenth year of the regime, offers a real lead to mankind in the direction of the coveted better social and economic order. Molotov, chairman of the Council of People's Commissaries, made this bold prediction last January to the 17th Party Conference in Moscow :—

The great success of Socialist construction, which is embodied in the successful realisation of the Five Year Plan and now in the first proposals of the second Five Year Plan, demonstrates to the workers and toilers of the whole world that the future belongs, not to the rule of the bourgeoisie, but to the dictatorship of the proletariat, that the facts speak against Capitalism and for Socialism.

Toward this far-reaching demonstration of the Communists, a changed and saner attitude has come to prevail. This is accentuated by the prevailing doldrums of Capitalism, the unemployment aspect of which, in the United States, according to an eminent economist,¹ "will destroy capitalist society" if it cannot be cured. During the first decade, the prospects of Soviet success could be flouted, as the project seemed so fallacious in theory and monstrous in execution that shortly it must fall of its own weaknesses and wickedness. Surely time would prove its fatal folly and vices. Who among us

¹ *Business Adrift*. Wallace Brett Dunham, Dean of the Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University.

holding that view has not found his position shaken as successes have followed in volume sufficient to give pause to the first hasty and sweeping conclusion?

To take a typical example of the rapidly changing attitude, the *New York Times*,² in reporting the monthly meeting of the Steel Founders' Society of America, printed this quotation from a high official of the Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company of Milwaukee :

Ours is a big part in this social upheaval, and woe to us if we do not play our part well. The present depression, with its widespread misery, has disclosed defects so vast as to impugn the claims of our capitalist theories, and it behoves us now more than ever before to change. Even Communism may have some features, hidden from our prejudiced grasp, worthy of emulation.

Many of the Soviet claims belong to the class of unsupported assertions. The burden of proof rests on whoever makes them. Certain of them can be brought under observation and measurement, although at this stage any findings must be recognised as tentative. No system as a whole or in part can be brought to judgment with finality after only fourteen years of operating experience. At present the first requisite is that inquirers should exercise honesty and intelligence when they try to ascertain in what respects the enterprise which the Communists have set on foot in Russia tends to commend itself by actual performance.

The achievement in acquiring means and quantity of production has the rest of the world gasping at the pace. The industries of Imperial Russia in the decade just prior to the World War were by no means static. Railroad mileage had increased 28·6 per cent., the output of iron and steel 80 per cent., of coal 96·5 per cent., of copper 277·6 per cent.³ The far more impressive and familiar figures, coming out of Communist Russia, do not need to be recounted. They are already in the record. Capital has been found, workers mobilised, power harnessed, mills multiplied, whole new cities of industry begun, the enthusiasm of several millions, at least, generated, prodigious labours performed. The result has been to raise Russia's level sharply, as regards the implementing of production. Her ranking still remains low as compared with older industrialised countries, but a further upward thrust will be given by the Second Five Year Plan.

For the financing of the mighty project, the people, and they

² 23 October, 1931.

³ *Economic Statesmanship*, E. P. Dutton and Company, New York, second edition, pp. 410-12.

alone, have paid. Communist formulas have worked no financial magic in the creation of wealth. That taken over from the old system did not multiply of itself. Rather it deteriorated. The first currency had a short day, as was natural with so little to support it, finally going into the discard at an exchange rate of some billions to one of the succeeding issue. For a short time the new money, with full redemption guaranteed, enjoyed a premium over the pound and dollar. Seventy-five per cent. of the supporting reserve consists of collateral held by the Government to secure the short-term loans to its own economic enterprises. Parallel with this so-called bank-note or Chervonets currency, there has been issued an almost equal amount of purely fiat treasury notes of small denominations. Both issues have swollen until the ratio of the total circulation to the reserve stood on 1 November, 1931, at two to one. In relation to the firm cover of the reserve, the ratio was eight to one.⁴

The Government does not longer trust this medium to the give-and-take of the international money market. With an embargo laid upon both its export from, and admission to, Soviet Union territory, foreign trade in it is confined to the "black" or underground bourses. In Paris, the guaranteed ten-rouble bank-note, once in good standing at a shilling over the pound, recently ruled at one shilling and four pence. Inside, where power resides to enforce the exchange rate, the official rouble valuation is par. Actually, four different values obtain. In the shops for foreigners, it will not be accepted. In the low-price controlled stores, its purchasing power is three to ten times its worth in the high-price controlled store, if the buyer's rationing card allows the cheaper purchasing right at the given time. Manifestly two of those State-determined levels reflect depreciation, in the effort to realise from the goods something nearer to their worth in stable currency. The prices in the "free" market of the private traders depreciate the rouble still further to levels that correspond to an international exchange value.

Foreign borrowing limits proved minimal, although the Soviet system began functioning without indebtedness, either internal or external. Repudiation of obligations to domestic and foreign creditors, whether State or commercial in character, had wiped the slate clean. The nationalisation of all property had the effect that the land, factories, forests, mines, industries, stock, and transport became assets with no offsetting liabilities. The total national income in 1931 was given as 60,100,000,000 in bank-note, or

⁴ *Economic Survey* of the State Bank of U.S.S.R., October-November, 1931.

chervonets, currency. The capital investments during 1930 and 1931 were 25,900,000,000. The national accumulation (undistributed) was calculated to be 6,100,000,000. Yet in the fifteenth year of the regime, a figure of £100,000,000 or less, represents about the limit of external credit which the total accumulation of capital commands. The maximum known time-limit extended by any creditors is five years. Credits for two years or less are more common. Discount rates of 25 per cent. to 40 per cent. greet Soviet commercial paper abroad, when saleable at all. The heaviest credits are sustained in large part by the guarantees of foreign governments, given to their exporters to secure contracts. The principal underwriting governments are larger buyers than sellers in their Soviet trade.

The initial seizure of all capital funds of the population and the orthodox Communist policy of preventing private capital accumulation automatically placed severe limitations on borrowing capacity at home. Internal loans, nevertheless, have been opened and pressed on individuals, organisations and industrial units. These rose from nothing to 3,221,300,000 roubles in the first thirteen years. The total increased by 1,552,000,000 in 1931. The practice has been to pay off the earlier loans by refunding them into the new and larger ones. A rare phrase has been coined to describe the sales process—"attraction of the means of the population."

An adverse annual foreign trade balance in each year except three, despite the forcing of exports, left much to be desired of income from that side. The accrued debit balances up to 1931 were \$194,000,000. Last year added \$100,000,000.

Huge and mounting sums, therefore, that appeared in successive annual budgets for capital investments, have been loaded on to the traditional bearers of all history—the people. The new capital sum employed in 1931 was 16,100,000,000 roubles. Phrases used in launching the budget of that year suggest how it was balanced: "A steel hoop around consumption." "The system of dual prices." "Increase in taxation, by forcing the income of the State." "Pressure exerted on the capitalistic elements in the villages and cities." Bond sales of 1,355,000,000 roubles, "three-quarters to be collected from workers and employees." "Higher excises" on vodka. "Heavier taxation on industry," calculated often on imaginary returns. In the first half of 1931, the industries responsible to the Supreme Council of National Economy paid 130,000,000 roubles more than their balance sheets later established to be collectable. Income taxes from individuals and industries, as scheduled that year, amounted to 9,500,000,000 roubles.

Thus it turns out that the real Soviet financial achievement consists in having acquired, organised and exercised an authority over the population that took control practically of the entire productive capacity of the nation, left the people from the return on their labours barely enough for existence, and employed the surplus so gained in industrial construction and operations with war-time fervour, speed and wastage. The capital investments alone in 1931 requisitioned 26.6 per cent. of the total national income of 165,000,000 human beings. Contemporary industrialism nowhere else furnishes an example of such a load of super-taxation successfully laid upon poverty, a condition to which the entire nation was first reduced. The fact, stated bluntly, is that Soviet financing on the income side has not yet advanced beyond what its authors would label in a capitalistic system as "exploitation of the masses."

For the price paid, however, a major construction programme is being accomplished. That of the oncoming Second Year Plan can probably be achieved at a like price, together with attaining substantially advanced goals of quantity production. What continues highly problematic is whether quality and cost of production, along with quantity, will be achieved at such levels as to make the system so economically profitable that the present strained, drab existence of the people will be wholesomely relieved, and, at the same time, capital surpluses created for plant maintenance, replacement, and expansion. No system of production and distribution will widely commend itself as sound and enduring until it reaches a state of fiscal health that meets those tests. The Party theoreticians freely recognise, in principle, that, to win the world finally to its economic ways, Communism must go farther than merely to outdo Tsarism. As Trotsky once observed, they "are acquainted with the fundamental laws of history; victory belongs to that system which provides society with the higher economic plans."

Up to date the new order has advanced current living conditions of the Russian population little beyond the state at which it took over responsibility for them. Many of the large claims of improvement made inside Soviet Russia and to the world outside lack corroboration when examination of them penetrates the published wage figures. Molotov's presentation to the recent Party Conference gave the wage rise for 1932 in roubles, as established by the control figures for the fourth year of the Five-Year Plan. Compared with the 1931 wage fund of 21,000,000,000 roubles for 18,600,000 workers, there is budgeted this year 26,800,000,000 roubles for 21,000,000 workers. The monetary return to the worker, therefore, is scheduled

to average 1,876 chervonets roubles in 1932, or £2 10s a week (both currencies at par). As the principle of equality of wages is yielding in the major industries to that of compensation according to the individual's output, the industrious and skilled worker may accordingly receive more than the two and a half pounds, others less. The schedules also provide for a variation between industries.

Manuilsky⁵ calculates that by the end of 1932 the index of wages in relation to the pre-war level will be 200. There has been found no sufficiently convincing conversion of this figure into terms of real wages. While working out the schedules for the Five-Year Plan, the Soviet economists found that over the period 1913-1928 their level of prices for manufactured goods in comparison with the world market has risen well over 50 per cent. It has not been lowered since, if quality be given any consideration. Much of the wage value, as will be seen later, depends also on the amount of goods that the worker is able to procure in the low-price stores. Then, price manipulation from the centre is a simple and common operation.

The issue turns on what the earned wage will buy under conditions where free purchasing does not exist. First, the Trade Union fees are collected at the source. In return for his stated dues the member receives his money's worth in certain cultural advantages and technical instruction, liberally interspersed with political indoctrination. The regulations limit the union's assessments to 4 per cent. of the worker's income. In practice there is no limit. To a single loan, members were informed that it was their wish to subscribe a month's wages, which is reminiscent of war-time methods. Recurring pressure applied to extract subscriptions to numerous funds to further the proletarian cause in the socialistic fatherland and abroad makes real inroads on income and seriously subtracts from the living allowances.

For a small sum, a modicum of crowded living space will be allotted. Relatively to the other urban classes, the workers have gained in housing by occupying the homes of the dispossessed bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, yet in the net results to them at the beginning of 1932, scarcely anywhere could the situation be regarded as tolerable. Nor was it materially improving. *Izvestia*⁶ recognised a decline ever since the Revolution—a fact arithmetically demonstrable. Manuilsky, in the document already cited, places at 3,500,000 the present annual increase in Soviet population. *Economic*

⁵ *The Communist Parties and the Crisis of Capitalism*, p. 18.

⁶ 27 April, 1931.

Life (*Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*)⁷ records 27,000,000 square metres of new housing accomplished during the past five years on a scale of five square metres per person, or space for less than half of the increase of population in the same time. In addition, fire and abnormal deterioration have taken a heavy toll of the old construction. *Izvestia*⁸ regarded every one of 19,000 Moscow buildings as more or less in need of repairs. The large programmes of 1931 and 1932 for housing, if fulfilled, will leave the space per head lowered from 4.83 square metres to 4.37.

For Industrialisation (*Za Industrializatsiu*)⁹ published an article on housing which alleged that, with some exceptions, an indubitable general change for the worse had taken place. In some of the largest projects, the condition was characterised as "ominous." Notwithstanding that the assigned causes of the devastating labour turnover invariably include "bad housing conditions," *Pravda* next day demanded that the writer recant. Instead of an apology, the paper three days later branded the Co-operative Building Section as "a flat failure" with only 50 per cent. of performance.

In some of the organs, specific cases are not withheld. In the Donets Basin, housing space in 1931 went up 25 per cent., the population 38 per cent. In the Kuznetsk Basin the space allotted to each person averaged 2.4 square metres. Seventy thousand people had access to four small bath-houses. Of 1,300 new houses scheduled in 1931, the erecting of 185 had begun by August. Upon the completion of the Nizhny-Novgorod automobile plant, *Izvestia* reported that the lay-out of the living quarters had been much less than half realised. As a result, 15,000 workers would continue to live in barracks for the winter with roofs that leaked by bucketsfull. The paper also announced the postponement until 1932 of provision for the hospital, laundry, nurseries, bath-houses and several lunch-rooms. In November, the Leningrad schedule for new housing in 1931 had progressed only 25 per cent., that of Moscow slightly farther.

In these and other large cities, three to five families using the same kitchen and sanitary conveniences is normal. As revealing as the findings of a survey commission, was a Moscow child's reply to the teacher's question: "What is your conception of an ideal home?" The answer was: "A room through which strangers do not have to pass to get to their room."¹⁰

⁷ 5 December, 1931.

⁸ 17 May, 1931.

⁹ 24 November, 1931.

¹⁰ *These Russians*. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

The roubles left in hand may or may not buy the holder enough food and other consumers' goods to maintain him and his dependents at an endurable subsistence level. This is conditioned on whether or not the goods are available in the low-price controlled shops up to the limit prescribed by his rationing card. As a rule, the low-price stocks, except bread, have been far from adequate to meet even the demands of the ration cards. Whenever shortages occur, the alternatives are either to go without or to have recourse to the high-cost shops. In them no limit to purchasing rights exists so long as the buyer's roubles last at such an altitude of price.

This dilemma, if not viewed from the consumer's position, appears to be a stroke of genius in the financing of the Five Year Plan. The device operates either to hold down consumption of goods by an individual or family to the restricted rationed minimum or to dispose of them at prices yielding excessive profit to the State as the monopolistic seller. The rationing plan, together with the arrangement of low and high prices, has reduced the grain consumption of the cities by 25 per cent. A correspondent of the *London Economist*¹¹ reported his journey from Russia on a ship carrying 1,200 tons of Soviet butter in its cargo. Concurrently with this apparent ability to export, *Pravda*¹² contrasted Moscow's daily need of 14,000 cans of milk with a daily receipt of 5,500 cans. The same cargo contained eggs from Russia, where the low-price shops only intermittently offered them. In the others they fetched nine-pence each.

The *Berliner Tageblatt*¹³ and the *Esthonian Revaler Bote*¹⁴ gave price lists in the low-cost stores, furnished by their Moscow correspondents, of which the following are representative :—

	Roubles		Roubles
1 kilo rye bread	·075	1 kilo cooking butter ..	3·20
1 kilo white bread	·15	1 kilo table butter	4·10
1 kilo rice	·325	1 kilo sugar	·58
1 kilo potatoes	·7	$\frac{1}{4}$ kilo tea	2·10
1 kilo beef	2·20	1 pair of socks	·71
1 kilo veal	3·41	1 pair of stockings	·81
1 kilo herrings	·65	1 shirt	1·72
1 dozen fresh eggs	1·14	1 pair of high boots	22·65
1 quart of milk	·30	1 pair of women's shoes ..	10·45

¹¹ 5 September, 1931.

¹² 4 August, 1931.

¹³ 29 November, 1931.

¹⁴ 17 November, 1931.

Such quotations, set over against the Soviet wage-level, spell a prevailing bread diet. The egg, meat, butter, sugar costs admit of only the most frugal use of these goods. The price-scale for the last three exceeds the American level, also that for rice and tea. Nor are the items of wearing apparel comparably low for the wages by which they must be procured. *National Economy of the U.S.S.R.* (1932)¹⁵ contains a price list of eight items in terms of the average selling prices in consumers' co-operatives throughout the Soviet Union. In general, the lists harmonise. The country at large tends to lower the Moscow rates slightly. The second-named list gives comparisons by years from 1928 to 1931. The price for bread held steady. The rates during the four years for all of the other food items given—beef, butter, potatoes and eggs—ranged upwards, in the order given, by 25, 40, 50 and 60 per cent.

The Soviet Premier's pledge of better conditions during the Second Five Year Plan, admitted, by implication, how low are the living standards which have prevailed. He announced that the increase of consumers' goods, including foodstuffs, by the end of the second five years must equal in quantity at least two to three times the volume to be attained at the end of 1932. He had just promised a goodly increase during 1932. Unless the standard has hitherto been kept near to the line of marginal existence, the 1937 level would be one wholly out of keeping with even the advanced stage of Soviet planning and finance which was being expounded.

The University of Birmingham Bureau of Research,¹⁶ "after making necessary corrections for deterioration in the quality of industrial production and subtracting the sums representing national accumulation," gives computations in terms of pre-war roubles which indicate a slow rise in the personal consumption per head in Soviet Russia from 73.6 roubles in 1925-6 to 89.2 in 1930, then a decline to 86.9 in 1931. These figures compare with 90.6 in 1913. If the calculations approximate to the reality, the "rigid regime of economy and denial of primary needs" forecast by the Five Year Plan has, indeed, been enforced. In return for the people's sacrifices, the undistributed national accumulation has been augmented by 335 per cent.

W. H. Chamberlin, who is in the foremost rank of objective students of Russian conditions, when summarising the gains and losses under the Five Year Plan, in *The Soviet Planned Economic*

¹⁵ Pp. 348-50.

¹⁶ *Memorandum on Russian Economic Conditions*, No. 3 (November, 1931) and No. 5 (May, 1932).

Order, includes among the debits the deterioration of living standards, especially in the towns. He confirmed this judgment in November of last year in his correspondence with the *Christian Science Monitor*. The result could scarcely be otherwise when, without allowing for lessened export, the quantity of cereals produced has not increased in proportion to the population; when the number of meat and fat producing animals fell sharply and has not yet regained pre-war levels; when the production of consumers' goods has been sacrificed to heavy industry (the cotton textile production has actually declined since the inauguration of the Five Year Plan); and when capital investments have been made, wholly out of proportion to the national income.

Over against demerits in respect of housing, feeding, and clothing its citizens, the Soviet system has earned credits of substantial proportions in the sincerity and extent of the protection it undertakes to give to the workers and employees against old age, disability, sickness, unemployment and the other hazards of life. This service represents a major advance over the old regime, which left nearly all such ministries to the charity of individuals and groups. Formerly insurance existed only on account of sickness (including child-birth) and accident. The provisions were less liberal and, being confined to the larger employing enterprises, covered only about 20 per cent. of the industrial pay-rolls. Also the beneficiaries paid three-fifths of the premiums, whereas the Soviet system imposes the whole of the cost on the employing bodies or individuals. No other national systems of social protection surpass this one in comprehensiveness, though the best of the others equal or surpass it in the maturity and, accordingly, in the execution of their programme.

The appropriated Social Insurance Fund reached 2,573,000,000 roubles last year and 3,490,000,000 in 1932. The totals include large amounts for housing and other construction projects related to human welfare. The distribution for 1931 follows in million roubles :—

		Per cent.
Payments for temporary incapacity to work ..	524·2	20·4
Payments for supplementary types of insurance ..	64·6	2·5
Invalid, orphan and old age insurance	353·6	13·7
Unemployment insurance	—	—
Medical aid and hospital construction	475·6	18·5
Rest homes and sanatoriums (including capital investment)	95·3	3·7

		Per cent.
Other health work	37.1	1.4
Training of personnel and other work of education	186.2	7.2
Workers' housing and sanitary measures	351.6	13.7
Other objects	484.8	18.9

Advances in the protection of health have been marked, resulting already in a lowered death-rate. Of special significance are the gains in the more backward national units. The following¹⁷ table reflects the rate of progress in this field :—

Republics Years	Number medical points	Vill pop to 1 med point (in thous)	Hospitals		No dis- pensaries	Inst for Protection of Motherhood and Infancy		No doc- tors	No doc- tors for every 10,000 of pop
			No	No beds		No con- sultations	No perm crèches		
RSFSR									
1924	3,938	20.2	3,553	146,058	188	548	536	17,251	1.83
1930	6,922	12.8	4,906	195,476	561	1,534	1,574	46,127	4.23
Ukraine									
1924	1,313	17.3	883	26,236	141	201	105	6,276	2.32
1930	2,157	11.4	1,190	39,204	232	577	327	15,503	4.61
White Russia									
1924	174	22.7	115	3,918	6	22	8	652	1.42
1930	341	12.5	188	7,563	29	105	69	1,672	3.22
Azerbaijan									
1927	136	12.2	56	4,047	—	15	11	863	3.75
1930	150	11.5	68	4,288	23	47	35	1,225	4.95
Georgia									
1924	217	9.0	77	—	2	14	5	712	2.88
1930	327	6.7	86	3,469	20	41	18	1,575	5.55
Turkmenistan									
1925	5	174.5	13	—	3	1	—	—	—
1930	29	32.9	33	1,018	7	40	30	262	2.34
Uzbekistan									
1925	44	87.0	73	2,981	7	40	3	505	1.05
1930	201	17.0	112	4,578	22	94	51	1,539	3.55

Superficial propaganda lists often violate perspective by conveying the impression that application of all the admirable and beneficent measures initiated has been realised throughout the Soviet Union, whereas great gaps in programme fulfilment exist far and wide. According to an *Izvestia* contributor,¹⁸ 30 per cent. of the medical stations are dependent on other stations for the services of physicians. Another writer in *Culture and Life*¹⁹ fortified an appeal for more nurseries in Moscow with a calculation of 1,872 cases of truancy of workwomen in the electric plant, causing the State a loss of 250,000 roubles of work-time. Collective education

¹⁷ According to figures of the All-Union Health Census, furnished by the Soviet Union Information Bureau, Washington, D.C.

¹⁸ 27 January, 1931.

¹⁹ 13 May, 1931.

of the children, organisation of new baby-nurseries, kindergartens, playgrounds and rooms, seemed to the correspondent to be the only way out. It was represented that these facilities in 1930 existed for 3 per cent. of the pre-school children of the Moscow province, for $11\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in Moscow itself, and for $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, the largest unit of the Soviet Union.

Smidovich, in a publication of 1931 issued by *Centrizdat*, urged the importance of liberating workers' wives from kitchen duties and the care of children, "if only during the time they are at work in the factory." He pointed out that "the new order of life in the collective farms and especially in the communes is leading to the emancipation of women from the benumbing petty cares of housework and making possible the participation of women in the work of building up Socialism." Hence crèches and communal dining-rooms. He deplored the pace of increase in the former, which did not equal that of the growing number of working women. Only 13 per cent. were so accommodated in the industrial regions outside Moscow, and 12 per cent. on the collective farms (probably, statistics for 1930).

These and other social measures for improving living conditions show a general desire and purpose on the part of the leaders to go farther. Nor will they be permitted to forget or to delay overmuch. Millions of reminders of their vows are ever at hand with an insistence that has already received serious, if not anxious, attention.

The pressure in one form is expressed in the return to prominence of the pecuniary motive, though it has never been absent. The rationing of the population according to social categories, without regard to an individual's productive worth, brought industrial production in sight of the vanishing point in the four years following 1917. In 1921, wages expressed in money measured out equally to all workers in the same classification supplanted the automatic ration. Soon that fixed wage began to surrender to piecework, and by the mid-year of 1931 Stalin was characterising the equalisation of pay as a "craze." He found the gain-seeking element in the workmen's restlessness sufficiently strong to be given recognition and concession without protest, on the ground that the awakening cultural programme was operating legitimately to enlarge their demands. For factories and their personnel, pay-rates could be allowed to increase in accordance with the percentual accomplishment of their quota of the planned output of the stipulated quality and cost of production.

According to the leading industrial newspapers, some of the cultural awakening seemed to be of a somewhat uncommunitistic quality. The organ *For Industrialisation*²⁰ found "illegal" rises in wages amounting sometimes to 35 per cent. The offending plants included the famous Putilov Works in Leningrad. The Trade Union organ *Trud (Labour)*, twenty days after, wrote editorially:—

. . . Of late in a number of enterprises there is noticeable a considerable unauthorised overdraw of the wage funds and a growing gap between the increase of wages and of the productivity of labour. In a number of enterprises the growth of the wages surpasses the growth of productivity of labour. The Trade Unions must fight decisively against these tendencies of an unearned increase of the wages. . . .

A direct relation may be believed to exist between the 2 per cent. increase in the industrial production costs in 1931, the simultaneous pressure for wage increases, and Molotov's rejection of and lengthy argument against the conception that "Socialism is production for consumption." The last Party Conference theses laid down, as part of the fundamental political task of the Second Five Year Plan, "overcoming the remnants of capitalism in economy and in the minds of the people." Speaking to this point, he denounced as unrealisable and obviously false "the right of the worker to the full product of his labour." Continuing, he said:—

This narrow consumers' attitude to Socialism does not correspond to the interests of the Workers' State and the theory of Leninism. . . . Attempts to separate questions of consumption . . . from increasing, in the first place, heavy industry and developing the creation of the means of production—lead to mistaken conclusions.

Significantly, the major current concerns of both the Party chief and of the head of the State, easily identifiable in their highly official pronouncements, have their roots in the troublesome factors that afflict large-scale production in Soviet industry and in agriculture. The frustrations they describe are like those familiar to other responsible economic leaders who pursue seriously constructive objectives. They are beset by the age-old problem of arousing the motive to produce, linked with the economic necessity of profits.

That the spectacular Communist adventure has approached a decisive period can hardly be doubted. It is at grips with the factors and forces that determine economic failure or success. This observation does not imply an imminent decision. Never in its short history has the *dénouement* appeared less likely. There is simply in process a demonstration whether or not solid economic success can be

²⁰ 19 November, 1931.

erected on the basic assumptions of Communism and be perpetuated under its operating formulas.

First, the revolutionary rate of expansion has incurred very heavy liabilities. Among these bulks formidably an immense incubus of unprepared, undependable labour. Stalin characterised the mobility of workmen as "a regular scourge for our production" when addressing the economic workers in June, 1931. He said that few enterprises could be found "where the staff of workmen does not change to the extent of at least 30 to 40 per cent. in the course of six months, or in three months."

To put up with the prevailing condition he said, "would be tantamount to disorganising our industry, to ruining the possibility of executing our plans of production, and to wrecking the possibility of improving the quality of our production." It was disconcerting figures of labour mobility, even "fluidity," that prompted such plain speaking. In the preceding April, eighteen coal mines employed 20,656 new hands and lost 16,342. The Thirteenth Building Trust recruited 2,486 that same month and lost 1,902. *Pravda's* picture²¹ of the instability of coal-mine labour seven months later was yet darker in hue. The average monthly intake of workers in the Donets Basin during the preceding quarter was 36,933, the outflow was 39,929. The 1931 record of "Stal," the leading steel trust, with 128,800 employees on the average, was 58,300 in and 51,700 out. The labour force of the Eastern Ore Trust changed nearly three times, and the Eastern Steel Trust one and a half times.²²

Gross technical deficiencies in labour personnel further complicate the difficulties arising from its floating character. The recruitment of raw workers, at the pace called for by successive high-pressure plans, results in a most nondescript pay-roll. Shoals of peasants, with a dash of training or none, step from their primitive tools of agriculture to operate in a mill the latest models of the machine age. Nomads from the steppes mingle with village ploughmen. In May, 1931, the Stalingrad tractor plant operated with labour of which 45 per cent. had less than six months' experience in industrial production. Eighty per cent. had less than a year of such experience. Three-fifths ranged from seventeen to twenty-four years of age. The trial arising out of the tragic Kosino triple train wreck just outside Moscow last autumn, produced evidence establishing the presence among the crews of not one competent operator, either engineer, fireman or conductor. And such as these do not come into

²¹ 9 January, 1932.

²² *For Industrialisation*, 4 March, 1932.

industry rapidly enough. "We can no longer rely upon the natural flow," is Stalin's warning. He sees "only one way"—"contracts concluded between the economic organisations . . . and the collective farms and collective farm members."

Women, too, have gone, and more will go to the unfamiliar machines. The freeing of them from "the drudgery of housework" is not calculated to liberate them for afternoon teas and card parties. The summons calls 1,600,000 women in 1932 to join their 3,263,000 sisters already industrialised—at benches, on scaffoldings, trams and motor lorries. In the courses for training tractor drivers, 40 per cent. are women. In the steel-wire shop of the "Sickle and Hammer" plant, women constituted 31 per cent. of the working forces at the end of 1931.

The restricted supply of engineers, and the limitations of many of them, further handicap profitable production, notwithstanding the restoration of numbers of older ones to eligibility by the measures of 1931, which removed their disabilities in social origin and admitted them to the workers' category for compensation. Druzhinin²³ writes that the national economy "suffers from an acute shortage of staffs" with eighty engineers to every 10,000 workers. Four of the eight plants of the Ural Agricultural Machinery Trust had no engineer. Engineering quality, as well as quantity, is deficient. Only 22 per cent. of the present staffs have a completed college preparation. Forty per cent. have no theoretical education whatever. According to Druzhinin: "These are mostly foremen who took years to come up from the ranks of unskilled workers, for they did it by the old system of 'looking on.' Thirty-three per cent. of the mechanics and 14 per cent. of the construction men are in this category." In the entire printing industry only twenty persons have received a scientific training.

The effects of these disorders appear throughout the system in situations that induce headaches for the leaders and multiply costs. Rostov's farm machinery plant in July was spoiling from 35 to 40 per cent. of the daily output. *Economic Life*²⁴ observed in textiles "a certain lowering of the standard of workmanship and a very great increase in the amount of spoiled cloth." The Central Commission of the People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection at the end of 1931 recorded the average percentage of wasted metal in the machine-building industry to be 56 per cent., as

²³ *How Workers Become Engineers in the U.S.S.R.*

²⁴ 25 November, 1931.

compared with 23 per cent. in Germany.²⁵ In November, 1931, the wage-level in the Soviet iron and steel industry was raised 27·2 per cent over the average of the preceding quarter to stimulate production, but the output per rouble fell by 15 per cent.²⁶

*Pravda*²⁷ reported that at the Stalingrad tractor plant hundreds of machines were idle on account of breakage. The spoiled malleable iron castings amounted to two and a half times the perfect ones. To 1,586 tons of good grey castings there were 1,196 tons of spoilage. In July, 90 per cent. of the flywheels produced were defective. In September, stocks of steel worth 5,500,000 roubles, of no use for tractor production, cumbered the inventory. The plant designed to employ 11,000 persons had acquired a pay-roll of 17,000. There existed a current operating deficit of 6,000,000 roubles, involving delay in the payment of wages. At present Stalingrad shows signs of extricating itself from the morass. Production has approached capacity. Its problems ahead chiefly concern costs and quality. Meanwhile, conditions at the newer great Avtostroy at Nizhny Novgorod and the Chelyabinsk tractor works are reported to be *in extremis*.

In general, throughout heavy industry, the advantages of the new modern machinery are offset by the low proficiency of labour. Although better implementing has gone far in the coal mines, the tonnage productions per worker in 1931 stood at 157, compared with 150 in 1913 and 158 in 1930, while protests against the ash and other deleterious content rise to heaven from the consuming industries. In the fourth of March issue of the current year, *Izvestia*, dealing with the conditions in light industry, named "bad quality" as its "fundamental shortcoming," and declared it had "greatly deteriorated in comparison with the previous years."

Industry, nevertheless, presents more ground for satisfaction than agriculture, notwithstanding the superficial appearance. Farm collectivisation has been realised far beyond the Party's planning and expectations. Without doubt, constrained by the economic handicaps arbitrarily laid on those who try to maintain their independence, the residue of peasants will join the large majority already in the *kolkhozy*. Consequently, larger farm units, better implemented, promise a better rural economy than the pitiful strip-farming system and archaic cultivation which till then widely prevailed; but successful practical results have not followed com-

²⁵ *Inprecor*, vol. 12, No. 7, p. 128.

²⁶ *For Industrialisation*, 4 March, 1932.

²⁷ 18-19 April, 1931.

mensurately. Up to now, scarcely more than sporadic triumphs have been won. The first year (1930) of speed-up collectivisation yielded an unusually abundant harvest. The total Soviet crop for the first time exceeded the pre-revolutionary volume. The excess was 7·1 per cent. The past year, with collectivisation advanced twice as far, somewhat less favourable crop conditions again set the volume back, probably below the old level. The official figures have been withheld.

At the peak even, taking into account the growth of population, the yield of cereal crops per head presented a loss from the pre-war standard of nearly 7 per cent. A static performance, such as this, suffers by contrast with the gain in the yield of all grains per desyatine in the 1901-1910 decade. That rise was 15 per cent. for all private growers and 10 per cent. for the non-landlord owners.²⁸ Agriculture, according to Stalin, has as yet yielded no capital return to the State. It is still absorbing capital. Molotov has termed the progress in the yield of the harvest "significant." The economic loss caused by "liquidating" the 1,000,000 kulak families remains uncovered. Meanwhile, the urban population stand in queues before food shops that ration out only pinched supplies of everything save bread

The audacity with which the chieftains drive ahead withal, befits a great cause. They might well be baffled by the difficulties, but they are unbeaten in spirit. They rule themselves and others by iron will. "Party hangers-on" had called the production plan unreal, impossible to fulfil. Stalin defended its reality on several grounds. He stood finally on this:—

The reality of our programme is in living human beings—ourselves, our will to labour, our willingness to work in a new way, and our determination to carry out the plan. Are we possessed of it, of that will? Yes, we are. And consequently, our production programme can be, and must be, fulfilled.

A young generation particularly tends to follow leadership such as that. In 1931, the League of Communist Youth increased numerically by 3,000,000. The elect among them fill the shock brigades and meet the recurring demands upon them with an abandonment that thrills observers. They have saved important situations from disaster. Youngsters are not guided by any past. It is action that wins them. Those who give allegiance in Soviet Russia are put to use beyond any youth of all time. Knowing nothing better, an

²⁸ *Russia—Her Economic Past and Future*, Dr. Joseph M. Goldstein. Published by the Russian Information Bureau in the United States (1919).

unknown number of them carry on, content with hardships, even eager, in response to the challenge to adventure, for the new collective life.

They will, in large measure, be trained out of their technical deficiencies. The industries under the control of the Supreme Economic Council had 1,800,000 students in preparation during 1931.²⁹ That year, 21,000 young engineers and technicians completed their studies. For the next two years it is scheduled that 38,000 and 85,000, respectively, will finish the prescribed academic courses, along with 350,000 graduate workers from the factory schools. Kuibishev gives the aggregate in the technical colleges and schools, workers' faculties and factory schools as 2,700,000 in 1931, with an output of 259,000. As objectives for the goals of 1932, he sets 4,000,000 to be enrolled, and over 600,000 to be turned into production.³⁰ For the training of the rank and file of machine labour, exist networks of classes and schools to which there is probably no parallel in the history of industrialisation.

This very enthusiasm of the young involves and accumulates the greatest obligation which their masters will have to meet and discharge. Youth can be disillusioned. Witness the reaction from the emotions of the World War, which on every continent brought the serious-minded of the generation in its teens and early twenties to challenge fundamentally the basic ideas and institutions of society. Half-trained thousands or millions of youth, rushed here and there to meet heroically crises in coal mines, logging camps and harvest fields, reflect something remote from a sound economic system. So also with socialistic competitions that fracture the labour laws and otherwise savour of the speeding-up processes and the thrice-cursed "sweating" of capitalistic production.

That the forces against which 3,500,000 shock brigaders hurl themselves are not yielding the field, becomes progressively evident. It may turn out that these are born of Communism, despite parental denial of the progeny. If they are so begotten, they may be expected to multiply rather than to decrease with time. Certainly they will outlast the mere enthusiasm. On the face of things there appears to exist something of unresolved Communist inability to impart initiative widely enough, with the incentives at hand, or to secure responsibility in the general absence of freedom.

The Party Conference of January, 1932, itself, when legislating on the tasks of 1932, diagnosed as the current chief infirmity of the

²⁹ *Imprecor*, vol. 12, No. 7, p. 534.

³⁰ *Ibid*, vol. 12, No. 3, p. 54.

industrial system—"above all, the lack of personal responsibility." This applies to workers and managements alike on a wide front.

In June of 1931, Stalin revealed to the conference of economic workers a situation which "makes the unskilled workman have no interest in becoming a qualified workman, gives him no prospect of promotion and advance, in consequence of which, so to speak, he considers himself a 'summer camper' at his place of work, remaining there only temporarily in order 'to make a little money' and then go away to some other place 'in search of luck.'"

The strategists have of late been labouring valiantly to correct what they call "de-personalisation," which widely afflicts every range of management reaching up to the heads of trusts. The ways adopted for dealing with it appear to have been determined more by obstacles than by foresight. The "Credit Reform" of 1930, which within a year again required reforming, was calculated to tighten loose joints in the unified financial plan by making each enterprise really accountable for the funds and materials employed and for the volume, quality and costs of its production.

It met with practical defeat. Contracts between many enterprises, which were the basis for credits at the State Bank, proved often to be scraps of paper. Actual frauds imposed on the Bank for credit purposes multiplied in the forms of faked contracts, fictitiously described collateral and unprotected repayment checks. Barter of goods between different units took place, ignoring the new mandate that prescribed cash sales only. Counter-actions by the authorities followed one upon another—"posting" the contract-breakers, establishing a commercial rating register of the Bank's clients to gauge credit standing, the publication of annual balances as shown by the units of the socialised sector. Short-term advances made for temporary requirements went into capital uses to the amount of 2,856,600,000 roubles. These debts proved uncollectable. They had to be declared to be additional fixed capital of the State combines and trusts.

Finance and Socialistic Economy,³¹ the organ of the People's Commissariat of Finance, commented gloomily on the net results:—

The positive result is, that the economic organs over the whole territory of the Union have established contract relations between themselves. . . . But, unfortunately, our contracts in their great majority are nothing but a formal instrument to obtain credits in the Bank; our contracts suffer from many defects, both from the viewpoint of their contents, and from the viewpoint of their fulfilment. . . . The contracts

³¹ 7 November, 1931.

have not yet become an instrument of mutual control, mutual interestedness and, finally, of mutual responsibility between the economic organs.

At the same time, agriculture jibs at being relentlessly regimented in the name of collectivisation. The State insists on an organised control of all collective farm work and the principle of piecework, or division of the year's net return on the basis of the number of unit days of work performed. The peasants generally stand out for division according to the mouths to feed. Masses of them remain unconvinced and work grudgingly. The State changes its old complaint of peasant hoarding to hoarding by the collectives. In such soil breeds the discontent that neutralises otherwise favouring conditions of collectivisation.

The huge state farms, too, have been disappointing, except in respect to certain technical crops like flax, cotton and tobacco. A resolution of the Party Central Committee,³² based on the report of an inspection commission, blasts their managers with the most damning charges. Among these are enumerated a notorious wastefulness and an inadmissibly criminal way of handling state property, unsatisfactory tilling of the soil, absolutely insufficient use of the technical appliances, falsification of the harvest figures, extravagant and illegal grain expenditures, neglect of grain delivery obligations. "All these violations" of instructions, it is declared, "take place at the majority of Soviet farms." In April of this year, those responsible at the stock-breeding farms were denounced and removed.

Little on the horizon betrays a disposition on the part of the leaders to trust the future to any other alliance than that of the will of the few and the subservience of the many, mediated by force as may be necessary. In the supreme economic administration, the one fixed steering point has been centrally planned and unrelievedly controlled production. The new legislation and regulations introducing so-called business methods convey no real freedom of action to the enterprises. Rather they have been aimed at removing the remnants of free commercial relations. *For Industrialisation*³³ contained an editorial opinion to the effect that the new business system went little beyond "mere book-keeping operations," and that imperative requisites still lacking were "methods of technical rationalisation and economic stimulation of interestedness."

For agriculture, Lenin's "first phase of Communist society," with all citizens "transformed into the hired employees of the

³² *Collection of Laws and Orders*, U.S.S.R., Part I, No. 62, 11 December, 1931.

³³ 4 December, 1931.

State," was restated in an address of 1929 before Marxian agrarians in Moscow, when Stalin foresaw the farm collectives becoming "more and more mechanised and tractorised, their members gradually to amalgamate into a single army of workers in a collectivised village." This would mean that only expediency has dictated the very late concession to the private and collectivised growers, whereby they may dispose optionally of one-fifth of their products after 1932. The Second Five Year Plan threatens trouble for all recalcitrants. The Party Conference in proclaiming it stated, as its fundamental political aim, "the final liquidation of the capitalistic elements." This comprehended the rural and urban areas alike.

For its security, the dictatorship must, and does, hold sway over learning and thinking. Communist commissaries, attached to all scientific institutions, are there to insure research activities against deviations from the pre-determined Party line. Eminent scientific authorities are in exile for not finding facts to support given theories and policies. The influential *Komsomolskaya Pravda*³⁴ served a notice that there was now power enough to exercise "greater intolerance toward creative methods which are alien to the dialectic materialism of Marx and Lenin."

An impartial observer,³⁵ over a period long enough to give weight to his judgment, thinks that shaping and placing a definite stamp upon the individual has possibly progressed farther in Soviet Russia than the standardising of tractors and railroad equipment. He described the type wanted as "a sort of graphophone which plays without a hitch the records that are placed on it." Can this be "the collective man" who—so the world is promised—will perform miracles of production?

The Soviet stage is therefore well set for a large-scale exhibition of how far the apostles and organisers of force, domination, tyranny if you like, can succeed as constructors. In the ways that compulsion knows, they have gone far enough in achievement to be given, apparently, an indefinite lease of time in which thoroughly to test the possibilities and limitations of the system. They have brought the will of the people to political acquiescence. "The unyielding hand of the Communist State holds every Russian in its grasp from the day of his birth to the hour when he is buried by the state undertaking monopoly."³⁶

³⁴ 17 May, 1930.

³⁵ W. H. Chamberlin, *Foreign Affairs*, New York, January, 1932.

³⁶ *The X Y Z of Communism*. The Macmillan Company, New York, P. 74.

What, then, remains? To generate and distribute some power that will communicate widely to the submissive multitudes a truly creative spirit. Without it, social drive must come not less, but more from the centre—the puissant source that hitherto has not sufficed. Communist education, monopolistic and enforced, may prove spiritual soil out of which generations of youth, fertile in thought and life, will spring. For that phenomenon, an experienced world watches, but with scepticism. Meanwhile, the impasse is still there. The beneficence of the ultimate objectives and the excellence of many new techniques have not yet availed to multiply profitable factories and fruitful farms.

ETHAN T. COLTON.

New York City.

THE SECOND FIVE YEAR PLAN

I.

A YEAR ago I was asked what would happen after the Five Year Plan in Russia had been carried out; I answered, then, that there would be a Second Five Year Plan, and my audience laughed and thought I was joking.

But it was not a joke. And now we see that the supreme authority in Russia, the Conference of the Communist Party, has been busily engaged in discussing the Second Five Year Plan and has decreed that the so-called "control" figures (estimates) for this Plan must be ready by the end of this year.

In spite of the failure of certain branches of industry, transport and agriculture to follow the planned figures, the 17th Conference of the Communist Party held the view that, on the whole, the First Five Year Plan had proved a tremendous success. If we consider the speeches of the leaders of the Soviet Government at this Conference, we cannot fail to see that all their addresses, without a single exception, are divided into two parts. In one part we find praise of the achievements of the Party, a record of its marvellous work, a belief and a boast that the Second Five Year Plan will give Russia complete independence from capitalist countries and that the Socialist regime will be finally established in 1937. The second part of the speeches admits the existence of certain shortcomings, explains them, and states that they are, on the whole, insignificant.

This reminds us of the old times, of the days of the Russo-Japanese War, when all government manifestos loudly praised

the successes of the Russian army in the Far East and faintly admitted the weakness of the Russian Fleet and the somewhat slow progress of Kuropatkin's army.

The inadequate development of transport was considered by the Conference to be one of the chief failures of the First Five Year Plan. As a remedy for this, Molotov suggests the laying down of 25 to 30 thousand kilometres of railway track and a yearly output of 400 thousand motor-cars, during the second quinquennium. But there are some other problems which must be solved before that is done. "We are doing some quite incomprehensible things," says Orzhonikidze, "we carry coal all the way to Vladivostok, but half of it is consumed on the way by the engines which haul it; yet there are very good mines near Vladivostok which produce perfect coal, and this ought to be utilised for local needs."

Another obstacle to the success of the Five Year Plan lies, according to a resolution taken by the Conference, in the low productivity of labour and the high cost of production. This was caused, in the first place, by the wage system, the so-called *uravnilovka*—equal pay for nominally equal work—which has now been banned in Russia as representing a bourgeois principle; in the second place, by the shortage and even absence of experienced technicians; and, thirdly, by the lack of system and planning in the internal management of factories and workshops.

The way in which funds for wages in Russia are overspent seems well-nigh incredible: "The Factory in Memory of Sverdlov, for instance," said Shvernik, "has an overdraft upon its wages fund amounting to 640,000 roubles; the factory, *The Red Triangle*, overdrew 500,000 roubles in one month; the *Kolomensky* workshops spent in one year 463,000 roubles more on wages than was indicated in their budget; the Soviet State Farm, *Giant*, has exceeded its estimates by 791,000 roubles in less than a year; and even the Postmaster-General (*Narkompochtél*) spent 15 million roubles more on wages than he was entitled to do." The explanation of these phenomena can, according to Shvernik, be found in the practice of engaging workers on overtime work, in keeping more men employed in the workshops than is strictly necessary, and in ignoring the regulations as to rates of pay.

"No one is sufficiently interested in the payment of wages," said Postishev. "It does not concern the director of the works; it does not concern the higher technical staff; it does not concern the central authorities which supervise the factories."

The Conference admitted a great discrepancy between the amount

of wages paid and the productivity of labour, and severely criticised the bureaucratic way in which the industry was managed. It noted that "cumbersome economic organisations" were "in charge of industrial enterprises," and that there was no direct contact between the central management of the industrial trusts and individual factories.¹

II.

The speeches of the heads of different branches of industry give us an idea of the actual position of industrial reconstruction in Russia. "In the light industry we have not carried out the Plan," said Lyubimov, "and the quality of goods produced is very low." . . . "We do not know how to work, and therefore we waste a tremendous amount of raw material." . . . "In the leather industry, for instance, we are far below the standards of work in England and Belgium." . . . "There are occasions when we fail to produce the kind of article we require, as, for instance, with glass; we produce thick glass when it is thin glass we need." . . .

The printing trade in Russia, according to Lyubimov, is still equipped with machines installed twenty years ago, and it is for this reason that only one-tenth of the demand for text-books and other school equipment can be satisfied.

The timber industry, about which there has been so much talk in this country, progresses, according to Lobov, much more slowly than any other branch of industry in the Soviet Union. The absence of proper machinery, the poor assortment of hand-tools, and the unsatisfactory organisation of labour in the industry, are the chief causes of its backwardness. It would appear that, at last, the mistake of invading this industry with conscript labour, recruited from non-proletarian elements, is being realised by the management of the industry itself. As a result of this state of affairs Russian timber is inferior in quality, and 35 per cent. of it is exported in a raw state. At the same time, Russia, which possesses one-third of the world's area of forests, is short of paper. This sounds bad, but it is much worse in fact, if we remember that the success of government activities depends so much upon the printed word.

"In the metal industry we lag far behind the Plan," said Orzhonikidze. "Instead of increasing our production of cast iron by three million tons, we have only achieved an increase of a few

¹ See the Resolutions of the 17th All-Union Party Conference, published in all Soviet daily newspapers; the quotations from speeches and resolutions given in this article are taken from *Economic Life* (*Ékonomicheskaya Zhizn*) for February, 1932.

hundred tons." The explanation lies, according to the speaker, in the shortage of means of transport and shortage of trained technical staff. In addition to this, the housing conditions of the metal workers, as well as their food, leave much to be desired. "We cannot run our metallurgical industry on the amount of coal we extract now," said Orzhonikidze. "Besides, Russian coal," he admits, "is of poor quality and contains a large percentage of ashes." "We are short of fireproof materials," he goes on to say, "and we import it from abroad, yet in the Urals, Ukraine, and even the neighbourhood of Leningrad there is plenty of clay of very good quality." "Our oil industry is equipped much better than any other of our industries, and at present all tanks and reservoirs in Baku are full of oil; we are digging pits to store superfluous naphtha; yet there is a great unsatisfied demand for oil in the country; we cannot carry from Baku the one and a half million tons of oil awaiting transport."

In speaking of construction in general during the Second Five Year Plan and of proposed capital investments amounting to 12 milliard roubles, Orzhonikidze recognised that construction in Russia costs a vast amount of money. "We have learnt how to build; we construct marvellous factory buildings, but they cost us a very great deal." In future, he went on, all waste of material and labour must be avoided. There must be proper planning. Otherwise, "we build in quite the wrong places, and have been known to scrap newly erected buildings."

Apart from this, there is another problem which must be solved and which is connected with the waste of money on building materials. "It is disgraceful," said the same speaker, "that we should have to bring building materials from hundreds and thousands of miles away, when there are plenty quite near at hand . . . but immediately we begin to use local gravel and sand, their prices are raised by the local authorities by 150-200 per cent., in order to improve the local budgets." "The most expensive building materials with us are sand and gravel," he exclaims in conclusion.

Another instance of waste of material was referred to at the Conference in respect of the production of railway engines. The standard type of railway engine of 96.5 tons in weight seems to require different amounts of the same kind of raw material in different factories: the Kharkov works, for instance, use 117 tons of material for this, the Kolomensky works 125 tons, the Bryansky works 127, and the Lugansk works 130. "For the construction of locomotives

we use more raw material than any other country in Europe," says Orzhonikidze.

III.

"We may be asked. 'where is the Devil driving you, Bolsheviks?' " says Orzhonikidze, after giving an exposition of the failures of the First Five Year Plan; and to this he gives the old Russian answer that no obstacle is big enough to daunt them; they can conquer them all. He quotes Lenin, who once said that the Russian people had raised itself to the level of any advanced European nation in a few months; if this was the case, there was nothing the Russians could not do, once they set their minds to it.

This belief that Russia, in spite of the evident failures of the First Five Year Plan, can achieve anything demanded of it in the Second inspires all the speeches at the Conference. All the speakers, forgetting the volcanic soil on which their plans are built, instead of advocating less ambitious and more practical problems, repeat unanimously that, from the international point of view, "the Five Year Plan is a victory for socialism, and the future belongs to the dictatorship of the proletariat and not to the bourgeoisie" (Molotov).

The first political task of the Second Five Year Plan, according to the resolution of the Conference, is the complete liquidation of capitalist elements in Russia and the entire abolition of classes in general. Though admitting that some *petit-bourgeois* aspirations were likely to survive even the Second Five Year Plan, Molotov holds that, at the end of it, all peasants would be members of collective farms and that, therefore, there would be no place in the life of the country for small peasant ownership, "which," he said, "had for centuries existed in Russia and had left its mark on the psychology of the peasantry." The peasantry, in future, will consist of "active and conscious" builders of Socialism.

The chief economic problem of the Second Five Year Plan, according to Molotov, lies, first, in the sphere of consumption and production; secondly, in the elimination of the struggle between town and country; and, thirdly, in a higher level of cultural development. Consumption per head of population must, according to all the speakers, and even to the resolution of the Conference itself, be increased twice or threefold.

The primary financial task of the Five Year Plan, according to Grinko, is not the abolition of money and the disappearance of exchange in production and distribution, but the accumulation of national income. The abolition of money and of exchange economy

at the present stage of Socialist construction is considered by the leaders of the Communist Party in Russia to be anti-bolshevist in principle.

Here, I would venture to predict that if things go on as they do at present, Bolshevism will come to mean autocratic State Socialism; nothing will remain of the "scientific Socialism" of Karl Marx.

The accumulation of capital under the Second Five Year Plan must, according to Grinko, proceed along lines quite different from those of the First Five Year Plan. During the first quinquennium, accumulation of capital was achieved mainly by socialisation of industry, taxation of private incomes and private capital, and utilisation of private savings. For the second quinquennium, not much of private capital was likely to be left; industry and agriculture will be socialised, and the main source of accumulation of capital would be the profit-making capacity of all enterprises—whether industrial, commercial or agricultural. Every enterprise must endeavour to bring profit to the State.

But while advocating this principle of profit-making for every enterprise, with an increased turnover of money and goods, the present Commissary of Finance did not forget to mention another important source of income which must not be neglected and which must be dealt with most carefully—"the money income of those who were formerly proletarians and peasants, but who are now proletarians and peasants no longer . . . whose incomes will grow with great rapidity."

The 17th Conference of the Communist Party considered the main political, economic and financial problems of the Second Five Year Plan and drew up an elaborate maximum programme for the development of the various branches of industry. This programme is very much like all other maximum programmes worked out by social-democratic parties elsewhere, in which are outlined the ideal conditions of industry, housing, education, standard of life, etc. The final note of the Conference was struck by Kuibyshev, who said that "The Five Year Plan has transformed Russia from an agricultural into an agricultural-industrial country; 57·5 per cent. of the national income of the U.S.S.R. has been derived from industry, transport and the building industry, and only 22·9 per cent. of it comes from agriculture." "We shall begin the Second Five Year Plan equipped with highly-organised industries, built up on modern lines. We shall rebuild our country with our own hands and with the help of our own machines. This will prove to the whole world

the advantages of socialist methods and the soundness of a planned economy."

While admitting certain shortcomings of the First Five Year Plan, Kuibyshev, consciously or unconsciously, emulates Stalin and outlines six points upon which the success of the Second Five Year Plan must depend. These six points are : the revolutionary activity of the Party, the fight with the "bureaucratic poison" among the rank and file of the builders of the Plan, the improvement in the quality of work done, rationalisation of the management of industry, a perfect wage system, and the creation of efficient technical staffs.

The ultimate purpose of the Second Five Year Plan, according to Kuibyshev's ambitious declaration, is the complete economic independence of Russia from the outside capitalist world. "It does not mean," he says, "that we want to create an entirely self-contained State, but we do want to be in a position where we can dictate our own terms; we shall buy goods from the outside capitalist world if we want to buy; we shall sell our goods to them if we want to do so."

These are the outlines of the Second Five Year Plan as envisaged by the Soviet authorities; they believe, sincerely and fanatically, in its fulfilment, and they want the people of Russia to believe in it, too.

S. P. TURIN.

THE SOKOL MOVEMENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

I.

THE Sokols represent the largest voluntary organisation of the Czechoslovak people; they are banded together into units, that is local companies, the total of which, including branches, is 3,130. In accordance with their statutes these units "aim at improving the physical and moral strength of the Czechoslovak people in the spirit of Tyrš and Fügner," and they seek to attain that aim by encouraging regular physical exercises on the part of men, women and young people; by arranging lectures, meetings, discussions, concerts, exhibitions, amusements, theatrical performances, festivals and other recreations. They also encourage community singing and music; they organise and support institutions such as libraries, reading-rooms and book stores which promote the common Sokol welfare. In addition to these more private activities they endeavour to make the Sokol idea widely known and attractive to the general public by tours, excursions, competitions and public displays. The units are grouped in 52 "clans," together forming the Community of Czechoslovak Sokols (ČOS). This supreme body supports and controls the activity of the units, thus ensuring harmony of purpose and continuity in the aims laid down.

It is obvious that the Sokols are chiefly educational in intention, originating as they did with Tyrš, whose ideal was the harmonious development of every individual's capacities, both physical and mental, in accordance with the models of classical perfection and harmony. But it would be erroneous to argue from the name of "Sokol Gymnastic Unit" that they are merely gymnastic in character. The means laid down for acquiring this ideal sufficiently show the breadth and scope of the Sokol intentions. The variety of education afforded is so great that a separation into physical and mental training is inadmissible, and it is an education submitted to by adults (those of 18 years and over), children of school age (6 to 14) and adolescents (14 to 18). Every member is required to be of Czechoslovak or other Slavonic nationality (exceptions to be authorised by the Sokol central body only), to be of irreproachable morality and to carry out the duties and tasks imposed on him or her by the authorities, in heart and mind no less than in the letter.

The chief obligations undertaken in matters of personal opinion, are not to belong, while a member of the Sokol movement, to any political party whose programme is opposed to Sokol principles (this means in practice the clerical and communist parties), and not consciously or voluntarily to assist clerical aims in any way. At the beginning of 1930 the total of adult members enrolled in the Sokol units was 352,888, of whom 252,681 were men and 100,207 women; of this total, 91,205 (56,376 men and 34,829 women), or some 25 per cent., participate in physical training. The number includes some men of an advanced age, even septuagenarians. All young people are obliged to engage in physical training. Those between 14 and 18 number 76,305, while the number of children under 14 is 199,943 (94,788 being boys and 105,155 girls). Male and female instructors in charge of the physical training form a total of 22,118 (13,008 men and 9,110 women). The mental and moral education of each unit is in the hands of teaching corps, each with its appointed functions, such, for example, as theatrical and puppet plays, singing and temperance. The total of those engaged in Sokol work in Czechoslovakia is, therefore, almost 630,000.

Work analogous to that of the Sokol but with a political or denominational trend is performed by three other organisations: the Association of Workers' Gymnastic Units, which combines physical training on Sokol lines with Social Democratic party principles; the Communist Federation of Proletarian Gymnastics, a title which explains itself; and the Orel (Eagle), a gymnastic organisation with a Catholic political basis. None of these bodies can compare in numbers with the Sokols. The first named contained, at the end of 1930, 1,220 units with 64,221 members (51,857 men and 12,364 women), 13,144 adolescents and 51,632 children, or close upon 137,000 in all. In numbers and also in importance the Orel falls behind, having only 112,629 adherents (72,037 adults, 15,755 adolescents and 30,358 children). The Communist Federation does not publish any statistics and its activities are closely associated with those of the communist party. All these gymnastic bodies together are therefore far from approaching the Sokols either in numbers or in national importance; they were all originally Sokol offshoots, the party or denominational upbringing of whose members prevented them from association with a non-party and non-denominational body like the Sokols. Their connection with the parent institution is obvious not only in such things as their uniform, public displays and congresses, but also in their organisation, structure, gymnastic and educational methods.

The Sokol clans in Czechoslovakia number 50, of which 27 are in Bohemia, containing 1,772 units and 131 branches, with over 200,000 adult members, 45,000 adolescents and 122,000 children. There are 14 units in Vienna, with a membership of 2,000 adults, forming the independent clan of Austria, and the other foreign units, in Bulgaria, France, Germany and South America, and also in London, are grouped in a special clan of 1,817 members.

In Moravia and Silesia there are 889 units and 142 branches with over 102,000 adult members, almost 26,000 adolescents and over 65,000 children. The Sokol movement has been organised in Slovakia only since the political revolution, having been forbidden under the old Hungarian regime; there are now 129 units and 16 branches, making 6 clans in all, with a membership of 15,000 adults, over 4,000 adolescents and 10,000 children. The movement has spread also to Carpathian Ruthenia, where there is one clan with 14 units and 2 branches, having a membership of over 3,000. In the eastern districts development is handicapped by the great distances between the units and the remoteness from headquarters.

The 52 clans together form the Community of Czechoslovak Sokols, which was not founded till 1904, and then only after long and fruitless attempts. Tyrš realised the great value of an united organisation of all the Sokols, and as early as 1867 he tried to join the score of units then existing into a "central association"; but the Austrian officials, suspecting political tendencies, vetoed the project then and again in 1872. Tyrš had been dead only a few weeks when efforts were made in 1884 to found the first Sokol clans in Bohemia: the first, that of Kolín, still bears his name. In 1889 the ČOS was founded and contained 11 Czech clans with 152 units and 18,000 adult members; in 1892 the Moravian Sokols united to form the Moravian-Silesian Sokol Community—both of these uniting in 1896 with that of Lower Austria in the "Czechoslav Sokol Association," a title which was changed to "Czech Sokol Community" in 1902. On 29 November, 1915, the community was officially disbanded, but after the political revolution, when the movement had gained ground in Slovakia, it was restored and in 1920 was renamed the Community of Czechoslovak Sokols. It embraces in a single organised entity all the Sokols at home and abroad—except those in America, which have their own administration. The premises of the central body are in "Tyrš House," Prague, which was erected at a cost of 24,000,000 Czech crowns by the Sokols themselves without any external assistance. The Sokol Home was enlarged by the conversion in 1925 of the old Michna

Palace in Malá Strana, which was equipped with a model gymnasium, baths and training grounds. All the meetings of the central committees take place there, and there is a regular training school which spends more than half a million crowns annually in training instructors and professionals in the various physical training methods.

Eight hundred and forty-three of the 3,130 units and branches have their own training premises; the others train in schools or local halls, only 124 being still without any premises. There is a great development in summer training and playing grounds; the number of bathing resorts and camping sites is also growing, for training work is being increasingly supplemented, especially in recent years, by national gymnastics, games and the various forms of physical training which were formerly the prerogative of purely sporting organisations. The Sokol statutes have accordingly included, in addition to their regular training, games, touring, camping, riding, water sports, skating, ski-ing, fencing and shooting Long and high jumping, running and the other athletic exercises also form part of the regular training, especially in the summer months. Increasing emphasis is being laid in recent years on physical training in the open air. Playing and summer grounds were until recently the exception, but now there are only 840 units without them, while 94 units have their own bathing place. Mountain hostels have also been erected in suitable places by some of the clans or societies.

All financial expenditure incurred by the Sokols in their educational and training work is covered by the members themselves. The funds obtained as a result of State assistance are quite negligible, and the bulk of the income is derived from subscriptions, amusements, theatres, films, etc. There are no paid Sokol officials. In accordance with one of the first of the Sokol principles, many thousands of teachers, instructors and officials give their services entirely free, without thought of profit or glory, to the common cause. Only the central body authorises an expenditure of 2 million crowns for annual current needs. If the holdings of the clans and units are reckoned in, and the movable and especially the immovable property of all kinds, we have a good idea of the great importance and standing of the Sokols both economically and socially. The volunteer principle, the ideals of self-sacrifice on behalf of others are applied in practice, each individual serving and helping his neighbour and the body corporate, giving effective assistance to the needy, the unfortunate and all who are less advantageously

placed. Very many of the units, almost all the clans, and of course the central body, have special funds which enable assistance to be given to members who are old, unemployed, injured or ill. For example, the Sokol Health Fund for recuperation at the seaside and in the mountains; but most important of all is the independent Accident Insurance Society which spends over a million crowns yearly in rendering assistance. The financial independence of the Sokols is made possible only by voluntary sacrifice. As, however, the growing claims on the Sokol are frequently beyond the means of the members, who are for the most part drawn from the poorer classes, attempts have recently been made to supplement the resources obtained by various ambitious schemes.

2. *Physical and Mental Education.*

In the firm conviction that physical and mental strength are complementary in every human organism, Tyrš determined to give practical application to the doctrine *mens sana in corpore sano* in his training system and methods. The Sokol education is of the widest possible scope: it encourages the systematic development of the muscles, the correct functioning of the physical organs and the cultivation of the entire nervous system. The training is so constituted as to develop all mental qualities at the same time. Habits of self-confidence, resolution and presence of mind are formed; will-power and perseverance are strengthened, quickness of mind and appreciation of beauty are encouraged, discipline and the spirit of sacrifice are inculcated. The idea that all individuals shall make their personal interests and feelings subservient to the common good builds up a corporate body strongly endowed with a sense of brotherhood. This distinguishes Tyrš's method from all other educational and gymnastic systems, for it puts a check on every kind of individualism hurtful to the community. It aims, in a Czech and Slovak spirit, at uniting the "brothers" and "sisters" of the same nation into a great band, ready to perform great achievements for the common welfare. There is therefore a fine harmony of individual and corporate spirit; in team training and exercises the individual is merged in the whole, and his personal efforts or skill contribute to the general success. The Sokol method is not restricted to specially apt or gifted individuals, but endeavours to adapt itself to all by advancing from easy exercises "to the highest goal"; the competitive spirit, which can so easily degenerate into unfriendliness and jealousy, is repressed by Tyrš's command of "rivalry in harmony," the insistence on

pleasure in a comrade's success. His method and, consequently, the Sokol method of physical training aims at raising the general standard of bodily fitness of the whole nation; this explains the choice of simple, attractive and varied appliances graded according to the physiological needs and capacities of different ages and sexes. The Sokol training is therefore in no sense one-sided; in addition to gymnastic exercises, which were chiefly in vogue before the war, attention is paid to athletics and games. The variety of training methods is evident also from the system of organisation in the central body, where there are two controlling sets of officials for men and for women (on the technical side the women are entirely autonomous). There are a series of special commissions, for Defence, for Sokol Riding, for Medical Examination and scientific investigation, and again Commissions for winter sports, for swimming, canoeing and rowing, and finally for games and competitions, and for fencing. The specialised schools of instruction turn out over 560 instructors annually. Thus every season of the year is utilised for Sokol physical training; but the foundation of everything is the practice lesson, methodically organised and divided so as to afford the whole body harmonious and varied exercise, and to cultivate certain desirable mental and moral qualities.

The Sokol educational activity only developed at a later stage, but its beginnings must be sought in the time of Tyrš, who proclaimed and fostered Sokol thought by word of mouth and in print. The same lines are followed today when each unit has an educational corps with an instructor at the head. It does not aim at providing technical education, but moulds the character according to Sokol principles: it appeals to young people and adults and begins by giving each new member basic instructions on the movement, partly orally in special classes, and partly by printed matter. It then offers instruction in accordance with various educational methods, for which there are special committees. The variety and scope of this work is shown by the fact that in the year 1931 alone there were more than 88,000 addresses, 12,600 lectures, 7,200 excursions, over 9,000 theatrical representations, 7,000 puppet shows, 900 concerts and 135 exhibitions and gymnastic performances.

The central educational body pays special attention to every branch of this work; all activities are followed, the principles of physical health and the tasks connected with social activity are made known to the public; singing competitions are organised at the summer festivals, and many units have musical societies and choirs of their own. General educational questions, artistic and

æsthetic education, and, lastly, questions of public life, are not neglected. There are also special commissions for education through the theatre and puppet plays, a competition in this field being included this year for the first time in the programme of the All-Sokol Congress. A special fortnightly course for instructors is arranged annually at headquarters, and in addition each clan is bound to provide a similar course at least once in two years.

There is great press activity. Every Sokol library is obliged to have a technical section dealing with the movement, and instructive and recreational readings are given there. In 1931 there were 3,090 unit libraries with 643,000 volumes. The Sokol Publishing Company issues some special readers, technical works, popular books and pamphlets. Particular mention may here be made of the Jubilee edition of the collected works of Tyrš.

The Sokols also issue numerous periodicals. The monthly *Sokol*, founded by Tyrš in 1871, deals with the movement, its theory and practice; while the weekly *Věstník sokolský* (Sokol Herald), with a weekly circulation of 40,000, deals with administration. There are also four other monthlies: *Vzkříšení* (Regeneration), *Sokolské Besedy* (Sokol Talks), with 25,000 readers, *Cvičitel* (The Instructor) and *Cvičitelka* (The Instructress), and the *Sokolský Vzdělavatel* (Sokol Educator). Besides this, every clan issues a monthly, and even some of the bigger units have recently begun to issue their own bulletins.

3. *The Influence of the Sokols in the National Revival.*

The present state of the Sokols, their organisation and educational activity on the physical and mental side is founded on the Sokol idea as formulated by Tyrš and his fellow workers at the beginning of the 'sixties of last century. Special merit is due to Jindřich Fügner, the Grégr brothers, both of them leading Czech politicians, and Professor Tonner for having made Tyrš's ideal intelligible to the people and capable of realisation in the Sokol organisation. The classical ideal, which Tyrš cherished throughout life, home traditions and contemporary philosophy, applied to the needs of a nation awakening from long mental lethargy, were welded into an ideal which was to complete the patriotic efforts of previous generations.

When political and religious persecution, following the battle of the White Mountain (1620), deprived the Czechs of all sources of cultural life and of their existence as an independent people, when the country was laid waste by the Thirty Years' War and estranged

from the peasantry, material poverty and mental darkness seemed to herald a gloomy future for a nation in whose history many glorious pages had been written. The tenacity with which the remnant clung to its native language and religious traditions, despite the Counter-Reformation and the pressure of Germanisation, enabled the national consciousness and a knowledge of Czech to linger on at least in the thatched cottages of the villagers. These miserable remnants of the one-time glorious nation of Charles IV, George Poděbrad, John Hus, Chelčický, Žižka and Comenius had to suffice for the efforts of the first national awakeners. Spurred on by the glory of the past and the new spirit of liberty, equality and fraternity, they set themselves to revive the dulled national consciousness, they searched for a mental pabulum suitable to the level of an oppressed nation, they endeavoured to foster and purify a forgotten and neglected language. That is the first period of our regeneration.

The next generation followed in their footsteps, and its tasks increased with the growing consciousness of the different classes. Real poets appear, drawing their inspiration partly from the rich store of native poetry and partly from world movements in philosophy and poetry. Science begins to be studied not only in the domains of philology and history, but also in politics. And when the mighty flame of the French Revolution broke out for the third time in 1848, our nation no longer looked on, cowed with terror, but, intoxicated with the breath of freedom, was filled with the hope of securing its own freedom and that of its Slav brothers. It might perhaps have rushed headlong into the uncertainty of revolution, had it not been kept in the steady path of development by sober political leaders, and hearkened to the wise counsel of Havlíček and Palacký, who were convinced that complete national regeneration and political independence were in store only for a coming generation which should be materially, mentally and morally prepared for it.

A flood of new and fruitful ideas now arose in Czech hearts and lasted for some decades. The old national tradition was revived, the old books reprinted and a new literature interpreted to the nation its glorious past. The national consciousness which had fallen so low was further stimulated by the idea of Slav reciprocity, and practical efforts were made to promote the cultural, linguistic and religious rapprochement of all the Slavs. When these dreams of unification proved to be in the main Utopian, efforts were concentrated upon reviving the traditions broken by the White Mountain. The Sokol movement has an important place in this great work,

uniting in itself all the pent-up strength of the previous periods. It taught the now awakened nation true patriotism, tireless and unselfish perseverance to that end, even as Havlíček had taught it before Tyrš and as Masaryk is now teaching it. It proclaimed the need of work all the more vigorous and persistent in view of the smallness of our nation in the great European family. The idea of Slav reciprocity was taken over by the Sokols into their programme—not as a slogan, but as a step towards effective, organised work of the Slav nations for a common aim. Moreover it introduced into our national programme the idea of defence, which is only a result of a broader, more general idea, namely, that spiritual must be supplemented by physical regeneration. For if Tyrš's predecessor, Karel Havlíček, recognised that his own generation must die in order to make way for a better generation that should enter the promised land, he was directly calling for someone to continue his work and prepare new generations for the decisive struggle. Six years after his death this work was begun by Dr. Miroslav Tyrš and his great Sokol project, which aimed at creating "a new race, stouter than its predecessors, which, in a strong body preserving a strong will, would once more unite with the dovelike meekness of the Slav the falcon-like boldness of more glorious times; a race which would recognise rights of others, while holding fast to its own, and in days of tempest and storm would weld itself as of old into an impregnable barrier, on which all attacks of our enemies would be shattered."

Such was Tyrš's programme of the new race and the new man. And this programme of renaissance, the ultimate goal of the Sokol efforts, still remains unchanged. The requirements of every period demand its elastic adaptation; methods change and new goals are set up, that Sokoldom—and through it the whole nation—may ever go forward. Hence Tyrš's demand for continual advance, and hence his watchword: "He who is Czech is a Sokol," for a new race cannot be created except by the education of the greatest number of the members of a nation.

This twofold tendency—internal, leading to the intensification of the nation's education by Sokoldom, and external, the spreading of the Sokol idea throughout the broad masses of the nation—fills the history of seventy years, with their temporary failures but also their notable successes.

4. The Importance of the Sokol Movement.

Ever since 1862, when the first germ of the future Sokol was founded, almost till his death, Tyrš was the welding spirit of the

whole movement, partly by his activity in the Prague School and partly, since 1871, through his periodical *Sokol*. Then, under inspiration from Prague, special units began to form, not only in Bohemia and Moravia, but also in the other Slav countries, among the Slovenes, Croats, Poles, and Serbs and also among the various Slavs of America. But for him the movement would have wilted away or perhaps become incorporated with other societies, and disappeared without having any influence on the nation which was to be its *raison d'être*. For twenty years—with small breaks—he expounded, explained, conducted propaganda, but also defended the Sokol idea against its enemies, and, above all, against the misunderstandings which were even more dangerous—the mistaken conception that it was mere empty parade, a useless waste of time. The many articles in which Tyrš sought to explain the fundamental principles and correct interpretation of the Sokol idea, are a proof of how much effort was needed. He laid down the duty of unity of aim among all Sokol units, leaving the possibility of a difference of opinion only in so far as the means are concerned; and for that reason he rejected, as showing a lack of comprehension of the Sokol idea, such efforts as to transform the units into fire brigade companies. The danger that the Sokol idea would come to grief through being misunderstood or would degenerate into empty, formal patriotism, was especially great because the movement spread with unnatural rapidity, being almost from the outset a mass demonstration. The public displays and festivals, the flags and uniform, were also a danger, in that they caused the enrolment of some members who did not realise the final goal.

In one direction at least there was never any danger of misunderstanding, namely, the need for preparing a politically enslaved people for complete national and political freedom. Tyrš expressed this goal in the quotation from Lucian on the subject of the Olympic training exercises in ancient Greece: "For we reap from them a greater advantage both for the competitors and the whole State: to wit, the conflict in common. It is a reward of another kind which awaits all the citizens of the State, and the wreath here is not of laurel, nor of ivy, nor of olive, but is another wreath, which includes within it everything that intoxicates a man—the freedom of every individual in particular and of a common fatherland in general, its prosperity and glory, the preservation of the family and of the magnificence of patriotic festivals, in short, all the fairest things that any one might wish to be granted him by the gods." Work and education for political independence was the most pressing

and also the most popular task confronting the movement before the outbreak of war. Opposition to the national, political and cultural aims of a foreign dynasty and government was cultivated in the units, while the idea of Slavonic reciprocity was encouraged by excursions to other Slav countries and by participation of other Slav nations in the All-Sokol congresses. National harmony and the consciousness of a common goal were thus fostered on practical lines

A nation which was gathering all its strength for the final struggle of liberation needed, above all, physical strength and capacity, discipline and harmony, and enthusiasm for the common cause. Consequently the new current, which arose in the spiritual life of the nation not long after Tyrš's death, that "Realism" of which Masaryk was the exponent, remained for a certain time foreign to the Sokol movement, for it was felt to be all too critical, and even to serve as a damper on enthusiasm through its cautious outlook and surety of conviction. But the last phase of regeneration has shown that our national struggle needed both currents. The realist leader Masaryk became also the leader of our movement abroad during the world war; those trained as Sokols, the true disciples of Tyrš, rallied to the standard, full of enthusiasm and ready to sacrifice even their lives for freedom. Then it became evident that Sokoldom had made its preparations successfully and surely. Schools, literature and home training had of course led the way, but there was many a fighter in our ranks for whom the Sokols had meant everything and had imparted the courage and enthusiasm needed for the great sacrifice. The leader of our legions himself, Masaryk, bore witness that in the war "the ideals of Fügner and Tyrš had proved themselves." An extract from a letter written to his parents by one of the leading organisers of our Russian legions, explaining why he had enlisted as a volunteer, will show what the Sokol movement meant. Josef J. Švec writes as follows: "I expect you will find it easy to guess why I am acting in this way. I might have stayed comfortably in the warmth of the Caucasus and been as safe as other people, but I am drawn not, I think, by a desire for adventure or glory (on the contrary I feel I shall not get out alive), but there is something else which forces me to take this step. It is honour, the Sokol honour, and that must remain unsullied; I see that this is a fight for the freedom of us Czechs, and it would be a shame if I were to stay at home and did not help, even if it cost me my life, in the fight for a holy cause." So, too, did Jan Čapek, the founder of the Italian legions, issue the summons to the Czech

prisoners at Padua: "Brother Sokols! Turn words into deeds! In these great days let us show that we have felt and understood what our watchword at home means: 'He who is a Czech is a Sokol.' The call of your country is, 'He who is Czech is a Volunteer,' and the call is to you who have followed in the steps of Tyrš and have made yourself ready to defend it . . ." The Paris Sokols to a man enrolled as volunteers as soon as the war broke out and enlisted in the French army: of the 600 who joined up 200 fell and another third were wounded. The English Sokols formed a Czech detachment in the British army, and the same happened in America. The Sokol spirit of brotherhood and democracy found an echo in all our troops abroad: without distinction of military rank all the soldiers used the familiar address of *ty* (tutoiement) and addressed each other as "brother." The military organisation of our legions was modelled on that of the Sokols, with their qualities of voluntary but strict discipline, courage and readiness to place the general above the particular interest—qualities which in the decisive hour of conflict gave our arms that inner strength without which there can be no victory.

On 28 October, 1918, the first and most urgent task was achieved; the movement now had to find a new goal. It therefore returned to Tyrš and out of his national programme formed new lines of action, in harmony with the changed conditions of a liberated country. It was determined, however, to remain faithful to the aims which Tyrš had laid down once for all and at the same time to obey his behest of continual motion and progress. The movement which in the early days of our new-found liberty had been disorganised, now settled down to the work of consolidating the new State. The establishment of the Sokol forces in Slovakia when it was attacked by the Magyars and the response to the emergencies of the republic, the ready assistance against the Communist attempt at revolution, these tasks followed naturally from the pre-war Sokol programme.

But it was not enough to be the guardian of independence at home and abroad in times of danger. By its ideals and the personalities it produced the movement had helped to create our new State, and its duty was now to help in internal construction, in the spirit of the ideas which had governed it from the beginnings. It was, above all, the *national programme*, created by a long succession of the best Czech brains, which was to come into its own in the inner life of our republic. *Democracy*, which demands close co-operation in State affairs for the general well-being—this is the

actual outcome of the popular, democratic spirit infused into the movement by Fügner, Tyrš and their fellow workers. Brotherhood, to which Sokoldom had educated its adherents in the spirit of our past history, was to come into its own in our new State as *zeal for social justice*. And lastly, the movement was also to take its part in making of Czechoslovakia one of the *progressive* countries, because progress was one of Tyrš's well-known precepts for every sphere of Sokol activity. Into its new post-war programme the Sokol movement also introduced the cultivation of religious honour and progress, based upon Tyrš's "religion of enlightenment and love," and also on the religious activities of its great member, President Masaryk. In 1924 the VIIth Sokol congress expressly laid down, in accordance with Masaryk's principles, that "Every loyal, truly conscious Sokol shall be a defender of our Republic and our democracy, and as such a political and social worker in it"

These resolutions, binding on every member, are to become the groundwork of a new citizen education in the Sokol units.

The VIIth congress also laid down new guiding principles, aimed at the elimination of all thorny questions between the different Slav nations, the promotion of better understanding of each other in a democratic spirit, and a perception of the great mission to which all Slavs are called. Here, too, a great and important work awaits the Czechoslovak movement.

5. *Sokol History.*

Not only the present position of the Sokol idea, but also its organisation and educational methods are the result of considered reflection during several generations. Tyrš's work culminated outwardly in the first All-Sokol congress, which he arranged in Prague in 1882, on the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of the first Sokol unit. This festival was attended also by the Poles, Slovenes and Croats, and so set an example to posterity. Ever since then the connections with other Slav Sokols have remained and been strengthened by mutual intercourse. The first excursion outside our own territory was the visit to Cracow in 1884, followed by that to Ljubljana in 1888. In 1889 the newly-formed "Czech Sokol Association" in Bohemia took the important step of organising a visit to Paris. This was the first appearance of the Sokols in the international arena, and their model teams secured three first prizes in the competitions open to strangers. Other tours and competitions followed, at Nancy, Lyon, Périgueux, Nice, Arras, Brussels, Zürich, etc. And many were the tours to Poland and to

Jugoslav countries, the more important being that to Zagreb and Montenegro in 1906. In 1907 (at the 5th All-Sokol Congress) international gymnastic competitions were arranged in Prague, resulting in a victory for the Sokols, who ever since then have held almost continually the pride of place. In 1909 the Sokol team gained the second prize at the international competitions in Luxemburg, the first going to the French; but the defeat was wiped out in the following year in London, when the Sokols won the silver shield contest; and again at Turin and Paris in 1913 the Sokols won the first prize. Our tours to America in 1909 and to Belgrade and Sofia in 1910 must also be included in our victorious challenge against international teams.

Foreign interest in the movement was also shown by the presence of representatives of foreign gymnastic bodies at the six congresses which took place before the war, and served to make the movement known not only as physical training but also as a national idea. They were our "Olympic Games," and were conceived in accordance with Tyrš's desire, as the manifestation of a great common goal and the preparation thereto: the liberation of the nation. The mass exercises, the fine endurance and the symbolic representations of athletic effort made the meaning of Sokoldom clear even to foreigners; no wonder that this was expressed in the flattering words: "They are not gymnasts, but an army." The All-Sokol congresses also served as an index of the spread of the Sokol idea. The first, in 1882, was attended by 1,600 Sokols (720 performers); the second in 1891 by 7,000 (2,310 performers); the third in 1895 by 10,000 (4,270 performers); the fourth in 1901 by 22,000 (7,000 performers); the fifth in 1907 by 45,000 (11,000 performers), and the last of the pre-war series in 1912, which was also the first congress of the Slav Sokol Union, by 80,000 adult members (21,400 performers).

These congresses had immense importance for the idea of Slavonic reciprocity. Tyrš knew that "the Sokol idea is acquiring an undreamt-of importance for all the Slavs with whom we live in the same state, and is becoming a new and mighty link, more effective, sure and lasting than all others." Greater importance attached to the movement by the presence of representatives of the Slavonic nations at the joint festivals—in the sight of foreigners, chiefly our friends. The second congress in 1891 was attended for the first time by Frenchmen and similarly at the third congress in 1895, not only Slovenes and Croats, but also 212 Poles took part. At subsequent congresses there was an increasing number of visitors, that

of 1907 being attended by no less than 450 Slovenes, 800 Croats, 121 Serbs, 116 Bulgars and 51 Russians, while the Poles were represented unofficially. The greatest manifestation of Slavonic reciprocity, on the eve of the world war, was the " Slav Congress " of 1912, when 1,100 Serbs, 900 Croats, 500 Slovenes, 300 Bulgars, 800 Russians and 80 Ruthenes were present, together with official representatives of the Russian, Serbian and Montenegrin Governments. Non-Slav foreigners also had an opportunity of seeing how this Slavonic brotherhood was winning more and more ground, for the fourth congress was visited by representatives of the Paris municipality, and the fifth by visitors from Belgium, France, England, Scotland, Greece, Spain and Hungary. At the congress of 1912 1,000 American Sokols were welcomed in the old country; there were more foreign delegates than ever, and there were important demonstrations of solidarity with the Jugoslavs, and against Austrian foreign policy.

The world war brought severe persecution upon the Sokols at home; but the work was simply transferred abroad, where the Sokol spirit in our legions became a living inspiration to our troops in their fight for the liberation of the nation. After the war the movement assumed undreamt-of proportions. In 1862, when the first units were formed, there were only 9 units with 265 adult members, by the 'nineties there were more than 40,000 adherents, and by the outbreak of war this number had grown to 1,100 units with 130,000 adult members. But after the war this total again increased more than threefold, till in 1920 there were 2,630 units with 557,000 adherents, and since then there has been a steady increase. Despite great difficulties of transport and communication the seventh congress of 1920 proved successful beyond all expectations: exercises were performed by 24,000 men, 15,000 women, about 20,000 adolescents, and 11,000 children, while over 300,000 took part in the triumphant procession through the streets of Prague.

After the war our Sokols began to take part in the international Olympic games and won successes at Antwerp in 1920, at Ljubljana in 1922, at the Olympic Games of Paris in 1924, at Lyons in 1926, at Amsterdam in 1928 and at Luxemburg in 1930. They are not taking part in this year's games at Los Angeles, but are getting ready for the ninth All-Sokol Congress at home, when the Slav Sokol Union will take part, including the Sokols of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Jugoslavia and the Russian émigrés; negotiations are on foot for the participation also of the Wends and Bulgarians. This

congress will be in honour of the 100th anniversary of the birth of Miroslav Tyrš, the founder of the movement, and also of the first congress which took place half a century ago. The stadium at Strahov will hold 15,000 performers and 150,000 spectators; in the smaller stadium there will be competitions in running, games and athletics together with joint gymnastic displays begun with the winter ski-ing competitions; but the chief days of the congress are in June when on the 12th the school-children of the units from Prague and the immediate neighbourhood will perform; the 16th to 20th will be given up to the children of the secondary schools; the 26th is the day of the Sokol adolescents. The main programme is from 4 to 6 July, and on the latter day an imposing march past of the Sokols will give the salute to the representative of our glorious national history, John Hus of pious memory, and will also honour its greatest "brother," President Masaryk. These celebrations, like those which have gone before, will serve as an impulse for the fresh endeavour in the national cause, by tightening the bonds that unite the Slav nations, and strengthening the solidarity between Czechoslovakia and all other countries which pursue the ideals of perfection, health, strength, beauty and peaceful intercourse.

LADISLAV JANDÁSEK.

Brno.

THE POLISH CAUSE IN ENGLAND A CENTURY AGO.

ON the news of a rising in Warsaw, in November, 1830, it was said in England that the Polish cause was too chimerical to appeal to a commercial nation, too poetical for a sober-minded country.

Thus, while war was waged on the Vistula, the English Government stood aloof, however just the Polish cause may have seemed to it; while the Russian army trampled upon the Kingdom of Poland, the English community took no action, however warm its sympathies with oppressed Poland may have been. Except for one remonstrance, rather mildly phrased, which Lord Palmerston made to the Imperial Court at St. Petersburg; except for some occasional voices in the English press and in English poetry, the ten months of Polish revolution were allowed to pass unnoticed.

The distracted state of England during the Reform Bill campaign was in no small measure accountable for her indifference to the Polish struggle for independence. On the other hand, a mist of ignorance surrounded all things Polish; the claims of Poland upon the sympathy and assistance of the English people found no effective response, owing, chiefly, to their inability to understand the real state of affairs in a country so remote and so different from their own.

Wreaths of elaborate rhetoric had been thrown on the grave of Poland's independence by Burke and Fox and Mackintosh; inspired by Ossianic melancholy rather than by a virile political conviction, they soon withered away. And then the poetry of Thomas Campbell and the novel of Miss Porter were left alone to recall the faint memory of a country which had been excluded from the family of European nations. It was upon the *Pleasures of Hope* and *Thaddeus of Warsaw* that the English people first drew for enlightenment about Poland and her fate.

As time went on, the question of the restoration of Poland began to assume the character of a practical reality; the preponderance of France on the Continent having been reduced after Waterloo, another danger to the idea of the European Balance of Power began to loom large before the eyes of English statesmen: the encroaching spirit of Russian domination. It was only then, and not until then, that Poland entered more and more intimately into the circle of English political ideas, as a factor to be reckoned with in the task of preserving the European Balance of Power.

The principal obstacle to a just appreciation of the Polish struggle for independence in 1831 by the English people was their uneasiness about the word "Revolution." The Tory party was fighting hard against all attempts at carrying into effect a reform of Parliament, and regarded every revolution on the Continent as something that was sure to become a new support to the Whig policies at home. The Whigs, again, in spite of their avowed sympathy with the Polish cause, hesitated to give voice to it in the Houses of Parliament for fear it might divert attention from the paramount object of their internal policy. And similar was the attitude of the people at large, outside of Parliament. This was well reflected in a *Letter on the Affairs of Poland*, published by Montagu Gore in the course of 1831. "Though a general impression exists in this country in the favour of Poland," he wrote, "it may not be amiss to offer a few remarks, and to detail a few facts, with the twofold object of giving fresh impulse to the zeal of the friends of Poland, and of removing the scruples of the timid whom the word *revolution* may have hitherto deterred from espousing her cause. Though let me observe that this squeamishness about revolutions is somewhat novel in England; for till lately the proudest boast of a Briton has been that his ancestors were revolutionists, and achieved the revolution of 1688; and, in point of fact, all the blessings this country has enjoyed may be attributed to the influence of that revolution."

But, as soon as the contest over the Reform Bill was at an end, the Tories as well as the Whigs became aware that the fall of Poland was not a real issue in their party quarrels. It was then realised that the Polish question stood on a higher plane; that the issue was between despotism and liberty, of which last England had ever been an ardent champion; and that, instead of being regarded as a question between the English parties, it was in the balance of European Powers that it had to be considered, as a factor of determining importance.

This idea received a decided stimulus when a little band of well-wishers to the Polish cause resolved to form a "Literary Association of the Friends of Poland." It was called into existence on 25 February, 1832, Thomas Campbell, the poet, being elected President. The aims of the Association, as intimated in its *Articles*, were to be chiefly "literary." "The Literary Association of the Friends of Poland is instituted for the diffusion of general knowledge of the history and events of the ancient Kingdom of Poland, and for collecting all such information as may tend to preserve in the public mind of Great Britain a lively interest in the condition of that

country . . . The Society shall commence the formation of a Library, to consist especially of works treating on the history, geography, statistics and general literature of Poland, and also on the laws of nations and the Public Law of Europe . . . the Anniversary Meeting of the Society shall be held on 12 February, 12 February being the birthday of Th. Kosciuszko, one of the most exalted and magnanimous characters in the annals of mankind."

The example thus set by Thomas Campbell in London was soon followed by other towns, such as Hull, Warwick and Leeds. Nor was Scotland to remain unresponsive to her poet's heartfelt appeal for forming "Polish Societies"; profound homage was paid to his name in Glasgow, and the following resolution was carried: "That thanks be voted to our illustrious townsman, Thomas Campbell, the bard of Poland and of Hope, and the originator and President of the first Polish Association established in Britain."

The Polish Societies, disseminated all over Great Britain, kept in constant touch with the metropolitan headquarters, and carried on their work on the lines laid down by Thomas Campbell. The delivery of instructive lectures at stated intervals, the lending of books, the publishing of pamphlets or editing of monthly periodicals, such as the London *Polonia* or *The Hull Polish Record*, were the usual means of breaking the hitherto almost new and untrodden ground of the Polish question in England and of demonstrating that the rights of Poland were, as *The Hull Polish Record* puts it, "no sentimental or speculative illusion, but a truth susceptible of rigorous argument, and the legitimate subject of scientific and technical deduction from recognised and positive law."

The societies carried on their work of propaganda in two directions; on the one hand, it was Parliament they sought to penetrate in order clearly to place before the eyes of its members the justice of Poland's claims; on the other, efforts were made to rouse public opinion, so as to bring it to bear upon the proceedings of the Government in international affairs.

Drawing upon the rich resources of authentic and explicit information, which the London "Association" supplied, Members of Parliament found it possible to advocate the Polish cause in the light of true historical facts, and to found it in reason, law and justice. The crucial question was the breach by the Tsar of the Treaty of Vienna of 1815, by which the Kingdom of Poland had been granted a free Constitution, guaranteed by all the signatory Powers, including England and Russia. Provided with well-considered information and documents referring to the Treaty stipulations,

Cutlar Fergusson, Member of Parliament, addressed the House of Commons, in April, 1832, submitting the proposition "that the Emperor of Russia holds the sovereignty over Poland on the terms and conditions on which he received it from the Congress of Vienna and by no other title"; he denounced the rule of Nicholas over Poland as being made to rest, not on the Treaty but on conquest. In the debate on Fergusson's prolonged and detailed speech all Members enthusiastically declared their concurrence in the views which he expressed. The same fervour and unanimity were manifested during the next two debates on the Polish question in the course of the same year. However far from satisfactory, these were events of hopeful promise to public opinion, which had been roused by the indefatigable propaganda of the "Literary Association," and whose demands upon Parliament were thus partially met. "At length"—wrote the *Morning Herald* on the morrow of Fergusson's first motion—"the fate of Poland has awakened something like sympathy in the British House of Commons. It is a poor homage on the tomb of that departed independence, which, in the living agony of its great struggle with the giant despotism of the North, was deserted of all and met with neither sympathy nor support. It will not be honourably recorded in the future pages of history of the reforming House of Commons of England that it looked on, in silence, and with the most perfect indifference, while the great crime was perpetrated . . . The debate on Mr. Fergusson's motion presented the novelty in the House of Commons of a discussion in which there were no dissenters."

In the following period every opportunity was turned to account for laying before the House the question whether the obligations of treaties were properly observed on the part of Russia in respect of her policy in Poland; or what measures were being taken effectually to diminish the preponderance of Russia in Europe by an attempt to give justice to Poland. Of the many events in this connection, noted in Hansard's chronicle of Parliamentary debates, the most noteworthy took place on the eve of the Marquis of Londonderry's intended departure as British Ambassador to the Imperial Court of St. Petersburg, in 1835. The friends of Poland, who formed an overwhelming majority in Parliament, violently denounced the nomination on account of Londonderry's hostile attitude towards the Polish cause. Amidst a storm of indignation, which burst from every side of the House, the choice of the Government proved indefensible; the event was all the more awkward as it assumed the character of an issue between the Crown and Parliament. "It is

a disastrous occurrence,"—wrote Greville in his diary of 14 March—"If the Government should persist in the appointment, they would be beaten by a great majority, and the House of Commons would vote him out; if it is given up, it is a monstrous concession to the violence and power of the House of Commons, for however objectionable the appointment may have been, it is not so outrageous as to call for the interference of Parliament with the King's undoubted prerogative. It will probably lead, before long, to other encroachments upon the executive power, and we shall soon see the House of Commons interfering about everything." Eventually, Londonderry had to resign. But Greville writes, "It has altogether been a miserable affair! . . . I take it that the effect abroad will be prodigious, for though Londonderry resigns of his own accord, and Peel says he would have stood by him if he had not, the simple case is (and such will be the appearance of it all over Europe) that the King appointed Londonderry Ambassador to Russia, and the House of Commons cancelled the appointment." (Greville's Diary, 20. 3, 1835.)

The Londonderry affair was one of the greatest triumphs that the friends of Poland achieved in the British Parliament. The promotion of the cause they had set their heart upon was to continue, with a fair measure of success, until 1840 when, as a consequence of the Treaty of July, England drew closer to Russia, while her alliance with France became utterly disintegrated.

Until that time, Members of Parliament, when they took up the defence of Poland, never lacked the support of public opinion. And public opinion became, after the Reform Bill, an ever-increasing force. The part it was to play in the pro-Polish propaganda was fully realised at a meeting of the Hull "Polish Association," the President of which intimated that "the voice of the Ministers would be of no avail unless swelled into thunder by the millions of Englishmen." "Let that voice," he continued, "be heard in thunder in the North, until the despot trembled on his throne, ay, until that throne trembled under him, if he dare reject it."

This voice of public opinion caused great anxiety in those political circles in England which were apprehensive for the maintenance of undisturbed political relations with Russia. Even Lord Palmerston, however anti-Russian his attitude may have been in the last years of William IV, felt some uneasiness over the tone of the public protests, and the possible effects it might have on the policy of the Tsar. "With regard to the causes which have produced the great and almost universal hostility towards Russia in this country, there is no doubt that the treatment of Poland is among the foremost, and

that nothing has so much irritated the people of England against Russia and the Emperor as the vindictive severities and bitter cruelties inflicted upon the unfortunate Poles . . . There is nothing by which an English Ambassador could gain more credit than some mitigation of the exterminating policy which is now applied to the Polish nationality." (Palmerston to Lord Durham, British Ambassador in Russia, 31 May, 1836)

Lord Durham, who had set himself to cultivate good relations with Russia, complained, on his part, that the direction the Polish cause was taking in England was one of the greatest difficulties that stood in the way of his endeavours to establish a good understanding between London and St. Petersburg. Still, the Polish cause he took sincerely to heart. Whenever pleading with the Emperor on behalf of Poland, Lord Durham urged him to acts of clemency, and deprecated a system of absolute repression; he sought to bring home to him the fact that a new democratic era had set in, when public opinion should no longer be defied; that a system of liberal policy in Poland would not be a concession in favour of Revolutionaries, but an acquiescence in the laws of persistent historical evolution; acquiescence in the same laws which, in England, had necessitated the Parliamentary Reform, so much misapprehended, and so greatly and so unduly distrusted in Russian Government circles.

How anxious Nicholas I was to keep on good terms with England and English public opinion, in spite of his unabated policy of repression in Poland, is proved by his "ukaz of mercy" and other make-believe projects which were never to take real shape. In this connection a curious story is related by Greville in his "diary" (17 November, 1835), in reference to the Emperor's notorious speech to the municipality of Warsaw in 1835. "Melbourne mentioned at dinner on Sunday that it was not only quite correctly reported—rather understated—but that after he (Nicholas I) had so delivered himself, he met the English consul in the street, took him by the arm, walked about with him for an hour, and begged him not to be too hard upon him in his report to his Government . . . an anecdote evincing on the part of the autocrat, in the midst of the insolence of unbridled power, a sort of consciousness of responsibility to European opinion, and a deferential dread of that of England in particular."

The fact that what had at first been the standard doctrine of the "Literary Association" gradually became a settled opinion of the people of England at large, was due, in great measure, to the indefatigable exertions of Lord Dudley Coutts Stuart, who not only

was the very soul of the Association, but also, as Member of Parliament, fearlessly raised cardinal questions of foreign policy, and steadily advocated the expediency of keeping a firm check upon the encroachments of Russia. It was he, in the first place, who at all times kept alive that feeling of devotion to the Polish cause which might otherwise have easily died away after the first display of enthusiasm.

The interest in the Polish cause did not die away; it passed, for some time, into eclipse in the first era of Cobdenism and commercial pacifism, only to emerge, all the more strongly, on the outbreak of the Crimean war, which was regarded as a happy augury for the restoration of international justice and for the return of Poland to independence.

DR. TADEUSZ GRZEBIENIOWSKI.

GREECE AND SERBIA DURING THE WAR OF 1885.

THE news of the *coup d'état* of Philippopolis caused a most painful impression in Greece where Eastern Roumelia was regarded as a country to which Hellenism had undoubted rights. Its annexation by a power like Bulgaria, which was hostilely disposed to Greece and had views on Macedonia, could not but appreciably lessen the prestige of Greece in the East. Some months earlier an incident had occurred in Philippopolis which showed the nature of the relations between the two nationalities in Eastern Roumelia. On the name day of King George, the Bulgars had hauled down the Greek flag before the encouraging eyes of the authorities and attacked the Greeks as they celebrated in the consulate their king's birthday.

Fresh, too, were the disappointments suffered by Greece in 1878 and 1881, when she had succeeded in occupying only a part of the territories adjudged to her by the Treaty of Berlin.

There was a general conviction in Greece that the hour was drawing near when the country would be forced into war, and it was felt that she must not again remain inactive, as she had done in 1877, and let the suitable moment for action slip past her. The people therefore readily accepted the heavy sacrifices which the Government imposed on them, and the opposition was willing to forget political dissension for the sake of the national weal.

Public opinion was inflamed and rendered nervous by the unbridled demagoguery which then prevailed, thus making the task of the Government more difficult. In Athens and the provinces there were continual meetings at which street orators, for the most part men of repute holding good positions in public life, inflamed the passions of the populace.¹ This work was also supported by the Press. Nor had excitement abated in Crete, which was ready to go to war for union with Greece.

The Delyannis administration was roundly condemned for not having dispatched the army to Epirus and the fleet to Crete as soon

¹ D. Drosos, *Greece peacefully blockaded* (periodical). Melete, 1911, pp. 262-7, 346-49. By the same, *The problems of peaceful blockades*, Athens, 1912, pp. 299-322.

as the Philippopolis *coup d'état* became known, so that Greece, too, like Bulgaria, might have confronted Europe with a *fait accompli*. This view was also held by three members of the Government: the Minister of Church Affairs, A. Zygomalas; the Naval Minister, R. Roma; and the Minister of Justice, S. Antonopoulos. At first the Government seemed drawn to this view, for on 24 September it ordered immediate mobilisation and summoned an extraordinary meeting of Parliament. But soon the majority of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, Delyannis, considered that immediate action would be hazardous, and the three Ministers in question resigned.

The fact is that Delyannis had not the courage to face the opposition of public opinion, nor did he dare to risk exposing the country to a war against Turkey. He probably thought that the Powers would restore the *status quo* of events before the *coup d'état*. And he certainly believed that the Greek Government, by its strong show of preparations and readiness to obey the pressure of public opinion, would be able to force the hands of the Powers, and, despite its persistence in peace, wring a satisfactory solution, namely, the restoration of the frontiers adjudged in Berlin. The diplomatic activity of the Government began forthwith to be directed to this end, and repeated communications were dispatched to the European Powers, while military and naval preparation proceeded hot-foot. For Delyannis followed a policy which was "war-like in respect of the Greek people, and threatening but not devoid of conciliatory intentions in respect of the Powers."² But Greece was fated to "fill very exactly the rôle of a bogey which the Delyannis Cabinet imposed on her."³

Unlike the indecisive Delyannis, King Milan was determined on action. He it was who led and took charge of his Ministers, not one of whom, when it came to big questions of foreign policy, had the necessary experience for standing up to the King. When the *coup d'état* broke out, Milan was in Austria. He immediately returned to Belgrade, and on the day after his arrival (21 September) a meeting of the Cabinet took place under his chairmanship, to determine the attitude of Serbia in face of the new situation. The King's view was clear: the union of the two Bulgarias touched Serbian interests. By the Philippopolis *coup d'état* Bulgaria had become larger than Serbia and might one day occupy Macedonia. Serbia must therefore protest, and it was to her advantage to utilise the

² A. Aspreas, *Recent Political History of Greece*, vol. II, Athens, 1923, p. 160.

³ Drosos, *The problem of peaceful blockades*, p. 309.

Bulgarian violation of the Treaty of Berlin and to stress the necessity of a Balkan balance of power. If the Powers should insist on respect for the provisions of the treaty and re-establish the *status quo*, Serbia would consider herself satisfied, otherwise she would not hesitate to resort to arms in order to preserve the Balkan equilibrium.

As the Cabinet agreed with the King's views, it was resolved to mobilise and to summon a meeting of the Skupština at Niš to vote military credits.⁴

Having resolved to act, Serbia did not forget Greece. As early as 22 September the Premier and Foreign Minister, Milutin Garašanin, visited the Greek Chargé d'Affaires, G. Nazos, in Belgrade, and begged him to ask Delyannis "what the attitude of Greece would be towards the serious events which were being enacted," allowing it at the same time to be understood that Serbia regarded the moment as favourable for an entente between the two countries.⁵ Delyannis replied that he would discuss this question with King George, who, he said, was about to proceed to Athens.⁶

On 24 September Garašanin again expressed to Nazos his desire for joint action by Greece and Serbia in the event of the *status quo ante* not being restored in Eastern Roumelia. He explained that even without a previous understanding Serbia would act alone and march into Macedonia or Old Serbia, deeming the Treaty of Berlin non-existent and being persuaded that Greece would be drawn by what had happened into war.⁷ Two days later Garašanin returned to the same question, emphasising the necessity of an understanding between the two countries, and adding that Serbia was resolved to resort to arms in the event of her demands not being listened to by the Powers. He also expressed the opinion that if Serbia and Greece were to act jointly by appearing at the frontier, determined to risk everything, their demands would have a better hearing.⁸

To this Serbian *démarche*, vigorously if not very clearly expressed, the Greek Government responded without any particular zeal. It was not until 2 October that Delyannis informed Nazos of the receipt of his telegrams and requested him to consult with the Serbian Premier and acquaint himself with the ideas which in

⁴ St. Jovanović, *Vlada Milana Obrenovića* (The Rule of Milan Obrenović), vol. II, Belgrade, 1927, pp. 244-245.

⁵ Telegram of Nazos to Delyannis, 22 September, 1885 (Archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

⁶ Telegram of Delyannis to Nazos, 23 September, 1885.

⁷ Telegram of Delyannis to Nazos, 23 September, 1885.

⁸ Telegram of Nazos, 26 September.

Garašanin's view should serve as a basis for an understanding between the two countries.⁹

Meanwhile the Skupština had met at Niš on 2 October. In his speech from the throne King Milan indicated his views on the need for a Balkan balance of power, making it clear that he advocated war, but without mentioning the adversary against whom Serbia would bear arms. Amid scenes of patriotic enthusiasm the Skupština voted for all the Government measures. Until this moment the country was convinced that the Serbian Government was proposing to wage war against Turkey.¹⁰ This opinion prevailed for a considerable period among the members of the Greek Government also. But as it subsequently appeared, the latter was pitifully deluded in respect of Serbian intentions.¹¹

In the first place, the Powers which had agreed to refer the future handling of the Bulgarian question to the consideration of the Ambassadors in Constantinople, had made joint representations to the Greek Government urging it to abstain from any warlike adventure.¹² In addition, King Milan, who, in the first days of the crisis seems not to have excluded the possibility of a Serbo-Turkish war, soon became convinced that such a war would have a similar outcome to the catastrophe of 1876, and concentrated his forces on the Bulgarian frontiers, convinced that by an early victory over the Bulgars he would attain the military renown of which he stood so much in need. He did not regard the war against Bulgaria as one of conquest, but as an undertaking which would increase the prestige of Serbia, because according to his plans a Serbian victory over Bulgaria would not result in territorial aggrandisement, but in the compulsory acceptance of the *status quo* and the realisation that without Serbia's approval the Balkan balance of power could not be disturbed.¹³

Milan's decision to declare war on Bulgaria at the very outset of the crisis was checked by a promise from Austria to secure him an increase in territory without any war at all. The views of Kálnoky, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, were as follows:—The secret agreement of 1882 between Austro-Hungary and Serbia

⁹ Telegram of Delyannis to Nazos, 2 October.

¹⁰ Sl. Jovanović, *op cit.*, pp. 245–7.

¹¹ Some of the responsibility for the failure to dispel this illusion would seem to fall, apart from the lack of perspicacity of Nazos, upon the Ambassador in Vienna, Hypsilantes, for his report of 9 October, the contents of which are given by M. Lhéritier, *Historie diplomatique de la Grèce*, IV, p. 205.

¹² Lhéritier, pp. 202 and 204. A new joint *démarche* was made on 9 October.

¹³ Sl. Jovanović, *op cit.*, p. 247.

did not envisage the union of the two Bulgarias. Consequently, in the event of war between Serbia and Bulgaria, Austria was not bound to give her diplomatic support to the former. But Austria wished to avoid such a war and yet also wished to lend her diplomatic assistance to Milan and to the ruler of Bulgaria, both of whom were hostile to Russian influence in the Balkans. She consequently ventilated the idea of an expansion of Serbia towards Vidin and Trn. This solution would satisfy Serbia and also Bulgaria, in view of the fact that, by making so insignificant a concession, the latter would be assured of the European recognition of the union of the two Bulgarias.

By these plans Kálnoky restrained Milan from making immediate war, but, in order to get Serbia's claims more easily accepted, he also encouraged him to complete his military preparations and helped him to raise the military loan offered by the Viennese Länderbank.

In these circumstances it is clear that the instructions of Delyannis and Nazos arrived too late. Convinced that territorial aggrandisement could be attained without war, the Serbian Government now considered collaboration with Greece to be superfluous. This is best apparent from the reply which Garašanin, after a preliminary discussion with Milan,¹⁴ presented to the Greek Government through Nazos, who made a special journey for the purpose to Niš :—

Le Gouvernement serbe croit qu'en vue de la réunion de la Conférence de Constantinople, il est de toute nécessité que les deux gouvernements aient attitude identique dans leur manière d'envisager les événements de Philipopoli et leurs conséquences. Le Gouvernement serbe a formulé d'une manière solennelle par le discours du Trône le point de vue auquel il se place vis-à-vis de ces événements et croit qu'il serait très important que le gouvernement hellénique prît une attitude identique quant au fond et à la forme afin de témoigner ses vues et ses réclamations. Le Gouvernement serbe croit encore que si les deux états prenaient simultanément une attitude identique, la Conférence de Constantinople serait probablement amenée à s'occuper des prétentions des deux états. Le gouvernement serbe ajoute qu'il est de toute prudence de ne pas précipiter les événements avant que la Conférence se soit prononcée dans un sens ou dans un autre ; autrement les événements de la Roumelie Orientale pourraient être rejetés au second plan et provoquer une action simultanée des Puissances, soit contre la Grèce soit contre la Serbie

¹⁴ And, apparently, with Khevenhüller, the Austro-Hungarian Minister. Telegram of Nazos of 3 October, and report of 10 October.

ou bien contre les deux à la fois, comme pouvant donner lieu à des nouvelles et plus sérieuses complications.¹⁵

While Serbia was trying to evade the issue Greece continued to remain in the dark, regarding an understanding with Serbia as more than ever necessary. She did not consider the reply of Serbia satisfactory, feeling naturally uneasy as to the position of the latter in the event of the Conference of Constantinople *not* condemning the union of the two Bulgarias.¹⁶

Meanwhile the Serbian Government had suffered a double disappointment. There were already signs that the Conference, instead of condemning the events of Philippopolis, would content itself with attempting along academic lines to find a method of harmonising the *fait accompli* with the letter of the treaty of Berlin. The only country to recommend a vigorous stand against the Bulgarian movement was Russia, but she found herself isolated. England came forward as the champion of the Bulgars by recommending at the outset the personal union of the two Bulgarias, a solution, therefore, which preserved the letter of the Berlin treaty, but which also substantially gave full satisfaction to the Bulgarian demands. This solution did not displease the European Powers, nor even Russia, who bore enmity not to Bulgaria, but to her ruler, Alexander, and thought that a humiliating solution of this character would make his position appreciably more difficult.

But the disappointment in store for Milan in his hopes of territorial expansion towards Trn and Vidin was much more painful. The endeavours of Kálnoky to secure for Serbia some compensation for the enlargement of Bulgaria failed on account of the opposition not only of Russia, but also of Germany. The three northern autocrats were then united by the secret agreement known as the "League of the three Emperors," made in 1881 and renewed in 1884. By this agreement Austria-Hungary had in advance sanctioned the unification of the two Bulgarias in view of Russia's promise not to oppose the definite annexation by Austria of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Afraid of displeasing Russia and bent on avoiding any collision between her and Austria, Bismarck took his stand on the letter of the treaty by which Austria had already given her sanction to the union and consequently was not entitled, in his opinion, to claim compensations for Serbia.¹⁷

¹⁵ Telegram of Nazos of 6 October.

¹⁶ Telegram of Delyannis to Nazos of 10 October.

¹⁷ *Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette*, vol. III, pp. 178-9, 334-5, vol. V, pp. 8-9, 11-12; cf. also E. Corti, *Alexander von Battenberg*, Vienna, 1920, pp. 204-5.

This is why Serbia did not answer by evasions, as she had done five days earlier, Delyannis's inquiry as to her attitude in the event of the Conference not condemning the *coup d'état*. Unable to look forward to anything good coming out of the Conference and her hopes of expansion towards Vidin and Trn being by now dashed, she replied in a way which did not exclude the possibility of joint action, even if it were only diplomatic :—

Le gouvernement royal croit que si une entente venait à s'établir entre les grandes Puissances sur la reconnaissance de l'union de la Bulgarie et de la Roumélie sans en même temps tenir compte des justes revendications hellènes et serbes, il ne resterait aux deux pays d'autre voie que celle de chercher à obtenir des garanties selon les considérations stratégiques de chaque pays, les armes à la main. Le gouvernement hellénique croit-il qu'il y ait une autre voie à suivre et que peut-être une déclaration officielle identique des deux gouvernements vis-à-vis des grandes Puissances serait en ce moment opportune, déclaration sur les termes de laquelle on pourrait s'entendre et qui serait remise au même instant aux grandes Puissances ?¹⁸

The Greek Government by this time knew¹⁹ that Serbia would be opposed to Bulgaria, but it continued to believe that she would not abandon her claims to Kosovo. At that moment the Greek Government might have taken advantage of the attitude of Serbia by assuming the initiative of a joint diplomatic démarche to the Powers. But Delyannis preferred not to take the lead in this way and called upon the Serbian Government itself to indicate the terms of the joint declaration of the two States to the European Powers.²⁰

But the Serbian Government was then trying to secure the neutrality of Turkey in the already unavoidable war with Bulgaria. Desirous of maintaining a correct attitude towards Turkey, she feared that a declaration made jointly with Greece might expose her to Turkey. Consequently Garašanin telegraphed on 18 October as follows to the Greek Government :—

D'après les informations du Gouvernement Royal serbe la tendance des Grandes Puissances est de localiser le mouvement de la Roumélie Orientale, vis-à-vis de l'attitude ferme et énergique des Gouvernements Hellénique et Serbe menaçant d'ouvrir toute la question d'Orient. Ce dernier espère encore que placées dans un

¹⁸ Telegram of Nazos of 11 October.

¹⁹ From the reports of Nazos of 11, 12, and 13 October. Cf. also the instructions of Delyannis of 14 November.

²⁰ Telegram of Nazos, 18 October.

dilemme les Puissances peuvent tomber d'accord pour rétablir le statu quo ante. Une déclaration identique en ce moment pourrait peut-être éveiller susceptibilités de l'Europe et en donnant un caractère agressif à une attitude jusqu'à présent scrupuleusement conservatrice de part et d'autre, diminuer les chances du rétablissement du statu quo ante. Dans la pensée du gouvernement royal une déclaration identique serait opportune à un moment où il aurait été dûment constaté que l'Europe veut sous une forme ou une autre sanctionner l'union de la Bulgarie et de la Roumélie.²¹

Serbia's reply did not discourage Delyannis, who empowered Nazos on 28 October to enquire what her attitude would be if the Powers gave satisfaction to the Bulgars. He repeated the question on 2 November and was informed that Serbia was resolved not to allow the union of the two Bulgarias and would not demobilise until the Bulgars disarmed.²²

Even at the beginning of November the Greek Government was convinced that it could not expect any assistance from Serbia against Turkey, and it learnt at the same time that negotiations were proceeding between those two countries. Having lost hope in Serbia, the Greek Government did not hesitate in its perplexity to consider even the possibility of an understanding²³ with Bulgaria when King Milan sent his uncle, General Catargi, to Bucarest to obtain Roumanian military assistance against Bulgaria.²⁴ But neither the endeavours of Catargi in Bucarest nor the conversations in Sofia of the Greek Chargé d'Affaires ended in anything positive. When, on 14 November, King Milan, seizing upon an unimportant violation of Serbian territorial integrity, marched into Bulgaria, the Greek Government, before undertaking any fresh action, had to await the result of the war between the two Slavonic nations. As the French Ambassador, de Moüy, wrote: "on y voit le commencement de ce trouble général des affaires orientales, que la Grèce considère comme pouvant ouvrir une voie à ses espérances et offrant un moyen pratique de sortir de la situation présente."²⁵

When, however, contrary to all expectations the Serbs instead of conquering were conquered by the Bulgars, Delyannis considered

²¹ Telegram of Nazos, 18 October.

²² Telegrams of Delyannis to Nazos, 28 October and 2 November. Telegram of Nazos, 4 November.

²³ Lhéritier, *op cit.*, p. 208.

²⁴ T. Djouvara, "Souvenirs diplomatiques," *Revue des Sciences Politiques*, LIII, 1930, p. 31.

²⁵ French Yellow Book, "Affaires de Roumélie et de Grèce, 1885, 1886. Paris, 1886, p. 180.

the moment favourable for a new understanding with Serbia. He was undoubtedly led to take this, at first sight, almost inexplicable step by his over-estimation of the military power of Serbia and conviction that, even though defeated by the Bulgars, she would soon be able to reorganise her army and so ensure for herself a satisfactory solution from the Powers. He was also actuated by the conversations of the Greek Chargé d'Affaires in Belgrade with two leading Serbian politicians of the progressive party, the second of whom was considered likely to be the early successor of Garašanin.

When the Serbo-Bulgarian war had not yet broken out, G. Nazos, the Greek Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia, had begun to discuss collaboration of the two countries with Novaković and Piroćanac, who, though prominent members of the progressive party to which the Premier belonged, were opposed to him, Piroćanac bearing himself as if he were likely to supersede Garašanin at any moment.

The initiative of these conversations was due to Novaković, who, in an interview with the Greek Chargé d'Affaires, stressed the prevalent public opinion, which was shared by the progressive party, that a defensive and offensive *alliance* between the two countries was absolutely and urgently necessary. "Une alliance offensive et défensive entre la Grèce et la Serbie est absolument nécessaire, pour ne pas dire imposée. Dangers communs nous poussent à cette alliance; l'opinion publique en Serbie croit que cette alliance est déjà contractée, tellement cette idée a mûri depuis quelques années dans le pays. Les Bulgares, sur l'amitié desquels nous avons un moment compté, ne pensent qu'à notre perte; ils nous anéantiraient un jour s'ils devenaient plus fort que nous. La communauté de la race et de la langue nous absorberait en quelques années. Vous courrez les mêmes dangers que nous. Ne temporisons plus, faisons des sacrifices mutuels."

As for the question of the claims of the two countries to Macedonia, the Greek Chargé d'Affaires quite unofficially expressed the opinion that "la Serbie doit renoncer définitivement à ses prétentions sur Stroumitsa et la plaine de Bitolia, tout aussi bien que sur Ochrida. La possession de la ville de Stroumitsa et de l'affluent homonyme du fleuve Strymon menant dans la plaine de Serrés, dont la Grèce ne pourrait désister, doit naturellement appartenir à la Grèce. On ne pourrait pas céder cette ville (Stroumitsa) qui est en ligne droite avec Meleniko et Nevrokop, et garder l'affluent homonyme. En ce qui touche Bitolia, la Grèce ne pourrait d'aucune manière renoncer à sa possession. Les frontières de la Serbie dans la Macédoine contrale ne devraient pas dépasser Perlepés, Croussovo

et le fleuve Cerni Drin, c'est-à-dire ses frontières ne devraient pas passer au dessous de lac et de la ville d'Ochrida. Ce n'est que dans la Macédoine du nord bien au dessus de Meleniko et de Nevrokop que la Grèce pourrait faire les concessions." Novaković replied that these points could be accepted by Serbia in the event of a promise by Greece to make the harbour of Salonica free, thus giving Serbia a common outlet with Greece to the Ægean. The Greek Chargé d'Affaires expressed the opinion that this proposal might be accepted by Greece, but he added that if Serbia desired an outlet to the sea she should turn her eyes to the Adriatic, considerably to the north of Valona.

Novaković let it be understood that he believed in the early replacement of Garašanin by Piroćanac.²⁶ In a conversation with the Greek Chargé d'Affaires, Piroćanac stated that he entirely shared the views of Novaković, adding that the latter, who alone was competent in such questions, had already begun to compile an ethnological study in respect of the territories coveted by the two Powers, a study which would serve in future negotiations to settle with the least possible doubt the claims of the two.²⁷

For this reason, on 25 November, six days after the battle of Slivnica, Delyannis authorised Nazos to sound Serbia on her attitude towards an understanding with Greece.²⁸ But the Premier, Garašanin, stated that Serbia was not in a position to go to war again, while Novaković and Piroćanac entreated Nazos to telegraph to the Greek Government not to embark upon a war in which the now completely discouraged Serbs were unable to participate. "Telegraph," they said to Nazos, "to His Excellency that in the interest of both countries Greece should not risk herself alone, but should keep her prestige and strength intact."²⁹

These statements did not, however, discourage Nazos from informing the Greek Government that "he considered the present moment, if M. Piroćanac should undertake the formation of a Ministry, suitable for the reaching of a definite understanding for the future." "In such a case," he added, "I think that if at the present time immediate military action by Serbia should not be attainable, it would perhaps be possible to bring about some revolutionary movement in Old Serbia with a view to its being followed up by a military diversion in that area."³⁰ And on 8 January, 1886,

²⁶ Report of Nazos, 11 November.

²⁷ Report of Nazos, 27 November.

²⁸ Telegram of Delyannis to Nazos, 25 November.

²⁹ Telegram of Nazos, 26 November, and report of 27 December.

³⁰ Report of Nazos, 27 December.

he expressly asked Garašanin if Serbia would be able to make an armed incursion into Old Serbia by the spring. Garašanin avoided replying to that question, but gave him to understand that he did not exclude such a possibility, at the same time informing Nazos that Serbia would not listen to the intimations of the Powers on disarmament.³¹ On 10 January Delyannis telegraphed to Nazos to inform Serbia that Greece also would not disarm. He continued to be buoyed up by the same hopes of collaboration with Serbia, leaving it, however, to the initiative of Garašanin to fix the basis of the understanding. "Si à présent la Serbie est décidée de s'entendre avec nous, je crois que cette entente peut avoir lieu, et c'est avec plaisir que nous discuterions les bases que le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères voudrait bien nous indiquer pour cette entente."³²

But Garašanin could not take this step, because at the beginning of February, 1886, negotiations for peace with Bulgaria³³ were afoot, but especially because the position of the Government which he led continued to be very precarious. He resigned, indeed, towards the end of February, and although he remained in power for some time longer he was compelled to re-form his Cabinet and abandon the portfolio of Foreign Affairs.³⁴

Meanwhile the two Governments remained in close contact. It has already been mentioned that Garašanin had informed the Greek Government of the negative reply which Serbia would give to the joint *démarche* for disarmament which had been made at the instigation of Russia³⁵ by the Powers in Belgrade, Sofia and Athens. And, in fact, Serbia and Greece refused to disarm while Bulgaria made disarmament by her dependent on Serbia's reply.³⁶ When on 24 January, 1886, the Greek Government was informed of the momentous common decision of the Powers not to allow any naval assault by Greece on Turkey,³⁷ Delyannis, who had been informed on the day before by the British Ambassador, Sir Horace Rumbold,

³¹ Report of Nazos, 8 January, 1886.

³² Telegram of Delyannis, 10 January.

³³ The conclusion of peace was delayed because of Bulgaria's demand for compensation. After protracted negotiations and under pressure from the Powers peace was at length signed in Bucarest on 3 March, 1886; *cf. also* K. Kožuharov, *Istočnjak vpros i Blgarija*, 1875-1890, Sofia, 1929, pp. 317-319.

³⁴ St. Jovanović, *op cit.*, p. 312.

³⁵ British Blue Book, Affairs of Greece, Greece No. 3 (1886), pp. 4-8 and 13.

³⁶ Yellow Book, pp. 312, 371-373.

³⁷ Greek Yellow Book: Diplomatic documents deposited in the Parliament (Blockade), Athens, 1886, pp. 7-8. *Cf. also* Ch. de Mouy, *Souvenirs et causeries d'un diplomate*, Paris, 1909, pp. 201-202.

that the Powers were considering the use of force against Greece,³⁸ had telegraphed to Nazos on 23 January that "The Great Powers or at least some of them will take coercive measures to enforce disarmament on Serbia and Greece. Please telegraph what the attitude of the Serbian Government will be."³⁹ In reply Delyannis learnt that, according to information from the Serbian Government, it was not a question of coercive measures, but simply of fresh steps of the Powers in accordance with which any assailant would have no hope of attaining territorial aggrandisement.⁴⁰

Perhaps this information from the Serbian Government contributed to encourage Delyannis in his negative attitude, for he seems to have been for the moment prepared to resign.⁴¹ The misfortunes which Greece incurred through Delyannis not resigning in time and the peaceful blockade of 1886 which ensued are well known.

Such was the dismal end of the protracted negotiations between the two States. The Greek Government's ignorance of Serbia's attitude and the indecision of Delyannis who had no fixed programme could not, of course, bear any real fruit. Nevertheless, the idea of an understanding between the two countries, directed against Turkey, but especially against the Bulgars, whom both countries in their previous negotiations (for example, in 1867) had regarded not as enemies, but as allies against the Turks, was destined to survive, and in the two succeeding decades the relations between the two States were to be dominated by the question of the division of Macedonia and its complete safeguarding from the Bulgarian danger.

M. LASCARIS.

University of Salonica.

³⁸ White Book, pp. 3-4.

³⁹ Telegram of Delyannis to Nazos, 23 January.

⁴⁰ Telegram of Nazos, 23 January, and report of 24 January. Some days later the Serbian Government asked the Greek Government what its reply would be to the joint communication of the representatives of the Powers of 24 January. It learnt that the reply of Greece would be negative (telegram of Nazos, 1 February, to Delyannis, and telegram of Delyannis, 2 February, to Nazos). As is known, the negative reply of Greece was presented only on 2 February. White Book, pp. 7-8.

⁴¹ Lhéritier, *op cit*, p. 218, note 2.

A GREEK COMMUNITY IN MINORCA

A COMPREHENSIVE history of the Greek Diaspora after the fall of the Byzantine Empire has still to be written. It would be a theme abounding in interest, demonstrating that restless activity which is so prominent a feature in the modern Greek character, and also their passionate loyalty to Mother Country and Church. The history of Greeks in England alone would supply material for a volume. But the commercial activities of the Greeks in the Black Sea and Mediterranean areas from the middle of the eighteenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century would also be a subject well worthy of detailed treatment. The names of Odessa, Trieste, Venice, Genoa, Leghorn and Marseilles will evoke memories of the time when Greek shipping under the Turkish flag was predominant in the two seas mentioned and was preparing the way for the exploits of the Greek naval heroes in the War of Independence.

The following glimpse of a Greek community in Minorca, slight as it is, is not without interest as showing that Greek trading activity in the eighteenth century was not confined to the large seaports. It is also instructive as illustrating the attachment of the expatriated Greek merchant to his Church, and his perseverance in the face of opposition.

The information here given is drawn from the Privy Council registers in the Record Office, and the abbreviated references (P.C. 2/99/ etc.) are to the official enumeration. I have to express my warm thanks to Mr. Alex. Pallis, of Liverpool, who drew my attention to the existence of these documents.

The first entry of the Council which concerns us is that dated 7 November, 1745 (P.C. 2/99/, p. 239). It is worth quoting in full.

“ Upon reading this day at the Board a Report made by Major General Wynyard Commander in Chief of the island of Minorca upon considering a Proposal made by Prince Scherbatow¹ relating to the admitting several Greek Merchants to Settle in the Island of Minorca who are desirous to become Subjects to Your Majesty upon

¹ Ivan Andreyevich (1696–1761), Ambassador of Peter II (1727–30) in Spain and under the Empress Anne (1730–40) in Constantinople and London. The fact that he had held these posts will explain his interest in Minorca and the Greeks. See Brockhaus and Efron, *Encyclopædia*. I owe this information to Sir Bernard Pares, who points out that the incident fits in well with the Panslavistic and Panorthodox ideas prevailing in Russia at this time.

condition they may be allowed all such Privileges Libertys and Immunitys as Your Majestys Subjects do enjoy in that Island together with the Liberty of Erecting a Church there with a Burying Place thereto annexed, wherein a Priest of their own Communion might have full Powers to exercise his Priestly Functions of Baptizing, Betrothing, Marrying, Burying &c. according to the Rights of the said Greek Church. IT IS ORDERED by His Majesty in Council that the said Report (a Copy whereof is hereunto annexed) Be and is hereby Referred to a Committee of the Lords of His Majestys most Honourable Privy Council to consider the same and Report their Opinion thereupon to His Majesty at this Board."

The Report of this Committee (Committee for Plantation Affairs) was issued on 16 November, 1745, and was entirely favourable to the petition. The grounds of their recommendation may be quoted, as showing the high opinion entertained of the beneficial activities of these Greek merchants. The reference is P.C. 2/99/, p. 250

"The Lords of the Committee this day took the said Report into Consideration, whereby it appears, that some few Greek Merchants who have already Settled there have been apparently Advantageous to the Trade of the Island, and that it is not to be doubted but with the Immunitys desired together with the free Exercise of their Religion it must certainly draw Numbers of them there and in consequence increase the Trade."

The Order in Council adopting the Committee's Report is dated 28 November, 1745 (P.C. 2/99/, p. 266), and need not be reproduced, as it merely records the King's Order that the privileges asked for in the original petition be granted in full.

But Roman Catholic opposition in Minorca was strong, and was successful in rendering this Order nugatory, as we learn from the following entry of the Committee of the Council for hearing appeals from the Plantations, dated 5 June, 1749 (P.C. 2/101/, p. 258).

"Your Majesty having been pleased to referr unto this Committee a Letter from Major General Wynyard Commander in Chief of the Island of Minorca to His Grace the Duke of Newcastle One of Your Majestys Principal Secretarys of State transmitting a Memorial of Nicholas Alexano, Constantine Paleologo, Emanuel Paleologo, and Nicholas Paleologo for and in behalf of all the Greeks that now are or hereafter may be Inhabitants in the Island of Minorca Setting Forth That Your Majesty was graciously Pleased by Your Order made in Council so long since as the 28th of November 1745 to Grant Permission to the Greeks to settle in that Island and to Erect a Church and make a Burying Place, and to have a Priest of their

Communion to Exercise his Priestly Office therein, yet that notwithstanding the same, the Greeks have not been able to make the least Progress therein, Occasioned as they apprehend by the Interposition of the Clergy, And therefore Praying that they may be enabled to reap the Benefit intended them by Your Majestys Said Order in such Manner, as may be most conducive to Your Majestys Service—The Lords of the Committee this day took the said Letter and Memorial into their Consideration, and have been Attended thereupon by General Wynyard, who confirmed what is before represented, That Your Majestys Said Order had not been carried into Execution, and that it was apprehended the obstructions thereto, arose from the Vicar General and the rest of the Clergy in Minorca, who have been suspected of intimidating the Inhabitants with the terror of Excommunication, in case any of them should dare to furnish the Greeks with either Materials, Workmen or Labourers to Build the said Church. Upon Consideration whereof the Lords of the Committee are humbly of Opinion, that it may be adviseable for Your Majesty to Order Lieutenant General Blakeney the present Lieutenant Governor of that Island, to call before him the Vicar General and the rest of the Clergy, and make enquiry into the truth of what is so laid to their Charge, And that he do at the same time make known to them, that it is Your Majestys determined Resolution, that Your aforementioned Order of Council made in behalf of the Greek Inhabitants, shall be carried into due Execution, And that if either the Clergy or any Person whatsoever shall presume to take any Steps, or make use of any Methods, to impede or obstruct the Execution thereof, such Persons will unavoidably draw upon themselves Your Majestys highest displeasure. And the Committee conceive it may be likewise necessary on this Occasion to direct General Blakeney to require the Judges and Deputys of the University² and Magistrates of Minorca, to give their Assistance in carrying Your Majestys aforementioned Commands into Execution. And that in case the Greeks have not been able to Purchase a Spot of Ground sufficient for building their Church and making a burial Place, that he do set apart a Piece of Ground belonging to Your Majesty sufficient for those Purposes, and make a Grant thereof to the Greeks Inhabitants of that Island.”

On 28 June, 1749, the Privy Council passed an Order (P.C. 2/101/, p. 282) in emphatic language, enforcing the previous Order of 1745.

² John Armstrong, *History of Minorca* (1752), p. 98 note, points out that the Universities of Minorca were the acting magistrates in the various *Terminos* or Districts, and had nothing to do with the pursuit of learning.

In effect this Order embodies the recommendation of the Committee, but a short passage may be reproduced to show its peremptory nature.

"Whereas it hath been lately represented to His Majesty at this Board that notwithstanding it is now near Four Years since His Majestys aforementioned Order was issued the Greeks have not hitherto received the least benefit thereby nor has it been practicable to carry the said Order into Execution from the Opposition secretly made thereto by the Vicar General and Clergy of the Island who have so intimidated the Inhabitants with their Ecclesiastical Authority and the Terror of Excommunication that none of them dare to furnish the Greeks with either Materials Workmen or Labourers to erect the said Church and make their Burial Place; His Majesty this day took the same into His Royal Consideration together with a Report made thereupon by a Committee of His Privy Council, And is hereby pleased with the Advice of His Privy Council to Order, that Lieutenant General Blakeney, the Present Lieutenant Governor, or the Commander in Chief of that Island for the time being do upon the receipt of this His Majestys Order in Council call before him the Vicar General and the rest of the Clergy and make enquiry into the Truth of what is so laid to their Charge, And that he do at the same time make known to them, that it is His Majestys Determined Resolution, that His aforementioned Order in Council made in behalf of the Greek Inhabitants shall be carried into due Execution, And that if either any of them or any other Persons whatsoever shall presume to take any Steps or make use of any Methods Publick or Private to impede or obstruct the Execution thereof, such Persons will unavoidably draw upon themselves His Majestys highest Displeasure."

The Registers also contain interesting sidelights on the trading enterprise of these Greek merchants, and on the part played by Greeks settled in the island during the siege and capture of St. Philip's Castle—the fortress commanding the approach to the town of Mahon—by the French in 1756.

The most important of these documents are those relating to an application by Greeks for Letters Patent for the sole making of salt in the island. The first entry in the Council Register, dated 20 December, 1752 (P.C. 2/103/, p. 271), may be quoted in full.

"Upon reading this day at the Board the humble Petition of Theodoro Alexiano on behalf of himself and of Nicholo Alexiano and Marcus Tarucy of the Body of Greeks settled and residing on the Island of Minorca by His Majesty's Royal Permission, Setting forth

that there is not any Salt made in the said Island, but what is Scraped off the Rocks and Places where the Dashings of the Sea have accidentally fell and which being afterwards exhaled by the Sun, have left some Particles of Salt there which the Inhabitants Collect, and is not sufficient for the Consumption of the Natives and other Inhabitants who are therefore obliged to import it from Yvica and other Islands at a Considerable Expence of Ready Money³—That the Petitioners have found out a Method of making Salt which is New in the said Island, and not hitherto used there, and the Petitioners having considered well the Scituation of the Island and the Conveniency's it afford's for making Salt are satisfied they can Manufacture not only a sufficient quantity for Home Consumption, but a very considerable quantity for Exportation to such Places as are now supplied by Spaniard's Sardiniard's and others and that they shall be able to Sell the Salt to the Inhabitants of Minorca at a lower Price than they are usually furnished with it—The Petitioner therefore prays that His Majesty will be graciously pleased to grant to him and the said Nicholo Alexiano and Marcus Tarucy His Royal Letters Patent for the Sole making of Salt in the said Island of Minorca in such their New Method for the Term of Fourteen Years—IT IS ORDERED by His Majesty in Council, that the said Petition together with an Affidavit of the Petitioner Theodoro Alexiano and also a Certificate from Lieut. General Blakeney Lieutenant Governor of Minorca thereto annexed, Be, and they are hereby referred to a Committee of the Lord's of His Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council to Consider the same and Report their Opinion thereupon to His Majesty at this Board."

On 21 December, 1752, the Committee for Plantation Affairs refer the matter to the Attorney and Solicitor General for Report

³ Armstrong, *op. cit.*, p. 124, has some remarks on the making of salt in Minorca, which, he says, might easily be produced in quantities a thousandfold greater than at the time when he was writing (1741). "There are a great many Places on the Coast of the Island where the Rock is but little higher than the Surface of the Sea, and is flat for a great Way together. In Gales of Wind the Sea is beat all over these Levels, and the Salts have by Degrees corroded the softer Parts of the Stone, and reduced its Face to an infinite Number of small Cavities, divided from each other by the more solid Veins, which have resisted their Impression. These Cavities they fill with Water from the Sea, by means of Scoops, and one Day's Sun suffices to evaporate the Water, and leaves the concreted Salt dry in the Cells. The Women and Children gather it in the evening, and carry it home, and the Cells in the Rock are filled as before."

He also says (p. 35) that salt was made in *Laire de Mahon*, a little island some two miles from the southernmost point of Minorca. This was exempt from duties—a fact which shows the comparative scantiness of salt and its importance to the island.

(P.C. 2/103/, p. 279). After receiving the report of these two officers, the Committee, on 1 March, 1753, issued the following recommendation (P.C. 2/103/, p. 335):—

“Your Majesty having been pleased to refer unto this Committee two Petitions of Theodoro Alexiano in behalf of himself and of Nicholo Alexiano and Marcus Tarucy and the Body of Greeks settled and residing in the Island of Minorca, by His Majesty’s Royal Permission. The Lords of the Committee have mett and took the said Petitions into their Consideration, and do find that they both relate to an undertaking to make Salt in that Island, and that for the better enabling them to carry out the same to perfection, they humbly pray, that Letters Patent may be granted to secure to them the benefits arising therefrom for the Term of fourteen Years, And likewise that they may obtain a Grant of some small Parcell’s of Land Situate on the Sea Coast. And the Committee having taken the Opinion of Your Majesty’s Attorney and Sollicitor General upon the Petition praying for the said Letters Patent, Do thereupon Agree to Report to Your Majesty, that in regard they propose to make Salt from Sea Water, which (is) no New Invention, the same having been long Practised in many Parts of the World, it will not be adviseable for Your Majesty to grant a Monopoly of such Manufacture’s by Letters Patent. But the Committee conceive, that the making Salt in the said Island, will be of great utility to all Your Majesty’s Subjects residing there, and that it will be proper to give the Petitioners all due Encouragement in carrying on their said undertaking, The Committee do therefore take leave humbly to propose, that Your Majesty may be pleased to signify Your Commands to the Lieutenant Governor of Minorca to grant to the Petitioners for the use of themselves and the rest of the Greek People of the said Island for a certain Term not exceeding thirty one Years at a small Yearly Rent or Acknowledgment such convenient Tracts or Parcels of Land Situate on the Sea Coast of the said Island belonging to the Crown as the said Lieutenant Governor shall see fitting for erecting and carrying on of the said Salt Works, And also such other Parcell’s of Land belonging to the Crown as may be sufficient for the Habitation and Culture of the Greeks, that shall be concerned in the said Works, and that in Order to the said Governor discovering and ascertaining what Lands suitable for the purposes aforesaid belong to Your Majesty on the said Island from such as may be private Property, the said Lieutenant Governor may be empowered to send for and Examine such Records, Persons and Papers as may be necessary for that Purpose; And that the said

Lieutenant Govr: may be further directed to give the Petitioners all due Encouragement on the said Undertaking."

Under date 30 June, 1748 (P.C. 2/101/, p. 58), there is a record of an appeal made by one Peter Cruise, Merchant, from an award of 1800 dollars granted to Nicholas Alexano, presumably a Greek, for the fall of a warehouse in which Alexano had rented two rooms.

To show that Greeks took part in the defence of the Island against the French, who captured the place in 1756, there are three entries. The first and third are similar in character and may be given in summary; the second is more interesting and is worth quoting *in extenso*. The first, dated 1 March, 1757 (P.C. 2/105/, p. 451), deals with petitions on the part of Pedro Michaliche, Nicholas Cacomeris, and Georgio Angelo, natives of Greece; they served as volunteers during the siege of St. Philip's Castle by the French, without pay. They were now in England, destitute, and applied for a Royal Bounty. The third is another petition of a similar character, dealt with by the Privy Council under date 2 February, 1762 (P.C. 2/109/, p. 35). The petitioner was Alexander Alexiano, a native of Greece, and his grounds of application were exactly the same as those of the previous petitioners. The Privy Council referred these applications to the Treasury.

The second petition, considered by the Council on 8 July, 1757, is reported (P.C. 2/105/, p. 552) as follows. It is instructive as throwing light on the way in which emigration from Turkish Greece was effected:—

"Upon reading this day at the Board the humble Petition of Constantine Calamata late Master of a Ship belonging to the Island of Minorca, setting forth that the Petitioner was settled in Minorca under His Majestys Protection, and with his Ship (of which he was part owner) made several trading Voyages, and brought several others of his Countrymen, to settle on the said Island, that happening to be there with his Ship when the French made a descent, he quitted his Ship, together with his Interest and Effects, and entered the Castle of St Philips, as a Voluntier, and without any pay, bore Arms during the whole Siege, and faithfully discharged the duty of a Soldier, as may appear by the annexed Certificate from Lord Blakeney that the Petr. thro' the Capture of St Philips has lost his all, and is reduced to the most indigent Circumstances being entirely destitute of Friends neither dare he go into his own Country for fear of persecution from the Turks on account of his having brought away those Greeks to settle at Mahon, which is contrary to the Turkish Laws, and having since his arrival in England been in a bad

state of health, he most humbly prays that His Majesty will be graciously pleased to grant him His Royal Bounty or such other Consideration as to His Majesty in His great Wisdom and Goodness shall seem meet."

This petition, like the two previously mentioned, was referred to the Lords of the Treasury.

This concludes the Privy Council entries relating to the Greek Community in Minorca. How the French occupation of the Island from 1756 to 1763 affected it, we do not know. But if any argument can be drawn from the silence of the Privy Council Registers during the two subsequent periods of the British occupation of Minorca (1763-83 and 1798-1802), it would seem that the Greek Community either had little vitality or that it was in the blissful condition commonly ascribed to those who have no history.

F. H. MARSHALL.

King's College, London.

THE MEMOIRS OF COUNT N. IGNATYEV (III)

APART from all the mishaps of his journey across the Balkans, Ignatyev was disturbed by telegrams from Gorchakov. He had hardly succeeded in leaving Russia, when under the influence of information received from "our representatives, especially Shuvalov and Novikov," Gorchakov began sending in haste after him "telegrams and papers which changed the form of action that had been prescribed to him by the Sovereign on his departure." Thus on 14-26 and 17-29 January, Gorchakov telegraphed to him in Bucarest that, according to news from Berlin, the Turks had decided to accept "our terms" and to sign an armistice. Gorchakov did not explain who would formulate our terms, whether the Grand Duke or Nelidov or Ignatyev, who had not yet arrived. On 18-30 January, the Chancellor informed him that Andrassy had taken up a directly hostile attitude to Russia, and therefore warned him against any kind of hint at the question of restraints (*San Stefano*, pp. 65, 66)—adding in complete panic, "the negotiations entrusted to you are only preliminary." Thus faded away the resolution of the diplomats, while the military bureaucracy at headquarters was showing a determination to set at nought the will of the autocratic Tsar as prompted by Milyutin and Ignatyev (11-23 January). When he reached Kazanlik, Ignatyev learned officially that the Grand Duke had concluded an armistice with the Turks "and that at headquarters a service of thanksgiving had been held on the occasion of the conclusion of war."

All this had the most depressing effect upon him (p. 72). Certainly the war had been won, but the peace was still in great doubt. At the station of Trnovo-Semenli (p. 74) Ignatyev met Prince Alexander of Battenberg, the future Prince of Bulgaria, who had arrived by train from Adrianople with some Austrian and Prussian officers. The Prince, "in an ironical tone," communicated "the most miserable information (p. 75) on the moral state of headquarters, at which, according to him, everyone was tired of the war, glad to get out of Turkey and waiting impatiently for a chance of returning as quickly as possible to St. Petersburg and forgetting the Eastern Question, of which they were all sick. The Prince freely added that not only he, but all the foreign officers who had been there, could confirm him in saying that all who had served in the German or Austro-Hungarian

armies, even the British correspondents, had been struck with the decline of the military spirit at headquarters. . . . Everyone there was hoping that it was all over, that . . . peace had already been signed, which was why they had held a solemn thanksgiving service. They all wanted a rest and . . . everything had got slack. As if he were talking of the most ordinary subject, the Prince related . . . in the presence of the foreign officers . . . that the English fleet was expected about this time (p. 70) in the Sea of Marmora, and that the Turkish plenipotentiaries, after completing the negotiations with the Commander-in-Chief and Nelidov, had already gone home. He ended with the question: 'Why have you come? What are you going to do at Adrianople, as it was all over there before you got here?' Evidently this was only an echo of what the Prince had heard at headquarters." Ignatyev was "very depressed and indignant at all that he heard." The foreign officers mischievously "painted a distressing picture of the state of mind at headquarters." The immediate entourage of the Commander-in-Chief imagined that everything had already been "finished satisfactorily in Turkey and that it was time to go home," and meanwhile "the direct duty of the military authorities had not been carried out, and as to the political side nothing at all was finished." Thanks to our casual attitude, all the trumps had fallen "into the hands of the jealous English."

It was "with thoughts of this kind" that Ignatyev reached Adrianople on 27 January-8 February at five in the morning and "presented himself to the Commander-in-Chief as soon as he had got up." Ignatyev's speedy passage from Bucarest was a surprise for headquarters (p. 77). "An unpleasant scene took place between the Grand Duke" and Ignatyev, who "reported the commission which had been given him and the Imperial instructions" and asked the Commander-in-Chief "why he had stopped and hastened to conclude an armistice." Ignatyev added "that he had never expected such an untimely halt from the Grand Duke, as he had heard earlier of his wish to go as far as Constantinople. . . . This time the Sovereign also had wished and expected this . . . and telegraphed to you in this sense on 11-23 or 12-24 January." Nikolay Nikolayevich, in reply, began to assure him "that he had been hurried from Petersburg by Prince Gorchakov, and from London by Count Shuvalov, to conclude an armistice, that the troops were tired and in a dragged condition, the artillery and parks had failed to keep up with the rapid movement from Philippopolis and that finally, according to the news from London, he feared by

moving on Constantinople to provoke a new war, this time with England. The Grand Duke had not received the telegram from the Sovereign to which Ignatyev kept on referring, allowing him to advance uninterruptedly to the heights of Constantinople¹ and warning him that a plenipotentiary had been sent to headquarters for negotiations with the Turks." Ignatyev "could not refrain from remarking that it was impossible that the Tsar's telegram should not have arrived (p. 78) in seven days by field telegraph, that if so . . . one would necessarily be surprised at the negligence of headquarters and at once take measures for establishing . . . regular communications with St. Petersburg, the more so as military operations might still have to be renewed in view of the obstinacy of the Turks, supported by the intrigues of the English and Austrians and by the interference of England in our negotiations with the Porte. At these words the Grand Duke almost shouted: 'God forbid! Look here! Are you going to saddle us with another war with England? It's time to stop all military operations and go home' " Ignatyev replied that the best way of avoiding complications was "to take account only of strategic considerations and pay no attention whatever to warnings and wishes coming from London or even from our Foreign Minister " (pp. 78, 79).

Ignatyev "wanted at all costs to elucidate the obscure question of the alleged non-receipt of the Sovereign's telegram sent after the Council of 9 January." He dashed off to General Chinghis-Khan, whom he had known from early childhood in the Corps of Pages and who was in charge of the field telegraph at headquarters. Chinghis-Khan "admitted that a telegram from the Sovereign to the Commander-in-Chief in cipher had been handed by him to the Grand Duke on the morning of the 18-30, that is, on the day of the signing of the armistice." Then Ignatyev "returned to the Grand Duke and informed him that he had made inquiries, that . . . the telegram inviting him to continue his advance to the heights of Constantinople had really been received by him, though with a considerable delay yet some hours before the signing of the armistice (p. 80). In considerable agitation, the Grand Duke replied with annoyance: "That's the trouble; the telegram came too late. Nelidov had already come to terms with the Turkish plenipotentiary, and I had already agreed, and could not then change it. In consequence, we had to confirm the armistice and allow Nepokoichitsky to sign it. What are you going to get out of me by pressing me?" Ignatyev

¹ From all this explanation it is not clear whether the Tsar had given *orders* to occupy Constantinople or *permission* to do so.

“ in a hasty burst of indignation declared : ‘ I wanted to make sure that His Majesty’s permission to go forward to Constantinople had reached you, but allow me to report to you that if you were not a Grand Duke and were only Commander-in-Chief, you would be liable to great responsibility. Not only after the receipt of such permission from the Tsar, but even if this had not been received at all, it is the duty of the military commander . . . not to allow himself to be stopped by negotiations with the Turks when they are seeking salvation in an armistice, but to go forward without stopping, driving the beaten enemy to the shores of the Bosphorus before they could recover from the rout or the English could intervene.’ ” The Grand Duke answered that his ardent desire was, indeed, to go to Constantinople,² “ but there was nothing to be done in the matter, as I had already promised Namık and Server Pashas, and did not want new complications. Besides, I had to give a rest to the troops and give time to the artillery to come up and reach their units.” Ignatyev retorted that “ a promise given to the Turks without thinking, could easily have been broken,” that circumstances had changed, that the Commander-in-Chief was merely “ the executant of the Tsar’s will, and the Sovereign had ordered him to go forward. In view of English intrigues . . . you would have been quite in the right with the Turkish plenipotentiaries,” and then the Turks would have been free to complain of England. Ignatyev added that “ by the armistice and a demarcation line that tied us hand and foot, the Turks had been given the chance of recovering . . . and the English, by the unjustifiable agreements of Count Shuvalov with Lord Derby, were left freedom of action against us ” It was quite natural that after such a conversation the initial confidence and former personal relations between the Grand Duke and Ignatyev should have been ruined beyond all repair, and on this various persons in the former’s entourage, who had special influence with him, set themselves to widen the breach still further. “ And in the end it ruined the Ambassador at Constantinople.”

A few weeks afterwards, when Ignatyev proposed to break the armistice in view of the obstinacy of the Turks, the Grand Duke announced to him “ that he dreaded war with England, a new war, that the troops were tired, without boots and with their clothes in rags, that the artillery had not yet come up, that in such batteries as they had the guns were not in good condition and lacked a sufficient

² In his meetings with young officers, the Grand Duke, to judge by the memoirs of Hasenkampf, suggested that it was “ our diplomacy ” that had prevented him from taking Constantinople !

supply of shell, that the infantry had used all their cartridges, and all the parks were so far behind that the army could not move forward for three weeks without renewing its stores and completing the supply of shell and cartridges. He added that . . . the roads had become so impassable with mud, that even to get to the line of demarcation quite a time was required . . . as they could not move more quickly" (p. 94). Replying to Ignatyev's reproach "that our troops had not occupied the heights of the Bosphorus and of Constantinople, as they ought to have done, and as the Emperor had wished, the Grand Duke justified himself by referring to the London telegram of Count Shuvalov, who had disturbed him by prophesying immediate war with England if our troops appeared in Gallipoli and Bulair and if an armistice was not instantly concluded at once and our advance stopped. His Highness added that if Ignatyev relied on some telegram or other of the Sovereign sanctioning his advance to the Bosphorus, he himself could rely on a whole number of contradictory telegrams received by him in the first half of January from Petersburg, and on a telegram inviting him to hasten the conclusion of the armistice. Further, he maintained that Gorchakov had informed him that the swift advance of our troops on Constantinople was arousing great suspicion in Europe (p. 95), and apparently reproached him with dragging out the negotiations at a distance from Kazanlik to Adrianople. In Petersburg they not only did not condemn him for the armistice, but had congratulated him on his success, and the Emperor had expressed his satisfaction."

Ignatyev "continued to press his view that the advance ought to be continued for a few more days . . . seizing with our troops the approaches to Constantinople, even the heights of the Bosphorus and on the other side the lines of Bulair. Even if the Grand Duke did not wish to disregard Shuvalov's appeal by occupying Gallipoli, Bulair could not, he argued, be left in the hands of the Turks and their allies—as it were, on the flank of our line of operations." The Turks, after in words appealing to the clemency of the victor, were arming feverishly and were waiting for something to happen. Ignatyev proposed a renewal of military operations. But the Grand Duke refused to violate the military convention and the line of demarcation, insisting that the troops required a rest and reinforcements of guns and munitions, and that "it was impossible to risk a failure under the walls of Constantinople." Ignatyev replied that "it was much worse to give the Turks time to strengthen the fortifications of the Kuchuk-Chekmedje line and in front of Constantinople

itself, to collect forces and even let the English get into the city first. But he had to submit to the Commander-in-Chief."

Moreover, Ignatyev "noted with surprise" that the Grand Duke and the director of his diplomatic chancellery, Nelidov, "imagined themselves to have won over the Porte to a sympathetic attitude towards Russia by their conversations (p. 96) with the antiquated Namik Pasha and the characterless Server Pasha." Ignatyev "could not share the credulity of headquarters in supposing that the work in Turkey was over and done and that there only remained secondary questions of no significance." The general view of the officers at headquarters "was that Russia had already gained all that she could wish," and they explained the dissatisfaction of Ignatyev "by a personal disappointment that things had been settled without his immediate participation."

In reality, of course, neither side was quite just in its estimate of the other. Far nearer to the truth is the account of an outside observer, the German Military Attaché, General Lignitz³: "In the entourage of the Grand Duke the view prevails that Count Ignatyev is pulling the strings too tight (with the Turks) and that his appointment as plenipotentiary is a real misfortune." The German historian Bamberg⁴ is delighted with the chivalrous conduct of the Grand Duke towards the conquered Turk. This is not in question; but it is still to be proved whether this chivalry did not damage those Russian and Slav interests for which Ignatyev was contending. His report, sent to Gorchakov on 3-15 February, 1878, is an open condemnation of all that had been done by headquarters and the Grand Duke (*San Stefano*, pp. 96-9). In it there is a hint at a second instance of open disobedience, when the Tsar, in telegrams of 29-30 January (10-11 February) ordered his brother, in view of the entrance of the British fleet into the Sea of Marmora, "by some means or other, with or without the agreement of the Turks, to occupy their capital." The Commander-in-Chief replied evasively on 3-4 (15-16) February, asking for supplementary details and explaining that the occupation of Constantinople must not be regarded as "so easy and possible as it was two weeks ago." He thus directly contradicted his own declarations during his first conflict with Ignatyev. This is convincingly proved by S. S. Tatishchev,⁵ who, in his *History of Alexander II*, publishes the texts of the telegrams and letters exchanged between the Tsar and his brother.

³ V. Lignitz, *Aus Drei Kriegen*, p. 285.

⁴ Bamberg, *Geschichte der orientalischen Angelegenheit*, pp. 585-95.

⁵ Tatishchev, *Alexander II*, II, pp. 447-58. See also *Saburov's Memoirs*, pp. 46, 9.

The behaviour of the Grand Duke was doubtless dictated by high motives—by his patriotic anxiety for his exhausted army in view of the impending danger of an Austro-British coalition, of which he was warned by Novikov, Shuvalov, Nelidov, and even to some extent by Gorchakov himself. In studying the details of this tragic conflict between two wills, behind which lay a conflict of two opposite points of view in the governing circles of Russia, it is useless to guess what would have happened if the Tsar had shown more strength of will and had overcome the passive resistance of his brother and the Chancellor. It was a straight issue between two rival tactics—the bold plan of Ignatyev, supported by the Tsar, Milyutin and Obruchev, and aiming at a temporary occupation of the heights of the Bosphorus, and even of the capital, to be followed by a proposal to Britain for a joint Anglo-Russian occupation, and on the other hand, the cautious, senile tactics of Gorchakov, who remembered the Crimean War and was logically leading up to the Congress of Berlin.

Both plans aimed at avoiding a new war and both set as their object the welfare of Russia. Perhaps that of Ignatyev was attended with a certain risk and demanded great restraint, if war with England, or even a new Crimean War was to be avoided. But that of Gorchakov was only good on paper and in bureaucratic chanceries. In any case there are no grounds for suspecting the good intentions of either side, although each of them did suspect the other. The moral atmosphere in which the negotiations with the Turks were conducted was simply intolerable for the chief Russian plenipotentiary. The Grand Duke and General Nepokoichitsky, with bitter smiles, called him to his face “the militant diplomat” (p. 78); while their whole entourage was openly hostile to him and took the line:—“Conclude peace as quickly as you can, and let us go home. Confound the Bulgarians who have made us struggle all this way.” Only Cherkassky, Gurko and Skobelev supported Ignatyev. Cherkassky bitterly complained “against headquarters (p. 81), especially against Nepokoichitsky and his assistants, against the flabbiness of the Grand Duke and the lack of all foresight in their actions and arrangements, against the general casualness and apathy, and the constant tactlessness and prejudice shown towards the Bulgarians, which he attributed to Polish influences on various members of the staff.” Moreover, while Ignatyev was still in Petersburg, Gorchakov had instructed him to be conciliatory, but had not indicated the precise limit of possible concessions (pp. 85–9). The Chancellor was worried by the rapprochement of England with Austria and pointed out how greatly this would encourage the Porte to resist.

"It seems to us," he writes, "difficult to uphold without alteration the programme sketched by you [i.e., Ignatyev] for a preliminary peace. . . . The fixing of the frontiers of Bulgaria and the other States which have become independent . . . will probably fall into the category of questions subject to revision, whose decision may now be temporary and uncertain." We already scent in the air the Congress of Berlin.

Meanwhile Namik and Server Pashas signed the armistice and went home. The Porte delayed the sending of new plenipotentiaries, and in the interval news came of an attempt of the British armoured squadron to enter the Dardanelles. The Grand Duke sent two telegrams to the Porte demanding the immediate dispatch of plenipotentiaries (p. 98). In order to make the Turks move and find out their tactics, Ignatyev proposed sending to Constantinople as temporary representative of Russia, M. K. Onou, who had come with him as first dragoman and now received a convoy of Cossacks and ciphering officials and had instructions to take over the Embassy from the German sailors who were guarding it (p. 100). Having received the consent of the Grand Duke for this, Ignatyev instructed Onou to press for the departure of the Turkish plenipotentiaries, "to get into relations of confidence with the Grand Vizier and other high officials, and try to get the powers of the plenipotentiaries extended, to collect trustworthy intelligence as to the situation in Constantinople, to renew friendly contact with persons who had been in good relations with the Embassy, to ascertain the actual disposition of the Sultan and his Ministers and what was being done by the European Embassies. . . . In accordance with the Tsar's orders to the Commander-in-Chief, Onou was to make it clear to the Turks that if the British squadron entered the Bosphorus, we should be compelled to occupy the surrounding heights and that in such a case it would be infinitely more advantageous to the Porte to admit us of its own free will as friends, rather than be compelled to obey us as conquerors (p. 100). Onou was instructed to make it clear to the Turks that our only object was to prevent foreign fleets from coming into the Straits, which serve as an open door to our house; that we prefer, if possible, to act in this matter in agreement with the Porte, the more so as the Sultan, having his capital on the very shore of these Straits, was equally interested in keeping away foreign ships of war (p. 101) which threaten his security and independence. The question of the Straits must not be touched" (p. 102).

"Onou executed the delicate commission entrusted to him with great tact and caution, and after sending a detailed report, returned

to Adrianople to supplement it with verbal explanations." A few hours later Ignatyev sent him back again, "to work upon the Turks on the spot and to keep a closer watch, both on the Porte and the foreign representatives." Ignatyev was at first very pleased with the information supplied by Onou, which confirmed his own point of view against that of the Grand Duke. He wrote to Gorchakov : " Onou thinks that the Russian troops will be received in Constantinople, if not with satisfaction, calmly and with submission to destiny on the part of the Musulman population of Stambul." The local Turkish papers " discussed this possibility as the most natural consequence of preceding events. They are even discussing which barracks could be left to us and mention the big one of Daud Pasha and Raliz-Cheftlik." In consequence of this and of Onou's general report as to the disposition of the authorities and the population, a staff officer, Prince Cantacuzin, was sent back with him, with orders " to inspect those barracks which the Turks might suggest for us . . . and to see to their cleaning and sanitation against the risk of infectious diseases. . . . Onou, while staying in Pera, was able to convince himself of the feverishly hostile activity of Layard and the British Embassy in general. But he was extremely surprised by the open hostility and hatred for Russia shown by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, the more so as he remembered the recent friendly personal relations between Ignatyev and Count Zichy and also the joint action of the two Embassies. . . According to Onou, Count Zichy has gone so far as to demand of the Porte the passage through the Dardanelles of two Austro-Hungarian battleships, to join the British squadron " (p. 103). " The Vienna Cabinet, quite as much as that of London, Onou informs us, is in every possible way urging the Turks not to enter into any immediate agreement with us and not to accept our terms. . . ." " It was evident . . . that the Austro-Hungarian intrigues would finally make an impression on the Turks, who had not really lost hope of the formation of a European coalition against Russia."

Meanwhile the Turkish plenipotentiary, Savfet Pasha, did not reach Adrianople till 31 January (11 February), that is, almost a fortnight after the signature of the armistice. At that time Ignatyev succeeded in getting into communication with the representatives of Russia's allies, whom Prince Gorchakov would not admit to the green table on the same terms as Russia and Turkey. Special interest attaches to conversations with the representatives of Serbia (*San Stefano*, pp. 106-10, 114-8, 128-30, 187-98), giving the most abundant material for a survey of the Serbian question.

The Turkish plenipotentiary pretended not to know that the British squadron was at that time entering the Dardanelles; and the intelligence department was so badly informed that headquarters learned of this only through Onou. Then Ignatyev insistently told Savfet Pasha that the arrival of the British squadron had changed the position for the worse and would make Russia more exacting. The wily Turk began by entirely denying that it had arrived at all, and when Ignatyev told him that he had received a telegram to that effect from Onou, he insisted that the latter must have been misled by the rumours of "ill-disposed persons." Meanwhile at Petersburg everything had become known officially by 30 January through the British Ambassador. Alexander II at once telegraphed to the Sultan (p. 141) that Russian troops would occupy Constantinople, in view of the British Government's announcement that the fleet was entering the Sea of Marmora to defend British interests (pp. 138-9). When the squadron arrived (3-15 February), the Grand Vizier instructed Savfet Pasha to implore the Grand Duke not to occupy Constantinople, but the latter,⁶ frightened by his own staff and also by Novikov and Shuvalov, was by no means disposed to carry out the Imperial order of 29 January. The Tsar's telegram said that the Sultan already knew of the impending entry of Russian troops: "It would be desirable that this entry should be carried out peaceably, but if the plenipotentiaries oppose this, you must be ready to occupy Constantinople even by force" (pp. 138-9). The Commander-in-Chief replied evasively that it was not easy to carry this out, and then had long discussions with Ignatyev, declaring that the command was not categorical and was contradictory. Finally, on 12-24 February, he escaped from his dilemma by the half-measure (pp. 158-60) of occupying San Stefano with Russian troops, by consent of the Turks, and meanwhile he kept the Emperor quiet by the untrue announcement that San Stefano was a suburb of Constantinople (pp. 140-52). From a comparison of Ignatyev's account with the book of Tatishchev (II, 457, 9) we get a picture of the weakness of the autocratic will of Alexander II,⁷ which failed against the passive resistance of his brother,⁸ inspired by the military and diplomatic bureaucracy.

For the third time the Grand Duke again disobeyed on 18-19

⁶ Compare Tatishchev II, 456-9. In the opinion of the Russian Government, England had broken the promise given conditionally by Derby to Shuvalov.

⁷ Tatishchev, II, 457, 8.

⁸ Tatishchev finds that the orders received from Petersburg were somewhat confused, II, 438.

(30-31) March, when the Tsar twice telegraphed to him that, in view of "an almost inevitable" rupture with England, it was necessary to occupy the shore of the Bosphorus with troops and "no time should be lost in anticipating the arrival of a British landing force" (p. 480). The Commander-in-Chief replied to the Tsar on 20 March (1 April) that he did not refuse to take Constantinople, but did not believe in the possibility of success and awaited a precise and definite "order"—in other words, he transferred the responsibility for what might follow to the Tsar's own shoulders. This last conflict between the Tsar and his brother, ending with the latter's recall from the army on 17-19 April and the appointment of Todleben in his place, is not mentioned at all by Ignatyev, who left for Petersburg on 4-16 March. The latter had throughout this time literally carried out the will of the Tsar and the War Ministry, in spite of the resistance of the staff and of some of Gorchakov's colleagues.

Ignatyev's negotiations with the Turks, leading to the signature of the Treaty of San Stefano, are described in such detail, with such a mass of documents, that to summarise them, however shortly, is quite impossible. It was a case of Ignatyev imposing his will on the Turks, directly by moral pressure on Savfet Pasha, and indirectly through Onou at the Porte. As Ignatyev attached first-class importance to indirect pressure on the Grand Vizier, Ahmed Vefik Pasha, and his Ministers, he has literally drowned his personal reminiscences in the reports of Onou.

Of these personal reminiscences, especially typical is his conflict with Mehmet Ali Pasha, the best Turkish general, who introduced a lively strain of sharp opposition into the plaintive and dilatory tactics of Savfet Pasha. Mehmet Ali was not a Turk by birth, but a Germanised Frenchman from Hanover, who had adopted Mahomedanism and hated Russia. The Turkish plenipotentiaries, physically exhausted in their struggle with the relentless Ignatyev (p. 208), called in Mehmet Ali to help them at the time of the discussions over the Serbian frontier, which, according to Ignatyev, were the most difficult part of the negotiations and "very nearly produced a complete rupture. . ." (p. 215). In the evening sitting of 16-28 February, Mehmet Ali broke out on the question of the contested frontier in the interests of the Albanians; he raised his voice and spoke in such a tone that Ignatyev and Nelidov left the sitting and refused to go on with the negotiations with Mehmet Ali, as a person who was not invested "with full powers from His Majesty the Sultan. . . ." (pp. 215-8).

The Russian plenipotentiaries went straight off to the house

occupied by the Commander-in-Chief. Finding him in bed, Ignatyev entered his bedroom—"a little after 10" he notes, not without irony. Ignatyev apologised for "disturbing his rest to announce that negotiations were broken off, and that now it entirely depended on the Commander-in-Chief to announce without delay the end of the armistice, and next day, on 17 February (11 March), to move his troops to the heights of the Bosphorus and Constantinople. Now, the Turks," said Ignatyev, "had themselves, by their tactlessness, given us an opportunity to renew military operations and to remedy the mistake we had made when we stopped prematurely and let the English reach Constantinople before us." At this the Grand Duke "got very excited and angrily told Ignatyev: 'You have gone off your head. You absolutely want to drag us into a new war with England. That's what all your designs are leading to.'"

While putting on some clothes, the Grand Duke called his Chief of Staff, who was in a neighbouring room, and indignantly informed him that the negotiations had been broken off and that Ignatyev was proposing an immediate renewal of military operations. General Nepokoichitsky, in spite of his usual imperturbable coolness, also insisted, with some heat and evident annoyance, that it was desirable to renew the negotiations and not to end the armistice. "The renewal of military operations, in his view, offered no advantages and would put us in all probability in a dangerous position. He insisted . . . on the difficulty of feeding the troops; the Black Sea could not be taken as a base for our army (p. 219) and the British fleet only had to go through the Bosphorus in order to seize our naval communications and put our army in the most critical position. Finally, Nepokoichitsky maintained that, apart from frontal opposition of the Turks, which would be more considerable than Ignatyev imagined, the right flank of our army and even its rear could be endangered from Gallipoli and the lines of Bulair, that already Turkish troops had been collected there from various quarters, and might be reinforced by a British landing force." Thus it was evident that headquarters did not wish for an opportunity of seizing the heights of the Bosphorus according to the instructions of the War Minister, and preferred to stay at San Stefano. The Grand Duke and Nepokoichitsky used every argument to persuade Ignatyev to renew the negotiations, and in the end he declared that if the Turks would reflect and "by 10 a.m. announce that they accepted unconditionally and without any change the proposed line of frontier for both Bulgaria and Serbia," then he would agree to resume. As he left the Grand Duke, Ignatyev said to him: "half in jest: 'It

depends on your Highness to erect the Cross on St. Sophia tomorrow,' and added that in any case he would not allow Mehmet Ali to be present at the Conference, adding the threat, 'If he dares to come again, I will push him out of the room.' "

Next morning the Turks accepted all the conditions announced to them and Mehmet Ali apologised. As he was going, however, he asked Ignatyev (p. 120) "not to hand over the poor Albanians as slaves of the Serbs and Bulgars, whom they had long been accustomed to despise." At that time headquarters were going their own way, trying to win the good will of the Turks. "The desire of headquarters to end the alarms and privations of war as soon as possible and to rest on their Turkish laurels in their own country" was "an extraordinary hindrance" to the conduct of the negotiations, "the more so as those surrounding the Grand Duke, and even His Highness himself, found our demands to the Turks excessive and advised . . . their reduction" (p. 121). In the view of headquarters, "we should have tried by concession to obtain the good will of the Sultan at the cost . . . of our political demands in favour of our co-religionists" (p. 132). "The Commander-in-Chief . . . exhausted by his winter campaign, feared above all things European complications, such as would compel him to remain much longer in the Balkan Peninsula and expose to some disaster the reputation and glory which he had won on the plains and hills of Bulgaria. In his eagerness to return as soon as possible to Russia, His Highness insistently demanded only one thing of the plenipotentiaries, that some kind of peace treaty should be signed not later than 19 February-3 March, declaring his wish to celebrate the anniversary of the Tsar's accession by announcing the end of the war at a military parade . . . and telegraphing the news to the Emperor" (pp. 181, 2).

Meanwhile, Onou was reporting that the Turks were entirely exhausted and would let the Russian troops in "without pleasure," but without a single shot. The Turks would go on bargaining till the last minute, and then would yield everything or nearly everything. On one point only did he declare decidedly against the views of his chief. Ignatyev demanded the surrender of the Turkish fleet to Russia, but Onou reported that the Turks were terribly irritated at this, and that the Sultan threatened to sink every ship in the Bosphorus rather than surrender them to the flag of St. Andrew, and that the Turks were threatening to transfer the Government to Brussa in Asia Minor, and you may go and look for them there (pp. 157, 165, 6). The Anglophils proposed that the fleet should be surrendered into British hands, but the Sultan shouted :

"I'll sink it." Though Ignatyev was annoyed at these doubts of his subordinate, he none the less referred them to the judgment of Gorchakov, and the latter agreed with Onou's view, giving orders not to insist on the surrender of the Turkish fleet" (pp. 172, 4, 222). Ignatyev afterwards agreed with this view,⁹ but continued all the more firmly to insist on the other demands in spite of opposition from various sides. Meanwhile, the Emperor urged him to conclude peace soon, and personally telegraphed to him "*Fais vite.*" The historian Pokrovsky accuses Ignatyev of having made small concessions to the Turks for the sake of effect, in order to sign peace on the date of the Tsar's accession¹⁰; this is true of headquarters, but not of Ignatyev.

As the Turks endlessly prolonged the negotiations, the final time limit of 3 March was given them (p. 187), and in this respect, not Ignatyev, but the Grand Duke showed especial insistence, bordering on thoughtlessness. The Turks were hypnotised by this date and bargained up to the last minute. Onou reported on 17 February (1 March) (p. 234): "Ahmed Vefik, the Grand Vizier, has told me that he is waiting for the treaty to be signed on the day of the Emperor's accession. . . . If it is really signed by that date (I pray God that this may be done), the Porte intends to fly flags on its ships and to give a salute of 19 guns. But if, in spite of all our wishes, peace is not signed on that day (p. 235), the Porte anticipates that there will be a panic in Constantinople . . . if our batteries at San Stefano begin to fire without the Turkish ships being the first to salute. . . . The Sultan himself is in a horrible fright. I, of course, promised, to report to you; but I remarked in jest that this highly triumphal day could not pass without artillery salutes, and the best means of avoiding the complications anticipated by the Porte would be to sign the peace as soon as possible. The Turks were not pleased with my joke" (p. 235).

The Third of March came, and the Turks still hoped to snatch some advantage. The Grand Duke was exclusively concerned in making the celebration of this event as effective as possible and giving pleasure to the Tsar on this day.

"From the morning of 18 February till late that evening" took place the final negotiations and the final drafting and copying of the text of the Treaty (p. 241). "The Grand Duke, not recognising

⁹ Pp. 184, 311. Ignatyev later admitted: "We risked bringing about the flight of the Sultan to Brussa or stopping in front of Constantinople without a Turkish Government with which we could conclude a peace treaty."

¹⁰ M. N. Pokrovsky, *Diplomatia i voyny tsarskoy Rossii* (*Diplomacy and Wars of Tsarist Russia in the 19th century*), 1923, p. 295, note i.

the difficulty and minuteness of the secretarial work which had to be done in the final twenty-four hours, began already very early on the morning of the 19th to send adjutants demanding immediate signature . . . His Highness, without warning Ignatyev or asking his opinion, after midday assembled the troops in the plain facing San Stefano, in sight of the minarets of Stamboul and the cupola of St. Sofia (p. 242) to make the army a solemn announcement of the conclusion of peace, and continued to send members of his suite to hurry up the signature, without taking any account of the explanations already given, namely, that the hour for the final signature of diplomatic documents cannot be mathematically fixed in advance and that it was useless to assemble the troops too early. In the end the treaty might be signed only about 6 p.m." The Grand Duke finished the parade of his troops and sent from the field of review a telegram of congratulation to the Tsar (p. 244): "On the day of the emancipation of the peasants, you have freed Christians from the Moslem yoke."

Immediately after the signing of the Treaty of San Stefano there began an "intrigue" to remove Ignatyev altogether from office, and in any case from the post of Ambassador. "The intrigue was conducted with cleverness, skill and forethought," with the indirect support of Gorchakov, headquarters, and the Grand Duke. It came first from the British and German Ambassadors in Constantinople. Of special interest in this connection is the behaviour of Prince Reuss, who, during the war and truce, had rendered great services to Russia. When Ignatyev met him in 1879 in Vienna and asked why he had worked so hard for his removal from Constantinople, Prince Reuss replied: "If you had been in my place, you would have behaved in the same way. I was so convinced that you would take the Porte in hand and frighten the Sultan, and that Turkey would carry out all your immoderate demands; the treaty would be executed, Austria-Hungary would be left out and there would be nothing left for Europe to do, and we had in view a congress and a revision of your treaty. It is much less easy to understand why your own headquarters did not want you to return, and why many influential Russians helped us when we were working to prevent your return from Petersburg."

Who, then, were these Russians? Ignatyev names, in the first place, Prince Imeretinsky and Prince Dondukov-Korsakov, Nelidov, and—the Grand Duke. The word "intrigue" is explained by his irritation; but the precise explanations given in his book, *San Stefano* (pp. 302–8, etc.) clearly show the motives. Ignatyev had

become hateful to the Sultan; and headquarters and the Petersburg diplomats were playing for friendship with the Sultan and the Turks. Turcophilism had replaced Slavophilism; and as Ambassador in Constantinople was appointed the Turcophil Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky, whom the Sultan called his best friend. The removal of Ignatyev was not an "intrigue," but a reaction against the war of liberation and against those who came to be called the "little brothers."¹¹ Unfortunately, the champions of this reaction did not hesitate to use calumny to overthrow Ignatyev, who was liked by the Tsar Liberator (p. 309)

After his arrival in Petersburg for the ratification of the treaty, Ignatyev made a very clever report to the Sovereign on his disagreements with headquarters (pp. 313, 4). He first explained the point of view of the Grand Duke and then added that "his health absolutely needs repose." Afterwards he cautiously alluded to the non-fulfilment of the Tsar's orders by telegraph, and in the name of the Commander-in-Chief stated that one telegram arrived in a mutilated form, another was nine days on the road, and the third never got there at all. Possibly he carried out this commission "with a shade of irony," as the Emperor asked "his frank opinion as to the wish of the Commander-in-Chief to get back quickly to Petersburg" (p. 315). "I will honestly tell you," replied Ignatyev, "that it is not good to keep the Grand Duke long in Constantinople at the present juncture. His Highness is too confiding for political negotiations and has got bored with them. He wants to get back quickly to Russia; he will get confused in the Turkish and European intrigues, he will make concessions harmful to Russia, and a brilliant war will end badly. It would be better for the Grand Duke to return and to leave a *responsible* Commander-in-Chief till the political position is cleared up." The Emperor thanked Ignatyev for his frankness and dismissed him in silence, "without saying anything as to his own decision."

Alexander removed both the Grand Duke and Ignatyev from the Near East. On 11 March by personal command of the Tsar the latter was sent to Vienna to clear up the position with Austria; Alexander instructed him "to receive from the Chancellor all information as to the negotiations which had taken place in the course of the last two years. . . ." which, for the most part, were quite unknown to Ignatyev. "Prince Gorchakov carried out the wish of the Sovereign reluctantly and most superficially," and Ignatyev even asserts that "he wanted to conceal from him all the

¹¹ The minor Slav peoples of the Balkans.—Ed.

secret documents" (p. 336). It seemed that the Petersburg officials had adopted the German aphorism : " Und der König absolut, wenn er unsern Willen tut." They also concealed from him the anxious reports of Onou, and he only learned of them from a personal letter of 29 March, announcing that the Turks were beginning to come to themselves and were concentrating troops and fortifying positions. The Sultan had stiffened, the British and Austrians were prompting the Ministers.¹² Onou added " They probably gave you my reports to read," but Ignatyev with intelligible mortification remarks : " The Foreign Minister concealed from me most of the correspondence received from headquarters since the first days of April." Thus, while Alexander II remained irresolute, his officials were already by silent spade work undermining the author of the Treaty of San Stefano.

The weakness of Russian policy was to be explained by the weakness of the Tsar. The policy of Russia at this historical moment was not at all double-faced, as some think, but was marked by indecision, nervousness, lack of unity. Two opposite lines of tactics were exchanged and confused in it : (i) the ideas of Ignatyev, backed, as a rule, but not always, by the autocrat himself, and by the War Office, Milyutin and Obruchev ; (ii) the plan of the Chancellor, Gorchakov, and of the Ambassadors in London and Vienna, for which stood headquarters and the Commander-in-Chief. Up to San Stefano, Alexander II leaned to the side of Ignatyev, but did not carry his resolution to the end. For good or for bad, after San Stefano, Russian foreign policy was directed not by the Tsar, but by the aged yet skilful and cautious hand of Gorchakov, who was afraid of England and thought of utilising the " honest broker," Bismarck, in his relations with her. Ignatyev, on the contrary, thought that it would always be possible to come to an understanding with England direct, if only too great concessions were not made. Holding that England in sharp opposition was less dangerous than Austria the dissembling friend, Ignatyev wanted by a bold stroke to seize the Bosphorus for a time and then invite indignant England to share with Russia the occupation of the capital. He thought

¹² " The Ministers (Turkish) are trying to maintain a balance between us and the English, but they will not succeed. Everyone is expecting something which ought to happen and supposes that it is not all over yet. At the last appearance of the Sultan at the Selamlık there were about 500 Russian officers. Abdul Hamid was terribly frightened, and Savfet Pasha instructed me (Onou) to ask the Grand Duke to forbid such a gathering of officers on the road of the Sultan's procession. . . ." Thus passed in Tsargrad the period of the execution of the San Stefano Treaty.

that England would readily consent to this, and he consciously aimed at such an agreement with her. It may seem paradoxical, but Ignatyev, so hated by the rulers of England at that time, was, together with Olga Novikov and Gladstone, the first precursor of the Anglo-Russian agreement which many years later was realised by Sazonov.

ALEXANDER ONOU.

Errata in the previous article, *Slavonic Review*, Vol. X, No. 30, April 1932 :—

P. 636 : *For* " Ignatyev knew all about the agreement of Reichstadt, by which Austria was to be allowed to have Bosnia and Hercegovina . . . but he did not yet know of the Convention of Budapest," *read* " Ignatyev knew all about the agreement of Reichstadt, but perhaps he did not yet know of the Convention of Budapest, by which Austria was to be allowed to have Bosnia and Hercegovina. . . "

P. 639 : *For* " Nelidov, the Russian and Panslavist," *read* " Nelidov, not a Russian or Panslavist."

Ibid. *For* " Tsortelev " *read* " Tsertelev."

GOETHE AND SERBO-CROAT BALLAD POETRY*

I.

GOETHE'S translation of the "*Hasanaginica*"—*Klaggesang von der edlen Frauen des Asan Aga*—appeared anonymously in 1778, in Herder's collection of *Volkslieder*. Herder, in his commentary, says: "The translation of this noble poem is not by me; I hope later to publish others of this kind." A copy of the original translation was found among Herder's papers, in the handwriting of his wife, Caroline. It first appeared over Goethe's signature in the eighth edition of his collected works (1789).

It is not exactly easy to say when it was made. Goethe himself gives us a clue when, in an article on *Serbische Lieder*, which he published in 1825, in the review *Über Kunst und Altertum*, he says that "over fifty years have passed." This would bring us roughly to 1775, and in no case could he have translated it before, since the *Hasanaginica* was published for the first time in 1774 by an Italian scholar, Alberto Fortis, in his work *Viaggio in Dalmazia*. A part of this work, "on the customs of the Morlaks," having been published in a German translation by the poet Werthes, in the following year, it reached Goethe, probably in the latter part of 1775, and he found in it the *Hasanaginica* in both original and German translation.

By a careful examination of the style and the spelling of the manuscript of this translation, in the handwriting of Herder's wife, corrected by Herder himself, and especially by studying the use of the apostrophe by Herder and Goethe during their *Sturm und Drang* period, it has been possible to fix the time of Goethe's translation of this ballad as before the end of 1775. This point is strengthened by young Goethe's feeling for traditional poetry and for everything "natural" and nationally authentic. Moreover, all the circumstances of his life in that year confirm that he had translated the *Hasanaginica* before he went to Weimar early in November, 1775. If we take it that the book on the "Morlaks" came into his hands in the summer of 1775, during his travels in Switzerland, he must then have made the translation before the late summer or the early autumn of that year.

* See previous articles on "The First Link between English and Serbo-Croat Literature" by David H. Low, No. 8 of *SLAVONIC REVIEW*, p. 363, and by Professor H. G. Fiedler in No. 17, p. 390. The former contains Walter Scott's little-known version of the "*Hasanaginica*".—ED.

There were in Herder's *Volkslieder*, in addition to the *Hasanaginica*, three more "Morlakian" songs, and it was generally held that it was he who persuaded Goethe to translate the *Klaggesang*. But though Goethe was at that time still under Herder's direct influence, it has been proved that the latter's interest in "Morlakian" songs was accidental and that he had no influence over Goethe in this matter. Of the four songs which Herder had borrowed from various works of Fortis—one being from his *Osservazioni sopra l'isola di Cherso ed Osero*, 1771—three originated in a collection made by a Dalmatian Franciscan friar, A. Kačić, while the *Hasanaginica*, having lived in the mouths of the people, must have been taken down by Fortis or by one of his Dalmatian friends, while it was being chanted or recited.

In his article "Serbische Lieder," Goethe says that he remembered Fortis, from whom the *Hasanaginica* had come to him, but he adds that it reached him through the "Morlakian Notes" of Gräfin Rosenberg (= Justine Wynne, Comtesse d'Ursins-Rosenberg), where he found it in the original and a French translation. Goethe, however, made a mistake, for the book *Les Morlaques*, to which he referred, does not contain the *Hasanaginica*, and, indeed, was published ten years after Herder's *Volkslieder*. He also could not have translated it from the French, since the French edition of Fortis's Dalmatian journey only appeared after this song had been published by Herder.

Goethe's confusion can be explained by the fact that about 1825 Charles Nodier and Prosper Mérimée began to publish their falsifications of popular ballads, in which Goethe was much interested; it was natural that these should have led him to the "legends" of Countess Rosenberg and caused a confusion of her "Morlaks" with those of Fortis. It is therefore certain that Goethe made his translation while using that of Werthes, and also the original in Serbo-Croat quoted by Fortis. In my doctor's thesis *Das serbische Volkslied in der deutschen Literatur*, published in Leipzig in 1905, I have tried to show how young Goethe, without any knowledge of the Serbian language, yet—to quote his own words, "mit Ahnung des Rhythmus und Beobachtung der Wortstellung des Originals"—succeeded not only in correcting Werthes's translation, but also in producing an excellent translation of his own. It was only a translator of his calibre who could have done such a thing.

II

While studying law at Strassburg (1771-2), young Goethe fell strongly under the influence of Herder, who had at that time

formulated his own main ideas clearly and begun to realise and to publish them Love towards Nature and towards everything emanating from it—in the sense of Rousseau's teaching, but still more under his own direct feelings and mood—assumed in the literary productions of the successful author of *Werther* a more definite note, adapting itself to the principal tendency of Herder, namely, the creation of a national art modelled on traditional poetry, but at the same time making a profound study of this or that nation. The action which Lessing demanded from poetry was supplemented in Herder's case by the need of force and passion, defending feeling as superior to reason for all kinds of poetry, the highest expression of which he found in the national traditional songs, from Homer onwards. These ideas fell upon fertile soil in the youthful Goethe; he had now found a guide, and his writings of those days clearly show how powerful Herder's influence was and how busy Goethe was in reading and studying various books on traditional poetry in all its aspects. He published essays on Homer, especially in the *Frankfurter Gelehrte Anzeigen*, translated Ossian, and personally collected popular ballads in Alsace. In sending Herder copies of twelve such ballads, "*die ich auf meinen Streifereien aus den Kehlen der ältesten Mütterchens aufgehascht habe*," he wrote from Frankfurt in the autumn of 1771, that he had "carried them on his heart like a treasure," and "alle Mädchen, die Gnade vor meinen Augen finden wollen, müssen sie lernen und singen," but "he would not let even his best friends copy them out, in spite of their repeated requests." Herder published some of them, like the *Hasanaginica*, in his *Volkslieder*, having first published that beautiful song of Goethe's, modelled on traditional poetry—"Sah ein Knab' ein Röslein stehn, Röslein auf der Heide"—in his *Blätter von deutscher Art und Kunst* (1773), thus opening the way for traditional poetry in the beginning of the *Sturm und Drang* period. Later, in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Goethe remembered the trials of his youth in this direction, and it is well known that, during the years of his enthusiasm for natural and traditional poetry, he kept a record of all special "popular" expressions and forms which he then used in his songs and plays. Finally, about the same time, Goethe also translated the "Song of Songs"—to use his own words, addressed to his friend Merk in October, 1775—"this most beautiful collection of love songs created by God." And, by a strange coincidence, forty years later, the old Goethe compared some of our Serbian "female" songs in their beauty with the "Song of Songs"—"and that means something!"

One might consider in greater detail the evidence illustrating

the youthful Goethe's interest in traditional poetry, created under Herder's direct influence, an interest which lasted for a considerable time at Weimar, until he left for Italy. By a more detailed examination, it would then be possible to point out many traces of his influence and its consequences upon what he himself produced at that time. Such traces may be found later than the *Hasanaginica*, in a whole series of lyric songs, composed in the so-called "Serbian trochaic." But the reverse is also possible: that Goethe found it easier to bring the line and rhythm of the *Hasanaginica* back to our decasyllabic line, by composing his own lyrics at that time in trochaics, which consisted mostly of four feet, but also sometimes of five, from which it was not difficult to come to the decasyllabic line. From all this it would transpire very clearly how Herder's young friend and admirer kept his ears wide open for poetical productions such as the *Hasanaginica* and with what understanding, common sense, and competence he undertook the work of translation.

There is yet another explanation which perhaps shows still more clearly why young Goethe was particularly attracted by this "mournful song about the noble wife of Hasan Aga," namely, that while he was engaged in translating it there lived in the poet's heart the images of his heroines of that time, so that "in das Lied von der verstossenen Morlakin flossen Stimmungselemente der Frankfurter Zeit." With the exception of Madame Camilla Luzerna, hardly anyone has dwelt on this point, and it may be of interest to examine these "Stimmungselemente" of the young translator, of whom his chief recent interpreter, Herr Gundolf, says that he never tried to express anything not based on personal experience, and that we may therefore conclude that the *Hasanaginica* came to Goethe at the very moment when he "was ripe for it," that is when he was "living" it.

It is superfluous to point out the great part played by women in Goethe's life and work. From his cradle to his grave, love, like an imperial express train, came first. It may be that Gundolf exaggerates in saying that the young Goethe *created* a new kind of lyric—the lyric song in which the poet identifies himself with what he personally experiences at the moment of making it—for what else is lyric poetry? Goethe was, however, one of the greatest lyric poets and therefore one of the greatest lovers, who were able to make a song out of their own feelings. He was pre-eminently a lyric poet and a lover. He himself considered his poetic gift a part of his nature and practised it—as he says in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*—either unwittingly, without any particular desire (and

even against his desire) or as the result of a special occasion. Is it, then, any wonder that his most beautiful songs were caused by his numerous love affairs? By the time he was twenty-three, Goethe had experienced three unhappy love affairs—unhappy for the women whom he had loved and then deserted, Katchen at Leipzig, Friederika near Strassburg, and Lotte at Wezlar. From each of these he had emancipated himself, in addition to his moral sufferings and pains, by an abundance of “poetic blood”—it is enough to mention, apart from his songs and short plays, *Faust* and *Werther*. Once again he found himself in his native Frankfurt, as a young lawyer and already a writer and poet of fame, “like a child of nature with many talents, causing curiosity” in social circles, and was admitted to the house of the well-known merchant and banker Schonemann, where he soon fell deeply in love with the only daughter, the beautiful Lili. In the fourth part of *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, which only appeared after the poet’s death, is a description of this love, the fourth to end tragically; and the notes on which this part is based show that he had gone fairly far, an engagement having been announced after he had passed through all the phases of happiness and passion. A whole series of songs and small poetical works—among them the dramatic scenes *Erwin und Elmire* in their original version—have come down to us to illustrate more clearly those “feelings of the moment.” “Wären die sammtlichen Gedichte jener Epoche beisammen, sie würden den Zustand besser darstellen als es hier geschehen kann,” is written in one of his notes; and right down to the end of that year (1775) in circumstances quite different and in a new atmosphere his love for Lili still mastered him and inspired him to poetic effort—the last time perhaps in a letter to Carl August, on 23 December, while on a trip to Jena—

Holde Lili, warst so lang
 Meine Lust und all mein Sang—
 Bist ach nun all mein Schmerz und doch
 All mein Sang bist du noch.

Lili’s Park is no doubt the most eloquent illustration of this “state of feelings,” and Goethe said that he wrote it at that time, immediately after he left for Switzerland in the summer of 1775. It was necessary once more to break off a connection so pleasant and apparently so firm; it was necessary to tear himself away and give her up. Her image and the memory of her followed him on the whole journey, and one of the rare verses which it produced

re-echoed in the mountains, when, enchanted by the majestic view of the Lake of Zurich, he sent her the greetings of a loving heart—

Wenn ich, liebe Lili, dich nicht liebte,
Welche Wonne gab' mir dieser Blick !
Und doch, wenn ich, Lili, dich nicht liebte,
War', was wär' mein Glück ?

It was during the days when he wrote these jubilant lines—which he reprinted in the *Dichtung und Wahrheit* in the original form, because it perhaps better illustrated his innermost feelings—that the little book of Werthes containing the text of the *Hasanaginica* must have reached him and he set himself, when again in Frankfurt, to translate it, during the early morning allotted to work (die frühesten Morgenstunden war ich der Dichtkunst schuldig) in so far as the disquiet and impatience aroused by his love permitted him. Although determined to break off the match, yet “ he returned home from the summit of Gotthard, turning his back on Italy,” because he could not live without her. “ It was an accursed state of mind, comparable in one sense to hell, where live the separated unhappy-happy ones. . . .” From this suffering which, even in his later memory seemed unbearable, he turned to work and song, seeking in them consolation and distraction. Does not the *Hasanaginica*, therefore, fit into this state of mind in Goethe? While his love for Lili was still aflame in his bosom and at night forced him to go to her window, there hovered before his eyes the noble image of the “ Morlakian ” Kaduna, whose heart bursts asunder on parting from the man whom she loves and who loves her yet sends her away. Did he seat himself at his table to forget his own sufferings, poring over the lines of Fortis's original, comparing them with Werthes' translation, trying to decipher “ Morlakian ” names and discovering from them the original rhythm : *Seto se bjeli u gorje zelenoj*?

Nowhere does Fortis say from where he received the original text of *Hasanaginica*, but he is constantly referring to his Dalmatian friends who helped him to collect and translate every kind of material, and in the chapter on the Morlaks he thanks by name Archdeacon Matija Sović, of Osor, with whom he had long discussions on the language and its orthography and on the bad effect of “ Italianisms.” He also says that these national songs are sometimes written down in order to preserve their memory, and it is highly probable that he knew the written collection of Dr. Julius Bajamonti, his intimate friend at Split. Indeed, it is not impossible that it was here that he obtained the *Hasanaginica*; this is the view of Mr. V. Bogišić and

Professor Murko. In any case the Slovene scholar Miklošić obtained much later a manuscript from Spalato, including the *Hasanaginica*, and published it in German in 1883. Mention may also be made of the opinion of Madame Kamila Lucerna, that Fortis may have heard the poem in the original from his friend the Voivod Pervan Kokorić, at whose country house near Imotska he was a guest, and who, he tells us, "had in his youth composed many heroic and lyrical poems." Finally, Dr. Gesemann, of Prague, in his edition of the Erlangen MS¹ (1925) has published the oldest known variation of this ballad.

Even Vuk Karadžić, to whom Kopitar showed Goethe's translation in Vienna, reproduced in his first collection of ballads published in 1814, the original text of Fortis, with notes of his own, which were supplemented in later editions. Not one of the German translators, nor Vuk himself, nor any of the numerous writers in recent times who have studied the subject—down to Professor Murko, who made special journeys in 1927—have ever heard the *Hasanaginica* recited among the peasantry. And yet the ballad still lives and is sung in the very district where it originated, from Imotska to the Lika in Southern Croatia. The proof of this came to me in the following way.

After publishing in 1905 my doctor's dissertation under the title *Das serbische Volkslied in der deutschen Literatur*, I grew more keenly interested in our national poetry and followed with special attention the work of our young artists of the "Medulić" group, round Ivan Meštrović, who drew their main inspiration from that poetry. I was on close terms of friendship with them, and even then often heard Meštrović talk of Marko Kraljević, of the hajduks (robbers) and uskoks², and recite the versions which he had learnt as a child from his mother and grandmother. Even then he mentioned the *Hasanaginica*, but it was only after the war that I learned that he knew the whole poem by heart, and this not in Fortis's version, but in one used in his village, Otavice, when he was a boy. I suggested to him that he should commit it to paper, exactly as he remembered it. But it was only quite recently, when I was preparing a special number of *Nova Evropa* in honour of the Goethe centenary and told him of Goethe's youthful enthusiasm for the ballad, of his later interest in our literature and of the service which he had rendered to us in first introducing us before the forum of Europe, that

¹ See review "A New Collection of Serbian Ballads" (Erlanski Rukopis Starih Srpskohrvatskih Narodnih Pesema) in *Slavonic Review*, No. 14, p. 455.

² Half-piratical refugees from Turkish rule in the 16th century, in the North Dalmatian islands and uplands.—ED.

Meštrović's interest was kindled, and he produced from memory a version differing materially from that of Fortis and Vuk.

In conversation he told me that he had learnt it from his father's mother, a woman of alert and original character, who knew by heart a great number of ballads and recited them to a great age, dying early in the present century. She sang them to his brother Marko in his cradle, and Ivan, who was seven years older, listened and drank them in, until he himself was able to sing them to the older members of his family. He remembers other women also singing this ballad; it was not the custom for men to sing poems of this kind to the accompaniment of the gusla, but only the so-called "heroic" ballads. He can remember that the name of Hasan Aga occurred in some of these other heroic ballads. On one occasion, at the spinning, while the men were chanting to the gusla and the women sat round and listened as they worked, someone mentioned Hasan Aga, and his grandmother could not refrain from cursing him, so keenly did she feel against the "heartless one" (*bezdusnik*) who had deprived his wife of her five children and caused her death. Meštrović's youngest brother, Petar, also remembers the ballad being recited when he was a child, but cannot, like Ivan, reconstruct it from memory.

In conclusion a word *pro domo suo* may be allowed.

In writing my original dissertation I spoke of *Serbian* national poetry, because it appeared over a hundred years ago under that name and so made its way into German literature. Today I should like to modify my title, in the light of recent facts and my own observations. The *Hasanaginica* clearly originated with a branch of our people which bears the Croat name. This is proved by the written sources both of the Fortis original and of numerous variations (as dealt with by Professor Gesemann) on the Dalmatian littoral and islands, and by the whole milieu in which these have been found. It is proved still more by the versions which still survive in the Dalmatian uplands, and notably that of Meštrović. And as it was this ballad which first ushered our poetry into the great world, it is but fair that in world literature it should be referred to as Croat no less than Serb.

I write thus because in the last twenty years I have learned various things which I did not know before, regarding our national songs and their distribution, especially in Dalmatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina—for instance, that in Dalmatia *Orthodox* gusla-players are unknown; but above all, because it seems to me necessary, under present conditions in our country, to turn our gaze a little backwards

and reckon with the fact that unhappily not everyone shares our belief as to the unity of Serb and Croat, and that there is still a struggle before us, until this conviction strikes deep root in the consciousness of all. We can only be thankful that we have reached this wider experience in the field of our national poetry, for this fortifies our belief in the indivisibility of our national territory and the essential identity not only of our language but of our national spirit.

(*Trans.* R. W. S.-W.)

MILAN ĆURČIN.

The following English translation is rendered from the oral version recited by Ivan Meštrović (*see* above). As will be seen from the originals printed below, the metre of these ballads is decasyllabic and unrhymed, with a cæsura in the middle of the line, on either side of which greater varieties of speed and scansion are attainable than in the facile but sometimes monotonous rhythms of Scott or Byron. They are meant to be chanted or recited, to the primitive accompaniment of the gusla, or one-stringed fiddle. What makes them so untranslatable is their utter directness and simplicity of phrase. The translator is only too conscious of the inadequacy of his own versions, but it is hoped that the special method adopted, with its insistence on the cæsura, will render them suitable for recitation and thereby preserve something of the atmosphere of the original, even despite the linguistic differences.

R. W. S.-W.

LAMENT OF THE NOBLE WIFE OF HASSAN AGA

(*Translated by* R. W. SETON-WATSON.)

What shines so white	upon the mountains?
Is it the snow	or is it swans?
Or is it sheep	high on the meadows;
If it were snow,	it would have melted;
The swans would soon	have flown away,
The sheep would soon	have wandered home.
It is not snow,	it is not swans,
Nor white sheep	gathering in flocks.
But 'tis the tent	of Aga Hassanaga,
Where he lies stricken	with grievous wounds.
His mother and sister	visit him,
But not his wife,	his dear love Káduna ¹ —
So young, so shy,	she dared not go.

¹ For the reader's guidance an accent is placed on each proper name as it occurs for the first time. See also introductory note.

When then the Aga's
 A letter he wrote
 " Káda, my wife,
 " Wait not for me
 " In my white hall

Hardly had Káda
 When horses' hoofs
 And when she heard it,
 To fling herself
 After her ran
 Little Fáta,
 And Níkolica,
 Clinging to
 " Fling not thyself
 " 'Tis not our father
 " It is our uncle,
 And on the instant

Káda falls
 " O brother,
 " That he sends me away
 And never a word
 But his hand he puts
 And draws forth the letter
 Which lets her take
 And turn again

And when she had
 She kissed her daughters'
 And the manly brows
 But her tiny son
 She could not bear
 And her brother took her
 And scarce could tear her
 Then he mounts her
 And carries her home

Káda was fair
 Nor long had she been
 Scarce had a week
 When suitors from all sides
 And above all came
 Káda besought

wounds were healed,
 to his dear love Káduna.
 my faithless wife,
 in my white hall,
 amid my kin."

read the letter,
 sound in the court.
 she flew to the lattice,
 from the tower so high.
 her two young children—
 but seven years old,
 who was but three—
 their mother's skirts.
 down, mother dear.
 Hassan Aga,
 the Beg Pintérovic."
 he gains the hall.

on her brother's neck.
 what unheard-of shame,
 from my children five."
 the Beg makes answer,
 within his breast
 of divorce,
 away her dowry
 to her mother's hall.

perused the letter,
 ruddy cheeks,
 of her two boys.
 within his cradle—
 to part from him.
 by the arms
 from the child.
 behind him on his horse,
 to his own white hall.

and nobly born,
 in her mother's hall—
 passed since her coming,
 came to woo,
 the Kadi of Imotski.
 her dearest brother,

" Beg, I beseech thee,
 " And not to lose
 " Give me not, brother,
 " Lest in my breast
 " While that I think
 But not a whit
 But gives her to

Káda beseeches
 To write for her
 And send it to
 Say, " thy young bride
 " When the wedding guests
 " Assemble on
 " When with thy kinsmen
 " A long veil bring
 " That she may not see

When then this letter
 The wedding guests
 He marshalled them,
 And a long veil
 In safety they came
 In safety they turned

And when they passed
 Her daughters through
 But her sons came out
 And to their mother
 " O mother dear,
 " Thy dinner we
 When then their mother
 Fondly the groomsman
 " I beg thee, o groomsman,
 " Stop the horses
 " That I may see
 " And give to them

Before the gate
 And the mother gave
 Dresses of silk
 Knives to her sons,
 And to the infant
 To him she gave

on thy life,
 thy sister's love,
 to any other,
 my heart should burst,
 of my orphans dear."
 does her brother care,
 the Kadi of Imotski.

her brother the Beg
 a fair white letter
 the Kadi of Imotski.
 beseeches thee,
 in full array
 the wedding morn,
 thou comest to fetch her—
 with thee, she prays,
 her orphans dear."

reached the Kadi,
 were already assembled.
 to fetch the bride,
 he brought with him.
 to fetch the bride,
 them back again.

the Aga's hall,
 the lattice watched,
 from the Aga's hall,
 they called aloud :
 come back to us,
 have prepared for thee."
 heard them call,
 she besought.
 my brother in God,
 before the gate,
 my orphans dear
 a mother's gifts."

the horses stopped,
 to each of them—
 she gave to her daughters,
 inlaid with gold,
 in the cradle,
 an orphan's clothes.

When the Aga saw this
 He called to him
 "Come hither to me,
 "Even for you
 "Your mother
 And when the wife
 Down on the black earth,
 For her mother's heart
 As she looked upon

from the window,
 his two young sons.
 my orphans dear,
 she has no pity—
 with a heart of stone."
 of Hassan heard,
 down she fell.
 had burst asunder,
 her orphans dear.

XALOSTNA PIESANZA
 PLEMNITE ASAN-AGHINIZE

(Version of the Abbé Fortis, used
 by Goethe)

Seto se bjeli u gorje zelenoj ?
 Al-su snjezi, al-su Labutove ?
 Da-Su snezi vech-bi okopnuli ;
 Labutove vech-bi poletjeli
 Ni-su snjezi, nit su Labutove ;
 Nego sciator Aghie Asan-Aghe.
 On bolu-je u ranami gliutimi.
 Oblaziga mater, i sestriza ;
 A Gliubovza od stida ne mogla.

Kadli-mu-je ranam boglie bilo,
 Ter poruça vjernoj Gliubi svojoj ;
 Ne čekai-me u dvoru bjelomu,
 Ni u dvoru, ni u rodu momu
 Kad Kaduna rjeci razumjela,
 Josc-je jадna u toj misli stala.
 Jeka stade kogna oko dvora :
 I pobjexe Asan Aghiniza
 Da vrāt lomi kule niz pexere.
 Za gnom terçu dve chiere djevoike :
 Vrat-nam-se, mila majko nascia ;
 Ni-je ovo babo Asan-Ago,
 Vech daixa Pintorovich Bex.

ASANAGINICA

(Version of Ivan Meštrović)

Šta se bili gore na planini ?
 Il' je snijeg il' su labudovi,
 Il' su bile na plandištu ovce
 Da je snijeg već bi okopnio,
 Labudovi već bi poletili
 A bile se odjavile ovce.
 Nit' je snijeg nit' su labudovi
 Nit' su bile okupljene ovce
 Neg' je čador Age Asanage.
 On boluje od ljutije rana.
 Po'odi ga majka i sestrica
 Ne po'odi Kaduna ljubovca,
 Jere mlada od stida nemogla.

Kad je Agi ranam bolje bilo
 Knjigu piše Kaduni ljubovci :
 "Kado moja moja nevirnice
 Ne čekaj me u bilome dvoru
 Ni u dvoru ni u rodu mome."
 Istom Kada knjigu proučila
 Stade klopot konja pokraj dvora.
 Kad to začu Asanaginica,
 Leti ona zrčali pendžeru
 Da se baci niz visoku kulu.
 Za njom trči dvoje dice lude—
 Mlada f'ata od sedam godina,
 Nikolica od tri godinice,
 Materi se drže oko skuta :
 "Ne skači nam naša mila majko,
 Nije ono babo Asan Aga
 Neg' daidža Pinterović Beže."
 Uto Beže ulize u dvore.

I vrâtise Asan Aghiniza,
 Ter se vjescia bratu oko vrâta.
 Da ! moj brate, velike sramote !
 Gdi-me saglie od petero dize !
 Bexe muçi : ne govori nista
 Vech-se mâscia u xepe svione,
 I vadi-gnoj Kgnigu oproschienja,
 Da uzimglie pod punno vienčanje,
 Da gre s'gnime majci u Zatraghe.

Kad Kaduna Kgnigu proučila,
 Dva-je sina u čelo gliubila,
 A due chiere u rumena liza :
 A s'malahnim u besicje sinkom
 Odjetiti nikako ne mogla.
 Vech-je brataz za ruke uzeo,
 I jedva-je sin-kom raztavio :
 Ter-je mechie K'sebi na Kogniza,
 S'gnome grede u dvoru bjelomu.

U rodu-je malo vrijeme stâla,
 Malo vrijeme, ne nedjeglie dana,
 Dobra Kado, i od roda dobra,
 Dobra Kadu prose sa svi' strana ;
 Da najvechie Imoski Kadia.
 Kaduna-se bratu svomu moli :
 Aj, taxo te ne xelila, bratzo !
 Ne moi mene davat za nikoga,
 Da ne puza jadno serze moje
 Gledajuchi Sirotize svoje.

Ali Bexe ne hajasce nista,
 Vech-gnu daje Imoskumu Kadii.
 Sok Kaduna bratu-se mogliasce,
 Da gnoi pisce listak bjele Knighe
 Da-je saglie Imoskumu Kadii.
 " Djevoika te ljepo pozdravgliasce,
 " A u Kgnizi ljepo te mogliasce,
 " Kad pokupisc Gospodu Svatove
 " Dugh podkliuvaz nosi na djevoiku ;
 " Kada bude Aghi mimo dvora,
 " Neg-ne vidî sirotize svoje."
 Kad Kadii bjela Kgniga doge,
 Gospodu-je Svate pokupio.
 Svate kuppi grede po djevoiku.

Kâda bratu pade oko vrata :
 " Ao', brate, puste li sramote
 Di me goni od petero dice "
 Muçi Beže ništa ne besidi,
 Neg' se maša rukom u džepove
 I izvadi knjigu od rastave
 Da sa sobom uzima miraze
 I vrati se u majčine dvore.

Kad je Kada knjigu proučila,
 Čeri ljubi u rumena lica,
 A sinove u čela junačka
 Al' sa malim u kolivci sinom
 S' njim se majka rastati nemore
 Neg' je bratac uvati za ruke
 I jedva je otrže od sina
 Ter je baca sebi na konjica
 Odvede je svome bilu dvoru.

Lipa Kada a od dobra roda,
 Malo ona kod matere bila
 Ne prolazi ni nedilja dana
 Prose Kadu prosici sa svi' strana,
 Ponajviše Imocki Kadija.
 Moli Kada mila brata svoga :
 " Ao Beže života ti tvoga
 Da bi tebe sestra neželila
 Ne daj mene brate za nikoga
 Da u meni srce ne pripukne
 Sićajuć' se moje siročadi."

Al to bratac aje i neaje,
 Neg' je daje Imockom Kadiji.
 Moli Kada Bega brata svoga,
 Da joj piše listak knige bile
 I posalje Imockom Kadiji :
 " Moli tebe mladjana nevista
 Kad sakupiš kićene svatove
 I kad' po nju u rodbinu dodješ
 Da doneseš dugačke koprene
 Kada prodje kraj Agini dvora
 Da ne vidi svoje siročadi."
 Kad Kadiji sitna knjiga stiže
 Več je bio svate sakupio.
 Skupi svate ode po nevistu

Dobro Svati dosli clo djevoike,
I Zdravo-se provratili s'gnome.

Sobom nosi dugačke koprene.
Zdravo svati došli po Kadunu
I zdravo se natrag povratili.

A kad bili Aghi mimo dvora,
Dve-je chierze s'penxere gledaju,
A dva sina prid-gnu izhogiaju,
Tere svojoj majci govonaju.
Vrati-nam se, mila majko nascia,
Da mi tebe uxinati damo.
Kad to čula Asan-Aghiniza,
Stariscini Svatov govorila :
Bogom, brate Svatov Stariscina,
Ustavimi Kogne uza dvora,
Da davu jem Sirotize mije.

Kad su bili kraj Agina dvora,
Dvije čerke gledaju s'pendžera
A dva sina prid nju izlazila,
Ter su svoju dozivali majku :
" Vrati nam se naša mila majko
Mi smo tebi ručak pripravili."
Kad to čula Asan Aginica
Ona moli svatskog starešinu :
" Bogom brate svatski staresino
Zaustavi konje ispod dvora,
Da darujem moje sirotice ! "

Ustavise Kogne uza dvora.
Svoju dizu ljepo darovala.
Svakom' sinku nozve pozlachene,
Svakoi chieri čohu da pogliane ;
A malomu u besicje sinku
Gnemu slagie uboske hagline.

Pod dvorim su konje ustavili
Ter je majka dicu darivala :
Čerkam daje svilene aljine
A sinovim nože pozlačene,
A malome u kolivci sinu
Njemu šalje sirotske aljine.

A to gleda Junak Asan-Ago ;
Ter dozivglie do dva sina svoja :
Hodte amo, Sirotize moje,
Kad-se nechie milovati na vas
Majko vascia, Serza argiascoga.
Kad to čula Asan-Aghiniza,
Bjelim ličem u Zemgliu udarila ;
U pût-se s' duscjom raztavila
Od xalosti gledajuch Sirota.

To gledao Aga sa pendžera,
Te dozivlje dva nejaka sina :
" Od'te amo moja siročadi,
Ni vami se smilovati neće
Majka vaša srca kamenoga ! "
Kad to čula Asan Aginica
S licom pade na zemljicu crnu,
U majci je srce prepuknulo,
Gledajući svoje sirotice.

SLAV VERDICTS ON GOETHE

It seemed to us that our readers would be interested in the following critical pronouncements, passed, on the occasion of the Goethe Centenary, by two men of eminence in the Slav world, but differing *toto coelo* in their intellectual outlook.—ED.

I. THOMAS G. MASARYK

I WAS in my seventeenth or eighteenth year when Goethe first came my way. I had saved a few pence and bought myself a selection of his poems; after that I was soon able to buy an edition of his

works in six volumes, which, though not complete, satisfied me at the time

It was as a lyric poet that I first got to know him; I marvelled at the skill with which he wielded the German language—his wonderfully smooth style, his graphic, even onomatopoeic, use of words, his perfect rhymes and versification and the harmonious whole into which he welded the separate poems. In everything the form matches the content.

From the lyrics I passed on to the novels and dramas and, above all, to *Faust*; and in *Faust* I was enthralled by the form, what I may call the lyrical quality of that drama. Do I say drama? *Faust* is an analysis of the modern man, an analysis of the transition from the 18th to the 19th centuries, and hence a philosophy of history, and particularly of contemporary history, though also of the age which lay behind him. For Goethe history is not a presentation of facts, but rather, and very rightly, an evaluation of facts.

The *Faust* problem is Titanism—he himself calls Faust a superman, liberated from his shackles by modern science and philosophy—the headlong onslaught of modern man, the fervent striving after an entirely new life, frequently in opposition to tradition. Goethe has overcome the Middle Ages, humanism and rationalism alike in so far as they find expression on the one hand through the scholastic view of theology, and on the other through modern philosophy and science.

A son of the 18th and 19th centuries, a contemporary of the great Revolution, of reaction and restoration, of Voltaire and Rousseau, Goethe the artist was profoundly influenced by both the classicism and the romanticism of his time; but in his innermost soul he remained a classic, as *Iphigenia* and *Tasso* amply testify.

In the first part of *Faust* he broached with perfect consistency the problem of suicide (see also the passage in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*) and of murder (the killing of Margaret's brother); this final stage of modern disintegration, with its essential halfness and one-sided sensuality, has been more realistically analysed, partially under Goethe's influence, by the great Russians, and in particular by Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy.

A certain aristocratic trait, alike in the intellectual and social sphere, matched his classicism; he solved the problem of Titanism mainly in the domain of philosophy and religion. The social side did not remain outside his ken; but custom, home tradition and his private life at a small Court and in towns prevented him from escaping that German bourgeois admixture of his day, with which

Beethoven so harshly reproached him. In practice, Goethe was all his life the pattern of an intellectual worker, and also, in his early Weimar days, of an official and a financier.

The second part of *Faust* solves the philosophical problem. His becoming a doctor of laws, an advocate and an official did not ruin poetry for him, but rather gave him a practical direction. (In this connection we may note the poetical elements of the post-Goethe realism of new Germany.) The energetic Götz overpowered the milk-and-water Werther; Götz characteristically preceded Werther, although Goethe lived through both characters at the same time.

From Goethe it is easy to measure the relation of art and poetry to science and philosophy.

Goethe was for me a teacher by his universality and world-outlook; the culture of all ages and nations attracted him, every domain of human thought and achievement interested him. Goethe is fundamentally German; but he endeavoured to understand all peoples and their art and to learn from them. He was entirely free from the jingoism which was then beginning to make itself felt in Germany; he was not afraid to cast it far from him. Today, of course, both national and international consciousness is richer and intenser, but Goethe marked out the course well—the harmonious alliance of nationalism and internationalism. He was one of the first real Europeans.

My own development was strongly influenced by Goethe; he helped to mould me. The influences on a modern educated man acquainted with the literature and culture of many centuries and peoples are, of course, manifold. We take over individual thoughts, we learn method, we appraise and imitate our models, but also we outlive and reject what does not stand the test of criticism. And there may be a powerful, intense, good influence in such a rejection also. It is in this broader sense that I use the expression “moulding influence.”

I did not take my teachers and models uncritically, and so I soon became critical of Goethe, too. He opened my eyes by his strong egoism, by a certain ruthlessness (Heinrich's abandonment of Gretchen, ruthlessness towards Philemon and Baucis—to restrict my illustrations to *Faust*). But I was reconciled by his truthfulness, which did not shun confession, not even thankless confession. His confession was discrete, in so far as he revealed himself to his readers. Literary sleuths keep the reading public informed also of his more intimate confessions, just as they do for other great poets. *Dichtung und Wahrheit* does not belong to a *genre* of which Goethe holds the

monopoly, but follows methods common to all autobiographers. So few people realise that human life is not only thought and moral and technical practice, but is also compounded of art and poetry.

Goethe was not fortunate enough to make the acquaintance of a strong woman, educated to his standard or at least capable of understanding him, his life is a portrait gallery of weak women, from Gretchen on. He dreamed of Helen, but he found Christiane Vulpius! Only Frau von Stein was a real friend to him over a long period

II. A. V. LUNACHARSKY¹

. . . If we do esteem Goethe it is by no means uncompromisingly. We do not make of him an object of adoration, "a spotless sun, . . ." His destiny is far from appearing to us as harmonious and providential as some of Goethe's famous biographers would like to make it out. As he did himself in his autobiography, we regard his life and work as a long and painful conflict.

The great poet did not manage to come quite victorious out of that conflict. But he had a great merit—a double merit, we should say—of having none the less triumphed, despite the great difficulties, over so many prejudices, so much pettiness, so much meanness of his time. There are moments when Goethe seems not to avoid completely the Philistine spirit of that age. The eagle wings of this giant of thought are sometimes weighed down by so much mediocrity. Yet we must show ourselves quite tolerant and respectful towards him. If Goethe had not made that sacrifice, if he had not submitted, on the social and political plane, to the sinister surroundings of his time, his genius might have failed, depriving us irrevocably of its unrivalled fruits.

Let us set aside two misunderstandings. The first consists in the acceptance of an opportunist philosophy pretending to identify the progressive evolution of personality with the recognition by that personality itself of its own limitations. All this metaphysics of compromise and conciliation, so dear to the petty bourgeoisie, is as alien to us as the fantastic petty bourgeois individualism inevitably tinged with pessimism. Prometheus kissing obsequiously the hand of Zeus appears to us less great than in his unforgettable revolt of which Æschylus and Goethe have told us. The second

¹ This article, published in connection with the Goethe Centenary in *Vecherniyaya Moskva*, from the pen of the former Commissary of Education and well-known Russian writer A. Lunacharsky, deserves the attention of our readers, owing to its highly original and interesting treatment of the subject.—ED.

misunderstanding consists in seeing in the case of Goethe only an instance of the eternal conflict between society as such and man in general. No, the poet has succeeded in always remaining faithful to himself; he is as great in the assertion of his personality as in his voluntary limitations. . . But the harmonious uprooting of the individual is impossible except within a developed and harmonious society.

Goethe dreamed all his life long of such a society, as is testified by the second part of *Faust* and by *Wilhelm Meister*. He even sometimes spoke of a project of secret alliance of all the great European minds in favour of a better society. But neither before nor after Weimar could he fulfil his dream. We must therefore recognise that Goethe's renunciation was a real "privation" and a painful ordeal. This magnificent bourgeois always bore in his heart of hearts the daring and lofty ideals of the young bourgeoisie oppressed by medieval society, by the nobility and the clergy. His dialectical pantheism, as deep as that of Spinoza, but more living and more artistic, enabled this extraordinary man to affirm, notwithstanding all obstacles, his faithfulness to nature, to the senses, to lucidity of thought, to fullness of earthly happiness. He had, at the same time, to resist the temptation offered by the sight of the French Revolution by stressing of his own free will all the latter's drawbacks.

Engels said in speaking of Goethe: "He did not like to deal with God. He never felt at his ease except in things human. His greatness, which neither the Ancients nor Shakespeare could challenge, consists in having freed art from the fetters of religion. And what his 'prophetic' intuition has grasped, the entire German philosophy has but enlarged upon. . . . But in spite of his greatness Goethe was defeated by the German mediocrity of his time. He refused to follow Schiller's example and to seek salvation in the flight toward some Kantian idealism. He was at once too active, too universal, and too 'fleshly,' not to see that that idealism was but a high-sounding expression of the same mediocrity. . . . Goethe's temperament and his spiritual outlook predisposed him to action. But could he act in the stifling atmosphere of his time? Terrible alternative: to live amid surroundings which one despises, and not to be able to break loose from them! Alas! as he grows old, the great poet disappears more and more behind the little Minister of the small State of Weimar . . . We do not blame him, as do the Liberals, for not having taken part in the fight for Germany's freedom; we only reproach him for having at times sacrificed his *æsthetic* sense to the Philistine spirit, and for having thus, of his

own free will, remained outside historic events of the foremost importance. . . .”

Engels admits that Goethe reached the close of his life all covered with wounds, his wings broken and soiled . . . But he also admits that Goethe could not have succeeded except at the cost of that painful sacrifice. This false mask of the Olympian has preserved the great poet from rubbing shoulders with the cursed realities of his time. He was thus able to produce, alongside with lamentable works bearing witness to a sorry opportunism, unforgettable things of which the proletariat must avail itself in working out its culture. Engels points out Goethe's drawbacks; but this does not prevent him from recognising in the man of Weimar the greatest of all Germans. Goethe's books form part, according to Engels, of that treasure heaped up by the most genuine of creators to which the proletariat must put forward its claims. Does not the proletariat continue their work, and is it not called upon to carry out the loftiest of their dreams?

LEOPOLD STAFF

LEOPOLD STAFF was born in 1878, considerably later, therefore, than the more widely-known Polish writers of the present century, Kasprowicz, Wyspiański, Żeromski, and Reymont, who were all born in the eighteen sixties. He first appeared in print when Żeromski was already the author of *The Homeless*, Wyspiański of *The Wedding*, and Kasprowicz had already written his great metaphysical odes. But, early though his début was (he was scarcely twenty-two), he made his appearance at once as an accomplished artist, in his full stature of a conscious master of verse-forms and poetic diction. In his very first volume there were poems which could be placed in an anthology side by side with the best lyrical poems written in Polish up to that date. In his crystalline clearness and in the richness of his verbal expression he may be regarded as the very antithesis of Wyspiański, whose greatness faltered on the point of style. This first volume of Leopold Staff was only the beginning of a long line of development, and in later years he was to reach higher planes of perfection, but, nevertheless, there was never at any period such inequality between his works as there was between some of those of Kasprowicz and even Żeromski, greater though the message of their poetry might have been. He is one of the best "organisers of inspiration," as someone called him. When very young, he came to be acknowledged as one of the leading figures of literature. And now, at the age of fifty-four, he still maintains his place. Moreover, his new collections strike us not only by their accomplishment, but by their freshness, though in the meanwhile a rich and varied younger poetry has developed in Poland under his influence, and by the daring of its imagination, by the intensity of its emotional texture, and by many technical innovations seems to outshine the attainments of the preceding period.

Staff is the foremost representative of pure lyric poetry in Polish literature. Fully to appreciate his importance, some historical background is necessary.

Lyric poetry has a long tradition in Poland. Already in the Middle Ages, in religious hymns, some elements of poetic style were elaborated and foundations were given to a system of versification which is active in the language to the present day, though later centuries enriched, subtilised and varied it in almost innumerable ways. In the second half of the 16th century the first great poet

appeared in the country in the person of Jan Kochanowski. He was a humanist, and Polish literature owes to him the introduction of modern notions of secular feeling, poetic diction and construction. He was also the first to create poems in the vernacular which were to be perennially fresh and vivid, poems which are read today with understanding and emotion as they were more than three hundred years ago. There are even psychological or moral motifs of today which seem to have been expressed at their best by Kochanowski. His poetry has always preserved the privilege of popular quotation. As a humanist, Kochanowski tried his hand at many kinds of writings, but he was genuinely a lyricist, and the lyric is what remains alive in his works today. There are different levels in his poetry; he was tinged by Horatian didacticism; but in poems expressing love, the feeling of Nature or the magnitude of God, he attained the height of purest classic sublimity. He even passed beyond the limits of classic art, giving way to his poignant personal woe in the *Threnodies* after his child's untimely death.¹

Another lyricist of the 16th century, Nicholas Sep, introduced into Polish poetry an element of religious sophistication acquired from contemporary Spanish mystics.

Sep remained for a long time rather obscure, but the influence of Kochanowski was immense. He was, indeed, a *magnus parens* of Polish literature. No other writer in the language was afterwards in such a degree looked up to as a master and a model. His influence was infused in the 17th century with that of the Italian baroque poetry, chiefly of Gianbattista Marini. There followed a great lyric outburst, chiefly erotic, marked by elaborations undreamt of in former times. Seemingly unsurmountable difficulties in verse-form were boldly faced and triumphantly overcome. In metaphors, comparisons and epithets, startling originality and strangeness became the accepted standard. The most brilliant representative of this poetry, Andrew Morsztyn, was a surprising artist; his poems are glittering jewels: some of them, as, for instance, a *sestina* with interior rhymes, scarcely surpassed in any language, though it is difficult to see any profound feeling in them. But in the love-poems of Zimorowicz a penetrating personal note resounds in most careful verse structures, and elements of baroque imagery are most discreetly united with the directness of popular songs. With some other poets, likewise, Italian brilliance became a means soberly used for personal expression. Unfortunately, in the late 17th and

¹ Some of his poems are accessible to the English reader in the translation of Professor G. R. Noyes.

in the early 18th centuries lyric poetry declines with all the rest of Polish literature. Great talents are lacking; smaller ones cannot artistically develop in the prevailing atmosphere.

There is a change for the better only in the second half of the 18th century. But that renaissance of literature is not propitious for lyrics. The reigning taste, modelling its standards on those of contemporary France, favours rather satire and wit. If any lyrics are written by foremost poets, their aim is elaborate coldness and rational argument. The artificial primitivism of court idylls becomes the subsequent fashion. If, nevertheless, from time to time some terse and genuine lyric poems appear, they do so, as it were, on the margin of the ruling tendencies. It is a curious and characteristic fact that the finest lyricist of the epoch, Kniaźnin, when preparing the collected edition of his works (1787), left out of it precisely his best erotic poems which he had published some nine years earlier (1779); they must have seemed to him too intimate. They remained completely forgotten until lately, though they are the chief poetic glory of Polish literature in that century.

Instead, this century handed down to its successors, as its most heartfelt lyrical achievements, some sentimental pastorals by Karpiński and some religious hymns by the same poet which, owing to their stark simplicity and generality of diction (not devoid, however, of nobility) became church prayers and reached a popularity with which no other work in the language can vie.

Romanticism was in Poland, as everywhere, the great revival of lyrical energies. The great importance of Mickiewicz in particular cannot be over-rated. Love, a feeling for Nature, internal conflicts of the soul, religious elation, were expressed by him with a profoundness unknown up to that time, and with a vividness of imagination which enthralled the mind. But his chief poetic ambitions were not in the field of lyric poetry. As a matter of fact, he published only one purely lyrical collection, namely, his *Sonnets*, in 1826.

After the disastrous rising of 1831 his lyrical poems appeared only as additions to his works of a greater scope, and some of them remained in manuscript, being regarded by the poet as pages of his personal memoir. Even less known to his generation were the lyrical works of the other great romantic, Słowacki. His was a purely lyrical nature, but his artistic aims were also outside the lyrical domain. An epic or a dramatic basis was generally necessary for him to express his mind in poetry. Pure lyrics are few in number among his works, and only a small part of them was destined by their author for publication. The majority, including some master-

pieces of the language, became publicly known only many years after Słowacki's death. Krasiński published even fewer of his lyric works than Słowacki, and he was anonymous in all his publications.

Thus, strange though it may seem, this period, so deeply saturated with lyricism, regarded lyrical forms as inferior and unworthy of the moment. If purely lyrical cycles appeared, they had to have national or social feelings for subject (as, for instance, the celebrated Ujejski's *Lamentations of Jeremiah*). Even poets to whom extra-lyric poetry was most contrary by nature (like Zaleski) made efforts—hopeless, of course—in the epic kind.

Some difference came in the next generation when enthusiasm for folklore and popular poetry became one of the animating forces in literature. This movement created a sort of semi-personal expression in diction and verse-forms imitated from the songs of the people. A master of that kind of poetry was Lenartowicz. He did even more than that. He penetrated so deeply into the spirit of popular poetry that, without imitating it, he wrote in a manner which was natural to himself and which bore at the same time the most essential characteristics of genuine popular lyrics.

Only gradually, as the 19th century advanced, did lyrical poetry increase its scope and gain acknowledgment. The influences of foreign writers were active in this respect, chiefly those of Heine and Musset. There was scarcely anybody who knew at that time the existence of the great solitary poet, Cyprian Norwid. Still less was there anybody to know that he was one of the most original, most profound and most pure masters of lyric that Poland ever had. His ideas were too far ahead of his time, his style was too personal and too strange for a generation which was crushed by disasters and which looked to poetry only for consolation. The result was a complete misunderstanding between him and his contemporaries. Norwid was to feel himself, up to the end of his life, a neglected musician at a feast where people are dancing to a hurdy-gurdy.

Meantime, life went slowly on its way. From the early seventies more and more books of verse appear, with only the simple title *Poems*. The strongest and most influential personalities produced by that period are Asnyk and Maria Konopnicka. Those two were to dominate Polish lyric poetry for more than twenty years. Their popularity was, indeed, very wide. They were read and learned by heart. But this popularity was due not so much to the purely literary qualities of their works as to the national accents in them. Konopnicka especially was full of this rhetoric of citizenship which, in the long run, was rather noxious to the proper development of her

genuine literary gifts. Her output was prolific. There are in her works many fine things, but the greater part of her verse is spoilt by argumentative eloquence. The case of Asnyk was similar, but even more poignant perhaps, as his talent was not so strong as that of Maria Konopnicka. His was a delicate gift which was at its fullest when he spoke about personal yearnings, regrets and reveries. But Asnyk forced it to express what he considered the living thought of his generation. So we have a long series of philosophical poems conveying a sort of evolutionary idealism clad in the tritest literary phrases of the day.

But new theories of poetic liberty were already being voiced at that time. Baudelaire, the "Parnassians," and Verlaine were translated and discussed. And in the early nineties a new name had appeared which for some years was to be the symbol of all that is free, intense, individual and bold in poetry. It was the name of Casimir Tetmajer. He brought into his poems a strong feeling of personal independence, a declared voluptuousness, a subtle music and a vivid feeling for nature, especially for the Polish mountains. In poetic diction he was a disciple of Słowacki and of Asnyk at his best, and he put the mark of his own personality upon what he received from them. Mr. Paul Selver has succeeded rather happily (in his *Anthology of Modern Slavonic Literature*) in rendering the mood (though not the movement of the rhythm) of one of his best early poems: *The Tune of the Night Mists over the Black Pond in Gąsienica Valley*.

Tetmajer was not an exclusively lyrical poet, but lyrical poetry was to be one of the principal streams of his activity. And he contributed undoubtedly to the rise of a new interest in the lyric among the reading public. But his lyrical message did not prove to be very rich. His bold description of erotic sensations was soon outdone by other writers. And poems of such delicacy and music as the *Tune of the Night Mists* were not numerous in his volumes. On the other hand, he developed an inconsistent attitude towards the world, in which an erotic sensuousness mingled with yearnings after Nirvana, and a scorn for the multitudes went hand in hand with a romantic urge for some kind of indefinite leadership. Tetmajer used to seek refuge from the painful complications of the time among his beloved mountains and their people. He wrote some poems in the mountaineers' dialect, one of which became a popular song among them. And then this lyricist wrote his best and most poetic work—in prose; it was a series of masterly dialect stories (called *In the Rocky Highlands*) taken from the life and traditions of the

mountaineers.² Only a small number of his poems are read now; some of them are assured of a lasting existence, having been set to music by the well-known composer, M. Karłowicz.

Tetmajer, at the height of his popularity, was overshadowing many greater but less prolific and less facile lyricists (among whom the solitary genius of Anthony Lange was particularly remarkable), when Leopold Staff, then a young man of twenty-two, produced his first collection. He acknowledged his debt to Tetmajer, dedicating to him one of these poems: *A Tune of the Gloaming*. It was a parallel to Tetmajer's *Tune of the Night Mists*; and by it the disciple reached at once the heights of his master.

Leopold Staff did not confine himself to lyric writing alone. There is among his works a long epico-philosophical poem and there are six dramas, one of them even written in prose. But lyrics prevail, and most of his larger works are so closely connected with his lyrical motifs that they seem only a transposition into another key.

A successor of the immediate past in his poetic vocabulary and verse-forms, in the inmost spirit of his poetry he seems rather to renew the tradition of Kochanowski's classicism, so universalised and measured is his poetry. Moreover, in his works, Staff is more detached than any of his contemporaries from everyday things around him. In general, there are no topical allusions in them. They form a world of their own. As a rule, there is in them no reference to the hopes or troubles of the nation. Once only, during the war, while an exile in Russia, Staff allowed crude actuality to enter his poetry, and wrote his book, *A Rainbow of Tears and Blood* (1918), the weakest and least characteristic of his collections, which leaves us cold and uninterested.

Staff's poetical life, which finds its expression in his lyrical poems is, of course, related to its time and its general movements, but this connection is not so explicit as in the case of Asnyk, for instance. It is an internal relationship. Poetic statements are here no more directly informative of their day than are musical sonatas or symphonies.

Staff's first volume bore the title *The Dreams of Might* and appeared in 1901. *A Day for the Soul* followed in 1903. And then at almost equal intervals were published: *For Birds of the Air* (1905), *A Bough in Blossom* (1908), *Smiles of the Hours* (1910), *In the Shadow of a Sword* (1911), *The Swan and the Lyre* (1914). The war

² A translation of one of these, "The Miller's Maryna," by Miss H. E. Kennedy, was published in *Slavonic Review*, Vol. X., No. 30, pp. 684-701.

interrupted their continuity. After the single volume of occasional poems already mentioned, *Field Paths* appeared in 1919, and *A Murmuring Shell* in 1921. Then followed the longest pause in Staff's lyric activity, after which he produced *The Needle's Eye* (1927), a book marking a decisive change in his view of life. His latest collection is *Tall Trees* (1932)

It is extremely difficult to give an idea of a pure lyricist without being able to give long quotations. Every prosaic representation of the contents of poems destroys a great part of their significance. And the difficulty even increases in cases of classical poets, in whom discipline has to be taken so much into account.

Leopold Staff entered literature with great and courageous plans. The title of his first book was expressive of his intentions. He dreamed of power. We meet continually in this collection such phrases as: "My dream walks in a glorious royal purple," "The whole world is too small for the statue I dream of." He saw the perspective of life as immense. He was penetrated by the sense of fullness and even of excess. He felt a kinship to blind winds, to lightning, to thunders, to the free and savage steppes, to "boasting and unbridled hurricanes." His best-loved symbol was the ocean—"dark and boundless, proud, wild, and immense." His song was to be "a song of strength, plain, hard and severe," "a song of tempest and freedom." He imagined himself as a gambler boldly playing with destiny, his whole life at stake. Another of his privileged metaphors was a volcano. We must remember that it was the time when the philosophy of Frederic Nietzsche was prevailing, and Staff was even to translate some of his works.

But from a very early moment of his poetic consciousness a feeling was present in Staff that that force and rich experience of which he was dreaming would not be given him gratuitously. The introductory poem to the first collection (*The Blacksmith*), in a sense summarised his attitude. He sees precious metals in his soul. But he feels he must forge out of them a heart for himself: "a heart tempered, manly, strong and proud." If it were to be sickly and weak, it were better for it to perish under the strokes of the hammer. In another poem he compares himself with a wood-cutter who carves off branches which do not bear fruit. Another symbol is a vigilant watchman, looking sleeplessly into the night though oppressed by an overwhelming fatigue. The essential thing, then, seems to be not so much a violent display of energy as a careful choice of the appropriate path.

That path is not a smooth one. There are sufferings on its way.

There are yearnings and pains of restlessness. There is a grief of solitude. In his loneliness the poet figures himself as a madman among healthy people, a madman who laughs at the funeral of his beloved and cries when he sees jumping clowns in a fair. But he overcomes his gloom and gives his blessing to every hour of his life, though they all wound him and the last will kill: *vulnerant omnes, necat ultima*. He forbids himself to curse even stones on his road: "We are going by a rocky and hard way—the vault above our heads is sunless—angry clouds threaten us with thunders—sharp stones pierce our feet—but our lips are singing words of silent orisons—and our soul is proud of the love of blue distances! . . ."

The way, travel, pilgrimage, expeditions, become the poet's most frequent symbols. He pictures himself as a sailor, a wanderer; the whole world is for him "one marvellous adventure." To define his characteristic attitude, a title of one of his poems may be quoted; it is called *A Departure into Reverie*. Other symbols are eternally tumbling waves, a swinging pendulum, signposts reminding one of the necessity of continuing the journey.

But what is the aim of this journey, so carefully prepared, so constantly before the mind? What does the poet expect at the end of it? Love? Yes, he is looking for love, but he knows its frailty and transience. Truth? He has no belief that truth is really obtainable. There are some personal ways of approaching it, but they are of no profit for anybody except the individual himself. A mother cannot see the truth of her son (*Mother*). One cannot even explain rationally one's own vision of the truth, as is shown in a curious sonnet, *The Strange Shrine*.

Other poems complete the meaning of this sudden statement. The poet has discovered that to move forward is more important to him than to reach the goal. "Travelling"—he says in so many words—"is for me a greater delight than arriving." He feels like an hour-glass which will be reversed by the next night, or as a tent which is everyday folded and unfolded, and he finds happiness in this feeling. He blesses every yesterday and welcomes every tomorrow. Robinson Crusoe, in this order of thought, is equal with Columbus, or perhaps even greater. For the fulfilment of dreams is dangerous. The most beautiful statue is the one for which we are always seeking. This idea is largely developed in Staff's symbolical drama *The Treasure* (1904). A tribe in a fantastic land has guarded and defended for many generations a mysterious treasure which has scarcely been seen by anybody. When at a certain moment doubts declare themselves as to the very existence of the treasure, and some

younger people insist on seeing it, the old guardian blows up the cavern, though he has to perish by his act. But that holy ideal must not be exposed to proofs or be laid open to all eyes. A similar story is that of *Master Twardowski*, the legendary hero of Staff's long poem (1902). He had invented a miraculous elixir which would give happiness to all mankind, but he destroys it lest men be deprived of the salutary influence of toiling and struggling. Both the poem and the drama are overburdened with elaborate symbolism. But Staff's lyrics express the same belief with directness and an enchanting note of ecstasy. The most beautiful ending of life seems to him to be death on a journey. The highest happiness is to "run a race with illusion and distance." The pilgrim's staff bears for the poet "a flower of dream and a fruit of freedom" (*The Mad Sonnet*). Wandering seems to be such a supreme passion that the pilgrim-poet would even say to his love that he prefers his "straying paths" to her fondness. In poetry, Staff's preference is now for Paul Verlaine. He honours him by a poem in which he is called *The Discoverer of Golden Worlds*. These worlds are islands in the ocean of dreams.

The value of short stretches of time is now fully appreciated by the poet in his flowing world. *Smiles of the Hours* is a very symptomatic title. More striking is another, given to a group of poems, *The Joy and Sorrow of Happiness and of the Moment*. "Everything dies and passes"—says one of these poems. "Who made you believe that a moment is less than a hundred years?" The best expression of beauty is for the poet the dancing Hora who stiffened into a statue at one moment of her dance and preserved for long centuries her rapturous attitude as if of a sudden flight. And the drama of *Godiva* (1906) shows how one splendid moment may deserve the sacrifice of the rest of a man's life.

Staff's art itself is at its highest when he simply evokes passing moments. A spectacular fragment of the world and a feeling of time tinged with the poet's own emotion; such, as expressed in general terms, are most often the contents of his poems. But, of course, such a formula says nearly nothing. To make it more substantial, it may be added that Staff's feelings are always as plain and direct as Verlaine's, and that in poetic diction he combines the classic strictness with variety and audacity reminiscent of the 17th century baroque masters; in verse he employs all means from the most simple to the most crafty.

I shall try the impossible and analyse briefly one of his short but comparatively complicated poems bearing the title *To the Stars*.

It consists of three stanzas, in each of which the poet addresses the stars with different metaphorical names and epithets. The epithets are simple: "godly" in the first, and "saintly" in the second stanza. Metaphors, on the contrary, are abundant, unexpected and varied. Stars are "grains of the celestial harvests, scattered by the corn of dreams"; they are a "starry sea"; they are "flowers of the plains of night"; they are "a pathless track, mysterious as a miracle". Then they are called "skylarks of the fields of God, conjured into a silent song of the cloudlands"; then "bees taken into the hive of heaven"; and, finally, "eyes looking into the depth of the soul." Addressing them in a series of exclamations the poet tries to express his ecstasy. His grief drinks from the stars "a lure of sweetness," and he sees "thuribles of hearts sending their fragrance" towards them. Their incense hovers round his head and raises his yearnings to the height of dreams.

The stanza is no less complicated in its structure. It consists of eight lines of different length, of 6, 5, 4, and 3 syllables, which are linked by two rhymes only: one dissyllabic (*a*) and one monosyllabic (*b*). The order of rhymes is: *a*, *b*, *b*, *a*, *a*, *b*, *b*, *a*; the order of rhythms: 5, 6, 4, 5, 3, 6, 4, 3.

After all these analytical remarks, it may seem improbable that the union of this unusual verse-form with that florid boldly metaphorical style can produce a whole transparent syntactical clarity. To give an idea of the sound of the poem I quote it in Polish:—

O, gwiazdy b^oże,
 Ziarna niebieskich żniw,
 Które z swych grzyw
 Strząsa snów zboże!
 Gwiazd morze!
 O, kwiaty nocnych niw,
 Tajne, jak dziw,
 Bezdroże.

O, gwiazdy święte,
 Skowronki bożych pól,
 W niemy śpiew ról
 Obłocznych wklęte!
 Ponętę
 Miodu z was pije ból,
 O, pszczoły w ul
 Nieb wzięte.

O, gwiazd żrenice
 Patrzące w duszy toń !
 Wam ślą swą woń
 Serc kadzielnice !
 Zywice
 Marzeń—owiały skroń,
 Wznosząc w snów błoń
 Tęsknicę . . .

In Staff's poetry there are even more fancifully executed pieces, but their rich technique is always subservient to the vision, never obscuring it. It is most often a vision of a moment only, but it conveys that element which pure poetry alone is able to convey, the union of the spectacular and the dimly metaphysical. It is suggestive of long emotional vistas, and yet it is light and limpid.

All Staff's meditations on his attitude towards life are based on his creative experience. His philosophy of life is identical with his philosophy of poetry. It may seem strange to find the poet's announcements about power and conquest fulfilled in the field of pure poetry only. But he realised that it was, indeed, a conquest. Though uneventful—as he states in one of his poems—his life was rich; it was given to him to see things which had never been seen by any man (*Life without Happenings*). That is why the hours smile on him, and a bough in blossom becomes a symbolic title of one of his central volumes. That is why he praises life, though feeling keenly its bitterness and disenchantments. He describes himself as "calm by wise sorrow and experienced in sufferings."

In later years also the sense of compassion for his fellow-men is more strongly marked in his poetry. The "weeping man" becomes one of his subjects (*Tears*); he writes a poignant poem on a wretched mad village girl, the most injured and unhappy being one can imagine (*Krysta the hedge-girl*); he composes a poem on the biblical lily amidst vices, and a *Prayer for charity toward those who do not know any virtue*. Owing to this vivid sense of human pains, his wanderings, which had been begun under the auspices of Nietzsche, acquire more and more of a Franciscan character. He sees himself now not so much as a knight, a conqueror or a discoverer, but rather as a pilgrim, a strolling singer, a tramp or a beggar. He speaks more of the happiness of the homeless, of the grace of forgiving, of love for an enemy. His images become simpler and more intimate. The influence of the *Fioretti* is sometimes directly felt. The symbol of happiness is now for him "a spot of sunshine on the earth." His desire is to be as simple as grass itself. Children, olive trees,

birds eternally singing glad tidings, roses with thorns sheathed lest they wound the hands, these are some others of his frequent motifs. He asks only for the calm and freedom of a mendicant. He prays only for the prosperity of his kinsmen. Let them have rich lands and harvests and houses and progeny. For himself he wants only a path between their fields; narrow as a coffin though it be, it will suffice for his wandering soul looking into the stars; his kingdom "is not of this world."

Then once again: Protean metamorphoses, eternal change. It is by incessant scattering, by living thousands of possibilities that the poet will always be himself. The difference between truth and illusion is immaterial for him. He does not care if he will be called a liar. If the country which he praises does not exist, he is still the gainer for having dreamed of it.

It was as a herald of this gospel that Staff became most popular.

But a doubt seems to have suddenly grown in the poet's mind. We find it expressed in his drama, *The Show* (1909), a work full of new and unexpectedly moving accents. By far the best of all his dramatic pieces, this vigorous play has a symbolic character. The scene is in Rome of the third century. The hero, Philemon, is a Roman actor of genius, as gifted for performing different rôles as Staff himself for living through various possibilities of existence. He feels every rôle and gives his heart to each. He can move people to tears. But in the depth of his soul there is a painful coldness. This man who so admirably imitates men of all kinds of beliefs has no truth for himself to believe in. "We repeat the tremendous word *to live*"—he says to his friend—"but have you lived in the fringes of alien actions and alien thoughts, of alien tears and alien feelings?" He sees that his life is empty. And he sees its vivid contrast with persecuted Christians, who prefer death in tortures to renunciation of their God. There is just now impending the trial of an old Christian deacon, Apollonius. Philemon, owing to his influential acquaintances, obtains the permission to visit Apollonius, releases him, and himself appears in his clothing before the tribunal. He acts the part of the old Christian marvellously. He denounces the age. His audience is deeply touched. Some are converted and accept martyrdom. He realises with alarm that he has lost the distinction between truth and feigning. His friends unmask him. But he feels that the nobility of his new impersonation, though he was only acting, is so far above all the rest of his life that he will not return to it, and he drinks poison. "I die for my great moment, which would not be nourished by the miserable littleness of my tomorrow. My future

dies of hunger for the truth." And when Romans admire the sublimity of his death, he answers: "Thus I ought to have lived." The play is classically constructed, and its energetic blank verse contributes to the impression of the whole. It is one of the highest points of Staff's poetic activity and significant of an internal change in him.

A tragedy of a man who knew how to die and had nothing to die for was, indeed, not what one could naturally expect of the author, who so many times declared himself to have found a vocation and an aim in trying to live a thousand different ways, in incessantly changing his hopes and his attitudes. *The Show* seems to say clearly that this creed, good though it may be for a poet, is not sufficient for a man. "Ay! There is no self without a belief in a truth"; these are the words of the dying Philemon.

And, indeed, in Leopold Staff's poetry which followed the drama we feel increasingly the tendency toward a real, extra-poetic truth. His Ariel gradually becomes more and more a Prospero. His next dramas are not symbolic like the earlier ones. One of them, *The Same* (1912), shows the conflict of a strong, unyielding character with base surroundings. Another, *The Laurels* (1912), illustrates a collision of an artistic ambition, jealous vanity, and love. Both these dramas are much nearer to common life than any one of the previous. In the lyrics of the last years before the war deeper notes of hard earthly wisdom seem to be more frequent too.

Of course, there are bound to be simplifications in such an outline of a poetic life like this. What I have narrated here, did not happen in a strictly chronological order. Some tendencies crossed one another. The same notes are struck in different periods. One can, however, characterise these periods separately according to the traits which prevailed.

Old poetic motifs did not disappear in the later collections. We hear again about wanderers and seekers, but they are called *The Tragic Phalanx*, and it is decidedly stated that "the least thing they are allowed to do is to do more!" About the wine of the poet, which is "the wine of the strong," we learn now that it is "tremendous and cruel." The new character of the time is felt in the diction, in the conciseness of such lines as: "I shall go towards sunset with my soul full of gratitude"; "long years was I conquering you, calmness sublime"; "as a star am I silent and as a star I burn." Rhetorical equations like this are rather frequent: "the delight of life begets suffering, and suffering begets the delight of song."

The war influenced Staff in a particular way : it turned him for a time aside from his poetic path. He wrote a volume of weak patriotic poems. Then he became interested in problems of labour in the post-war world, and composed a cycle, *Field Paths*, meditating on and glorying in agricultural toil. This cycle is half-didactic and reminds us of classic models of the kind, though a modern attitude is apparent in many poems devoted to subjects traditionally regarded as ignoble ; there is a poem on a pig, and even on manure. The high light of the book is *The Golden Elegy*, a splendid description of autumn, ending with a prayer that the human heart may be like the earth, which does two things : it loves and dies.

With meditations on field work and field labourers assuredly must be connected the new drama, *The Devil of Noontide* (1920). Its subject is a conflict between a peasant's conscience and his passion for the ownership of land.

The next collections brought back again Staff the lyricist, a master of style, a man governing his emotions. Only he is more of a stoic now than at any earlier time. But in the volume *The Needle's Eye* a still greater change is effected. Franciscanism, which had earlier only been a resource of style, now became a real truth. This collection with a biblical title is penetrated by a deep and humble religious feeling which was never before so vocal in the poet, though in *The Swan and the Lyre* he had already said that his equilibrium is formed by the two arms of the cross. Happier, then, than his Philemon, he seems to have found a truth not only for poetry, but for life. The book ends with an *Ave Aurora*. And his most recent volume, *Tall Trees*, is saturated with the same wisdom.

The wanderer had completed a long journey. Meanwhile his poetry became the daily bread of a new generation. No one of his contemporaries exerted such a visible literary influence in his country. What this influence was for the young is best defined by a poetic stanza of one of their representatives, Julian Tuwim : " The heart, like a new-born child, writhes and seeks for its speech. Awakened, lusty, young, it beats in the stanzas of Staff."

WACŁAW BOROWY.

KATIE

Translated from the Slovak of JÉGÉ by N. B. JOPSON.

EVA came out of her house which was perched on a steep slope and shouted at the top of her voice : " Geo-o-orgie."

At the far end of the slope appeared a figure with a scythe in his hand, wiping his forehead on his ample sleeve.

" Wha-a-t ?"

" Grandma has lost her spectacles again. Where have you put them ? "

" Wha-a-t ? "

And in her highest treble, Eva again shouted :

" Grandma's spectacles are lost ; where have you put them ? "

" Wha-a-t ? I can't hear what you are yelling about."

" Oh, nothing, you deaf idiot." And in disgust she turned back into the house.

Half an hour later George, filled with alarm, was back home.

" What in thunder is the matter ? Hey, Eva, where the hell are you ? "

George went in and attacked Eva. " Whatever has happened, for you to plague me like this ? "

Eva wrung her hands. " There wasn't any call, you know, for you to rush back like this. I was only trying to find mother's spectacles, and here are you turning up."

" To the devil with the whole business. Dragging a man back for a thing like that. Where are the confounded spectacles ? Let me have them."

" Mother has got them ; she is sewing at your shirts in the back room. She had them in her pocket and didn't know it ; that's what happened."

" Well, I'll teach you all some sense—you and your goggles."

George dashed into the room where the eighty-year-old Mrs. Gašó, bent all double, was sitting at the window and with trembling, gnarled hands was patching away at a coarse shirt. With her coarse needle she was making half-inch stitches at regular intervals. She was sewing without a thimble, and her head waggled as she worked.

" Mother, give me those goggles."

The old woman took the spectacles off her shaking head without a word and handed them to him.

George took them and went out to the wood-shed, put them on the block and with his boots stamped twice on them.

So that was that, and off he went.

At noon his twelve-year-old daughter Zuzka brought him his dinner in a basin and, as though it was a school lesson, began to gabble about how mummie was properly vexed and how grannie hadn't said a single word but hadn't touched a bite; how she had picked up her prayer book and gone and sat down in her room, and had only said that she wanted to die, and was praying away, and how she had folded up daddy's shirt nicely and put it away, and so on, and so on. And she wiped her nose on the back of her hand.

George sat down under a bush, stretched his legs out, set the basins between them and straight off ate up all that Eva had sent. One of the basins contained fried noodles, a dish he was very fond of.

When he had finished his dinner, he gave the dish to Zuzka and with a cheery tap on the shoulder said: "Clear off now—you are not wanted here, but she'll need you at home."

Zuzka put the basins in order, ran her fingers through her hair under the little cap, and with a "Goodbye, Daddie," scampered on her nimble legs down the precipitous slope.

When George came home in the evening he did not go into the cottage, but went straight to the cattle stall. He saw his wife, but said not a word. Zuzka ran up and told him that grandma had made up her mind to die, for she hadn't anything left in life to do, being unable to see.

George went inside and grasped Eva by her plump shoulder.

"Eva, what are you vexed over? Why don't you open your mouth?"

"What have I got to say to a bear like you?"

"And wouldn't anybody be angry, lugged down that slope for nothing? To the devil with you down here, I thought, worrying a man for a silly thing like that. Has anybody ever heard the like?"

At three o'clock in the morning George got up quietly, had a look at the cattle and then went off over the mountains to the town and was back again about nine. He had bought grandma new, brand new spectacles. They didn't suit her perfectly, of course, but then old Mrs. Gašó wasn't too spoilt, so she managed with them somehow and was for ever losing them just as she had done the old ones. She hunted for them two or three times every day, but she didn't say anything about it to anybody now, but just looked for herself. About a year after, the old lady sidled one day up to George as he was going with his horses to the town:

"Sonny, I would like to go once more to church; I could drive with you."

"If you like; I'll throw in a truss of hay, so get up. I'll look in for you at Auntie's on the way back."

So she dressed up in her best and went off with her son. In the church she went to holy communion, took the communion and drove back again with him.

When she was at home she began to go through and sort out her possessions, and was helped in her task by Zuzka, who looked longingly at all the marvellous things which grandma kept in her trunk. Her eyes bulged out of her head when she saw in their different compartments all the buttons and buckles and ribbons and finery so dear to a child's heart.

"Grannie, why are you going through all these things?"

"I am making ready to die, my child, because I shan't be here for long. When I am dead, you take everything I have here."

Zuzka began to weep bitterly. "Grannie dear, I'd rather you gave me nothing than that you should die."

"My child, it is God's will; I shall have to go."

Next morning grandmother did not get out of bed. Zuzka sat by her all day, weeping and beseeching her not to die. Her head stopped shaking by the evening and her breathing grew fainter and fainter. Zuzka began to scream:

"Grannie dear, shake your head. Why don't you shake it?" and she began to move it with her hand. The old woman gave her a glance, smiled a little—and it was all over.

They put her best clothes on and laid flowers all over her, so that she looked like a young bride. They gave her a fine funeral, and almost the whole of the village was present.

The day after the funeral George went into the cottage, and in the middle of the table he saw grandmamma's spectacles. He clapped his hands together.

"You stupid woman, look what you've missed out. You didn't give grandma her spectacles. Now, that is a fine thing. She can't do without them. Eva, Eva, however did you come to forget them?"

Eva ran up and broke out, too: "Oh, oh, it is those silly women, or else that Otrubulya who always makes a muddle of everything. Well, she can't go without her spectacles. Whatever is there to be done? She is sure to come for them."

She put the spectacles into a box in the corner. George said: "Well, we'll see what can be done. There will be some way out."

But it wasn't the church way.

For George woke up in the night and it seemed to him that something was walking about in the cottage. He jogged Eva, who

was sleeping by his side, and said : " Eva, listen, grandma is here looking for those spectacles."

" Don't talk nonsense. All angels praise the Lord."

But George couldn't help mumbling : " It has struck twelve."

And at that moment there was a flap, flap, flap in the kitchen, repeated every little while.

" It is grandma all right ; one of the soles of her boots is loose and flaps just like that," whispered Eva, out of her mind with terror.

George got up early and went into the kitchen to see what had been flapping. He found nothing but an opened window which the wind shook, and that had caused the flapping.

" Look, Eva, she came in by the window."

" Yes, that's it, the Lord save us."

" Well, we must make things right about the spectacles."

Towards evening the women gathered under Mrs. Majdo's lime tree.

" Neighbours, what is happening with grandmamma is God's visitation on us," Eva began. " She was walking about the house the whole night through, looking for her spectacles just as when she was alive. We did not get a wink of sleep. And in the morning George found the kitchen window open."

" Send her the spectacles then, or you won't have a minute's peace." Mrs. Majdo nodded in agreement.

" Send them? But how are we to send them? By post?" said Eva irritably.

" Don't you know how, you silly?" retorted Mrs. Majdo. " See now, Katie Mrynár is going to die. They have had the doctor to her. She will take them to her."

" Yes, that's right. The Kvopko lad took old Špirko his pipe and gave it to him, and ever since the Špirkos have had peace. They paid money for special masses for him, but it was no good, and they were always having prayers; but the haunting went on just the same. Not until they sent him his pipe were things quiet," Mrs. Otrubulya explained.

" You go to the Mrynárs and give Katie the spectacles. She'll take them to her."

Eva went across to the Mrynárs.

" Praised be Jesus Christ. How is your Katie?" she began.

" Very poorly; she may not last till the morning," old Mrynár replied.

" Her life is hanging by a thread," said his wife.

Katie was about six years old and had been suffering from

consumption for a long time. Eva went into the cottage and saw her little pale face—all eyes and no bigger than your fist—peeping out from the eiderdown.

“Look, Katie, at what I have brought you,” said Eva and gave her a bag of peppermint sweets.

With her bird-like voice, Katie piped : “Give me them.”

She took the sweets and feverishly, as if in a swoon, she put them all in her mouth and kept them there without moving.

“Katie, did you know old Grannie Gaśó?” inquired Eva.

Katie sucked at the sweets and then said shrilly :

“I knew her. The old woman whose head was always shaking. Like this,” and she shifted her head a bit on the pillow.

“Yes, that’s her. Well, when she died she forgot her spectacles, and she cannot get on without them. As you know her, couldn’t you take them to her?”

Katie lifted her head a little.

“Where are they? Have you got them?”

Eva gave them to her. “Here they are—they’re almost brand new.”

Katie clutched them in her thin little hand.

“I’ll take them to her. Only don’t forget to give me them. Put them under my head.”

Katie died two or three days later. She did not forget to take the spectacles with her. As long as she lived she kept them tight in her hand so that no one could take them from her.

Ever afterwards there was no haunting at the Gaśó’s.

AD LEONES

Translated from the Polish of C. K. NORWID by N. B. JOPSON.

THE red-bearded sculptor who dropped in at the Café Greco almost every evening when the day’s work was done, accompanied by his big Kirghiz hound, had abilities of no mean order and a constitution of great endurance. The very fact that he had chosen so magnificent a creature, whose clean lines and lithe muscles combined both strength and grace, was in itself enough to make an attentive observer think highly of the intellectual dignity of the man.

For if General Jomini is right in saying that it is the horse and not the man that makes good riding, there are far better psychological reasons for affirming that the selection of a particular breed of dog is transparent evidence of the feelings and taste of its owner. The

ideas a porkbutcher has of a dog are different from those of a hunting man or a society lady.

It was a handsome beast as it slowly strode in front of the red-bearded sculptor, with its clean purple tongue spread like a fresh flower over the white fangs of its wide-open mouth.

With a kind of magnificent politeness it jostled no one as it slowly strode along. But if any street urchins tried to tease it, it glanced round at its master and, in a flash, with the snap of a spring in perfect order, it had leapt over the heads of the crowd and was slowly pacing ahead again while the terrorstricken miscreants were picking themselves up from the gutter, wondering what had happened.

In the café, also, it would leap over tables piled high with glasses and disturb none of them, but drop again into its easy, slow stride, expecting no applause as though it fancied that any of the customers could have done the same.

So the lovely hound was held in high esteem by every one.

When we say every one we mean a particular group and two choruses (Greek), one chorus finishing the words off and the other gesticulating.

The red-bearded sculptor's group formed one of the four corners of the billiard room and consisted chiefly of: the Editor of the *Literary and Political Gazette*, a good-looking singer who gave lessons to foreigners, a talented painter, and a young tourist who had been sent by his parents to "develop his outlook on things," as he himself put it. He had with him an inseparable tutor, inseparable in the sense that they both were generally looking and enquiring for each other in the town, never meeting till the evening in the Café Greco.

You could hardly help knowing all this, and more personal details besides. For by virtue of a special transparency of the social atmosphere and the crystallisation of the characters (two things but little known to northerly towns and people) even a stranger, first putting foot in the café, could easily divine not only who was who and what was his special occupation or industry, but even what were his present *preoccupations*.

A figure like the Editor's was, of course, at once distinguishable by his public manner alone—his vivacious look, his smooth and polished gestures and, when needed, his glibness. And then there was his faded umbrella, rather like a cardinal's, and his style, in which you at once recognised the man of letters.

If you have ever seen those glass gimlets (which by some secret mechanism perfectly simulate the trickling of spring water) put in

position in the gullets of plaster lions, all bedecked with flowers and greenery, you will have noticed that not one leaf of one flower feels the presence of a single drop of water, not one breath of coolness and life. The parallel exactly fits the Editor's style and delivery.

What is he now busied with? Obviously something quite exceptional, for he is dressed with more than usual care and his flying visits to the café occur at unusual hours.

The singer, too, overcoat on arm or shoulder, and humming a tune under his too-elegant moustache, and with a roll of music in his hand, did not present an unreadable riddle.

The tutor (whom his pupil was looking for) was less distinctive with his readiness to talk but his unreadiness in delivery, his slight lisp and his habit of slobbering whenever he was well launched.

He would have been far more accessible and intelligible if the adjective *scientific* had not always been so often in his mouth. Yet he was not shy about betaking himself to his pen, for, while he was rolling a cigarette from the tobacco strewn over a sheet of white paper, one of his visitors, sharp-eyed if not over discreet, a year before had read the title words "A Brief Survey" in a manuscript of his, and although yesterday, too, in the same place and under similar circumstances, his caller had not succeeded in reading any more, it was clear that he was still working at "A Brief Survey." But what seemed amazing in a man so scientific was that when he miss-hit a billiard ball he should bend his whole weight in the direction he had aimed for, and, by the will-power of his foot, heel, and eyes try to coax the recalcitrant ball into the right path, a proceeding as ineffective as unscientific, offending, as it does, against the law of gravitation.

The red-bearded sculptor in his black velvet coat, sitting as motionless as an old Venetian portrait, and holding aloof from all the toils and fatigue of a billiards competition, has had exercise enough in the fierce pursuit of his full day's work not to feel any enthusiasm for energetic evening pastimes.

But in illustrious Rome you do not need to be admitted to the intimacy of an artist's circle to have an advance idea of his completed work. From the Café Greco it is only a step to the Piazza di Spagna—then up a broad staircase dividing into two branches and rising up to Monte Pincio, like some enormous fabulous bird only waiting for people to group themselves on its wings and soar from the pavement.

The square and the staircase are a forum for models—some of them resting and others waiting for employment; you only need to

approach a picturesque and quick-witted group of them to learn everything there is to be known of the work an artist has on hand.

You might discover from them that the sculptor was engaged in a prodigious group throbbing with the all-pervading tragedies of the human soul. The composition was thought to be in the Euripides manner and would show the figures of two Christians of the age of Domitian being cast to the lions. These details were so generally known by talk that many a close friend would hail the sculptor not by his name, but by Ad Leones.

The sculptor would suitably acknowledge the greeting by raising an edge of his broad-brimmed hat and making a significant gesture with his right hand, as though he were flinging a handful of modelling clay, and at this the greyhound would halt and glance up into his master's eyes to ascertain his wishes.

The artist's work just born and now about to be shown to the world was becoming a kind of magic symbol. Readers of a newspaper which reported some unfortunate political crisis would often turn to the sculptor and suitably intone "Ad Leones," to which, with conspiratorial ambiguity, he replied by winking his left eye.

Droll though such a habit is, it beautifully and in advance wins—in a way unknown to cold countries—the approbation of the public for the accomplishment and presentation of a work of art.

Happy, however, is that artist only who has soberly estimated, understood and accepted so hospitable a reception of his labours.

For years past, it has been an approved habit to use the address of the Café Greco and to pick up letters there. So in looking in one morning early I was rather astonished to find the sculptor and the editor already there. I was meaning even to pass them by, assuming that they were engaged in some grave concern, when the hound, being despatched after me, obliged me to draw near to its master and his friend. On being requested on a fixed day and at a fixed hour to visit the sculptor in his studio, I replied :—

"I am not so much one of the cognoscenti as to presume that you wish to show us the finished work, but I imagine it may have reached one of those interesting stages when the artist has visualised and designed his conception as a whole. Though, not unreasonably, the experts maintain that an artist must to the very end keep himself free to change his composition completely, which composition, for that reason, has movement, variety and life."

The editor seized upon this idea, defending and elaborating it, and, even while taking notes in pencil, was careful to keep abreast of the conversation. Simultaneously with the sculptor he then

politely asked me if I would be so kind as to tell them what I was working at.

"The slight part I take in artistic matters," I said, "does not warrant my putting my name to anything big. But I may confess, returning frankness with frankness, that I am just now very busy on the execution of two heads, and when I say two heads I include all that makes up their ensemble and their movement, although the chief interest of the composition resides only in the two heads. The problem is this: one head is to have its eyes raised towards the heavens, and the other to have its eyes gazing either at the ceiling or the hook to which the chandelier is attached. The eyes of both heads look upwards. I do not deny that my work has sometimes greatly tired me."

The sculptor clasped his forehead in his strong hands, whereupon the hound, which had been lying at his feet, rose and began to fathom its master's look. The editor was making aimless pencil designs on the marble top of the table. Civilly bidding them both goodbye, I then went out after being momentarily detained in the doorway by the young tourist who was enquiring for his tutor.

But I had not taken many steps when I met the tutor on the Scala di Spagna and was informed that the invitation to the sculptor's studio was no exclusive favour, inasmuch as all friends and celebrities might be expected to be present in order to settle once for all the moral significance of the group and the characteristics particular to each of the figures. I was told in addition that, thanks to his influential connections, the editor had fortunately succeeded in inducing the rich correspondent of a big American daily to commission the group from the sculptor. His intention was to send the purchase to America, provided that the composition and the execution of the work came up to his standards of taste and imagination.

When the day for visiting the studio arrived I found myself in an interesting décor in the midst of a distinguished assembly. The disorder and the dust which lay thick in every corner of the great hall lent a fantastic appearance to the whole scene, but dust which has settled on excellent plaster casts merely enhances the artistic harmony of good sculpture, while the self-explanatory disorder deserves rather to be called dramatic than untidy.

In the centre of the room, with the light full upon it, there reposed a huge and solid mass of damp clay representing the group on which the artist was engaged. He was at that moment undraping the wet cloths in which it was wrapped. As each cloth was removed and revealed now a splendidly designed clay arm, now a thigh or

again the folds of clothing, anticipatory hurrahs of admiration for the whole were liberally bestowed.

The male statue was giving promise of a very beautiful torso and the maiden was an emblem of poignant drama; both figures were ecstatically raising *pro Christo* crosses. The lion, which was doubtless intended to recline at their feet, stupefied, was as yet hardly more than a shapeless lump, but this lent a greater appearance of completion to those other parts of the group which were more advanced.

"Ad leones, ad leones," the young tourist shouted, and, rushing to the darkest corner of the studio, by the door, he reappeared from behind a big Dionysius with a young man who came forward with a napkin over his arm and holding out a basket filled with different wines. The whole company at once drained their glasses, and the applause redoubled. Even the sculptor adopted the proper manner of one who challenges the world to mortal combat.

Pointing to the nearest of the busts lying on the floor, the tutor said: "Now that is Domitian, I think."

"You are correct, Sir," the sculptor replied, and, with a kick, smashed the Emperor's nose. Thereupon the hound, which had been lying like a gryphon moulded in bronze, rose, sniffed at the broken pieces of plaster and resumed the same attitude of monumental repose.

The handsome singer, gracefully throwing back his cloak, at first began to hum in a powerful baritone and then to sing with the full force of his lungs:—

Tremble, tyrants of the world,
Hear the people's cry,
Death and doom are nigh,
Thunder from the clouds is hurled,
Ta-ra-ra-ra-ray,
Tremble, tyrants of the world.

The young tourist and the painter encored with:—

Ta-ra-ra-ra-ray,
Tremble, tyrants of the world.

The enthusiasm was followed by a psychologically necessary calm, hardly disturbed by a desultory observation of the painter, who said:—

"I, too, have lately done something which I may be satisfied with, but I must ask persons who are well read to tell me what my

work means and what it will develop into, for it might be a Cleopatra or perhaps 'The Assumption.' "

As soon as the calm was complete and all were found sitting quietly on their chairs, the editor addressed himself as follows, in the first instance to the sculptor, but at the same time to the guests also :—

"The thought of us all present is, or rather, on reflexion, will always be, that this work of genius has assured for our friend and *maître* an imperishable future. To be sure, costs and expenditure are not merely high at the present time, but will progressively increase."

Having signified their agreement in different ways, all present waited for the orator to continue.

"Now the Mæcenas who has fortunately appeared on the scene might have been, or rather, one may say, is, a rich correspondent of the great American newspaper, the *Monitor*. As this individual's religion is unknown to us—and there are scores of religions in the United States—would it not be seemly, I might say even æsthetic, to remove the crosses from the hands of the figures? For what, indeed, avails that dead symbol, the feeling of which already pervades the whole composition? On account of its presence the purchaser being, let us say, of the Jewish religion, will not be able to place the group in his manorial park, and will abstain from making the purchase."

The sculptor pointed out that the crosses suitably completed the pattern of the main lines. Then, continuing to play with his broad boxwood chisel, he looked attentively at everyone as though seeking to gauge the general feeling and, noticing that I was nearest, he motioned questioningly in my direction.

"My view," I said, "is that the holding of a cross in the hand is the hardest of all the mimic and plastic problems ever yet known. *The hand touches the symbol*—this can be neither skilful and elegant, nor clumsy, threatening or meaningless, neither easy nor exaggerated, neither simple nor ingenious, neither lovely nor unlovely! I know nothing harder. And the artist able to do that can produce any composition."

I spoke thus, not reflecting that my remark was to have an effect quite unintended by me, for the editor and painter at once exclaimed: "That, then, is one difficulty the less!"

And then the sculptor, mumbling the same remark, ran up the steps which reached up to the group and were supported by it, and with two snips of a boxwood tool he cut the cross away from the

male figure. As he hesitated to strike the hand of the female statue the tutor shouted out to him :

"If anything needs to be shoved into the woman's hand to complete the pattern it would be scientifically authentic to mention that the recommended Chaldæan and Egyptian custom, transmitted to the Semites and by them to the Christians, was to put a *key* into the hands of such personages as comment or announce great things, traces of which custom being found even in the Gospels, namely, St. Peter's key, and in the Apocalypse."

The sculptor, whose hand was stayed during this speech, brought his tool down on the other cross and with a few rapid movements sketched the general outlines of a key.

All this was done as by enchantment, thanks to the general temper and sentiment and the total lack of any reasoned protest. But after the sculptor had come down from the last step he suddenly exclaimed on nearing the editor :

"But in this way and with this new standpoint the whole Christian idea would have to be altered !"

The editor, seeming to take the tutor to witness, said with an impatient smile :

"Is the group an historical work? Does the scene take place in Domitian's, and not in Nero's time? Are these *portraits* of a martyr X or a tragic heroine Y? Of course not—we are not concerned here with personalities, but with drama."

Whereupon the tutor added :

"A single scientific brief survey is sufficient to explain everything; the figures may represent not necessarily Christians cast to the lions, but struggle itself, sacrifice itself, merit itself. Anything and everything that the artist has so gracefully aimed at in his work, whatever intoxicates, whatever satisfies the public."

Somewhat beslobbered, the speaker wiped his mouth, while the sculptor shook hands with them both. But the singer, the young tourist and the painter, whose habit it was to avoid all discussions as useless, headaching things, withdrew from the studio unobtrusively and politely.

The hound, who saw the visitors off, ceremoniously as usual and in keeping with the place, was suddenly heard in the corridor barking with a silvery note. The sculptor made a sign to the editor and to me showing that he knew from the dog's tone what the matter was. Upon this the door opened and there came in a gentleman of middle height, wearing a low-crowned grey hat and a smart grey suit. His white neckcloth was in perfect taste, and from his waistcoat a

thick, gold chain with clasps and seals of precious stones dangled on to his stomach.

It was the American, the correspondent of the great United States *Monitor*.

He greeted the editor cordially, returned the sculptor's bow and, including us all in a friendly wave of his hand, came close up to the group. For a moment he looked at it with a grey and profound look, thrusting his hat to the back of his head and stroking his tawny beard, which his clean-shaven upper lip made appear even more luxuriant.

"I wish to have a full explanation of the statues," he said to the editor and the sculptor, who thereupon took a step backwards in order not to be the first to speak.

"It is . . . as has been said . . . it is a pathetic scene taken from the tragic life of man . . . the man represents the energy of action which begets work . . . and the woman desires to participate in it . . ."

"And," the American interrupted, "she seems to have a key in her hand, and lower down I see (pointing to the shapeless lump intended for the lion), I see a *chest*. The woman stands, then, for Thrift? The man's energy promises to be very fine and appropriate. I think that near the chest should be shown the implements of the husbandman and the artisan. As it is now, the lower mass looks more like a sleeping beast than a box."

The sculptor drew near and sketched the outlines of a sickle and two sides of a chest, whereupon the American, after again walking round the whole group, exclaimed :

"It is long since I have met a more clearly explained or a more beautiful conception. The group personifies *capitalisation* in a manner which is both well reasoned and intelligible. I think that today, in consideration of the stage which the work has reached, it will be sufficient if our friend the editor will be good enough to write on my card as follows (here he gave his card to the editor, who hastily made himself ready for writing) :

Isaac Edgar Middlebank, Junior, herewith commissions from the distinguished sculptor . . . a group representing *Capitalisation* to be executed in faultless white marble, for a sum not greatly in excess of 15,000 dollars.

"Is that in order?" the American asked. The sculptor replied by slipping his own card over to the editor, who wrote :

The sculptor . . . undertakes to execute the group (*Capitalisation*) in white marble, as far as possible faultless, for a sum not greatly exceeding

75,000 lire, being commissioned thereto by Isaac Edgar Middlebank, Junior, Esquire, etc., etc.

The American, having examined both documents through his eyeglass, desired that the date should be added, and when this was done exchanged the cards, saying :

"Everything is as it should be. I congratulate you, Sir, on your fine abilities"—and here he shook hands—"and on your fine bitch. What a superb animal! What a pure breed! It may be safely affirmed that there is not in the whole town anywhere a bitch of her class."

And with these words he bowed and moved towards the door.

In all speed the sculptor then, with one hand, skilfully threw a wet cloth over *Capitalisation*, while with the other he grasped his hat and hastened after the editor and the tutor. The latter were paying their compliments to the parting guest, for whom a modest carriage was waiting in readiness to convey him elsewhere.

I felt troubled and heavy of heart, and my soul was oppressed . . . a breath or a groan whispered in my ear the lamentation of Job :

Everything therefore in this rightly accursed world, everything which is conceived by the virginal inspiration of thought, must be sold for 6 dollars (*thirty pieces of silver*).

And although I had vowed to say nothing, yet, unable to endure alone the whole moral burden, I said to the editor :

"How far it is from the Confessors of the Faith, from those who for their confession were cast to the lions, how far it is from them to *Capitalisation*."

And he, as he set his glasses straight, began to draw something with the tip of his umbrella on the pavement, and replied without raising his eyes :

"Editorial work is not like a telephone. We do this kind of thing every day, for almost every idea and every sentiment. . . . *Redaction is Reduction*."

"Even so, as *conscience is conscience*," I replied.

STEWED PUMPKIN

Translated from the Bulgarian of ELIN-PELIN by N. B. JOPSON.

DICK GOODFELLOW, the secretary of the local county council, went with some documents to his chief's house for him to sign and found him sitting at table with his wife and children, eating a pumpkin stewed whole on the oven.

After signing the papers the chief cut off a slice of the pumpkin and invitingly offered it to his secretary.

"Now, Dick, try this glorious pumpkin. It has just caught a bit, but that is nothing, you'll find."

"N—n—no, thank you, Sir," the secretary replied in embarrassment. "I—I somehow don't like pumpkins."

"How is that? You from the country and don't like pumpkins."

Now Dick felt uncomfortable whenever he was reminded, intentionally or otherwise, that he was from the country, and so now he flushed with shame.

"Well, Sir—my digestion, you know; I've grown unaccustomed to such things"—and he shook his head

And he could not keep his eyes off the piece of pumpkin, all sugary and its skin browned and caught just enough to taste delightful. His mouth began to fill with water, but he did not dare to gulp, for fear the others would detect his greediness.

"Come on, now, don't be shy," said the chief encouragingly. "For years now I haven't touched a mouthful of pumpkin, and, look, my digestion stands it."

"I daren't, Sir, really I daren't touch a bit," Dick answered, and thought to himself: "What a fool I'm making of myself! I ought to have taken it."

And in order not to stay and be tempted any longer, he bowed, mumbled good night and went out. As soon as he was outside, he could breathe freely and give vent to his annoyance with himself.

"A fool and a blockhead, that's what I am. Take what you are offered, you poor dolt."

And he tapped his skull disparagingly, but the tasty slice flashed before his eyes, hot and sweet and temptingly sizzling in its thin halo of steam.

"Indeed, if there is one thing I like best in the world, it is stewed pumpkin," so his thoughts ran on as he walked along with his head down. "I like it as well as sucking-pig. But what a cursed name it's got. Pumpkin: a silly, clodhopping sound. It makes people say—he is a pumpkin-bumpkin, a loutish lump of a fellow, a pig, in fact, the sort of oaf that likes going off to the country to stuff himself full of pumpkin—right away from decent people."

And his imagination began to pile up in front of him pumpkins, luscious and lovely pumpkins.

From that day on Dick Goodfellow grew rather restless and nervous. A hallucination of stewed pumpkins began to persecute him. He would sit down to his work in the office, but his thoughts

strayed. He covered reams and reams with his writing; but he always had the feeling that every buzz of the alarm clock on his table was a pum-pum-pum, and every scratch of his pen was a kin-kin-kin. Whenever he had a tiff with an office friend, he was sure to be told that he was as red as a pumpkin, or when he got in a heat, that the sweat rose from him like steam from a pumpkin.

At night-time, as soon as he dropped off, the accursed hallucination again pursued him. He dreamt of a field, a big field, a field without any end, and glutted with nothing but stewed pumpkins, and over each pumpkin there was a delicious halo of steam. And Dick would walk over the field looking at the pumpkins and wanting to pick them, but as soon as he stooped, they vanished. So he went on walking in the field, but it wasn't a field any more—only an office, but what a spacious office. And suddenly a large pumpkin appeared and began to waddle up to him, growing larger and larger. It grew as big as a house, a church, a mountain, bigger and bigger, and it hurtled towards him with an ever greater speed and menace. Dick trembled with fear and he ran and ran, and his legs grew shorter and shorter, until the monstrous pumpkin caught him up and was on him. The secretary shuddered and woke with a start, bathed in sweat. This dream began to torment him every night.

One evening the clerks in the department had a party. A special stew was made for them at Kalcho's, and they all assembled to do honour to it and make merry. The stew had been made hot, so that they might drink more wine—and they had, of course, invited the secretary. Wine, speeches and songs—love songs and patriotic songs, not one in the whole repertoire was passed over, and all ended with a toast. Some drank the health of the chief, on condition, of course, that he stayed where he was—away! Others drank to the ladies in the town or to the greatness of Bulgaria, the Tsar, the Bulgarian nation, the fleas in the office, and so on and so forth.

The last to rise was Dick. He climbed on to a chair, cleared his throat and with an enthusiastic gesture raised his glass: "Gentlemen and colleagues and good companions."

But the thread of his ideas was unceremoniously broken by the incursion of that terrible stewed pumpkin which had so persistently pursued him and now came to whirl round all the store of ideas collected during his dozen or so years of service. Dick made an effort to continue. With a bold gesture he waved his arm in the

direction of the low ceiling and held it there for a minute or so in triumph while he gazed down with flashing eyes on his colleagues :

"Straight from the shoulder, that is to say . . . more or less, thereabouts. . ."

But the pumpkin again burst in on the stream of his thoughts. He felt quite helpless. He let his arm drop, turned to his friends, and, sincerely but simply, in a tone totally free from all oratorical emphasis, said :

"What do you say to going some time and having some stewed pumpkin? That would be jolly. It won't come to a lot. And what fun we'd have."

There was a short silence. Then they all clapped and cheered till the rafters shook again.

"Hear, hear!"

"This very evening," someone shouted.

And in less than five minutes the hat had gone round and with the money collected a pumpkin was bought and put on the oven.

Dick abandoned himself to sweet thoughts. An hour later when the pumpkin was ready, he decided to go himself and bring it in. But just as he was coming back with the tray, from which rose a delicious smell of stewed pumpkin, he was met by the chief.

"Aha, Dick," he said, "so you've stewed some pumpkin, have you. My warmest congratulations. I can see your digestion is all right again now."

Dick gulped, tongue-tied. When he brought the pumpkin in, his friends noticed that he had gone all yellow like a corpse.

"What is the matter with you?" they asked in amazement.

"I feel ill," answered Dick, and he dropped helplessly into a chair in the corner and remained there dumb and frowning. Plunged in his gloomy meditations, he did not even look at his friends when they greedily and joyfully began to eat the luscious pumpkin.

"Do have some, Dick," they urged him.

"I have no appetite," he answered despondently, adding in heartbroken tones: "I feel bad, very bad, you fellows. . . I am going to die."

POETRY

THE BUILDING OF SKADAR*

(Translated from the Serbo-Croat by R. W. SETON-WATSON)

Three blood brothers
Three blood brothers,
The first of them
The next of them
The third of them
'Twas Skádar they built,
And three long years
Three long years,
But no foundation
Far less build
All that the masons
By night the Víla

built a city—
the three Mrljávčević.
was King Vukášin,
was the Voivode Úgljesa.
was Gójko Mrljávčević.
on the river Bojána.
they went on building,
with three hundred masons :
could they lay,
the city of Skádar.
built by day,
tore asunder.

When the fourth year
Then called the Víla
“ Plague not thyself,
“ Plague not thyself,
“ Thou canst not lay
“ Far less, then, build
“ Until thou findest
“ Two of like name,
“ Stójan and Stója,
“ And dost wall them into
“ Only thus
“ Only thus

was beginning,
from the mountains :—
o King Vukašin,
nor waste thy fortune.
the foundation, o King,
the city of Skádar,
two kindred souls,
Stójan and Stója,
brother and sister,
the tower's foundations.
canst thou lay the foundations,
canst thou build the city.”

When King Vukašin
His servant Désimir
“ Désimir,
“ Till now wast ever
“ But from this day
“ Span then the horses
“ And lade it with

heard these words,
he did summon :
dear little son of mine !
a loyal servant,
my dearest son.
to my carriage
six loads of gold :

* For an explanation of the method of translation see introductory note to “ The Lament of the wife of Hassan Aga”, on page 134. For the help of the reader, accents have been placed on all proper names —ED.

" And go, my son,
 " And search for two
 " Search, my son,
 " Stója the sister
 " Seize them, or buy them
 " Bring them to Skádar,
 " That we may wall them
 " So can we lay
 " So can we build

through the wide white world,
 of a kindred name.
 for Stójan and Stója,
 and her brother Stójan.
 with gold, but bring them—
 on the Bojána,
 into the foundations.
 the tower's foundations,
 the city of Skádar."

When then the servant
 He spanned the horses
 And laded it with
 And through the wide
 Searching for two
 Searching for Stójan
 Three long years
 Yet never two
 Stójan and Stója
 Then back he turned
 To the King he gave
 To the King he gave
 " Here, o King,
 " And here, o King,
 " But never two
 " Stójan and Stója,

Désimir heard this,
 to the carriage,
 six loads of gold,
 white world he wandered,
 of a kindred name,
 and for Stója.
 he searched for them,
 of a kindred name,
 could he find.
 to Skádar again,
 the horses and carriage
 the six weights of gold
 are the horses and carriage,
 the six weights of gold.
 of a kindred name,
 could I find ! "

When King Vukašin
 Ráde the mason
 And Ráde called
 To the building of Skádar,
 But what they built
 At night the Víla
 Lest with foundations
 The city of Skádar

heard these words,
 he called to him.
 three hundred craftsmen
 on the Bojána.
 in days of toil,
 tore asunder,
 firmly laid,
 should arise.

Then called the Víla
 " O king Vukašin,
 " Plague not thyself,
 " Thou canst not lay
 " Far less, then, build
 " But hear me !

from the mountains,
 hear my words.
 waste not thy treasure.
 the foundations, o King,
 the city itself.
 Ye are three blood brothers,

" Each of you has
 " She who to-morrow
 " Bringing food
 " Wall her into
 " Thus the foundations
 " Thus shall be built

When King Vukašin
 His two blood brothers
 " Hear me, I pray,
 " Hear what the Vîla
 " Useless it is
 " The Vîla lets us not
 " Far less build
 " But yet again
 " ' Surely here
 " ' And each of them has
 " ' She who to-morrow
 " ' Bringing food
 " ' Wall her into
 " Thus the foundations
 " Thus shall we build
 " Let us then swear
 " No word of this
 " Then to Fortune
 " Who to Bojána

And each of them sware
 To breathe no word
 Then as the night
 Each turned to his
 Each dined at his
 Each with his true love

But behold,
 King Vukašin
 He was the first
 " I bid thee beware,
 " Go not to-morrow
 " Bring not their dinner
 " For thus wouldst thou surely
 " Thou wouldst be walled

his own true love
 shall come to Bojána,
 for the craftsmen's meal,
 the tower's foundation !
 firm shall stand.
 the city of Skádar."

heard these words,
 he bade to him.
 my brothers dear.
 calls from the mountains.
 to waste our treasure.
 build the foundation,
 the city of Skádar.
 she calls from the mountains :—
 are three blood brothers,
 his own true love.
 shall come to Bojána,
 for the craftsmen's meal,
 the tower's foundation !
 firm shall stand,
 the city of Skádar.
 'fore God, my brothers,
 our loves to tell.
 we must leave it,
 to-morrow shall go."

'fore God an oath,
 to his true love.
 drew on apace,
 white palace gate,
 own royal table,
 went to rest.

how great a marvel !
 broke his faith.
 to tell his love.
 mine own true love.
 to the Bojána
 to the craftsmen.
 lose thy life,
 beneath the tower."

And Uglješa also
 And he too spake
 " Be not deceived,
 " Go not to-morrow
 " Bring not their dinner
 " For thus thy young life
 " Thou wouldst be walled

broke his faith,
 to his own true love.
 mine own true love.
 to the Bojána,
 to the craftsmen.
 wouldst thou lose.
 beneath the tower."

Young Gojko did not
 And to his love
 When the first light
 Early arose
 And hied them to
 The time for dinner
 And 'tis the Queen
 She to the wife
 " Hear, o hear me,
 " My head is aching,
 " God grant thee health—
 " Take then their dinner
 Answer made
 " O my sister,
 " I have hurt
 " God grant thee health—
 " Go then and speak
 Then she went
 " Sister of mine,
 " My head is aching,
 " God grant thee health—
 " Take then their dinner
 And to her answered
 " Hear me, sister,
 " Glad would I be
 " But my child
 " And my linen
 To her answered
 " Go, then," said she,
 " And bear their dinner
 " I meantime
 " I meantime
 Nought then could save
 But she must bear

break his faith,
 spake never a word.
 of morning dawned,
 the three Mrljavčević
 the camp by Bojána.
 is drawing nigh,
 whose turn has come
 of Uglješa went.
 sister mine !
 aching a little
 I am not well.
 to the craftsmen."
 the wife of Uglješa.
 my lady Queen !
 my arm a little.
 I am not well.
 to our young sister."
 to their young sister.
 young wife of Gojko !
 aching a little.
 I am not well.
 to the craftsmen."
 the wife of Gojko :—
 my lady Queen.
 to do thee service
 is still to bathe,
 is still to wash."
 the lady Queen :—
 " my sister dear,
 to the craftsmen.
 will wash thy linen,
 will bathe thy child."
 the young wife of Gojko,
 to the craftsmen their dinner.

When then she reached
Gojko Mrljavčević
And the hero's heart
Woe to him
Woe to him
His child that was
Then from his eyes
Then she saw him,
Calmly to him
Calmly to him
"What then ails thee,
"That the tears are rolling
But to her answered
"Ill betide us,
"I have had
"And today it fell,
"And the grief of it
But his slender bride
And thus to her lord
"Pray to God
"And a better apple
Then bitterer still
Full wae, he turned
Nor dared to look

And Gojko's brothers
Holding her, each
To build her into
Then they summoned
And Rade called
But gaily laughed
For all this seemed
They placed her where
And all three hundred
Began to work
Soon the wall
Up to the height
And still she laughed,
Still hoped that all
And all three hundred
They set to work
Soon the wall

the river Bojána,
saw her come
was heavy within him.
for his loving bride,
for his child in the cradle.—
but born a month.
the tears did fall.
his slender bride,
she drew near,
addressed her speech.
my dearest lord?
down thy cheeks?"
Gojko Mrljavčević,
my loving bride.
an apple of gold,
in the river it fell.
abides with me."
has nought in mind,
she makes reply.
for health and strength,
you soon will make."
was the hero's grief,
his head aside,
upon his love.

led her away,
by one fair hand,
the city's tower.
Rade the mason,
the three hundred craftsmen.
the slender bride,
a jest to her.
the wall should rise,
began to work,
with wood and stone.
had risen around her,
of a horse's fetlocks.
the slender bride,
was but a jest.
set to work,
with wood and stone.
had risen around her,

Up to the height
 Then wood and stone
 And she saw the ill
 And her shriek was as
 To Gojko's brothers
 " Give me not up
 " To wall me in,
 So she besought them,
 For they too

of a horse's middle.
 closed in upon her,
 that awaited her.
 a fierce snake's hiss.
 she did cry.
 if God ye fear,
 so green and young !
 but in vain,
 dared not look on her.

Then shame and shyness
 And turned to beg
 " Give me not up,
 " To wall me in,
 " But send thee word
 " For treasure enough
 " Let her then buy
 " And wall within
 So she besought him,
 And when the slender
 That all her prayers
 Then she besought
 " O brother in God,
 " Leave me a window
 " That when mine own
 " He thus may suckle
 And as a brother
 And left her a window
 That when her own
 He thus might suckle
 Yet once again
 " Leave me a window
 " That I may gaze
 " When my wee Jova
 " And when he is taken
 And as a brother
 Left her a window
 That she might gaze
 When her wee Jova
 And when he was taken

she cast aside,
 her own dear lord.
 mine own dear lord,
 so young, so young.
 to my old mother :
 my mother has
 a female slave*
 the tower's foundations."
 but in vain.
 bride perceived
 did nought avail,
 the master Rade :—
 o master Rade,
 for my breasts,
 wee Jovo cometh,
 at my breasts."
 Rade hearkened
 for her breasts,
 wee Jovan came,
 at her breast.
 she called to Rade,
 for mine eyes,
 on our fair hall,
 is brought to me,
 home again."
 Rade hearkened,
 for her eyes,
 on her fair hall,
 was brought to her,
 home again.

* This verse in itself shows the great antiquity of the poem.—ED.

And thus was she walled
 Then they brought her
 And for a week
 After a week
 Yet still for the child
 Still for a whole year
 And so it has
 And still today
 A sign of wonder,
 For every woman

within the wall.
 the child in his cradle
 she suckled him.
 she lost her voice.
 the milk did flow,
 did it flow.
 remained for ever,
 the milk doth flow—
 a sign of healing,
 that cannot suckle.

MARKO'S PIPE

(Translated from the Serbo-Croat by R. W. SETON-WATSON.)

PRINCE Marko rides
 Over the lofty
 There came to meet him
 With Stojan Tošić
 And as they came,
 "Listen my brothers,
 If we should chance
 Ye shall not greet
 For never was hero
 While yet he spake,
 And from his pouch
 (A wee bit pipe
 And when the band
 Loud he shouted
 "Hullo, ye Turks,
 And all of them
 Only too quick,
 Yet when they'd put in
 The half of it
 But Tošić had not
 Had kept to himself
 And stood—alas
 Before Prince Marko,
 "Listen, O Marko,
 The dues thou owest
 Thou ridest on
 Daily thou ridest

his piebald steed
 Ravana range.
 Turkish horsemen,
 as their leader.
 said Stojan to them,
 ye fifty Turks !
 to encounter Marko,
 him churlishly,
 Marko's match !"
 came Marko riding,
 pulled out his pipe
 —weighed twenty pounds !)
 of Turks he spied,
 this as greeting :—
 just fill my pipe !"
 pulled out their pipes
 and filled his up.
 all they had,
 was still to fill.
 paid his share,
 his own tobacco,
 for his poor mother !—
 and addressed him :—
 why dost thou pay not
 to the Sultan ?
 the Sultan's lands,
 on his roads :

It were but fair
 Then said Prince Marko
 "Certainly if
 I gladly pay
 Come here, that I
 Poor Stojan Tošić
 Came near—alas
 Came near, but never
 For Marko paid
 But it was with
 He hit him at
 A vital spot,
 So fiercely,
 In thirteen pieces
 In fifteen pieces
 His Turkish horsemen
 But Marko
 Then to the dead man
 "I did but mean
 In deadly earnest
 Poor Turk, thy skull
 'Fore Heaven, these
 They die before
 Who then shall stand

that thou shouldst pay."
 to Stojan Tošić :
 it is mine to pay,
 the Devil his due.
 may pay it thee."
 came to him,
 for his poor mother !—
 to return.
 to him the taxes :
 the pipe he paid !
 a vital spot,
 right on the brow,
 that his eyes dropped out.
 fell the pipe,
 Stojan's head.
 mourned for him,
 for his well-filled pipe !
 he did say :
 a harmless joke ;
 thou didst take it.
 was all too soft !
 are sorry heroes,
 my pipe of clay !
 against my Star ? "

EVENING DISCOURSE

*Translated from the Polish of ADAM MICKIEWICZ by DORIS DURST
 and GEORGE RAPALL NOYES.*

I

With Thee I speak, who art in Heaven the King,
 As Thou within my spirit-house art guest ;
 When midnight buries all in her dark ring
 And only sleepless grief can find no rest,
 With Thee I speak, yet have no words to bring !
 Thou rulest far and wide ; Thou knowest best
 My thoughts ; Thou reign'st a King in Heaven on high
 And in my heart, as crucified I cry.

And all good thoughts, like rays of light, return
 Anew to Thee, as to the gleaming sun,
 And floating back, anew within me burn.
 I send a gleam, and then new light have won,
 While all my good desires Thy praises earn
 And Thou in paying me art never done.
 Oh, may Thy slave, Thy child, as Thou above,
 So glitter through this world, dispensing love !

Thou art my King, and yet my subject too !
 My each base thought is like a keen-edged spear
 That opens Thine unhealèd wounds anew.
 Evil desires like vinegar will sear
 Thy lips, a sponge held forth by one untrue
 My sordid nature laid Thee on Thy bier
 And Thou a slave wert sold, all suffering knew.
 As Thou upon the cross, Thy child and lord
 Should suffer and for evil good reward.

II

When my sick soul unveiled before men's sight
 The gnawing cancer doubt that in me lies,
 The sinner saved himself by instant flight ;
 The good man wept, but turned away his eyes.
 Mighty physician, Thou who knowest all
 Mine ills—their horrors do not Thee appal !

Before my friends within my soul doth rise
 A voice more piercing than a scream of pain ;
 A stricken voice in hellish torture cries—
 The voice of guilty conscience, stilled in vain.
 Dread Judge, stirring the flames that purify
 My guilty conscience, Thou hast heard my cry !

III

When I seem calm unto the common crowd,
 I hide a stormy soul from worldly eyes ;
 Indifferent pride, like a protecting cloud,
 Then cloaks the thunder that within me lies.
 Only at night—gently—into Thy breast
 The storm pours forth ; mine eyes with tears are blest !

THE PILGRIM'S SONG

*Translated from the Polish of ADAM MICKIEWICZ by DORIS DURST
and GEORGE RAPALL NOYES.*

The trees that freshly flower this spring
Intoxicate with fragrance rare;
The waters murmur, the nightingales sing;
The grasshopper's chirp is soft on the air.

Why do I stand by thoughts bemused
And find no joy in the lengthening days?
Because my heart is orphaned, confused—
With whom shall I share the flowery ways?

Before my house in the grey twilight
Musicians are singing a sweet refrain:
The notes of guitars, the languid night
Bring lonely tears to my eyes again.

They are in love, those minstrels gay,
They sing their songs to a lady fair:
To me they bring no joy by their lay—
With whom can I the music share?

I have felt so much and suffered so long,
And yet I shall never return to my home.
To whom can I tell the tale of my wrong?
In my silent grave I shall cease to roam.

With folded arms I sit resigned
And gaze at my candle blown by the breeze;
At times I fashion a song in my mind,
At times a sorrowful pen I seize.

Fair words and fairer thoughts are mine;
Much do I feel, writing early and late;
My soul like a widow's must still repine—
To whom my songs shall I dedicate?

To thoughts and words I give birth each day—
Why do they not my sorrow appease?
Because my soul is a widow grey
And only many orphans sees.

Winter and spring will pass away,
Fair weather will pass as the storms are blown;
But grief in the pilgrim's heart will stay,
For he is a widower and alone.

OBITUARY

MICHAEL POKROVSKY

MICHAEL NIKOLAYEVICH POKROVSKY died on 10th April, 1932, at the age of 64. He was a pupil of Klyuchevsky, but apparently temperamental difficulties arose and Pokrovsky did not follow a university career. He joined the Social Democrats in 1905, went through much of the underground existence of the party, and in the autumn of 1917 was the president of the Moscow Regional *Sovnar-kom*. He later became Assistant Commissary of Education, and was a leading figure in Soviet learned institutions, including the remodelled Academy of Sciences. Before the war he wrote a history of Russia, of which the first volume has recently appeared in an English translation. Since the October revolution he has combined active participation in the endeavour to found a new revolutionary school of scholars with a considerable output of historical books. These include a concise history of Russia and other works, but before all they establish Pokrovsky as an editor of archives. He edited, among others, the documents of Pugachev's rebellion and the December revolt of 1825. He was also one of the editors of *Krasny Arkhiv*, a rich and varied source of historical material, the importance of which can hardly be over-estimated.

Pokrovsky was the great Marxist historian of Russia and a challenging figure. No future student of Russian history will be able to dispense with his works or find complete satisfaction in them. But it is safe to say that pure history will be able to give greater recognition to Pokrovsky than Pokrovsky was able to give to pure history. He was too much involved in the ideological struggle of his time to be able to rise above the *mêlée*, and the career of Pokrovsky is in itself a significant historical document. As he himself wrote, "there is nothing more individualist than the work of an intellectual; in no other sphere does the *personality* feel itself in such degree master of the whole 'process of production' from beginning to end." But is Pokrovsky not wholly master? He himself took refuge from the troubles of "critically thinking personalities" in the "all-simplifying class-standpoint." As a result, his history makes strange excursions into far-off fields of economic fact, as the

explanation both of the agrarian reform of 1861 and the policies of Alexander III. Nevertheless, as the Marxist intention winds tortuously through his interpretation of history, it knits up the ravelled skein of his erudition and yet permits moments of sheer insight to a genuine historical talent. In one almost too personal moment he shows signs of sensitiveness to possible accusations that his history is one-sided. "But what is one to do? Every historian depicts that side of the past which is visible to him; let others depict the other sides—in the whole you will have something more 'many-sided.'" Who can complain, when a Marxist is so human? If he destroys the idealistic glamour of the great reforms in a narrative which defies analysis, at any rate he concedes that without a poetic approach to the problem of "free" labour the peasant reform would not have been possible. Pokrovsky's talents show at their best in his narrative of the revolutionary movement, of which he had a deep understanding. Economic facts here appear more in their old role as fate, and ideals, tragically dying, move Pokrovsky to pity, "since in one way or another all who strove for revolution in Russia had in view the Europeanisation of Russian relations and not their Asiaticisation." Ideas and ideals peep out here and there from the heavy Byzantine armour of his Marxist sarcasm.

Being, therefore, immanent in the process which he described, Pokrovsky passed through the whole experience of his party, until there comes the day when the struggle which moved him to tragic depths pales in significance before political violence of another order. In the process Pokrovsky has changed. There is a marked difference between his pre-revolutionary and his post-revolutionary work. Then he had derided as a "liberal prejudice" the belief that the Government's repressions had turned "peaceful propagandists" into the terrorists of the 70's; now he counts heads against the Tsars. As if the tale of blood could prevail against Stolypin, when urged by a member of Lenin's government! But Pokrovsky, writing in 1927, sees in Stolypin only the "hangman." We need not waste our polemics on this change of temper. In the fire of revolution Pokrovsky has lost his self-consciousness and is frankly the party man.

Even here Pokrovsky maintains his challenge to our attention. It is tempting to contrast those two new discoveries of the universal in human life, which have been in these years the achievement of the Russian intellectual in mutually hostile but parallel courses, the *partiinosť* of the Bolshevik and the *sofinost'* of the Paris group. Of course, *partiinosť* is not "partyism"; "partyism" in English is

merely partisan, particular. But when the party is no longer a part, but the whole, then its universality becomes the universality of its abstract rationalist principles. The universal reason is contrasted with St Sophia, the universality of the Divine Wisdom. The parody is complete even to its emotional content. "Fear those," said Pokrovsky, "who speak with an unintelligible tongue; they speak thus to hide their unleninlike nature." A completely religious echo!

A. F. DOBBIE-BATEMAN.

13th June, 1932.

JOSEPH SCHEINER

IN the early part of this year (11 January) there passed away at Prague, at the age of nearly 71, Dr. Joseph Scheiner (born on 21 September, 1861), whose whole active life was linked with the Sokol movement. He was born at the time when Tyrš was engaged in founding the first Sokol unit; as a student he left his native Benešov for Prague and entered Tyrš's gymnastic establishment for students, and on attaining the age of 18 he became a member of the Prague Sokol, of which Tyrš was the soul.

This meeting with Tyrš, whose colleague he soon became as gymnastic instructor and assistant editor of the magazine *Sokol*, determined Scheiner's career for life. Having learned from the founder himself the essence of Sokoldom as an element in the regeneration of the whole nation, he kept this inspiration. He actually achieved Tyrš's aim of the organic unity of the whole movement. The foundation of the Czech Sokol Union (1889) and the League of Slav Sokols (1908) are the crowning successes of Scheiner in this field. Scheiner maintained and popularised Tyrš's legacy of ideas as editor of the *Sokol*, which he directed for thirty years; and, seeing that Tyrš's doctrines were in danger of oblivion, he published—ten years after the latter's death—the first two volumes of his essays and speeches. The necessity for and the importance of this achievement were at once proved by the first general Sokol gathering in 1895; this was to the credit of Scheiner, and meant the extension of Sokol education as a spiritual and moral training by special teaching methods. The popular education of our nation, which afterwards developed in independent organisations, has its roots in

this Sokol activity. As far as concerned physical education in the Sokol, Scheiner maintained Tyrš's view that this must not be cultivated one-sidedly, to the end that individuals should gain prizes in contests, but that it should be a means of education for the whole people, and that the Sokol gymnast should be distinguished from one-sided athletes by a moral nobility and a practical altruism.

Unwearied activity, spiritual insight, relations with the whole Slav and Western European world, placed Scheiner at the head of Czechoslovak and Slav Sokoldom; he held that pre-eminent position for thirty years, until his death. And as a leader of the Sokol he had the pleasure of incorporating it with world organisations for physical education; he was vice-president of the International Gymnastic Federation, comprising twenty-four organisations for physical education. From 1888 he cultivated relations with French gymnasts, undertook almost every year journeys to Slav countries, France, England, Belgium, and elsewhere, and when the World War brought to our nation the opportunity for freedom, we found the way well prepared among our great Western friends through the Sokol labours of Scheiner. President Masaryk several times gratefully recalled the collaboration of Scheiner in the work of liberation. One of the first members of the Maffia, he took charge from the beginning of the financial side of our foreign activities, and though he was for half a year imprisoned under suspicion of high treason, he persisted in his revolutionary activity. The day of liberation summoned him to the first place in the organisation of the young army of the new State. Having handed over the army, which had been kept up throughout the most difficult times, to specialists, he returned to the work and organisation of the Sokol, greatly increased since the Revolution. He attempted afresh—and successfully—to renew the League of Slav Sokols; his authority and opinions were available when the movement sought a new orientation in the independent Republic; and even if his views did not triumph entirely, he submitted to the majority like a true democratic leader and led his comrades along new paths.

Scheiner was the representative of a whole generation, not only Sokol, but national. He grew up in a period of subjection and worked for the freedom of the nation. All his life he followed devotedly and unwearyingly along the path marked out by Tyrš; and hence the whole nation bowed at his bier with respect and gratitude. President Masaryk himself came to bid farewell to his faithful colleague, devoted with his whole heart and life to the welfare of the nation.

L. JANDÁSEK.

FRANCISZEK SOKAL

FRANCISZEK SOKAL (1882-1932), late Polish Delegate to the League of Nations, studied at the Warsaw Polytechnic and received the diploma of engineer in 1904. From 1918 onwards he took an active part in the organisation of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. In 1919 he assisted in the work of the International Commission for Labour Legislation at the Peace Conference in Paris, and was afterwards appointed First Polish Delegate at the Labour Conference in Washington, and then to the Executive Council of the International Labour Office, relinquishing his post in the Ministry of Labour and being attached to the Cabinet as chairman of a special commission. In 1924 he represented Poland at the First Emigration Conference in Rome, and at the Second of these Conferences was elected permanent member of the Executive Committee. In November of the same year he became Minister of Labour and Social Welfare and occupied this position for a year. During the whole of this period he was in close collaboration with the International Labour Organisation, represented Poland at all International Labour Conferences, and in 1931 was unanimously elected chairman. Sokal took part in the work of the League of Nations from the moment of its creation, and was a member of the Polish delegation at the meetings of the League. When in 1927 Poland was granted a seat on the Council, the Government nominated the Foreign Minister as its representative and Sokal as his deputy. He was nominated Second Delegate of Poland at the Disarmament Conference, but serious illness prevented him from taking up the position. He published several works on Social Policy.

. . . "But deeds are not everything," writes M. William Martin in the *Journal de Genève* of 12 April, 1932, "it is the spirit that counts; and in M. Sokal it was an exceptional one. Self-effacing by nature, he yet never hesitated to speak his mind when necessity arose. The relevance of his statements and the justice of his reasoning were above reproach, while his courtesy created a friendly atmosphere even in controversial moments. A single-hearted and sagacious loyalty to the principles of an ardent patriotism invested him with an influential authority in a milieu where such qualities received full recognition. Poland has sustained a great loss. But is it not an even more grievous loss to the League of Nations, which today stands in need of such men as M. Sokal, who blend a high ideal with a sense of statesmanship and national patriotism with international interests?"

SOVIET AGRICULTURAL LEGISLATION

(IV)

(Selection of Decrees and Documents)

THE Decrees we publish below embrace the period between August and December of 1931, that is to say, the most important period in the agricultural year, when the crops are harvested and the practical results of the agricultural season are ascertained.

The study of these documents seems to indicate that the general results of the Soviet agricultural policy, from the Soviet point of view, were most unsatisfactory. Although huge sums were expended on maintenance of the "sovkhozy" and "kolkhozy," and large numbers of tractors and up-to-date agricultural machinery were supplied to them, the agricultural production in 1931 has declined very considerably. What is more important, the peasants forced into the kolkhozy, continued their passive resistance, and the most drastic measures applied by the Soviet Government have failed, so far, to overcome this resistance.

The coming agricultural season will, according to all indications, be most critical for the Soviets. The policy in regard to the collectivisation of agriculture will be put to a severe and, probably, to a final test. Its success or failure will, undoubtedly, produce far-reaching economic as well as political results.

From this point of view the legislative measures passed by the Soviet Government in the second half of 1931 are of a paramount importance, and we feel that there is more than sufficient reason to publish them for the benefit of students of the Russian situation and conditions.

Resolution of the Kolkhoztse of the U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R. regarding the fulfilment of the Decree of the People's Commissariat of the U.S.S.R. for Agriculture and the Kolkhoztse of the U.S.S.R. about the approximate distribution of income in the Kolkhozy in 1931.

On the evidence of investigation into the practice of the distribution of income in the kolkhozy, the Kolkhoztse notes that the Decree of 12 July, 1931¹ of the People's Commissariat of the U.S.S.R. for Agriculture and of the Kolkhoztse of the U.S.S.R. on the approximate distribution of income, has not been properly explained to the kolkhoz members in the majority of the kolkhozy; the discussions on this decree in many

¹ See *Slavonic Review*, Vol. X, No. 30, p. 711.

SOVIET AGRICULTURAL LEGISLATION (IV). 193

cases are only of formal nature (for instance, after the reading of the text of the Decree at various meetings, decisions of a general character have been passed, such as: "We take note of the Decree," "We accept it as a basis," "We approve it generally," "We consider it correct," etc.). In connection with this, many kolkhozy have violated the Decree and have not ascertained the total amount of income to be distributed between members not later than 1 October, 1931, in the southern districts, and on 1 November in all other districts

In spite of absolutely clear instructions issued by the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and the Kolkhoztseutr that income should be distributed in accordance with the number of days worked and with the quantity and quality of work done by each member, there are cases in many kolkhozy when these instructions are infringed and the Decree of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and of the Kolkhoztseutr, approved by the Government, is distorted, namely:—

1. In many districts the kolkhozy, when giving advances to the members, adopt the method of equal distribution of income; give money and products according to the number of mouths in a member's family and not in accordance with the number of days worked by a member; introduce rations; give advances not in accordance with the number of days actually worked by a member, but in accordance with the number of days he is expected to work, or upon request of a member.

2. Instead of giving food products at the fixed prices to the families of kolkhoz members who, though working conscientiously, could not earn enough to provide their families with food, the food products are supplied free of charge and in excessive quantities, whereby § 3, Division IV, of the Decree of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and the Kolkhoztseutr is infringed. Many various officials who have no relation to the kolkhoz, are supplied with food products from the kolkhozy.

3. The Decree of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and the Kolkhoztseutr regarding the contribution of 2 per cent. of the income towards the cultural and social fund is also infringed: in addition to a 2 per cent. contribution many other contributions, such as "cultural hectares," mutual aid fund, "women's hectares," subsidies to the Red Army units, Osoaviokhim, etc., are established, very often even without consent of the kolkhoz members.

4. The share of the income in kind is not given to the kolkhoz members at their free disposal, but, instead, monthly equal food rations are established.

5. Out of the money to which a kolkhoz member is entitled, the shares to co-operative societies, debts of the members to various organisations and other obligations, are deducted, and paid out, without first obtaining the consent of the members affected.

6. In the districts of incomplete collectivisation (White Russia, Ivanovo-Voznesensk province) instead of putting aside 5 per cent. of the total income for the distribution in accordance with the value of

property surrendered to the kolkhoz (§ 4, Division VI of the Decree of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and of the Kolkhoztseñtr) the smaller percentage of income—2 per cent.—is put aside.

The above-mentioned infringements and distortions of the Decree of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and of the Kolkhoztseñtr are made not only by individual kolkhozy, but also by some republican, provincial and district kolkhoz organisations.

In order to remove the above-mentioned irregularities and stop the infringements of the Decree of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and of the Kolkhoztseñtr, the Board of Directors of the Kolkhoztseñtr resolves :—

1. To cancel the resolution passed by the kolkhoz "The Red Harvest" of the Inzinsk district (Middle Volga region) on the distribution of grain in accordance with the number of population and on fixing the normal ration of 300 kilograms per member without taking into consideration the number of days worked by a member.

2. To cancel the instructions issued by the Baitugan District kolkhoz union (Middle Volga region), which fixed the maximum ration, without taking into consideration the number of working days, at 232 kilos for the able-bodied person, 100 kilos for children under eight, 232 kilos for children above twelve, and 200 kilos for old and infirm adults; to cancel the instructions issued by the Kinelcherkassk District kolkhoz union, which fixed the ration at 50 kilos per head of population.

3. To cancel the resolution passed by the kolkhozy "The Banner of Labour" of the Tatishchev District and "The Bolshevik" of the Balandin District (Lower Volga region), which fixed the food ration at 300 kilos per head, irrespective of the work done.

4. To cancel the instructions issued by the North Caucasian Provincial kolkhoz union in regard to the contribution of 3 to 5 per cent. of the gross income to the working capital of the kolkhozy.

5. To cancel the instructions issued by the Middle Volga Provincial kolkhoz union regarding the contribution of some part of the kolkhoz income towards the fund of communal feeding.

6. To cancel the resolution passed by the kolkhoz "Frishforan" (Lower Volga region) regarding the contribution, apart from the contributions enumerated in the Decree of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and of the Kolkhoztseñtr, of additional sums to the village soviet, Red Army, Osoaviokhim, kindergartens, schools, etc., the total sum of such contributions having been 4,350 roubles, while the sum to be distributed between the members has been only 15,500 roubles.

Having in view the practical experience in the distribution of income and in order to safeguard the fulfilment of the Decree of 12 July, 1931, of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. and of the Kolkhoztseñtr, the Kolkhoztseñtr of the U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R. considers it necessary :—

1. To note that when the maximum amount of grain to be given to a

member who has worked the maximum number of days, is fixed (*Note 2, Division IV*), irregularities often take place, and it often happens that the best working members get only as much food products as those who worked less and worse; thus, instead of encouraging the best workers, equal distribution of products is established.

2. To instruct the republican, provincial, regional and district kolkhoz unions and also managements of the individual kolkhozy that when fixing the amount of grain to be given to the members who have worked the maximum number of days, they should be guided by the rule that a member who has worked the larger number of days should receive more grain than the member who has worked a smaller number of days and has not done his work conscientiously

3. Those kolkhoz members who have not been occupied in actual production (chairman, members of the management, technical staff) and whose working have been calculated not in accordance with the work done, but according to the time they have worked, cannot receive more grain than those members who have worked the maximum number of days in the fields or in other manual tasks

4. Indivisible and other public funds are to be calculated in money (seed and forage funds must be excluded from these calculations) after the sums due for payment of the agricultural tax, insurance and debts have been deducted from the gross income of the kolkhoz.

5. In the districts of wholesale collectivisation, to give twice as much for the value of collectivised cattle as for other property, out of the 2 per cent. fund assigned for compensation for collectivised property. In the districts of sporadic collectivisation, the same rule is to be followed in regard to distribution of the 5 per cent. fund provided for this purpose. The amount of the contribution towards the 5 per cent. fund in the districts of sporadic collectivisation and towards the 2 per cent. fund in the districts of wholesale collectivisation should be deducted from the same income as contributions towards indivisible and other public funds.

6. To instruct the boards of directors of the republican, provincial, regional and district kolkhoz unions to establish strict control over the distribution of income in the kolkhozy; to encourage the discussion of this question at the meetings of kolkhoz members; to apply measures of administrative coercion in respect of those kolkhoz organisations and individual officials in the kolkhoz system who, through neglect of their duties, inattention to the details of distribution of income in the kolkhozy in money and in kind, and absence of energy, allow the distortion and infringement of the Decree of People's Commissariat for Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. and of the Kolkhoztsestr, and by so doing play into the hands of kulaks, their parasites, egotists and idlers.

The Kolkhoztsestr of the U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R.

N. TATAYEV.

(*Published in "Izvestia," 20 September, 1931, No. 260-4, 467.*)

To All the Kolkhozy of the U.S.S.R.

The Kolkhoztseutr has discovered many cases where the kolkhozy, instead of *immediately* carrying out the programmes of grain delivery and meeting their obligations towards the Workers' and Peasants' State in accordance with the contracts entered into, establish grain funds for feeding cattle and form various other grain funds (seed, insurance, food, fodder, etc.), thus diminishing the amount of grain to be delivered to the State.

The Kolkhoztseutr considers such an attitude on the part of the kolkhozy towards the fulfilment of their obligations to be an inadmissible surrender to the kulak influence, and points out that the *first* and *foremost* duty of all the kolkhozy, and kolkhoz unions is the fulfilment of their obligations in regard to the delivery of grain in accordance with the contracts and the dates therein stipulated.

The Kolkhoztseutr resolves:—

1. That all instructions and orders issued by the cattle-breeding kolkhoz central bodies, kolkhoz unions and the kolkhozy, in respect of formation of grain funds for the feeding of cattle and horses should be cancelled.

2. That the grain fodder funds for feeding cattle and for supplying the needs of the cattle-breeding kolkhozy can be formed only after the grain delivery programme has been fulfilled, and in no case can the programme of delivery be diminished on account of the need of forming fodder funds.

3. That the kolkhoz unions should be instructed to admonish general meetings in those kolkhozy which have failed to fulfil the programme of grain delivery, and explain to the kolkhoz members the importance of the fulfilment of the programmes of grain delivery at the time due, for the welfare of their kolkhoz and their responsibility for any failure to fulfil their obligations towards the State and to remove the distortions which have been allowed in respect of the programme of grain delivery.

4. That the members of those kolkhozy which have already fulfilled their programmes of grain delivery, should discuss, at their general meetings, the methods of formation and expenditure of seed, fodder, insurance and food funds, and the ways and means for increasing the production above the stipulated programme.

Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Kolkhoztseutr of the U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R., T. YURKIN.

(Published in "Izvestia," 19 October, 1931, No. 289, 4,496.)

To All Directors of Machine and Tractor Stations, Provincial Branches of the Traktorisentr and Agents of the Traktortseutr.

Information received from the provinces indicates that the Machine and Tractor Stations form various grain funds (fodder and food) in many kolkhozy, although these kolkhozy have not fulfilled their programmes in

SOVIET AGRICULTURAL LEGISLATION (IV). 197

regard to the delivery (sale) of grain to the State. Such actions lead to an evident infringement of the grain collection plan and to a mass accumulation of grain reserves in the villages, and represent a manifestation of kulak tendencies, directed against the carrying out of the grain collection plan.

In view of this, the Board of Directors of the Traktortsentr categorically orders :—

1. That no grain funds of any description are to be formed in the kolkhozy by the Machine and Tractor Stations and no inviolable reserves of grain are to be established until each kolkhoz has fulfilled in full its obligations in respect of grain deliveries.

2. That political and explanatory work among the kolkhoz members must be increased, the chief watchword of this work being “the programmes as to the delivery of grain to the State must be fulfilled immediately and in full”; the kulak character of suggestions of keeping the grain in the kolkhozy must be shown up, and the kolkhoz members must be mobilised for the speediest fulfilment of the programmes of grain delivery.

3. That a most careful inquiry must be carried out in all kolkhozy, in order to ascertain whether they had formed any grain funds before fulfilment of the programme of grain delivery, measures should be taken for the immediate checking of such irregularities. Against those kolkhoz managements which resist the immediate fulfilment of the programme of grain delivery are to be taken the measures of coercion which are adopted against wreckers of the grain delivery campaign.

The Board of Directors of the Traktortsentr holds the directors of the Machine and Tractor Stations personally responsible for carrying out present instructions in respect of all kolkhozy functioning in the Machine and Tractor Stations areas, and orders them, immediately on the receipt of this letter, to report, by express mail, to the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Traktortsentr, what steps they have taken in order to secure the execution of the instructions contained in the present circular letter.

The branches of the Traktortsentr and the Agents of the Traktortsentr are to see to the execution of the present instructions in all Machine and Tractor Stations

Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Traktortsentr,
A. MARKEVICH

(Published in “Izvestia,” 19 October, 1931, No. 289, 4,496)

Resolution of the Præsidium of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviki) and the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the U.S.S.R.

Regarding the Distribution of Income in the Kolkhozy.

Investigation into the question how the distribution of income in the kolkhozy is going on, shows that the propaganda campaign to explain

the decision of the June Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviki) and the Decree of the People's Commissariat of the U.S.S.R. for Agriculture and of the Kolkhozsentr regarding the distribution of income in the kolkhozy is being carried out unsatisfactorily. Owing to this, a considerable portion of the kolkhoz members are not aware of the methods which are to be applied to the distribution of income. In many districts the granting of advances to the kolkhoz members has not been utilised as one of the most efficient methods for organic and economic strengthening of the kolkhozy. The managements of many kolkhozy, while distributing the income and granting the advances, have flagrantly infringed the directions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party regarding the distribution of income, they have distributed advances in kind and in money not according to the number of days worked, but according to the number of the population, they have established food rations, have decreased the saleable surplus of grain and have failed in their grain deliveries.

Together with this, the Præsidium of the Central Control Commission and the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the U.S.S.R. note that, in many districts, the guidance rendered by the District Kolkhoz Unions as to the distribution of income is very unsatisfactory.

In order to obtain a correct distribution of income in the kolkhozy on the fixed date, 15 January, 1932, the Præsidium of the Central Control Commission and the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, while taking account of the decrees issued on the matter and, in particular, the Resolution passed by the Kolkhozsentr of the U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R. on 20 September, 1931, instruct the Kolkhozsentr of the U.S.S.R. to carry out the following additional measures within the next ten days :—

1. To organise a strict investigation by the District kolkhoz unions into all projects of distribution of income which are suggested by the managements of the kolkhozy; special attention should be paid to the timely and full execution of the grain delivery programmes, to the correct formation of seed, fodder, special and indivisible funds, to correct the ascertaining of income in money and in kind destined for distribution between the kolkhoz members, to a strict observance of the principle of distribution only in accordance with the number of days worked, etc.

The responsibility for correct calculations as to the distribution of income is to rest with the chairmen of the District Kolkhoz Unions and the technical staff (accountants, agronomists, veterinary surgeons, etc.).

2. To take decisive measures for putting in order the book entries regarding the expenditure of labour as well as the general checking of income and expenditure in the kolkhozy. To instruct the District kolkhoz unions that, by means of careful investigation into the affairs of each

kolkhoz, they should within the next ten days obtain the following results :—

(a) That the labour books should be handed to the kolkhoz members and not accumulated or kept in the kolkhoz offices.

(b) That the entries in these books should be made every day or at least not less than once in every five days ; not only the number of days worked by each kolkhoz member should be entered in the books, but also *the amount of work done* in accordance with the established minimum output

In order to render assistance to those kolkhozy which do not have trained accountants, to recommend to adopt the method practised in some districts (Northern Caucasus), i.e., sending trained accountants from the kolkhozy in which the number of working days and the income have been ascertained, to those kolkhozy where this work has not yet been done.

3. Taking into account the fact that in many instances the managements of the kolkhozy, when granting advances to the members, have adopted the principle of kulak equality, to direct all the units of the kolkhoz system that when distributing further shares of income between the members, they should correct all previous mistakes and distortions in such a manner as to make the total income of a kolkhoz member, in kind as well as in money, strictly correspond to the number of days he has worked between 1 January and 31 December, 1931.

In view of a noticed confusion as to the methods of formation of funds in money (indivisible, collectivised property, etc.), and special food funds, and also in view of the confusion existing in regard to assigning sums for purchasing shares in the "Traktortsentr" and shares of the "Agricultural Machinery Supplies," and making contributions towards the "Long-term Credits Fund," to instruct the Kolkhoztentr to issue the following explanations :—

(a) That the Resolution of the Board of Directors of the Kolkhoztentr of 20 September, 1931, in respect of the formation of various funds only gives further particulars about the Decree of the Commissariat of the U S S.R. for Agriculture and of the Kolkhoztentr of 12 July, 1931, and stipulates that all public funds are to be calculated on the basis of the total income of a kolkhoz, and not only on the income in kind.

(b) That the shares of the Traktortsentr and of the "Agricultural Machinery Supplies" should be purchased and the contributions towards the "Long-term Credits Fund" should be made, as a rule, over and above the fixed contributions towards the indivisible funds.

(c) That special attention should be paid to the inadmissibility of the formation of extravagant special food funds (in some kolkhozy these funds form as much as 30 or 40 per cent. of the grain funds destined for distribution between the kolkhoz members in accordance with the number of days worked) ; such a practice tends artificially to diminish the saleable quantities of grain and infringes the basic principle of distribution of

grain in accordance with the number of days worked. A careful and strict surveillance should be instituted that the grain earmarked for special food funds, should be given only to those kolkhoz members who, though working conscientiously, have failed to earn enough for meeting the needs of their families, or who have gone to work outside the kolkhoz in industrial occupations, or to all other categories of kolkhoz members enumerated in the Decree of the Commissariat of the U.S.S.R. for Agriculture and the Kolkhozsentr of 12 July, 1931. Those kolkhoz members who work unsatisfactorily must be deprived of the right to receive grain from special food funds.

(d) Communal feeding in the fields, which is organised on the decision of kolkhoz members, must be paid for by the members themselves out of the products they have to receive. The manner of communal feeding in the fields is to be fixed by each kolkhoz.

5. Having in view the fact that the control commissions in many kolkhozy are absolutely inactive in matters of distribution of income, the Præsidium of the Central Control Commission and the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the U.S.S.R. instruct the District Control Commissions and District branches of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and also the District Kolkhoz Unions to check the work of the kolkhoz control commissions and to arrange for the re-election of those of them which cannot carry out the work assigned to them.

6. To instruct republican, provincial, regional and district Control Commissions and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection to establish a systematic control of the distribution of income and to combat resolutely all distortions and infringements of the party general policy in respect to these matters.

7. To publish the present resolution in the Press.

(Published in "Izvestia," 21 October, 1931, No. 292, 4,498.)

Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. Regarding the Report of the Kolkhozsentr on the Organisation of Labour on the Kolkhozy.

After hearing the report of the Kolkhozsentr on the organisation of labour on the kolkhozy of the R.S.F.S.R., the All-Russian Central Executive Committee notes that the agricultural labourers, *bednyaki*² and *serednyaki*³ have responded to the appeal made by the 6th Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. to the peasantry to form kolkhozy, by the mass joining the kolkhozy.

At the time of the 6th Congress of the Soviets of the U.S.S.R., the number of peasant households in the R.S.F.S.R. which had joined the kolkhozy was 6,100,000, or 33·4 per cent. of the *bednyaki* and *serednyaki* households; now, in December of 1931, the number of households in the R.S.F.S.R. united in kolkhozy is 10,500,000, or 62 per cent. of all the

² Poor peasants.

³ Average peasants.

peasant households. In many provinces and districts of the R.S.F.S.R. wholesale collectivisation has been already completed, the *kulaki*, as a class, have been destroyed and the kolkhoz peasantry has already become the chief factor in agriculture.

Responding to the appeal of the 6th Congress of the Soviets of the U.S.S.R. to sow at least 50 million hectares in order to increase the sown area by 10 million hectares and to have not less than 50 per cent. of the total spring-sown area of our country under kolkhoz cultivation, the kolkhozy of the R.S.F.S.R. alone have sown and harvested in 1931 57,900,000 hectares, against 23,100,000 hectares in 1930.

The kolkhoz movement, developing on the basis of the decisions of the Party and the Soviet Government, achieved in 1931 fresh overwhelming victories. Enormous successes have been achieved in respect of the cultivation of technical plants: the kolkhozy of the R.S.F.S.R. has sown in 1931 405,000 hectares of cotton, against 138,000 hectares in 1930, 1,460,000 hectares of flax, against 405,000 hectares in 1930, 132,000 hectares of sugar-beet, against 50,000 hectares in 1930.

The area under the autumn crops was 20 million hectares, against 6 million hectares in 1930, and the area ploughed in the autumn in preparation for the spring-sowing in 1932 was 20 million hectares, against 6,500,000 hectares in 1930.

A decisive part in collectivisation and in the fulfilment of production programmes of the kolkhozy has been played by the Machine and Tractor Stations, which have sown and cultivated about one-third of the area under kolkhoz crops. The speedily-spreading net of the Machine and Tractor Stations, while providing the kolkhozy with improved technical means of cultivation, makes the labour of kolkhoz members lighter, and, at the same time, frees a colossal amount of labour for employment in industry.

While fulfilling the decisions of the Party and the Government, the kolkhozy of the R.S.F.S.R. have begun to organise the stock-breeding farms. The number of such farms organised by the end of 1931 was 35,000. Together with this, the kolkhozy have organised 125 poultry-breeding stations of industrial type; all these stations are supplied with incubators.

Carrying out economic campaigns (sowing, harvesting, etc.) on the basis of socialist methods of organisation of labour (socialist competition and shock brigades), the best kolkhozy have produced fresh examples of efficiency, which considerably exceed the productivity of labour in individual peasant households, and, by achieving this, they have proved by practical example the advantages of socialised, large-scale agricultural methods of production.

In 1931 the kolkhozy have been the chief producers, not only of marketable grain products, but also of raw materials for industrial purposes; the kolkhozy of the R.S.F.S.R. have delivered (sold) 7,150,000 metric

tons of grain, 9,200,000 metric tons of sugar-beet, 58,000 metric tons of flax, and 500,000 metric tons of milk.

All these successes were achieved owing to strict adherence to the general policy of the Party, to the successful progress of the industrialisation of the U.S.S.R., and to the liberal assistance rendered to the kolkhoz peasantry by the Soviet State. Together with this, the strengthening of the kolkhozy has been assisted by the adoption of piecework remuneration by the overwhelming majority of the kolkhozy, by a steady struggle for wholesale collectivisation, by liquidation of the *kulaki* as a class, and by the activity of the kolkhoz peasantry for the economic strengthening of the kolkhozy.

The experience which the kolkhozy gained during the conduct of the chief agricultural campaigns in 1931 shows, however, that in spite of great successes achieved by the best kolkhozy, there have been most serious shortcomings in many kolkhozy: late harvesting of grain cultures, poor organisation of harvesting technical plants, fruit and vegetables. All this resulted in non-fulfilment of production programmes by many kolkhozy and in great waste, and has caused economic losses to the kolkhozy, the kolkhoz members, and the State.

The All-Russian Central Executive Committee especially notes insufficient work on the part of the provincial, regional and local soviet organisations in respect to the development of stock-breeding on the kolkhozy, and also in respect of formation of fodder funds on the basis of local resources.

These most important shortcomings were the result of poor organisation of labour on the kolkhozy, insufficient utilisation of machinery, draught animals and human labour, establishment of sham forms of piecework remuneration, absence of due control, insufficient combating of obsolete methods of work, rapacious tendencies developed by certain kolkhozy, malicious *kulak* propaganda which, in some instances, caused the concealment of agricultural products, and insufficient guidance given to the kolkhozy by Soviet institutions, especially by the District kolkhoz unions, District executive committees, and the village soviets.

The All-Russian Central Executive Committee considers that, on the basis of the successes already achieved in the building up of the kolkhozy, it is necessary, under the new conditions, to concentrate the main efforts on the qualitative indices of kolkhoz work and on the raising of productivity of labour in the fields in order to increase the amount of saleable production on the kolkhozy. Organisation of labour on the kolkhozy, which is a very important link in their economic and organic strength, must secure the fulfilment and over-fulfilment of their production programmes and delivery (sale) of all necessary products to the State in the first instance.

The village soviets and the District Executive Committees, the kolkhoz unions and the kolkhozy, as well as all the kolkhoz members, must regard the timely-planned socialist organisation of labour on the

kolkhozy and the raising of the yield of crops as their main task in the forthcoming spring-sowing campaign and in the harvest of 1932.

II

The All-Russian Central Executive Committee resolves that :—

1. The planning of production and general work on the basis of a proper distribution and utilisation of human labour and machinery must be the foremost task of the managements of kolkhozy, brigadiers, managers in charge of separate branches of work and of the farms, and kolkhoz members.

It is necessary to prepare in the proper time production and financial plans for 1932, taking into account the specific conditions of each kolkhoz and the necessity of raising the output of agricultural production and the increase in livestock.

The People's Commissariat for Agriculture must immediately start drawing up the programme of work to be done during the winter, and inform the kolkhoz members of this programme in proper time.

The timely organisation of brigades, with a specific task for each brigade, distribution of kolkhoz members in the brigades, the choice of brigadiers and specialists in various branches of kolkhoz activity, must be the foremost task of the managements of kolkhozy.

The plan of distribution of human labour in the kolkhozy must take into account the necessity of dealing with the superfluous labour on the kolkhozy, and provide for the employment of superfluous kolkhoz labourers in industry, transport, building trades and in seasonal occupations, in correspondence with the contracts concluded with State institutions.

2. Organisation of labour exclusively on the basis of piecework remuneration must be the decisive factor in the economic-strengthening of the kolkhozy, in the raising of productivity of labour and in the securing of the saleable surplus of kolkhoz products. The piecework remuneration must be carried out in such a way as to take into account the quality and quantity of production and the nature of various branches of agricultural work. The distribution of income on the kolkhozy must be effected in correspondence with the quantity and quality of the labour expended by each kolkhoz member. Special attention must be paid to the quality of labour. The quality of labour must be ascertained separately in various branches of agriculture. Equality in the remuneration of labour of kolkhoz members must be completely eliminated.

3. It is necessary to eliminate absolutely the existing shortcomings and distortions of the instructions issued by the Party and Government in respect of distributing grain and other agricultural products between kolkhoz members. Granting advances without taking into account the quality and quantity of labour, attaching such persons to the kolkhozy as have no right to receive food products from the kolkhozy, giving out

of agricultural products in portions after income has been distributed, instead of sharing out the income at once, must be eliminated.

4. Normal daily tasks must be fixed on the basis of the output achieved by the best kolkhozy and kolkhoz members. When these normal tasks are worked out, the necessity of increasing the qualitative indices of work and raising the productivity of labour must be taken into consideration. The new normal tasks must also be fixed in such a manner as to take into account the ever-increasing application of mechanical means of production in agriculture

5. The People's Commissariat for Agriculture and the Kolkhozsentr are to take steps in the shortest time possible to guarantee that each agricultural machine should be handled by one man or by a group of men, and that cattle and horses should also be looked after by men specially appointed for the task. In order to achieve this, agricultural machines and implements must be attached to separate brigades and to individual labourers within the brigades. Brigades and individual labourers must be held responsible for the machines and implements during the whole period of the agricultural season. In order to achieve better utilisation and maintenance of collectivised livestock, draught animals and productive cattle must be attached to separate brigades, which are to be held responsible for the good condition of the animals.

The All-Russian Central Executive Committee orders the republican, provincial, district and village institutions and also the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and the Kolkhozsentr to organise the kolkhoz members for a decisive struggle against fluidity of labour in the brigades and also against any inexpedient apportioning of various tasks to the same brigade.

6. To be able to handle machinery is the aim of every kolkhoz member. The most immediate and important task of kolkhoz unions, kolkhoz members and the local soviet institutions, is to train the brigades of kolkhoz members in handling and working complicated and simple agricultural machinery and to apply to agriculture the necessary minimum of knowledge of agronomy, stock-breeding and veterinary surgery.

7. Special attention should be paid to the organisation of labour on the stock-breeding kolkhozy and on kolkhozy which specialise in the cultivation of technical plants (raw materials), where particular care must be exercised in the distribution of labour in various tasks in which special training is necessary. While working out the rates of normal tasks in such kolkhozy, the specific conditions of each stock-breeding kolkhoz should be carefully considered; this applies also to those kolkhozy which specialise in the cultivation of technical plants.

8. While working out the plans of organisation of labour, it is necessary to provide for an increased application of female labour in productive and public utility work on the kolkhozy, especially in connection with the recruiting of labour for industrial requirements. Simultaneously, the

net of communal eating-houses, crèches and kindergartens should be developed on the kolkhozy.

9 An unprecedented growth in the number of kolkhoz trained workers still cannot meet the ever-increasing requirements of the organisers of large-scale collectivist economy, especially in the national republics and districts. The People's Commissariat for Agriculture and the Kolkhozsentr must work out schemes for training and re-training the necessary cadres for the kolkhozy, having in view the growing need of such cadres in correspondence with the successes of socialist reconstruction. It is the most immediate task of the local soviets, executive committees and kolkhoz unions to retain experienced specialists on the kolkhozy and to train new specialists chosen from the best kolkhoz members—men and women.

10 The All-Russian Central Executive Committee calls especial attention to the fact that the task of strengthening the kolkhozy demands a higher level of technical education of kolkhoz members, and it instructs the Kolkhozsentr to work out measures for the speediest liquidation of the technical inefficiency of members of managements of kolkhozy, brigadiers, managers of various branches of kolkhoz activity and stock-breeding farms, for training accountants chosen from the kolkhoz members, and for re-training the present accountants, in order to improve the methods of kolkhoz accountancy and to guarantee the possibility of control by the members of the kolkhozy over the conduct of kolkhoz economy.

11. Having in view the leading part in the development and strengthening of the kolkhozy played by the Machine and Tractor Stations, to instruct the Traktorsentr to see that all production and financial programmes should be drawn up by all the Machine and Tractor Stations by the proper time, and that the raising of the productivity of labour, improvement of the quality coefficients in every branch of kolkhoz activity, and the increase of the saleable amount of products should be taken into consideration.

III

The realisation of all these measures is possible only on condition of the utmost development of self-activity of the kolkhoz members themselves, of the further augmentation of proletarian influence, and of the active guidance of the kolkhozy by the local soviets and district executive committees. The most important duty of all institutions of the Soviet Government, and, first of all, of the village soviets, is to render every assistance to the growth of self-activity of kolkhoz members; with their support, the village soviets must carry out their practical guidance, through the elected bodies of the kolkhozy and through the active portion of kolkhoz members. The village soviets must radically repudiate attempts at administrative coercion in matters concerning the kolkhozy; these attempts are the result of a failure to understand the fact that the decisive part in the economic strengthening of the kolkhozy is played

by the self-activity of kolkhoz members. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee appeals to the kolkhoz members and invites them to develop socialist competition and shock-work methods, to participate actively in working out the production programmes, so that every kolkhoz member should know these programmes, to remove all shortcomings in their work, to offer energetic resistance to rapacious tendencies, to strike a strong blow at the *kulaki* and their satellites, who try to explode the kolkhozy from inside, to carry out conscientiously all orders issued by the Government, which assists in building up the kolkhozy technically and financially. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee expresses the conviction that the kolkhoz members, unflinchingly carrying out the instructions issued by the Party and Government, will strengthen the economic conditions on the kolkhozy, raise the productivity of collective labour and, on the basis of socialist agriculture, raise their material and cultural standard of life.

The President of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee,
M. KALININ.

The Secretary of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee,
A. KISELEV.

Moscow, Kremlin, 21 December, 1931.

(Published in "Izvestia," 22 December, 1931, No. 351, 4,558.)

CHRONICLE

RUSSIA

The Far East.

In the domain of foreign affairs the past few months have brought increasing tension in the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan in connection with developments in the Far East. Although the official pronouncements of statesmen in both countries emphasise the need of maintaining peaceful and cordial relations, semi-officially both sides are accusing one another of subversive activities and war preparations. The Soviet Press complains that the Japanese in Manchuria are encouraging Russian émigré "White Guards" to hostile acts on the Chinese Eastern Railway and attacks on Soviet officials, while certain Japanese circles maintain that the Soviets are massing troops and fortifying the frontier and stirring up revolt in Manchuria and supplying the rebels with arms and munitions. In all their speeches and in the Press the Soviet leaders are urging upon the population the necessity of being on the alert against the impending attack of the imperialists and of concentrating their energies on training for the defence of the Union.

Disarmament.

The Soviet delegation headed by M. Litvinov took part in the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission in Geneva. M. Litvinov submitted a draft scheme for a proportional and progressive reduction of armaments and armed forces in each country based on the actual size of its respective armed forces, the U.S.S.R. being classed in the third category with the highest ratio of reduction. The Soviet proposal was waived aside and handed over to the Bureau.

Industry.

A comparative table of the value of the industrial output during the first quarter of the year (1926-27 prices being taken as basis) was published by the central department of national and economic accountancy. According to these data, the total output of the industries controlled by the Commissariats of Heavy, Light, Timber and Supplies Industries, respectively, amounted to 7,718.3 million roubles, or 120.3 per cent. of the output for the corresponding quarter of 1931. Taken separately, the output for the various branches of industries was as follows: Heavy industries, 3,404.1 million roubles, or 134 per cent. of 1931; light industries, 2,104.7 million roubles, or 117.3 per cent. of 1931; timber, 882.3 million roubles, or 102.3 per cent., and supplies, 1,327.2 million roubles, or 109.2 per cent. The great dam across the river Dnieper on the "Dneprostroy" has been completed and is functioning; but the opening of the entire system announced for May Day did not take place, owing, probably,

to some hitch in the progress of construction. Another "giant" concern, the Moscow roller and ball-bearing works, has been opened, which, when working to its full capacity, will render the U.S.S.R. independent of imported bearings. Several new blast furnaces have been started, the production of pig-iron increased, and the first aluminium works in the country opened in the province of Leningrad. After a series of mishaps the Stalingrad tractor works are now reported to be working at full capacity and, together with the Kharkov tractor works, have been awarded the Lenin order of merit. On the other hand, the Nizhny-Novgorod motor works, opened in January, are nearly at a standstill, owing partly to shortage of material and apparatus, but mainly to bad management and lack of discipline. A special commission has been sitting to investigate the matter and draw up measures for improving the situation. Somewhat similar conditions have been revealed in many other concerns, where a systematic practice of "eye-wash" has been going on for months, faked reports of progress being presented to the authorities. These investigations have resulted in numerous dismissals of responsible officials and Communists, and several arrests. An extensive scheme for the construction of three huge electric power stations on the upper and middle Volga, and of a hydraulic power station for the irrigation of 4-4½ million hectares on the left bank of the Volga between Kinel-Samarka and Kamyshin to serve as a "perpetual wheat base with an annual output of 5,000,000 tons of grain," has been launched as part of the Second Five Year Plan.

In spite of these spectacular achievements, the condition of the three "leading" industries, i.e. mining, metallurgic and transport, causes grave anxiety, and the necessity of increasing their output is being constantly urged by all Soviet leaders. A special committee for the re-organisation of transport has been set up. The coal output continues to be below plan, and although the production of pig-iron and steel has increased, it is still insufficient for the needs of the machine-building and other dependent industries.

The Trades Union Congress.

The Trades Union Congress, held in April after an interval of three years, yielded much interesting information on these points. In the report on the progress of the heavy industries, Pyatakov, Assistant Commissary, said that the quarterly programme for pig-iron and steel had been fulfilled only up to 80 per cent., and 87 per cent. for rolled steel. The failure to execute the programme depended entirely on "internal causes," namely, lack of discipline and proper technical control, disorder, and dirt in the factories. Particularly "dangerous" was the "breach" on the coal front, where the increase in the output established during the last quarter of 1931 had not been maintained, and that in spite of improved mechanisation and increased wages. The cost of production, instead of being reduced as laid down by 8 per cent., had risen in the

heavy industries by 6 per cent. The increase had not been universal, but had gone up by leaps and bounds in certain branches of industry, for instance, coal mining by 30 per cent., peat-extraction by 28·5 per cent., mineral ore extraction by 23 per cent., etc. The main cause of this lay in defective organisation of labour, inefficient use of machinery, raw material and fuel, but particularly in the absence of conscientious effort on the part of the collective body of workers of the respective concerns as a whole. The basic cause of the "breach" in the programme for the reduction of costs of production was the big overdraft in wages during 1931, which had increased the cost of production per unit by 12·3 per cent.

The report on the Trade Union movement stated that during the three years since the last Congress, the number of members of trade unions had increased from 11 millions to 16½ millions. The number of women employed in industry had gone up from 26·5 per cent. to 33 per cent. The average increase in wages amounted to 56 per cent. since 1928. 83 per cent. of the workers were on the 7-hour day, and 64 per cent. on the piecework system, but this was not yet running smoothly. The budget for social insurance had increased to 3½ thousand million roubles in 1932, as compared with 1,425 millions in 1928-29. The problem of the supply of essential commodities was still acute, in spite of the alleged increase in the production of all foodstuffs (except meat and fats) and other essential articles. The workers were invited to develop "self-help" in providing foodstuffs by organising piggeries, rabbit-breeding, kitchen-gardens, etc., around their respective factories and shafts. Absolute dependence on a "centralised supply service" is to be discouraged. Contradicting his own statement made at the session of the T.S.I.K. in December last, M. Molotov, President of the Council of People's Commissaries, told the Trades Union Congress that until the next harvest perhaps the most difficult problem faced by the Soviet Government would be that of the food supply.

Agriculture.

The spring sowing is proceeding slowly, 68·3 per cent. of the plan having been sown by the collective farms and only 42·7 per cent. by the individual peasants by 25 May, the average being 3 per cent. lower than for the corresponding period of last year. "To stimulate production by collective farms and individual peasants," important concessions, obviously called forth by the acute shortage of foodstuffs in the towns and industrial areas, were made to the peasants. By a decree dated 6 May, the quota of grain to be delivered to the State by the collective farms was reduced by 264 million puds, the peasants being granted full liberty, after delivery of it and the setting aside of the seed fund, to sell the surplus on the open market. Another decree of 10 May reduced by one-half the quota of meat cattle to be delivered to the State, with the right to dispose of the rest of the stock by private trade. Finally, on 20 May, a decree was

published authorising the free sale by the peasants of all agricultural and dairy produce on the open market at market prices, direct to the consumer and free of taxation. Great emphasis is laid on the assertion that this is not a return to "private" trade, but a new form of "Soviet" trade, wherein no profiteering, middlemen or the opening of private shops will be tolerated. Nevertheless, the fact remains that for a time at least the Government has gone back from its drastic policy of socialisation and has been obliged to a certain extent to give way to the peasants. For how long—remains an open question.

SLAVIC COURSES IN THE UNITED STATES

PERHAPS the most significant development in this field is the inclusion for the first time of Slavic courses in the curriculum of Harvard Summer School. Three courses are offered—one in Elementary Russian; one in Russian Literature and Culture; and one in Church Slavic (with an introduction to Slavic Philology); and they will all be given by Assistant-Professor Samuel H. Cross, who has succeeded Professor Leo Wiener as head of the Slavic Department at Harvard.

We should also note that Boston University has been giving, in the second semester of this year, an evening course on the economic history of Russia. While this course has been mainly on economic developments with comparisons of Russian and American economic history, and with some estimates of the future economic significance of Russia, political and social developments are also being treated. The instructor is William L. Raymond.

In the Middle West, Professor George J. Waskovich is now giving at St. Teresa's College, Winona, Minnesota, a course on Russian and Near Eastern History. Owing to the fact that Mr. Maxwell I. Raphael is studying in Eastern Europe this year (1932-33), there will be no course in Roumanian given at Harvard University. Mr. Raphael is to investigate the historical origins of the Roumanian language.

Another encouraging sign is the development of courses at the Los Angeles section of the University of California. A course in Russian History was started here in the winter of 1930-31, covering two semesters and dealing with Russian history from the earliest times to the present day. This course is now being given regularly and permanently. In the summer session last year also a course on Russia and Asia was given, and in that of 1932 there will be a course on Russian Literature and another on modern Russia, covering mainly the Revolution and the period preceding it. All these courses are in the charge of Andrew Lobanov-Rostovsky, who has recently been made Assistant Professor of History.

A. I. A.

Books Received

(Inclusion in this list does not preclude subsequent review.)

- AINALOV, DEMETRIUS. Geschichte der russischen Monumentalkunst der vormoskovitschen Zeit. Berlin (de Gruyter & Co.), 1932.
- Bibliografický Katalog Československé Republiky. Edited by K. Randé and V. Foch. Prague (Minist, Školství), 1932.
- BINENTHAL, LEOPOLD. Chopin: Dokumente und Erinnerungen aus seiner Heimatsstadt. Trans. A. Guttry. Leipzig (Breitkopf und Härtel), 1932.
- BOROWY, WACŁAW. Kamienne Rękawiczki. Warsaw (Instytut Literacki), 1932.
- BRIGGS, MITCHELL P. George D. Herron and the European Settlement (Stanford Univ. Publication) Oxford (Milford), 1932.
- CHARQUES, R. D. The Soviets and the Next War. London (Secker), 1932.
- Concise Statistical Year Book of Poland. Warsaw (Chief Bureau of Statistics), 1931.
- DAVIES, C. COLLIN. The Problem of the North-West Frontier (1890-1908) Cambridge (University Press), 1932.
- DMOWSKI, ROMAN. Świat Powojenny i Polska. Third edition. Warsaw (Nikiewicz i Żaluzko), 1932.
- FILOW, BOGDAN. Geschichte der altbulgarischen Kunst. Berlin (de Gruyter & Co.), 1932.
- GOETEL, FERDYNAND. From Day to Day. Translated by Winifred Cooper. Introduction by John Galsworthy. London (Elkin Matthews), 1931.
- GURIAN, W. Bolshevism: Theory and Practice. Translated by E. I. Watkin. London (Sheed and Ward), 1932.
- GUTTRY, A. V. Polens geistiger Anlitz: eine kulturhistorische Skizze. Paris (Gebethner and Wolff), 1931.
- GUTTRY, A. V. Unbekannte Literatur: Charakteristiken Polnischer Dichter. Paris (Gebethner and Wolff), 1931.
- HOOVER, CALVIN B. Economic Life in Soviet Russia. New York (Macmillan), 1931.
- Jahrbuch für Polen 1929-30. Warsaw (Biblioteka Polska), 1931.
- KHUN, ALFRED. Die Polnische Kunst von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart. Berlin (Klinkhardt und Biermann), 1930.
- KOCHANOWSKI, JEAN. Chants. Traduit, avec Introduction, par Jacques Langlade. Paris (Les Belles Lettres), 1932.
- KOVÁŘÍK, FEDOR. Zážitky a Dojmy Ruského Čecha za Carství. Prague (Orbis), 1932.
- KRASINSKI, ZYGMUNT. The Un-Divine Comedy. Translated by H. E. Kennedy and Z. Umińska. Warsaw (Książnica Polska), 1932.
- KRUSZEWSKA, FELICJA. Twarzona Zachód. Warsaw (Instytut Literacki), 1932.
- LANGLADE, JACQUES. Jean Kochanowski: L'Homme, le Penseur, le Poète Lyrique. Paris (Les Belles Lettres), 1932.
- MASARYK, T. G. Studie o F. M. Dostojevském. Edited by J. Horák. Prague (Orbis), 1932.
- MELVILLE, CECIL F. The Russian Face of Germany. London (Wishart & Co.), 1932.
- MORTON, J. B. Sobieski, King of Poland. London (Eyre and Spottiswoode), 1932.
- PFITZNER, JOSEF. Bakuninstudien. Prag (Deutsche Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften), 1932.
- QUÉNET, CHARLES. Tchaadaev et Les Lettres Philosophiques. Paris (Champion), 1931.

- RAMOVŠ, F. Dialektološka Karta Slovenskega Jezika. Ljubljana (Univ-Tiskarna), 1932.
- SBORNIK, PRACÍ I Sjezdu Slovanských filologů v Praze, 1929. Svazek II. Praha (Orbis), 1932.
- SPEKTORSKIJ, E. Zgodovina Socijalne Filozofije. Ljubljana (Slov. Matica), 1932.
- SUBOTIĆ, D., Yugoslav Popular Ballads: Their Origin and Development. Cambridge (University Press), 1932.
- ŠUSTA, JOSEF. Světová Politika 1871-1914. VI. Prague (Vesmír), 1932.
- TOLSTOJ, L. N. Vojna in Mir (Slovene translation by Vlad. Levstik). Ljubljana (Slovenská Matica), 1932.
- TRETER, MIECZYSLAW. Samtida Konst i Polen · ett urval bilder med inledande text. Malmö (A. B., Malmö Ljustrycksanstalt), 1930.
- VLČEK, JAROSLAV. Malá Rukovat z Prác. Turc Sv. Martin (Matica Slovenská), 1932.
- VOIGT, A., and HAUSHERR, I. Oraison Funèbre de Basile I. Par son fils Léon VI. Roma (Pont. Institut. Orientalium Studiorum), 1932.

REVIEWS

[*Special features of the present number are (1) a Complete Index for 1922-1932; (2) a List of Publications by members of the Staff, and (3) a List of Thesis work undertaken at the School during these ten years. Their inclusion has forced us, to our great regret, to print much fewer reviews than usual.*—ED]

Soviet Policy in Public Finance. By Gregory Y. Sokolnikov and Associates. Translated by Elena Varneck. Edited by Lincoln Hutchinson and Carl Plehn. (Stanford University Press, Stanford University, California. Pp. 931. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. Pp. 470.)

THIS book has an interest which is independent of its content. It is the salvage which remains from a comprehensive project organised at Stanford University under the leadership of Professor Frank A. Golder, with the aid of Professor Lincoln Hutchinson and Mr. H. H. Fisher. The group which they organised intended to make a study of Soviet policy since 1917. The project was to be carried on as a co-operative venture by Russian scholars, scientists and administrators working under the sanction of the Soviet Government in collaboration with the research group in the United States.

With the exception of this book, the project has so far been abortive. Although a Russian agricultural economist of eminence was permitted to go to the United States and to work for the period of a year at the Hoover War Library at Stanford, permission has never been given by the Soviet Government for the publication of the manuscript which he prepared. The editors say of the present study that it is far from being the sort of study which was originally projected, since they recognise that it is neither really scientific nor objective. Nevertheless, they feel that it merits publication. With this judgment the reviewer is in entire accord.

The idea of making the type of objective and analytical study which this group of American scholars had planned has occurred to other groups as well. The possibility of making such a study depends upon the supposition that the Russian Revolution is ended. Such is not the case, however. Not only does the Russian Revolution continue, but the connection of the Russian Communist Party with revolutionary movements abroad renders it inevitable that economic and social research by outside groups who expect the co-operation of the Soviet Government must for a long time remain illusory or impossible. Economic and social research in Soviet Russia is likely to continue to depend, therefore, upon the individual investigator. Such an investigator may ferret out facts in addition to those which the Soviet Government is willing to make public. But much data cannot be so obtained, and when information is obtained against the will of the Soviet Government it is likely to be subjective in nature. Consequently, all economic and social studies of Soviet Russia almost unavoidably mingle the objective with the subjective in a way which is naturally disconcerting to the reader who does not understand the conditions under which research must be carried on.

While this book was prepared under the direction of Mr. Sokolnikov, all of the chapters except two were written by associates in the Commissariat of Finance selected by him. As might be expected, there is a considerable amount of duplication and overlapping of subject matter. Sections are devoted to the pre-war system of finance, to the period of War, the Civil War, and the New Economic Policy. It is interesting to observe that the period covered ends with the year 1928, and that the authors write under the assumption that the New Economic Policy is to continue. However, the year 1928, in fact, marks the end of the period of the New Economic Policy, so that the date of finishing the manuscript happened to coincide with the beginning of a sharp change in fundamental policy by the Soviet Government.

There is a great deal of data which is of importance to the student of Soviet economy. For example, the brief account of the progress of the nationalisation of industry contained in the section devoted to public finances during the Civil War, accompanied by footnotes which refer to the series of decrees extending over the period from the October Revolution to the final decree of nationalisation of 29 November, would be useful for reference purposes. But in the accompanying text a computation by the authors of percentages of all establishments nationalised, which should total 100 per cent., actually totals 98.4 per cent., as the editors note. Such errors of detail, which are numerous, make it obvious that the book cannot be used as a source of exact data. Assuming a prior critical knowledge of the Soviet economy, it is possible, nevertheless, to find a large amount of supplementary data, in addition to suggestive references which can be checked against other sources if one so desires.

The description of the Soviet system of taxation is interesting, but the analysis is frequently so inept that it is almost impossible to understand what the authors are trying to say. An example of this is furnished by the account of the tax on the rent of land. This subject is of interest not only from the standpoint of public finance, but is of equal interest to the economic theorist. From the description of the authors, one finds that the Government taxes the rent of land, but if one had no other source of information little else would be made manifest.

In view of the extremely limited sources of information concerning Soviet economics, the editors have performed a service in publishing the manuscript, in spite of their misgivings as to its objectivity. It is more than doubtful whether the Russian economists who contributed to it would be allowed to write of economic matters at the present time with even as much freedom as was permitted to them in 1928. Certainly, it would have been impossible to have done so in 1930, when the situation with respect to collectivisation of agriculture and the shortage of food brought about a new wave of repression. Consequently, it is essential that there should be the maximum utilisation of such data as can be sent out of Russia during periods when there is some relaxation of revolutionary fanaticism.

Duke University,

CALVIN B. HOOVER.

Durham, North Carolina.

Rural Russia under the Old Regime. A History of the Landlord-Peasant World and the Prologue to the Peasant Revolution of 1917. By Geroid Tanquary Robinson, Associate Professor of History in Columbia University. (Longmans, Green and Co., London, N.Y., and Toronto), 1932. Pp. ix + 342, illus.

WE hope the author will accomplish on the same lines of thoroughness the following volume of this important work. It is not only very readable, but packed with information from pre-revolutionary as well as post-revolutionary statistical, economic and political evidence, printed and even unprinted.

Both Appendices on landholding in European Russia, the notes added to the respective chapters, together with the bibliography covering nearly four hundred entries of books—some of which are almost inaccessible outside Russia—give an adequate idea of the amount of work and thought applied to the problem under discussion. Professor Robinson has also made use of contemporary newspaper reports, and, when possible, he has sought information from private conversations during his repeated visits to Russia in the course of the last ten years. The immense material thus collected has been very ably reduced to a narrative of only two hundred and sixty-three pages, of which sixty are devoted to the pre-emancipation developments up to 1861. Since the history of the cultivators of the soil in Russia as in most countries bristles with technicalities, legal, economic and social, the author of *Rural Russia*

under the Old Regime deserves the highest praise for having found his way through the undergrowth of agrarian arrangements. In converting such a study into a narrative, the dangers of over-simplification, of a moralising attitude, of a specific *post-factum* wisdom, can hardly be avoided. In the case of Russian agrarian developments such dangers are the greater, as the whole literature is filled to saturation by socio-political doctrines—populist, socialist and others sometimes helpful, often confusing, seldom independent, and less so now than formerly.

And it still remains as difficult as before to discover the meaning of the basic process, nowhere in pre-war times operative to the same extent as in Russia, of the passing gradually of more and more land, both *against* and *with* official pressure into the hands of the cultivators. This process during the decade preceding the Great War had assumed such proportions that given the same rate of development in another decade or so—without a Revolution—very little indeed would have remained of non-peasant arable lands. Professor Robinson has steered with great caution through the maze of material, especially as regards his special subject—the post-emancipation period.

The English-speaking students of Russian Affairs will benefit from Professor Robinson's *Rural Russia*, as it supplements the respective volumes of the Russian Series of the *Economic and Social History of the World War* edited by Professor James T. Shotwell, Dr. J. Pavlovsky's *Russian Agricultural Economics*, and the second volume of the late Professor J. Mavor's *Economic History of Russia*.

A. MEYENDORFF.

Litauisch-Deutsches Gesprächsbüchlein. By Professor Eduard Herman. Kaunas, 1931.

THIS up-to-date work is of first-rate interest. Besides being accurate and packed with valuable material for the scholar who has learned Lithuanian largely for its philological importance, it has great practical value for all those who intend to travel in a country where communications are difficult and reliance on personal introductions is helpful.

Hitherto nothing of the kind has been published, so far as I am aware. Of small works the Metoula guide is, like all those in the series of the enterprising firms of Toussaint-Langenscheidt, excellent, and, considering its convenient size, very complete. Even the stress and intonation are marked in the simplified transcription adopted. But it suffers from the disadvantage, inevitable in any book of a series which has a common plan, that the subject-matter is not always suitable for the intending traveller in a new country like Lithuania. Those who desire to come to grips with so delightful a language as Lithuanian and to supplement their knowledge of the written language acquired from Schleicher, Kurschat, Leskien, Baranowski, Būga, and the rest, by real contact with the educated as well as the uneducated Lithuanians, will find in Professor Herman's work just what they want.

The accent and intonation are marked throughout, and a description of them is embodied in the conversation. The business man and pleasure tourist will, of course, cut all that part, and many similar parts! Even the learned author felt he must not go *too* far in this respect, but his scientific mind could not resist giving some further hints in the appendix—for which may he be blessed! There are, moreover, many useful notes scattered throughout the text—in Lithuanian and in German.

The first sixteen chapters are of general interest and have for the most part no particular reference to Lithuanian conditions. They contain the type of sentences—dealing with weather, travel, age, eating and drinking, etc.—which are to be met with in all good conversation manuals, and in this book are particularly well done. Even such modern sports as football and flying are adequately treated; the would-be traveller is warned of the state of Lithuanian roads, and is informed of the details of the clothing of the peasantry, the proper way to greet persons of high and low degree, and similar useful matters.

It is in the second half of the guide (chapters 17 to 31) that the greatest value of the Professor's work becomes apparent. Here he breaks new ground or at least makes accessible in good Lithuanian little-known general facts concerning the country, its language, history, politics and everything that one may reasonably feel curious about.

Anyone who has learnt to read Lithuanian and then masters Professor Herman's manual, including both the text and the subject-matter, will, indeed, talk like a book. When he has acquired that ease in speaking which only regular practice with an educated native speaker can give, his encyclopædic knowledge will surprise the Lithuanians—and for that he will owe much to this work.

N. B. JOPSON.

Husitství a Cizina (Hussitism and Its Relations with Foreign Countries).

By F. M. Bartoš. Prague (Čin Publishing Co.), 1931. Pp. 272.

THIS book does not contain a systematic study of the influence exerted from abroad on the development of the Hussite movement in Bohemia, or of its echoes beyond the frontiers of the Czech kingdom. It is a volume of essays that appeared at different times and were written for divers occasions; not until later were they assembled in book form. Hence an answer is only given to some among the knot of problems that arise in the course of research into Hussite relations with the rest of Europe. In some chapters the author offers a solution of special questions; elsewhere he endeavours to explain matters that are essential factors of the Hussite movement. For example, in his first chapter he tries to prove that the author of the anonymous work *Tetragonus Aristotelis* was not an Oxford professor, but a Prague theologian of the 14th century, Master Adalbertus de Ericinio, who had relations with Oxford. Dr. Bartoš edited the work issued by the Czech Academy in 1916 as No. 41 of the collection *Historický Archiv*, so that it is easily accessible to students who feel inclined

to challenge his arguments. The second chapter deals with the relations between Hus and the ideas of Wyclif, and would certainly arouse interest if published in English, even in summarised form, as an offset to the work of the German scholar Loserth. In contrast with the latter, Bartoš makes it clear that Hus's position was already firmly developed in the reform movement in Bohemia before Wyclif's writings became known in Bohemia. Bartoš does not deny the Czech reformer's close dependence on the English thinker, but shows that Hus in his turn rendered valuable services to Wyclif, for without his effective interpretation of Wyclif's ideas many of them would have disappeared without a trace. The third chapter of the book examines the question of how Hus's friend and helper, Master Jacobellus de Misa, came to the conviction that the laity, too, must receive the Chalice. Bartoš believes that the decisive influence was the report of Master Jerome of Prague, who, on a journey to Lithuania, got to know the rites and usages of the Orthodox Church and taught them to his companions in Prague. Bartoš also traces the first year of the conflict about the Chalice in Bohemia, and in a supplement to this chapter describes the young English Lollard, Peter Payne, and his flight to Bohemia. Of the remaining chapters the most interesting for English readers is the seventh, entitled "Partisan Literature of the Hussite Struggle." It treats of the works *Sermones de Antichristo* and *Anatomia Antichristi*, the authorship of both of which Bartoš attributes to Paul Kravař, burnt at St. Andrews in Scotland. It must be admitted that his arguments are here not entirely convincing, and it still remains necessary to ascertain whether Paul Kravař really wrote the two works. Bartoš also here examines the Hussite manifestos of the years 1430 and 1431, directed towards the propagation of Hussite ideas abroad. That they reached England is evident from the writing of a Cambridge professor, of the year 1430, which is preserved in the Bodleian Library. In his last chapter Bartoš mentions the participation of a Waldensian bishop in the ordination of the first ministers of the Unity of Czech Brethren. This matter has often been discussed in connection with the question whether the Moravians preserved the "Apostolic Succession." Bartoš considers that they did not and that the Unity is the first church of the Presbyterian type.

OTAKAR ODLOŽILÍK.

A LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

By MEMBERS OF THE STAFF (1922-1932)

The completion of ten years of our REVIEW justifies us in publishing the following survey of publications by the staff of the School of Slavonic Studies. This list will, we hope, justify our claim to be a useful research department of the University.

PARES, SIR BERNARD (Professor of Russian Language, Literature and History, and Director of the School, since 1918)

A History of Russia. London (Cape) 1926; 2nd edition 1928.

My Russian Memoirs. London (Cape) 1931.

Krylov's Fables. (Verse Translation.) London (Cape) 1926.

The Mischief of Being Clever. (Verse Translation.) By A. Griboyedov. London (School of Slavonic Studies) 1924.

Contribution to The New Russia. (Faber and Faber, 1931.)

Prefaces to Letters of the Tsaritsa to the Tsar (Duckworth, 1923); The Reign of Rasputin, by M. V. Rodzyanko (Philpot, 1927); Glimpses of High Politics, by A. V. Tcharykoff (Allen and Unwin, 1931); and The Comrades Know How to Die, by Sophie Bocharsky.

Articles in the SLAVONIC REVIEW, Quarterly Review, etc.

MEYENDORFF, ALEXANDER F. (Reader in Russian Economics and Institutions, 1924-1932).

The Background of the Russian Revolution. London (Bell) 1929

Correspondence Diplomatique du Baron de Staal, 1884-1900. 2 vols. Paris (Rivière) 1929.

MIRSKY, D. S. (Lecturer in Russian Literature, 1923-1932)

Modern Russian Literature. Oxford (University Press) 1925

Pushkin. London (Routledge) 1926.

Russian Literature since Dostoyevsky. London (Routledge) 1926.

A History of Russian Literature to 1881. London (Routledge) 1927.

A History of Russia. (Benn's Sixpenny Series) 1927.

Russia: A Social History. London (Cresset Press) 1931.

Lenin. London (Holme Press) 1931.

Prefaces or Introductions to Tales of the Wilderness, by Boris Pilniak (Routledge, 1924); Chronicles of a Russian Family, by Aksakov (Routledge, 1924); Life of the Archpriest Avvakum (Hogarth Press, 1924); The Mischief of Being Clever, by Griboyedov (School of Slavonic Studies, 1925); A Hero of our Time, by Lermontov (Philip Allan, 1928); The Queen of Spades (Blackamore Press, 1928); The Bare Year, by Pilniak (New York, Payson and Clark, 1929); A Brief History of Moscovia, by John Milton (Blackamore Press, 1929); Russian Poems, trans. by C. Fillingham Coxwell (Daniel, 1929); The Demon, by Lermontov (Collins, 1930); Letters of Dostoyevsky to his Wife (Constable, 1930); Dostoyevsky, by E. H. Carr (Allen and Unwin, 1931).

Russian Literature (13th edition of Encyclopædia Britannica).

Russian Literature, Ukrainian Literature and Tolstoy (14th edition of Encyclopædia Britannica).

Russia (in Contemporary Movements in European Literature).

Russia, 1015-1462 (in Cambridge Medieval History, vol. VIII).

Articles in London Mercury, SLAVONIC REVIEW, Quarterly Review, Criterion, Versty, Nouvelle Revue Française, Etudes (T. S. Eliot), etc.

- TURIN, S. P. (Lecturer in Russian Economics since 1930).
 Problems of Labour in Great Britain (in Russian). London 1920.
 Russian Local Government during the War and the Union of Zemstvos (in collaboration with Prince V. A. Obolensky and T. Polner). New Haven (Yale University Press) 1930.
 The Labour Movement in Russia (in preparation).
 Edited Self-Government in Russia (I Zemstvos and Towns. II. North Russian Zemstvos and Municipalities) London 1919; and Care of the Population in England (in Russian). London 1920.
 Articles in the SLAVONIC REVIEW.
- SETON-WATSON, R. W. (Hon. Lecturer in East European History 1915-22; Masaryk Professor of Central European History since 1922).
 Europe in the Melting Pot. London (Macmillan) 1919.
 The New Slovakia. Prague (Borový), English and Slovak editions 1924.
 Sarajevo A Study in the Origins of the Great War. London (Hutchinson) 1926 Serbian and Czech editions, 1926 and 1929.
 British Foreign Policy, from Waterloo to the Death of Palmerston (on the eve of publication).
 Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question (on the eve of publication).
 The Czechoslovak Republic (Czech Society 1919).
 The Historian as a Political Force in Central Europe. London (School of Slavonic Studies) 1922.
 The Emancipation of South Eastern Europe. First Hyndman Memorial Lecture, 1923.
 A Plea for the Study of Contemporary History. Creighton Lecture, 1930.
 The Rôle of Bosnia in International Politics (1875-1914). Raleigh Lecture (British Academy) 1932.
 Edited Tudor Studies (presented to A. F. Pollard, by Twelve of his colleagues and pupils). Longmans 1924.
 Translated and edited (with introductory essay), Slovakia Then and Now, by 25 Slovak Writers. English and Slovak editions. Prague (Orbis) 1931.
 Prefaces to Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary, by Oszkár Jászi (King, 1924); and The Reign of the Emperor Francis Joseph, by Karl Tschuppik (Bell, 1930).
 Encyclopædia Britannica—12th edition (1922) Serbia since 1910; Yugoslavia; and various biographies; 13th edition (1926) Serbia, Yugoslavia, Croatia-Slavonia since 1910; 14th edition (1929) Serbia; Yugoslavia; Bosnia; Croatia, Dalmatia; Montenegro.
 Contributions to Šišićev Zbornik 1929 (in honour of Prof. F. Šišić); Festschrift in honour of Prof. Bogdan Popović (Belgrade 1928); President Masaryk in Paris, Brussels and London (Prague 1924); Economic Problems in Europe To-day, ed. W. H. Pringle (A. and C. Black, 1928); Zlatá kniha Slovenska (Bratislava 1929); Transilvania 1918-28, vol. III (Bucarest 1929).
 Articles in The New Europe (1916-20); SLAVONIC REVIEW (Transylvania, Italy's Balkan Policy, Italian Intervention, William II's Balkan Policy, etc), Contemporary Review; History (Roumanian Origins, The Strange Story of Lady Grange, The Emperor Francis Joseph); Le Monde Slave (Les Relations de l'Autriche-Hongrie et de la Serbie, 4 articles,

La Tchécoslovaquie et le Problème Slovaque, 2 articles, etc); Le Flambeau; L'Esprit International (La Petite Entente); Nova Evropa (The Making of Yugoslavia), International Affairs; also occasional articles in the British and foreign press

JOPSON, N. B. (Reader in Comparative Slavonic Philology since 1923).

The Distribution and Inter-Relations of the Slavonic Peoples and Languages. (School of Slavonic Studies, 1923).

Encyclopædia Britannica, 14th edition (Articles on Slavonic Languages, philology and early civilisation)

Contributions to The Linguist, Harmsworth Encyclopædia (1929), Modern Languages and to Slovene, Czech and Serbo-Croat periodicals.

Articles and numerous translations in SLAVONIC REVIEW.

DYBOSKI, ROMAN (Lecturer in Polish, 1924-27, since 1927 Professor of English Literature in the University of Cracow)

Periods of Polish Literary History Oxford (University Press) 1923.

Modern Polish Literature Oxford (University Press) 1924.

Outlines of Polish History. London (Allen and Unwin) 1925.

Poland Old and New (Three Lectures) Oxford (University Press) 1926.

KRZYŻANOWSKI, JULIAN (Lecturer in Polish, 1927 to 1930; since 1930 Professor of Polish Literature at University of Riga).

Pieśniarz Krainy Kępińskiej i Wiecznej Nędzy. Zakopane (Wydawnictwo Muzeum Tatrzańskiego) 1927.

Polish Romantic Literature. London (Allen and Unwin) 1930.

BOROWY, WACŁAW (Lecturer in Polish since 1930).

Od Kochanowskiego do Staffa; Antologia Liryki Polskiej. Lwów (Ossolineum) 1930.

Kamienne Rękawicki i Inne Studja i Szkice Literackie. Warsaw (Instytut Literacki) 1932.

Articles in SLAVONIC REVIEW.

SUBOTIĆ, D. P. (Lecturer, then Reader, in Serbo-Croat Language and Literature since 1919).

A Serbian Grammar In collaboration with the late Professor Nevill Forbes. Oxford (University Press) 1926.

Engleska Gramatika. With Nevill Forbes. Oxford (Clarendon Press) 1920.

A First English Book for Foreign Students. Serbian section, in collaboration with Professor Craigie. Oxford (University Press) 1921.

Yugoslav Popular Ballads; Their Origin and Development. Cambridge (University Press) 1932.

Translated into Serbian (A Short History of England), by Sir Charles Oman. (Williams and Norgate) 1920.

Articles in SLAVONIC REVIEW, Srpski Književni Glasnik, Novi Život, Nova Evropa and Prosvetni Glasnik.

CHUDOBA, F. (Lecturer in Czechoslovak 1919-23; since 1923 Professor of English Literature in University of Brno).

A Short Survey of Czech Literature. London (Kegan Paul) 1924.

Bánsnikovo mládí (Shakespeare's Youth). Bratislava 1930.

Pod lesním stromem. Prague (Melantrich) 1932.

VOČADLO, OTAKAR (Lecturer in Czechoslovak 1923 to 1928).

V zajištění babylonském Prague 1924.

Anglická Literatura xx Století. Prague 1932.

Editor of "Standard Library" (Prague).

Contributions to *Obtův Slovník Naučný*.

Numerous articles in *Časopis pro Mod. Filologii, Rozpravy Aventina, Nové Čechy, Lumír, Atheneum, SLAVONIC REVIEW*.

ODLOŽILÍK, OTAKAR (Lecturer in Czechoslovak 1928-30; since 1930 Lecturer in Czechoslovak History at the Caroline University of Prague).

Československá Vlastivěd a. Prague (Sfinx). Vol IV. Sections on 1273-1419 and 1326-1648 Z pansofických studií J. A. Komenského. Brno 1928. Moravští Exulanti Jiří a Jan Veselštv-Laetové 1930. Bratři, na Slovensku 1931. Ze Zápasů pobělohorská Emigrace 1932.

Articles in *SLAVONIC REVIEW, Časopis Matice Moravské*, etc.

HANÁK, JAN (Lecturer in Czechoslovak since 1930).

Bratři a Starší z Hory Lilecké (De Monte Liliorum) Brno, 1929.

Articles and reviews in *SLAVONIC REVIEW, Český Časopis Historický, Časopis Matice Moravské* and *Naše Věda*.

WHARTON, L. C. (Hon. Lecturer in Polish, and Librarian of the School since 1920)

Joint founder and editor of *Philologica*.

Edited (jointly with Sir Everard im Thurn) *Journal of William Lockerby (Hakluyt Society, 1925)*.

Contributions to *Transactions of the Philological Society, the St. Paul's Ecclesiological Society; Proces Verbaux of Congrès International des Bibliothécaires, and Proceedings of Conférence des Historiens des États de l'Europe Orientale et du Monde Slave; Przewodnik Bibliograficzny (1926) and The Library World*.

LIST OF THESES PREPARED IN THE SCHOOL (1922-1932)

RUSSIA :

The Influence of Byron on Russian Poetry. By William Matthews, Ph.D.

The Russian Poet Tyutchev By Miss M. Parkhurst Webb, Ph.D.

The Art of Ostrovsky. By Mrs. Ina Beasley, Ph.D. (External; University College, Nottingham.)

The Russian Psychological Novel. By Miss E. M. Hill, Ph.D.

Russian Literary Movements between 1910 and 1921. By Dr. H. Walde, Ph.D., Innsbruck (Ph.D. : in preparation)

Russian Literature from the Eve of the Revolution to 1921. By Miss B. Malnick, B.A. (Ph.D. : in preparation.)

Russian Fiction under the Bolsheviks. By Alexander Werth, M.A. (Ph.D. : in preparation.)

Russian Proverbs in the Field of Russian Folklore. By A. Gershun. (Ph.D. : in preparation.)

Slavonic Curses and Charms. By Miss E. M. Hill, Ph.D. (D Litt : in preparation.)

The Movement of Thought in the Forties in Russia as reflected in Russian Literature. Miss D. Mennell, Ph.D.

Russian Slavophil Thinkers. By J. D. Stojanović, Ph.D.

The Influence of Contemporary Political tendencies in Europe on domestic policy in Russia. By A. F. Dobbie Bateman. (Ph.D. : in preparation.)

Anglo-Russian Relations in the 18th century. By E. W. McIntosh, Ph.D.

Russo-British Relations from the opening of the Eastern Crisis 1839 to the eve of the Crimean War. By G. H. Bolsover, B.A. (Ph.D. : in preparation.)

The Rôle of Stratford de Redcliffe in the Crimean War. By Miss A. Hammond, B.A. (Ph.D. : in preparation.)

Conflicting Principles of Russian Education Policy in the 19th century. By Nicholas Hans, Ph.D. (Published 1931 by P. S. King and Son under the title History of Russian Educational Policy 1701-1917.)

A Critical Survey of the Narodnik Movement between 1860 and 1880. By Anne Branfoot, Ph.D.

The Trade and Industry of Russia, 1905-1914. By Margaret S. Miller, Ph.D. (Published in 1926 by P. S. King and Son under the title The Economic Development of Russia 1905-14.)

Agricultural Economics in Russia, 1880-1916. By G. A. Pavlovsky, Ph.D. (Published 1930 by George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., under the title Agricultural Russia on the Eve of the Revolution.)

The Russian Peasant Movement from 1906 to 1917. By L. A. Owen. (Ph.D. : in preparation.)

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE :

Italian Influences on Ragusan Poetry in the 16th century. By J. Torbarina, Ph.D. (Published 1932 by Williams and Norgate, Ltd., under the title Italian Influence on Ragusan Poetry)

Austro-British Diplomatic Relations 1790-1795. By C. W. Terry, M.A. (Ph.D. : in preparation.)

The Diplomatic Relations between Serbia and Great Britain in the reign of Prince Michael. By Miss E. F. Robinson, M.A.

British Policy in the Bulgarian Question (1878-1885). By W. N. Medlicott, M.A.

Serbia and the Diplomatic Relations of the Powers, 1868-1878. By M. Stojanović, Ph.D.

The Emperor Charles IV. By Mrs. K. M. Gadd, M.A. (D. Litt. : in preparation.)

Lord Odo Russell and Anglo-German Relations. By Miss W. Taffs, Ph.D.

The Growth of a Modern Administration in Serbia and its reactions on the Life of the Peasants. By V. Andjelković. (Ph.D. : in preparation.)

Ecclesiastical Opinion in England on the Eastern Question (1856-78). By S. Poole, B.A. (M.A. : in preparation.)

Swiss Influence upon the German Weimar Constitution. By R. D. Milne, B.A. (M.A. : in preparation.)

A COMPLETE INDEX (1922-1932)

I. Subject Index.

ALBANIA :

A Survey of Albanian Studies. N. B. Jopson. III, 412.

ART

Exhibition of Icons at Victoria and Albert Museum. E. H. Minns VIII., 627

Kondakov, N P E H. Minns. III., 435

Malczewski, Jacek, The Art of. T Szydłowski X., 274

Michelangelo Ivan Meštrović V, 225

Restoration of Old Russian Paintings. N Levinson. III., 350.

Sculpture in Soviet Russia D. Aronovich VII, 687.

Traditionalism of Ancient Russian Art. Paul Muratov. VIII, 514

Two Losses to Czech Art. F. Žákavec. IV., 695.

AUSTRIA :

Austria since 1928. C. A. Macartney. VII, 288.

Economic Aspects of Dualism in Austria-Hungary. I. L. Evans. VI, 529

German Medieval Expansion and the Making of Austria. J. Westfall Thompson. II., 263.

BOHEMIA, *see* Czechoslovakia

BULGARIA :

Bulgaria under Prince Alexander. Lady Grogan I, 561.

Bulgaria under Tsar Simeon. S S. Bobčev VII., 621 VIII, 99

Political and Social Aspects of Modern Bulgaria. T. Tchitchovsky. VII., 272, 595. VIII., 176.

The Admirative in Bulgarian. G. Weigand II., 567.

CROATIA, *see* Jugoslavia.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

Background of Political Parties in Czechoslovakia. Emanuel Čapek. X, 90

Březina, a Czech Mystic. Lawrence Hyde. II., 547.

Centenary of the Matice Česká. J. Prokeš. X., 420.

Church and State in Czechoslovakia John O. Crane VI, 364.

Contemporary Czech Thinkers. N. Lossky. IX, 149.

Czech Literature during and after the War. Arne Novák II, 114

Czech Reformation. F. Žilka. VIII., 284.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA—*cont.*

Czechs and Slovaks after 1848. Albert Pražák VI, 119.

Czechs and Slovaks in the Revolution of 1848 A Pražák V, 565

Difficulties of the Exchange in Czechoslovakia. J. Drachovsky I, 419.

Dobrovsky Miloš Weingart VII., 663

Economic Conditions in Czechoslovakia. Josef Gruber II., 133.

Education in Slovakia Anton Štefánek. II., 308.

English Influences on Palacký. O. Vočadlo. III, 547

Financial Policy of Czechoslovakia. K Engliš X, 489

German Medieval Expansion in Bohemia J. Westfall Thompson. IV., 605.

Good King Wenceslas O Odložilík. VIII, 120

Havlíček Jan Herben III, 285.

Janáček and Moravian Music Drama. Rosa Newmarch I, 362

Kollár and Literary Pan Slavism. VI., 336.

Land Reform in Czechoslovakia. J. Macek. I., 144.

Land Reform in Slovakia. Stephen Janšák. VIII., 612 IX, 177.

Masaryk, President, in Exile R. W. Seton-Watson III, 615.

Masaryk, President, Message from. VII., 240.

Masaryk, President, Message to Czechoslovakia (1928). VII, 374.

Masaryk, President, in Exile. E. Beneš. III, 609.

Masaryk as Philosopher Jan Kozák. VIII, 478

Masaryk at King's College II., 455

Masaryk, the Man and the Teacher. H W. Steed. VIII, 465

Masaryk's Philosophy of Life VIII, 691.

Memorials of the Czech Reformation. Arne Novák I, 323

Nationality and the New Czechoslovak Census. A. Boháč X., 105.

Philosophy of Czech History Jaroslav Werstadt III, 533

Religious Problem in Slovakia, The. R. W Seton-Watson II, 519.

Secret Peace Negotiations. S. Osuský. IV, 657.

Slav Congress of 1848 and the Slovaks. A. Pražák. VII., 141

CZECHOSLOVAKIA—*cont.*

- Slovak Sources of Kollar's Panslavism.
A Pražák VI, 578
Slovaks and Czechs in the Early
Nineteenth Century J Hanák.
X, 588
Smétana V Helfert III, 141
Survey of Modern Slovak Literature
Stephen Kréméry VII, 160
Svehla, a Representative Czech Karel
Čapek VII, 268.
Two Losses to Czech Art F. Zákavec.
IV., 695.
Tyrš, the Founder of the Sokols
L Jandásek X, 572.
Wycliffe's Influence on Central
Europe O Odložilík. VII, 634
Zizka, the Hussite Leader R.
Urbánek III, 272

DIPLOMATIC HISTORY :

- Diplomatic Relations after the
Congress of Berlin. W N.
Medlicott VIII., 66.
Italian Intervention and the Secret
Treaty of London. R. W. Seton-
Watson V., 271.
Italy's Balkan Policy in 1914 R. W.
Seton-Watson V, 48.
Lord Carnock. The Earl of Onslow
VII, 540
Russia and the Straits Question.
R. J Kerner. VIII., 589.
Russian Commitments in the Bosnian
Question R. W Seton-Watson.
VIII, 578
The Bosnian Annexation Crisis.
Bernadotte E. Schmitt IX, 312,
650 X, 161, 408, 641.
The Mediterranean Agreements of
1887 W. N Medlicott V, 66.
The Mission of Liman von Sanders
R. J Kerner. VI., 12, 344, 543 :
VII, 90
The War Scare of 1875 Winifred
Taffs. IX, 335, 632.
William II.'s Balkan Policy R W.
Seton-Watson VII., 1.

ESTONIA :

- Agrarian Revolution in the New Baltic
States I. L. Evans III, 587
An Estonian Novelst F. Tuglas
Aino Kallas. VI, 28.
Estonian Folk Literature. O. P.
Kallas. IX., 107

HUNGARY :

- Agrarian Problem in Hungary A.
Dániel. I, 151.
Hungary since 1918. C. A. Macartney.
VII., 577.
Jókai, Maurus. A. Hevesi. VIII,
356.

HUNGARY—*cont.*

- Kossuth and Palmerston E Horváth.
IX, 612
Madách and 'The Tragedy of Man'
A. Hevesi IX., 391
Studies in Modern Hungarian Litera-
ture A Hegedus X, 293
Two Great Hungarian Poets A
Hevesi IX, 94.
JUGOSLAVIA
Background of the Yugoslav Dictator-
ship, The. R. W. Seton-Watson
X, 363
Bogomils, The. Janko Lavrin VIII,
269
Byron and the Yugoslavs Ilija
Petrović. VIII, 144
Centenary of the Matica Srpska.
V Stajić VI, 593
Centralism and Autonomy in Jugo-
slavia Franjo Šuklje II., 328.
Constitution of 1921, Yugoslav. III.,
166
Croat View of the Yugoslav Crisis, A.
VII, 304
Croats, Crown Prince Rudolf and The
Baron O Mitis V, 580
Early Diplomatic Relations of Britain
and Serbia M Gavrilović I, 86,
333, 552
English Influences in Croatia Josip
Horváth IV, 721
First Link between English and
Serbo-Croat. H. G. Fiedler. VI,
390 David Low III, 363
Kerdić, Ivo, The Medal Work of
W. Chauncy Langdon VII., 171.
Kosovo Lily F. Waring. II., 56
Land Settlement in Yugoslav Mace-
donia. Pero Slijepečević. IX., 160.
Miletic and the Liberal Movement
V. Stajić V, 106.
New Yugoslav Regime Svetislav
Popović X, 616.
Origin of Serbo-Croat Ballads D.
Subotić. IX., 116.
Sarajevo Murder Trial IV., 645.
Serbia in the Early Seventies.
Slobodan Jovanović IV, 382.
Serbia of Prince Miloš, The. D.
Subotić. III., 156.
Serbian Popular Poetry in English
Literature. D Subotić V., 628 :
VI., 150.
Studies in Yugoslav Psychology. Jovan
Cvijić. IX., 375, 662 : X, 58.
Survey of Modern Slovene Literature
Josip Vidmar. VI, 618.
Vojnović, Ivo, Plays of. Arsen
Venzehdes. VIII, 368.
LAND REFORM.
Agrarian Problem in Hungary. Arnold
Dániel. I, 151.

LAND REFORM—*cont.*

- Agrarian Reform in Danubian Countries. I. L. Evans. VII., 604 : VIII., 601
Agrarian Revolution in Baltic States I. L. Evans III., 587.
Agricultural Survivals in Central Europe. Doreen Warriner. X., 357.
Land Question in Slovakia. S Janšák. VIII., 612. IX., 177
Land Reform in Czechoslovakia. J Macek I., 144.
Land Reform in Poland. Z Ludkiewicz. VIII., 315.
Land Settlement in Jugoslav Macedonia P Slijepčević IX., 160.
Russian Agrarian Revolution C. Zaitsev IX., 547
Russian Land Commune K Kachorovsky. VII., 565

LATVIA.

- Agrarian Reform in the Baltic States. I. L. Evans III., 587.

LITHUANIA

- Lithuanian Studies in England. N B. Jopson. III., 642.

MISCELLANEOUS:

- Central Europe after Ten Years. E. Beneš VII., 245.
Economic Aspects of Dualism I. L. Evans VI., 529.
End of the Renaissance. N Berdiayev. IV., 1, 347
Foreign Policy of the Little Entente. V., 523.
Great Tartar Invasion of Europe. H. T. Cheshire V., 89.
Imperial Idea in History of Europe. L Eisenmann V., 242.
Index of Soviet Inquisition. IV., 725
Message from President Masaryk. VII., 240
National Reconciliation in S. E. Europe C Brockhausen. VII., 311.
Organization of Academic Work in White Russia. VII., 371
Petchenegs. The. C. A. Macartney. VIII., 342.
Present Position of Russian Universities. II., 138.
President Masaryk at King's College. II., 455.
President Masaryk's Message to Czechoslovakia. VII., 374.
Russian Archives in Prague V. Burtsev V., 687.
Slav Conference at Richmond. III., 684
Slav Courses at American Universities. X., 213.

PHILOLOGY.

- Admirative in Bulgarian, The. G. Weigand II., 567
Bibliographical Appreciation of Jagić F. Pastrnek II., 213
Bibliography of Ukrainian Language. A Kolesa V., 168
First Congress of Slav Philologists. J Horák VIII., 713
On some Siberianisms Malcolm Burr V., 659
Pronunciation of Slav Words and Names II., 668
Slav Linguistic Purity. O. Vočadlo. V., 352

POLAND

- Bruckner, Alexander. R Dyboski. IV., 686.
Dante and Polish Romanticism. Z Szmydtowa VIII., 292
Educational Reform in Poland A. B. Boswell III., 131
English Literature in Eighteenth-Century Poland. S Heltsztynski. VI., 142
Historical Studies in Poland J. Feldman. II., 660.
Kasprowicz W. Borowy X., 28.
Monica Gardner V., 340
Kochanowski, Jan W Bruchnalski. IX., 56.
Konarski, Stanislas. W. J. Rose. IV., 23.
Labour Conditions in Modern Poland. J H Penson I., 572
Literary and National Life in Modern Poland R. Dyboski III., 117.
Malczewski, Jacek, Art of T Szydlowski X., 274.
Mianowski Foundation, Jubilee of W Rose. X., 427
Mickiewicz, Anglomania of. St. Windakiewicz. VIII., 31.
Mickiewicz and Pushkin. J. Krzyzanowski VI., 634.
Ossolineum, Centenary of VII., 361.
Peasant in Modern Poland, The R. Dyboski. II., 101.
Peasant in Polish Literature. T. Zielinski. I., 584. II., 85.
Peter the Great in Poland. L. B. Roberts V., 537
Poland C. Skirmunt I., 273.
Poland and the Slavophil Idea. W Lednicki. VII., 128, 649.
Polish Emigrants in France S Gargas V., 347
Polish Reformation, Aspects of K. Gorski. IX., 598
Polish Rising in Dramas of Wyspianski M. Gardner IX., 361
Polish Rising of 1830. A. Lewak. IX., 350.

POLAND—*cont.*

- Polish Self-help under Prussian Rule
Earl of Onslow X, 126
Polish-Soviet Campaign of 1920. M
Kukiel VIII, 48
Political and Economic Progress of
Poland S Kutrzeba I, 277
Pope in Poland S Helsztyński
VII, 230
Prus, Boleslav J Krzyzanowski
IX, 695
Sienkiewicz, Henrik Monica Gardner
III, 524
Third Partition, The R H Lord
III, 481
Ukrainian Question in Poland Count
S Los X, 116.
Wyspiński S Srebrny II, 359
Zeromski and Reymont R Dyboski.
IV, 552

ROUMANIA.

- Pagan Remnants in Roumanian Folk-
lore M Beza II, 388.
Percy's Reliques, Scott's Minstrelsy
and Roumanian Ballads M Beza
I, 121
Political Evolution of Roumania
J S Rouček X, 602
Roumanian Chroniclers M Beza.
IX, 124
Roumanian Legends and Superstitions
of the Moon M Beza. III, 356
Roumania's Share in the War of 1877.
R Rosetti VIII, 546
Sacred Marriage in Roumanian Folk-
lore M Beza IV, 321 V, 647
Stephen the Great of Moldavia R.
Rosetti VI, 86
Ten Years of Greater Roumania
A. Vaida-Voevod VII, 261
Transylvania R W Seton-Watson
I, 306, 533. III, 304. IV, 101.

RUSSIA

Economics.

- Bolshevik Agrarian Policy A.
Baikalov VIII, 533
Brief Outline of Russian Co-opera-
tive Movement A Baikarov.
I, 130.
Crisis of the Five Year Plan S.
Prokopovich. X, 317
Financial Embarrassments of the
Soviet Government. Count V.
Kokovtsev VI, 1.
Financial Reform in Soviet Russia
Margaret S. Miller. X, 328, 547
Financing of Industry in Soviet
Russia. M S Miller. IX, 13
Five Year Plan Maurice Dobb.
X., 80.
Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R.
S. P. Turin. X, 338.

RUSSIA—*cont.*Economics—*cont.*

- Labour Conditions in Soviet Russia
V Hoffding VII, 67, 349
Memorandum on Russian Situation
IX, 497
"Nep," in Eclipse, The B
Bakhmetev III, 259
Planning System in Soviet Russia
M S. Miller IX, 449
Recent Russian Labour Legislation
IX, 735
Russian Agrarian Revolution C
Zaitsev IX, 547
Some Notes on the Five Year Plan
A F Meyendorff IX, 22
Soviet Agricultural Legislation X,
201, 344, 705.
Taxation in Soviet Russia M S.
Miller IV, 124, 418 V., 494
Trade Balance of Russia, The. M
S Miller. I, 401

History.

- Buchanan, Sir George, in Russia
B Pares III, 576
Caucasus, The, since 1918 Z.
Avalov III, 320
Conquest and Civilisation of Siberia
A Baikarov. X, 560
Decembrists, The D S Mirsky
IV, 400
England's Place in the Discovery of
Russia Inna Lubimenko VI,
104
Epochs of Russian History V V
Rozanov. VIII, 164
Franco-Russian Alliance W L
Langer III, 554. IV. 83
Gorky and the Bolsheviks A
Kaun. IX., 432
Gorky and the Tsarist Police A
Kaun VIII, 636
Gorky in the Revolution of 1905
A. Kaun IX, 133.
Grand Duke Nicholas. Sir A.
Knox VII, 535
Great Battle of Galicia N Golovin
V, 25
Kipchak Turks, The. A B
Boswell. VI, 68.
Klyuchevsky and his Russian
History. A Kiesewetter. I,
504
Lenn B. Myakotin. II., 465
Liberal Movement in Russia. The.
F. Rodichev. II., 1, 249
Memoirs of Count Ignatyev. X,
386, 627.
Mohammedan Writers on Slavs.
S. Rapoport. VIII, 80.
Months before the Russian Revolu-
tion, The. B. Shulgin. I, 380

RUSSIA—*cont.*History—*cont.*

- New Material on the Revolt of
Pugachev B H Sumner VII,
113, 338
Peasant Question and the Russian
Revolution B Maklakov II,
225
Peter the Great in Poland Louise
B Roberts V, 537
Pobedonostsev and Alexander III
VII., 30
Petrograd. Harold Williams II.,
14
Petrunkevich, Ivan The Veteran
of Russian Liberalism F
Rodichev VII, 316
Radicals of the Sixties H T
Cheshire. I, 110
Russia Peter Struve. I, 24
Russian History and the Revolution. M Philips Price VII, 334
Second Duma, The B. Pares
II, 36.
Siberian Hermit Kuzmich A
Kulomzin. II., 381.
Why the Russian Monarchy Fell.
A Kerensky VIII, 496

Literature

- Aksakov, Ivan Peter Struve II,
514.
Andreyev, The Message of A
Kaun IV, 137.
Avvakum, Archpriest. Selected
Texts VIII, 249
Blok, Alexander, Creed of Clarence
A Manning V., 332
Blok, Alexander In Memory of.
A Remizov. X, 241.
Chaadayev and the Slavophiles.
A Koyré V., 594
Chekhov Alexander Werth III,
622
Chekhov and Maupassant J.
Lavrin V, 1
Chekhov's Attitude towards Life.
George Z. Patrick X., 658.
Chernyshevsky and John Stuart
Mill. S. P. Turin IX, 29.
Dostoyevsky an Epileptic? Was,
E H Carr IX., 424
Dostoyevsky and Proust. J.
Lavrin V., 609.
Dostoyevsky and the Slavonic
Question. Anton Florovsky. IX.,
411.
Earlier Russian Chronicles, Com-
position of Nevill Forbes. I.,
73.
Early Russian Folk Epics. Kate
Blakey I, 525
Esenin, The Tragedy of Clarence
A Manning. VII, 676.

RUSSIA—*cont.*Literature—*cont.*

- Garshin, Guilty Conscience of
Clarence A Manning X, 285.
Gerschensohn George Florovsky.
V, 315
Gogol Clarence A Manning IV.,
573
Griboyedov, The Centenary of.
D S Mirsky. VIII, 140
Iron Messiah, The George Z.
Patrick VI, 379
Kondakov, N P. E H. Minns.
III, 435
Love of Russia in Contemporary
Peasant Poetry George Z
Patrick VII, 81
Mickiewicz and Pushkin J.
Krzyzanowski. VI, 634
Modern Russian Poetry George
Z Patrick IV., 405
Old Russian Literature D S
Mirsky III, 74
Ostrovsky The Dramatic Art of.
Ina Beasley VI, 603.
Problems of Method in Study of
Literature in Russia A M
Voznesensky VI, 168
Pushkin D. S. Mirsky II, 71.
Russian Documents in British
Museum V Burtsev IV., 669.
Solovyev, Philosophy of N.
Lossky. II, 346.
Solovyev, Successors of N.
Lossky. III., 92.
Solovyev, Teaching and Significance
of J. Lavrin IX, 403.
Struve, Peter. Harold Williams
IV, 18.
Tolstoy. D. S. Mirsky. VII, 77.
Tolstoy, Miraculous in Alexis
Remizov VII, 473.
Tolstoy, New Light on. M A.
Aldanov VI, 162
Tolstoy, Recollections of Aylmer
Maude VII., 475.
Tolstoy, Two Letters of VIII.,
242, 246
Tolstoy's 'Memoirs of a Madman'
Leo Shestov. VII, 465.
Tolstoy's Novel 'Family
Happiness.' P. Pavlov. VII,
492.
Tolstoy and Nietzsche. J.
Lavrin. IV., 67.
Tolstoy and Tolstoyism M A.
Aldanov. VII, 482.
Turgenev and Dostoyevsky. E H.
Carr. VIII, 156
Tyutchev, Historical Premonitions
of. G. Florovsky. III, 337.

RUSSIA—*cont.*Literature—*cont.*

- Vinogradoff. A Critical Bibliography A F Meyendorff V, 157.
 Vinogradoff the Public Man B. Pares IV, 544
 Vinogradoff the Scholar W C Holdsworth IV, 529.

Politics.

- Crisis of the Five Year Plan S Prokopovich X, 317
 Eurasian Movement, The D S Mirsky VI, 311
 How I was hoodwinked B. Shulgin VI, 505
 In Prison at Ekaterinburg P Bulygin. VII, 55
 Issue in Manchuria, The B Bakhmetev VIII, 305
 League of Communist Youth, The Katherine Kuskova X, 301
 Police Provocation in Russia. V Burtsev. VI, 246, 260
 Policy of U.S. towards Soviet Russia. VIII, 1
 Present Crisis in Russia, The B. Pares IX, 1
 Psychological Undercurrents of Russian Revolution A Lobanov-Rostovsky. VII, 554
 Russian Imperialism in Asia. A Lobanov-Rostovsky. VIII, 28
 Russia and Mongolia A Lobanov-Rostovsky V, 515
 Russia at the Crossroads. A Lobanov-Rostovsky. VI, 496
 Sleeping Car, The. B. Shulgin. V, 465.
 Soviet Foreign Policy V, 298.
 Soviet Russia and E Karelia. W. Keynas VI, 520.
 Ten Years B Pares. VI, 241.
 Third International and Colonial Propaganda A. Guchkov. X, 509

Thought, Art and Culture :

- Academy, Bicentenary of the Russian. M Florinsky. IV., 396
 At the Feast of the Gods. S. Bulgakov. I, 172, 391, 604.
 English Political Thought in Russia. Paul Milyukov V., 258.
 Exhibition of Icons at Victoria and Albert Museum. E. H. Minns VIII., 627.
 Guardian of the House of the Lord S Bulgakov. IV., 156.
 Judas or Saul? S. Bulgakov IX., 536
 Kireyevsky, The Philosophy of Ivan. H. Lanz IV., 594

RUSSIA—*cont.*Thought, Art and Culture—*cont.*

- Kondakov, N. P E H Minns. III, 435
 Narodniki, The. Anne Pedler VI, 130.
 Psychological Undercurrents of the Russian Revolution A Lobanov-Rostovsky VII, 554
 Religion, a Study in Russian S Bulgakov II, 487
 Restoration of Old Russian Paintings N Levinson III., 350
 Russian Slavophil Philosophy J. D Stojanović VI, 560.
 Sculpture in Soviet Russia D. Aronovich VII, 687
 Soviet Family Law. A Comedy of Errors. A. F. Meyendorff V, 482.
 Traditionalism in Ancient Russian Art Paul Muratov VIII, 259.
 War on Religion in Russia, The. Nicholas Klepinin VIII, 514
 Yaroslavsky, Speeches of IX, 536.

SERBIA, *see* Yugoslavia

SLAVISTIC STUDIES

- Courses at American Universities. X, 213
 Objectives of Russian Study in Britain. B Pares I., 59
 Slavonic Studies in America. R J. Kerner III, 243
 Slavonic Studies in France L Eisenmann I., 295 · Boris Unbe- gaun VII., 694.
 Slavonic Studies in Italy E Lo Gatto VI., 44.
 Survey of Slavistic Studies. Vatroslav Jagić I, 41, 523
- SLAVS, THE :
- Crisis of Democracy and the Slavonic World IX., 509.
 Dostoyevsky and the Slavonic Question A Florovsky IX, 411
 From Križanić to the Slavophiles. E. Shmurolo VI, 321.
 Kollár and Literary Panslavism VI., 336.
 New Slavonic Policy. A. P. N. Milyukov VI., 481.
 On the Early Slavs. VIII., 331.
 Problem of Small Nations after the World War. E Beneš IV, 257.
 Slavonic Reciprocity. P. Novgorodtsev. I., 497.
 Slavonic Studies in Church History. M. Spinka. V., 114.
 Slavophil Idea Re-stated V. V. Zenkovsky VI., 302.
 Slavs after the War. S. Bobčev. VI., 291 : T. G. Masaryk. I., 2.

SLAVS, THE—*cont.*

Slavs in Medieval History Jaroslav
Bidlo IX., 34

World War and Slavonic Policy, The.
P Milyukov VI, 268

SLOVAKIA, *see* Czechoslovakia

TRANSYLVANIA, *see* Roumania

UKRAINE

Bibliography of Ukrainian Language.

A. Kolessa V., 168

Centres of Ukrainian Learning
Roman Smal-Stotsky II, 559

Conditions of Ukrainian Independence
B. Paneyko II, 336

Early Relations between England and
Ukraine E. Borshak. X, 138

UKRAINE—*cont.*

Galicia and the Polish-Ukrainian
Problem B Paneyko IX, 567

Shakespeare in Ukrainian. D Doro-
shenko IX., 708

Shevchenko, Taras Ivan Franko
III, 110

Ukrainian Historiography D
Doroshenko IX., 708

Ukrainian Policy in Poland. S Los.
X, 116

Ukrainian Problem in Poland.
S Srokowski IX., 588

Ukrainian Uniat Church, The. J.
Mirtshuk X, 377.

2. Contributors of Articles.

ALDANOV, M A

New Light on Tolstoy VI, 162

Some Observations on Tolstoy V,
305

Some Reflections on Tolstoyism.
VII, 482

ANONYMOUS

Crisis of Democracy and the Slav
World, The IX, 509

Croat View of the Yugoslav Crisis A.
VII, 304

Foreign Policy of the Little Entente.
V, 523.

Pobedonostsev and Alexander III.
VII, 30

Policy of the U S towards Soviet
Russia VIII, 1

Soviet Foreign Policy V, 298

ARONOVICH, D. Sculpture in Soviet
Russia VII, 687

AVALOV, Z.. The Caucasus since 1918.
III, 320

AVVAKUM, ARCHPRIEST. Selected Texts.
VIII, 249

BAIKALOV, ANATOLE

Bolshevist Agrarian Policy. VIII.,
533.

Conquest and Colonisation of Siberia.
X, 560

Russian Co-operative Movement I,
130

Soviet Agricultural Legislation X
201, 344, 705.

BAKHMETEV, BORIS

The Issue in Manchuria. VIII., 305.

The 'Nep' in Eclipse. III., 259.

BEASLEY, INA The Dramatic Art of
Ostrovsky VI, 603.

BENEŠ, EDVARD:

Central Europe after Ten Years
VII, 245

President Masaryk in Exile. III., 609

Problem of Small Nations after the
World War. IV, 257.

BERDIAYEV, NICHOLAS. The End of
the Renaissance IV, 1, 347.

BEZA, MARCU.

Pagan Remnants in Roumanian Folk-
lore II, 388.

Percy's Reliques, Scott and Rou-
manian Ballads I, 121

Roumanian Chroniclers IX, 124

Roumanian Legends of the Moon.
III, 356.

Sacred Marriage in Roumanian Folk-
lore IV, 321, V, 647

BIDLO, JAROSLAV The Slavs in Mediae-
val History. IX, 34

BLAKESLEE, GEORGE N: A. L. P.
Dennis X, 187

BLAKEY, KATE. Early Russian Folk
Epics. I., 525

BOBČEV, STEPHEN

Bulgaria under Tsar Simeon VII,
621, VIII, 99

Slavs after the War, The VI, 291

Tolstoy and the Congress of Sofia.
VIII, 246

BOHÁČ, ANTONÍN. Nationality and the
new Czechoslovak Census X, 105.

BOROWY, W.:

Kasprowicz X, 28.

S Czerwinski X., 442.

A Debicki. X, 186.

S Dobrzycki. X, 443.

T Holowko. X, 435.

A Prochaska. X, 187

A Skrzynski. X, 434

BORSHAK, ELIE: Early Relations of
England and Ukraine X, 138.

BOSWELL, A BRUCE.

Educational Reform in Poland III,
131

Kipchak Turks, The. VI, 68.

BROCKHAUSEN, CARL. National Re-
conciliation in S.E. Europe VII.,
311.

- BRUCHNALSKI, W : Jan Kochanowski. IX, 56.
- BULGAKOV, SERGIUS.
At the Feast of the Gods I, 172, 391, 604
Judas or Saul? IX, 525
Old and New. A Study in Russian Religion II, 487.
Patriarch Tikhon. IV., 156
- BULYGIN, P : In Prison at Ekaterinburg VII, 55
- BURR, MALCOLM. On Some Siberianisms V., 659.
- BURTSEV, VLADIMIR.
Azev the Tsarist Spy VI, 246.
Bolshevist Spy System VI, 260.
Russian Archives in Prague. V, 687.
Russian Documents in British Museum. IV, 669
- ČAPEK, KAREL : Antonín Švehla VII, 268.
- CARR, E H :
Turgenev and Dostoyevsky VIII., 156.
Was Dostoyevsky an Epileptic? IX., 424.
- CHESHIRE, HAROLD T :
Radicals of the Sixties, The. I, 110.
Tartar Invasion of Europe, The V, 89.
- CÍSAŘ, J : Vlastimil Tusar. III., 187.
- COLLINGS, E. H. R : Exhibition of Czechoslovak Art. VI., 478.
- COLLINS, J. WALTER : Bulgaria since the War III., 704.
- CRANE, JOHN O : Church and State in Czechoslovakia. VI., 364.
- CVIJIĆ, JOVAN : Studies in Yugoslav Psychology IX, 375, 662; X., 58.
- DANEŠ, A. : Jovan Cvijić. VI., 193.
- DANIEL, ARNOLD : The Agrarian Problem in Hungary. I, 151.
- DOBB, MAURICE : The Five Year Plan. X, 80.
- DOROSHENKO, D. :
Shakespeare in Ukrainian. IX., 708
Ukrainian Historiography. III., 233.
- DRACHOVSKY, JOSEF : Difficulties of Exchange in Czechoslovakia. I., 419.
- DYBOSKI, R. :
Alexander Brückner. IV, 686.
Centenary of Ossolineum VII., 361.
Literary and National Life in Poland. III., 117.
Peasant in Modern Poland. II., 101.
Zeromski and Reymont. IV., 552.
M. H. Dziewicki. VII, 422.
Casimir Morawski. IV., 471.
- EISENMANN, LOUIS :
Imperial Idea in the History of Europe, The. V., 242.
Slavonic Studies in France. I., 295.
- ELTON, OLIVER : Sir Charles Eliot. X, 172
- ENGLIŠ, KAREL Financial Policy of Czechoslovakia. X, 489
- EVANS, IFOR L.
Agrarian Reform in Danubian Countries VII, 604
Agrarian Revolution in Baltic States. III., 587
Economic Aspects of Dualism. VI., 529.
- FELDMAN, JOSEF : Historical Studies in Poland. II, 660
- FIEDLER, H. G. First Link between English and Serbo-Croat VI, 390.
- FLORINSKY, MICHAEL Bicentenary of Russian Academy. IV., 396.
- FLOROVSKY, ANTON. Dostoyevsky and the Slav Question IX, 411.
- FLOROVSKY, GEORGE :
Gerschensohn. V, 315
Historical Premonitions of Tyutchev. III, 337
- FORBES, NEVILL. The Earlier Russian Chronicles I, 73
- FRANKO, IVAN. Taras Shevchenko. III, 110.
- GARDNER, MONICA M :
Archbishop Cieplak IV., 704
Kallenbach, J. VIII, 420
Kasprowicz V, 340
Polish Rising in Wyspianski's Dramas IX, 361
Sienkiewicz, Henryk. III, 524
- GARGAS, S : Polish Emigrants in France V, 347
- GAVRILLOVIĆ, M : Early Relations of Britain and Serbia I, 86, 333, 552.
- GOLOVIN, NICHOLAS : The Great Battle of Galicia V., 25.
- GROGAN, ELLINOR E S.
Bulgaria under Prince Alexander. I., 561.
Ivan Gešov. III, 190
- GRUBER, JOSEF. Economic Conditions in Czechoslovakia II., 133.
- GUCHKOV, ALEXANDER : The Third International and Colonial Propaganda. X, 509.
- HANÁK, J. :
Slovaks and Czechs. X., 588
Hoppé, V. X., 183.
Kálal, K. IX., 731.
Vlček, Jaroslav IX., 730.
- HAVRÁNAK, B. : J. Zubaty X, 176.
- HEGEDUS, ADAM : Modern Hungarian Literature. X, 293.
- HELFERT, VLADIMIR : Bedřich Smetana. III., 141
- HELSZTYNSKI, S :
English Literature in Poland. VI., 142.
Pope in Poland. VII., 230.

- HERBEN, JAN.: Harel Havlíček III, 285
- HEVESI, ALEXANDER:
Jókai, Maurus. VIII, 356.
Madách and the 'Tragedy of Man' IX, 391
Two Great Hungarian Poets. IX, 94.
- HOFFDING, VLADIMIR. Labour Conditions in Soviet Russia. VII, 67, 349
- HORÁK, J.: First Congress of Slavonic Philologists. VIII, 713
- HORVÁTH, JOSIP. English Influences in Croatia IV, 721.
- HOULDSWORTH, W. S. Sir Paul Vinogradoff. IV, 529
- HYDE, LAWRENCE: Otto Březina. II, 547
- IBRAHIM - IBN - YAKUB, Narrative of. VIII, 331.
- IGNATYEV, COUNT N. · Memoirs. X., 386, 627
- IVANOV, S F. Anatole Koni VI., 674.
- JACHIMECKI, ZDZISLAW: Moniuszko and Polish Music II., 533
- JAGIĆ, VATROSLAV: Survey of Slavistic Studies I, 40, 523.
- JANDÁSEK, LADISLAV: Miroslav Tyrš and the Sokols X, 572.
- JANŠÁK, ŠTEFAN: Land Question in Slovakia VIII, 612; IX, 177.
- JÁSZI, OSZKÁR · How a New Lourdes Arises IV., 334.
- JOPSON, N B
Early Slav Funeral Ceremonies. VI., 59
Lithuanian Studies in England III, 642.
Survey of Albanian Studies. III., 412.
- JOVANOVIĆ, SLOBODAN: Serbia in the Early Seventies. IV., 382.
- KALLAS, AINO. An Estonian Novelst. VI, 28.
- KALLAS, O P. · Estonian Folk Literature. IX, 107
- KARSAVINA, TAMARA: Anna Pavlova. IX, 725.
- KAUN, ALEXANDER:
Gorky and the Bolsheviks IX, 432.
Gorky and Tsarist Policy. VIII., 636.
Gorky in Revolution of 1905. IX, 133.
Message of Leonid Andreyev. IV., 137
- KERENSKY, ALEXANDER: Why the Russian Monarchy Fell. VIII., 496.
- KERNER, ROBERT J:
Golder, F A VIII, 203.
Mission of Liman von Sanders. VI., 12, 344, 543; VII., 90.
Russia and the Straits. VIII., 589.
Slavonic Studies in America. III., 243
- KEYNAS, W. Soviet Russia and E. Carelia VI, 520
- KIESEWETTER, ALEXANDER · Klyuchevsky and his Russian History I, 504.
- KLEPININ, NICHOLAS.
Speeches of Yaroslavsky IX, 536.
War on Religion in Russia VIII, 514
- KNOX, SIR ALFRED:
Blair, J M IV, 482.
Brusilov, General. V., 147
Kuropatkin, General IV, 164
Nicholas, Grand Duke VII., 535.
Sukhomlinov, General. V., 148
- KOKOVITSEV, COUNT V: Financial Embarrassments of the Soviet Government VI., 1
- KOYRÉ, A. Chaadayev and the Slavophiles V, 594
- KOZÁK, JAN Masaryk as Teacher. VIII., 478
- KRČMÉRY, ŠTEFAN: Modern Slovak Literature VII, 160.
- KRZYŻANOWSKI, JULIAN:
Mickiewicz and Pushkin VI., 634.
Prus, Boleslav IX, 695.
Los, Jan VII, 702.
Orkan, W IX, 216
Przybyszewski, Stanislas VI, 420.
Ptasnik. IX, 222.
- KULOMZIN, ANATOLE: The Siberian Hermit, Kuzmich II, 381.
- KUSKOVA, KATHERINE: The Enthusiasm of Communist Youth X, 301.
- KUTRZEB, STANISLAS. Political and Economic Progress in Poland I, 277.
- LANGDON, W. CHAUNCEY: Medal Work of Ivo Kerdić. VII, 171.
- LANGER, WILLIAM L. The Franco-Russian Alliance. III., 554; IV., 83.
- LANZ, HENRY.
Philosophy of Kireyevsky. IV., 594.
Selected Texts of Archpriest Avvakum. VIII, 249
- LAVRIN, JANKO.
Bogomils, The. VIII., 269
Chekhov and Maupassant. V., 1.
Dostoyevsky and Proust. V, 609.
Solovyev's Teaching. IX, 403; X, 42.
Tolstoy and Nietzsche. IV., 67
- LEDNICKI, W.: Poland and the Slavophil Idea. VII, 128, 649
- LEE, DWIGHT: Anglo-Austrian Understanding of 1877 X., 189, 449
- LEVINSON, N. · Restoration of Old Russian Paintings III, 350
- LEWAK, ADAM: The Polish Rising. IX, 350.
- LOBANOV-ROSTOVSKY, Prince A:
Psychological Undercurrents of the Russian Revolution. VII., 554.
Russia and Mongolia. V., 515.

- LOBANOV-ROSTOVSKY, Prince A.—*cont.*
Russian Imperialism in Asia. VIII., 28.
- LO GATTO, ETTORE ·
Palmieri, Aurelio. V., 683
Slavonic Studies in Italy VI., 44
- LORD, R. H.: The Third Polish Partition III., 481
- ŁOŚ, COUNT S.: The Ukrainian Question in Poland X., 116
- LOSSKY, NICHOLAS:
Contemporary Czech Thinkers IX., 149.
Philosophy of Solovyev II., 346
Successors of Solovyev III., 92.
- LOW, DAVID H.: The First Link between English and Serbo-Croat III., 363.
- LUBIMENKO, INNA: England and the Discovery of Russia. VI., 104
- LUDKIEWICZ, Z.: Land Reform in Poland. VIII., 315
- LYATSKY, EUGENE: Thoughts on the Style of Dostoyevsky. I., 353
- MACARTNEY, C. A.
Austria since 1918. VII., 288
Hungary since 1918. VII., 577.
Petchenegs, The VIII., 342
- MACDONELL, A. R.: The White Women. VII., 191
- MACEK, J.: Land Reform in Czechoslovakia I., 144
- MAKLAKOV, BASIL.: The Peasant Question and Russian Revolution. II., 225
- MANNING, CLARENCE A.:
Creed of Alexander Blok V., 332.
Guilty Conscience of Garshin. X., 285.
Nicholas Gogol. IV., 573
Tragedy of Esenin VII., 676
- MARSHALL, F. H.: Reminiscences of Greek War of Independence V., 552.
- MASARYK, THOMAS G.:
Message VII., 240
Message to Czechoslovakia VII., 374.
Philosophy of Life VIII., 691
Slavs after the War. I., 2
- MAUDE, AYLMER: Recollections of Tolstoy. VII., 475.
- MEDLICOTT, W. N.:
Austria-Hungary and War Danger of 1877. VI., 437.
Diplomatic Relations after 1878 VIII., 66.
Mediterranean Agreements of 1887 V., 66
- MEŠTROVIĆ, IVAN: Michelangelo. V., 225.
- MEYENDORFF, A. F.:
Conversations of Gorchakov Andrassy and Bismarck. VIII., 401
Notes on Five Year Plan. IX., 22
Novikov, Olga IV., 175.
- MEYENDORFF, A. F.—*cont.*
Petrazycki, L. I. X., 184
Soviet Family Law. V., 482
Vinogradov. A critical biography. V., 157
- MILLER, MARGARET S.:
Financial Reform in Soviet Russia. X., 328, 547
Planning System in Soviet Russia IX., 449
Soviet Financing of Industry IX., 13
Taxation in Soviet Russia IV., 124, 418; V., 494
Trade Balance of Russia I., 401
- MILYUKOV, PAUL N.
Influence of English Political Thought in Russia V., 258.
New Slavonic Policy. VI., 481.
World War and Slavonic Policy VI., 268
- MINNS, ELLIS H.:
Bury, J. B. VI., 422
Exhibition of Icons VIII., 627.
N. P. Kondakov III., 435.
- MIRSKY, D. S.:
Bryusov, Val III., 441.
Centenary of Griboyedov. VIII., 140.
Decembrists, The IV., 400
Esenin, S. A. IV., 706.
Harrison, Jane Ellen VII., 414
Herschensohn, Michael IV., 170
Lunts, Lev N. III., 193
Mayakovsky. IX., 220
Old Russian Literature III., 74
Periods of Russian Literature. IX., 682
Pushkin. II., 71
Tolstoy. VII., 77.
- MIRTSYUK, J.: Ukrainian Uniat Church. X., 377
- MITIS, BARON OSKAR: Crown Prince Rudolf and Croats V., 580
- MURATOV, PAUL: Traditionalism of Ancient Russian Art. VIII., 269.
- MYAKOTIN, BENEDICT: Lenin II., 465.
- NEWMARCH, ROSA:
Janáček, Leoš. VII., 416
Janáček and Moravian Music Drama I., 362.
- NOVÁK, ARNE
Březina, Otakar VIII., 206.
Čapek-Chod, K. M. VI., 416
Czech Literature during and after the War II., 114
Dyk, Victor. X., 179
Goll, Jaroslav VIII., 409
Jirásek, Alois IX., 213.
Memorials of Czech Reformation I., 323
Sova, Antonin VII., 418
Stašek, A. X., 440

- NOVGORODTSEV, PAUL : Slavonic Reciprocity I, 497
- ODLOŽILÍK, OTAKAR
Comenius and Christian Unity IX, 79
Good King Wenceslas. VIII., 120
Kadlec, Karel VIII., 204
Wycliffe's Influence on Central Europe. VII., 634
- ONOU, ALEXANDER ·
Lvov, Prince George IV, 168
Memoirs of Count Ignatyev. X., 386, 627
- ONSLow, EARL OF
Carnock, Lord VII., 540
Polish Self-help under Prussia X, 126
- OSUSKÝ, ŠTEFAN. Peace Negotiations between Vienna and Washington IV, 657
- PANEYKO, BASIL ·
Conditions of Ukrainian Independence II, 336
Galicia and the Polish-Ukrainian Problem IX, 567
- PARES, BERNARD
Braudo, A III, 443
Buchanan, Sir George, in Russia. III, 576
Eliot, Sir Charles X, 172.
English Books on Russia X, 525
Homyakov, Nicholas IV, 463
Objectives of Russian Study in Britain I., 59
Petrov, Father. V, 152
Present Crisis in Russia IX, 1
Sazonov, Serge, VI, 668
Second Duma, The II, 36
Shingarev, In Memory of VI., 675
Ten Years VI, 241
Vinogradov, the Public Man. IV., 544
Williams, Harold VII, 327
- PAVLOV, P. Tolstoy's Novel 'Family Happiness' VII., 492
- PASTRNEK, F. Bibliographical Appreciation of V Jagić II, 213.
- PATRICK, GEORGE Z
Chekhov's Attitude to Life X, 658.
Iron Messiah, The VI, 379
Love of Russia in Peasant Poetry VII, 81
Modern Russian Poetry IV, 405
- PEDLER, ANNE : Going to the People. VI, 130
- PETROVIĆ, ILIJA · Byron and the Jugoslavs VIII., 144.
- POPOVIĆ, SVETISLAV : The New Jugoslav Régime. X, 626.
- PRAŽÁK
Czechs and Slovaks in and after Revolution of 1848. V., 565; VI., 119
- PRAŽÁK—*cont.*
Slav Congress of 1848 and the Slovaks VII, 141
Slovak Sources of Kollár's Panslavism. VI, 578
- PRICE, M PHILIPS : Russian History and the Revolution VII, 334
- PROKEŠ, J. Centenary of the Matice Česká X, 420.
- PROKOPOVICH, SERGIUS · Crisis of Five Year Plan X, 317
- RAPOPORT, SEMEN Mohammedan Writers on the Slavs. VIII., 80.
- REMIZOV, ALEXIS :
Blok, Alexander, In Memory of. X, 241
Miraculous in Tolstoy VII, 473.
Shchegolev, P. E X, 437
- ROBERTS, LOUISE B. Peter the Great in Poland V, 537
- RODICHEV, FEDOR
Liberal Movement in Russia II, 1, 249
Petrunkevich, Ivan. VII, 316
- RODKEY, F S : Three American Diplomats on Nicholas I VI, 434
- ROSE, WILLIAM J
Jubilee of Mianowski Foundation X, 427
Konarski, Preceptor of Poland IV, 23.
- ROSETTI, RADU ·
Roumania's Share in War of 1877 VIII., 546
Stephen the Great of Moldavia. VI, 86
- ROUČEK, JOSEPH S : Political Evolution of Roumania. X, 602.
- ROZANOV, V. V. Epochs of Russian History VIII, 164
- SABLIN, E : The Empress Maria VII., 410.
- SCHMITT, BERNADOTTE E :
Archibald Cary Coolidge. VI., 671.
Bosnian Annexation Crisis IX, 312, 650; X., 161, 408, 641.
- SETON-WATSON, R W. :
Austro-German Plans for Future of Serbia VII, 705.
Background of Jugoslav Dictatorship X, 363
Four Jugoslav Patriots. VIII., 416.
Four Serb Elder Statesmen IX, 457.
Gauvain, Auguste X, 175
Gavrilović, Michael. III., 438.
Italian Intervention and Treaty of London V., 271.
Italy's Balkan Policy in 1914. V., 48.
Jagić, Vatroslav II, 417
Kolisek, Alois X, 438.
Lorković, Ivan. IV., 707.
Masaryk, President, in Exile III., 615

- SETON-WATSON, R W — *cont*
 Pelly Dick, O VII, 423
 Religious Problem in Slovakia. II, 519
 Russian Commitments in Bosnian Question VIII, 578
 Russo-British Relations. III, 423, 657; IV, 177, 433, 733; V, 413, VI, 423
 Transylvania I, 306, 533; III, 304
 Transylvania since 1867 IV, 101.
 Wesselitzky, Gabriel IX, 732
 William II.'s Balkan Policy VII, 1
 SHESTOV, LEO Tolstoy's 'Memoirs of a Madman.' VII, 465
 SHMURLO, E. From Križanić to the Slavophiles VI, 321
 SHULGIN, BASIL:
 How I was Hoodwinked VI., 505.
 Months before the Russian Revolution. I, 380
 Sleeping Car, The V, 465
 SKIRMUNT, CONSTANTINE. Poland. I, 273
 SLIJEPCJEVIĆ, PERO: Land Settlement in Jugoslav Macedonia. IX, 160.
 SMAL-STOTSKY, ROMAN:
 Centres of Ukrainian Learning II, 559.
 Petlyura, Simon V., 154.
 SOLOVYEV, VLADIMIR: The Meaning of Art X., 50.
 ŠPINKA, MATTHEW: Slav Studies in Church History. V, 114.
 SREBRNY, STEFAN: Wyspianski. II, 359
 SROKOWSKY, S.. The Ukrainian Problem in Poland. IX., 588.
 TAJIĆ, VASA:
 Centenary of Matica Srpska. VI., 593.
 Miletić, Svetozar. V, 106.
 STEED, WICKHAM: T. G. Masaryk, Man and Teacher. VIII, 476.
 ŠTEFÁNEK, ANTON: Education in Slovakia. II, 308.
 STOJANOVIĆ, J. D.: Russian Slavophil Philosophy. VI., 560
 STRUVE, PETER:
 Aksakov, Ivan. II, 514.
 Russia. I, 24
 SUBOTIĆ DRAGUTIN:
 Dimitrije, the Patriarch. IX., 218.
 Forbes, Nevill VII., 699.
 Origin of Serbo-Croat Ballads. IX, 116.
 Šantić, Aleksa. III., 194.
 Serb Popular Poetry in English Literature. V, 628; VI, 150.
 Serbia of Prince Miloš. III., 156.
 ŠUKLJE, FRANJO: Centralism and Autonomy in Jugoslavia II, 328
 SUMNER, B. H.: New Material on Pugachev. VII, 113, 338.
 SZMYDTOWA, Z Dante and Polish Romanticism VIII, 292
 SZOBER, S Wiktor Porzeziński VIII, 421
 SZYDŁOWSKI, T The Art of Malczewski X, 274
 TAFFS, WINIFRED
 Russell Andrassy Bismarck VIII, 701
 War Scare of 1875. IX, 335, 632
 TCHITCHOVSKY, T. Political and Social Aspects of Modern Bulgaria VII, 272, 595, VIII, 176
 THOMPSON, JAMES WESTFALL German Medieval Expansion in Austria II, 263 in Bohemia IV, 605.
 TOLSTOY, LEO: Two Letters VIII, 242, 246
 TURIN, S P:
 Chernyshevsky and Stuart Mill IX, 29
 Foreign Trade of U.S.S.R. X, 338.
 UNBEGAUN, BORIS Slavonic Studies in France VII, 694
 URBÁNEK, R.: Žižka the Hussite Leader III, 272.
 VAIDA - VOEVOD, ALEXANDER Ten Years of Greater Roumania VII., 261
 VENZELIDES, ARSEN. Plays of Ivo Vojnović. VIII, 368
 VIDMAR, JOSIP: Modern Slovene Literature VI., 618
 VOČADLO, OTAKAR:
 English Influences in Palacký. III, 547.
 Slavonic Linguistic Purity V., 352.
 VOZNESENSKY, A. M.: Problems of Method in Study of Literature in Russia VI, 168
 WARING, LILY F.: Kosovo. II, 56
 WEIGAND, GUSTAV: The Admirative in Bulgarian. II., 567
 WEINGART, MILOŠ:
 Dobrovský, Josef. VII, 603
 Vondrák, Václav. IV, 474
 WENDEL, HERMAN: Marxism and Southern Slav Question. II., 289
 WERSTADT, JAROSLAV: Philosophy of Czech History. III., 533
 WERTH, ALEXANDER. Anton Chekhov. III, 622.
 WILLIAMS, ARIADNE: Prince P. Dolgorukov. VI., 200.
 WILLIAMS, HAROLD:
 Petrograd. II., 14
 Struve, Peter IV., 18
 Wrangel, General. VII, 198
 WINDAKIEWICZ, ST: Anglomania of Mickiewicz VIII., 131
 YARMOLINSKY, A.: Tolstoy on Non-Resistance. VIII., 242.

- ZAITSEV, CYRIL Russian Agrarian Revolution IX, 547
 ZÁKAVEC, F Two Losses to Czech Art IV, 695
 ZENKOVSKY, V V The Slavophil Idea Re-stated VI., 302
 ZIELIŃSKI, THADDEUS · The Peasant in Polish Literature. I, 584, II, 85
 ŽILKA, F · The Czech Reformation. VIII, 284
 ZLATARSKI, V. N · Making of the Bulgarian Nation. IV, 362, 629

3. Translations of Poetry.

BULGARIAN

- Vazov, Ivan · Bulgaria. IX, 208
 CZECH.
 Kvapil, Jaroslav : Dialogue II, 403
 Machar, J. S.
 Beethoven. II, 404
 Deathbed of Aeschylus V., 144
 Toman, Karel. Old Autumn Allegory II, 402
 HUNGARIAN ·

- Ady, Andrew · Legend of St. Margaret IX, 718
 Aprily, Louis · The Victor. IX., 719
 Bárd, Miklós : The Ancient Song. IX, 720.
 Berzsényi, Daniel :
 Invocation. IX., 715.
 My Lot IX, 714.
 Gyóni, Géza : For Just One Night. IX, 720
 Kazinczy, F : Our Tongue. IX., 713
 Kisfaludy, Charles : Mohács IX., 716.
 Kosztolányi, D. : A Flag. IX, 722.
 Madách, Imre : Scenes from 'The Tragedy of Man' IX, 249.
 Mécs, Ladislas : The Prince's Three Sorrows. IX, 722.
 Reményik, A : The Dead Pine. IX, 724
 Virág, B. : Invocation. IX., 713.

POLISH.

- Chodźko, I. : Wild Raspberries. II, 154.
 Gawalewicz, Maryan : A Song. IX., 205.
 Kochanowski, Jan. :
 Laments IV., 317.
 St. John's Eve. VI., 401.
 The Sweet Bonds of Love. IX, 204.
 Konopnicka, Maria :
 A Peasant's Love Song. II, 156.
 Songs. V., 411.
 The Nation's Oath III, 66.
 Verses IX, 282.
 Krasinski, Zygmunt :
 To Eliza. VI., 185.
 Mickiewicz :
 Forefathers' Eve. III., 499; IV., 42
 Sonnets. IX., 204.
 Sonnets from Crimea. VII., 391.
 The Enchanted Youth. VII., 394.

POLISH—cont.

- Mickiewicz—cont
 The Master of Masters III, 67.
 The Sages III, 69
 To a Polish Mother III, 68.
 Slowacki, Julius :
 An Exile's Hymn at Sunset on the Sea. I, 439
 On the Transfer of the Dust of Napoleon. III, 751
 The Father of the Plague-Stricken. X, 669.
 Ujejski, Cornelius : Poland's Cry to God III, 65
 Tetmajer, Kazimierz : Melody of the Night Mists. V., 145
 RUSSIAN.
 AKHMATOVA, Anna : The Wounded Crane. II, 158.
 Anonymous. A Prayer for the Children. V, 406.
 Ballads :
 The Cossack Chief. IV, 691; V., 143.
 Roses and Thorns. IV, 692.
 Bely, Andrew : Verses. IX, 207
 Blok, Alexander :
 Ravenna. III., 750
 The Bridge. VII, 393
 The Twelve. VIII., 188
 Fedorov : One of Them. V., 407
 Fet, A. A. :
 Forget Me, Madman I, 217
 The Hawk at Liberty I, 217
 Gruboyedov, Alexander : The Mischief of Being Clever. III., 1, 370.
 Homily of Adam in Hades to Lazarus. X, 244.
 Homyakov, Alexis : The Labourer. IV, 319
 Ivanov, George : Verses. X., 272.
 Koltsov · Poems. VII, 392
 Krylov, Ivan :
 Gadfly and Ant. I, 437
 Two Dogs. I., 438
 Young Lion's Education. II, 158.
 Lermontov, Michael :
 Clouds. IX, 279.
 Gratitude IX, 280
 I am not Byron VI., 659.
 June 11, 1831. III, 71.
 Poems II, 405.
 The Angel. III., 70.
 The Demon. IV., 278.

RUSSIAN—*cont.*Lermontov, Michael—*cont.*

Verses IX., 279

We Parted. VI., 659.

Minsky, N. M. : Verses. X, 25

Pushkin, Alexander :

A Feast in the City of Plague
VI., 178

Arion IX., 206

Don Juan. V, 662.

Fairy Tales, Episode from. I, 623.

Farewell X., 22

I Loved You VI., 415, 659

Mozart and Salieri VII., 762.

Poems. II., 402; VII., 392

Ruslan and Lyudmila, Prologue to
II., 157.Tale of the Dead Princess and the
Seven Champions. II., 587.

The Golden Cock. VII., 513

The Muse X., 22

The Poet IV., 691

The Prophet. IV., 154

The Talisman. IV., 690.

Verses. X, 23

Solovyev : Poems. III, 72

Tolstoy, Alexis :

Haystacks IX., 281.

Spring X., 23.

Verses. IX, 280

RUSSIAN—*cont.*

Turgenev, Ivan :

Autumn X., 24.

On the Road X, 207

Verses. X, 272.

Tyutchev, Fedor :

Silentium IX., 206.

Verses. X, 271

Why, o Willow. II, 406

Voloshin, Max :

Cosmos. IV., 147

Rebellion V, 409.

SERBO-CROAT.

Ballads

Ballad of the Hajduks VIII, 389,
678

Death of Ivo I, 440.

Death of Omer and Merima. VIII,
198Revolt against the Turks VI,
646, VII, 179

Rakić, Milan.

Euphemia X., 26

Simonida VI., 415

The Deserted Church X, 27

Vojnović, Ivo The Dying Republic.
I, 184.

SLOVAK.

Krasko, Ivan.

Grief VI., 415

The Slave II, 403.

4. Prose Translations.

ALBANIAN :

Folk-Tales :

Blood will out IV, 314

The Jealous Sisters. IX, 308

The Wiles of Woman. VI, 666

Skendo, Lumo : A Tear III, 419.

BULGARIAN :

'Ehn-Pelin' : The Dominie's Soul.
V, 678.Kristov, Cyril : Baba Meglena III.,
45.

CZECH.

Čapek-Chod, K.M. : The Death of the
Poet VII, 397.Dyk, Viktor : The Ratcatcher. X,
259.Holíček, Josef : Concerning Jožífek.
VIII., 375.

Jirásek, Alois : Dalibor. IX., 292.

Něruďa :

How Mr. Vorel coloured his Meer-
schaum Pipe. III., 407.

Mrs. Ruska's Kind Heart X, 11

HUNGARIAN :

Mikszáth, Koloman : Anna Bede's
Debt. V, 128.Móricz, Zsigmond : Seven Kreutzers.
X, 265.

JUDÆO-SPANISH :

Romano, G. Buk :

Matchmaking in a Tavern IX,
297

The Mother. VI., 397

LITHUANIAN :

Folk Tales, Three. VII., 531.

Kudirka, Vincas : The Old Bridge
IV, 142.

POLISH :

Konopnicka, Maria Banasiowa.
X, 252.Prus, Boleslav : The Waistcoat IX,
283.

Reymont, W. S. :

The Peasants I., 428, 598.

The Sowers. III., 37

Tetmayer, K. P. The Miller's
Maryna X, 684

Zeromski. A Soldier's Lot. IV., 561

ROUMANIAN.

Creanga, Ion :

Story of a Lazy Man IX, 202.

The Five Loaves. IX, 198.

The Mother-in-Law. VII, 524.

RUSSIAN :

Azvolinskaya, Nadezhda : Diary of a
Soviet Student VIII., 662

RUSSIAN—*cont*

- Babel, I. . The Story of my Dovecot
X, 1.
Byl'ny of Lord Novgorod the Great.
III, 52
Gogol, N
The Gamblers V., 398.
The Lawsuit. IV., 587
Homily of Adam in Hades to Lazarus
X, 244.
Remizov, A. . Gone Out III, 31.
Tsar Alexis and his Rules of Falconry.
III, 63
Zemyatin, Eugene: The Cave. II,
145
Zoshchenko, Michael. Two Stories
VII, 519.
SERBO-CROAT.
Andrić, Ivo: The Žepa Bridge.
V, 398
Božović, Grigorije.
Hassan Chaush X, 16
Wild Men's Lair. IX, 302.

SERBO-CROAT—*cont*

- Folktale The Shrew VII, 407.
Karadžić, Vuk. Mujo the Drunkard.
X, 269
Jakšić, Mileta: Mysteries VI, 187.
Stanković, Bora Stanoja VI., 660.
Vilović, Djuro. The Bird IV., 308.
Vojnović, Ivo. The Dying Republic.
I, 184
SLOVENE.
Lavrin, Janko. My Friend Zimm.
II, 569.
Tavčar, Ivan: Old Antony's Son.
II., 397.
UKRAINIAN.
Khvyľ'ovy, Mykola. Puss in Boots.
IX, 187.

WENDISH:

- Folktale: The Cat and Dog join
Forces. X., 7.

5. Translators of Poetry.

- Bacon, L III, 751.
Brown, J III., 67.
Coleman, A. P IX, 208.
Coolidge, Archibald C. IV, 278.
Copeland, Fanny S. I, 184.
Durst, Doris IX, 204, 280, 281.
Dziewicki, M. H. II, 154, 156; III,
65, 66
Elton, Oliver. I, 217, 623; II, 157,
158, 587, III, 750; VII, 393, 513
Forsyth, A. R. IV., 154.
Fortey, F. H. I, 439
Gardner, Monica IV, 693; V, 145
Hewitt, R. M II, 402, III, 72,
VI., 415.
Jerrold, Maud F VI, 659; IX, 206,
207, 279, X, 22, 24, 271, 272.
Kirkconnell, Watson IX, 713.
Krunić, Milutin X, 26, 27.
Lampson, Robin IX, 206.
Lanz, Henry V., 406
Lockley, Phyllis H. VIII, 198.
Macahister, Sir Donald IV., 691, 692;
V, 143; IX., 207; X, 25

- Matthews, W. III, 70, 71
Meltzer, Charles H IX, 249.
Morison, W A II, 405, 406; VI, 646,
VII, 179, VIII, 389, 678.
Noyes, George R III, 67, 68, 69, 499,
IV, 42, V., 411; VI, 185, 401, IX,
204, 280, 281; X, 669
Pares, Bernard I., 437, 438; III, 1,
370, IV, 319, V., 132.
Parish, J. III., 68.
Pazvolsky, L V, 407
Peacock, Marjorie. V, 411; VI, 185,
401, X, 669
Prall, Dorothea III, 499; IV, 42,
317, X, 26, 27
Radin, *see* Prall
Ruby, F IX, 205
Selver, Paul II, 403, 404; V, 144;
VI., 414
Seton-Watson, R W. I, 440; VI., 415.
Todd, Dorothy III, 69
Tomkeyev, S. IV, 147; V, 409.
Vajda, Paul. IX, 249
Werth, Alexander. V., 662; VI., 178.

6. Translators of Prose Literature.

- Blakey, Kate. III, 52.
Byng, Lucy IX, 198, 202.
Casey, F. P. VIII, 375.
Chwalewik, W. IX, 56.
Cooper, Joshua. III, 31.
Dimitrijević, V. VI., 660.
Dobbie-Bateman, A. F. VIII, 164.
Duddington, Natalie. IX, 149.
Edwards, L F. X, 16
Foster, Fanny IX., 375, 662; X., 58.
Gill, R. X., 50.

- Jopson, Cynthia VII, 524.
Jopson, N B. II, 397; III., 419;
IV., 142, 308, 314, 629; V., 128, 299,
678, VI, 186, 394, 397, 666; VIII.,
99, 369, 375, IX, 187, 283, 292, 297,
302, 308, X, 11, 252, 259, 269, 702.
Kennedy, H. E. IX, 588; X., 684.
Maddocks, E. G. VI, 186.
Meltzer, Charles H X, 265.
Mirsky, D. S II., 145; IV., 156,
V, 315; IX., 187; X, 1.

Morawska, Jadwiga IV, 561.
 Pares, Bernard IV, 587, V, 364, 465,
 595; VII, 349, IX, 546
 Seton-Watson, R W V, 225, 242,
 VI, 593
 Shidlovsky, A A. IV., I, 361

Vajda, Paul X, 265
 Vidaković, L V, 398
 Wallerstein, G. V, 364
 Werth, Alexander VII, 519.
 Zóltowska, S. III, 37

7. Obituary.

Blair, James M IV, 482
 Blok, Alexander I, 218
 Bouchier, J D I., 227
 Braudo, Alexander III., 443
 Března, Otakar VIII, 206
 Brusilov, General A. A. V, 146
 Bryusov, Valery III, 441
 Budkiewicz, Monsignor II, 161.
 Burchard, Anson W V., 685
 Bury, J B VI, 422.
 Čapek-Chod, K. M. VI, 416.
 Carnock, Lord VII, 540.
 Cazalet, Edward. II, 601
 Cieplak, Archbishop IV, 704
 Coolidge, Archibald Cary VI, 671
 Cvijić, Jovan. VI., 193
 Czerwinski, S. X, 442
 Daneš, J V. VII, 197
 Debicki, Z X, 186
 Dennis, A. L P X, 187
 Dimitrije, Patriarch. IX., 218
 Dobrzycki, Stanislaw X., 442
 Dolgorukov, Prince Paul VI., 200
 Dyk, Viktor X, 179.
 Dzewicki, M. H VII, 422.
 Eliot, Sir Charles. X, 172.
 Empress Maria VII, 410
 Esenin, S A IV., 706
 Finkel, L. IX., 728.
 Forbes, Nevill VII., 699
 Gauvain, Auguste. X, 175.
 Gavrilović, Michael. III., 438.
 Gešov, Ivan III, 190
 Gjorgjević, Vladan IX, 457
 Golder, F A. VIII, 203
 Goll, J VIII, 409.
 Gollancz, Sir Israel. IX., 462
 Gumilev, N. S I, 221
 Harrison, Jane Ellen VII, 414
 Herschensohn, Michael V., 315.
 Hinković, Hinko. VIII, 416
 Holeček, Josef VIII., 413
 Holowko, Tadeusz. X., 435
 Homjakov, Nicholas IV, 463
 Hoppé, Vladimir. X., 183
 Hviezdoslav, Pavel Orszagh. I, 222
 Hynais, Vojtech. IV., 695
 Jagić, Vatroslav. II, 217
 Janáček, Leoš. VII., 416.
 Jarnak, Jan Urban. I., 644
 Jurásek, Alois IX., 213
 Kadlec, Karel. VII., 204.
 Kálal, Karel. IX, 731.
 Kalina, Antonín. I, 639.

Kallenbach, J. VIII, 420
 Kolisek, Alois. X, 438
 Kondakov, N P III, 698.
 Koni, Anatole VI, 674
 Korff, Baron S A III, 441
 Krasin, Leonid. V, 439
 Krešić, Milan VIII, 418
 Kulomzin, Anatole II, 603
 Kuropatkin, General IV., 164
 Leger, Louis. II, 423.
 Lenin. II, 465.
 Lorković, Ivan. IV, 707
 Los, Jan VII, 702.
 Lunts, Lev N. III, 193
 Lvov, Prince George IV, 168
 Manuilov, Alexander VIII, 239
 Masaryk, Charlotte II, 163
 Mayakovsky, V. IX, 220
 Mickiewicz, Wladislaw V, 435
 Morawski, Casimir IV, 471
 Myslbek, Jos Václav I, 632
 Nabokov, Vladimir I, 443
 Nicholas, Grand Duke VII, 535
 North, Father IV, 176
 Novgorodtsev, Paul III, 440
 Novikov, Olga IV, 175
 Orkan, W IX, 216
 Palmieri, Aurelio V., 683
 Pavlova, Anna. IX., 725
 Pelly Dick, Octavius. VII, 423.
 Perzinski, W. IX., 726.
 Petiyura, Simon V., 154.
 Petrov, Father. V., 151.
 Petruzycki, L. I. X, 184
 Pollen, John. II., 425.
 Porzezinski, Wiktor. VIII, 421.
 Prochaska, Antoni X, 187.
 Protić, Stojan. II., 411.
 Przybyszewski, Stan VI, 420
 Ptasnik, J IX., 222.
 Rašin, Alois. I., 636.
 Rodzyanko, Michael. II, 604
 Šantić, Aleksa III, 194
 Sazonov, Sergius VI., 668
 Semenov-Tian-Shansky, P. P. V, 686
 Shchegolev, P E. X, 437
 Shidlovsky, Sergius. I., 445
 Skrzyński, Alexander X, 434
 Sova, A VII, 418
 Stakhovich, Michael. II., 608.
 Stambolsky, Alexander. II, 407.
 Stara Zagora, Bishop of. I., 641
 Stašek, Antal. X, 440.
 Stojanović, Ljuba. IX., 459.

Štursa, Jan IV, 701
 Sukhomlinov, General V A V., 148
 Tavčar, Ivan I, 643
 Tikhon, Patriarch IV, 156
 Tollemache, Beatrice V., 685
 Tretiak, Joseph II, 164
 Trifković, Marko. IX, 460
 Tusar, Vlastimil III., 187
 Vazov, Ivan I, 225
 Vinogradoff, Sir Paul IV, 529

Vlček, Jaroslav IX, 730
 Vojnović, Ivo VIII, 418
 Vondrak, Václav IV, 475
 Vukičević, Velja IX, 461
 Wesseltsky, Gabriel. IX, 732
 Williams, Harold VII, 327
 Wrangel, General VII, 198
 Yastrebov, Nicholas II, 611
 Žerjav, Gregor VIII., 417
 Zubatý, Josef X, 176

8. Books Reviewed.

Akhmatova, Anna *Chetki* I, 690
Alabama, Southern Edith P Stickney. VI, 716
Alexander von Battenberg E C Corti I, 246
Andreyev A Kaun III, 474
Andreyevsky, S. A *Kniga o Smerti* II, 654
Anglosophia in Poland III., 201.
Antsiferov, N P. *Soul of St. Petersburg* V, 193
Armstrong, H Fish *The New Balkans* V, 692; VI., 230
Arseniyev, N *Pravoslavie, Katolichestvo, Protestantizm.* IX, 755.
Ashes. S. Zeromski. VIII., 230
Averchenko, A. *Razskazy Tsimka.* IV., 772.
Avvakum, Archpriest, Life of. IV., 528.
Baerlein, Henry. *Birth of Yugoslavia.* II, 457
Baernreither, J M. *Fragmente eines politischen Tagebuches.* VII, 439
Bayron i Pushkin. V. Zhirmunsky. III, 209
Balkan Peninsula, The. F. Schevill. II, 453
Balkan-Archiv. V, 215.
Ballads of Marko Kraljević. D. H Low. I, 481
Baring, Maurice. *Oxford Book of Russian Verse.* III., 730.
Bartoš, F M. *Literarní Cinnost Rokycana.* VIII, 232
Batsell, W. R. *Soviet Rule in Russia* VIII, 438
Baudiš, J. *Grammar of Early Welsh.* VIII, 734.
Baudouin de Courtenay, J. *Zarys historii języka polskiego.* II., 209.
Beard, C. A. *The Balkan Pivot.* VIII, 730
Belaya Sibir. General Sakharov. III., 720
Beletsky, S. P. *Iz Zapisok* II, 651
Belgrad bis Buccari, Von. H. Wendel. I, 267
Beneš, Edvard. *My War Memories.* VIII, 720.

Biblioteka Narodowa VII., 225
Bismarck und Serbien H Wendel VII, 219
Bittner, K *Herders Geschichtssphilosophie und die Slawen.* IX, 235
Bizzilli, P. *Studies in Russian Poetry* VI, 236
Blagoy, D. *Class Consciousness of Pushkin* VI, 238
Blanc, Elsie J. *The Co-operative Movement in Russia* III, 727
Bobčev, S S *Slavjanskijat Svjat* II, 653
Bogatyrev, P. *Cheshsky Kukolny i Russky Narodny Teatr.* II., 460
Bogičević, M *Le proces de Salomque.* VI., 703
Bogoslovna IV, 246; V, 697.
Bolsheviks and Classics, The VII, 755
Bolshevist Russia A Karlgren. VI, 216
Borovička, J. *Ten Years of Czechoslovak Policy* VIII., 452
Borowy, W. *G K Chesterton* IX, 228 *Od Kochanowskiego do Staffa.* IX, 218.
Botkin, G. *The God who did not laugh.* VIII, 464
Boyanus, S *Russian Dictionary.* IX, 744
Bratislava VII, 761, IX., 765
Bratislava University Publications III., 729
Bratři a Demokráté J. F. Ježek. III., 217
Breshkovskaia, Katerina *Hidden Springs.* X., 730
Brezina: A Study P. Selver. I., 259
Bryusov, V. *Nauka o Stukhe.* I., 265.
Bryusov i Nasledie Pushkina V Zhirmunsky I, 266.
Burr, Malcolm. *In Bolshevik Siberia* X, 723
Bystron, J S. *Polacy w Ziemi Swiętej* IX, 230
Callina, Josephine *Shakespeare in Poland* II, 211
Čapek, Karel. *Krakant* III, 477
Čapek, Thomas *Naše Amerika* VI. 475

- Carency, J de *Pilsudski*. VIII, 732
 Carnock, Lord H Nicolson IX, 477
Central Europe, New Governments of
 M W Graham. V, 247
 Chasyl A Remizov IV, 241
 Chetki Anna Akhmatova I, 690
 Chukovsky, K *Zhena Poeta* VIII,
 458
 Cisař, J, and Pokorný, F *The Czecho-
 slovak Republic* I, 489
Civic Training in Russia. S. N. Harper.
 VIII, 214.
 Comenius, New Light on VII, 453
 Conrad, Joseph. Polish Study on. VII,
 224.
 Cooke, Bishop *Religion in Russia*.
 III, 724.
Co-operative Movement in Russia Elsie
 T Blanc III, 727
Columbia University Course in Literature
 VIII, 461
 Corti, E. C. *Alexander von Battenberg*
 I., 246.
 Cournois, John *Short Stories out of*
Russia VIII, 463.
 Crane, J O *The Little Entente* X, 228
 Crawley, C. W. *Greek Independence*.
 X, 226
Croatian Dictionary F A. Bogadek.
 VIII, 236
Croatian Tales of Long Ago Ivana
 Berić-Mažuranić III, 480
 Czapka, Marie *Vie de Mickiewicz*
 X, 479
 Czech Plays on London Stage. II, 194.
 Czechoslovak History, Notes on. IX,
 242
 Czechoslovak New Periodicals X., 238
Czechoslovak Republic, The. J Cisař.
 I, 489
 Czechoslovak Research Work. VIII,
 236.
Czechoslovakia. J Gruber III, 728.
Dalmatian Art. M M. Vasić II, 456
 Davis, Jerome. *The Russian Immigrant*
 II, 204
 Dennett, T *Roosevelt and the Russo-
 Japanese War*. IV., 506
Desyat Let Sovetskoy Nauki. VII., 458
Deutschland und Russland. J. Kolshorn.
 II., 205
 Diner-Denés, J. *La Hongrie* V., 693
Disobedient Kids, The I., 489.
 Dobb, M. *Russian Economic Develop-
 ment*. VII., 212.
 Dodwell, H. *Muhammad Ali*. X., 724.
 Dostoyevsky, A. M. *Vospominaniya*.
 IX., 753.
 Druce, G. *Wanderings in Czechoslovakia*.
 X., 239.
 Durham, M. E. *The Sarajevo Crime*.
 IV., 513.
 Dvorniković, V *Studije za Psihologiju*
Pesimisma V, 212
 Dyboski, R. *Modern Polish Literature*.
 III, 211. *O Anglii i Anglikach*
 VIII, 462 *Outlines of Polish History*.
 IV, 511 *Poland Old and New*
 V., 698 *Siedm Lat w Rosji* II, 450.
 East, W G *Union of Moldavia and*
Wallachia IX, 487
 Echoes Sir D Macalister IV, 774
 Eichenbaum, B M *Lermontov* III,
 733 *Voprosy Poetiki*. III, 227
European Economic and Political Survey.
 VI, 240
European Powers and Near East M W
 Tyler V., 461.
 Evans, I L *Agrarian Revolution in*
Roumania III, 224
Evropa-Rosja-Azja. M Zdziechowski.
 I, 666
Feudal Germany J Westfall Thompson.
 VII, 758
 Fortey, Frank H *Gems of Polish*
Poetry II, 453
Forty Years of Diplomacy Baron R
 Rosen I, 687
 Fox, Frank. *Finland of Today*. VII,
 459
 Fox, Paul *The Reformation in Poland*
 IV, 238.
 Francis Joseph. J. Redlich VII, 747
Fragment de mon Journal Sibérien
 General Janin III, 724
 Fredro, A. *Ladies and Hussars* V., 211.
 Gardner, Monica *Sienkiewicz*. VI,
 711.
Gems of Polish Poetry F H. Fortey.
 II, 452
 Gerschensohn, M. O *The Key to Faith*.
 IV, 769
Geschichte der russischen Literatur. A
 Luther. III, 735.
 Gesemann, G. *Die serbo-kroatische*
Literatur. IX, 489. *New Collection*
of Serbian Ballads V, 455.
 Ghica, General Jancu *Correspondența*.
 IX, 491
 Gjorgjević, T. R. *Iz Srbije Kneza Miloša*.
 I, 684.
 Gogol J. Lavrin V, 223.
 Goncharov, I *Oblomov*. VIII, 464.
 Geographer's Reckless Statements, A,
 IV, 781
 Graham, M. W. *New Governments of*
Central Europe IV., 247
 Graham, Stephen *St. Vitus Day*. IX.,
 494
Grammatica Russica IX, 471
 Grabski, W J. *Trzy Wiece* V, 223.
Gramatyka staroslowianska J. Los.
 II, 207
Grammaire de la Langue Serbo-Croate.
 A. Meillet. III., 231.

- Grammaire de la Langue Tchèque* A. Mazon I, 482.
 Gromov, N. *Pered Razsvetom* VI, 467
 Haensel, Paul *Economic Policy of Soviet Russia* IX, 481
 Harper, S. N. *Civic Training in Russia* VIII., 214 *Making Bolsheviks*. X, 230
 Harrison, Jane Ellen *Book of the Bear*. VII, 457
 Haumant, Emile *La Formation de la Yougoslavie* X., 227.
Hidden Springs of Russian Revolution
 Katerina Breshkovskaia X, 730
 Hoare, Sir S. *The Fourth Seal*. IX, 480
 Hopper, Bruce *Pan Sovietism*. X, 721
 Hus, Mistr Jan V Novotný III, 212
 Hybl, F. *Dějiny Národa Bulharskeho* IX, 492.
Icon, The Russian. N Kondakov VI, 471
 Illustrated MSS. VII, 460.
Iamans and Greeks in S. Russia. M I Rostovtsev I, 688
 Italy and Poland in their Historical Relations II, 191
 Izvolsky, Alexander *Memoirs* I, 685
 Jagellonian Prayer Books. Two. VIII, 452.
Jail, The J S. Machar I, 258.
 Janik, M. *Dzieje Polaków na Syberji* VII, 752
 Janin, General *Fragment de mon Journal Sibérien* III, 724.
 Jász, Oszkar *Magyariens Schuld, Ungarns Suhne* I, 675.
 Jelinek, H. *Etudes Tchecoslovaques* VI, 713
 Ježek, J. F. *Braň a Demokracie* III, 217.
 Jovanović, Slobodan *Druga Vlada Miloša i Mihaila* I, 684.
Jugoslav Literature, Early. M. S Stanoyevitch. II, 455
Jugoslavia, La O Randi I, 680.
Jugoslaviya X, 733
 Jurković, L. D. *Koravke*. III., 225
 Kallas, Amo. *Eros the Slayer*. VI, 475
The White Ship III, 740. *The Wolf's Bride* IX, 236
 Karlgron, Anton. *Bolshevik Russia* VI., 216.
 Kaun, Alexander *Gorky and his Russia*. X., 719 *Leonid Andreyev*. III, 474
 Kerner, R. J. *Social Services in Balkans*. IX, 493.
 Kiesewetter, A. A. *M S Shchepkin*. V., 451.
 Klarnerowna, Zofja. *Slownanofilstvo*. V., 696.
 Kleiner, J. *Die polnische Literatur* X, 231
 Kochanowski S. *Windakiewicz*. IX, 224
Kolchaka, Dopros VIII, 225
 Kolshorn, J. *Deutschland und Russland*. II, 205
 Konarski W. J. Rose VIII, 456
 Kondakov, N. *The Russian Icon*. VI, 471.
 Konopnicka, Maria *The Browne Scouts* VIII, 735
 Konrad Wallenrod. Mickiewicz IV, 235
 Kossak - Szczucka, Z. *Troubles of a Gnome* VIII., 231
 Kotarke L. D. Jurković III, 225
 Koyré, A. *La Philosophie en Russie* IX, 755
 Krakatit K Čapek III, 477
 Kramář, K. *Ruská Krise* I, 471
 Krzyzanowski, J. *Presmarz Krajny Kep i Wiecznej Nedzy* VI, 477 *Polish Romantic Literature* IX, 760.
 Kuba, L. *Čtení o Lužici* V, 214
 Kybal, V. *Origines Diplomatiques de l'Etat tchécoslovaque*. VIII, 452
Ladies and Hussars. A. Fredro V, 211
Land Reform in Czechoslovakia Lucy E. Textor. II, 463
Land und Leute. VI., 720
 Landau, Rom *Pilsudski*. VIII, 732
 Lavin, J. Gogol V., 223 Tolstoy. III, 207.
 Lermontov B Eichenbaum. III, 733
 Lewery, L. J. *Foreign Capital Investments in Russian Industries* III, 745
 Lo Gatto, E. *Storia della letteratura russa* VII, 228. *Studi di Letteratura Slave*. VII, 459
 Los, J. *Gramatyka staroslowianska* II, 207.
 Lossky, N. *Russkaya filosofia* IX., 221. *The World as Organic Whole*. VII, 221
 Low, D. H. *Ballads of Marko Kraljević*. I, 481.
 Lunacharski, A. V. *Vasilissa the Wise* I., 695
 Luther, A. *Geschichte der russischen Literatur*. III, 735
 Lyall, A. *Guide to the Languages of Europe* X., 732.
 Lyatsky, E. A. *Roman i Zhizn*. IV, 780.
 Lyde, L. W. *Frontiers of Hungary* IV., 781.
 Macalister, Sir D. *Echoes*. IV, 774
 Macartney, C. A. *Magyars in 10th Century*. IX, 762. *Social Revolution in Austria*. V., 693.

- MacBride, R. M. *Romantic Czechoslovakia* X, 734.
 Machray, R. *Poland* X, 726.
Magyarians Schuld Ungarns Suhne.
 O Jász I, 675.
Making of a State, The. President Masaryk VI, 454.
 Malaczewski, E. *Kon na Wzgorzu.* I, 478.
 Manning, Clarence A. *Czechoslovak Anthology* VIII, 461.
 Masaryk, President. *Books on* X, 483.
 Masaryk, President. *The Making of a State.* VI, 454.
 Maude, Aylmer. *Tolstoy on Art.* III, 739.
 Mazon, A. *Grammaire de la Langue Tchèque* I, 482.
 Meillet, A. *Grammaire de la Langue Serbo-croate* III, 230.
 Mickiewicz *Konrad Wallenrod* IV, 235.
Pan Tadeusz IX, 226.
 Milton, John. *Brief History of Moscow* VIII, 464.
 Mirsky, D. S. *Modern Russian Literature* IV, 243.
Russia: a Social History IX, 751.
 Mitana, T. *Religijnošć Škargi.* V, 462.
 Mitis, Baron O. *Kronprinz Rudolf* VII, 443.
 Mitrany, D. *Land and Peasant in Roumania.* IX, 483.
 Molotov, V. M. *Success of the Five Year Plan* X, 478.
 Morf, Gustav. *Polish Heritage of Joseph Conrad* X, 217.
 Moscow Art Theatre Abroad I, 691.
 Mothersole, Jessie. *Czechoslovakia* V, 693.
 Muratov, Paul. *La Pittura Bizantina.* VII, 757.
Nachala. I, 266.
Na Chuzhoy Storone. V, 462.
Na Putyakh k Novoy Shkole. II, 202.
Nauka o stikhe. V Bryusov. I, 265.
Nauka Polska. VIII, 233.
 Nemcova, Božena. *Shepherd and Dragon.* V, 480.
 Niederle, L. *Kultura drevnikh Slavyan.* III, 232.
Rukovet Slov. filologie. IV, 527.
 Nosek, V. *Spirit of Bohemia* V, 693.
 Novak, G. *Naše More.* VI, 714.
Nové Ceské Divadlo. VI, 239.
 Novotný, V. *Ceské Dejiny.* VIII, 449.
Mistr Jan Hus. III, 212.
 O'Beirne, J. J. R. *Serb-Croat Self-Taught.* I, 264.
 O'Brien, M. A. *Russian Dictionary.* X, 473.
 Opočensky, J. *The Collapse of Austria-Hungary.* VIII, 452.
Opyty po Istorii drevne-Russkikh politichemy VII, 229.
Oxford Book of Russian Verse. M Baring. III, 730.
 Paley, Princess. *Souvenirs de Russie* II, 190.
 Panayeva, Avdotya. *Vospominania.* VIII, 458.
Pandemonium. C Rover VI, 221.
 Pasternak *Slav Miscellany.* Dedicated to II, 461.
 Pasvol'sky, L. *Russian Debts and Reconstruction* IV, 244.
 Papoušek, J. *The Czechoslovak Nation's Struggle* VIII, 452.
 Patrick, G. Z. *Popular Poetry in Soviet Russia* VIII, 460.
 Pavlovsky, G. A. *Agricultural Russia* IX, 757.
 Petrović, I. *Byron kod Jugoslavena.* X, 216.
Pisma Imperatitsy Aleksandry II, 182.
Poetics, Problems of B. M. Eichenbaum III, 227.
Poland R Machray. X, 726.
Poland Old and New R. Dyboski. V, 698.
Poland, Reformation in Paul Fox. IV, 238.
 Polish Books, Notes on. IX, 495.
 X, 231.
 Polish, English Masterpieces in. III, 737.
Polish Grammar P Ssymank X, 236.
Polish Heritage of Conrad G. Morf. X, 217.
Polish Literature, Modern. R Dyboski. III, 211.
 Polish Political Memoirs. IV, 226.
 Potter, S. *Palacký v anglické písemnictví* VIII, 732.
 Pozner, VV. *La Littérature russe.* VIII, 464.
Prehledné dejiny literatury české J V. and A Novák. II, 199.
 Pušcaru, S. *Studie Istroromâne* X, 476.
 Pushkin. *Oeuvres choisies* VII, 457.
Pisma. VII, 228.
 Recent Books on I, 475.
 Randi, O. *La Jugoslavia.* I, 680.
 Recent Russian Publications V, 459.
Rečnik Srpskohrvatskog i nemačkog jezika. VIII, 234.
 Redlich, J. *Francis Joseph.* VII, 747.
Religion in Russia. Bishop R. J. Cooke. III, 724.
 Remizov, A. *Chasyl.* IV, 241.
Les Soeurs en Croix. VIII, 464.
Po Karmzám. VIII, 463.
The Fifth Pestilence. VII, 427.
Tri Serpi. VIII, 463.

- Revival of Russian Prose Fiction. II., 200
- Rivista di Cultura Letteraria*. III., 742.
- Rivista di Letteratura Slave*. VII., 459
- Rodzyanko, M. V. *Memoirs* VI., 228.
- Rogers, Leigh. *Wine of Fury*. III., 480.
- Roosevelt and Russo-Japanese War*. T. Dennett. IV., 506.
- Rose, W. J. *Konarski*. VIII., 456
- Rosen, Baron R. *Forty Years of Diplomacy*. I., 687
- Rosenberg, V. *Iz Istori Russkog Pechati*. V., 198
- Rostovtsev, M. I. *Iranians and Greeks in S. Russia* I., 688.
- Roumama, *Agrarian Revolution in* I L. Evans III., 224
- Rover, C. *Pandemonium*. VI., 221
- Rozanov, V. *Soltaria*. VII., 457.
- Rudolf, Kronprinz. Baron O. Mitis. VII., 443
- Runciman, S. *First Bulgarian Empire*. IX., 488
- Ruski Arhiv*. IX., 238.
- Russia: A Social History*. D. S. Mirsky. IX., 751
- Russia: Rivista* II., 659. III., 741.
- Russian Anthologies, Recent. I., 255.
- Russian Economic Development*. M. Dobb. VII., 212.
- Russian Emigrés, Historical Work of. VI., 233.
- Russian Fiction, Recent Translations of. IX., 752.
- Russian Immigrant, The*. Jerome Davis. II., 205.
- Russian Industries, Foreign Capital Investments in* III., 745
- Russian Literature, History of*. D. S. Mirsky. VI., 233
- Russian Literature, Modern*. D. S. Mirsky. IV., 243
- Russian Newspapers under Old Regime. V., 198.
- Russian Poetry, Modern*. II., 451.
- Russian Poetry, Studies in*. P. Bizzelli VI., 236.
- Russian, Pronunciation of*. M. V. Trofimov. III., 228.
- Russian Revolutionary Memoirs*. II., 231.
- Russkaya Mysl*. III., 741.
- Russkaya Shkola za rubezhom*. V., 220.
- Saburov Memoirs*. J. Y. Simpson. VIII., 445.
- Sakharov, General. *Belaya Sibir*. III., 720.
- Salonique, Le Procès de*. M. Bogičević. VI., 703.
- Sarajevo. R. W. Seton-Watson. V., 205.
- Sarolea, Charles. *Impressions of Soviet Russia* III., 470.
- Savinkov, Case, The. IV., 760
- Sazonov, S. *Les Années Fatales* VI., 688.
- Sborník Žižkov*. III., 742
- Schaeder, Hildegard. *Moskau das dritte Rom* VIII., 454.
- Schevill, F. *The Balkan Peninsula*. II., 453
- Schipper, H. *Sentimentalizm w Tworczosci Mickiewicz* V., 700.
- Scott, A. M. *Suomi*. VII., 459.
- Selver, Paul. *O. Břežina*. I., 259.
- Serajevo Crime, The*. M. E. Durham. IV., 513.
- Serbia under the Obrenović. Ž. Živanović* III., 219.
- Serbo-Croat Self Taught*. I., 264.
- Seton-Watson, R. W. *Sarajevo*. V., 205. *The New Slovakia*. III., 713.
- Shakespeare in Polish*. J. Callina II., 201
- Shakespeare in Slovene I., 261 In Serb. I., 693.
- Shcherbakivski. *Vadim i Danilo*. VII., 462.
- Shengeli, G. *Traktat o russkom Stikhe*. II., 657.
- Shipov, D. N. *Thoughts and Reminiscences*. II., 641.
- Shmurlo, E. *Le St Siège et l'Orient Orthodoxe* VIII., 455 *Voltaire et la Russie* VIII., 729
- Sienkiewicz* M. Gardner. VI., 711.
- Simak, J. V. *Kronika Československá*. VI., 231.
- Simpson, J. Y. *Saburov Memoirs*. VIII., 445
- Skarga, Piotr. J. Windakiewicz and S. Kot VII., 449.
- Sizicev Zbornik* IX., 765.
- Sköld, H. *Zur Chronologie des slawischen Akzentverschiebung*. I., 488
- Slav Literatures and Czech Research. X., 727.
- Slavishe Rundschau*. VII., 464
- Slavjanskij Svjat*. S. S. Bobčev II., 653
- Slavonic Philology. Recent Works in IV., 523
- Slovakia, The New*. R. W. Seton-Watson. III., 713
- Slovanská Nesvornost*. O. Vočadlo. II., 462.
- Slovansky Sborník*. In Honour of F. Pastrnek. II., 461.
- Slowacki, J. *Anielli*. IX., 226.
- Sosnosky, T. von. *Franz Ferdinand* VIII., 222.
- Soul of St. Petersburg*. N. P. Antsiferov V., 193.
- South Eastern Affairs*. X., 239
- Souvenirs de Russia*. Princess Paley. II., 190.

- Soviet Russia, Impressions of* C Sarolea. III, 470
Sovietskoye Pravo V., 219
Soyuz Russkago Naroda VIII, 726
 Spinka, M. *The Church and Russian Revolution*. VII, 446
 Spring Rice Sir Cecil. *Letters* VIII, 447.
 Stanoyevitch, M S *Early Jugoslav Literature* II, 455
Starinnyy Teatr v Rossii. II, 657.
 Street, C J S *President Masaryk*. VIII, 724
Studencheskie Gody. V, 464.
 Sukhotin, L M *Lyubov v russkoy Litve* VI, 237
 Suomi. A. M Scott. VII, 459
 Šusta, J. *Z dob dávnykh i blizkych* IV, 525
 Sverdlov Communist University. *Zapiski* IV., 776
 Symón, Vie de. VII, 461.
 Szeps, Moriz *Kronprinz Rudolf* I., 673.
 Tarnowski, W. *Hist. Literaturny Angielskiej* X, 731
 Textor, Lucy E. *Land Reform in Czechoslovakia* II, 463.
 Thompson, J. Westfall. *Feudal Germany*. VII, 758
Three Capitals. V. Shulgin VI, 216
 Tilea, V V. *Actuinea Diplomacia a Româner*. IV, 777.
 Tolstoy. H I. Fausset. VI, 478.
 Tolstoy. J Lavrin. III, 207.
 Tolstoy. *Neizdannyye Razskazy* V., 210.
 Tolstoy. *War and Peace* II, 202
 Tolstoy on Art. A. Maude III, 739.
 Torbarina, J *Italian Influence on Ragusan Poets*. X, 473
Traité de Droit Civil des Soviets X., 230.
 Tretiak, A *Lord Byron*. X., 214.
 Trofimov, M. V., and Jones D. *Pro-nunciation of Russian*. III, 228.
 Tsvetayeva, Marina. *Molodets* IV., 775.
 Tuma, H. *Pomen in Razvoj Alpinizma* X. 481.
 Turgenev. A. Yarmolinsky. VI., 234
 Tyler, M W. *European Powers and Near East*. V., 461.
Ukrayinski Narodni Dumy.
 Urbanek, R. *České Dějiny*. IX., 492.
 Vasić, M. M. *Arhitektura u Dalmaciji*. II., 456.
 Vasmer, Max. *Untersuchungen* III, 459
 Vernadsky, G. *History of Russia* VIII, 724.
 Vočadlo, O. *Jespersen and Comenius* VIII, 734. *Slovanská Nesvornost* II., 462.
 Volkonsky, A. M *Imya Rusi*. IX, 232
Volya Rossii. IV, 254
Voprosy Poetiki II, 658
Vospominania Count Witte. I, 463
 Waldenberg, V E *Politicheskaya Filosofiya Diona Chryzostoma* V, 699
 Wanczura, A *Polshi w Plyw* IV, 240
Szkolnictwo w starej Rusi II, 644
 Weingart, Miloš. *O Podstatě Slovanské filologie* IV, 527.
 Wendel, Hermann *Aus der Welt der Sudslawen* V, 693 *Bismarck und Serbien*. VII, 219. *Der Kampf der Sudslawen*. IV, 520 *Sudslavische Silhouetten* IV, 252 *Von Belgrad bis Buccari* I, 267
White Ship Amo Kallas. III, 740.
 Windakiewicz, S *Piotr Skarga* VII, 449
Wine of Fury L Rogers III., 480
 Winkler, M P J Čadaev IX, 755
 Witte, Count *Vospominania* I, 463.
 Wolker, Jiří *Dílo* IV, 249
World as Organic Whole N. O. Lossky. VII, 221.
 Yarmolinsky, A. *Modern Russian Anthology*. II, 451 *The Jews* VIII, 237 *Turgenev*. VI, 234
 Young, R. F. *A Bohemian Philosopher* IV., 526 *A Bohemian Scholar at Heidelberg*. VII, 463. *A Czech Humanist* IV., 779. *Comenius and Indians of New England*. VIII, 455.
 Yugov, A. *Economic Trends in Soviet Russia*. IX, 237.
Zapiski Instituta Izucheniya Rossii. V, 460
Zapiski Nablyudatelya. III., 740
 Zdziechowski, M *Europa-Rosja-Azja*. I., 666.
 Zeromski, S. *Ashes*. VIII., 230. *Cenery*. X., 477.
 Zhurumsky, V. *Bayron i Pushkin*. III., 209. *Bryusov i Nasledie Pushkina*. I., 266.
 Živanović, Z. *Polit. Istorija Srbije*. III., 219.
 Župančić, Oton. *Translations of Shakespeare*. I., 261.

9. Reviewers

- Aldanov, A. VI., 223
 Allen, James G X., 224.
 Andrews, Arthur I. IV., 247; VII, 730.
 Baikalov, A. V. X., 723.
 Barker, Ernest. IV, 779.
 Bartulović, N. VI, 714
 Baynes, N. H. VII, 461.
 Behayev, N. T. IX., 232.

- Borowy, W. IX, 495; X, 231, 236, 479
 Boswell, A Bruce III, 211; IV, 511; V, 698
 Carr, E H. VIII, 458, IX, 753
 Cheshire, H T I, 691.
 Chudoba, F. I, 258, 259; III, 729, 742, IV., 249, V, 214
 Chwalewik, W. X, 217
 Cooper, J E S III, 727
 Copeland, Fanny S I., 261; X, 481
 Cross, Samuel H X, 718
 Dearmer, Percy II, 456.
 Duddington, Natahe X, 221
 Dyboski, R. I, 666, II, 194, 211, III., 201, IV., 226, 235; V, 211; VI, 711; IX, 228
 Elton, Oliver III, 730
 Florovsky, Anton VII, 216
 Florovsky, George V. V., 193.
 Forbes, Nevill II, 452, 644
 Foster, Fanny V, 455
 Gardner, Monica. I, 478, V, 462, 696; VI, 477; VII., 224, 752; IX, 226, 760
 Gavrilović, M. I, 684
 Grzembienowski, T. X., 214, 731
 Haensel, P. X, 478
 Hanák, J IX., 492, 765, X., 238, 483.
 Hans, N V, 220, X, 733
 Harper, Samuel N. VIII, 438.
 Heidenreich, J. X, 727.
 Hóman, B IX, 762
 Hutchinson, Lincoln. IV., 244
 Ivanov, S. VII, 458.
 Jopson, N B I., 488, 693; II, 207, 209, 455, 462, 653, III, 228, IV., 523; V., 215, VII, 734, IX, 744; X, 472, 476, 732
 Kantorowicz, Hermann V, 205
 Kerner, R J. V, 460, 461, VI., 230, 240, 475; VIII, 724, X., 730
 Knox, Sir Alfred II, 190, III, 724
 Krzyzanowski, J. VII, 225, 449, 759; VIII, 230, 231, 233, 453; IX, 224, 230.
 Lobanov-Rostovsky, A VIII., 440.
 Lord, Robert H IV, 238
 Lybyer, Albert H. VI, 716, IX, 493.
 Macartney, C A VIII, 452; IX, 488.
 Macek, Josef II, 463.
 Manning, Clarence A. III, 724; VI, 234; VIII., 460.
 McCullagh, Francis. III, 720; V., 221, VIII., 460.
 Medlicott, W. N. VIII., 445.
 Meyendorff, A. F. I., 687, II, 202, 204, 651; III., 221; IV., 776; V, 219; VI, 720; VII, 212, 446; VIII, 447, 454, 726, 729; IX, 235, 245, 480, 755; X, 229
 Miller, Margaret S. VI, 695.
 Minns, Elhs H. I, 688; II., 459; VII., 460, 757; IX., 751.
 Mirsky, D S I, 255, 266, 475, 690, II, 200, 210, 451, 460, 654, 657, 658, III, 207, 209, 228, 733, 735, 739, IV, 254, 774, 775, 780, V, 210, 223, 459, 463; VI, 236, 238, 471, 475, VII, 227, 228, 457, IX, 752
 Nicoll, Josephine III, 737.
 Nowak, Frank VIII, 456
 Noyes, George R VII, 463, VIII, 236, 461, IX, 495, X, 480, 734.
 Odložilík, O VII, 453, 463, 761; VIII, 232, 236, 449, 454, 732, IX, 242, 477, 480.
 Pares, Bernard I, 463, 685, II, 182, 205; III, 470; IV., 760, 769, VI, 216, 228, 233, VII, 462, 464, VIII, 214, 225, 233, 237, IX., 236, X, 230
 Pat, M VIII, 462
 Phelps, W. Lyon III., 474
 Pollak, R X, 477.
 Popović, V. A. V, 212.
 Pražák, Albert III, 713.
 Prezelj, J III, 225
 Prokeš, Jaroslav. III, 212
 Rapoport, Semen IX, 471
 Reade, A R. VII, 459
 Scott, J W. VII, 221.
 Seton-Watson, R W I, 247, 267, 481, 489, 673, 675, 680; II, 453, 459, III, 224, 480, IV., 506, 513, 520, 781, V., 693; VI, 454, 688, 703, VII, 219, 439, 443, 748, VIII, 222, 720; IX, 483, 487, 491, 494, 764; X, 226, 227, 228, 239, 724, 726, 736.
 Shilovsky, P. P. IX, 757.
 Spinka, Matthew V, 456.
 Stojanović, J D. IV., 246; V., 697, 699
 Subotić, D S I, 264, 265, III, 219, 230, IV, 252; VIII, 234, IX., 238, 489, X, 216, 473
 Tchitchovsky, T. VI., 719
 Textor, Lucy E III., 728
 Timofeyev, B IV, 528
 Tschan, F. J VII., 758.
 Turin, S. P. IX., 237.
 Vernadsky, G. X., 721.
 Vinogradoff, Paul II., 641
 Vočadlo, O I, 482; II, 199, 224, 460; III., 217, 477, IV., 525, 526; VI, 231, 239, 713.
 Wendel, Hermann. II, 457.
 Werth, Alexander. IV., 772; V, 198, 451, 453.
 Wharton, L. C. II., 450; III., 742, IV., 240; V., 223
 Williams, Ariadne. III, 205; IV., 243
 Williams, Harold. I, 471.
 Windakiewicz, S. X., 218.
 Wrench, J. E. VI., 474.
 Wuorinen, John H. III., 740.

10. Bibliographical

American Doctoral Dissertations	III, 745	Pope in Poland	VII., 230
Bibliographical Notes	I, 269, 490, 696.	Pronunciation of Slavonic words and names	II., 668
Bulgarian Bibliographical Works	IV, 255.	Russian Archives in Prague.	V, 687.
Historical Studies in Poland.	II, 660	Russian Publications	X, 465, 736
Jagić, Vatroslav, Bibliography of.	II, 213	Slav Studies in Germany.	I, 494
		Ukrainian Historiography.	III, 233
		Ukrainian Language	V, 169

11. Chronicles

Czechoslovakia.	I., 238, 652; II., 431, 617; IV, 216, V, 183-8.
Bulgaria.	III., 704.
Jugoslavia.	I, 236, II., 620, III., 198, 453, 698; IV, 715; V., 188, VI., 448; VII, 427
Poland.	I, 456, 647; II., 635; III, 195; IV, 206; V., 177; VII, 728; VIII, 432.
Russia	I., 229, 448, 646, II, 161, 427, 613, III, 444, 694, IV., 198, 485, 710; V, 173, 442; VI, 202, 444, 680, VII, 204, 425, 725; VIII, 209, 424, 707, IX., 462, X., 445, 740

Economic Surveys

Czechoslovakia.	IV, 223-4
Jugoslavia	IV., 491-505
Poland	IV., 221-3.
Roumania	IV., 224-5
Russia	III, 460-9; IV, 220-1

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

An American Quarterly Review

Hamilton Fish Armstrong—Editor



THE world's leading statesmen, economists and financial authorities write for FOREIGN AFFAIRS. They keep the readers of this important American review informed about the basic causes of the great events which today are making history.

CONTENTS OF THE JULY ISSUE.

THE GREAT DEPRESSION	<i>Edwin F. Gay</i>
THE WAR IN THE FAR EAST: A SOVIET VIEW	<i>Karl Radek</i>
THE POLISH CORRIDOR: REVISION OR PEACE?.....	<i>Jan Ciechanowski</i>
BRIAND	<i>Friedrich Sieburg</i>
BEFORE OTTAWA	<i>H. V. Hodson</i>
DANUBIA: RELIEF OR RUIN	<i>Hamilton Fish Armstrong</i>
THE PERMANENT BASES OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY	<i>F. R. Scott</i>
THE CRISIS IN GERMAN AGRICULTURE	<i>Karl Brandt</i>
BURMA AND ITS PROBLEMS	<i>Sir Harcourt Butler</i>
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE SPANISH REPUBLIC...	<i>Luis Jimenez de Asua</i>
THE MEMOIRS OF VISCOUNT ISHII	<i>Roland S. Morris</i>
AMERICAN INTERESTS AT LAUSANNE	<i>William O. Scroggs</i>
THE SOUTH SEA ISLANDS UNDER JAPANESE MANDATE	<i>Walter B. Harris</i>
SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	<i>William L. Langer</i>
SOURCE MATERIAL	<i>Denys P. Myers</i>

—also the usual maps and notes, bibliography of new books in the international field, index of treaties and trade agreements, etc.

Subscriptions: \$5 a year post free to any address.

Use form below for special offer.

TEAR OFF HERE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 45 East 65th St., New York.

Please enter me for a year's subscription and include *without charge* the issue described above. I enclose \$5 in payment.

Name

Street

City.....

July

Memoranda published by the Birmingham Bureau of Research on Russian Economic Conditions. Russian Department, University of Birmingham.

THE School of Slavonic and East European Studies is co-operating through its Lecturer in Russian Economics, Mr. S. P. Turin, in the work of the Birmingham Bureau. *Memorandum* No. 5 was published in May and was devoted to "Remarks on the Five Year Plan," "Agricultural Collectivisation," and "Oil Consumption and Export." Three other numbers will be published this year, and all four may be obtained at an inclusive cost of 8s. 6d. from the Secretary of the Bureau, Russian Department, The University, Birmingham. Copies are not sold separately.

The Bureau is composed of the following members: A. M. Baykov (Russian Economic Service in Prague), Prof. S. Konovalov (Universities of Birmingham and Oxford), Lancelot Lawton, Prof. Jean Lescure (University of Paris), Prof. S. N. Prokopovich (Russian Economic Service and Slavonic Institute in Prague), and E. M. Shenkman.

YUGOSLAV POPULAR BALLADS Their Origin and Development

By DRAGUTIN SUBOTIĆ

Crown 8vo. With a Frontispiece. 10s. 6d. net.

The aim of this book is to revive, and possibly widen, the interest of the British people in a subject which, under the name of *Serbian popular ballads*, they thought worthy of their attention throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century, and which, having lost none of its beauty will, the author trusts, still prove attractive for them under its new name.

RUSSIAN HEROIC POETRY

By N. K. CHADWICK

Demy 8vo. 15s. net.

Russian heroic poetry has been preserved by oral tradition down to our own day. The poems celebrate the deeds of princes and heroes throughout a period of nearly a thousand years, from the tenth to the nineteenth century, and are invaluable for the light which they shed on the history of Russian civilisation. This book aims at giving translations of a representative series from all periods, and the author has kept in view the two-fold aim of illustrating both the course of Russian history and the development of Russian heroic poetry.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

THE SLAVONIC

AND EAST EUROPEAN

REVIEW.

VOL. XI. No. 32.

JANUARY, 1933.

PROTESILAUS AND LAODAMIA

A TRAGEDY, by STANISŁAW WYSPIAŃSKI

*Authorised translation from the Polish by ELIZABETH MUNK CLARK
and GEORGE RAPALL NOYES.*

CHARACTERS

LAODAMIA	OLD MAN	SERVING MAID
BARD	HOUSEKEEPER	
	CHORUS	

The action takes place in Phylace.

PART I

SETTING

A pillared portico ; through the pillars in the background a grove of cypress trees is visible, in the midst of which a white sepulchral stela may be seen. In the background are cliffs along the seacoast and the sky golden in the sunset. From right and left the maidens of the Chorus enter from their rooms ; they pass through the colonnade and take their places on either side of the stela. The Bard waits, leaning against the shaft of the column.

CHORUS

How long each day must we before this grave
In sorrow take our stand?
Obedient servants of our lady, we.
Her queenly sorrow unappeased, it seems,

For all eternity will last. But see,
 From out her chamber now in sadness she
 Draws nigh. The longings of her heart command
 Her movements and with hateful memory
 Nourish and tend that source of endless tears —
 Thus, though she lives, and few are yet her years,
 She bends her youthful life in torture slow,
 In lamentation and eternal woe.

LAODAMIA

(comes in from her chamber ; she is clothed in a crimson robe of linen, fitting her body closely like a tight gown, covering her from her shoulders to her ankles, and fastened on the right from top to bottom with twelve agraffes ; she is girt with a belt of wrought silver links ; her bosom and shoulders are veiled with two loosely falling panels of linen (of the same colour as her "heanos") cut into squares, which are fastened in front at her shoulders with two large brooches ; she has long hair, raven black, carefully arranged, plaited into four braids, and gracefully fastened at the back of her head with gold bands and large pins and fillets ; on her upper arms are several snake bracelets, wound about in spirals ; her feet are shod with sandals, tied with crossed ribbons, which reach above her knees ; beneath the sandals are high wooden cothurns)

1. Forever Happiness to me is dead, alas !
 Forever !
 Forever closed the gate of heavy brass
 Above my love.
 Ah, thou whom I have loved, for thy caress,
 Thy close embrace, my longing arms now yearn.
 And to thine honied lips, O dearest love,
 My lips, a budding rose, in longing turn.
 Ah, why doth Orcus snatch thee from me, why ?
 In tearful anguish of the soul I sigh,
 In longing sad shall I forever be ;
 My mournful soul to thine doth ever cry —
 And thou eternally art lost to me.
2. Thou wert for me the light of day, the flame ;
 Clapsed in thine eager arms a rose was I.
 Why doth the day, so quickly darkening, die ?
 Why gleameth now so feebly love's sweet flame ?
 The stormy blast away doth carry thee,
 And soon thy withered rose shall faded lie.

- Ah, why doth Orcus snatch thee from me, why?
 These bleeding wounds of aching soul are mine;
 My longing soul doth ever sigh to thine,
 And thou eternally art lost to me!
3. Thine eager arms in passionate embrace
 Hold me in dreams, in dreams they still pursue.
 The fiery gleams of ardent eyes pierce through
 My troublous dreams and burn my blushing face.—
 Return, but for a single moment, come,
 That we may be united once again;
 Return, but for a single moment, come,
 Let thine unhappy wife, made happy then,
 Experience delights. Thou dost disdain
 The wife who lonely in her bed doth lie.
 Ah, why doth Orcus snatch thee from me, why?
 Will not the great gods be more kind to me?
 After thy soul my soul through space doth hie,
 Into those pathless wastes where dwell the dead —
 But I, yet living, keep my soul in fee,
 Sadly returning to mine empty bed;
 A living soul may not Death's River pass,
 Nor overcome the guards of Hell. Alas,
 Why am I then so cruelly tortured, why?
 These are my wounds, these my complaints that cry!
 My soul to longing is forever wed;
 I know—thou art forever lost to me.

(She stands a moment at the tomb, and leans her head on the hewn stone of the stela; she remains thus for some time, motionless)

CHORUS

1. Sad is our lady, sad without her consort, sad without the caresses that might soothe sorrow—the caresses of a consort and lover.
2. Sad is thy home, with its structure half-completed; not yet covered with their roof of bronze are those chambers where caresses were to enfold you and unite you with bonds of affection.

LAODAMIA *(returns to her chamber, calm)*

CHORUS

3. Each day dost thou from thy sight dismiss the merchants disappointed; thou dost send away the gold-woven carpets

and the vessels of perfume encircled with gold, and platters carved from green stone—out of thy sight float those treasures, to return in their black ships—and thou art left alone.

(The maidens draw the curtain, thereby closing the rear of the stage; only the blue of the day can be seen filtering through the veil)

4. No longer from those regions across the sea canst thou expect any one —
and thou art sad and thou sighest, even as women worn by waiting.

LAODAMIA *(sits down on her bed)*

CHORUS

Thy woeful glance wanders over the marble flagstones of the room like the darkened glance of those who see a feeble gleam of hope.

5. Thine hands, eager for caresses, twine themselves about thy slender neck and shelter thy blushing cheeks—like a rose is thy face. . . .

LAODAMIA *(with her hand makes a sign of impatience)*

CHORUS *(becomes silent)*

(From behind the curtain, the head of the Bard appears. A maid, who has perceived him, approaches Laodamia)

SERVING MAID

Behold, as every day, at the appointed time, when twilight falls, the bard draws near;

He approaches, stopping importunate at the first step of the entrance.

Behold, the rhapsodist, famed for eloquence, burns with a desire to tell thee the well-known story of thy consort.

What a hero he was, and how he perished.

The bard each day a well-turned strophe adds,

And it seems today he has brought new verses.

BARD *(has entered meanwhile)*

SERVING MAID

Behold already he stands near me, thy handmaiden,

And pleading with his eyes, he gazes upon thee

To know if thou wilt, for his evening meal,

Permit him to serve thee.

He is eloquent. . . .

LAODAMIA (*not looking at the Bard*)

Each day thou comest. —
Sing me today a long song, as each day
Thou dost,
When the day declines. —
And to the sound of thy voice the twilight falls. —
Only today in me there awakens a different song
Than before. — — —
Speak thou.

(They sit down ; the maidens of the Chorus seat themselves in a wide semicircle on the ground ; the Bard in the midst in a special chair. His face is bronze, sunburnt, framed by a black beard, close-cut, and trimmed into a wedge at his chin ; on his head is a spray of fresh laurel, forming a half-crown, from which crimson ribbons fall to his shoulders ; he wears a short bronze tunic and a white cloak fastened with a leather belt, over which it falls ; in his hands is a Pan's pipe ; his mask laughs with the smile of the men of Ægina¹)

LAODAMIA (*listens eagerly ; now she rises to heights of triumph ; now she suddenly becomes sad, restless*)

BARD

1. Paris, son of kingly Priam,
From the palace of the Argives
Carried Helen, royal consort,
Snatched her from the son of Atreus,
Prisoned her in Ilion city,
Forcing love upon the woman.
2. Menelaus to his brother,
Kingly ruler of Mycene,
Thus began his grave complaining :
“ If we do not now avenge us
Of this injury, we shall merit
Shame disgraceful. This sly stranger,
Guest within my royal palace,
Trampled on all laws of honour.”
3. Launched were many warlike vessels
Black upon the azure waters,

¹ Probably a reference to the archaic smile of the pedimental statues from a temple on the island of Ægina, now in the museum at Munich.—*Translators.*

Snowy sails unfurled for flying;
 Prow of red cuts deep the sea waves.

(Here, on the curtain may be seen ships sailing)

4. Now the air with cries resoundeth,
 As in time of birds' migration;
 And the flock together gathered
 Long about the shore doth circle,
 In the Aulis harbour prisoned
 Till it sail the mighty ocean.
5. In the Delphian grove, the temple
 Of the prophets of Apollo
 Holy stands; its far-famed priestess
 Thus unto the Achæans speaketh,
 While in reverence they hearken :
 " Ilion by fire shall perish;
 Yours the fame, the immortal laurel;
 But the man who, swiftly leaping
 Past the bridge that fronts the vessel,
 First shall reach the soil of Ilion
 And his feet in sand shall bury —
 he shall perish.
6. Yet to him the greatest glory
 Won by death and grave is given."

— — — — —
 Protesilaus hears this.

(The Bard, confused, breaks off, since, during the last moments of his song, Laodamia is heard whispering, as if talking with someone close beside her)

LAODAMIA

Although thy sweet caress doth comfort me,
 I guess the secret thought that fills thine heart.
 For laughing thou dost hold me, while I see
 Thou growest silent and thy smiles depart.
 Ah now, the thread of life hath but begun
 By Clotho to be spun;
 Nor from her distaff hath the Fate unkind
 The thread begun to wind.

BARD

7. Protesilaus is not willing
 To attend his wife's complaining.

Glory now inflames his being —
 Hotter this than all love's passion;
 "It is Fame alone that waits me;
 I must leave behind my country,
 Thee forsake, my best beloved,
 Wife above all else most precious.
 I die first—do not await me."

LAODAMIA

Thou rosy dawn
 That didst descend
 Into the dark depths of the sea,
 Tear not thyself away in fear
 From out the Old Man's grasp!
 Thou dost intend
 Escape on slopes of distant waves,
 To light the fires of dawn;
 — And bring our hour of parting near.

.

BARD

8. Blaming Fate, accusing Fortune,
 At his darling's side he slumbered,
 Dreaming all the night of valour;
 Dreaming of immortal laurels
 By his might and sole endeavour
 Snatched from hosts of noble warriors,
 In the presence of Achæans
 Covered all in glistening armour.
9. With the night so swiftly passing,
 There approached the hour of parting.

LAODAMIA

Thou rosy dawn,
 With swift feet dost thou run,
 My words thou dost not hear;
 But wrapped in garments soft
 Of tinted mists,
 So swiftly dost thou run
 To warn black Night
 The Sun shall soon appear,
 That from beneath the waves
 The heavy steeds already draw aloft

The golden chariot.

Phœbus, thou youth!

Thou partest us so young!

BARD

10. He runs first of all before them—
His fleet ship is first in landing.
Swift of foot the warrior rises,
On the sands the bridge-plank throwing.
Like an eagle now in stature,
High he holds his lance and buckler;
Awful to the foe, he shouteth,
Kindled by the fires of Ares,
God of battle.
11. Now is heard the lances' whistling
And a cloud of lances veils him.
He has fallen. On his buckler,
Dead, his friends have borne their leader.
12. Now black vessels fast are speeding,
In the sandy beaches sinking;
Flock of crows that augur evil,
Sure destruction to the Trojans.
13. Far from sandy shores of Ilion
Hath the kingly Agamemnon
Built for thee a tomb; and in it
Have they laid thine arms heroic.
14. Elm trees, given the tomb as guardians
By the hands of fair nymph maidens,
Early grown to full maturity,
Deck with green their spreading branches,
There above the barrow growing.
They but see old Priam's city²
When they wither all and perish;
Yet the great trunks at their bases
With fresh sap are newly coloured.
15. Years pass—still the youthful woman
In her joyless heart complaineth.

(Here the Bard rises from his chair, and bending towards Laodamia, he speaks in a lover's whisper her very words, which he has overheard previously)

² "City of Tyndareus," by an error, in the original.—*Translators.*

BARD

“Thou knowest arms in passionate embrace;
In dreams they hold thee, and they still pursue:
Know thou the ardent gaze that flickers through
Thy troublous dreams and burns thy blushing face—
Be mine, but for a single moment, come—
And thou wilt know delights. . . .”

(He is about to speak further; Laodamia interrupts him with a gesture.—At the sound of the first words of the last strophe she has risen—now she turns her head towards him.—She looks at him curiously, examining him with surprise, with anger, with contempt)

BARD *(abashed, goes out)*

LAODAMIA *(still standing, cannot recover from her feeling of repugnance—she dismisses the Chorus)*

CHORUS *(goes out, the maidens bowing one after another; Laodamia gives a sign to the last girl, who delays longest in going out, to approach her)*

LAODAMIA *(sits down; when the girl runs to her, she whispers to her)*

GIRL *(runs out at the right)*

LAODAMIA

Already now a sacrilegious glance
With all its shameless and forbidden fire,
The hidden secrets of mine heart doth pierce
To soil the holy flame of my desire.
O Hera, why am I not dear to thee?
The red blood stains my face with blushes; see,
I burn with shame.

.
Tonight in secret must I still prepare
Abundant offerings for the spirits there;
And summon Witchery and Might:
That that dark spirit which in dreams is seen
May come, and from these pangs of longing wean
My soul, and bear me out into the night.

(The girl returns with an Old Woman)

LAODAMIA *(gives a sign to the Old Woman to come nearer, and to the girl to stand back, so that she may not overhear the conversation)*

OLD WOMAN (*approaches Laodamia, kneels before her, and embraces her feet*)

LAODAMIA

Thou art obedient to me.

OLD WOMAN

I am the aged keeper in thine house
By thine own grace and will.

LAODAMIA

Now I will give thee one more piece of land;
Only be silent.—Do as I command.

OLD WOMAN

Thy words I hear. Thy queenly hand
Enjoins me silence. Though unwilling, still
Shall I be silent.

LAODAMIA

Three pieces more I promise thee —
Only be silent thou.
A measure of flour must I have,
Sifted, wheaten, white.

OLD WOMAN

Much in the granary there is hid.

LAODAMIA

It must be freshly ground.

OLD WOMAN

It in the hand mill I will grind.

LAODAMIA

A jar of honey, and a jar of wine
Do thou have ready. And now hearken well:
When twilight mist begins to fall,
Into the garden do thou bring
Flowing measure and full jars,
And hide them near the tomb.

OLD WOMAN

They will see me. . . .

LAODAMIA

No.—For thou wilt first to me
Send all the serving maids,
As every day is now thy wont. . . .

OLD WOMAN

Thou art unhappy.

LAODAMIA

Thou wilt lead forth a snow-white lamb;
Thou wilt lead forth a jet-black ewe:
These thou wilt hide amid the cypress grove
Beside the grave,
To a tree trunk tying them.

OLD WOMAN

Thou wouldst disturb the quiet of the dead —
Such horror! By the gods, thou art possessed!

LAODAMIA

The holy and mysterious strings I crave
To touch, and I would sing the secret songs —
The thoughts that in my soul cry out in pain,
The thoughts that in my soul aloud complain —
Abandoned so, despised. —

.
Depart.

(The Old Woman goes out)

SERVING MAID (*approaching Laodamia*)

And dost thou bid me hasten to the town?

LAODAMIA

Whence comes this eager haste to see the town?

SERVING MAID

To town each morning thou dost order me
That I may fetch for thee
Apples and pears from out my father's close;
And so, an eager servant to thy will
I go each day unto my father's house.

LAODAMIA

A lover hast thou there most certainly.

SERVING MAID

May maidenhood then be my punishment!

LAODAMIA

Dissemble not A gift will I present
To thee and to thy lover.

SERVING MAID

My lover dwelleth on the bit of land
That joins my father's—I am thine.

LAODAMIA

So take thy kerchief, and when twilight falls
Thou wilt Eunœus then before me bring;
Say not one word of this unto thy friends;
And when up to the gate thou ledest him,
Charge him that he before my threshold sit,
Waiting until I send away my maids
And am alone. . . .

SERVING MAID (*kneeling before her and embracing her knees*)

How dully fall thy words upon mine ear.

LAODAMIA

But thou, gay maiden, do thou be bold.
Then from the palace take him food to eat,
A pitcher full of mead, abundant meat —
Let him come satisfied.

SERVING MAID

I am afraid.

LAODAMIA

Then with thy lover joyously abide
Throughout the night. At break of day return —
And so be gay; I shall be generous.

SERVING MAID

Wouldst thou work magic then throughout the night?

LAODAMIA

Thou wilt spend all the night in happy love.

SERVING MAID

Thou wilt thy ruin work, woman most sad!

LAODAMIA

I would that thou the old man now shouldst bring.
For I would do all that in human power
I can.—So quickly fly !

(The girl runs out)

(When the Serving Maid has disappeared behind the curtain, Laodamia, as if relieved from the burden of human glances, suddenly rises, and stands straight and stiff. Violently she raises her arms high, with face upturned ; then, wringing her hands, she lowers them, wide-spread ; she bends her head a little, and gradually more and more to the side, towards her left breast ; she veils her eyes with her lids, assuming an expression of utter exhaustion. . . .

She sits down with an appearance of intense ennui . . .

In the armchair, near her, having entered from under the earth, sits Ennui, a figure in a black costume, embroidered with white circles ; she sits like a stone, like a statue, sluggish.

The sun, with an orange light, breaks through the parted curtain, falling with a sheaf of colour into that corner of the room where is the entrance to the chamber)

LAODAMIA *(opening her eyes, perceives Ennui, only slowly becoming conscious of her presence ; she passes her hand before her face, as if trying to dismiss the apparition ; then she lowers her hand weakly ; Ennui makes the same movements)*

LAODAMIA

. Thou has come to me as a guest ; today as yesterday, and the day before yesterday, and the many days which passed before that. —

. And thou art nearer me today, sister, than yesterday, than the day before yesterday, and the many days which have passed by.—I look upon thy figure, as if myself were repeated before me. —

. Thou sittest silent, and thou tellest me long tales in silence, quiet tales, which thou drawest from my fantasies, endless and unchanging, and which direct my sad thought to the courts of my palace

. . . and into the garden, midst the cypresses, along a path strewn with sea sand sifted—even up to the gates of the tomb—to the closed gates of the tomb. —

. And thou leadest me in fancy up to the tomb, through the garden, across the terraces of my palace, to the

shades of those rooms whereof I know each marble slab and hewn stone. —

Unfailing companion of my meditations, sister inseparable —
 Thou comest each day at twilight, when the dying gleams spread a coloured carpet in that corner of the alcove, where the entrance to my chamber . . . brought me to happiness with my consort,

. happiness so quickly passing, so irrevocable—a few moments of happiness, eternal memories.

. The gleams spread a golden dust on the threshold of the chamber—I am alone. —

Here I was once clasped in the embraces of my husband . . .

.

Sister and my mistress, thou hast exceeding power over me. —
 The gleams make a mist in the scattered dust — and are lost.

Behold also thou art vanishing,

Thou fadest, like the illusion of murky mists.

.

My fancy plays with me —

And darkens my soul; it plunges me sad into deep meditation;

My soul, winged, floats round about me,

My thought wanders—and knows not whither it tends.

(Rising, she goes slowly towards the gleam in the corner of the room, until the gleam disappears as she reaches it.

Sleep enters, a winged youth, a transparent dress over his bare marble body; the hair of the young lad is arranged in golden locks, the colour of his entire dress is constantly changing, and grows darker from moment to moment.

Sleep comes to an understanding with Ennui, who is pursuing Laodamia. —

Ennui disappears under the ground.

Sleep approaches Laodamia from behind and strikes her on the forehead with wands of poppy stems—he touches her temples and forehead with a stem, then drives her with movements of his hands back to the bed, where, after a moment, Laodamia seats herself)

LAODAMIA

Behold thou approachest, alluring, divine, giver of rest eternal.

. I recognise thee and thy nearness to me from the
quiet and semi-darkness which surround thee. —

. Already art thou near, close to my head, which
obediently I bend:

These are poppy stems, and ripe, dry seed-pods;
Shaken in thy hands, they rustle and murmur.

.

There is a roar close by my temples;
'Tis the roar of the distant waves of the sea, that rush
to the rocks of the shore —

And now mine eyes are closed. —

Now roar the waves of distant seas

On the rocks, on the rocks, on the shore. . . .

Behold the pebbles washed along the sands! —

They cry and fret, strewn by the thousand hands

Of yon tumultuous host of water sprites,

Old Nereus' daughters, running arm in arm.

From afar, from afar, from the seas

Race the Oceanides,

Dispersing on the wide sands of the shore.

Crash, roar. . . .

(suddenly louder, more clearly)

— And thou comest to lull me to sleep with the roar and the
noise of waters . . .

I am wonted to thee, O thou messenger of mysterious forces . . .

(more quietly)

Thine arm, embracing, clasps me!

Sleep, sleep . . . my world —

My better world. . . . —

.

Beloved! . . .

(To be concluded.)

[Stanisław Wyspiański, a strange genius who combined the talents
of a painter and a poet, died in 1907, at the age of 38. Poland
commemorates him today not only as an artist, but as a great
national figure who, in some sense, moulded the political feelings
of his generation. *Protesilaus and Laodamia* (1899) belongs to his
earlier works, the whole period of his literary activity having
extended over little more than ten years.—ED.]

THE KNAVE OF DIAMONDS

Translated from the Russian of LEONID LEONOV *by* N. B. JOPSON.

THIS little girl had a doll given her for a Christmas present, and she was just fourteen years old. And she had her own sunny little room in the loft over the lilac trees. There it was Granny dozed in her oval frame behind the dusty glass, and Grandpapa bravely paraded his hussar epaulette before his feather-brained descendants. From the window you could see the park, which was as large as the sea, and above it was a cloud, white as the cloaks of the women at the festival of the Assumption.

It was a park of lime trees, and when the limes were in flower pillars of sweet fragrance whirled and rushed over the limitless meadows. Fall into one of the pillars and you were all twisted and twirled about, so giddy that you could not find the road again.

The little girl's name was Lenchka.

Sergey Nikolayich would not send Nanny Stepanida away. It was Nanny Stepanida who had nursed him. Nanny Stepanida was sixty-eight years old, and was now queer in the head : she was for ever at war with cockroaches and stray dogs and savage, tousled cats. But, most of all, she was at war with devils—she went round and made war on them. Whenever Sergey Nikolayich came home from the factory—hair on end like a yard-brush and sweat pouring off him—he would see Nanny peering into the corners and stabbing at the devils with her knitting needle—and then Sergey Nikolayich would stop to wipe the sweat off his neck and say :

“ So you are on the war-path, Stepanida Filippyevna.”

And Nanny Stepanida would turn her face to him, though it was not a face, just wrinkles.

“ At war, Serge dear, at war. . . . Heigh-ho, what a crowd of them you've got, to be sure : they're as thick as flies. It's turpentine they need.”

. . . And Stepanida Filippyevna loves telling fortunes by the cards. She will tell anyone all that is in store for him, just for the pleasure of it all. She told Grushka, for instance, she would have fortune in love with the king of diamonds, and true enough, eighteen weeks later to the very day, Grusha married Nicky the coachman. The only thing she was wrong in was that the king of

diamonds was, of course, brown-haired, while Nicky was coal-black, like the Persians who go from door to door with their hurdy-gurdies.

Stepanida has a pack of fortune-telling cards, too, an old pack. With it she has foretold many a piece of good and bad luck. A lot of the cards have long been wanting from the pack, it is true: the ten of diamonds accidentally came to a bad end under Nicky's heel, so the brisk, brand-new little two does duty for him now. And the ace of spades got so decrepit that he had to be thrown into the swill bucket, and the spades are now ruled over by a grimy seven from another pack. Oh, and there is a knave of diamonds, you know, in the pack. He is young, his eyes are sad, and he bears a wooden axe in his hand. . . . So how can the others compete with him?

. . . No one knew, no one ever guessed, that in the early sleepy hours, when the May lilacs were spreading out in the damp blueness of the night, the knave of diamonds would climb up the creaking staircase to Lenchka's high little attic. And the nights just then were moonlit, nightingale nights, nights when you gave your heart away before you knew it. . . .

When the cocks crew midnight under the blue cowl of slumber, the familiar boards would creak and the door would turn ever so little and ever so softly on its hinges, and Lenchka gently opened her eyes. . . . Lenchka's eyes grew dark and big, taking everything in. And then the sickle moon passed behind the trees of the lime park and walked abroad over the chill glass of the night river. . . . Gently the door turned, and gently Lenchka's eyes unfolded. Listening to the sweet creak of the familiar boards and the soft rustle of the door, Lenchka was lying all white in her little bed; in he came and placed his wooden axe in the corner and came up to her, peering fearfully in the corners, and he went down on his knees and stared and stared at Lenchka with his glazed diamond eyes.

. . . And with a lock of her loosened hair pressed to her burning lips, she whispered: "My darling, my own naughty boy . . . My sweet one, my dear silly diamond knave."

The time was torturingly long in the green depths of the nightingale nights. And when the sickle moon, with its sharp horn clinging to the little cloud, again climbed up over the park, the knave went back to his pack, where the jealous queen of clubs, with eyes made up, was smiling and whispering to the six of diamonds something terribly insulting about diamond love.

.

Eyes grow sad at autumn time. So did Lenochka's. . . . In autumn the forest pools are dimmed, and where the blue of a spring morning has opened out the leaden waters are ruffled in the slanting rain.

In the autumn Stepanida Filippyevna changed her knitting needle for a rolling pin—the better to get at them with. Hit them over the head—that was something they were afraid of. Besides, stabbing them with a needle made such a stink. They had eyes of a greenish tinge and tails as long as rats' tails: it's turpentine they need.

Eyes grow sad at autumn time. In the flower bed in the park, among the last asters, the vetch is secretly and timidly bristling up, and the stiff nettles look stone-like on gloomy days. . . .

Nanny Stepanida would say to Lenochka: "What ails you, Lenochka? You're out of sorts, and your eyes are dark. . . . Come, and I'll tell your fortune! Oh, but how tired I am."

She had been hammering the devils all day long, that is why she was tired.

"Yes, do tell me!" and something in Lenochka woke up.

They went down into the dining room, and there sat down. Nanny spread the cards over the sofa, the red suits and the black, the sevens and the aces. . . .

"There you are, dearie. . . . And now I'll tell you your fortune. You will have a big piece of luck with a heart interest. . . . You are loved, dearie, by a dark-haired diamond, but the queen of spades is trying to thwart him. Look how her eyes are bulging, the double-faced hussy. But you mustn't be uneasy: for after three club-roads the king of spades will come riding out for you from government house, and you will become queen and marry the king of spades and be thwarted no more. So don't take on: you will grow up and forget and, forgetting, you'll change."

Sergey Nikolayich had come up on to the terrace, where Ksyusha was rattling the plates. And what a laugh he had—loud as a log hurtling down a hill-side.

.

They went every summer into the country, to a villa of their own, in Baranovka. It was there that the brigadier, Nikolay Petrovich Varezchnikov, in a sudden burst of passion, had declared his love to granny Paraskeva Ivanna. There it was that Auntie Agrippina had suddenly died from unexplained causes, and there it was that Sergey Nikolayich himself had first seen the light, howling outrageously.

Every summer. And Lenochka was as she had always been—with a black ribbon, like a witch butterfly, in her stiff hair. Her gait was as before, light, though it is beginning to have a hint of heaviness. Everything is just the same. This spring, like every other spring, the gay lilac was lush and mauve-flaming under Lenochka's window. From the dusty glass the unageing hussar is still flaunting his tarnished epaulette, and as dusk comes on throws a wink at someone with his faded eye. Just as of old, the seventh board from the top creaks in the night, and a noiseless door is thrown open. And again he rises to his knee and, with arms dutifully folded over his breast, waits for Lenochka's kind words; but Lenochka is silent, and her soul, like the soil in February, is cold, promising love against the springtime. Lenochka has grown weary of diamond tears, and fickle diamond love is odious. In a dream Lenochka has seen someone else, and he is better. She is sleeping, her arms outstretched, and has not heard the knave's words. In September, Lenochka was going on for sixteen. . . . The smiles on Lenochka's face grew rarer as the noise of the familiar footfall penetrated through the closed door.

When autumn was over, winter drew on. Afterwards summer came rushing on with sun overhead, and again it was autumn when there were many rains. The frost-tinged gold of the limes mouldered away, and on the rain-drenched plot the thistles waved their sodden heads.

Nanny Stepanida Filippyevna was gone to her everlasting sleep under the grass, and Lenochka was affianced. And in Stepanida Filippyevna's box, among the bald aces and the unlovely queens, wasted away the knave of diamonds, even he. . . .

And this all happened as expected and foretold. On Sunday, after lunch, at two of the clock, Sergey Nikolayich sat in his armchair on the terrace, lazily studying the texture of his right boot. Suddenly, there, in a cab, was Alexey Semenyich. Sergey Nikolayich was ever a kindly host: "Ksyusha, the tea cups, and this and that." He threw open his arms, but at once he noticed something: Alexey Semenyich was wearing a frock-coat, on his nose there were beads of perspiration, and altogether he was in birthday attire. Sergey Nikolayich, who at once knew, of course, the reason for it all, did up his buttons and grunted to show that he knew the reason for it all. And Lenochka had noticed it, too, and had run away to the shelter of her attic.

Alexey Semenyich, without losing any time, fiercely rubbed his hands together, and came to the point: "You will naturally realise,

Sergey Nikolayich, that in view of my position at the university, and so on. . . .”

Sergey Nikolayich rubbed his bald head, and quietly answered : “ Well, it is not for me to decide, and so on. . . .”

Here Lenochka rushed out, cast herself into Alek’s arms, and all was over.

Then Alexey Semenych divested himself of his frock-coat, hung it behind the armchair and sat down to tea, and Sergey Nikolayich poured out for him and talked to him of this and that, and Alexey Semenych nodded his assent.

Everything is silent and asleep, hushed by the scratching patter of the slanting rain. At times, in the dirty gutter by the fence smelling of weeds and dirt, the wind will rustle and again drop to sleep. . . . Only the rare bark of a dog from near-by Usolye keeps watch over the quietness.

There is a cheerful blaze in Lenochka’s little attic, and companionable laughter. Lenochka is sitting next to her fiancé. Lenochka’s head is rocking in laughter on her fiancé’s shoulder : Alexey Semenych has straddled his fingers wide and with them is counterfeiting a goat’s face for Lenochka.

There ring out two laughing voices in the narrow room where Paraskeva Ivanna, the brigadier’s wife, mincingly purses up her baby mouth and for the thousandth time delights to inhale the imaginary perfumes of her painted bunch of flowers.

“ Look, on this little finger we shall put an ordinary ring, and on this one an engagement ring. . . .”

“ And that one? ”

“ That one we shall kiss.”

What with the laughter and the tap tap of the rain, none of them heard the creak of the seventh board from the top, none heard how a chink of the door opened, and none heard the anguished groan nor saw the frightened glance of the knave when he saw someone else in the attic. But he came down as softly as ever, looked into the dining-room—all was quiet—crept noiselessly up to Nanny’s trunk, which Stepanida Filippyevna had forgotten when she journeyed to the other world. And there, in the pack, between two feather-brained sixes, bitterly clasping his wooden axe, the knave of diamonds surreptitiously wept.

Behind him the two bald aces were whispering about the vanity of mundane affairs, and the nine of spades had hurled himself like a stone on his heart. And the jealous, cross-grained queen of spades, who had pushed her sharp edge out of the pack, was

giggling with a noiseless caustic guffaw and dashing a stingy spade tear on to her lace shoulder.

Then the Varezchnikovs went away into the town. No need now to take Nanny's box with them!

A fortnight later Alexey Semenyich took unto himself Lenchka, dressed all in white. And her heart happiness came to her, and she was like a queen with her spade king. . . . And only once, when she was now Elena Sergeyevna and had reached her fortieth year, did she kiss in her memory, in despair and tears all night long, her forsaken knave of diamonds.

WALLENSTEIN'S TOMB

Translated from the Czech of JAROSLAV DURYCH
by F. P. CASEY.

[Albert Wallenstein, or Waldstein, the famous Imperialist General who held Gustavus Adolphus at bay, was made Duke of Friedland for his services and was suspected of aiming at the Bohemian Crown. In 1634 he was assassinated at Eger by foreign adventurers in the Imperial service, with the connivance of Vienna.

General Banér was one of the foremost generals in the service of Gustavus and in the later campaigns of the Thirty Years' War.

Jaroslav Durych is perhaps the most interesting of post-war Czech historical novelists, and his trilogy on the career of Wallenstein has aroused much attention—ED.]

RESIGNEDLY the old major-domo of the House of Jičín made a bow. He did not like doing what was asked of him, but there was war, and if his Lord, Maximilian Count of Trautmannsdorf and Wainsburg, Knight of the Golden Fleece, Imperial Privy Counsellor, Chamberlain and Supreme Hofmeister, stood now in his place, he would with careful courtesy and a smile do what the servant was prepared to do, though only with sadness in his heart and with the spur of sharp arms and still sharper glances. John Banér, General of the Swedish Crown, had deigned to visit before supper the Carthusian Cloister of Valdice.

The cloister was due to receive, or had perhaps already received, from the Imperial Treasury the fifty thousand and six hundred gulden, which the Duke of Friedland during his life had not paid into its funds. Had they received this sum, or had they not? How was he to find out; how was he to conduct himself? The noble generals and the commissioners certainly had stolen what they could, and who knew whether or not so much remained of the

Friedland property; who knew whose duty it was to pay out this money? The stewards had wisely taken flight. But the Swedish General had good information; he had trustworthy spies everywhere, and was well skilled in war. Why the devil does he want to look at those Carthusians? Surely he does not desire to visit them to change over to the Catholic Faith? Should he send the Prior secret word? But what is all that to him? If the Lord Count Maximilian be not content with him, well, he is prepared not to die in this unhappy country. The general had asked him about the count's children. He could name them without fear, for were they not in Vienna, where there was no need to be alarmed that the general could easily capture and put them to ransom? He had mentioned by name Adam Matthias, John Frederick, Maximilian Carl, Francis, Ferdinand, and Sigismund. Madame Banér had been astonished, and had smiled with a motherly smile. So many sons! How pleased she would have been to know them! Oh, the good little Calvinist woman was pious as well as lovable; and when she had eaten, drunk, and taken all that she desired, she would have liked to fondle the children of the man whose house and court they had plundered. How kind and noble she was! And that was as it should be. Generals Wittenberg and Douglas courteously praised her beautiful sentiments, but General Banér meditated as though on the eve of battle, paying no heed to the imbecilities and babblings of his wife.

The talk, it is true, soon turned to warfare. There was a rumour that Hatzfeld, the Imperial General, expected a considerable reinforcement from the Austrian Archduke Leopold William, pluralist Bishop and Abbot. General Banér ordered the carriages to be made ready for the drive to the cloister, and Madame Banér became deeply absorbed in thought.

To the Carthusian cloister! What were the monks like? According to report, they were very strict, and not allowed to speak; ghostly and terrifying, they kept their faces veiled and prayed in croaking voices; they went about barefooted and slept in coffins. They were a kind of monkish pietists, even though they were papists. What should she put on? Piety was not to be affronted, even if it were pagan, musulman or papist piety. She noticed that her dress was not altogether appropriate for such a visit. How, in this dress, could she move the Carthusian monks to recognise her goodness?

She went to her chamber and tried on an old-fashioned dress with a cape, which hung low over her shoulders and raised her chin

towards the heavens. But as she sat before the mirror she remembered that to match this dress she must wear a high Spanish chevelure, and have her hair curled and crimped. And while her maid was heating the curling irons and moistening her hair, other apprehensions came to her mind. The dress which she had just put on was certainly respectful and decorous, but it had too many colours and lustres; the sleeves were slashed and plentifully supplied with jewelled clasps; the satin lining was too resplendent, and upon the bodice were masses of pearls and gold, as many as on the painted portraits of noblewomen. And the painted noblewomen had at least the consolation that they were bedecked with trinkets and chains of pearls only in the portraits painted for them by the artist at so much a head; but the consort of the General of the Swedish Crown was not lucky enough to be bedizened with merely imaginary jewels. And, besides, wherever could all General Banér's spoil of war be put? There was no space left to hang or fasten any more trinkets, chains, precious stones, or buckles on to. And, besides, she ought to put a diadem in her hair—but would it be proper to go in such harness to visit Carthusian monks? Regretfully, she took off the gigantic cape and rummaged among her lace wraps, taking counsel with her maid whether she should wear a skirt tucked up at the back or one slit in front, and how many under-petticoats should go with each.

But what would the strict Carthusian monks say if she arrived with ten petticoats a-rustle as though she were a queen? Such pious people have been famed from olden times for a lack of fastidiousness in word and for being no respecters of persons. Would it be better to wear a collar ruffed up at the back? Oh, how the general had liked her when she wore it some years ago! Or, better, perhaps, a soft collar? Where was the poor, late lamented Gustavus Adolphus! She tried on one after the other, and the maid drew back the curtain. And she forgot how time was flying. The general had already sent word to say that he was waiting. "Ah, what am I to do?" The lady had not yet decided. Quickly she and the maid pulled dresses out of the wardrobe. Finally, the general himself came, and made a grimace.

"My dear, do tell me what am I to wear? For a visit to the Carthusians old clothes really won't do. What would they say!"

"Why all this get-up!" growled the general gruffly, taking in at a glance the disorder of the room and the despair of his wife; "leave all that till you are in Sweden, off to church or the court. Or did I get you a bad dressmaker? But bestir yourself!"

The lady blushed, and gazed at her husband with the yearning of beauty in its first decline.

“ But how about the Carthusians? ”

“ You surely don’t imagine that the Carthusians care about make-up ! ” he replied, derisively.

The lady exulted inwardly. Indeed, why should she doubt that piety in an attractive dress, even though daringly new-fashioned, was less meritorious than the starched costume affected by old-modish virtue. Her husband was right. She had forgotten that her old festive dress was quite unsuitable to the carriage.

Swiftly the maid parted her hair down over her head, looped it across the temples in attractive waves, and plaited it in a knot beneath her crown. And the consort of the General of the Swedish Crown found herself clad in a dress of soft satin of that light colour which scandalised strict people, with a short train—oh ! what would the bishop say to that ! The first wrinkles on her face alone ventured to scold her. Quick with the rouge ! Or should she stick on a patch of English plaster, too ? But the general is already impatient. Oh dear, what else has she forgotten ? A prayer book. But by now she is on the stairs and must not turn back. They would laugh at her, and say she wished to pray with papists.

There was no particular cause to imagine that Count Trautmannsdorf had taken away to Hungary all the most beautiful horses from the stalls of the Duke of Friedland. More than five years had passed since then, but the team was still respectable and betrayed its Andalusian pedigree. The general, however, preferred his own carriage to the relics of the outfit of the Friedlander ; in Germany there was plenty of choice. The coachman loosened the reins, the huge back wheels began to grind out the song of the road.

Although the House of Trautmannsdorf was most comfortable, yet when the carriage came out on to the drive and went through the Jičín Gate, it was like a release from purgatory. Upon one side there still frowned the Deanery Church, but the evening sun shed a chary smile upon the housetops, and the sky resembled the skies of Sweden. The road climbed imperceptibly, and the horses trotted. In the shade of a chill breeze the carriage entered an avenue, and the horses were free to slow down until they merely walked. The driver did not use the whip. Upon the clothes and faces of those in the carriage the shadows began to play. They multiplied upon them. They settled upon their laps, they stroked them caressingly,

they followed each other like fawning seconds of silent and cold time, with cruel flattery.

Madame Banér looked out and was shocked at what she saw. The general, observing her interest, ordered everyone to get out and walk on the side path. To the driver he signed to drive slowly ahead.

The avenue of trees was endless. The trees stretched away gradually uphill, silently and in a gloomy seriousness. Here all that rustled like the leaves, and sang like the sparrows and linnets, was but an empty and ill-placed consolation. There were four rows of trees. They were lindens, and here and there a linden seemed to have mournfully pined away. They were too numerous to count. They rose at intervals towards the top of the hill. Upon their trunks there clung green lichens and mould, and the sun's rays moaned over this musty greenery as upon the walls of a crypt. These lindens were not very old, but they seemed unduly experienced, eerily sly. There were four rows of them; through the centre ran the high road and along each side a fairly wide footpath. The sun cringed as it peeped in among them, and it seemed as though the trunks, supporting themselves by the aid of their cold, slanting shadows, mocked the sun and the daylight. But the singular thing was that all those trunks, standing so silently and cynically, bowed from every side towards the centre of the highway; and some of them bowed lower than others, as if they were inquisitive, incapable of patiently waiting, eager to be the first to see whether he had yet arrived, whether they had yet borne him hither.

They were in no mood for talk. The major-domo took the liberty of telling his distinguished visitors that this avenue had been planted by the Duke; that it was by this road that he used to drive to his gardens, to the pheasant-walk, and to the game preserves; that it was along this road that he came to the secret conference with the agents of His Excellency the Chancellor of the Swedish Crown, and that the last time he had stayed here was before his Silesian campaign. But the chief purpose of this avenue had been to serve as a funeral road. By it the Dukes of Friedland were borne to their tombs in the Carthusian Cloister of Valdice.

The coachman drove slowly a few paces ahead, and the carriage seemed to be a hearse which they were following. Madame Banér shivered, for she sympathised with the poor and humble, and her heart was easily frightened; association with her husband in his campaigns had been quite useful to her in fostering such praise-worthy feelings. Although she had a pious horror of death, yet out

of respect for it she walked in the centre of the highroad, in admiration of its stateliness. But she was fear-stricken. The road lost itself in its wanderings up hill and down. The four gloomy rows of trees were silent in unceasing mockery, and the chirping of sparrows and linnets seemed but an ill-placed disturbance of the grave-like, terrifying stillness which derided not only life, sky and sun, but also the general and his lady.

"And what kind of funeral did you give him?" asked the general of the major-domo, with a sneer in his voice.

This question was like a lash to the old official. But, before a word could come to his tongue, feelings of bitterness, sadness, uncertainty, awe and of shame, changed his countenance into a mask of mockery. It was an eerie mockery, almost as eloquent as the omniscient slyness of those lindens along the highway of death.

The face of the victorious general glowed with righteousness. Even so had erred the pride of a man who had believed only in the stars and had scorned everyone in the world. And, indeed, they had borne him hither secretly by night, drawn by a team of oxen, without lights and without a cortege, for the officials of the Holy Roman Emperor had not allowed it to be done otherwise. And it was for this that he had planned a funeral road of this kind, more magnificent than any in the domains of any ruler upon earth.

But his lady had begun to call to the driver to stop the coach although the drive had scarcely lasted half an hour. A terror had touched her heart. It seemed to her that the trees were dead, that they were of stone or bewitched, that the green leaves and branches were nothing but frauds and cheats. The distance seemed to her unending. Life was speechless. A silence of death mocked at the narrow crevice of blue sky. There is no God, there is no heaven, there is no salvation, there is no life after death—nothing but endless, horrible anguish in a cold, dumb, mocking tomb. It was for this that the lindens bowed down towards the centre of the road and were eagerly on the watch; for behind each of them there lurked a silent demon with a snare, and whoever stepped this way was caught and made captive, so that never, never, could he escape, even by paying tenfold the ransom required for a captive general. She was afraid lest her husband's blasphemy should have some dreadful consequence, as had been her sad lot more than once already.

"I feel unwell; I am tired," she explained.

They all smilingly took their seats, and Generals Wittenberg and Douglas attempted pleasantly to dissipate the depression of their commander's wife. The coachman was ordered to drive fast. He drove past the gardens, past the empty and deserted aviary, past the pheasant-walks and preserves with their tall black pines. Even the camel stall was empty; seven years had already passed since the King of Poland had sent the camel, presented to him by the Tartar Khan. He had sent it as an honourable gift to the Lord of Questenberg at Vienna, and the camel had made the pilgrimage across Moravia. But Questenberg had been grievously puzzled to know what to do with such a monster in Vienna. And he had remembered his friend, the generalissimo, and sent a messenger to meet the camel, to tell him to turn round and to direct his long steps towards Jičín instead of Vienna. The letter which he had sent about it set the generalissimo thinking. What was he to do with such a monster? But out of loyalty to the Lord of Questenberg he accepted the gift and had the stable built for the camel. Then the Khan of Tartary had travelled in German lands, and had made his bow to King Gustavus Adolphus. He met the generalissimo, too, and made his bow. Perhaps the camel would have wandered on from court to court, as a gift of honour, until once more it found someone to appreciate it. But in the meantime it had died of loneliness.

The carriage reached a fortress. A queer rampart, long and straight, leered at the setting sun. Its ineffective bastions seemed sad and bent beneath a load of sorrow. But the building inside the enclosure was as magnificent as a royal residence. The Swedish soldier blew his trumpet, the gates opened, the carriage entered the first courtyard.

In the cloister were stationed Swedish dragoons. The monks were neither to be seen nor heard. The buildings were beautiful and clean, but there was an unfriendly twilight atmosphere. The arms of Albert of Wallenstein were to be seen, piously arranged for the journey into eternity. The visitors alighted before the second gateway, and Madame Banér admired the stucco vaulting, similar to what she had seen at the House of Jičín and in the stables. It was the work of Italian artists. Then came a large court, with wells, which seemed dead and bottomless; then more lindens, cloistered buildings with dark roofs, and, facing the entrance, the church, magnificent, high, white, its gates studded with silver nails, and possessing two towers with stone pillars and a coat of arms. Wide stone steps led up to the door of the church, which someone

from within opened slowly, as though expecting the arrival of a funeral

The Prior of the Carthusians awaited the visitors, inside the church. The interior of the church drew them, as it were a torture chamber.

It was lofty, so lofty that a feeble prayer would not have reached the roof, beneath which two swallows in hasty, frightened flight showed as specks of black. It was wide as the freedom of heart which reckes not of its own defence nor of the confusions of this world. It was white as the eternal day, pure white and clear, with a whiteness that was holy and majestic, a dazzling whiteness even whiter than that of the walls. The stucco here, too, was Italian. But beneath this whiteness was the haunting darkness of the long black benches, the black pulpit, the black altars, the black doors. All this was below; the spectre-like whiteness was above. Below was the darkness of the tomb; above the whiteness of hope in the resurrection and in eternal life. Below was terror and sadness; above freedom, the firmament, the light of heaven. It was cold here. The Prior bowed, rather from resignation than from respect.

"I do not wish to lay any burden upon you," the general said to him, "and you have no grounds for alarm. Not one straw which might be of use to you shall I take from here. I only want something which to you, as a Carthusian, is of no consequence."

"Your Excellency," replied the Prior, "whatever may befall can only be by the will of God, without which not even a hair can fall from a man's head."

The generals gazed around the church. Certainly there was nothing here which might serve as loot. In their campaigns and raids they could have had their glut of beautiful and rare things, far better than those here. There were not many pictures, and the image of St. Joseph upon the high altar was of no special value. There were not even statues or votive offerings of jewels, or silver vessels; and the rivets upon the doors appeared to be plated rather than of solid silver. It was a splendid church, magnificent and yet marvellously poor. The Duke had not caused much wealth to be brought hither to his grave. But where was his tomb of white marble, with his statue and coat of arms?

The general asked this question of the Prior.

They were standing before a side altar, and the Prior pointed to the opposite altar. They moved towards it, looking at the hard and severe countenance of St. Bruno, founder of the Order, in the

altar-picture. An interesting picture, but who would care for it in Sweden? Yes, but where was the tomb?

The Prior placed his foot upon the stone. Even the general, who did not like to show surprise, was astonished.

"Is this the place which he himself settled, or was he only buried like this by command of the Imperial officials?"

"Such was his own wish."

"Thank you," said the general. "We no longer need your services. Line up your monks, that I may greet them!"

The Prior folded his hands and glanced at the figure of St. Bruno. His own countenance was firm and contemptuous; a dark contempt for the world and consummate resignation to the will of God had changed it to stone. He looked into the face of St. Bruno, bowed his head—a bow which might, or might not, be intended for the Swedish visitors—and walked away slowly and gravely, rustling his monastic habit.

The doors of the church were opened. A Swedish cornet, with wagoners and farm hands, was waiting for instructions. Then their footsteps rang upon the pavement of the church, and though Madame Banér quaked with fear, yet was she thrilled by this proof of the goodness of her heart and her piety. Now it was certain. The general was going to have the tomb opened and the coffin raised, and perhaps it would be possible to look upon the body of the Duke of Friedland. Oh, how terrible, but also how edifying! Mortals must remember death and instruct themselves by gazing upon the face of the dead. Of corpses, Madame Banér, on her journeys with her husband, had already seen plenty, but a corpse like this she had so far never seen.

The work, however, was not easy or rapid. It was like when the pious King Gustavus Adolphus of sacred memory recovered the canons which the Bavarian Elector had walled up in secret cellars before the fall of Munich. The church protested against the rude clamour and banging, and its silence was unbearable.

The major-domo of Jičín felt a strange unease, not knowing, nor even daring to ask, what the General of the Swedish Crown really meant to do. What was he himself to do? Would Count Trautmannsdorf or some Imperial commissioner come back some day to this district, or would these new masters remain here for ever? What was one to think of it? But, after all, this was a disgraced generalissimo and a rebel, whose removal His Majesty had openly and solemnly confirmed and approved in a letter to the Electors and German princes. Moreover, it was known that

His Majesty only unwillingly and, as it were by oversight, had given permission for the body to be brought here from Střibro, and that it was only out of respect for the people's feelings that his Lordship Count Trautmannsdorf had raised no objection. But thinking of all this almost turned his brain, and he was suddenly distraught with fear, as though in a few moments the generalissimo were going to raise the coffin lid, stand erect on his feet, and turn upon him first of all those terrible, piercing, furious eyes.

The coffin had by this time been lifted out. The General of the Swedish Crown did not flinch. In the church it was getting dark and the bottom of the tomb could not be seen, though heaven alone knew what might be hidden there that his assistants would be pleased to steal. The coffin clattered upon the pavement.

"A light!" commanded the general.

The Swedish cornet looked round. His experienced gaze perceived candlesticks on the altar of St. Bruno. He climbed up on to the altar; the altar-cloth silently shivered in the dusk; he seized a candle, and as he was looking for his flint and steel, he noticed the perpetual lamp. He strode towards it, but it was high. Then the doors opened, and towards him there stepped a scowling spectral procession.

The monks approached him like ghosts. Their dress, their attitudes, their peculiar, skeleton-like, slow gait, their bent heads—all this, to a confessor of the pure word, seemed ridiculous and disgusting; there was something mad about them all. Each of them carried a lantern, fairly large but with only a tiny, narrow opening, so that they looked like magicians. The cornet was taken aback, but quickly sprang towards the nearest, opened his lamp, lighted his candle from it, and with a mocking guffaw walked to the altar of St. Bruno, paying no further attention to the mad monks. He lighted all the candles. Madame Banér liked this. Even the generals glanced at the picture of the severe saint. The candle-light dissolved into dusk and fell dully upon his countenance. The shadows upon it deepened, its severity was accentuated, the hunger for torture cried out from the face, and the eyes glowed as in blind ecstasy. This was an ascetic saint. Of what was he now thinking? Now the Papists would be expecting a miracle, but there was only this major-domo present, and he seemed untrustworthy.

Then sounds began to be heard in the church. The general looked around, listened, and then spoke to his wife:

"If you wish it, go and look at the Carthusians!"

The major-domo gasped in terror.

"Your Excellency," he stuttered, "he, that is to say the Duke, was a strict man, but pious and noble. To thousands of the poor he showed mercy and punished the unrighteous, regardless of human persons——"

From the choir there sounded :

"Though I walk in the midst of trouble, thou wilt revive me : thou shalt stretch forth thine hand against the wrath of mine enemies, and thy right hand shall save me."

The general did not clearly understand the words, which the echoes in the church made it difficult to grasp, but the praying of those people at this moment filled him with a peculiar relish. The wagoner opened the coffin ; it had rotted, a piece of the cover was torn off and creaked so shrilly that Madame Banér raised her hands and turned from the monks to the coffin. The raised lid terrified her, the blood turned cold in her body and her legs trembled. Now she was to see the corpse of the Duke of Friedland ! She felt a sadistic pleasure. She thrilled and trembled in expectation of a delight which her apprehensions made more vivid.

"He was ever a friend of the Swedish Crown," stammered the major-domo.

At that moment the monk who was reading raised his tired voice : "O Lord, thou hast searched me, and known me. Thou knowest my downsitting and mine uprising——"

The general understood. He smiled insolently and gave his orders with an irrevocable gesture.

"Your Excellency !" cried the major-domo, "what if he were to come to life, and arise !"

There was no time for anyone to heed him, for anyone to smile at those words of senseless despair. The lid fell to the ground. Then might the visitors themselves learn the significance of the 139th Psalm :

"Thou compassedst my path and my lying down ——"

The major-domo stammered :

"He released without ransom General Torstenssen ; he offered his aid against the Bavarian Elector ; he defended the liberty of the princes, and it was not his fault that His Majesty the King of Sweden fell heroically ——"

The general looked on calmly and understandingly.

"Whither shall I go from thy spirit ? or whither shall I flee from thy presence ?"

" If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there : if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou are there.

" If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea ;

" Even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me.

" If I say, surely the darkness shall cover me ; even the night shall be light about me.

" Yea, the darkness hideth not from thee ; but the night shineth as the day : the darkness and the light are both alike to thee."

The major-domo, hearing those words, hoarsely rattled forth by one of the monks, blanched as though convicted of a lie. And the general looked into the coffin upon something unpleasant and repulsive.

" Yes, indeed," he exclaimed, " but for him our renowned King might still be alive and our armies might never have suffered the misfortunes of two years ago. But now *I* am here ! "

Madame Banér stepped back. The odour of death rose like a mist, curling in the air and reaching down to her throat. This was not fitting. The body lay there unheeding, and the eye-sockets sneered at the noble lady.

" We knew his thoughts better than you did," said the general to the major-domo ; " but your Emperor rewarded him badly "

The monks had fallen silent. The general turned towards them. They said no word, their heads bowed. He saw the face of one of them. It was like that of an exorcist. A narrow circle from the light in his hand illumined a big book with big characters.

The light fell upon those characters only, and the rest remained in darkness. High up in the roof the terrified swallow was twittering. And once again broke out the lamentation of the Carthusians :

" Deliver me, O Lord, from the evil man : preserve me from the violent man—— "

" Go, bid them stop now ! " shouted the general to the major-domo.

The major-domo went to carry out the command. The general, with his wife, gazed after him. The major-domo said something to the monks. They were all wrapped in their cowls. But still the chant was heard :

" Which imagine mischiefs in their heart ; continually are they gathered together for war —— "

The major-domo tugged at the shoulder near him.

"They have sharpened their tongues like a serpent; adders' poison is under their lips —"

"His Excellency the General commands," cried the major-domo, shaking the lamp.

But the voice was raised yet higher :

"Keep me, O Lord, from the hands of the wicked; preserve me from the violent man; who have purposed to overthrow my goings"

The general was disgusted, and his wife saw now that he was preparing to chastise the monks for this untimely behaviour. She would have held him back, but the general suddenly called out to the major-domo :

"Leave them then! Come here! Are they praying for the soul of their benefactor?"

The major-domo, not understanding, cautiously shrugged his shoulders

"They do this seven times day and night; even during the night they get up and come here, but on other days they lock themselves in here."

And the voice answered :

"Let burning coals fall upon them : let them be cast into the fire; into deep pits, that they rise not up again."

The general was beginning to heed them. The major-domo, in the glittering of the tortured lights, observed his cruel smile.

"Are they saying this against me?" he asked the major-domo.

The latter was terrified.

"Oh, God forbid, your Excellency!"

"Or against this fellow?" asked the general, tapping the coffin.

The major-domo stared with starting eyes.

The general bent over the coffin and touched the head. It moved freely. Gone now was its immunity; gone, too, was its stiffness. Candles were brought from the altar to the coffin. They blazed and smoked. The body lay idly in the coffin. It was in a vile and ragged shirt, already eaten through by worms, turned black by the cruel misery of the tomb, and the rotting flesh showed itself, all unconscious, in its shameless monstrosity. The murdered man slept in the midst of decay, carelessly, fearlessly, as though his coffin were not opened, as though this were not a General of the Swedish Crown, with his devout wife in a new dress, with a company of generals and soldiers; as though he were not illumined by six candles from the altar of St. Bruno; as though no frowning saint were gazing down upon him. The general raised first the

left arm of the murdered man, and then the right. The remnants of the sleeves of the shirt tore apart. The open coffin was a gruesome sight. The general touched the feet. He was astonished. They were both broken across, sharp fragments of bone peeped out repulsively through the skin. He dropped the thigh which he had raised. It trembled slightly, as though it yet held some remnant of life. He approached the group of monks.

“Come and take leave of your patron, if you wish!”

But not one cowl moved; the light never turned from the page with the writing in big characters, and the words of the general came in long-drawn phrases that trickled out as though the voice were in its death-struggle.

“Set a watch, O Lord, before my mouth; keep the door of my lips——”

The general mercifully respected the promised clemency. The rest of the work was done by the wagoner. He pulled up the sleeves, rubbed the hands, pressed together the jaws of the corpse, and, resting his other hand on the neck, twisted it. The corpse made neither moan nor grimace. Remnants of the skin and tendons were burst apart; only at the back of the neck did some sinews hold. The wagoner snatched away his hand and grasped his cutlass. It seemed as though the coffin would break asunder. At last the head was severed from the trunk. The wagoner paused to take breath and would have wiped away the sweat from his brow. Agghast, he stopped short as he raised his hand to his face.

“What do you intend to do?” said the lady in affright.

“Nothing wrong,” the general consoled her; “the Papists, too, sever the corpses of their devout in this way, so what I am doing cannot offend them. Besides, we see how hateful this man was to the Emperor and his friends. See how they left him!”

He drew back the rags from the breast, and Madame Banér, in the light of the candle, cried out. The sharp edges of the ribs stuck out darkly with a fiendish grotesqueness before her terrified eyes. He showed her the broken legs.

“They had intended to put him in the pillory at Prague. They did not mean him to be buried here, and the Imperial generals threatened to leave the army if the Emperor allowed him to be buried. If now I order part of him to be carried away from here, I shall assuredly please the House of Austria.”

His smile was frigid.

The wagoner wrestled with the right arm of the former Imperial General. The dead shin-bone, warped and twisted, peered out of

the coffin; the powerless fingers stretched out in a meaningless gesture, as though the hand were commanding in some grim battle in the dark world of nothingness. The knife had at last done its work, and the severed bone lay at rest upon the breast of the corpse. The wagoner drew breath and looked confidentially towards the general.

The candles blazed and smoked. Madame Banér, in anguish, turned away, staring into the darkness. Here her gaze fell upon the face of St. Bruno. She was shocked. The face was so dark and pallid; there was such an intensity of menace in it. Not only the Papists but also worshippers of the Gospel believed in miracles, and in the vengeance of those strange saints. So much was told of hurricanes, conflagrations, earthquakes, palsies, and sudden deaths. The general observed her terror, and with delight fixed his eyes upon the dark picture of the gloomy saint.

"Oh," he said with a smile, "Saint Bruno makes no protest at all against our actions."

His wife feared his blasphemy, but as she weighed these words, and watching the motionless figure on the altar picture, her trust in her husband revived.

"But what do you mean to do with this?"

Then the General of the Swedish Crown spoke in solemn tones, not merely to his wife, but also to the whole assembly:

"This General was the cause of this great war, and likewise of my Swedish King's coming with his army into German territory, and of his perishing at the battle of Lützen; and accordingly it is a fitting thing that those two pieces, the head and the right arm, should be preserved in Sweden, in eternal remembrance."

The generals, Wittenberg and Douglas, loudly acclaimed this decision, for such booty would be above all agreeable to the Swedish Crown; it would be an equitable satisfaction; the Swedish people would rejoice; the head and the right arm would be sent to Sweden as trophies. The generals had no need of such famous booty for themselves; they would unselfishly surrender them for the common good; they would be satisfied with other things; perhaps, too, the Swedish Crown would even compensate them for this. General Banér knew how to weigh money and merits.

Madame Banér, hearing mention of the deceased King, grew sad. Why, only seven years before, at the ball in Augsburg, he had been so dashing as to unbuckle his lace collar and with it decorate her, Fröken Jakobina Lauber, as the most beautiful of all the women in that city! And lo, already he is in the hands of God; may he

be forgiven; he was a noble and pious King! . . . Now this saint in the altar picture did not help; perhaps he did not know how to help, or was unable. Perhaps this Imperial Commander-in-Chief was damned. Even the Carthusian monks paid no more attention to him than to the extinguishing of the lights in their lamps.

The cornet tore the cloth from the altar, and the wagoner threw into it the results of his work. But the booty stank. It was necessary to wrap it further in the carpet that covered the steps of the altar. The general, however, was conscientious in all he did. These emaciated monks would scarcely be able to replace the stone slab upon the grave. The soldiers lifted the cover. For the last time the candles illumined the contents of the coffin, the heap of ribs, and the loathsome rotting fragments. Now it had no head, no eye-sockets whence might glare anything menacing or alarming; now it had no right hand. If the Emperor and all the Saints, in tardy repentance, should desire to bring back the murdered Commander-in-Chief to life, they would only find a headless and armless horror. The lid was replaced; the soldiers laid hold of the coffin; the escort with six candles moved forward; the knapsack with the head and the hand remained lying in a black shadow upon the pavement of the church.

With a clanging and creaking the coffin, with its hideous and mutilated contents, was carelessly bundled into the gaping, greedy grave. The lights dwindled, the wax dropped upon the flags and into the grave, the work was done. But the stone had still to be rolled into place, that the monks might be content and have no cause for complaint. And so it was done.

The candles were placed once more upon the altar. The cornet hastened from the church to bid the coachman bring round the horses. The shadows of all present were intertwined upon the pavement. The wagoner stumbled over something, hopped up, and jumped over it. It was the bundle with the booty.

No one felt inclined to say farewell to the monks. They were so absorbed in their lamentations and in their strange exercises that none of them would have looked up or replied, even if his head and arm had been broken off even as the head and arm had been broken off from their murdered patron. It was useless to think of pleasing them by a careful choice of dresses and jewels. They were not worth the trouble. Not even this patron of theirs in the altar picture had shown his power. He could not frighten even a fly. With sheer disgust the visitors listened to the slowly-uttered words, interrupted by gaps of gloomy silence :

“ Bring——my soul——out of——prison —— ”

The wagoner, taking his seat at the back of the coach, held on to the bundle.

“ It won't smell on the way? ” asked the general.

“ I hope not.”

The general wondered to himself whether the flesh would have fallen off before the booty could reach Sweden. He laughed at the thought that the joy of the Council of State might be marred by the condition of his mournful and precious loot, and assisted his wife into the carriage.

The coach rolled out again through the gate. The outriders carried torches. The sky was dark; the gloom of the ducal cloister was slowly lost in it. They drove back through the game-park. The birds were frightened from their sleep. Then came the avenue. The light of the torches illumined the trunks of the lindens. They seemed naked, staring, and surprised. Their daylight majesty took on a ghost-like appearance in this illumination. They no longer caused the slightest alarm. Everything seemed puny and powerless. At the back of the coach the wagoner hugged the bundle.

And now not even Madame Banér was afraid of death.

POETRY

WHO WILL REMEMBER?

Translated from the Polish of SIEMIENSKI

by MARJORIE BEATRICE PEACOCK and GEORGE RAPALL NOYES.

WILL e'er the wanderer, storm-driven,
Greet once again his native heath?
Will those to whom his name is given
E'er seek the sod he rests beneath?

If no friend's tears of sympathy
Water the place of his last sleep,
Rose, periwinkle, bryony,
Above him heavenly dewdrops weep!

If cold and heedless passers-by
Turn from his lonely grave away,
Shine mildly on him from on high,
Still moonbeam, with thy heavenly ray!

And when no living memory
Recalls my melody and words,
Ye groves and fields, remember me;
Remember, ye fair woodland birds!

Ye birds, and grassy vales, and flowers,
Thou moon, and star, and sky of blue,
For you I sang in happier hours—
Remember me whom once ye knew!

TO TWO SISTERS.

Translated from the Russian of TYUTCHEV
by MAUD F. JERROLD.

I SAW you both together,
And all that was of you in her I read :
The tenderness of voice, the look of calm,
And of a morning hour the breeze and balm
That floated round your head !

As in a magic mirror,
All things reflected there did now disclose
Of a past day the happiness and pain ;
And your departed youth took shape again,
And my dead love arose.

VERSES.

Translated from the Russian of TYUTCHEV
by MAUD F. JERROLD.

SHE sat upon the ground ; there lay
A heap of letters by her side ;
She tore and flung them all away,
Ashes from which the fire had died.

Lines so familiar to her sight
She looked on with estranged air :
Thus souls might gaze from some far height
On bodies they were wont to wear.

How much of her was here that she
Would irretrievably destroy !
What better moments ceased to be,
What memories of love and joy !

Silent and sad I stood apart,
And fain upon my knees to fall,
Feeling as though upon my heart
Darkness descended like a pall.

THE PROBLEM OF SOVIET FINANCE

RUSSIA, with her peculiar conditions of life, has always attracted the interest and provoked the astonishment of Western European observers. At present, so far as the economic and financial condition of the country is concerned, that astonishment must give place to amazement when one examines the official Soviet data and the explanations given of them by government representatives and the press (the latter, as everybody knows, is of a purely official nature in the U.S.S.R.). In fact, in contrast to information which reaches us of the great material hardships suffered by the population, of the impossibility of their satisfying their most primitive needs, the finances of the country, according to statements of the Commissary who is in charge of them, are in a very healthy state. And this at a time when such an obvious and extremely grave disorganisation prevails in the "capitalist" countries. The budgets of the most solid States in Europe and America reveal colossal deficits (in the U.S.A., in 1931-32, it exceeded 3 milliard dollars), while the Soviet Minister of Finance speaks of "half cover." Here is his statement: "The unified State Budget fixed at 19 billion roubles was duly carried out; revenue, in fact, amounted to 20,450 billion roubles. In other words, the growth of our socialist economy not only enabled us to carry out our programme, but even to obtain a surplus for the additional financing of the main branches of socialist construction."¹ "Figures and facts that can be verified," continues Grinko, the Soviet Commissary of Finance, "show that our financial position has been strengthened, and that the financial power of the Soviet Union has considerably increased in 1931. The result is the more important, as for the whole of the capitalist world the year 1931 has been a year of the most severe financial crisis, surpassing anything before known." On the strength of these encouraging data, the Soviet Commissary deemed it possible to submit for approval in 1932 a State Budget amounting to 27.54 milliard roubles.

Of course, a *temporary* well-being of the Treasury is logically compatible with a decline of national prosperity (there are many historical instances of this). But the point is that the Soviet sources

¹ Report of Grinko, Tsik., *Izvestia*, 30 December, 1931.

give the picture of the financial consolidation of the Union on the basis of a constant increase of national income. According to the calculations of the Soviet Government, the national income of the U.S.S.R., in terms of money, reached, in 1930, 31·4 milliard roubles; in 1931, 43·5, and in 1932 it was estimated at over 53 milliard roubles.

If such assertions correspond to reality, one is involuntarily led to the conclusion that the *regime* of "planned economy"—at least in the domain of public finance—brings about results more favourable than is the case with the competitive system of economy.

Let us try, as far as this can be done without having recourse to the original sources, to investigate the chief points of what we call the "problem of the finances of the U.S.S.R.," namely: What is their *real* money volume, what are their sources, and to what extent can they be considered as stabilised?

In approaching such an investigation, it is in the first place necessary to forewarn the European reader, accustomed to put a definite meaning upon certain financial and economic terms (such as money, credit, banks, State Budget), that, under Soviet conditions, that meaning has in many cases undergone radical changes, so that one must be prepared to realise that the terms used by the Soviet Government do not correspond to the essence of the phenomena they denote. Thus, for example, Soviet banks are not at all like European banks, because "credit" in the *bourgeois* sense is impossible in the Soviet Union. Since the Soviet State claims to concentrate under its rule all the economic life of the country, (according to Grinko, in 1928 the socialised sector produced 53 per cent. of the national income; in 1931, 81·5 per cent., and in 1932 it is expected to produce 91 per cent.), it is quite natural that the State Budget of U.S.S.R. must greatly differ, both in its magnitude and in its composition, from European budgets. Comparisons should be made with great caution. Strictly speaking, the Soviet Government ought to have completely excluded from use the conception of "State Budget," substituting for it an all-embracing formula such as "Financial Plan." Last year it came near to doing so, but this year it gave up the idea for reasons which will be stated below.

Finally, the question may arise as to what extent the very word "finance," in its accepted sense, is applicable to Soviet reality. Indeed, finances represent economic processes *as expressed in terms of money*, their reflection in money phenomena. Such an expression

of the national economy in terms of money has a sense and a meaning only inasmuch as the money fulfils within the given economy all the functions that are proper to it, that is, inasmuch as there is a free market in which the produce of various individual enterprises is exchanged. In other words, money serves as an economic regulator under a system of free individualist economy, (the economic activity of public bodies makes no difference in this case, as these act as private entities). It is quite different in the regulated "planned" economy. Here, instead of money, it is the Government which immediately directs the economic processes, ordering its citizens to do certain work and supplying them in return with a definite *ration* (in articles of consumption). The money mechanism is, under such circumstances, superfluous, and the only interest a regulated economy can really have in money is in its relations with foreign countries whose economies are based on the system of free competition.²

All these considerations must be borne in mind whenever parallels are drawn between conditions in Europe and in Soviet Russia.

Seeing that the Soviet Government, like the "bourgeois" States, expresses its "finances" in terms of money, it is, first of all, necessary to investigate what Soviet currency really represents, what are the conditions of the Soviet money mechanism, and what is the significance of the calculations in milliards which we find in Soviet data.

II.

The currency reform of 1922-27 set up in the Soviet Union the so-called "Chervonets currency." Nominally, the gold chervonets, equal to ten former gold roubles, was proclaimed as the unit of currency. But, in practice, circulation is backed by inconvertible paper money of two categories—the so-called bank-notes in the State Bank (from 1 chervonets upwards) and the Treasury notes (1, 3 and 5 roubles). In *substance*, there is no difference whatever between these two categories of paper money, in spite of the different

² In free economy, too, circumstances sometime arise when money loses its regulating effect and is replaced by administrative actions of the Government, as was the case during the World War, especially in Germany. In such a case, money ceases to reflect and gauge the economic processes, natural economy comes to the fore, and "finance" in the ordinary sense of the word, has no meaning any longer. Post-war history has shown how painful is the process of the restoration of a free competitive economic system.

institutions issuing them, for the conditions of issue have turned out ultimately to be the same.

To the above-mentioned notes one should add a considerable quantity of small coin. Thus, the currency of the U.S.S.R. is a typical paper currency, of which the unit is an inconvertible paper rouble, which from the very outset lost in inland circulation about one-half of its nominal value (in gold). The further history of Soviet currency is characterised by two parallel tendencies: a constant increase in the volume of its circulation and an almost ceaseless depreciation of its buying capacity (according to trade indices).

By the time the Five-Year Plan began to be realised, the buying capacity of the rouble was, according to Soviet data, about 50 pre-war kopeks in wholesale trade, and not more than 20-25 kopeks in retail trade. As far as the "external rate of exchange" of the rouble is concerned, its parity with foreign gold currencies, which the Government strictly maintains officially, is notoriously purely fictitious, and the Soviet Government does not deny this. On foreign exchanges the chervonets is not quoted, whereas all the foreign currency obtained by the Soviet Government from the export of goods and other sources is concentrated in its hands; there is no money market, and the "rate of exchange" of Soviet currency amounts merely to the Government evaluation of foreign currency. Whenever there are private transactions with the rouble—their volume is insignificant—its rate diverges sharply from the normal parity and approaches its internal buying power.

Currency reform was indispensable during the period of the N.E.P. (New Economic Policy), when the reconstruction of private economics was going on within certain limits. But even after the N.E.P., so long as the "private sector" continues to exist, the Soviet Government is in need of a money mechanism for its dealings with "private elements." This turns out to be indispensable, even under the system of enlarging the "socialised sector," the State not being in a position to ensure to its workers and employees the full ration promised and allowing them to make good that deficiency in the "free market." For these reasons, the central Government is obliged to take an interest in the vicissitudes of money, and the constant decline of commodity values cannot help causing it anxiety. The Five-Year Plan was drawn up on the assumption of a consolidation of the buying power of the rouble. It was therefore decided that, in the course of the next five years, the total volume of money in circulation should not increase by more than 1,250

million roubles (at the rate of 250 million roubles a year). These calculations were entirely upset by the reality, as may be gathered from the following figures:—

MONEY IN CIRCULATION.

(Millions of roubles.)

(All Categories.)		Increase over the preceding Year.
To 1 January, 1928	.. 1,667	312
To 1 January, 1929	.. 2,027	360
To 1 January, 1930	.. 2,773	746
To 1 January, 1931	.. 4,302	1,520
To 1 January, 1932	.. 5,672	1,370 ³

Under these circumstances, there is nothing surprising in the fact that, given the constant deficiency of articles of general consumption, "famine prices" prevail on the "free" market, which was illicit until quite recently when the peasantry were allowed to sell food. According to the best-informed foreign correspondents (for example, of the German papers, *Berliner Borsen-Kurier*, *Vossische Zeitung*, etc.), the value of the rouble has been reduced to 5 or 6 gold kopeks.

But if the depreciation of the unit of currency is a great disaster, the evil becomes quite intolerable when the money mechanism loses its unity, when the value of the unit of currency changes according to the hands and the market that handle it. It is long since the Soviet theoreticians and administrators began to point out that there is no *single* rouble in the U.S.S.R. In connection with the regulation of prices in the co-operatives according to the principle of the priority of separate groups of the population (the so-called "class policy of prices") a distinction can be drawn between the worker's rouble, the peasant's, the official's, the *bourgeois's*, etc. Among other things, pursuing this "class policy of prices," the Soviet Government began, in 1930-31, to organise a vast network of "State shops" in order to sell various commodities at high prices (approaching "free" prices to the so-called '*bourgeois* elements'); but all groups of the population rushed to these shops, thus naturally confirming the fall in the unit of currency, (the calculation of prices in the Government shops made the rouble amount to about 10 pre-war kopeks). A sharp divergence ensued in the evaluation

³ In the course of the current year during the first three months a certain decrease is shown up to 1 March—5,375 million roubles; but from April on (5,453.4 on 1 April) there is a fresh increase, and by 1 July the amount of money in circulation reached 6,183.1 million roubles.

of the rouble by the Government itself: in regulating prices in the co-operatives, where the scarcity of necessities was chronic, the chervonets rouble was, on an average, taken at 2.5 times below the pre-war rouble, and in State shops 10 times.⁴ It is natural that in the "free" market the depreciation of the rouble is even more considerable.

Last spring, in view of great food hardships, the Soviet Government decided, as we have said, to allow to the peasants (both collectivised and individual) a free sale of their produce. It is said that the result was a fall in the prices of many commodities. This is, of course, quite possible; but it can hardly prove of permanent value to the Soviet currency. The point is that, according to the Soviet press itself, trade can only succeed when there is on the market a sufficient supply of industrial articles. The population avoids paper money as such. In fact, we have to deal here with something almost resembling barter in a natural economy.

To sum up, we are led to the conclusion that the Soviet Government itself, by its measures, has brought about the disintegration of the money mechanism: there is no single rouble, and the only thing that remains to the population is a flight from the rouble.

Under these conditions the very complete "financial estimates" made by the Soviet Government prove shaky in their very foundations. How, for example, would one estimate and express in terms of foreign currency the State Budget of 1932, amounting to 27.54 milliard roubles? In what paper roubles is it expressed? The difficulty of answering these questions may be illustrated by an example. More than a half of the revenue side of the Budget—15 milliard roubles—comes from the turnover tax. This tax is ultimately paid by the consumer. This is how the Commissary of Finance argues in this connection: "Fifteen of the largest units of national economy, such as *Soyuzsakhhar* (Sugar Trust), *Soyuztabak* (Tobacco Trust), *Soyuzneft* (Oil Trust), Textile Union, Forest Industry, Sewing Industry, *Soyuzspirt* (Alcohol Trust), etc., decide the fate of the turnover tax."⁵ Trade is done both with foreign countries and with all groups of the population at home. Foreign

⁴ Alongside with co-operative and State shops, there are also the so-called "Torgsin" shops (for trade with foreigners), where goods are sold in foreign currency according to the gold exchange. The price-lists of "Torgsin" and of State shops bear witness to the evaluation of the rouble by the Government itself. A comparison of their prices shows that the paper rouble is worth from 12 to 15 per cent. of the gold rouble, depending on the commodity.

⁵ Grinko, *Financial Programme for the Consolidation of the Five-Year Plan*, Moscow, 1932, p. 41.

countries supply currency estimated at the gold rate of exchange, while the roubles of home origin vary according to the consumer and the place of consumption. The same applies to the expenditure of budget sums

Thus the difficulty lies not only in the fact that the value of the rouble has exceedingly diminished (and, therefore, as the German periodical, *Wirtschaftsdienst*, of 25 March, 1932, points out, the budget figures will be considerably reduced by the fall in the buying power of the rouble), but still more in the absence of a general unit of calculation. Were it even possible to detach from the budget the sums to be received in foreign currency, it would still be impossible to discover for the remaining part a common gold coefficient. Twenty-seven milliard paper roubles could be estimated in gold either at co-operative prices, and thus amount to about 10 milliards, or at the prices of the State shops, which would bring it down to 3 milliards, or, finally, at the "free market" prices, making it equal only to 1.5 milliard gold roubles. Yet all such wholesale calculations would be erroneous. Two propositions can be firmly laid down: (a) that the actual "gold" expression of the Soviet Budget is several times below the nominal; and (b) that the absence of a single standard of calculation urgently demands the substitution of a budget in kind for the money budget, this being what is really wanted in a planned economy. When the national income and the part of it to be retained by the Government are calculated in kind, one can form a definite opinion as to the volume and stability of the State Budget.

III.

After making these important reservations, it would, nevertheless, be useful to dwell on certain aspects of the State Budget as passed by the Central Government, amounting, together with the local budget, to 32.3 milliard roubles. The money income of the population is estimated by the Commissariat of Finance at 53 milliard roubles (30.6 milliard roubles for the urban, and 22.4 milliard roubles for the rural, population). We see, then, that over 60 per cent. of the national income has to pass through the State mechanism for raising resources. Given that, as the Bolsheviks affirm, three-quarters of the State Budget and one-third of the local, are expended on financing "State economic organisations," it is, nevertheless, quite obvious that the tribute levied upon the population, through the Budget alone, for the development of national economy is *inordinately great*. It must needs contribute

to the reduction of the resources for national consumption resources. Very significant in this respect are the calculations of the Birmingham Bureau of Research into Russian Economic Conditions, Memoranda Nos. 3 and 5. According to these data, the personal consumption per head of the population has decreased from 90·6 in 1913 to 85·8 pre-war roubles in 1929-30. "Taking into account the deterioration in the general quality of the products of Soviet industry (not less than one-third), we arrive at the following interesting table:—

			Personal Consumption (in million gold roubles).	Per head of the Population.
1913	12,479	90·6
1925-26	10,165	70·3
1926-27	10,752	72·7
1927-28	11,270	74·5
1928-29	11,020	71·2
1929-30	10,761	67·9

The consumption of cereals (in double cwt.) per head of the population amounted in 1913 to 5·9, in 1931 to 4·8. Of other food products there is no need to speak. A list of the rations of products distributed through the co-operatives among the privileged holders of the first-category red ration cards will give a good idea of the poverty of life. In addition to a daily ration of bread, one was entitled *monthly* to 1·6 kilograms of meat, 15 eggs, 500 grams of butter, 1·5 kilograms of sugar, 750 grams of herrings, 500 grams of soap; and 25 grams of tea for two months. These beggarly rations, on which the population would die of starvation if it did not manage to conceal from the Government a part of its income and to obtain additional rations by all kinds of illicit means, vividly illustrate the tragedy behind the following words of the Commissary of Finance: "We are building at the expense of current accumulations. This obliges us, parallel with a great fight for accumulation in the socialised economy, parallel with the development of Soviet trade, to proceed energetically with active work tending to attract the resources of the population to socialist construction" (p. 28). Thus, a high tax on poor official products diminishes the ration, which thereupon is still further reduced by money contributions. Under these conditions, the accumulation is *simply tantamount to a constant diminution of the consumption fund, which is scanty as it is*. The limit to such accumulation is set by the degree of physical and moral endurance of the population. That limit seems to have been reached. A proof of this may be seen not only in the

tragic news of growing general poverty (with the exception of the privileged groups), but in the admitted failure to fulfil last year's financial plan. Though, expressed in figures, the failure to fulfil the "unified financial plan" for 1931 does not exceed 600 million roubles, yet this result was possible only thanks to an intensified issue of paper money—contrary to the solemn promises of the Government. It is highly characteristic that this year not a financial plan (which was tentatively estimated at 47 milliard roubles), but only a budget scheme has been submitted for approval to the central body.

This is what the Commissary of Finance says: "In 1931 it was found that the carrying out of the unified financial plan created difficulties in fixing the limits of budget resources, the credits of the State Banks and private funds of the economic State organs, and also frequently obstructed the inculcation of a real responsibility of the State organs in respect of their private funds and the advances entrusted to them in the shape of loans." As this has often been mentioned in the Soviet press, the economic organs, especially since the abolition in 1930 of bills of credit and the substitution for them of "direct advances," became convinced that any deficiency in funds should be covered by the State Banks, which they believed to exist for that purpose. At the session of the Central Executive Committee, Kuybyshev, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, stated with sufficient clarity the failure of the plan, "both as regards the productivity of labour and the reduction of production costs." The productivity of labour increased in the course of three years by 34 per cent., while it was supposed to increase by 110 per cent. in the course of five (four) years. The cost of production in the industrialised sector was reduced in 1928-29 by 4.2 per cent. as against the 7 per cent. laid down by the Five-Year Plan, in 1929-30 by 6.3 per cent. as against 7.4 per cent. In 1931 there was an increase in costs of production of 2 per cent. instead of the projected decrease of 7.6 per cent. Thus, in the course of four years (including 1932), the reduction has attained only 18 per cent. instead of the 35 per cent. laid down by the Five-Year Plan (*Izvestia*, 27 December, 1931). This has resulted in arrears amounting to millions of roubles, the greater part of which had to be defrayed by unforeseen issues of paper money.

It is thus quite clear that in 1931 the carrying out of the financial plan has shown a deficit. But this deficit has, so to speak, been withdrawn from the Budget and concealed in the balance-sheet of the State Bank, and the Budget itself has been proclaimed as

"more than balanced." Such accountancy can hardly give a proper idea of the successes of "socialist construction." The issue of paper-money, officially eliminated as a source of State revenue, all the time comes forward as an element in the financing of the Five-Year Plan.

Feeling itself insecure on this point, the Soviet Government endeavours to prove that an increased issue of paper money cannot lead to inflation, since the Soviet trade turnover shows a rapid growth. Here the Soviets and some of their foreign advocates (for example, Professor Elster⁶) make a gross error: so far as concerns the movement of commodities between the Soviet economic organs and the distribution of produce among the population at regulated fictitious prices, no real market exchange of goods takes place. The free market trade is the only mainstay of currency. Therefore, when the Commissary of Finance, in his natural tendency to preserve the buying power of the rouble, speaks of "Soviet trade," that is, of State and co-operative trade organs, as the mainstay of Soviet currency, he confuses two categories—the free and the regulated economy. The State monopolised trade, in an attempt to supersede the law of supply and demand, prevents money from carrying out its regulating function, and cannot therefore serve as the *mainstay* of currency. For an evaluation of the latter, one has to turn to the illicit free market. Should the peasant trade that has now been allowed become firmly rooted, and should it be unhampered by administrative action, it might to a certain extent consolidate the currency—provided, of course, there were a cessation of the intensified issue of paper money destined to credit State enterprises. It must not be forgotten that the chervonets rouble was assimilated by the economy of the U.S.S.R. chiefly owing to the N.E.P.

The main essence of the State Budget of U.S.S.R. must really be clear from the preceding paragraphs: it lies in the *inordinate* taxation of the population, the prevailing form being indirect taxation (taxation on turnover implied in the selling prices of commodities). According to the classification established by the Soviets themselves, "taxable sources" account for 16.75 milliard roubles. The principal among these are the tax on turnover (15.121 milliard roubles) and the agricultural tax (600 million roubles). Other items of the revenue are, however, to a great extent of the same nature. If we set aside the revenue from transport (by rail and water), which amounts to 2.96 milliards,

⁶ Elster, *Vom Rubel zum Tschervonetz*. Jena, 1930.

barely covering the expenditure of 2.92 milliards, and which is in the nature of a turnover, and some other unimportant items (such as minting, passenger insurance, etc.), all that is left is the surplus on the profits of the State social and economic undertakings (1.24 milliard roubles) and loans (4.34 milliards). As far as concerns the profits of various enterprises, these are drawn from the monopoly prices of commodities and those on compulsory State insurance from compulsory premiums. Of the compulsory nature of Soviet loans (indirectly if not directly) too much has been said and written for me to dwell upon it here. Everyone knows nowadays that in the U.S.S.R. loans have become a rather common form of tax. If we put together all the sources of taxation, we shall see that over 22 milliards fall upon loans, and that the great majority of them are *indirect*.

There is nothing surprising in this: the building up of the economic system according to Communist plan can only be attained at the expense of the private consumption of the population, and the best way to cut down rations is by indirect taxation.

As regards the expenditure side of the Soviet Budget, we shall limit ourselves in this article to two remarks. First, the calculation of expenses for a number of Commissariats, especially those for War and the Navy, raises very serious doubts. Army and Navy expenditure has been estimated at the low figure of 1,278 milliard roubles (for special forces, that is, for the Red *gendarmérie*, 119 milliards). It is very significant that the above-mentioned German review, *Wirtschaftsdienst*, is unable to understand how it is possible to ensure with such modest means, the maintenance of the quite well-organised external and internal defence of the Government.

The Soviet Government strives to show that an overwhelmingly greater part of the funds collected by it goes to finance the national economy. But even if we assume that the data given are correct, it is quite evident that the allocation of means is monstrously out of proportion. It is impossible to build up the national economy with the aid of a starving and ragged people: such an idea is conceivable only in the serf-owning colonies, at the dawn of capitalist development, and even then on condition that a supply of serfs is assured at a low price. It is impossible to spend the lion's share of revenue on heavy industry and on the "production of the means of production," holding out a vague promise to the population of a "twofold and threefold" increase of its supply only in the course of the Second Five-Year Plan. Anything done

in too great a hurry is in danger of proving unstable—such is the mildest formula by which we can summarise the expenditure estimate of the U.S.S.R. Budget.

Thus, for reasons stated above, we are not in a position to answer the question as to what is the real value of the Soviet State Budget expressed in stable currency. We can merely state that: (i) it shows a deficit, but the deficit is concealed in other items of the financial plan (credits); it shows a deficit because the issue of paper money has been in excess of the plan; (ii) to an overwhelming extent it is arrived at through the taxation of the population, that is, through the reduction of their scanty rations; (iii) the proportion of the means of consumption extracted from the population is inordinately high; and (iv) since it evidently brings the population to the verge of semi-starvation, the budget can by no means be held to be stable. In any case, in its very essence, it has nothing in common with the conceptions of democratic socialism with its watchwords of a constant rise in the workers' standard of life. The only analogy that really imposes itself is the following: the Soviet Government is building up its economics and organising its finances in a way which used to be favoured (and to a certain extent still is favoured) by foreign companies in colonial possessions.

Just as in the case of those companies, so in the case of the U.S.S.R., the real finance is revealed in, and determined by, external relations. Let us see what this "external budget" of the U.S.S.R. is like.

IV.

The ordinary revenue of that "external budget" is constituted by the proceeds from the export of goods; the extraordinary, by foreign credits and exports of precious metals (gold). Apart from some minor items (such, for example, as interest on deposits abroad and dividends of the Soviet commercial and banking establishments working outside Russia), to the sources of revenue must be added remittances of money by Russian *émigrés* to their relatives and the expenses of foreign tourists in Russia.

The expenditure side consists of payments for the importation of goods; interest on foreign debts of the U.S.S.R.; remuneration of the foreign specialists in the employ of the Soviet Government; and the upkeep of its various organs outside Russia (both of a commercial and a political nature). Of the expenditure of the Comintern (the Third International), we have, of course, no informa-

tion, for it is a secret of the Party. We are not in a position to know what is its amount nor how it is borne. One may only guess that at certain periods in certain countries (for example, China) this expenditure attains a very high figure and constitutes a heavy burden on the Soviet Union's balance of payments with other countries. In what follows, we do not take into account expenditure on the "preparation of the world revolution"; but we must always bear in mind this additional burden which, politically speaking, is of the foremost importance to the Soviet Government.

According to the data of the Soviet Trade Delegation in Berlin, the trade balance during the last two years was as follows:—

	1930.		1931.	
	1,000 tons.	Mill. roubles.	1,000 tons.	Mill. roubles.
Export	21,486·4	1,036·4	21,778·9	811·2
Import	2,855·9	1,058·8	3,564·3	1,105 0
Negative Balance..	—	22·4	—	293·8

The enormous deficit of the past year is explained by the heavy fall in world prices, especially of the raw materials which form the main item of export from Soviet Russia. This deficit has a natural tendency to increase this year, too, (probably not less than 130 million roubles in the course of the past five months). It is well known that the chief source of earnings for the U.S.S.R. is the export of corn, oil and timber. The diminishing supply of food for the population is recognised by the Government itself. The unfavourable results of the hasty and forcible collectivisation of the peasantry are definitely manifesting themselves, and threaten very serious complications in the near future. The export of oil has apparently reached its limit, the loading of the existing pipe lines having attained its maximum. The supply of timber becomes every year more and more difficult, all the best-situated wooded areas having already been exploited.

In order to get an idea of how the U.S.S.R. balances its estimate of foreign revenue and expenditure, let us make use of an excellent scheme of the Soviet balance of trade drawn up by a former Soviet specialist, E. Schenckmann, and published in the Fourth Memorandum of the Birmingham Bureau of Research (February, 1932).

For the budget year 1930-31 (from 1 October, according to the old calculation), the balance of trade was composed of the following items:—

I.

EXPENDITURE.

	In million gold roubles.
1. Merchandise imports (including the cost of credit) ..	1,044
2. Contraband imports	35
3. Commercial parcels imports	6
4. Brokerage, commissions, etc.	16
5. Overhead and other administrative expenses, including taxes	50
6. Interest on commercial credits contracted abroad ..	35
7. Foreign labour and technical assistance	38
8. Non-commercial transactions	30
	<hr/>
	1,254

II.

INCOME.

1. Merchandise exports	836
2. Export of precious metals	110
3. Contraband exports	9
4. Increase of short-term indebtedness abroad ..	230
5. Interest on short-term credits and deposits abroad ..	4
6. Profits, dividends and miscellaneous	6
7. Currency remittances, tourists' expenditure and other expenses of foreigners in U.S.S.R. ..	55
8. Other sources	4
	<hr/>
	1,254

We see that the deficit could be covered only by an increase of indebtedness and by the export of gold.

As regards the increase of foreign indebtedness of the U.S.S.R., all the sources of information concur in fixing the amount, to 1 October, 1931, at about 1,200 million roubles. It can be said with certainty that, considering the above-mentioned deficit in the balance at the end of the last and in the first months of the current year, it had increased by another 200 million or so, now probably representing about 1,400 million roubles.

In itself this figure, considering the economic possibilities of Russia, would not seem too burdensome; but the heaviness of the debt is determined by its short-term commercial nature (56 months'

credits are an "exception") and the high rate of interest (an average, counting re-insurances, of about 18 per cent., according to Schenckmann). Therefore, every year it is necessary to redeem a considerable portion of the loans and to pay over 200 million roubles of interest (in various forms), that is, as much as Imperial Russia in its last years used to pay abroad for its enormous consolidated debt (on Government loan bonds held abroad). The fear, on the part of foreign creditors of the U.S.S.R., of a possible annulment of debts by the Soviet Government similar to that which was carried out in regard to the loans of the Imperial and Provisional Governments, and the generally aggressive policy of Communism, deprive the Soviets of any real long-term State credit. Loans are granted only for short terms and at a very high rate of interest (the discount on non-guaranteed Soviet bills in Germany, according to German papers, sometimes reached 45-50 per cent.). This year, towards the end of which, according to calculations of the specialist press, the Soviets will have to pay back 425 million roubles (250 million roubles to Germany alone), must put the Soviet Government in a particularly difficult position. Properly speaking, the best part of the U.S.S.R. credits may be regarded as "frozen." The Soviet Government will be unable to do without a moratorium *sui generis*, whatever measures it may invent for economising foreign currency (for example, through the Torgsin shops). It can hardly curtail to any considerable extent the import of plant from abroad, nor can it forgo the aid of foreign specialists for fear of making the Five-Year Plan of industrialisation fail.

There can no longer be any hope of a considerable export of gold. Of the precious metals and foreign currency figuring in the balance sheet of the State Bank to 1 June, 1932, to the sum of 702.6 million roubles,⁷ the greater part of the gold has been exported abroad (where it apparently serves as security for credits). The annual output of gold cannot possibly exceed 50-60 million roubles. The available reserve of the State Bank, together with the annual output of gold, will hardly suffice to cover the deficit of the trade balance.

By reason of circumstances, the short-term foreign indebtedness, so burdensome for the country, has a tendency to increase. If things go on in this way, soon the whole annual export of goods, together with the annual output of gold, will not suffice for the Soviet Government to redeem the loans falling due and to pay interest on its foreign indebtedness.

⁷ Including 650.8 million roubles' worth of gold.

Thus the foreign budget of the U.S.S.R. must be recognised under present circumstances as extremely unstable and as showing a large deficit.

V.

In conclusion, let us sum up the answers thus given to the questions put by us with regard to Soviet finance.

Soviet Russia has two budgets: home and foreign. The first cannot be expressed in money terms because of the obvious disintegration of the Soviet monetary mechanism. Two things only can be affirmed: that it weighs extremely heavily on the population, whose personal consumption fund has been greatly curtailed, and that it certainly shows a deficit notwithstanding the Government's assertions, this deficit being concealed by charging the losses from the financing of national economy on to the credit system.

As regards the "foreign" budget, it can be estimated in money. Its deficit is obvious and is explained by the fall in the value of exports and by the peculiar nature of Soviet indebtedness. What is most significant is that the unsatisfactory conditions of the Soviet trade balance have an obvious tendency to grow worse, and must therefore be a cause of natural alarm to the creditors of the Soviet Government.

Tr. G.S.

M. BERNATSKY.

THE FALL OF THE DINAR

FROM STABILISATION BY LAW TO TRANSFER MORATORIUM.

THE legal stabilisation of the dinar and its valuation at 26·5 mg. gold was effected on 28 June, 1931. This corresponds to a rate of 10·9555 dinars to the Swiss franc. Therefore the legal stabilisation only confirmed the rate which had existed for several years, since the dinar had stood at the above rate as compared with the Swiss franc since 1925.

Less than a year had elapsed since the legal stabilisation of the dinar when its rate on foreign stock exchanges began to fall, and foreign currencies began to rise in value in Yugoslavia far above the parities established by law. The dinar began to vacillate again after six years of virtual, and less than one year of legal, stabilisation. This unsteadiness has increased so rapidly of late that a complete chaos in the exchanges is threatened, with all its usual consequences.

A loan, amounting to 1,325,000,000 French francs (or 2,225,000,000 dinars) had been contracted on 11 May of last year for the purpose of stabilisation. But as the rate of issue was only 80 per cent. of the nominal value, Yugoslavia actually received only 1,800,000,000 dinars. And as 50,000,000 francs of this sum were placed in the country itself, Yugoslavia received in foreign exchange only the sum of 1,700,000,000 dinars.

The National Bank announced on 28 June, 1931 (the day that legal stabilisation entered into force) that it had a gold cover of 1,540,000,000 dinars and a cover in foreign exchange of 743,000,000 dinars. Gold amounting to 200,000,000 French francs, or 440,000,000 dinars, had been bought with part of the loan, and this, combined with the 1,100,000,000 in gold which the National Bank had before the legal stabilisation, made up the sum of 1,540,000,000 dinars in gold that was announced by the National Bank as cover for the dinar circulation on 28 June, 1931. As 440,000,000 dinars had been used to buy additional gold cover, the reserves in the shape of foreign exchange at the National Bank ought to have been at least 1,300,000,000 dinars. But actually they only amounted to 743,000,000 dinars.

The balance of our payments in the first part of 1931 was adverse to such an extent that the National Bank, in order to be able to cater for all the needs of trade, had been obliged to contract at that time two foreign loans to the amount of 10,000,000 dollars—

560,000,000 dinars—which, of course, had to be repaid, as a first claim, from the stabilisation loan as soon as it was raised. This is why the reserves of foreign exchange on the day of stabilisation amounted to only 743,000,000 dinars, instead of the 1,500,000,000 which had been foreseen.

Conditions had rapidly changed for the worse from the day when the stabilisation loan was raised (11 May, 1931) to the day when the stabilisation of the Yugoslav currency was legally effected (28 June, 1931). The failure of the Austrian Kreditanstalt had taken place in the interval, and, as this bank had close connections with certain big Credit institutions of Yugoslavia, the international distrust which had fallen upon Austria was extended partly to Yugoslavia as well. Foreign credits were withdrawn, and the National Bank had to give out huge sums to meet the payments involved. It is estimated that the Kreditanstalt affair has cost Yugoslavia at least 300,000,000 dinars in foreign exchange.

The situation grew even worse immediately after the legal stabilisation of the dinar. The German and Hungarian banks were obliged to declare a moratorium, and lack of confidence with regard to Central Europe increased. Credits were withdrawn, and new ones could not be found in their place. Moreover, Yugoslavia made the fatal error of giving full freedom in foreign exchange dealings under her stabilisation law. Anyone was able to buy as much foreign exchange as he wanted, and thus to transfer his capital abroad. And as confidence diminished, especially when the banks, in connection with the fall of the pound, suspended the repayment of deposits, the flight from the dinar assumed such dimensions that it is estimated to have reached, during the three months of unrestricted dealings in foreign exchange, a sum of several hundred million dinars.

The flight from the dinar was especially pronounced in Belgrade, and it was the political notabilities there who were the first to transfer abroad considerable sums of money.

Such a state of things, of course, meant a heavy loss to the stocks of foreign exchange at the National Bank. By 15 October, 1931, these had fallen from 743,000,000—their amount on the day of stabilisation—to 397,000,000 dinars. At that date, the French Government made a loan to Yugoslavia of 250,000,000 francs, and on 22 October the stocks of foreign exchange had risen to 701,000,000 dinars. By the end of the year they had again fallen to 332,000,000.

The stocks of foreign exchange were thus less, by 400,000,000 dinars, than at the time of the legal stabilisation of the dinar on 28 June. As the reserves of gold had increased by 200,000,000

dinars, gold to this amount having been bought with the proceeds of the new French loan, this meant that the securities available for maintaining the exchange value of the dinar had by then diminished by 200,000,000 dinars.

The adverse balance of payments had by this time greatly increased, because Yugoslavia had meanwhile received the loan of 250,000,000 French francs—550,000,000 dinars. But not even this loan was sufficient. The National Bank received during the second half of 1931, from the Bank for International Settlements, a loan of 3,000,000 dollars, and from the Banque de France a loan of 5,000,000 dollars—together 8,000,000 dollars, or 45,000,000 dinars.

Therefore one must put the adverse balance of payments of Yugoslavia at about 1,000,000,000 dinars during the second half of 1931. The economists, aware of this situation, immediately tried to take measures to counteract the evil. In the first place, imports had to be restricted, in order to create a favourable trade balance, since, in view of the structure of our economic life, the trade balance of Yugoslavia ought to be favourable by at least one milliard dinars.

Certain other factors, besides the collapse of confidence and the flight from the dinar, were influential in aggravating the adverse balance of payments. In the first place, there was the cessation of German reparation payments to Yugoslavia, which, exclusive of interest on war debts, amounted to 600,000,000 dinars. The remittances of emigrants to America diminished by 50 per cent., and the income from the tourist trade was also considerably smaller.

Economists and business men had from the very beginning been in favour of placing restrictions on foreign exchange dealings, desiring to prevent or lessen the flight from the dinar, but full freedom was nevertheless allowed, and only on 7 October, when hundreds of millions had already been transferred abroad, came certain restrictions. But even much later currency regulations in Yugoslavia were far less strict than in the neighbouring countries, though some had more favourable conditions than Yugoslavia.

The situation, as we can see, was not very favourable at the end of 1931. Nevertheless, the National Bank was meeting adequately all the requirements of industry and trade in foreign exchange, and there was no reason for the slightest drop in the rate of exchange of the dinar. All Yugoslav importers who were in a position to produce foreign invoices or bills of lading, and the customs certificates for imported goods, received all the exchange they wanted, without consideration, whether the goods imported were necessary articles or things which could well have been dispensed with during the

depression. Even those who imported bananas and dates received all the foreign exchange they applied for.

Difficulties began to arise in the first days of January. The National Bank made the decision that only those importers who had imported their goods after 1 January, 1932, could be supplied with foreign exchange. Those who had imported their goods at an earlier date had first to ask the permission of the National Bank to buy exchange, and only after obtaining this permission could they buy, through their banks, the exchange they needed. This was done to prevent the buying of exchange on the pretence of paying for goods, which had actually already been paid for during the period of unrestricted dealings in foreign exchange, when no note had been made on import papers about the purchase of the required exchange.

This state of things continued throughout January and February, when the National Bank still supplied the traders with considerable sums in foreign exchange—it is estimated that during February the National Bank issued 200,000,000 dinars' worth of foreign exchange to importers. Therefore, during the first two months of 1932 there was no reason for a fall in the exchange rate of the dinar, and we can see that the dinar was quoted at Zürich in January at 9.10 and in February at 9.05—that is to say, almost at par. And foreign exchange could still be bought in Yugoslavia at almost the normal rate. Gold coins, however, cost more than was warranted by their gold content.

The stocks of foreign exchange at the National Bank continued to fall. From 320,000,000 dinars on 31 December, they fell at the end of February to 118,000,000 dinars. As a matter of fact they were still smaller than this, because certain foreign credits which could not be realised were put on the balance sheet as assets. This only served to save appearances—namely, to maintain the fiction of a 35 per cent. cover for the circulation of bank-notes and coin provided for in the stabilisation law.

During the first two days of March the National Bank gave out considerable sums in foreign exchange for State and private payments abroad. Its reserves were already exhausted. Its manager, Dr. Protić, was in Paris to negotiate another loan.

On 3 March came a dispatch from him to the effect that there was no possibility of obtaining another loan. The National Bank had at that moment only 7–8 million dinars in foreign exchange.

The fateful decision was then arrived at, which has cost the dinar its stability. The National Bank stopped any further issue of foreign exchange for the needs of trade and industry, without regard as to

whether it was required for the most urgent purposes—such as raw materials for industry which kept thousands of workmen busy—or not. Later the National Bank began to make a daily allowance of 10,000 dinars in foreign exchange to certain of the bigger undertakings, and afterwards this allowance was reduced to 5,000 dinars; this ruling has remained in force up to the present time.

The National Bank had been giving, through the Zagreb Stock Exchange, foreign exchange to the amount of about 100,000,000 a month to the industrial undertakings—5,000,000 dinars for every working day on the Stock Exchange. At present the National Bank is allowing only about 50,000 daily—or 1,000,000 monthly—for the needs of all industry centring on Zagreb. This means that the National Bank is giving out only 1 per cent. of the amount of foreign exchange that it gave out in earlier years. And although imports have fallen, it is quite obvious that no importer can obtain *through legal channels* the required exchange, even if the articles he imports are of the most necessary kind.

From 3 May onwards, importers have no longer been able to satisfy their requirements in foreign exchange by legal means. Certain importers attempted to buy their exchange privately, and from that moment the rate of exchange in these private (prohibited) dealings began to rise; other importers tried to induce their creditors abroad to postpone settlement or to consent to being credited with the equivalent amount in dinars.

At the end of March the National Bank made another fateful decision: liabilities in foreign countries could be settled by depositing the equivalent in dinars of the value of the goods in one of the Yugoslav banks. By this means, foreigners received, instead of foreign exchange, dinars, of which they could not even dispose. That is to say, foreigners could use these dinars by spending them in Yugoslavia itself, but could not buy and export goods on them.

These measures created conditions leading to the fall in the exchange rate of the dinar, and consequently to a rise in the rate of foreign exchanges in Yugoslavia. And this happened very quickly. On 20 March the dinar fell in Zürich, for the first time in six years, to 9 Swiss francs to 100 dinars. It rose again in May to 9.05, as a result of steps taken by the National Bank, and remained at this rate until the middle of June.

In the meantime, Yugoslavia had, on 1 April and 1 May, fully paid the interest due on her foreign debts. She obtained the necessary foreign exchange by mortgaging at the Banque de France a part of her gold reserve. First the gold which had been acquired

for stabilisation, and which had been left in Paris was mortgaged, and when this proved insufficient, gold was sent from Belgrade to Paris. The amount of gold remitted during the spring months was 7,000 kgs., equivalent to 250,000,000 dinars.

The gold reserve of the National Bank, according to its report, amounts at present to 1,763,000,000. But if one takes into consideration the fact that the National Bank has a foreign debt of 6,000,000 dollars, for which the gold acts as security, and the fact that part of the gold has been mortgaged, it becomes clear that the gold reserve amounts to scarcely 1,000,000,000. The National Bank, instead of having gold cover of 36 per cent. of the note circulation, as shown in its reports, has a cover of hardly 15 per cent. The regulations concerning the cover of the note circulation have therefore for a long time been infringed, but assurances that all is in order, intended to allay public anxiety, are continued. But the real state of things was well known to the experts, and certainly had an unfavourable effect on the exchange rate of the dinar.

The Italian credits, in the form of deposits in dinars made by the Yugoslav importers, were liberated in June. This was done owing to pressure from Italy to which Yugoslavia had to submit. From that time on, the Italians could offer the dinars due to them on foreign stock exchanges. The result of this was that on 24 June the dinar fell from 9 to 8.40 centimes. It improved later and rose to 8.50, but after that it fell steadily. On 18 August it was quoted in Zürich at 8.30, at the end of August at 8.15. In September the fall was even greater. On 30 September the dinar was worth in Zürich only 7.60. In October the drop increased again—on the 14th the dinar stood at 6.70, and has remained at this rate up to the present time. The legal parity was determined and fixed at 9.13, which means that the dinar fell by 2.43 centimes, or lost about 30 per cent. of its value. We are being quoted in London at 270 dinars to the pound, which means a fall of over 30 per cent. It is the same thing in Berlin and in other markets.

Foreign currency rates began to rise in the internal market. The National Bank, nevertheless, continued to maintain the parity rate for foreign exchange on the Yugoslav stock exchanges, which showed that it wanted to keep up the fiction of the stability of the dinar. The exporters, who are obliged to give up four-fifths of the foreign money received in payment for exports to the National Bank, complain that the National Bank takes this foreign money at the parity rate, while they could get much more than parity rate for it by private dealing. It is the Belgrade exporters particularly

who complain, since the exporters in the new provinces dare not demand that the fall of the dinar should be officially recognised

On 30 August the National Bank made a secret decision, of which the public were to know nothing, that a premium of 5 per cent. must be added to these rates of exchange, recognising by this decision that the dinar stood at a discount of 5 per cent. On 2 September this discount was raised to 6 per cent., on the 5th to 7 per cent., and on the 7th to 8 per cent. On 9 September this discount had risen to 9 per cent., and on the 16th to 10 per cent. On the 20th it was 11 per cent., and on the 22nd 12 per cent. It remained at this level until 3 October.

On that day the value of the dinar abroad fell considerably, and since the dinar was being sold at an even greater discount privately than at the National Bank, the discount at the National Bank was raised to 15 per cent., and on 17 October it was raised again to 20 per cent., at which figure it has remained up to the present time.

The dollar is being sold privately at 80 dinars, and as the parity rate is 56.50, this means that the dinar is at a discount of some 40 per cent. By discounting the dinar by 20 per cent., the National Bank have recognised that the dinar has fallen by that amount, but they have not shown the courage to correct the rate of exchange openly, and have recourse to such palliatives as this "premium."

This is the history of the dinar up to the present time. Our adverse trade balance influenced the fall of the dinar, but this balance has always been adverse. Up to the present Yugoslavia has corrected the adverse balance by means of loans from abroad. From 1927 to 1931, that is to say during five years, we have borrowed abroad 5,000,000,000 dinars, and have maintained the stability of the dinar with this money, not by our own resources. As soon as it became impossible to obtain any more loans, the rate of the dinar could no longer be maintained.

Since 3 March the National Bank has ceased to supply any more foreign exchange to industry. Those who needed it had to get it through private dealers, whose rates rose according to supply and demand. And since the demand for foreign exchange was greater than the supply, it is obvious that rates had to increase. Therefore the fall of the dinar is the natural result of the fact that the National Bank no longer provides the import trades with means of payment, even for the most justifiable needs.

We have, on the other hand, settled our foreign liabilities by deposits in dinars. As foreign countries do not require dinars, or at any rate not large quantities of them, foreign merchants have

been selling dinars at extremely low rates. This also contributed to the fall of the dinar, because as soon as supply exceeds demand, prices fall. The Germans have about 400,000,000 dinars deposited by our importers at the National Bank to their account, the Italians 80,000,000 lire. These large deposits for foreigners, who are offering them for sale on foreign exchanges, are the main reason for the fall of the dinar.

What, then, are our prospects? The factors which contributed to the fall of the dinar from 9·13 to 6·70 are still present. The National Bank, though it has raised the discount on the dinar to 20 per cent., continues to refuse to give any foreign exchange to industry. Those who need foreign exchange must buy it privately and secretly. Private dealers take dinars at an even greater discount than the 20 per cent. of the National Bank, since they must cover the risks connected with such business. Therefore there is every likelihood that the price of foreign exchange will continue to rise, since there is almost no supply to meet even the most legal requirements, and none at all at the official rate of the National Bank. Our industry is faced with the alternative of dismissing thousands of workmen or of buying the necessary foreign exchange privately. It is the same thing in trade. And as long as the disparity between supply and demand continues, the downward tendency of the dinar must prevail. On a graph showing changes in the value of the dinar the fall would not be represented by a straight line, of course, but by a curve with a downward tendency.

Approximately 600,000,000 dinars have been deposited to the account of foreigners at the National Bank and other banks. These 600,000,000 are weighing heavily on the value of the dinar. The dinar could only be stabilised if these 600,000,000 could be bought from the foreigners. But we have no means of doing this. The National Bank has at present hardly 5-6 million dinars' worth of foreign exchange. It is true that its accounts show it to have 250,000,000, but these are only frozen credits, put on the balance-sheet for ornamental purposes; we cannot liquidate these assets.

On 15 October the dividend on the Serb pre-war Internal Loan was due. It was not paid. Only 35 per cent. of the value of the dividend of the State Mortgage Bank, which fell due on 1 October, was paid. The interest on the Blair Loan, due on 1 November, and that on the Stabilisation Loan, due on 1 December, will not be paid in foreign currencies, but an equivalent amount in dinars will be deposited in the shape of unliquidatable accounts at the National Bank. Yugoslavia is thus proceeding to a transfer moratorium.

This will have an unfavourable influence on credit. The market price of 7 per cent. Blair Loan has in consequence fallen to 18 dollars, the nominal value being 100 dollars.

In future, as long as the transfer moratorium lasts, we shall require some 1,000,000,000 dinars less a year in foreign exchange for the service of foreign debts. This measure could have helped a year ago, when we still had stocks of foreign exchange. But instead of declaring a transfer moratorium then, as other States of Central and Eastern Europe did, we continued to pay as long as we had anything to pay with. And when our means failed, we mortgaged our gold. Now that even this can no longer be done, we are suspending our payments abroad. Instead of being a measure of economic policy, the suspension has come as the consequence of actual inability to pay. If we had declared a transfer moratorium a year ago when the National Bank still had foreign exchange, we might perhaps have been able to maintain the exchange rate of the dinar, or to prevent such a tremendous fall in the external value of our currency by a limitation of imports. And now the dinar is worth even less than the Austrian schilling or the pengö—although conditions in Austria and Hungary are more serious than in our country. But these States had a far better exchange policy than we had, and have succeeded in maintaining their exchange rates better than we did.

With half of our gold reserve mortgaged, with a stock of foreign exchange amounting to only 5-6 million dinars, with 600,000,000 dinars in the possession of foreigners, the offer of which on the market is permanently keeping down the rate of the dinar abroad—with our trade balance still adverse, and therefore our balance of payments adverse, too—prospects for the dinar remain gloomy. The factors which have brought about the fall of the dinar are still present. It could only be saved by a large foreign loan, but there is no possibility of this at present. A State whose paper is quoted at one-fifth of the price at which it was issued cannot get a loan, especially when it no longer meets its foreign liabilities.

Nevertheless, the greatest danger to the dinar lies in our State finance. Our financial affairs have never been in order, and are least of all so at present. With a permanent deficit in the Budget, the floating-debt payments, etc., were being met by means of loans. But now it is impossible to get loans, and it is becoming even more difficult to make up the deficit. According to the statement of the Minister of Finance, the past year has been concluded with a deficit of 700,000,000 dinars. But the bonds which have been issued are

not included in this sum, and they must be paid some day. The Minister of Finance stated in August that the deficit would amount this year to 1,150,000,000 dinars, and actually it will be still greater. The new taxes that he proposed, and the increase of old taxes will produce at the outside 500,000,000. Thus there will again be a deficit of at least 700,000,000 dinars.

We are on the verge of inflation. As a matter of fact, it has already begun. The Minister of Finance, according to the laws passed for the stabilisation of the dinar, can borrow at the National Bank up to 600,000,000 dinars. He has rapidly exhausted this allowance. And these are not short-term credits, but permanent ones, since there is no possibility of paying back these sums. This is the first step on the way to inflation.

The issue of 1,000,000,000 dinars in silver coin is the second step. It had been calculated earlier that the profits from issuing silver coin, estimated at about 700,000,000 dinars on 1,000,000,000 issued, would serve to repay the State's debt to the National Bank and that the issue would be accompanied by the cancellation of an equivalent amount of bank notes in circulation. But this was changed in August, so that the profits should go to the Minister of Finance to cover the deficit. In spite of this, these profits are at present being used to meet the current expenses of the State, and there can be no possibility of the bank-note circulation being diminished by an amount equivalent to the new issue of silver coin. The circulation will therefore be increased by one milliard dinars. This is simply inflation, because the increase in the circulation has not been made to meet the needs of industry, but to meet the needs of the Ministry of Finance.

The Minister of Finance collected all the money in the possession of the State Mortgage Bank and the Post Office Bank, even their reserves. And when this proved insufficient, these institutions had to discount their bills and other trade papers at the National Bank, and lend the sums obtained to the Ministry of Finance. This, too, is a kind of inflation. If the State finances are not put in order, we shall have to embark openly on inflation. And this will mean the total collapse of the dinar.

“DANAS.”

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND CENTRAL EUROPEAN TARIFFS

I.—ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

I. THE NATURAL LIMITATIONS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

THE economic life of the Czechoslovak Republic is conditioned by three factors: it is over-populated, its resources are all being utilised, and its transport connections are weak.

Over-population, which economic theory in Western Europe gave up as a possibility, is here a reality. It cannot be disputed that the people live under worse conditions than they would if they were a smaller number; in many branches of industry the wage-level is pressed down by the existence of small works and home industries which cannot be killed off. In certain parts of the Republic, Eastern Slovakia, Carpathian Ruthenia, and South-West Bohemia, the land does not provide for its inhabitants that standard of living with which they are acquainted as normal

The whole of Slovakia, as compared with the historic lands (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia), can be considered over-populated. The historic lands, highly industrialised, belong to the most densely populated districts in Europe, Bohemia with a population of 332 to the square kilometre, Silesia with 394, Moravia with 309. Slovakia has a density of 159 to the square kilometre, a high rate for a predominantly agricultural country, and Carpathian Ruthenia 124. The average for Slovakia is brought lower by the district of the east and centre—from which in pre-war times the great stream of emigration came (30,000 a year from Slovakia from a population of about 2 millions). This stream has now been checked by the restrictions on immigration imposed by the United States; it continues to the extent of about 12-14,000 a year, going, for the most part, to South America. In the pre-war times great numbers of seasonal agricultural workers went from the mountains to the Hungarian plain, and this stream has been checked also. Some new industrialisation in Slovakia has taken place in the post-war period; but probably this has not been enough to counterbalance the reduction in employment brought about by the dismantling of factories which, under the Hungarian policy of forced industrialisation, had been built up in Slovakia before the war. But

to some extent the pressure of population has been relieved by the land reform which, in Slovakia, offered greater increases of employment than it did in Bohemia.

In Bohemia as marked a contrast exists between the north and south as exists between the historic lands and Slovakia. In the whole of the south-western half of Bohemia (south of a roughly diagonal line Polička-Praha-Kadaň) where the inhabitants are almost entirely¹ Czech and almost entirely agricultural, population does not increase. In the last 50 years before the war Southern Bohemia lost a yearly average of 8 persons per 1,000, a greater loss than other parts of the monarchy which were economically much less developed—Carniola, Galicia, Dalmatia and Bukovina.² This was due to the stagnation and dying out of old industries in the Bohemian forest and the growth of industry round Prague and in the north of the province.

There does not seem much likelihood that the expansion of industry either in Bohemia or in Slovakia will be enough to take in the increase of population under present conditions. In many industries—sugar, malt, brewing and linen—factories have closed down in recent years. In fact, the only considerable increase in industrialisation has taken place in Moravia, due to the creation of Zlín as a factory town by the enterprise of Thomas Bat'a. The principal reasons for this stagnation in development are that the raw material resources of the country are all in process of utilisation, and that the Republic is unfavourably situated for transport of its products.

The historic lands are well provided with raw material. The natural wealth of the country is very varied in character and widely distributed. The mineral deposits are all found in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia; Slovakia has only great forest wealth as a basis for industry. Coal and lignite deposits, equal to 2½ per cent. and 11 per cent. of the total European reserves, are the basis of the heavy industry in Prague (Kladno district), Plzeň (Pilsen), the Erzgebirge and the Ostrava Karwin basin. The ore deposits are small, serving as the basis of the fine-steel production of the Poldihütte. Otherwise ore has to be imported; and the great Plzeň Škoda works use scrap in consequence. The porcelain industry is concentrated round the kaolin deposits of the Karlsbad area, the glass industry in Hradec Kralové (Königgrätz). The textile industries are concentrated in

¹ The chief exception is the German "island" round Jihlava

² See Kovčák, *Vylidňování jižních Čech*. (Depopulation of Southern Bohemia), 1929.

many districts, predominating chiefly in the north-eastern area on the German frontier, and in Brno (Brunn); they import almost all their raw material. Timber and paper industries draw their supplies from the forests of Slovakia. All the natural wealth of the country is in process of utilisation; there are no new sources of raw material.

The third factor which conditions economic life is the outcome partly of geographical conditions, partly of historical development. In the future, the Republic may be able to fulfil its claim to unite east and west, by including within itself territories which natural conditions and historical conquests have held apart for centuries; but at present, from the economic standpoint, the country is a bridge which crosses without connecting.

Bohemia is a country of peculiar character, owing to its geographical isolation: a broad, uneven mass of land, forming a rough square, wedged down southwards between two territories drained by the Danube's tributaries, Bavaria and Moravia. Its waters run towards the centre, and are collected in one principal channel, the Vltava, which joins the Elbe at Mělník, north of Prague; Bohemia belongs to the Elbe basin, but is only connected with it through the gorge by Podmokly, which serves as an outlet for all the rivers of Bohemia. On three sides this square is surrounded by a forest belt, which in the north and east is thickly settled with small industrial towns. The racial and natural frontiers of the land do not coincide; a broad band of German inhabited territory runs round three sides of Bohemia, and the Czech villages only come right up to the German frontier at one or two points in the Bohemian Forest. Crossing the forest, the contrast between Bohemia and Bavaria or Saxony soon becomes apparent; the plain is full of villages, thirty or forty largish one-storied whitewashed farmhouses, with big arched entrances, grouped round a pond in the centre of the village street, which is full of half-plucked geese. Nearer Prague, in the sugar-growing district, the villages grow still denser. Of this square upland, Prague is the natural centre.

But for Slovakia, Prague will never be a centre, either economic or cultural. Slovakia belongs to the Danube system; it is a long, broad strip from Bratislava and Komarno, tapering out as it goes eastwards and gets more mountainous, a sort of shelf dividing the two great plains of Europe, the Hungarian Alföld and the Polish plain. It has three centres, Bratislava for the richer corn-growing west, Košice for the east, both with large Magyar elements, and Trenčín, definitely Slovak, for the middle. Where Slovakia joins Carpathian Ruthenia, its culture is definitely eastern; in the

mountain villages the wooden churches are Byzantine in style; by imperceptible stages the Slovak villages merge into Roumanian on the south, Ruthene on the north.

The Republic is naturally divided by its river systems into two areas, but neither of these systems serves to unite it closely with north or south. The Danube, well fitted for navigation, passes through districts without industry and does not touch the chief economic centres. The Elbe, on the other hand, though it passes through the heart of the industrial districts and the most fertile agricultural area, and is connected with Prague by the Vltava, is only navigable for a short distance in Bohemia.

In consequence the Danube chiefly carries agricultural products and timber, the former being shipped chiefly at Bratislava and the latter at Komarno. The Danube route is used chiefly by Hungarian corn; for corn from Yugoslavia and Roumania the distance is too great. The Elbe carries principally lignite from the north Bohemian seam; and as lignite export has fallen off since the war, the volume of traffic has declined.³ The canalisation of the river begun by the Austrian Government in 1896, completed by the opening of the last lock at Strehov, near Aussig, in March 1925, is not likely to benefit the industry of the district very much.

The railway connections between the two halves of the Republic are also unfavourable. One of the two systems was designed to connect with Vienna, the other with Budapest. In the mid-19th century Prague's position was disadvantageous, as Brno and the Morava-Ostrava district lie on the main line of communication between Vienna and Galicia, the first line to be constructed in the Monarchy in the thirties of last century. Prague was only connected with Brno some time later by way of Olomouc (Olmütz). But now that the main line of connection runs from Vienna to Berlin through Prague, the position of the capital could not be more favourable. But the connection with Slovakia is still poor. Only one main line connects with Slovakia; this, the line Košice-Bohumín (Oderberg), is the only exception in the general system which drew all lines to Budapest, since its course was determined by the natural geographical connection of the valleys of the Váh, Poprad and Hernád.

The first task of the new State therefore was to unite Slovakia with Bohemia, and to connect existing lines into a main artery.

³ In 1925 and 1927 the volume of traffic (2.8 and 2.7 million tons) was smaller than in 1901 and 1913, when it amounted to 3½ million tons. Only 0.7 million tons and 0.6 went outside the country. Lignite export by the Elbe amounted to 1.2 million tons per annum before the war, and is now only 0.2 million tons.

running east and west. In addition to this, local lines will be constructed connecting isolated districts with Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia, and others connecting districts on either side of the Moravian frontier. At present transport is still cheaper from Slovakia to Budapest, and from Budapest to Prague, than it is from Slovakia to Prague. It is proposed to remedy this by means of a graded railway tariff with proportionately lower rates for long distances.

When these connections are made, the effect will be to draw Slovakia's traffic to the north-west instead of to the south.⁴

The routes over Germany to Hamburg will always remain the most important for Bohemia, as they were before the war. For several years Czech exports gained an advantage from the railway-rate competition between Hamburg and Trieste.⁵ Finally, a settlement was made, by fixing a line at which freights should be equal. This line runs through the middle of Bohemia—Plzen-Prague, Kolin, Bohumin, so that the bulk of Bohemian industry lies on the northern side of it. The same kind of struggle is in process on the Danube. The Austrian railways, since September 1928, have offered lower tariffs for corn coming up the Danube to Vienna, that is, from Hungary, Yugoslavia and Roumania. The Czechoslovak railways retaliated by lowering rates to Bratislava. This revealed the divergence in transport interests which exists between the two halves of the Republic; the Slovak mills were put at a disadvantage as regards the Czech.

Attempts have been made to encourage exports over Poland. Owing to the loss of Polish markets in Central Europe, the Polish Government has been obliged to force exports of Silesian coal and rye over Danzig—and since Danzig is not Polish—over the new port Gdynia. But the volume of Polish goods carried is not enough, and the Polish railways have therefore attempted to encourage Czech exports by special rates to Hamburg *via* Danzig and Kiel—

⁴ The total length of this line, when completed, will be 674 km, of which 198 km consist of line already in use, 149 km. of local lines which must be transformed, and 327 km. of entirely new lines.

⁵ This arose because under the peace treaties Austria and Hungary were obliged to maintain their pre-war rates on their line of communication from Czechoslovakia, Italy also agreed, in return for certain concessions, that the same rates should prevail to the Adriatic. The German railways lost traffic from Czechoslovakia in the period of currency inflation, and in order to regain it made an agreement from 1 April, 1925, which undercut Trieste by about 50 per cent. The Italian railways retaliated by further rate cuttings, and finally the struggle grew so intense that each of the railway authorities announced that it would undertake to offer the lowest rate from any Czech station, i.e., to undercut whatever rate the other offered.

about twice as far as the direct connection Prague-Hamburg. This attempt has had very small success, as very little traffic goes to Poland and almost none to the north.

There is not likely to be any advance in economic development due to changes in the transport system. The great plan for improvement of Central European traffic, the construction of the Rhine-Main-Danube canal, will not benefit the Republic much, except in so far as it offers opportunities for cheap wheat export from Slovakia. If the new route proved sufficiently cheap to attract export trade from Bohemia, new lines of railway connection would have to be developed in the south-western direction (Prague-Ceské Budějovice) at present not main lines.

2. THE CHARACTER OF ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE.

(1) *Agricultural*.—A peasant State the Republic is not, if by a peasant State is meant that in which the typical agriculturist is the small owner, employing no labour but that of the family, and producing chiefly for his own needs—a State like Serbia, for instance, or Wurttemberg and Baden. It is a land of independent smallholders, covering a large part of their own needs, and supplying the greater part of the food requirements of the towns. The types of cultivation are so varied in a small space that there is no typical farmer; agricultural interests are as diverse, and as liable to conflict with each other, as are the industrial. In Bohemia the distribution of holdings resembles that of Central Germany.

Agriculturally the Republic is an area of transition between several types of cultivation. The German-Czechoslovak frontier runs through the area of transition from small to large holdings in Germany; in Central Germany the "medium-sized peasant" holding (5–20 hectares) takes up over 50 per cent. of the land surface in some districts, while east of the Elbe the large holding (over 100 hectares) begins to prevail. The general distribution of holdings in Bohemia is the same as in the Central German district, but if the results for the whole of the German Empire and the Republic are compared, the absence of large holdings in Czechoslovakia becomes clear.

Comparing the change in the size of holding with that of the pre-war period, we see the same development in Czechoslovakia as in Germany. A marked increase of proportion of the total surface taken by the medium-sized holding (5–20 hectares) took place in Germany between the years 1907 and 1925, a marked decrease in the 20–50 hectare class and the very large class over 200 hectares.

In Czechoslovakia an increase in the proportion of the total surface taken by the 5-10 hectare class and the 10-30 hectare class took place between 1902 and 1921, but the very small holdings declined, while those over 30 hectares increased.

The land-holding system in Czechoslovakia has undergone a fundamental change since the war, as that of Germany has not. It was generally expected that the effect of land reform measures would appear in the results of the 1930 census. The results published by the State Statistical Office up to the present do not show that there has been any change in the direction of development; the biggest change has occurred in the class 5-20 hectares. The land reform therefore strengthened the natural growth of the medium-sized holding, which was already taking place. It was not, as it was often represented to be, a reversal of the trend of development towards large estates.

The type of cultivation in Central Bohemia and Moravia resembles that of Central Germany and the eastern districts of Poland, highly intensive, specialised, and in close connection with well-organised agricultural industries. In the sugar beet areas the typical farm is something between 50-100 hectares; it sells the beet to the factory in its area, receives a fixed price, and a percentage of the price in the form of feeding stuff (pulp) for stock and fertiliser (filter press cake) which enable it to carry on extensive live-stock feeding as well. In these districts the farming practice is modern, the technical education of the farmer good. In the southern mountain districts potatoes are the chief crop; a similar close connection exists between the distilleries and the potato growers.

Slovak agriculture is largely extensive, except in the sugar-beet area. A journey across Slovakia from south to north passes through four principal types of cultivation: the wheat districts round Bratislava, the surplus wheat area of the Republic, the sugar-beet district, the potato and maize crops of the lower hills, and, finally, the pasture farming of the mountains. Apart from the wheat and sugar districts, agriculture is of the same general type as is found in Galicia on the other side of the mountains.

In the extreme east of Slovakia many villages still practise the communal type of agriculture known as "three field"—to be found lingering in all the frontier districts of the old Hungary, in Transylvania and the Voivodina—a system under which the land of the village is divided into three areas, one of which is sown with a spring crop, the second a winter crop, and the third left fallow. To ownership of land is attached the right to keep stock in the common

pastures. These villages are those remote from the main centres of population; agriculture is organised, not for sale, but as a means of furnishing a livelihood to the peasant and his family. Expert opinion is anxious to abolish the system in order to raise the yield in these districts by abolishing the bare fallow. But the lapse into individual cultivation is in itself no guarantee of an improvement; the excessive fallows exist in other districts where the communal cultivation has lapsed. What is needed is maintenance of the communal system, with some State assistance for the purchase of machinery.

Further east still, in the sparsely populated mountain villages of isolated Carpathian Ruthenia, the joint pasturage predominates; the herds of the villages, or of several villages, are led up to the *poloniny* or alpine meadows in the spring, where they remain until September, under the care of a few shepherds. The land of the village is cultivated in two fields, spring crop and fallow. In these villages the life of the peasantry is extremely primitive, but their isolation does not make the contrast with the western a source of discontent. The State has done what is possible to raise their standard of living by continuing the State milk farms in the mountains, constructed under the old regime.

In almost all branches of agricultural production and marketing, the co-operative society plays an important part. It is the most important agency for the supply of credit, from which function it originated. The only branch of production where co-operative marketing has not gone far is live stock; organisation is, however, just beginning.

(2) *Industrial*—When one hears the Republic described as half-agricultural, half-industrial, one imagines it to be a modern industrial State. That it is not. It conserves many types of production as living forces, which are elsewhere extinct or appear only as survivals. Bohemia is highly industrialised, but it is a country with few of the phenomena of modern industrialism.

In the first place, the industries are widely scattered and split up into innumerable small branches. In every branch of industry except sugar, large and small works persist side by side.⁶ In the

⁶ There are no figures which can be used to show the prevalence of the small undertaking. The 1926 "factory" census does not show the actual number of large and small undertakings, since a factory for the purpose of the census was an undertaking employing over eighteen workers *or* employing motor power. The prevalence of the small sawmill undertaking is revealed by the power statistics. In 1920 two-thirds of the whole number of undertakings used water power.

brewing branch, for instance, there are over 500 independent breweries, of which 12, in Prague and Pilsen, produce 8 million hectolitres yearly; the rest produce only 3 million together. Small mines continue to produce by the side of the large; small textile works struggle on; in all the forest districts, small wood works are to be found, dating from the times when the saw was connected with a mill and sawed wood only occasionally.

Two causes favour the survival of the small firm. Firstly the small firms are usually old-established family concerns, privately owned; the larger ones are all under the control of the banks, and have no motive to acquire the small firms, which earn what profits they do earn by some small monopoly or trade secret. The wide distribution of industry, and the high specialisation, make this sort of undertaking more prevalent than elsewhere. In remote parts of the Bohemian Forest one comes across tape factories, bottle capsule factories, little potteries, supplying a world market, with only one or two other firms in the world competing with them.

Secondly, the solitary position of these works makes them exempt from any efforts at collective bargaining. Even in industries in which collective bargaining has gained some ground, the trade unions allow the smaller works to pay lower wages.

Not all the small firms, however, are inefficient or weak in competition with the large ones. The small isolated factories already mentioned are often economically as efficient, with a good export organisation—usually the owner and manager in one.

The size of the industrial undertaking is increasing, but not very rapidly. According to the preliminary results of the 1930 census, the biggest increase has been made in the class of factory employing 6–20 workers.

In the second place, "home work" continues to exist. Two quite different sorts of work are understood by the phrase: production at home, for consumption at home (of goods which in countries with manufacturing industries are usually bought) and the production of goods at home for sale in the market. The first type is widespread in Slovakia and Ruthenia, as it is, of course, in the whole of Eastern Europe, where the peasant community is self-supporting. Everywhere linen, wool and hemp are prepared for home use, and often shoes, baskets, wooden buckets, and pottery of a primitive type.

Home work⁷ as it is carried on in Bohemia and Moravia is a

⁷ *Lukás—Domácká výroba*, Socialní Revue, 1930. *Sirotek, Domácká práce*, Socialní Revue, 1925. Other information obtained from Mr. T. Sulík, of the Ministry of Social Welfare.

different phenomenon, peculiar to Central Europe. The same type of industry is found in the other poorer territories of the Monarchy, particularly in Slovenia, where the strength of the co-operative movement has given it a better organisation. In these provinces it is not a survival from an earlier type of economic system, but a sign of the pressure of the population on the outlets for economic expansion. Capital accumulation cannot develop on the scale which could carry these workers into fully-developed factory production; the persistence of home work indicates that the rapid rate of change in Western Europe is here retarded indefinitely.

Industries of this kind are found in the poorer agricultural districts of Southern Bohemia, and in the mountainous districts of the north and eastern frontiers, the Erzgebirge and Riesengebirge (Krkonoše). Many districts are specialised to one kind of work—shoes in Chrudim, gloves in the Erzgebirge and round Prague. But various forms of textile production, embroidery in particular, are widely spread through Bohemia. What the extent of these industries really is, is difficult to estimate, because home work is frequently carried on as an additional occupation, combined with independent agriculture, or with seasonal work in a sugar factory, or other agricultural industries. According to the Austrian census, 16 per cent of the total industrial population of Bohemia were employed in home work as their chief occupation, 275,000 out of an industrial population of 1,825,000. At present it is estimated⁸ that 500,000 people are engaged in it, directly or indirectly.

There seems to be no question of a general decline of these industries in recent years. Certain branches, for instance, hair nets, a flourishing industry before the war, have been killed by changes in fashion. But other changes in fashion have benefited; the Gablonz industry enjoyed a three years' boom owing to artificial pearls, while more recently the popularity of Yo-Yo has given fresh hope to the wood turners of the Bohemian forest. Only in certain branches is home production dying out owing to the competition with factory industry.⁹ Many small shoemakers have been driven out of production, although less than might be supposed, since the high quality of the home-made shoe enables the home producer

⁸ Dr. Pártl, in a speech to the Federation of Home Workers (Svaz domácích výrobců v (CS.R.)

⁹ Reichental, in the Bohemian forest, once a centre of the iron industry, took to glass cutting after the last iron works closed down in 1868, but the new industry could not compete with factory industries, and the last furnace closed down in 1922; the population then took to wood cutting and turning, supplying parts to the neighbouring German toy industry.

to hold his ground. These industries are bound to persist, so long as there is no other occupation for the population and no support for the unemployed.

The earnings of workers in these industries are miserable in the branches with declining markets. In Purschau, the wood-turning industry of the Bohemian forest, it is said that the home workers making the wooden stocks for buttons can only earn 24 crowns (three shillings) in fourteen days' work, working 18 hours a day. In Reichtental, wood carvers get 4 crowns (6d) for 1,000 trumpet mouthpieces. But in general the level of earnings in home work compares much better with earnings in factories than it does in England. In the Gablonz artificial jewellery industry, which is entirely carried on under home-work conditions, earnings are as high as any in the Republic, the glass presser in good times, working an unlimited number of hours a week, can earn as much as 1,000 Kč. (£6) per week. In Bakov,¹⁰ the centre of the basket-making industry, a workman can earn 30 Kč. (3s 9d) a day, a rate which would compare well with any factory earnings. To raise the rate of wages in these industries has been the object of special legislation. Wages were not regulated at all until after the war; the Austrian Government had prepared a law in 1919, which never came into force, but was the basis of the Czech legislation of 1924. This followed the usual procedure, by setting up commissions to regulate wages; trades were divided into five large groups, textiles (two groups, one for weaving, one for lace and crochet work), clothing, glass, jewellery and shoes. These commissions have only succeeded to a very limited extent.¹¹

3. INCOMES.

The slow rate of economic development fixes a relationship between incomes, savings and prices, other than that which exists in countries where trade and industry are expanding rapidly or have expanded rapidly in the past. Incomes are more equally distributed, savings form a smaller proportion of incomes, the general price level

¹⁰ J. Lang, *Domácká práce pro výrobu rakouského zboží*, 1925.

¹¹ Principally because the law only allows validity to a wage award if all members are present, and this condition can rarely be attained when the representatives of workers and employers are scattered over large areas and no provision for travelling expenses is made. In textiles and clothing this has prevented all but one or two districts from fixing minimum rates. In the shoemaking industry attempts have been more successful: one committee even claims to have raised wages by 8-10 per cent. The Gablonz Commission has been quite successful in fixing rates for the more standardised branches of production.

and wages tend to remain stable, and the rate of interest is high.

It is difficult to speak of a general level of wages and profits. In the first place, the organised workers do not really represent the general body of wage earners. Not more than one-third¹² of the industrial workers of the country are organised in trade unions (about 1 million out of a total 3 million). The trade union movement aims at securing the level of wage already existing, rather than at raising the level. This cautious policy is forced upon them by the weakness of the movement in relation to the whole body of wage earners and by the system of unemployment insurance in force, under which the trade union and the State share the cost of unemployment benefit¹³. In pursuing this policy of preserving the *status quo*, most of the unions indulge in a practice which British trade unions regard as contrary to the whole spirit of trade unionism: they allow smaller and weaker firms to pay lower wage-rates. The leaders are well aware that in more or less static economic conditions such a concession is inevitable.

Labour organisation is not weak because capital is strong; on the contrary, labour as an organised force can only attain real power when capital dominates production, as it does not in Czechoslovakia. As it is, the movement cannot really surmount the difficulty of uniting wage earners who are split up into innumerable small units by the great variety of industrial production and its wide geographical distribution. In addition, the movement is further weakened by division into different political sections. Neither the industrialists *as a class* nor the wage earners play much part in political life. Capitalist interests are so highly concentrated in the banks and a few monopolised industries that they can secure tariff protection without seeking party support.

There is less social and economic distinction between the working

¹² Certain industries are well organised, like the metal workers, who include 45 per cent. of the workers in the industry, and certain branches, like the patternmakers and lithographers, form an aristocracy, as they do everywhere. In the breweries branch, 92 per cent. of the workers are organised, and in sugar, under a system of State control, 75 per cent., but in other large industries, most strikingly in food production and textiles, trade union organisation is weak. Even the well-organised branches rarely succeed in making national agreements (except for sugar, where they have been assisted by the State scheme). The metal workers have long aimed at securing a national agreement, but so far have only been able to get agreements made for large regions.

¹³ The unions approve the maintenance of this system, since, as all applications for relief must come through them, it considerably improves their membership.

class, the small bourgeoisie and the professional class than can be observed in more highly developed capitalist countries, so that although real wages are so low, the working class, in relation to other classes, is better off than it is in France, England or Germany. Apart from a very few large incomes, the distribution of income is more equal than in Western Europe. These few very large incomes, it may be assumed, come from monopoly sources. They are derived from industries protected and cartelled, like sugar or iron, or from a banking system rigidly controlled and concentrated. Few or none come from the land, few from trade.

Only the "higher" classes of income (over 23,556 kč. yearly, or about £138) which pay income tax direct, instead of through an employer, are covered by the income tax statistics. Of these incomes by far the greater proportion did not reach the level of £150 (25,000 kč.); in agriculture 87.2 per cent of all incomes did not exceed this level; in industry 79.2 per cent did not exceed it; in trade, banking and transport, 73.4 per cent.; and in the professions, 41.9 per cent. Of all "employees" only a small fraction (102,273 out of a total 3.85 million) have incomes over 25,000 crowns. In the whole Republic in 1928 only 302 persons had an income of over a million crowns (£6,000).

Estimates¹⁴ of the amount of income per head put it at 6,500 crowns for 1928, amounting to a national income of 90 milliard crowns. Of this, it is estimated that 8.5 milliard crowns, or 9.4 per cent., is saved—a low proportion compared with the estimate of one-fifth of the total income of France or Germany.

Owing to the policy of restricting foreign borrowing, the capital market is rigid. The cost of loans is high; in 1930 leading companies could get loans at 9½ to 10 per cent., while in Germany at that time the corresponding rate was 7 per cent. Strict deflationist policy helped to damp down industrial expansion. One or two large undertakings, such as the Skoda works, issued foreign loans; other-

¹⁴ Dr. Pavel Smutný, *Hospodarská bilance státu a národní uspořádkání*, 1931. Another estimate made by Dr. Hotowetz puts its value lower, 70 milliard crowns, for 1926, which would give an income per head of 5,000 crowns. This agrees with the estimate made by the Dresdner Bank (*Die wirtschaftlichen Kräfte der Welt*) which gives comparative figures.—

Annual income per head of population.

	Crowns.	Sterling.	Per cent. of Czecho-slovak income.
Great Britain ..	12,675	77	249
Germany ..	8,712	52	171
Czechoslovakia ..	5,096	31	100

wise, new industrial enterprise (above all, the Bat'a works), has been obliged to expand from profits.

Owing to the low price of agricultural products and the low wage rates, the cost of living is low. Generally speaking, commodities in which wages are the chief element in costs are cheap. Tailor-made clothing, furniture, meat products,¹⁵ hand-made shoes are extremely cheap. House rents in the old houses, *i.e.*, those built before the war, are extremely low, and in spite of the new building, extremely overcrowded; it is in the low standard of housing that the difference in standards of life between Great Britain or Germany and Czechoslovakia is most apparent.

The economic life of the country, it is clear, bears a peculiar stamp. To say that the economic system is not fully capitalistic may be understood to mean that it is not modern—which would be wholly untrue. The largest undertakings, the iron and steel industries, the big textile mills, the sugar factories, stand on a high level of technique, their export organisations are patterns of efficiency, and the level of working-class intelligence is high. But these works and this working class are not typical. The typical Czech industrialist is the *řemeslník*—the craftsman-artisan. In Vienna and the United States Czech tailors, cooks and carpenters are famous, and though, of course, this class does not outnumber the proletariat, it is proportionately much greater than elsewhere.

This economic structure has imprinted its characteristics on the Czech people, though the features of the national character, atrophied as it has been by centuries of submergence and rendered self-conscious by sudden freedom, are difficult to grasp. Hard-working, but not enterprising, saving and not risking money, they do not take naturally to capitalism; good workmen and technicians they are and seem likely to remain, for the industry and finance of the Republic are still to an overwhelming extent in German-Jewish control. Only the great Bat'a works at Zlin are the creation of Czech enterprise—and Bat'a himself was first and foremost a craftsman. For the true Slav "get rich" is not a categorical imperative, and while the Czech is much Westernised, he retains at least a trace of Slavonic indifference to economic effort.

DOREEN WARRINER.

¹⁵ The ham- and meat-curing industries of Prague and the goose-liver industry of Libuše, near Prague, secure thus.

SIBERIA SINCE 1894

As I have already mentioned in an earlier article,¹ the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1892-1900 gave a great impetus to the colonisation and general economic and cultural development of Siberia. It might be said that during the period between the completion of this mighty undertaking and the Revolution of 1917 the face of Siberia radically changed and the foundations were laid for her becoming a flourishing and prosperous country. In this article I shall deal briefly with various aspects of these changes.

Let us turn our attention first towards the movement of population in Siberia during this period. According to the official data the total number of persons who, between 1896 and 1915, came from European Russia was 4,302,000. The flow of emigration had, however, its high and low tides. Thus, while in the first five years (1896-1900) the total number of new settlers in Siberia was 728,000, during the following five years it fell to 339,000.

The comparatively high wave of emigration in the nineties must be explained by the impression the Great Famine of 1891-1892 produced on public opinion in the country as well as on the Government. It became evident that certain agricultural regions in European Russia had become over-populated and could not any longer provide enough work and food for the growing population. As this superfluous labour could not be absorbed by trade and industry, whose development at that time was just beginning to gain speed, the only solution of the problem of agrarian over-population rested in encouraging migration to the virgin lands in Siberia.

By a law passed in 1896 the Government not only removed many restrictions which had formerly been imposed on intending emigrants, but even provided many facilities for them. Among these facilities should be noted the establishment of the Emigration Bureau attached to the Ministry of the Interior.

This institution was entrusted with the duty to supply the emigrants with information on free lands in various districts of Siberia and the conditions prevailing there, to maintain feeding-stations and hospitals at the points through which the emigrants passed on their way, to make surveys of lands suitable for settlement, to construct roads, to arrange for the distribution of government grants among the settlers, to establish depots of agricultural

¹ See *The Slavonic Review*, Vol. X, No. 3, p. 557.

machinery and implements, etc. Peasants from the over-populated districts were glad to make use of these facilities to escape from the horrors of famine which were fresh in their memories.

The decrease in the number of emigrants in 1900-1905 should be ascribed to two main causes: the agrarian risings which swept through some of the central Russian provinces in 1901-1902, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

As every student of Russian history knows, the Russian peasants have always believed that the land should belong to those who worked on it. In spite of all efforts of the Government and the landowners to destroy this widespread belief and make them accept the land reform of 1861, the peasants never lost the conviction that the land which their forefathers had tilled had been taken away from them by a mean trick of the landowners, who had succeeded in bribing the State officials. The peasants also believed that the Tsar—"the Little Father" of the people—would some day learn the truth about the poverty-stricken conditions to which his "children" were reduced and would issue a "Manifesto" or "Golden Charter" giving the land back to its natural owners.

Very often rumours that such a "Manifesto" had actually been issued but that the landowners and the corrupted State officials had concealed it from the people, spread among the peasants like a forest fire, and they then seized the landowners' estates, looted the grain-stores, burned country houses of the gentry, and so on.

The Government sent punitive expeditions to the affected districts and crushed the revolts and disorders, sometimes with unnecessary severity and even brutality. Nevertheless, these severe measures never succeeded in killing in the minds of the peasants the hopes and dreams which they had cherished for generations. Naturally, at the time when these hopes ran high among the peasants, they did not want to migrate to Siberia or elsewhere, but preferred to stay at home, believing that there would soon be land enough in their native villages to live upon peacefully and prosperously.

The beginning of the 20th century coincided with a sudden rise of these hopes in the central provinces of Russia, from which the majority of emigrants used to come. Hence the drop in the figures of emigration to Siberia in 1900-1903.

During the Russo-Japanese War the Government had to stop the migration altogether, because the Trans-Siberian Railway was occupied to its full capacity in carrying troops, munitions and military stores to the Manchurian battlefields.

The Revolution of 1905-1906 failed to realise the hopes and

beliefs of the Russian peasantry, and the emigration to Siberia soared to an unprecedented height; during 1906-1910, as many as 2,167,000 persons went thither for permanent settlement.

Stolypin's agrarian reform checked the migration movement for a time; in 1911 the number of new settlers was 190,000, and in 1912 it was 211,000. But as it soon became evident that this reform could not possibly solve the problem of agrarian over-population in European Russia, the migration movement again began to increase rapidly. In 1913 the number of emigrants was 327,400, and in 1914 it was 336,400. The Great War interrupted this process, and in 1915-1917 only a few thousand new settlers arrived in Siberia.

According to the census undertaken in 1917, the total population of Siberia (excluding Kamchatka and Sakhalin) was 14,455,300. This figure shows an increase of 76 per cent. over the figure of the census of 1897. The increase in the population in various districts of Siberia was not equal. It can well be imagined that the emigrants occupied first those districts where the natural and other conditions resembled those to which they were accustomed at home and which were more accessible and fertile. As the overwhelming majority of the new settlers came from the central black soil districts of European Russia, naturally they settled in the southern parts of Western Siberia and in the localities adjacent to the Siberian Railway or the rivers. According to official statistics, out of 4 million persons who emigrated to Siberia between 1896 and 1915, about one million settled in the Steppe provinces (Akmolinsk, Turgaisk, Uralsk and Semipalatinsk), over two million in Western Siberia (Tobolsk, Tomsk and Altaisk), about 600,000 in Eastern Siberia (Yeniseisk, Irkutsk, Yakutsk and Transbaikal), and 350,000 in the Far Eastern provinces (Amur and Maritime).

It should be noted that by 1914 in many Siberian districts there was little or no free land suitable for agricultural purposes. Thus, according to the data of the Emigration Bureau, in the Western Siberian provinces there was enough unoccupied land left to settle only about 65,000 persons. Ample reserves of free lands remained in Eastern Siberia and in the northern parts of Western Siberia, remote from the railways and with difficult natural conditions.

It has been estimated that after 1915 not more than 200,000 souls could be settled in Siberia annually, because the major parts of the free lands required preliminary preparation, such as draining swamps, clearing away the scrub, or artificial irrigation, before people could settle on them. Another crying need of Siberia was the lack of facilities for communication. New railway lines needed to be

constructed, natural waterways improved and roads made. The corresponding plans and programmes had been prepared by the government departments and public authorities, and had not the War and Revolution interfered, these plans would have undoubtedly been put into operation.

I have already mentioned that the population in Siberia increased between 1897 and 1917 by 76 per cent., which gives 3·8 per cent. annual increase. In comparison with European Russia, where the population during the same period increased at the rate of 1·3 per cent. a year, the growth of population in Siberia was three times greater. Especially rapid was the increase in the town population. While in 1897 only 680,800 persons lived in the towns, in 1917 the number was 1,490,200, which gives a rate of increase of 118·9 per cent. Thus, the increase of population in the towns was proportionally far greater than in the villages.

There is another important fact in the population statistics which should be noted here. The racial structure of the Siberian population underwent a considerable change during the twenty years preceding the Revolution of 1917. While in 1897 the percentage of population of Slavonic stock was 66·6 per cent., by 1917 the proportion rose to 80 per cent. This should be ascribed not only to the inflow of emigrants from European Russia, but also to the fact that the natural increase of the Russian population was at least twice as much as of the native population—15 per thousand against 7 per thousand. On the other hand, native tribes in some districts of Siberia, under the influence of the Russian settlers, rapidly lost their nationality and adopted the Russian language, religion and culture.

The rise of population naturally went together with the development of agriculture and exploitation of the natural resources of the country, and the facts and figures which I shall give below will show how this process was going on in Siberia after the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway. According to the official data, the total area under agricultural cultivation in 1897 was 14,156,100 acres, and in 1917, 31,433,400 acres, thus increasing by 122 per cent. It should be noted that the rate of increase of the cultivated area was higher than the rate of the growth of population. While in 1897 the number of acres per 100 of population was 172, in 1917 the corresponding figure was 217·6. In comparison with European Russia, Siberia had 48·8 acres of cultivated area more per 100 of population. It has been estimated that while in 1917 the surplus of marketable grain per 100 of population in European Russia was about 130 cwt., in Siberia this surplus was 336 cwt., or 2½ times more.

Thus the Siberian peasants had more to eat and more grain to sell than their brethren in Europe.

Of course, the density of cultivated area per 100 of population was not equal in all parts of Siberia. A glance at an agricultural map of Siberia will show that the districts where the number of cultivated acres exceeded the figure of 3 per person, are all situated along the railways or the navigable rivers. The system of cultivation in Siberia was rather primitive. In the more densely populated districts the so-called "three fields system," so widespread in Russia, prevailed. Where there was enough free land, the so-called *zalezhnaya* system was employed. Under this system the virgin soil was sown with wheat for three or four years consecutively, then for two years with oats, and then left for eight or ten years "to rest." Manure and artificial fertilisers were applied to the soil only on rare occasions. The virgin soil usually produced good crops, and it was more economical to plough a new virgin field every year than to put costly manure and fertilisers on the old fields.

It should be mentioned, however, that owing to the shorter agricultural season and the shortage of agricultural labour during the sowing and harvesting periods the application of improved agricultural machinery, such as drill-ploughs, reapers, hay-mowers, winnowing-fans and mechanical threshers, was far more practised in Siberia than in European Russia, and American firms, such as the International Harvester Company, were doing prosperous business before the war, especially in Western Siberia.

As is usual in virgin countries, the prevailing grain-culture in Siberia was spring-sown wheat. According to the census of 1917, out of 100 acres of cultivated area, there was under wheat (for the whole of Siberia) 52.7 acres, under oats 25.1, under rye 9.8, under barley 3.5, and under all other grains (flax, potatoes, millet, buckwheat, etc.) 8.9.

The primitive conditions of agriculture governed the yield of crops, which varied from year to year very considerably, the minimum being 3.6 cwt. per acre and the maximum 8 cwt. The average yield for twenty years (1897-1916) was about 6 cwt.

As a matter of fact, the cultivation of cereals, owing to the great distances from world markets and the high cost of overland transport, had never been economically profitable in Siberia. Much more important from the economic point of view was the development of stock and animal breeding, because animal products, being more valuable, can stand high freight charges better than bulky and cheap grain products.

According to the agricultural census of 1914, the number of horses, cattle, sheep and pigs per 100 of population was much higher in Siberia than in European Russia.

			Horses.	Cattle.	Sheep.	Pigs.
European Russia	16.5	23.6	30.8	10.1
Siberia	53.1	66.9	63.2	17.0

Between 1897 and 1917 the number of horses increased by 131.2 per cent., of cattle by 189.5 per cent., of sheep by 149.7 per cent., and of pigs by 297.2 per cent. Thus, it might be said that stock-breeding in Siberia kept pace with the growth of population.

Of other non-industrial trades I must mention here hunting and fishing. Siberia has always been famous for its furs. Its richness in fur-bearing animals attracted the Novgorod "braves" as far back as 800 years ago. She still maintains her old fame. According to the figures made public in 1910 at the World Fur Exhibition in Vienna, Siberia produced £5,000,000 worth of furs out of a total world production at that time of £12,500,000. It was noticed, however, that during the last few years before the war Siberian furs began to decline in quantity and in quality. This should be ascribed partly to the increase in the number of population, but chiefly to the rapacious methods prevailing in the fur trade. The natives of northern Siberia were harshly exploited by the fur traders. They were paid very insufficiently for the furs which they trapped, and were kept by unscrupulous traders constantly in debt. In order to repay their debts the hunters killed the animals out of season or before they reached maturity. At the same time, owing to poverty, disease and alcoholism the natives were dying out at an appalling rate. A proper care of the native hunters and a more rational organisation of the fur trade could probably remedy most of these evils. In fact, during the war the Siberian co-operative societies started organising the fur trade on co-operative principles, and the first results were most satisfactory. It can hardly be doubted that, had not the Revolution and following events interrupted the initiative of the co-operative societies, the Siberian fur trade would by now have been reorganised on more scientific and humanitarian principles.

The Arctic and Pacific Oceans and also the mighty Siberian rivers and lakes abound in fish of every kind, including such valuable species as royal sturgeon and salmon. But up till now the fishing industry in Siberia has been only poorly developed. It has been estimated that in 1910 about 170,000 tons of fish were caught in all the fisheries of Siberia; the local consumption is not taken into account. But the experts maintain that were the fishing industry

rationally and scientifically organised, the quantity of marketable fish products could easily reach one million tons a year. Especially important are the Far Eastern fisheries in Kamchatka and the Amur estuaries. These fisheries, by the way, are not without political importance, as the Japanese are very much interested in them and would like to have them in their undisputed possession. The development of the fishing industry in Siberia practically began only after the construction of the Siberian Railway, because before that, owing to the lack of transport facilities, it was impossible to export perishable fish products to the outside markets.

One of the main natural resources of Siberia is her virgin forest. Nobody knows yet what are the precise limits of these resources, as they were not studied properly and scientifically before the Revolution. Some observers have calculated that the forest area is 2,700 million acres, and the most conservative estimate puts it as high as 1,000 million acres. It must be noted, however, that the actual area under forest suitable for economic exploitation can hardly exceed 350 million acres. According to reliable calculations, the natural annual increase of timber in Siberia is about 6,000 million cubic feet. Of this enormous quantity only about 200 million cubic feet were used, whether locally or for export. The rest was perishing from devastating forest fires and various diseases. Thus, these resources, if good roads are constructed and the waterways improved, may provide a means of existence for many new-comers.

As is widely enough known, the mineral resources of Siberia are enormous. Among them coal occupies a most important place. Before the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway coal was not worked in Siberia at all, for the simple reason that there was no demand for it. Since 1895 the coal production rose by leaps and bounds, as the following figures will show: in 1895 the total output amounted to 40,000 tons, in 1904 to 970,000 tons, in 1914 to 2,400,000 tons, and in 1917 to 4,000,000 tons. The ascertained coal reserves are estimated to reach the figure of 500 billion tons. Especially rich are the coal deposits in the Kuznetsk basin, where the thickness of the seams is said to be, on the average, 315 feet, and the quality and chemical properties of the coal are excellent. The Sudzhensk coalfields near Taiga, the Cheremkhov near Irkutsk, and the Suchansk near Nikolsk-Ussuriysk not only supply the railway, but also provide fuel for all industrial needs in the adjacent districts. New extensive coalfields were discovered recently in the provinces of Yeniseisk and Yakutsk. These deposits will last for hundreds of years, even if the consumption of coal in Siberia is raised a hundredfold.

Iron can be found almost everywhere in Siberia. Especially large deposits of iron ore exist in the Kuznetsk basin, the so-called Telbess deposits. But the production of iron not only did not develop during the twenty years preceding the Revolution, but even declined. Thus, in 1895 the total amount of pig-iron produced was about 10,000 tons, while in 1917 it was about 7,000 tons. This must be explained by competition of the cheap iron from the Urals, where the iron industry had been established since the times of Peter the Great. It has been more economical to import iron from the Urals than to produce it in the country.

Copper deposits are known to exist in many localities, but only a few of these were worked before the Revolution. This industry, however, developed rapidly. In 1907 the total output of red copper (non-refined) was about 1,000 tons, while in 1914 it had increased to 5,500 tons.

Silver and lead began to be worked from the end of the 17th century. In 1897 practically all the silver produced in Russia came from Siberia. Many silver and lead deposits are known in Transbaikalia and in the Altai. There are also large deposits in the maritime province (Tetiukhe) which, up till 1931, were worked by a British company.

According to the official data, the total amount of gold produced in Siberia from 1836 to 1897 was 1,466 tons, and during the period 1898 to 1917, 1,732 tons. These figures show that the industry was developing normally. But the deposits of gold in Siberia are so numerous and rich that there is every reason to believe that this industry can be developed to a much larger extent, provided sufficient capital is invested in it.

Of other minerals worked in Siberia should be mentioned salt, which was produced by the primitive method of evaporation at the salt lakes and springs, especially numerous in West Siberia. The total output amounted in 1917 to about 1.5 million tons.

Deposits of many other useful minerals and metals are known to exist in Siberia, such as graphite, mica, manganese, wolfram, etc. Near Lake Baikal were discovered deposits of radium and other rare metals. None of these metals and minerals were worked before the Revolution, and attempts to exploit these riches have been made only quite recently, within the last five years.

Manufacturing industries were practically non-existent in Siberia before the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The needs of the population were satisfied by imports of industrial goods from European Russia or by the products of cottage industries.

According to official data, in 1897 the total value of industrial production was estimated at 23 million roubles (nominally £2,500,000) and the total number of industrial workers was only 30,000. In 1917 the value of industrial production had increased to 150-180 million roubles. Naturally, only those branches of industry could be developed which worked at raw materials obtained locally. Therefore the chief industries were flour-milling, tanning, beer, spirits, soap and coarse wool-cloth manufactories. The whole industrial output was consumed within the country.

I must mention separately the Siberian dairies, which produced large quantities of butter. The development of this industry was entirely due to the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which gave an outlet to the surplus of butter and encouraged the farmers to breed more cattle. In 1897 the number of dairies was 51, while in 1917 they numbered nearly 5,000. The statistics show how rapidly this industry was developing before the war. In 1900, the total amount of butter exported from Siberia was 8,680 tons, and in 1913 the corresponding figure was 82,930 tons, or nearly ten times more. Nearly all Siberian butter was exported abroad, chiefly to Great Britain, Germany and Denmark.

The dairy industry in Siberia was organised on co-operative principles, as in Denmark. The most characteristic feature of the Siberian co-operative dairies was that these dairies were coupled with consumers' societies; in other words, the members sold their milk to, and bought commodities they wanted from the same co-operative society. This gave a sound economic basis for these societies, and their development was progressing with unprecedented rapidity. In 1908 these societies formed a central organisation, the Union of Siberian Creamery Associations. This Union organised the sale of butter and the purchase of goods for co-operative stores. In 1916 was started the Union of Siberian Co-operative Unions, *Zakupsbyt*, which also absorbed many of the co-operative dairies.

The chief need of Siberia was the improvement of communications. In 1907 the extent of all the railways in Siberia (including the Chinese-Eastern Railway) was 7,454 miles. A comparison with other countries, for instance, with Canada, will show how poorly Siberia was equipped in regard to railroads. While for 10,000 persons in Canada there were 38 miles of rails, in Siberia there were only 3.3 miles. In proportion to the area, the indices will be, for Canada, 0.4 miles per 100 square miles, and for Siberia, 0.07 miles. But if we remember that the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway was started in 1892 and completed in 1911 (with the Amur Railway),

we shall realise that much was achieved during the comparatively short period of twenty years. It must be said that the Imperial Government was quite alive to this crying need of Siberia. A special commission was set up in 1914, which drew up a scheme of railway construction. This scheme provided for building fourteen new lines, with a total extent of 4,800 miles, the chief of them being the so-called Southern-Siberian main line (Orsk-Akmolinsk-Semipalatinsk-Barnaul-Kuznetsk-Minusinsk) and the Turkestan-Siberian railway, from Semipalatinsk to Tashkent. This general scheme was supplemented by others drawn up by Siberian public organisations. According to these schemes the total number of lines to be constructed between 1917 and 1937 was to be 45, with a total mileage of over 12,000. Undoubtedly, if these ambitious schemes had been realised in practice, the economic and cultural development of Siberia would have by now reached a very respectable standard.

The Siberian rivers provide excellent means of communication, their total navigable length being about 28,000 miles. In 1916 the Siberian river fleet consisted of 504 steamers and 1,100 barges, with a total tonnage of about 1.5 million tons. But still there was a wide field for improvement, and many schemes were prepared. I shall mention among them the project to link the Pacific Ocean with the Black, Baltic and Caspian Seas by a single waterway. From the technical point of view this project did not present any considerable difficulties and, provided the necessary capital could have been found, it would have been well within the bounds of possibility to put it into operation.

Another very important question was the proper organisation of the direct sea-route from Siberia to Europe *via* the Kara Sea. The first attempts to open this route were made as far back as in 1869, when a Siberian merchant, Sidorov, reached the estuary of the Obi by sea. In 1874 an Englishman, Capt. Wiggins—one of the pioneers of this route—visited the Obi and, in 1876, reached the estuary of the Yenisey. Since then there have been many such voyages, and now it is definitely established that the Northern Sea Route is quite safe for navigation for at least nine weeks in the year. The Soviet Government during recent years has done much to provide facilities for the better use of this route. Harbours have been constructed in the estuaries of the Obi and the Yenisey, and several long-distance wireless stations have been set up for the benefit of the navigators.

Paved roads were practically non-existent in Siberia. In winter communications were maintained mostly over the ice-covered rivers,

but in summer many localities were inaccessible. Only during the last ten years before the war the Government Emigration Bureau built about 6,000 miles of non-paved roads of the type which existed in this country before the age of Macadam. The total length of tolerably good roads in Siberia was only about 15,000 miles which, of course, was totally insufficient for such a huge country.

The natural market for Siberian products and raw materials was European Russia. Since the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway the exchange of goods between Siberia and Russia has increased largely. The chief products which were exported from Siberia and their volume were as follows:—

Items.	Average per annum for :		
	1900-1904	1913-1914	1915-1916
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
Grain	282,000	1,000,000	1,700,000
Meat and poultry	37,000	61,000	110,000
Butter	34,300	88,000	79,000
Fish	4,000	14,000	24,000
Timber	43,000	327,000	350,000
Skins and furs	12,000	21,000	18,000

The imports consisted mostly of machinery, metals, textiles, sugar, tea, tobacco, glass and other manufactured goods, the total quantities being, for 1900-1904, 30,000 tons; for 1913-1914, 360,000 tons; and for 1915-1916, 370,000 tons. The value of the imports exceeded the value of exports many times over.

Owing to the absence of trustworthy statistics, it is impossible to ascertain the extent of Siberia's trade with foreign countries. It is known that some grain and large quantities of butter and furs were exported abroad, chiefly to Great Britain and Germany, while a good deal of agricultural machinery and cloth was imported from Great Britain and America. Germany had also a large share in the Siberian import trade. Trade with Japan was only small. More important was the trade with China and Mongolia, but its turnover also was not large.

The cultural development of Siberia, though it made big strides before the Revolution, left much to be desired. The number of elementary schools, especially in the villages, was quite insufficient, and the proportion of illiterates among the peasant population was much higher than in European Russia. The same may be said of the secondary schools (gymnasias) and the universities. Although each town had at least two gymnasias—one for boys and another for girls—still their number was very inadequate. Up till 1917,

there was only one university for the whole of Siberia, that of Tomsk, with two faculties—law and medicine. There was also one higher technical school in Tomsk.

Unfortunately for Siberia, the Imperial Government always regarded her as a colony. Therefore Siberia was deprived even of those limited privileges of local self-government which were granted to the European provinces after the great reform of 1861. The country was governed by the state officials, mostly of rather inferior type, who did not know the local conditions, did not care about satisfying the local needs and requirements, and did not understand the mentality of the people. This neglect of the most crying needs of the population created general discontent and gave food for political radicalism. This feeling was well reflected in the fact that the Siberian provinces always elected men of radical and often socialist views to the Imperial Duma. The Siberian intelligentsia worked hard to improve the economic and cultural conditions of the country. In every branch of public activity there was no lack of willing and energetic workers. The best example of what the Siberian educated class could do if not hindered by the bureaucrats of the autocracy, is to be found in the co-operative movement, which reached a very high state of development in Siberia within a short period of time.

I have already mentioned the Union of Siberian Creamery Associations and the Union of Siberian Co-operative Unions—*Zakupshyt*. These two unions between them had, in 1918, over two million members, and their joint turnover reached the figure of some 400,000,000 roubles (nominally £40,000,000). The credit and loan co-operative associations also reached a high stage of development, their total number in 1917 being 1,500 and their aggregate capital 20,000,000 roubles. The Siberian co-operative organisations, apart from serving the economic needs of the population, were also engaged in cultural work; they published journals, maintained elementary and secondary schools, arranged popular lectures, conducted training courses, etc.

It has always been maintained by all observers that Siberia's economic and cultural development was so rapid because the Siberian people possessed certain peculiar characteristics which were lacking in the peasants of European Russia. Psychologically, the Siberian type of Russian has many common features with the Americans or with the peoples of the British Dominions. As I have pointed out in my previous article, the original Siberian stock was formed by the Cossacks, the bold adventurers who went to Siberia to conquer

and explore her virgin wastes. They were joined by " roving men," who were also usually of the enterprising type. Religious dissenters, political offenders, and even the so-called " criminals " were really those who had enough courage to protest against the political, social or economic conditions prevailing in " the old country." From the point of view of social selection, these elements, though sometimes dangerous for the security and order of the State, were, nevertheless, psychologically more advanced than those who stayed at home and meekly submitted to the conditions of slavery introduced into the Russian social order from the reign of Godunov (1598-1605). Even the ordinary emigrants who came to Siberia in the 19th century were men of a type superior to that of an average Russian *muzhik*, they possessed initiative and courage, the qualities which are so essential for forming character. The primitive, hard conditions prevailing at that time in Siberia quickly weeded out the weak, and favoured the survival of the fittest.

A typical Siberian is far more independent in his mental outlook and outward conduct than a Russian peasant from Europe. He considers himself a free man, equal to other fellow-men. He lives in a spotlessly clean house and dresses in good, clean clothes. His food in quality and in quantity is much superior and more plentiful than that of a European Russian. He is a sturdy, bold and healthy man. He is accustomed from his childhood to handling arms, and is usually a good shot. During the Great War the divisions consisting of natives of Siberia were the best in the whole of the Imperial army and were always sent to the most dangerous points of the front.

The Siberians are quick to learn; they can adapt themselves better than others to new conditions; they are enterprising to the point of rashness. At the same time they are not so soft-hearted and compassionate as the Russian from Europe. They are more selfish, harder and more matter-of-fact, though always ready to help in case of a real need. Never having borne the fetters of serfdom, the Siberians are democratic in their general outlook. It is well known how difficult it was for the Soviets to establish their power in Siberia and with what determination the Siberian peasants still defend their economic independence and resist the collectivisation of agriculture. A people of such a type, living in a country enormously rich in natural wealth, is capable of great things; and the time will come when Siberia will occupy an honourable and enviable place among the countries of the world.

ANATOLE V. BAIKALOV.

IGNATYEV AT CONSTANTINOPLE, 1864-1874*

I.

FOR some years before the 1917 revolution the Russian Foreign Office used to issue an official publication called the *Izvestiya ministerstva inostrannykh del*. In the 1914 and 1915 numbers (books 1-6 and 1-4) was published the full text in French of a lengthy memorandum drawn up by Ignatyev in 1874 (at some time after February), surveying his past ten years in Constantinople. In 1914 and 1916 there also appeared, posthumously, in Russian, in *Istorichesky Vestnik*, Ignatyev's memoirs.¹ As far as I am aware neither of these two important sources for the appreciation of Russian foreign relations has received due attention from historians outside Russia. The memoirs deal in great detail with the period 1875-1878, and I hope to utilise them in a subsequent study on these years, but they begin with a general review of Ignatyev's ideas and policy from 1864 to 1874, thus overlapping with his official memorandum, and it is to this portion of Ignatyev's career, during which he became the dominating ambassador on the Bosphorus and was acquiring a European reputation as the leading diplomatic champion of Pan-slavism, that I propose to confine the present article.²

The memorandum addressed to Gorchakov is, of course, couched in official language. It is not clear for what exact purpose it was written, nor by whom it was intended, or thought likely, to be read. It must be remembered that Ignatyev was on bad terms, both personally and officially, with Gorchakov, and that at any rate by

¹ Two other portions of Ignatyev's memoirs appeared in *Russkaya Starina* in 1914 and 1915, viz., in vols. 157, 158, 159, his version of his mission in March, 1877, to the European capitals; and in vol. 161 his account of his return to St. Petersburg via Athens and Vienna after the Constantinople Conference.

² I use the following abbreviations. *I.V.* for *Istorichesky Vestnik*, 1914, vol. 135, *Iz.* for *Izvestia*. . . Extracts, down to 1870, from the memorandum printed in *Iz.* were published in *Russkaya Starina*, 1914, vol. 158; 1915, vols. 161 and 162. The latter part of the memoirs published in *I.V.*, from December, 1877, to the opening of the Berlin Congress, were republished in book form in Petrograd in 1916 in two volumes under the titles *San Stefano* and *Posle San Stefano*.

*NOTE.—This article was originally completed before the writer was aware that M. Onou had written his articles on the memoirs of Ignatyev which have been appearing in this *Review* since December, 1931.

the end of 1874 he was on almost as bad terms with Stremoukov, the Director of the Asiatic Department.

The memoirs were written long subsequently, at different dates and with various additions, the latest being subsequent to the publication of Tatishchev's life of Alexander II in 1903, and of Goryainov's study on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles in 1907. Their violent anti-Austrian tone seems to have been heightened by the passage of years culminating in the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, which Ignatyev just lived to see, and throughout there is unrestrained bitterness against Gorchakov's policy of the *Dreikaiserbund* and the fatal entanglements of Reichstadt and the Austro-Russian conventions of 1877. Hostility to England is almost equally marked. The bias and special pleading are quite unabashed. Ignatyev was always right, and his opponents always wrong. Repetitive tirades and personal animosity against Gorchakov, Shuvalov, Novikov, Andrassy, Elliott, Layard and Disraeli bulk more and more largely as the memoirs proceed. With good reason was Ignatyev nicknamed *Menteur Pacha*, and yet these memoirs are of real value if carefully handled. Approximately half of them consist of the texts, in Russian, and paraphrases of despatches, telegrams and letters from and to Ignatyev, and of memoranda by Ignatyev or Gorchakov and the Foreign Office. The selection, and the paraphrasing where the text is not printed, of course, give rein to Ignatyev's bias, but the texts which he gives do not seem to have been tampered with.

The beginning portion of the memoirs, with which I am here concerned, is in the nature of a brief introduction to the Eastern crisis of 1875-8, and is much more general than what follows. They depict an extreme Panslavist's view of the Eastern Question, and such other checking evidence as is available supports the impression that they do represent with substantial accuracy views that Ignatyev held at the time, and not merely those imputed to himself by himself when writing up his ambassadorship later. Only in one important respect do they show the clear influence of later events: the placing of Austria-Hungary in the forefront and the slight reference to France.

Ignatyev begins with a sketch of his general policy in the Near East. At least since his holding of the post of Director of the Asiatic Department from 1861-4 he was convinced that Russian diplomacy in the Balkans must follow three aims: the revision of the 1856 Treaty of Paris, the command of Constantinople and the Straits, and some form of common action by the Slavs under the direction

of Russia. By the revision of the Treaty of Paris, Ignatyev meant the return to Russia of the ceded portion of Bessarabia, the abolition of the Black Sea neutralisation and naval limitation clauses, and the suppression of the collective guardianship of Turkey and guarantee of all the Powers—as irksome to the Sultan as to Russia. Ignatyev admitted that Gorchakov also desired the abolition of the derogatory articles of the treaty, but he declared that there was a fundamental difference between himself and the Chancellor in that the latter believed in the European concert, thirsted for international conferences, and preferred loud-sounding phrases and diplomatic verbiage to continuous, solid, practical action. Ignatyev, on the contrary, was deeply suspicious of European conferences, holding that all the Powers were more or less hostile to Russia and could the more easily constitute an anti-Russian coalition, and he therefore made it his principal aim to work for a direct understanding with Turkey, avoiding any new obligations *vis-à-vis* the other Powers or any repetition of anything like 1856 (*I.V.*, 50-2).

As regards the Straits, Ignatyev held that Russia must command them as much for the security of her Black Sea coast-line as for her political and economic expansion. She must be master of Constantinople by one of two means, either by complete diplomatic predominance there as was achieved between 1871 and 1875, or by direct conquest if the opposition of the Turks and the Powers rendered the former policy impossible. Ignatyev seems to have conceived of the peaceful policy of dominance over the Sultan, with a harmless Turkey and a *de facto* Russian control of the Straits, as an interim course to be pursued until such time as a radical solution of the eastern question would have to be found involving the disruption of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. If the other Powers combined with Turkey against Russia, Constantinople and the Straits must be conquered and the Greeks, Bulgars, and Armenians must be won over to act as obedient tools of Russian policy (*I.V.*, 53).

Panslavism—the third main line of Ignatyev's policy—had to face three principal difficulties—the independent particularism of the Slav peoples themselves, the hostility of the Poles, with their Catholic fanaticism and strong western connections, and, above all, the powerful enmity of the new dualistic Austria-Hungary. Slurring over the divergences between Budapest and Vienna, he depicts Austria-Hungary as striving towards the Ægean and the enslavement of the Slav peoples and as the inevitable rival of Russia, with whom, sooner or later, she must fight for the first place in the Balkans and for the leadership of Slavdom (*I.V.*, 53-4). In this task of

opposing Austria-Hungary, the Slavs under Austrian and Turkish rule ought to be the effective allies of Russia. Only for the attainment of this task should Russia make sacrifices for them and be solicitous for their freedom and growth in strength. To aim merely at freeing the Slavs, to be satisfied with merely humanitarian success would be foolish and reprehensible (*I.V.*, 54). Nothing better illustrates the fundamental difference between the Panslavism of Ignatyev and his followers and the philosophical and religious slavophilism of the eighteen-forties and fifties, of which Ivan Aksakov was essentially the last prominent representative.³ It was in their attitude to Austria-Hungary that lay the source of the bitter divergences between Ignatyev and Gorchakov, and his nearest counsellors Jomini and Novikov, at the Vienna Embassy.⁴ In Ignatyev's eyes they fanatically upheld a disproportionate Austrian influence on eastern and Slav affairs, whereas Ignatyev preferred to adjourn any idea of solving the Balkan question or of liberating Bosnia and Hercegovina from the Turkish yoke rather than to sacrifice the future of the Serb race to Austria-Hungary. Against Gorchakov, Ignatyev insists that the Slav standard shall be borne exclusively by the Russian Tsar. Towards this aim all his efforts were directed from 1861 to 1877; Russia alone should control the Balkan peninsula; the Balkan peoples, above all the Slavs, should look only to her. To this end he worked at Constantinople; by sowing the seeds of dissension among his opponents, by intensifying relations with all the Slav peoples, by preparing them for independence, by undermining western influence on the Bosphorus, by sapping the 1856 treaty; working for the time when the development of Russia's strength and favourable conditions in Europe would allow of the attainment of a purely Russian solution of the Eastern Question—the Straits at the disposal of Russia and the creation of brother States (*oblasteri*) in blood and faith linked to Russia by adamantine ties (*I.V.*, 54-56).

This general review of his policy, with which Ignatyev prefaces his memoirs, is naturally written with the events of the 'seventies and the policy of the *Dreikaiserbündnis* of 1872 uppermost in his mind, but when he arrived at Constantinople in 1864 there was no

³ Cf. Pipin's article on Ivan Aksakov in *Vestnik Evropy*, August 1886, pp. 763-807.

⁴ Ignatyev was thinking of the eighteen-seventies. Novikov had been in the Constantinople Legation from 1856 to 1864, and was then minister at Athens, until 1870, when he was appointed Ambassador at Vienna. He had abandoned his earlier Pan-Slav views, and identified himself almost completely with Andrassy.

question of any understanding between Vienna and St. Petersburg, with Austrian treachery in the Crimean War still rankling. The *Ausgleich* was three years ahead, with Sadowa to intervene: Prussia had Bismarck at the helm, but was still but Prussia, the sure friend of Russia as 1863 had again demonstrated, yet insufficient alone: France, despite Mexico and Poland, seemed the foremost single Power; England was of doubtful effectiveness and about to become largely absorbed in the internal reforms which followed the death of Palmerston.

In the Near East it was, above all, France that bulked most largely, and the French Embassy at Constantinople that had predominant influence during the 'sixties. Hence, just because it was to Napoleon III that the eyes of the Balkans were turned, Ignatyev started his tenure of Büyük Dere with a six years' struggle against everything French. The emphasis in his 1874 memorandum on the unfriendly relations of the French, particularly over the Cretan question, and of their desire to keep Russia isolated at Constantinople is insistent until the Franco-Prussian War—Bourrée, the successor, in 1866, of Moustier as French Minister being specially stigmatised for his duplicity, ambition and pettiness in details.

Ignatyev's understanding of French policy in the Near East (of which, in fact, the most essential feature was its inconsistency) made thorough-going opposition on his part inevitable. He thus records a conversation of de Moustier, showing the basis of that policy: "La théorie des nationalités . . . ne peut et ne doit être comprise d'une façon absolue. Il y a nationalité et nationalité. Le droit à une existence distincte ne peut être indifféremment réclamé par toutes les races. Elles doivent produire leurs titres—un rôle historique, une même race, de la force, de l'union. Toutes ces conditions manquent aux populations Chrétiennes de la Turquie. Faibles et déchues, sans grandes traditions dans le passé, sans lien moral dans le présent—le cimenture leur est nécessaire pour former un état. Si je devais choisir un prototype pour l'Empire Ottoman, je citerais le Gouvernement de feu Mehmed Ali en Egypte. Une monarchie militaire sans distinction de nationalité, entrant hardiment dans les voies du progrès matériel, faisant appel aux capitaux et aux lumières de l'Occident, sans crainte de se compromettre en s'entourant d'étrangers." (Extract from Ignatyev's despatch of 31 July, 1866,⁵ *Iz.*, 1914, i, 121-3).

Such a policy would be the backer of the Ottoman Bank and

⁵ All dates in this article are given in the new style.

French financial railway projects, of the vilayet reform of provincial administration and Midhat Pasha's later constitutional programme of a strong centralised regenerated Turkey. It was the exact opposite of Ignatyev's basic idea, illustrated, for example, by the Bulgarian exarchate. "Toute solution," wrote Ignatyev in a despatch of 13 February, 1867, "qui ne serait pas prise dans un sens 'centrifuge' conforme aux traditions des différentes nationalités et ayant pour base les autonomies locales, le self-gouvernement—serait contraire au but que nous poursuivons invariablement. Les améliorations exigées par les Occidentaux tendraient au contraire à une centralisation complète devant fortifier soit disant l'Empire Ottoman en dénationalisant les populations Chrétiennes, en les transformant toutes selon le type de la civilisation occidentale et en assimilant, on pourrait dire en assujétissant, la Turquie elle-même à l'Occident" (*Iz.*, 1914, ii, 79). The difficulty, for the time being, was that Ignatyev's idea of reforms appeared, as Ali Pasha expressed it, to lead to the peaceful destruction of Turkey.

The two tangled years of the Cretan revolt were to intensify Ignatyev's bias against the French. In 1866 the outbreak of the Austro-Prussian War obviously filled Ignatyev with the hope that the psychological moment had come to tear up the 1856 treaty and to stir to action Balkan nationalism. He urged this on St. Petersburg (*I.V.*, 58), but the war was the six weeks' war. There followed immediately the outbreak of rebellion in Crete, and in September the Christians in the island declared for union with Greece. Ignatyev accuses France of stirring up the revolt in the hope merely of distracting Turkish attention from the Principalities; then when the revolt flared up on an unwelcomely large scale, she tried to shift the responsibility on to Russia. In fact, the internal conditions of Russia were such that St. Petersburg desired to avoid external commitments and considered the Cretan rising very inopportune. Ignatyev maintains that he himself did his best to stop the outbreak and instructed the Russian Consul-General at Kanea to disabuse the Cretans of any idea that Russia would come to their help, while at the same time advising the Porte to fulfil the demands of the Cretans and working to prevent hostilities (*Iz.*, 1914, ii, 67-9). This version can only be regarded as highly suspect, for Ignatyev and the Russian Consul-General in Crete had been intriguing hard in the island (as, too, the French and particularly the Greeks), making the utmost of the heavy taxation and forced labour which were the concomitants of Vely Pasha's westernising innovations in Crete. On the other hand, when the revolt actually broke out, the moment

proved inopportune, and Ignatyev very likely did then think that he had gone too far and tried to draw back.⁶

St. Petersburg took the initiative in proposing to Paris and London common pressure on the Porte for the satisfaction of the lawful demands of the Cretans; then when it became known that the Turks were about to use force, Ignatyev was ordered to act with energy and warn them that they must shoulder the consequences.⁷ Ignatyev, however, expressed his disbelief in the French sincerely joining Russia in diplomatic pressure on the Porte, since the proposal did not originate with them, and in the same letter to Gorchakov, of 18 September, went on to give expression to what was to be his dominant concern throughout the revolt. "The Cretans have revolted with insufficient preparations; they will be crushed unless the Greek and Slav population of Turkey come to their help and distract Turkish attention from Crete. . . . The struggle which each people wages separately is fatal to our co-religionaries; and yet such outbreaks cannot be avoided, for any accident may evoke them. . . . I foresee that, in the event of a Turkish victory, the complaints and grievances of the Christians will be levelled at Russia, whom they considered the only Power really interested in their lot, and that they will accuse us of having abandoned them" (*Iz.*, 1914, ii, 70-1).

In Ignatyev's eyes the two essentials were to utilise the Cretan revolt for decisive events on the mainland, and not to become entangled in fettering negotiations with France and the Powers. Gorchakov, however, would not act without careful sounding of the Powers, and was specially anxious to explore the possibility of securing French assistance in the East—the one chance, indeed, of Napoleon III dispelling the fatal effects on St. Petersburg of French conduct during the Polish revolt. The Quai d'Orsay, after having initially refused to join Russia in demanding special privileges for Crete, changed course completely and appeared ready to enter on far-reaching discussions as to the whole situation in the Balkans. By January 1867 it had proposed to Russia the union of Epirus, Thessaly and Crete to Greece, and as well brought forward the general question of the improvement of the lot of the Christian subjects of the Porte. Ignatyev stigmatised this as a subtle manoeuvre to sidetrack the Cretan question by opening out a broad field

⁶ I am much indebted here, as elsewhere in this article, to assistance very kindly given by Professor H. W. V. Temperley.

⁷ Bamberg, *Geschichte der orientalischen Angelegenheit*, p. 397. Tatishchev, *Aleksandr II*, vol. 2, pp. 63-4.

of negotiation which would give the Turks time to settle with the Cretans, and, in a despatch of 13 February, 1867, he recorded his opposition to the union of Epirus and Thessaly with Greece as upsetting the balance between Greek and Slav in the Balkans, unless the Slavs received some corresponding compensation, such as Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Old Serbia to Serbia. He was therefore against discussing the proposals put forward by France. St. Petersburg, however, thought otherwise and, as he complains, dragged on fruitless conversations for several years (*Iz.*, 1914, ii, 75-9).

Ignatyev does not deal with his own programme circulated to the Powers during that winter, which included a radical administrative reconstruction of Turkey on the basis of nationality, with a series of financial, judicial, military and educational reforms which could only be put into effective practice if they were worked under the control of European commissions.⁸ Probably it was not his original intention to open the field to such wide discussions, and perhaps these proposals were merely put forward in response to St. Petersburg instructions and intended as a counterweight to the French.

The tangled course of the Cretan question is not followed through by Ignatyev in adequate enough detail to warrant an analysis of it here.⁹ He emphasises the effect of the visit of the Sultan and Fuad Pasha in the summer of 1867 to Paris and London and Fuad's conviction that the French would take no serious action over Crete, though he makes no reference to the extreme hostility towards Napoleon aroused by his request during the visit for the independence of Crete—an idea which was decisively opposed by England (*Iz.*, 1914, ii, 89-90). He enlarges upon Fuad's visit to the Tsar at Livadia in August 1867 as offering an opportunity to arrive at an understanding confined to Russia and Turkey or at least prompt action in Crete by the Powers led by Russia, an opportunity which, despite his efforts, was not taken (*Iz.*, 1914, ii, 90-93). He underlines the dangers attendant upon the marriage in October 1867 of King George of Greece with Princess Olga Constantinova, a niece of the Tsar.

The Cretans, he pointed out retrospectively, had naturally been

⁸ Tatishchev, *Aleksandr II*, vol. 2, p. 65.

⁹ There is a detailed treatment of Russo-French relations during the Cretan revolt in F. C. Roux, *Alexandre II, Gorichakoff, Napoléon III*, chaps. 5 and 6, but very little light is there thrown on the rôle of Ignatyev. See also E. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours*, vol. 3, pp. 180-320, and particularly pp. 234-236 and 239-40, on the marriage of King George and Russian influence.

incited to believe in Russian help by the sympathy expressed for them in Russia in the Press and in society, by collections and balls for their aid. Close at hand, off their shores, was Admiral Butakov's squadron, which spent its time in putting spokes in the wheels of the Turks and facilitating Cretan communications with Greece, whither came a continual stream of assistance. The marriage of Princess Olga, Ignatyev claims to have prognosticated, would entail most awkward consequences: the Greeks now regard Crete as her dowry; everyone looks on Russia as committed to a successful conclusion of the Cretan question; if Russia fails to secure Crete for Greece, the situation will be extremely delicate. It is natural to find Ignatyev loudly bewailing the great blow to Russian prestige caused by the complete extinguishing of hopes, the suppression of the rebellion by the end of 1868, and the humiliation of Greece by the Turkish threat of war and the Paris Conference early in 1869 (*Iz.*, 1914, ii, 72-3, 103-5).

The interest of the years 1866-68, which is most strongly marked in Ignatyev's memoirs (and to a lesser extent this is true also of his 1874 memorandum) is not the diplomatic struggle over the Cretan question itself, but the possibility of combining the Christians on the mainland in some form of common action. The situation was becoming increasingly alarming for the Turks and afforded excellent opportunities for Ignatyev's intrigues. He expounded his policy in a series of despatches to Gorchakov, which explained that, while anything should be avoided which would give excuse for accusations that Russia intended to take part in the liberation movement or wished to guide it, Russia must at the same time give moral support to her co-religionists and further co-operation between the nationalities of the Balkan peninsula so that at the given moment they could support each other (*Iz.*, 1914, iii, 99-100).

In his memoirs lengthy avowal is proudly made of his efforts to build up a defensive-offensive alliance between Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and the Bulgars. Prince Michael was pronouncedly loyal to Russia and hostile to Austria. The Bulgars were at that time only raw material without sufficient elements for the formation of a self-dependent principality, and it was therefore suggested to unite all the Bulgar, as well as the Serb, lands, which could be freed from the Turks under Prince Michael. Hercegovina was to go to Montenegro; Bosnia, if circumstances permitted, to Serbia.¹⁰ Sufficient under-

¹⁰ This was the policy of one group in the Bulgar colony at Bucarest, "the old party," headed by the wealthy, influential *émigré* patriot Eulogios Georgiev, which worked under the ægis of Russian Pan-Slavism and concluded, in April, 1867, an agreement for a Bulgar-Yugoslav confederation to be headed

standing between the Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgars, and even the Albanians, for a general rising seemed likely to be attained, if only the Cretan revolt could be maintained successfully and Russia could secure the non-intervention of the Powers (*I.V.*, 58-9).

The most revealing exposition of Ignatyev's fears and hopes is contained in the long confidential letter which he wrote to Gorchakov on 8 January, 1867, and which is fully summarised by M. Onou in the December number of this *Review* (pp. 394-7; dating it according to the old style). This lengthy effusion closes with a reiteration that Russia might be compelled to take up arms. The naval Powers might send fleets to Salonika, the Dardanelles, or elsewhere; Austria-Hungary desired Bosnia-Hercegovina as a makeweight for her Italian losses;¹¹ the position of the Christians would be endangered as a result of Turkish successes. In the event of sudden military action being required, three groups, according to Ignatyev, would be required, one on the Galician frontier, one of 30,000 on the Black Sea coast ready for a sudden descent on the Bosphorus by sea, and the third, and most numerous, in Trans-Caucasia. In the event of a war with Turkey the main theatre of Russian military operations should be Asiatic Turkey, where the Powers could not intervene and where decisive results could be attained¹² (*I.V.*, 69).

by Prince Michael. Neither the personnel nor the policy of this group was, however, supported by the extreme Bulgar revolutionists, who, following their ablest leader Rakovsky (he died in October, 1867), were strongly anti-Russian. Rakovsky himself had become disabused by his experiences in 1862 of co-operation with the Serbs. A third group at Bucarest actively preached a form of dualism—a semi-independent Bulgaria under the Sultan as Tsar. Alois Hajek, *Bulgarien unter der Türkenherrschaft* (Berlin, 1925; based mainly on Bulgarian sources), pp. 229-34.

¹¹ Ignatyev adds that it would be preferable from a Russian and a Slav point of view that Austria took Wallachia and part of Moldavia, the Sereth forming the boundary with Russia. Ignatyev's anti-Roumanian bias is well illustrated by his acrid remarks in July, 1870, to Prokesch-Osten, Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople, on the impossible situation in the principalities: "There is only one way of helping, *viz*, to dissolve the union which has been the attempted means for creating a nationality which, in fact, does not exist, and to give Moldavia and Wallachia hospodars as before." If the people could speak, he declared, there would not be one voice against a return to hospodars except the reds and idiots. From Prokesch-Osten's "Erinnerungen aus den Jahren, 1870 u. 1871," in *Deutsche Revue*, April, 1880, p. 13. At this time in 1870, Ignatyev nursed hopes of Russia's utilising the very precarious internal situation of Roumania to regain the ceded districts of Bessarabia, either by allowing in return a proclamation of independence, or by coming to an understanding with the Turks whereby they should intervene in Roumania to suppress the expected revolution (*Iz*, 1914, v. 143-5).

¹² So, too, in *Iz*, 1915, iv, 230, with special emphasis on Kurdistan, "ce grand Monténégro asiatique." Ignatyev multiplied agents among the Kurds and Armenians, and continued during the crisis of 1875-8 to urge that Asiatic Turkey should be the main field of Russian military operations.

Quite obviously Ignatyev's chameleon-like plans depended to a large extent on Russia being left with a free hand in the Balkans. For this he counted on a Franco-Prussian war to prevent effective intervention by the Powers in the east. "Il nous faudra faire coïncider le mouvement gréco-serbe avec une guerre entre la Prusse et la France. Nous ne devrions jamais songer à prendre une part active dans une guerre européenne. . . . Si nous comptons nous entendre avec la Prusse et l'Italie dans le cas d'un mouvement gréco-slave, on pourrait, peut-être, obtenir le concours des gouvernements serbe et hellénique afin d'éviter que la lutte dans les provinces chrétiennes ne se généralise prématurément et n'attire intempestivement l'attention de l'Europe, avant que les cabinets soient absolument absorbés par le grand drame, qui se jouera pour la création d'un Empire d'Allemagne" (his despatch to Gorchakov of 20 January, 1868, quoted in part in *Iz.*, 1914, iv, 95-6).

These variegated and far-flung schemes did not commend themselves to Gorchakov. St. Petersburg disdained all Ignatyev's efforts to put the Cretan revolt to good use. Prince Michael's death destroyed the basis for the projected Balkan rising and the creation of a great Serb-Bulgar principality. Serbia could no longer be counted upon and might be squeezed in the fist of Austria-Hungary. It was necessary for Ignatyev to seek other combinations for the attainment of his ends, to dissemble and keep on good terms with the Turkish Government (*I.V.*, 70).

In fact, Ignatyev's grandiose foreshadowing of the Balkan League of 1911 came nearer realisation than might have been expected, for Prince Michael was prepared at least to go a long way towards concerting common action, even though he would not commit himself to dangerous risks.¹³ Serbian propaganda was active amongst the Bulgars, and, as has been already seen, plans were being launched for some form of Serb-Bulgar confederation. Treaties were concluded by Prince Michael with Montenegro, with Greece and with Roumania. The first two had been strongly supported by Ignatyev, though he could not prevent Macedonia being an apple of discord between the Serbs and the Greeks (*Iz.*, 1914, iii, 103-8). His attitude to the Serb-Roumanian treaty is not clear, but it can hardly have been approving if the Turkish version of that treaty was correct, for according to that, in the event of full success, Roumania was to have the Danube delta and Bulgaria east of the line Rustchuk—Varna, Serbia obtaining the rest of

¹³ See H. W. V. Temperley, *History of Serbia*, pp. 256-9, on Prince Michael and schemes for a Balkan alliance.

Bulgaria and Bosnia-Hercegovina Ignatyev would never have given his blessing to such a cutting off of Bulgaria from contiguity with Bessarabia. While all other schemes would probably have come to at least partial grief on the rocks of mutual jealousy, they were in any case ruined by the assassination of Prince Michael in June, 1868, and by the successes of Hussein Avni Pasha in Crete. All that actually happened in connection with them was Prince Michael's skilful diplomatic victory over the Turks in 1867 and three small and ill-prepared risings in Bulgaria, indiscriminately stamped out by Midhat Pasha.¹⁴

These ill-starred Bulgar outbreaks did not profit Ignatyev. It is typical of the accusations and counter-accusations bandied about in Constantinople that while the Turks and the western Powers ascribed the outbreaks to Russian money and panslav agents, Ignatyev professed to find full ground for believing that Polish agents, in relation with the French Embassy, had influenced the Bulgars. The old Russian bugbear of Polish *émigrés* in Turkey had been strongly reinforced after 1863. Grouped around Sadik Pasha Chaikovsky, they were castigated by Ignatyev as a serious element of anti-Russian intrigue, until the Franco-Prussian War and his own ascendancy at Constantinople effected a change ¹⁵(*Iz.*, 1914, iii, 108-9; 1915, iii, 167-8).

Over Prince Michael's able riddance in 1867 of the Turkish garrisons in Belgrade and the five other fortresses, which since 1862 were all that they occupied, and over the election of his young cousin Milan in succession to him, Ignatyev passes lightly. In his

¹⁴ For these risings in 1867 and 1868, see Hajek, *Bulgarien unter der Türkenherrschaft*, pp. 234-7. Midhat had been sent to introduce the new vilayet system, which he did with great energy and remarkable success. See F. Kanitz, *Donau-Bulgarien und der Balkan*, vol. i, pp. 28-32, 113-4. For the Serb-Roumanian treaty signed early in 1868, see E. Engelhardt, "La confédération balcanique" in *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 1892, vol. 6, pp. 36-9, printing a text of the treaty as supplied to the Turks by their agents. For the Serb-Greek treaty signed on 26 August, 1867, see S. Th. Lascaris, "La première alliance entre la Grèce et la Serbie," in *Le Monde Slave*, September, 1926, based on the Greek archives, and printing the full text of the treaty and of the military convention signed 28 February, 1868; and E. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours*, vol. 3, pp. 228-30, 236-8, 242, 247. For Serbian relations with Greece and Roumania note also N. Iorga, *Histoire des états balcaniques jusqu'à 1924*, pp. 356, 361-3.

¹⁵ Count Chaikovsky, a Polish ex-officer, had been a refugee in Turkey since 1849, and had entered the Turkish army as Sadik Pasha. He was entrusted with the formation of certain mixed cavalry regiments, including both Moslems and Christians, chiefly Poles and a few Bulgars. The Russian consular agents were actively warning the Bulgars in 1868 against being seduced into taking service with Sadik's cossacks. Sahh Munir Pasha, *La Politique orientale de la Russie* (Lausanne, 1918), pp. 122-3.

memoirs he claims that he strongly supported Prince Michael in his demands for the evacuation of the Turkish garrisons (*I.V.*, 830), but in the 1874 memorandum he implicitly admits that he did not press the Porte to yield on the question (*Iz.*, 1914, i, 120).¹⁶ Vladan Gjorgjević, Prince Milan's doctor and a violent Russophobe Serb politician and writer, may thus be correct in his statement that Russia, mainly in the person of Ignatyev, alone opposed the Serbian demands, and that she refused to join the other Powers, led by England, in their successful pressure on the Porte. To what extent he may be justified in his further accusations as to Russian hostility to the Obrenović family from the end of 1867 and as to Ignatyev enquiring of the Porte three days after Prince Michael's murder as to whether it had any objection to Peter Karagjorgjević as his successor is not revealed by Ignatyev.¹⁷ It is clear, however, that he regarded the regency (and particularly Blaznavac) which governed for Prince Milan with the deepest suspicion as being in the hands of the Austrians, and he accused it of great weakness, jealousy of Montenegro and loss of Albanian support (*Iz.*, 1914, iv, 77). Not until the visit of Prince Milan and Blaznavac to Livadia in 1871 was a turning point in Serb orientation reached (*Iz.*, 1915, ii, 164).

B. H. SUMNER.

(*To be continued.*)

¹⁶ No light whatever is thrown on the policy of Russia or Ignatyev in this question by the chief Russian historian of Serbia, Nil Popov. He deals with the evacuation of the fortresses in his article, "Serbiya i Porta, 1861-7," in *Vestnik Evropy*, 1879, vol 2, pp. 257-77.

¹⁷ For Gjorgjević's very biased anti-Russian account of 1867-68, see his *Die Serbische Frage* (Wl. Georgewitsch), pp 40-4. N. Iorga, *Correspondance diplomatique roumaine sous le roi Charles Ier* (1866-1880), p. x, records Onou, the Russian dragoman, as sounding Fuad as to what the Porte's attitude would be if the Skupština elected Prince Nicholas of Montenegro; Fuad replied that only a Serb from Serbia would be allowed to be chosen.

THE RECOGNITION OF ROUMANIAN INDEPENDENCE, 1878-1880

ARTICLES XLIV and XLV of the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 required the retrocession by Roumania of Bessarabia in exchange for the unattractive Dobrudja and various minor territories, and the removal of restrictions on Jews and other non-Christians;¹ and in face of a general disposition to regard the arrangement as not unreasonable, Roumania realised that she would lose rather than gain by any protest.² The one ray of hope for her was that while the other Great Powers were willing to accept the retrocession as one of the least objectionable ways of giving Russia some tangible compensation, they did not lose sight of the possibility that Roumania's indignation might serve to erect her into a barrier to Russia's future advances in the Near East. Russia had persistently treated the Principalities rather as a political No Man's Land where she could exercise a *de facto* sovereignty won from Turkey as the fruits of victory, than as a duly constituted State towards which she had the usual obligations of international law and friendship; and accordingly in the diplomatic struggle over the fulfilling of the conditions on which her independence was to be based Roumania aroused international complications which her position hardly seemed to warrant.

The situation imposed some particularly delicate problems on the British Government, and the involved story of the negotiations

¹ Article VII of the Roumanian constitution of 1866 laid down that "foreigners of Christian rites can alone obtain naturalisation." Article XLIV of the Berlin Treaty, 1878: "In Roumania the difference of religious creeds and confessions shall not be alleged against any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to public employments, functions, and honours, or the exercise of the various professions and industries in any locality whatsoever"; freedom of worship was to be assured to Roumanian citizens and foreigners, and no hindrance was to be offered "either to the hierarchical organisation of the different communions, or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs"; finally, "the subjects and citizens of all the Powers, traders and others, shall be treated in Roumania, without distinction of creed, on a footing of perfect equality." Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, iv, 2790-1. The text of the Roumanian constitution is given in Damé, F., *Histoire de la Roumanie Contemporaine* (1900), pp. 425-446.

² *Aus dem Leben König Karls von Rumänien*, iv, 81-83, 86, 88. *Acte și Documente din corespondența diplomatică a lui Mihail Kogălniceanu*, pp. 232, 233-6, 241, 242. Cf. H. S. Edwards, *Sir William White*, p. 137, Elliot to White, August 1878.

which led finally to the recognition of Roumanian independence in 1880 can perhaps best be viewed from the angle of British foreign policy. The Government had to choose between an early recognition which might be expected to strengthen Roumania in her resistance to Russia, and a postponement of the act of recognition until the immediate problem of Jewish emancipation had been satisfactorily arranged. There were weighty arguments in favour of the latter course, for Bismarck's vehement insistence on Roumania's full compliance suggested that Germany might seek Russia's aid in coercing Roumania if other Powers failed to give the desired support. The French Government also had reasons for insisting on satisfactory measures of emancipation; Waddington had need of Bismarck's support in Tunis, and powerful Jewish influences in France were pressing the Government to adhere firmly to its traditional support of the Jewish cause in Roumania.³ Salisbury therefore ran the risk of alienating both Germany and France by any precipitate recognition, and with the satisfactory execution of the Treaty of Berlin dependent on majority votes in the delimitation commissions in the Balkans, he could not afford to antagonise the two relatively neutral Powers.⁴ He had, however, before him a single purpose, that of getting the Russian troops out of the Balkan peninsula by May 1879;⁵ and there are indications that he would not have hesitated to abandon Germany and France on the emancipation issue, if Roumania's weakness had appeared to make such a course really necessary.

The Jewish question was undoubtedly the most paralysing of the problems which confronted the Roumanian Government, both before and after the Congress, and it accounts for much of the bad odour in which Roumania found herself in 1878.⁶ From the accession of Prince Charles in 1866 until the outbreak of the Near Eastern

³ D D.F. (*Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 1re. série, ii), no. 360, Saint-Valler to Waddington, 9 Nov., 1878. W. Langer, "The European Powers and the French Occupation of Tunis" (*American Historical Review*, Oct. 1925, Jan. 1926). Bourgeois et Pagès, *Les Origines et les Responsabilités de la Grande Guerre*, pp. 192-94, 365-66.

⁴ Cf. F.O. 64/933. Odo Russell to Salisbury, 28 June, 1879, no 322. Radowitz on the Roumanian question. "The support which the German Government had received from that of Her Majesty with respect to this question, had, he said, afforded them great satisfaction, and had materially contributed to the pleasure which they had felt in being able, on their side, to support the policy of Her Majesty's Government during the recent negotiations in Egypt."

⁵ Lady G. Cecil, *Life of Salisbury*, ii, 344.

⁶ E. Picot, *La Question des Israélites Roumains au point de vue du droit* (Bucarest, 1875) gives a detailed examination of the juridical position. Criticisms of this pamphlet are given in a memorandum by Percy Sanderson (F.O. 104/6, Sanderson to Salisbury, 28 Jan., 1879, no. 3).

crisis in 1875, the Roumanian Government was subjected to pressure from the Governments of Austria, England, France and Germany, and they, in turn, were kept thoroughly informed by powerful Jewish interests in their own countries⁷ The Roumanian claim that the question was of a social and economic, but not of a religious character does not appear to have made any particular impression on any of the Powers except Russia, and representations were based on the view that no arguments could justify the tolerance by a civilised government of persistent attacks on a racial minority.⁸ Protests by the Powers had begun immediately after the earlier and more liberal tendencies of Prince Charles' Government had been replaced by its virtual surrender to the Moldavian representatives in 1867,⁹ and repeated diplomatic pressure was exerted in 1867 and in the next few years by Austria, France and England;¹⁰ the British proposal of further pressure in May, 1872, revealed the beginning of a new grouping, Germany being now willing to intervene while Austria held back.¹¹ None of this international pressure had, however, any material effect as far as the Jews were concerned.

Roumania's relations with Germany were particularly unfortunate throughout the seventies. Bismarck had many grounds for his annoyance, and his scanty regard for the feelings of the Roumanians did much in the early years to encourage Roumania to look for support to Paris and Vienna. The question of the treatment of the Jews became dangerously entangled with the question of the railways, partly because many of the subordinate officials of the railway in Roumania were German Jews,¹² partly because a controlling interest in the railways had been taken by the great Jewish bankers, Hansemann and Bleichröder, with whom Bismarck's personal and political ties were becoming increasingly intimate.¹³

⁷ D.D.F, Saint-Vallier to Bismarck, 27 June, 1879, p. 522 For correspondence on the Jewish question before 1875 see the blue book, *Principautés No. 1* (1877).

⁸ Some attempt to expound the case against the Jews was made by J. H. Dupuis, the British Vice-Consul at Galatz. Cf. *ibid.*, Dupuis to Elliot, 28 August, 1872, no. 483.

⁹ *Ibid.*, nos. 37, 40, 88, etc.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, nos. 177, 197, 224.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, nos. 438, 440, 450, 462.

¹² F O 64/932. Odo Russell to Salisbury, 8 March, 1879, no. 152 (secret). G. D. Gioriceanu, *La Roumanie économique et ses rapports avec l'étranger de 1860 à 1915* (1928), pp. 169-172. R. H. Wienefeld, *Franco-German Relations, 1878-1885* (1929), pp. 51-96.

¹³ O. Jöhlinger, *Bismarck und die Juden* (1921), chap. i: O. v. Diest-Daber, *Bismarck und Bleichröder* (1897), p. 11; Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst, *Memoirs* (Eng. translation), ii, 210.

Although his upbringing and class outlook had hardly been of a nature to make intercourse with the Jewish magnates easy, he had very soon abandoned his earlier political hostility to them, and from the beginning of the fifties displayed anxiety to make use of them in his official programme.¹⁴ The Roumanian railway question furnished an excellent example of their value. An active policy of railway building had been foreshadowed by the law of September, 1862, and the most important of several concessions to foreign companies was the system which traversed the greater part of the country from Roman *via* Galatz, Ploëști, and Bucarest to Turnu-Severin near the Hungarian frontier. This undertaking proved too much for the concessionaires, a Berlin firm directed by Strousberg, a German Jew, and when, in January 1871, the latter announced his inability to carry out his obligations, Bismarck demanded that the unfortunate shareholders, mainly Prussian subjects, should be paid their interest by the Roumanian Government, in accordance with the guarantee given when the concession was made.¹⁵ In spite of their bitter indignation¹⁶ the Roumanians found it necessary to yield;¹⁷ and after Bleichröder and Hanseemann had undertaken to lend the necessary capital, a new company was formed by the shareholders to take over the concession.¹⁸ But hostility to Prussia, strengthened by the pro-French sympathies of the Franco-Prussian War period, remained, and the Prince continued to grumble at the terms forced on the country by the two bankers.¹⁹ In 1875, discussions in the Chamber over a further railway concession for the line Ploëști-Predeal produced violent attacks on Germany, and resulted in the concessions going to an Englishman, Crawley.²⁰

Austria made it clear from the start that she did not intend to join the three Western Powers in any strenuous defence of the Jewish cause, and the anxiety to conciliate the Roumanian Government immediately displayed by Andrásy may have led Bucarest in the first few weeks after the Congress to underestimate the difficul-

¹⁴ Jöhlinger, *op. cit.*, 5, 18, 19. General von Schweinitz, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, I, 202.

¹⁵ Cioriceanu, *op. cit.*, pp. 126, 127. *Aus dem Leben*, II, 244.

¹⁶ Cf. the conversations between the Roumanian agent in Berlin and Bismarck (May 1871). N. Iorga (ed.) *Correspondance diplomatique roumaine*, pp. 81, 82.

¹⁷ After a vote of the Roumanian Chambers annulling the concession Bismarck had demanded that the Porte should intervene as Roumania's suzerain. *Aus dem Leben*, II, 207-8, 209-213.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 233. Cioriceanu, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-2.

¹⁹ *Aus dem Leben*, II, 390.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 448. Cioriceanu, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

ties of the situation. Balatceanu, the Roumanian agent at Vienna, reported on 18 July a conversation in which Andrásy had promised to recognise Roumania immediately after the exchange of ratifications, and had described the conditions attached to the recognition by the Congress as "une bêtise."²¹ Elliot wrote on 6 August that Andrásy considered it would be inadvisable to put pressure on Prince Charles' Government to oblige them to pass a law for complete religious emancipation, which would be so much at variance with the feelings of the people as to be likely to be attended with great risk to the Jewish populations.²²

There seems little doubt that Andrásy had no intention in the first instance of delaying recognition, and there was an obvious advantage for Austria in giving Roumania such support against Russia as recognition would imply. Prince Charles proposed to assume the "somewhat novel designation" of Grand Prince, with the title of Royal Highness, on the recognition of his country's independence;²³ and Andrásy, after making it clear that he would not consent to either Milan or Charles assuming the title of King, expressed at once his willingness to recognise Charles as "Grand Prince of Roumania," though not of the Roumanians.²⁴ At the same time he decided to accredit without delay a representative at Bucarest with the rank of Minister-Plenipotentiary, and a week or two later, in deference to the wishes of the Roumanian Government, promised to give the representative the superior rank of Envoy. Count Hoyos, the Imperial Minister at Washington, was chosen for the post. Russia was, however, the first Great Power to appoint a Minister-Resident.²⁵

Little of this friendly disposition was found among the other Powers. Waddington defined his attitude to Lord Lyons on 17 August. He begged the British Ambassador to remind Salisbury of the importance of obtaining the execution by the legislature of Roumania of the stipulation in the Treaty of Berlin respecting religious liberty; if Article XLIV were duly carried into effect by

²¹ *Acte și Documente*, pp. 236-7, Balatceanu to Kogalniceanu, 18 July. Cf. *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 86.

²² F. O. 7/933. Elliot to Salisbury, 6 August, no. 547.

²³ F. O. 7/933. Elliot to Salisbury, 2 August, no. 530.

²⁴ F. O. 7/933. Elliot to Salisbury, 6 August, no. 546. Cf. F. O. 64/900, S. to Odo Russell, 27 July, no. 378. Salisbury tells Münster that the Government "would gladly acquiesce in any decision to which the German and Austrian Governments might come" on this question.

²⁵ F. O. 7/933, Elliot to S., 22 August, no. 597; 26 August, no. 606. F. O. 104/1, White to S., 26 August, no. 146. *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 98. *Acte și Documente*, p. 245. Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

Roumania, France would be willing to treat her with every courtesy, but if this was not done, it would, for parliamentary and other reasons, be very difficult for the French Government to overlook the conditions on which the recognition of independence was made dependent by the treaty.²⁶ The British Government, in spite of its traditional interest in Jewish emancipation, would probably have preferred to identify its attitude with that of Austria; for apart from the political considerations which pointed to the strengthening of Roumania against Russia,²⁷ trade relations between the countries were on a most unsatisfactory footing pending the drawing up of a commercial treaty.²⁸

"The Government will no doubt bear in mind that we are a nation of shopkeepers, and that the only sure way to our affections is through a liberal tariff," Salisbury had written to White in May; and although he felt it inexpedient to separate from Bismarck and Waddington, he betrayed some uneasiness throughout the winter as to the possible reaction of unduly stiff demands on the Roumanian Government.²⁹ Bismarck's emphatic demands for the complete fulfilment of the clauses relating to emancipation served to keep England in line with France and Germany on this issue for the next eighteen months,³⁰ though by the spring of 1879 Salisbury had begun to discover ulterior motives in Bismarck's zeal.³¹ Accordingly, in his reply to Lyons' dispatch of 17 August, Salisbury accepted Waddington's views that the formal acceptance, and as far as possible the execution of the conditions annexed to the Treaty, should precede the acknowledgment of Serbian and Roumanian independence.³² This assurance was communicated to the French Government on 11 September.³³ On 22 August, in a long conversation with Kogalniceanu, Andrassy had already broken the unwelcome news that no Power would recognise the independence of Roumania until the latter had made a formal submission to the terms of the treaty, and until then the diplomatic representation of the Powers

²⁶ F.O. 27/2312. Lyons to S., 17 August, no. 652.

²⁷ White repeatedly warned Salisbury that an unduly unsympathetic attitude on the part of the Western Powers would bring the strong Russophil element into office. Cf. F.O. 104/1, White to S., 2 September, no. 155.

²⁸ By the general tariff of 1876 Roumania had differentiated against countries which had not signed separate commercial agreements with her. *Commercial No. 11* (1877), no. 28, etc.

²⁹ Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

³⁰ Jöhlinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.

³¹ F.O. 64/931. Odo Russell to S., 2 March, 1879, no. 139 (secret).

³² F.O. 27/2301. S. to Adams, 9 September, 1878, no. 574.

³³ F.O. 27/2313. Adams to S., 11 September, no. 705.

at Bucarest would not be altered; moreover, France and England would require, before they accredited representatives, a vote of the Chambers for the emancipation of the Jews. He added that the longer Roumania postponed this question, the stronger would the "Alliance Israelite" become with the Western Powers.³⁴

The railway problem once more began to cause trouble with Germany as soon as the war was over.³⁵ From the beginning of 1875 the Roumanian Government had been anxious to free itself from the financial entanglements with Germany by a partial or complete purchase of the railways,³⁶ but satisfactory terms had not been arranged before the war interrupted negotiations.³⁷ On 22 May, 1876, the Roumanian Cabinet had drafted a law providing for the transference of the railway undertaking to the Roumanian Government, but after a visit of J. Calinderu to Berlin³⁸ the German bankers decided that they could not regard the Roumanian terms as satisfactory.³⁹ An additional link between the Jewish interests in Germany and Roumania's international status was established by the debates on the proposed Commercial Convention.⁴⁰ This was signed on 10 November, 1877, and was ratified without delay by the Roumanian Chambers; in the German Reichstag, however, it was severely handled by the Conservatives, who objected in particular to Article II dealing with the position of the Jews. Bismarck tried to dispose of the criticism by a pledge to obtain equal rights for all German subjects in Roumania, and by the argument that the question would be discussed elsewhere; but he was compelled to agree to the Convention being referred to a Commission for examination, and as the result of an unfavourable report the ratification was postponed until June 1881.⁴¹ This pledge supplied Germany's official reason for insistence on adequate measures of emancipation,⁴² while the terms of the Berlin Treaty supplied a convenient method of utilising the international interest in the Jewish question to force

³⁴ *Acte și Documente*, Kogalniceanu to Campineanu, 23 August, p. 243. *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 95.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, iv, 27.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, ii, 407-8.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, ii, 459, 475, 483; iii, 2, 9, 10. Damé, *op. cit.*, pp. 265-6.

³⁸ *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 54. He found that Prussian law did not provide any obstacles to the transfer, but that little progress was being made as the Ministry had been negotiating with secondary banks, and not with the Hansemann-Bleichroder group.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, iv, 58, 67, 86.

⁴⁰ C. G. Antonescu, *Die Rumänische Handelspolitik von 1875-1910* (1915), pp. 61-65.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 63. *Aus dem Leben*, iii, 348; iv, 26, 43, 235.

⁴² F.O. 64/910. Odo Russell to S, 22 November, no. 632.

upon Roumania a favourable settlement with Bleichröder and other German financial interests "I sat for an hour and a half with Bleichröder and listened to his Talmudic wisdom," wrote Hohenlohe on 15 June "The Roumanians cause him anxiety. . . The unpleasant part to me of the whole talk was that Bleichröder seemed to have influence with Bismarck in questions of commercial policy. He acted as if he shared in the Government, notwithstanding his assurances of humility"⁴³

Accordingly, as the time approached for the Roumanian Government to carry out its obligations, it found little inclination among the Powers to make concessions which would render the task of converting Roumanian public opinion more easy. The Government had prudently prorogued the Chambers on 16 July, in order to allow the first outburst of indignation time to exhaust itself, and before the Chambers reassembled at the end of September, a circular was addressed conveying to the Powers assurances of the intention of the Government to carry out the treaty conditions⁴⁴ The opposition tactics were to assert that though submission to the Powers was inevitable, the Government no longer possessed the confidence of the country, and that an appeal to the decision of the electors was indispensable; and the Government was accordingly by no means anxious to take an early decision on those portions of the treaty provisions which would necessitate an election.⁴⁵ The election of a special assembly was required for any change of constitution, such as the removal of religious disabilities, and the Government accordingly hoped to satisfy the Powers by the votes of the two Chambers on 11 and 12 October, authorising the surrender of Bessarabia and undertaking to solve the other questions in a constitutional manner⁴⁶

The three Powers showed no disposition to regard these steps as a satisfactory basis for immediate recognition. All the Powers had agreed by the end of September to address Prince Charles as His Royal Highness,⁴⁷ but this was essentially a personal tribute and the three Powers were not prepared to accompany it with changes in

⁴³ Hohenlohe, *op. cit.*, ii, 210.

⁴⁴ *Turkey No 53* (1878), no. 187. See also F.O. 104/1, White to S., 29 August, no. 151; 12 September, no. 160 (encloses copy of circular). *Damé, op. cit.*, p 314.

⁴⁵ F.O. 104/1. White to S., 14 September, no. 163; 23 September, no 166, 12 October, no. 190.

⁴⁶ *Turkey No. 53* (1878), no. 103.

⁴⁷ F.O. 104/1. White to S., 23 September, no. 165; 25 September, no. 169; remarking that Prince Charles had decided to give up the idea of assuming the title of 'Grand Prince.'

the diplomatic representation.⁴⁸ On 7 October, Varnav-Liteanu wrote that Bulow had stated definitely that the recognition could not take place nor the Ministers-Plenipotentiary be appointed until the treaty conditions were fulfilled.⁴⁹ Attempts were made to persuade the French Government to agree to recognition immediately on the retrocession of Bessarabia, without waiting for the measures for securing religious liberty and equality, on the ground that these could not be carried out pending a military occupation.⁵⁰ This request was communicated by Waddington to Salisbury, who on 7 October informed Lyons that the British Government accepted Waddington's apprehensions, and as at present advised did not propose to recognise Roumanian independence until the conditions prescribed by Articles XLIV and XLV had been fulfilled. Notes in the docket of this dispatch show that Salisbury had still some hesitations, but that Beaconsfield was strongly opposed to concessions.⁵¹ On 11 October the Roumanian agent in Paris, Callimaki-Catargi, telegraphed to Bucarest that Waddington was unable to give a favourable reply to the Government's request.⁵²

The efforts of the Roumanian Government to secure immediate recognition continued throughout October. Their argument was that formal promises to revise the constitution had been given, but that the solution of a social question could not proceed as rapidly as the drafting of a treaty; a thorough study of the problem in question did not imply any evasion of a solution, and the moral support provided by some practical expression of sympathy would strengthen the Government's hand.⁵³ These views were put in conversation to Lyons and Waddington by Callimaki-Catargi, and

⁴⁸ F.O. 27/2301. S. to Adams, 30 September, no. 634. *Acte și Documente*, pp. 607-8. *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 105-7.

⁴⁹ *Acte și documente*, Varnav-Liteanu to Kogalniceanu, 7 October, pp. 611-2; *cf.*, 29 September, pp. 610-11.

⁵⁰ F.O. 27/2301. S. to Lyons, 7 October, no. 653. *Acte și Documente*, p. 609.

⁵¹ F.O. 27/2301. *Ibid.*, no. 653. Notes in docket. "Lord Beaconsfield. This is a matter of some importance; as if Roumanians ultimately evade their obligations, we may seem to have connived at it. On the other hand, a permanent quarrel with them is very undesirable. S." "Considering the difficult and numerous engagements the Sultan has to fulfil, and the animus unduly to press his Highness, I think it desirable, that it should be seen, that there are other quarters where the engagements of the Treaty of Berlin are not carried into effect and I am strongly of opinion that we should not comply with the Roumanian request. B."

⁵² *Acte și Documente*. Callimaki-Catargi to Kogalniceanu, 11 October, pp. 614-5.

⁵³ *Ibid.* Kogalniceanu to Callimaki-Catargi, 11 October, pp. 613-4; to Roumanian diplomatic agents, 16 October, pp. 267-8.

Lyons promised to report them to Salisbury. On 25 October Waddington told Lyons that he had once more made it clear to Callimaki-Catargi that the French Government could not take any further steps until more progress had been made.⁵⁴

Salisbury would probably have given the same reply, but at this moment alarming reports began to reach London concerning Russia's demands for a right of way for troops through Dobrogea,⁵⁵ and Salisbury began again to express apprehension at the danger of forcing Roumania into the hands of Russia. Russia had taken formal possession of Bessarabia on 13 October, and on the 23rd, Balaceanu, who had just presented his credentials as Roumanian Envoy to the Emperor of Austria,⁵⁶ told Elliot that Russia was exerting strong pressure on Bucarest to induce his Government, before taking over Bessarabia, to conclude a military convention allowing the passage of her troops through the principalities for a period of two years commencing from May 1879, up to which time it was secured by the Berlin Treaty.⁵⁷ In this crisis Salisbury at once revealed his determination to subordinate all other Near Eastern problems to the task of getting the Russians out of the peninsula, and France and Germany were compelled to recognise that this danger might force him to identify his policy with that of Austria by granting recognition.⁵⁸

It was, however, not altogether easy to decide exactly how serious these Russian demands were, for the Russian Ambassadors, Oubril in Berlin,⁵⁹ Novikov in Vienna,⁶⁰ and Peter Shuvalov, travelling through Vienna to London,⁶¹ all denied knowledge of the affair, and statements from Roumanian sources were not always in entire agreement.⁶² Baron Stuart, the Russian Minister at Bucarest, was

⁵⁴ *Turkey No 53* (1878), no. 120.

⁵⁵ F.O. 104/1. White to S, 30 September, no. 178 (secret), says, all reports confirm the fact that "the Russians have got up an agitation in the Dobrogea with a view to create obstructions to its peaceful occupation by Roumania." On 22 October, White telegraphed that Russia was trying to secure new engagements from Roumania concerning "the future passage of the Russian forces through Roumania inclusive of the Dobrogea" (no. 206, recorder). Negotiations appeared to have been in progress for at least a fortnight (no. 207, extender). Similar reports came from Loftus a few days later. F.O. 65/1008. Loftus to S, 2 November, no. 901; 5 November, no. 902 (confidential); 5 November, no. 909 (confidential).

⁵⁶ F.O. 7/935. Elliot to S., 15 October, no. 735.

⁵⁷ F.O. 7/935. Elliot to S., 23 October, no. 762.

⁵⁸ Edwards, p. 195.

⁵⁹ F.O. 64/900. S. to Odo Russell, 25 November, no. 505.

⁶⁰ F.O. 7/936. Elliot to S., 25 November, no. 822 (confidential).

⁶¹ F.O. 7/936. Elliot to S., 16 November, no. 802.

⁶² White in a summary of the whole question wrote on 16 November

given full powers to conduct and conclude the convention,⁶³ and there are some indications that he went beyond the instructions of his Government⁶⁴ None of the Powers, however, appeared to doubt that some pressure was being put. The point was not a new one, for Article VIII of the Treaty of San Stefano had allowed Russia the right of communication through Roumania for two years, the period of Russian occupation, and had led to some particularly heated passages between the two Governments concerned.⁶⁵ By the Treaty of Berlin it was required that Russia should evacuate Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia nine months after the exchange of ratifications, and that within a further period of three months the passage of her troops across Roumania should cease, and the Principality should be completely evacuated⁶⁶ As the Dobrogea was not yet a part of the Principality, it was just possible that if Roumania recognised the right of Russia to lay conditions on her entry therein, Russia might have some excuse for regarding the Dobrogea as outside the two areas to which the treaty conditions applied; but the real explanation of the apprehensions of Andrassy and Salisbury is that the rumours concerning the Dobrogea fitted just at this moment with reports from many quarters as to Russia's intention of throwing aside the treaty and challenging the Powers⁶⁷ During October and November Salisbury and Andrassy united to impress on Russia their determination to sanction no infringement of the Treaty, and Salisbury was preparing to proceed to the immediate recognition of Roumania when the situation improved rather suddenly.

On 5 November, Baron Stuart, in an audience with the Prince, asked in the name of the Emperor if Roumania would guarantee the right of passage through the Dobrogea for the Russian troops;⁶⁸

that negotiations about the Dobrogea had been conducted for upwards of three months, that "the partisans of a Muscovite alliance have not neglected the employment of every plausible argument to induce persons in authority in Roumania to be guided by their Councils" and that "since the arrival of General Ghika at Livadia as the Envoy of Prince Charles the full influence of that powerful and insinuating Court has been brought to bear to induce compliance." F.O. 104/2, White to S., 16 November, no. 231.

⁶³ *Acte și Documente*, Giers to Stuart, 6 November, p. 599.

⁶⁴ *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 134.

⁶⁵ *Acte și Documente*, Correspondence between General Ghika (St. Petersburg) and Kogalniceanu, pp. 85-7.

⁶⁶ Hertslet, iv, 2778-9.

⁶⁷ An article by the present writer on "Diplomatic Relations after the Congress of Berlin" (*Slavonic Review*, June 1929, pp. 66-79) gives an account of the Anglo-Austrian co-operation in the Eastern question from August to November 1878.

⁶⁸ *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 127.

and on the 10th he presented a note saying that the Russian Government wished to have the Articles of Russo-Roumanian convention of 4/16 April regulating the right of military passage extended to the Dobrogea; these were the most favourable terms that Russia could offer, and if the Roumanian Government proceeded to occupy the Dobrogea without a previous understanding, it would have to accept the consequences. Russia undertook at the same time that the rights enjoyed by Roumania under the Berlin Treaty should not suffer; but on the following day the Prince's Government resolved to enter into no convention with Russia, relative to the right of transit, until Roumanian troops were in occupation.⁶⁹ Further details were supplied by Balaceanu, who called on Elliot on 16 November and said he had just come to Pest by direction of his Government to inform Andrassy of the demands being pressed upon them by Russia. The demands consisted of the recognition to Russia of an indefinite right of passage for troops; of constructing and holding certain batteries with stone jetties, on the sea and on the Danube; and it had apparently also been intimated that till these conditions were complied with, the Roumanian Government would not be permitted to take possession of the country. Balaceanu added that an offer by Kogalniceanu to allow the passage of troops through the Dobrogea for the same period as was fixed for it through Roumania by the Treaty of Berlin had been rejected as insufficient.⁷⁰ In the course of conversation with Novikov at Vienna on 25 November Elliot secured a partial admission from the Russian Ambassador of the truth of the Roumanian charge.

Although Monsieur Novikov began by declaring himself altogether without information on the subject, he very shortly proceeded to say that he was in a position to affirm the entire incorrectness of the assertion that his Government had tried to secure an indefinite right of military passage through the Dobrogea, all that they required being that when that district was incorporated with Roumania, it should be assimilated with the rest of the Principalities in regard to the passage of troops. Upon being pressed, however, my colleague declined to affirm that this right of military passage was only asked for the period fixed by the Treaty of Berlin, and it turned out that what the Imperial Government intended was that the Convention of April 1877 should be extended to the Dobrogea for whatever period that instrument might be held to be in force.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Texts of Russian note and Roumanian reply in *Acte și Documente*, pp. 281-284. *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 128.

⁷⁰ F.O. 7/936. Elliot to S., 17 November, no. 811 (confidential). *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 130. Cf. D. Bratianu's remarks to Layard, *B.M. Add MSS.*, 38939, Layard to White, 15 November.

⁷¹ F.O. 7/936. Elliot to S., 25 November, no. 822 (confidential).

Information as to the Russian demands had begun to reach Salisbury before the end of October, and he displayed every anxiety to encourage the Roumanians in an independent attitude.⁷² On the 29th Salisbury instructed Lyons to "inform M. Waddington that we are disposed to think that in view of the general interests of Europe it is not expedient to defer for a long period the recognition of Roumanian Independence; otherwise they might be driven into the arms of Russia at a critical time" He added that the Roumanian legislature had formally pledged itself to accept the conditions of Berlin and presumably a diplomatic assurance in the same sense could be obtained, on the other hand, owing to the peculiarities of the Roumanian constitution it appeared that a more formal consent could not be given until the end of 1879.⁷³ Waddington replied on 30 October that he was not aware of any special circumstances justifying a change of decision, but on the following day asked Lyons for further information as to Salisbury's grounds for thinking speedy recognition by France and England desirable.⁷⁴ Elliot made clear the intentions of the British Government in a conversation with Balaceanu reported on 2 November. The Roumanian envoy asked if Elliot considered that his Government, by consenting to a convention for the passage of Russian troops through the Dobrogea after the period fixed at Berlin, would be acting in a manner inconsistent with the Treaty; and Elliot replied, that without expressing an opinion as to whether such a convention would or would not be considered as a direct infraction of the Treaty, he could say without hesitation that by rendering the Dobrogea practically Roumanian territory as far as the passage of troops was concerned, the Roumanian Government would be acting in a manner completely at variance with the intentions of the Powers. Such an attitude on Roumania's part would lead the British Government to regard Roumania as an enemy in the event of an Anglo-Russian war over the Treaty.⁷⁵ Salisbury wrote on 14 November approving these remarks.⁷⁶ On 3 November a telegram was sent

⁷² Elliot joined White in urging on Salisbury the dangers of the situation " . . . as three months must elapse before the Constitution can legally be altered, it seems to merit very serious consideration whether a longer withholding of the recognition which has been made by others might not impair the influence which events may shortly make it very desirable for Her Majesty's Government to possess at Bucharest." F.O. 7/935. Elliot to S., 27 October, no. 764.

⁷³ F.O. 27/2302. S. to Lyons, 29 October, no. 717.

⁷⁴ F.O. 27/2315. Lyons to S., 30 October, no. 869, 31 October, no. 872.

⁷⁵ F.O. 7/936. Elliot to S., 2 November, no. 780.

⁷⁶ F.O. 7/926. S. to Elliot, 14 November, no. 587.

to White, announcing that Great Britain would give Roumania the fullest moral support in insisung on her rights to the Dobrogea without the condition of giving military passage to Russia, and White was authorised to inform the Roumanian Government confidentially that Great Britain had promised the Sultan to insist on the evacuation by Russia of Bulgaria and Roumelia in May 1879, and to co-operate with the Porte if force should be necessary. The telegram concluded with the warning that "if Roumania now binds herself to give a military passage, she will compromise her neutrality in the event of such a war"⁷⁷

Salisbury followed this initiative by arriving at an understanding with Andrásy as to the necessity of resisting whatever demands Russia might be making; but he was still unable to persuade the French and German Governments that early recognition of Roumanian independence was desirable. On 12 November, following a telegram from White as to the continued alarm felt by the Roumanian Government at Russia's insistent demands,⁷⁸ Elliot was sent telegraphic instructions to ascertain at once Andrásy's views and intentions respecting Russian pressure.⁷⁹ Elliot saw Andrásy at Budapest just after the Austrian Minister's interview with Peter Shuvalov.⁸⁰ Shuvalov said that he had read the entire Roumanian dossier without finding the least trace of such a demand.⁸¹ Andrásy told Elliot that Shuvalov had professed entire ignorance of any demand by his Government for a convention for the passage of troops through the Dobrogea, and he appeared satisfied that Shuvalov had not yet heard of it.⁸² Elliot replied that there could, nevertheless, be no doubt of the demand being energetically pressed upon the Roumanian Government. Andrásy's view was that not only

⁷⁷ F.O. 104/2 S to White, 3 November, no 57. On 29 October, White said that he was not aware of any objection on Great Britain's part to the taking possession of the Dobrogea by Roumania (F.O. 104/1, 30 October, no. 211). On 31 October, he telegraphed that the Roumanian Ministers were relying on the support of the friendly Powers (*ibid.*, no. 215). F.O. 7/926. S. to Elliot, 5 November, no. 565. Cf. *Add. MSS.*, 38939, Layard to White, 8 November, 1878.

⁷⁸ F.O. 104/2. White to S., 11 November, no 223 (recorder). A further telegram on the 12th (no. 225) stated that negotiations with the Russian Minister were being actively prosecuted, and on the 14th (no. 61), Salisbury telegraphed White to warn Roumania of the danger of losing the support of other powers by joining Russia.

⁷⁹ F.O. 7/926 White to S., 12 November, no. 574.

⁸⁰ Medlicott, *op. cit.* (*Slavonic Review*, June 1929), pp. 75-79.

⁸¹ *Acte și Documente*, Balaceanu to Kogalniceanu, 18 November, p. 319.

⁸² This information was telegraphed to Hoyos, who conveyed it at once to the Roumanian Foreign Minister. F.O. 104/2, White to S., 16 November, no. 232.

had Russia no possible right to insist upon such a convention, as a condition of their giving up the territory assigned to Roumania; but he held that the Powers could not recognise the validity of a convention which would set aside the decision they had come to at Berlin ⁸³ Elliot took this opportunity of communicating the British Government's promise to assist the Sultan in compelling the Russian evacuation, but did not say that this had been communicated to Roumania ⁸⁴ In the evening Elliot, in reply to further requests for advice from Balaceanu, said that it seemed indisputable that as Roumania was to receive the Dobrogea in compensation for the cession of Bessarabia, she was entitled to it as a matter of right as soon as it was made over by Russia; the best thing his Government could do would be to lay the case carefully before all the different Governments; the British had already promised the fullest moral support, and he advised the Roumanians not to give way. He added as a matter of personal opinion, that it was not even within the competence of Roumania to conclude such a convention as the one proposed Balaceanu replied that he hoped Andrassy might hold equally plain language, as it would make Roumania's course clear.⁸⁵ On 15 November the Roumanian Government sent a note to Baron Stuart giving reasons for not considering necessary any new convention regulating the passage of Russian troops through Roumania and the Dobrogea ⁸⁶ After seeing Andrassy, Balaceanu told Elliot on 18 November that the Austrian Minister's language was so identical with Elliot's that he imagined it to have been the result of a communication from Elliot, "which was, however, not the case."⁸⁷

On 12 November Salisbury explained to Münster, the German Ambassador in London, his reasons for desiring that the three Powers should now join in granting recognition.

In the first place, because a very strong pledge of obedience to the

⁸³ F.O. 7/936. Elliot to S., 16 November, no. 802.

⁸⁴ F.O. 7/936. Elliot to S., 16 November, no. 807.

⁸⁵ F.O. 7/936. Elliot to S., 17 November, no. 811 (confidential). Cf. *Add. MSS.* 38939, Layard to White, 22 November.

⁸⁶ F.O. 104/2. White to S., 16 November, no. 233. On 18th White wired that Roumania had closed the negotiations by declining to enter on any new convention, and the Russian Government had desisted from any further negotiations (18 November, no. 237) In reply, Salisbury remarked: "the result is no doubt due in great measure to your exertions and Her Majesty's Government are much gratified at their success" (21 November, no. 73).

⁸⁷ F.O. 7/936 Elliot to S., 18 November, no. 812. Edwards, p 163. Cf. *Acte și Documente*, p. 319.

stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin had been given by a vote of the Roumanian Chambers and by a subsequent circular from the Roumanian Government, and in the second place, because there was a danger, in the Western Powers persisted in withholding recognition, that the Roumanian Government, having obtained the recognition of the Powers which most nearly concerned them, might treat the refusal of the Western Powers with entire disregard, and might make any subsequent advances on their part exceedingly difficult.⁸⁸

The German Government did not appear impressed by this argument, and on 15 November Bulow, the Foreign Minister, told Odo Russell that as some opposition to the new law was expected, the German Government were in favour of waiting until the necessary constitutional reform had been made; and he expressed an earnest hope that the British Government would not object to defer their recognition of Roumanian independence until then, in concert with the Government of Germany.⁸⁹ Waddington on 18 November likewise expressed his unwillingness to accept Salisbury's suggestions, until at least a distinct commencement of the execution of the Treaty in regard to religious liberty had been made. He found, added Lyons, "that the German Government were very stiff in the matter; and that he imagined that Prince Bismarck must have given some pledge respecting it to M. de Bleichröder or some other influential member of the Jewish community at Berlin." Strong representations had been made to Waddington by the family of Rothschild at Paris; the question had also been taken up by the Liberal party in France, and "the Government would be involved in difficulties with its own supporters, if it showed any symptom of relaxing its endeavours to enforce the establishment of religious equality in Roumania." In conclusion, Waddington remarked, with some justice, that the Russian demands concerning the Dobrogea were wholly incompatible with Roumanian interests and independence, and consequently he could not think there was reason to fear that the Roumanian Government would throw itself into the arms of Russia.⁹⁰ Callimaki-Catargi's attitude during November really endorsed Waddington's reading of the situation. On 15 November the Roumanian agent had assured Lyons that Roumania would never voluntarily concede the right demanded by Russia. If abandoned by the Powers, they might yield to force as they had done

⁸⁸ F.O. 64/900. S. to Odo Russell, 12 November, no. 487a.

⁸⁹ F.O. 64/909. Odo Russell to S., 15 November, no. 621.

⁹⁰ F.O. 27/2316. Lyons to S., 19 November, no. 926 (confidential). Cf. Saint-Vallier to Waddington, 10 November, D.D.F., no. 361.

with regard to Bessarabia, but as long as they had the means of holding out, they most certainly would not give way⁹¹

The Italian Government, after some hesitation, put itself in line with France and Germany. The Italian Ambassador told Elliot on 27 October that his Government had decided to send at once to their agent at Bucarest the letter accrediting him as Minister.⁹² It was stated at Bucarest on 30 October that the appointment had actually been made, and the recognition formally accorded. But these announcements were premature. On 24 October Corti told Obédénare, the Roumanian agent at Rome, that the Premier, Cairoli, had not made up his mind on the matter, but a decision would probably be taken within the next few days.⁹³ On 3 November Cairoli wrote to the Italian agent in Bucarest that the Roumanian proceedings in regard to emancipation made desirable some precise explanation with a view to removing all doubt as to the strict realisation of the humanitarian aims of the Powers, and these explanations were to be asked for before the presentation of his letters of credence.⁹⁴ The Roumanian Foreign Minister replied on the 30th by quoting Prince Charles' recent speech at the opening of the new session of the Chamber.⁹⁵ Before this, however, Obédénare had to report on 21 November that the Italian Government had changed its attitude. He attributed this in part to the presence of twenty-six supporters of the Jews among the Italian deputies, whose support the Cabinet could not dispense with.⁹⁶ Count Maffei, the Secretary-General, told him that the vote of the Roumanian Chamber could not be considered sufficient; the other Governments disapproved of the initiative taken by the Italians,⁹⁷ and influential deputies considered that Italy had been over-hasty; until, therefore, Rou-

⁹¹ F.O. 27/2316. Lyons to S., 15 November, no. 915. On the other hand, Balaceanu and White both believed that a pro-Russian government might come into office. F.O. 104/1. White to S., 30 September, no. 178 (secret), discusses the strength of the Russophil elements. On 17 January, White wrote expressing his disagreement with Waddington's remarks to Lyons (F.O. 104/6, no. 12).

⁹² F.O. 7/935. Elliot to S., 27 October, no. 764.

⁹³ *Acte și Documente*, Obédénare to Kogalniceanu, 28 October, p. 279.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, Cairoli to Fava, 3 November, p. 285. *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 133.

⁹⁵ *Acte și Documente*, Kogalniceanu to Fava, 18/30 November, p. 287. At the same time Kogalniceanu reprimands the Roumanian agent for promising too much (3/15 November, p. 291). Obédénare's reply. 9/21 November, p. 294.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, Obédénare to Kogalniceanu, 9/21 November, p. 299.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 293. Cf. F.O. 64/910. Odo Russell to S., 22 November, no. 632. *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 154.

mania had satisfied the three Powers, France, Germany and England, Italy could not accredit a Minister ⁹⁸

On 21 November Lyons reported that as lately as the day before yesterday he had been informed, on undoubted authority, that the Russian Government was still making obstacles to the handing over of the Dobrogea. He proceeded to give details of the Russian demands very similar to those communicated to Elliot by Balaceanu on the 16th ⁹⁹. A later dispatch from Lyons stated that the information was based on a telegram received by Callimakî-Catargi, who wished the information to be communicated at once to Waddington and Salisbury, but for some unexplained reason did not want his Government's name to appear ¹⁰⁰. But he assured Lyons that he was convinced that his country would rather give up the Dobrogea altogether than receive it on the Russian conditions ¹⁰¹. Accordingly, on the following day, when Münster "very earnestly" pressed Salisbury not to recognise Roumania until the Jewish disabilities had been removed, he found the Foreign Minister disinclined to wait, even after the French Ambassador had been persuaded to combine with Germany on the point. Salisbury explained that his reason was not indifference to religious liberty, but because Russia was imposing conditions of a military right of way lasting beyond the nine months, and the fortification by Russia of the mouths of the Danube. "I urged on the German Ambassador that if Germany wanted us not to recognise, they ought to discourage these Russian pretensions, which were most dangerous to the peace of Europe."¹⁰² On receipt of telegraphic information of this interview, Odo Russell at once proceeded to the German Foreign Office, and spoke to Bulow in the sense of Salisbury's communication to Münster on 12 November, asking Germany to grant recognition. Bülow replied that much as the German Government wished to act in concert with Britain, they could not follow the course proposed, as they were pledged to secure equal rights for all German subjects in Roumania. The French Government, he added, appeared to share these views, and the Italian had made certain reservations in a similar sense. Finally, he did not consider that the conditions Russia might

⁹⁸ *Acte și Documente*, p. 300.

⁹⁹ F.O. 27/2316. Lyons to S., 21 November, no. 935. White also telegraphed (F.O. 104/2), on 21 November, that Russia's intention appeared to be to raise fresh difficulties (no. 241) by demanding the application of the convention of 4/16 April, 1877, to the Dobrogea (no. 244, 22 November). For Salisbury's comments in reply see no. 77 (25 November, S. to White).

¹⁰⁰ Cf. *Acte și Documente*, p. 309.

¹⁰¹ F.O. 27/2316. Lyons to S., 21 November, no. 936 (most confidential).

¹⁰² F.O. 64/900. Odo Russell to S., 22 November, no. 499.

endeavour to impose on Roumania would be influenced or promoted by the recognition question.¹⁰³

Salisbury was, however, not called upon to make a definite decision in the matter. On 24 November Baron Stuart received instructions from Livadia to accept the amendments proposed by Kogalniceanu and to instruct the Russian commander to proceed with the handing over of the Dobrogea.¹⁰⁴ The notes were exchanged on the 25th,¹⁰⁵ and Salisbury was at once informed by news from White¹⁰⁶ and from the German and French Ambassadors, that the Russian negotiations to obtain a right of passage through Roumania had been abandoned. The French Ambassador read a telegram from Waddington "pressing that we should withhold our recognition till more progress had been made in the removal of Jewish disabilities. I replied that our apprehensions on the subject of a Convention with Russia having been removed, we were as anxious as France for a due execution of the provisions of the Treaty in favour of religious liberty."¹⁰⁷ Munster was told that in the circumstances the British Government "had no desire to precipitate recognition in opposition to the wishes of Prince Bismarck."¹⁰⁸ He linked up the incident with the Jewish question by remarking to White on "the danger of Roumania contracting secret engagements towards Russia. Prince Charles and his Ministers will best consult the interests of the country by a strict observance on their part of the Treaty of Berlin."¹⁰⁹ Having conceded the point, Russia made no further objections, and the Roumanian administration was able to take possession of the Dobrogea within ten days.¹¹⁰

W. N. MEDLICOTT.

(*To be continued*)

¹⁰³ F.O. 64/910 Odo Russell to S., 22 November, no. 632.

¹⁰⁴ *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 136. *Acte și Documente*, Giers to Stuart, 24 November, p. 309.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, Stuart to Giers, 25 November, pp. 309-310 Cf. p. 600.

¹⁰⁶ F.O. 104/2 White to S., 25 November, no. 247. Cf., nos. 245 (25 November), 249 (26 November).

¹⁰⁷ F.O. 27/2302 S. to Lyons, 25 November, no. 792.

¹⁰⁸ F.O. 64/900. Odo Russell to S., 25 November, no. 505.

¹⁰⁹ F.O. 104/2. S to White, 30 November, no. 81

¹¹⁰ *Acte și Documente*, pp. 311-2.

ADMIRAL KOLCHAK

[This article by a former Chief of Staff of Kolchak will be seen to have been written from a certain political angle ; but this estimate of his character and conduct has been given also by others who disagreed with him, and even by some of his enemies, including Bolsheviks —ED.]

TWELVE years ago the Civil War in Siberia came to its tragic end, and the lapse of time allows one to judge the events with impartiality and to take an unbiassed view of the chief leaders.

The leaders of the Civil War in Russia were Admiral Kolchak and Generals Kornilov, Denikin and Wrangel, who though fundamentally different in their temperaments, had much in common. They were first of all patriots with a deep love for their country and worked for its salvation without any regard for self-advancement. Political intrigues were unknown to them and they were ready to work with men of any political party, so long as they knew that these men were sincere in their endeavours to free Russia. They were all exceptionally gifted men in their own sphere of work—naval or military warfare. They all had supreme courage and knew how to face death without flinching. In the political struggle they had only one aim in view—to produce armed forces to save Russia from Bolshevism and to make it possible, after the end of the war, for a National Assembly, chosen by the people, to decide the character of the future Government of Russia.

The White Leaders did not reach their goal; their armies were either defeated by the Reds or destroyed by Socialistic propaganda. Historians will probably find many errors in their tactics and different explanations of their failure. But even now it is clear that the chief cause of the failure was the fact that the Civil War had to start too early, when destructive forces were stronger than creative ones, and it was impossible at that time to arrest the process of disintegration. The slogan of the Communists was: "We will destroy everything and build a better world on the ruins." The White Leaders replied: "The Communists are deceiving you. Their promises cannot be fulfilled. You will be bereft of all and turned into slaves. We beseech you to make sacrifices now for the sake of the national well-being and in the name of all that was sacred and dear to you in Russia. When we conquer the forces of darkness, you will be able to build up your life again, but now you must all help us to carry the burden of the struggle." But the masses were still revelling in the new-found power given to them by the Revolution, and the more sober call of the White Leaders had no attraction for them.

Alexander Vasilievich Kolchak was born in 1874. He came

of a middle-class family with naval traditions and conservative ideas, possessing all the patriotism that was innate in this class of the Russian nation in the 19th century. His father was a retired major-general of the Marine Artillery, who was actively engaged in the siege of Sebastopol in 1854-55, and after his retirement worked as an engineer in ordnance works near St. Petersburg. His parents taught young Kolchak to love his country above all and to be true to the patriotic principles in which he had been brought up. His father also instilled in him an interest in research work.

Kolchak was educated in the Naval School at St. Petersburg. This was the oldest school in Russia, and had first been established by Peter the Great in Moscow in 1699. The boys were educated in an atmosphere of historical traditions, which had been built up during the 200 years of the school's existence.

The school traditions fostered the boys' love for their country and the naval *esprit de corps*, a feeling of independence, responsibility, and an absence of selfishness. Sea training in sailing ships developed in them from an early age courage and self-control.

In this environment was shaped the character of Kolchak, with its already fine qualities of courage, straightforwardness, and sincerity. Even in his school days Kolchak was well known for his power of influencing others and inspiring them by his example. Already at that early age he had in him the marks of a great leader.

POLAR EXPEDITIONS.

After finishing school, Kolchak, while serving in the navy, devoted all his spare time to oceanographic studies. His work was noticed by a well-known explorer, Admiral S. Makarov,¹ and when, in 1899, the Russian Academy of Sciences was planning an Arctic expedition for the purpose of exploring the seas of Northern Siberia east of the Kara Sea, Kolchak was selected to take part in this expedition.

This enterprise, at the head of which was the well-known Arctic explorer, Baron Toll, started from the Baltic on the steam schooner "Zarya" (Dawn) in 1900. Toll's idea was to explore the Arctic Sea north of the New Siberian Islands, where it was supposed there were some other islands, hitherto undiscovered, but the ice would not allow the "Zarya" to proceed. Toll decided to go further north on foot across the ice with three of his men, and as he was running

¹ Admiral Makarov, who came of comparatively humble origin, rose by his intellect and ability to be the most distinguished of Russian sailors. With two other exceptional men, the statesman Witte and the scholar Mendeleyev, he planned the opening of a north-east passage from the Behring Straits to Archangel.—Ed.

short of stores, he ordered the others to return to Archangel in the "Zarya," intending himself to reach Siberia on foot across the ice.

When the "Zarya" returned to St. Petersburg and the members of the Academy of Sciences heard of Toll's venture, serious misgivings were felt as to his safety. Kolchak suggested sending a new expedition to Bennett Island to help the explorers, but as the "Zarya" could not get there, he proposed to go in a rowing boat. This was considered very dangerous, but when Kolchak said that he himself was prepared to head this expedition, he received the consent of the Academy, together with the necessary funds for expenses. In January, 1903, Kolchak started, taking with him six seamen. They arrived on dog-sleighs on the northern coast of Siberia, waited there till spring and put out to sea in the rowing boat. Although the weather was not favourable, they reached Bennett Island safely. There they discovered signs of Toll's stay on the island, for they found both his diary and scientific collections. It was established that Toll and his men must have started in the late autumn towards Siberia and have perished before reaching the coast. Kolchak's mission was thus accomplished and he decided to return to Siberia, and after spending forty-two days in the boat in the open sea he landed safely on the mainland.

After the Russo-Japanese War Kolchak worked in the Academy of Sciences upon the material collected by him during these two expeditions. His study, *The Ices of the Kara and Siberian Seas*, was printed in the Proceedings of the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences, and is considered the most important work on this subject. Extracts from it were published under the title "The Arctic Pack and the Polynya" in the volume issued in 1929 by the American Geographical Society, *Problems of Polar Research*. For his exploring work Kolchak received from the Imperial Russian Geographical Society a gold medal—a most rare honour. These expeditions revealed the chief traits in his character—courage, enterprise, and indomitable resolution.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

Returning from Siberia after his expedition, Kolchak heard the news of the declaration of the Russo-Japanese War, and immediately telegraphed to St. Petersburg asking for permission to go to Port Arthur. This permission was granted, and on reaching Port Arthur he took part in several naval engagements with the Japanese Fleet. He was in command of a destroyer, and succeeded in laying mines in the path of the Japanese ships on their way to

Port Arthur. As a result of this work a Japanese cruiser was sunk. For this Kolchak was awarded the Sword of Honour of St. George.²

HIS WORK FOR NAVAL REFORM.

After the end of the Russo-Japanese War and the loss of the Russian Fleet, the young officers felt the national humiliation deeply. A movement was started to reorganise the navy and to remedy its shortcomings. The most energetic worker in this movement was the young Commander Kolchak. It was felt that the chief reasons for the defeat were the absence of properly prepared war plans and of clear ideas for the development of the navy and the training of its personnel. The technical part of shipbuilding had been developed without any relation to the needs of future warfare, and the ideas of the naval constructors had received no guiding help from the executive branch of the navy. There was no department in the Admiralty responsible for the preparation of war plans.³ One of the young officers worked out a scheme for the establishment of a Naval General Staff, which was sanctioned by the Emperor in the spring of 1906, and the new staff with Kolchak as one of its members set to work.

This was the year of Russia's first Parliament—the Imperial Duma. In order to receive grants for the rebuilding of the navy, it had to be made clear to the members of the Duma and through them to the public that a new navy was required and that it would not suffer from the defects of the old. Kolchak and several other officers started a campaign for propagating the naval idea among the public. He lectured at different meetings in St. Petersburg and had private discussions with members of the Duma and members of the various political parties. His speeches always made a deep impression. He proved that his ideas were backed by sound judgment, and the scepticism of the members of the Duma gave way to confidence. Kolchak himself called that period of his work—"the fight for the navy."

A NEW ARCTIC EXPEDITION.

Theoretical research work, however, did not satisfy Kolchak's active spirit. He was drawn to the sea, and continued to work on a plan for the further exploration of the Arctic regions. He wanted to prove that it was possible for steamships to pass along the Siberian coast from the Pacific into the Atlantic Ocean during the summer.

² At the surrender of Port Arthur, Kolchak, then lying ill in hospital, became a prisoner of the Japanese, who returned his sword to him.—ED.

³ The Russian Admiralty, under the incapable direction of the Grand Duke Alexey Alexandrovich, was in the most chaotic state.—ED.

season. Two ships of a special type were built from his designs, and in the autumn of 1909 Kolchak started with these ships from Kronstadt and sailed through the Suez Canal to Vladivostok, from which port he hoped, in the spring of 1910, to reach the Arctic Ocean.

On his arrival at Vladivostok, Kolchak received from the new Naval Minister, Admiral Grigorovich⁴, an order to return to St. Petersburg and give up the command of the expedition to another officer. Grigorovich was of the opinion that Kolchak's work at the Admiralty was more important in view of the possibility of war with Germany. Meanwhile the expedition was carried out successfully according to Kolchak's original plan by Lieutenant Vilkitsky.

CONTINUATION OF WORK IN THE ADMIRALTY

At the Admiralty Kolchak took up again his work for the development of the navy. He worked out a programme for the next ten years, and when this was passed by the Duma and the Council of State, he was appointed Chief of the Operation Department of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic Fleet (his Russian title being equivalent to that of flag-captain for operations). The flag-captain for operations was always chosen from the most capable and brilliant officers in the navy.

The Russian Navy, small in numbers, had to defend the Russian coasts so as to leave the army entirely free. Kolchak considered that this could be accomplished by placing submarine mines near the coast and concentrating the ships behind the mine-fields, thus preventing the enemy from sweeping them. The Commander of the Baltic Fleet, Admiral Essen, one of the most brilliant captains in the Russo-Japanese War, had great confidence in him and fell in with his scheme.

THE GREAT WAR IN THE BALTIC.

The sudden declaration of war with Germany did not find the small Russian Fleet unprepared; it was strong in organisation and in spirit. Kolchak's scheme was carried out as soon as the war began, the mine-fields were successfully laid, and the German Fleet was prevented from approaching the Russian coast.

Admiral Essen was not satisfied only to remain on the defensive, and ordered Kolchak to prepare a scheme for attacking the approaches of the German naval bases. During the autumn and winter of 1914-15, the old Russian destroyers and cruisers, though much less speedy than the enemy ships, started a series of very

⁴ This competent administrator, who enjoyed the confidence of the Duma, remained in office up to the Revolution of 1917.—ED.

dangerous night operations, laying mines at the approaches to Kiel and Danzig. Kolchak, being of the opinion that the person responsible for planning operations should take part in their execution, was always to be found on board those ships which carried out the operations and sometimes took direct command of the destroyer flotillas. Here, especially, his inborn qualities as a naval leader revealed themselves—his capacity for estimating the chances of success, his quick grasp of a situation and his willingness to assume responsibility.

The following two events are especially characteristic :—

On New Year's eve, 1915, the old and slow cruiser " *Rossia* " was carrying several hundred mines and was to lay them at the approaches to Kiel. The " *Rossia* " was the flag-ship of the rear-admiral in command of the operation. Kolchak was also on board, and when he went below, left orders to be called when the cruiser neared the proposed site of the mine-field. While still 50 miles away, the rear-admiral was informed that the wireless operators had tapped the wireless signals of the enemy ships in the vicinity. The admiral decided that it would be too risky to continue the operation and gave the order to turn back. As soon as Kolchak heard this, he went on deck and persuaded the admiral to carry out the plan, even if it meant the loss of the cruiser. The admiral consented, the operation was successfully carried out, and the cruiser returned safely, having passed through the enemy ships unnoticed.

The second incident was in February, 1915. Kolchak took command of four destroyers, with mines on board ready to be laid at the entrance to Danzig. The venture was a peculiarly dangerous one, and a division of cruisers was sent to sea to cover the destroyers. During the night the flag-ship " *Rurik* " went aground near the island of Gothland; it was refloated, but was found to have received serious bottom damage. The position was difficult, and the admiral in command of the cruisers ordered the ships to return home and postpone the attempt. Kolchak asked by wireless for the permission of the Commander-in-Chief to continue the operation without cruiser protection. Permission was given, and the operation brilliantly accomplished. Several German cruisers and destroyers and also some merchant ships carrying iron ore from Sweden to Germany struck these mines and were sunk; and the Commander of the German Baltic Fleet, Prince Henry of Prussia, was forced to issue an order to his ships not to go into the Baltic Sea until some means of dealing with the Russian mines had been organised.

In the summer of 1915, in connection with the advance of the

German armies into Russia, the German Fleet received instructions to enter the Gulf of Riga and assist the army in its attack on this city. The defence of the Gulf was not originally included in the work of the Russian naval forces. Nevertheless, an old battleship, "Slava," was sent to the Gulf, and the mine defences were set up at the entrance from the Baltic. This was done in accordance with a new scheme worked out by Kolchak. On 17 August the main forces of the enemy High Sea Fleet found their way into the Gulf of Riga. The Russian forces consisted only of the battleship "Slava" and some destroyers. Although the German Fleet succeeded in sweeping a channel in the mine-field and entering the Gulf of Riga, it lost several destroyers and damaged some of its cruisers on the mines, and the German admiral in command decided that it was too dangerous to remain in the Gulf and turned back. The German army advancing on Riga was left without support from the Fleet and Riga was saved. Soon after this Kolchak was appointed commander of the whole destroyer force in the Baltic and was put in charge of the defence of the Gulf of Riga. He worked actively on a plan of joint operations with the army near Riga, and when the German army again started to advance it was repulsed by the Russian forces with the help of gun fire from the Fleet. Kolchak also made several landings of small detachments along the coast occupied by the Germans and harried their rear. Further, he made several attacks on the German ships near the port of Windau with his destroyers and on convoys of merchant ships carrying ore from Sweden to Germany. For his successful work in defending the Gulf of Riga, he was given the Cross of St. George—the highest military honour in Russia, and was promoted to be rear-admiral.

THE WAR IN THE BLACK SEA.

In June, 1916, though still the youngest rear-admiral of the Russian Navy, Kolchak was promoted to the rank of vice-admiral and appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet. The author of this article was chosen by him to be flag-captain for operations.

At this time the position on the Black Sea was as follows: The Russian army of the Caucasus, having occupied the fortress of Erzerum and the port of Trebizond, had to be supplied with ammunition, provisions and other materials by sea from Novorossiisk and Batum. The armies of the south-western front were supplied with grain through the ports of the Sea of Azov and Odessa. The Odessa industrial districts received their coal supplies also by sea by way of Mariupol. It was therefore essential that sea transport should be

made safe. For 1917 a most important operation was planned, namely, the occupation of the Bosphorus by landing troops near the Straits on the borders of the Black Sea.

Though the Russian Fleet on the Black Sea was stronger than the German, the German cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau," having a much higher speed than the Russian battleships, continually attacked the Russian ports, sank merchant ships with supplies, and were able to get back to the Bosphorus before the Russians could overtake them. German submarines also attacked Russian merchant ships. There were about 180 merchantmen in the Black Sea, but their number was continually being depleted by the enemy, and the supply of the armies was becoming more and more difficult. During the spring of 1916 the German submarines sank about 30 Russian ships—25 per cent. of the whole cargo capacity of the Black Sea merchant navy.

Admiral Kolchak made up his mind to concentrate on fighting the submarines by laying mine-fields at the entrances to the Bosphorus and the Bulgarian port of Varna. In a short time the preparations were completed, and the laying of mines was started from destroyers and shallow-draught vessels, specially adapted for the purpose. The enemy was not very vigilant at night, and the destroyers, as a rule, had enough time to lay mines and get away before their presence was detected. During the day the Turks tried to sweep the mines, but they were continually impeded by Russian destroyers, and new mines were laid at night. In three months more than 2,000 mines were laid near the Bosphorus.

The result of these mining operations was better than anyone could have expected. The Germans lost six submarines, and from the middle of November, 1916, to the end of Kolchak's command not a single enemy man of war, submarine or merchant ship got into the Black Sea from the Bosphorus. The supply of coal to Constantinople from the only Turkish coal port, Zunguldak, situated on the Black Sea coast, was stopped, and Turkey was deprived of much of her coal supply. The movements of Russian transport steamers were now carried out in complete security. The army supplies were considerably improved, and there was only a loss of one steamer during the whole of Admiral Kolchak's command. After this, the Fleet continued the blockade of the Bosphorus and Varna, and assisted the armies in Roumania and the Caucasus.

At the end of 1916 an order came from headquarters that an occupation of the Bosphorus should coincide with the advance of the Russian army on its main front. This was expected for the

summer of 1917. In accordance with Kolchak's instructions, the plan of the landing was carefully worked out; but, unfortunately, this scheme never came into operation, as the Revolution destroyed the Russian fighting forces.

REVOLUTION.

Kolchak was at sea when the news of the Revolution reached him. In Sevastopol everything was still quiet and discipline was not yet undermined. Soon the news of the abdication of the Emperor Nicholas II was received, and his farewell address to the army and navy ordering them to support the Provisional Government and continue the war to the end was made known.

The military and naval commanders had been brought up in the tradition of loyalty to the Emperor, but when they had to choose between allegiance to the old regime and loyalty to the interests of Russia engaged in a life and death struggle, the choice could only be one. Admiral Kolchak informed the new Government of his own allegiance and called upon the men of the Black Sea Fleet, the ports and the fortress of Sevastopol to support it and to make supreme efforts to bring the war to a successful end. The officers, men and workmen at the ports showed at that time their great love and faith in Admiral Kolchak, and told him that they were ready to follow him and obey his commands.

At the time of the formation of the Provisional Government the Council of Soldiers and Workmen was formed in Petrograd. It was headed by revolutionary dreamers who understood little or nothing of the questions of the organisation of fighting forces and Bolsheviks who had returned to Russia on the outbreak of the Revolution, some of whom were subsidised by the German Government. This Council or Soviet started a fatal propaganda of hatred and violence among the soldiers and sailors. All fundamental principles of military discipline were undermined. All power was taken from the officers. In every army there are some who do not wish to fight or to risk their lives, and among these this propaganda was most successful.

The best men among the officers were those who suffered most. They were, in many cases, insulted and harassed by their own subordinates, but in spite of this they continued to fight for the honour of Russia. The Government did nothing to help the commanders on the fronts in any way, and they had to base their power on persuasion and personal influence. Admiral Kolchak, by a series of short patriotic speeches, endeavoured to revive order and discipline among his men. His speeches made a profound impression, and the

force of his personality kept order in the Black Sea Fleet for three months after the beginning of the Revolution. Ships went to sea and carried out naval operations. Thanks to the influence of Kolchak's speeches the sailors chose from their numbers five hundred of the best patriots and sent them to the fighting fronts to help by their example and to persuade the armies to fight bravely and faithfully; some of these men died heroically at the front.

Eventually Lenin sent his own agitators dressed up as sailors to the Black Sea. They called sailors' meetings at which they made subversive speeches, telling the men that they must follow the example of their Baltic comrades, who had killed their commanding admiral and several officers. The agitators achieved the desired result. A rising began in the Black Sea Fleet, and the sailors demanded that the officers should give up their arms. A deputation was sent with the same request to Kolchak. He refused to see it and called to his men to assemble on the deck of his ship, where he made a speech. He said that even the Japanese, after the fall of Port Arthur, respected the sword given to him for military courage, but they, his own men, wished to take it from him. "Well, you shall not get it," said he, "I shall not give it up to you, either alive or dead," and he threw his sword into the sea. This speech sobered the crew, but Kolchak said that he considered them unworthy of his command and that he was leaving for Petrograd. He determined to try to persuade the Government to restore discipline in the armed forces, as the prestige of the commanding officers had been badly impaired by the Soviets of Soldiers and Sailors. The writer was ordered by the Government to go with Kolchak to Petrograd. A handful of officers saw the admiral off, testifying their devotion to him. When the train was leaving, one of the officers shouted: "Courage and devotion, duty and honour were always the greatest virtues of a people."

The following appreciation of Kolchak's work was given by the Germans in their official history of the naval war: "Kolchak was a young and energetic leader, who had already made his name in the Baltic. On his appointment the activities of the Russian destroyers were considerably extended; communication with Zunguldak was made very difficult. The supply of coal became almost impossible for Turkey, and she felt the coal shortage severely. The Turco-German Fleet was obliged to cease operations. The laying of mines at the entrance to the Bosphorus was skilfully carried out. . . . During the summer of 1916 the Russians laid about 1,800-2,000 mines. They did this at night, as only then could they approach

sufficiently near to the coast. The Russian destroyers laid the new mines so near to the old ones that one can only wonder at the extraordinary skill with which they themselves escaped being blown up by their own mines. . . . Judging from the usual activities of the Russian Fleet, it became increasingly apparent that these operations were only preparatory for a greater offensive on another part of the coast. . . . The Ottoman Government had to be satisfied with 14,000 tons of coal arriving per month from Germany for all their needs. They had to curtail railway traffic, town lighting and even the manufacture of munitions. The year 1917 started therefore in very unfavourable circumstances for Turkey. Towards the summer the activities of the Russian Fleet decreased. Kolchak left. Life was slowly leaving the Russian Fleet—the Revolution and the Bolshevik upheaval completed its destruction. In December it was again possible to transport coal to Turkey, and the Ottoman Empire received a new lease of life ”⁵

On the journey from Sevastopol to Petrograd, Kolchak was very depressed. He realised that Russia was on the path to ruin. His indignation was aroused at Germany's methods of warfare, particularly at the secret transportation of Lenin from Switzerland in a sealed railway coach to Russia. To crush Germany, Kolchak was ready to fight even as a private soldier in the ranks of the Allies. He trusted the Allied Governments, and considered himself in honour bound to them. He hoped that when Germany was conquered, the Allies would help to overthrow the Bolshevik power and restore a national Russia.

On his arrival at Petrograd, Kolchak was invited to a meeting of the Provisional Government. There he put his view on the condition of the Russian armed forces and their complete demoralisation. He stated that the only way to save the country was to re-establish discipline and restore capital punishment in the army and navy. He also said that if the Government considered this impossible, the position should be frankly explained to the Allies, so that they should not any longer count on the help of the Russian army. The Government promised to discuss these questions, but took no effective action.

IN SIBERIA.

The American Mission, headed by Senator Root, was at that time in Petrograd, and Admiral Glanon, who was one of its members,

⁵ *Der Krieg zur See: Der Krieg in türkischen Gewässern.* Marine-Archiv, Berlin, 1928.

invited Kolchak to go to America in order to give the American Navy Department information in connection with a scheme for landing troops in the Bosphorus. The Americans intended to start an operation of their own to occupy the Dardanelles. Realising the impossibility of doing anything on the Russian front, Kolchak decided to accept the American invitation, and started preparations for his journey.

Admiral Kolchak was extremely popular in Russia. Many organisations and newspapers with a nationalist tendency spoke of him as a future dictator. A number of new and secret organisations had sprung up in Petrograd which had as their object the suppression of the Bolshevik movement and the removal of the extremist members of the Government. All these organisations asked Kolchak to accept the leadership of the whole union of patriotic groups, and Kolchak decided to accept and to remain in Russia. One evening the news was received that the main organisation was discovered by the then Naval Minister of the Provisional Government, Kerensky, and the next day Kolchak received a letter from Kerensky ordering him to leave immediately for America.

On 19 August, Kolchak with several officers left Petrograd. When passing through London he was greeted cordially by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, who offered him transport on board an English cruiser on his way to Halifax. The journey to America proved to be unnecessary, as by the time Kolchak arrived, America had given up the idea of any independent action in the Dardanelles. Kolchak visited the American Fleet and its ports, and decided to return to Russia *via* Japan. On the eve of his departure from San Francisco, he heard of the Bolshevik Revolution.

On his arrival in Japan, in November 1917, Kolchak heard details of the new Revolution and of the beginning of peace negotiations between the Bolsheviks and Germany. The peace of Brest-Litovsk was a heavy blow to him as to every Russian patriot. Wishing to remain true to the Allies and to his duty, he decided to join the ranks of the allied armies and to continue to fight against Germany. He applied to the British Ambassador in Tokyo with a request to be allowed to enlist in the British Army as a private. He received a reply that the offer of his sword was accepted and that he was to go to Bombay to the headquarters of the Indian Army and from there on to the Mesopotamian front.

On arriving at Singapore, he received a message from the British Government intimating that owing to altered circumstances on the

Mesopotamian front and to the request of the Russian Minister in Peking,⁶ the British Government was of the opinion that he should return to Peking. From the Russian Minister there he heard that in the south of Russia an anti-Bolshevist uprising had been started under the leadership of Generals Alexeyev and Kornilov, and that the time had come to organise armed forces in Manchuria. Admiral Kolchak accepted the post of commander of the proposed forces. This project was destined to fail, as it was impossible to unite all the separate units, which came into being, into one organisation.⁷ Japan subsidised separate detachments, and these did not want to join in with those units which had come into being without Japanese support.

Meanwhile important events were taking place in Russia. The White Army freed whole regions in the south of Russia from the Bolsheviks. Siberia was liberated with the help of Czecho-Slovak troops. On the Volga in Samara an anti-Bolshevist Government was formed, and in Ufa a meeting took place at which all the separate anti-Bolshevist governments were united under a Directory of five.

Kolchak decided to travel *via* Siberia and Uralsk to Crimea, where his family were living at the time, and to take part in fighting against the Bolsheviks with the Black Sea Fleet. When he reached Omsk, the Directory offered him the post of Military and Naval Minister. The new government was anxious to have in its ranks a man well-known for his patriotism and integrity. Kolchak accepted, deeming it his duty to work for the revival of a national Russia.

At that time a dispute was going on between the members of the Directory and the Siberian Government. The causes of this disagreement were inherent in the structure of the Directory itself. When it was being formed in Ufa, two groups were fighting for supremacy. One consisted of members of the Constituent Assembly elected at the height of the revolutionary wave in 1917. These were Social-Revolutionaries headed by Chernov, whose political creed did not differ very much from that of the Bolsheviks. They insisted on the Directory being responsible to a committee of members of the Constituent Assembly. The other group, headed by the Siberian Government, insisted on a Directory not responsible to the Assembly and constituted on a national non-party basis.

Finally, a Directory of five members had been formed under the chairmanship of a member of the Social-Revolutionary party,

⁶ Prince Kudashev.—ED.

⁷ Kolchak's efforts to secure the adhesion of the Ataman Semenov were rebuffed with the greatest discourtesy.—ED.

Avksentiev.⁸ The suggested responsibility of the Directory to the members of the Constituent Assembly was rejected. The Directory chose as its headquarters Omsk, the chief town of the Siberian Cossacks and the residence of the Siberian Government

As soon as the Directory started its work, the military and nationalist elements grew suspicious of its subordination to the Social-Revolutionary party organisation. The head of this party, Chernov, insisted on receiving from Avksentiev an account of the Directory's work and suggested the necessity of having "democratic control" in the army, in the shape of committees of soldiers for the supervision of officers. The officers could not forget the disorganisation of the old army in the days of Kerensky, when they were subjected to insults and mockery of the rank and file, demoralised by the doctrine of democratic control. The word "socialist" was for them synonymous with "traitor," and they felt that any new army organisation was psychologically impossible while the head of the Government was a Socialist.

A plot was formed in Omsk to overthrow the Directory and choose a Dictator. At the head of the plot was a Siberian, a former member of the Duma, Victor Pepeliayev; officers and representatives of the Cossacks took part in it. Admiral Kolchak had no part in the plot, but was in favour of a military dictatorship. In the beginning of November he left Omsk for the front to find out the needs of the army. He returned to Omsk on the 17th, and during that night two socialist members of the Directory were arrested by the conspirators. The following morning there was a meeting of the Council of Ministers which decided to depose the already non-existent Directory and to invest one man with dictatorial power until such time as the struggle with the Bolsheviks should come to an end and it would be possible to summon a new Constituent Assembly. At this meeting Kolchak suggested one of the members of the Directory, General Boldyrev, as Dictator, but the Council asked Kolchak to leave the room and in his absence proclaimed him Supreme Governor of Russia. Kolchak accepted this post. He looked upon it as a heavy responsibility, which he was called upon to undertake in the name of Russia's liberation.⁹ He issued the following manifesto to the population:—

"The Russian Provisional Government has come to an end.

⁸ Avksentiev's views and conduct are not to be identified with those of Chernov.—ED.

⁹ He once said: "When shall I be delivered from this cross?" He was quite at a loss among intriguing politicians.—ED.

The Council of Ministers, having all the power in its hands, has invested me, Admiral Alexander Kolchak, with this power. I have accepted this responsibility in the exceptionally difficult circumstances of civil war and complete disorganisation of the country, and I now make it known that I shall follow neither the reactionary path nor the deadly path of party strife. My chief aims are the organisation of a fighting force, the overthrow of Bolshevism, and the establishment of law and order, so that the Russian people may be able to choose a form of government in accordance with its desire and to realise the high ideas of liberty and freedom. I call upon you, citizens, to unite and to sacrifice your all, if necessary, in the struggle with Bolshevism."

But, as has already been said, the time was not yet ripe for a national movement against Bolshevism. Another factor which reacted unfavourably on the White movement in Siberia lay in the hostile propaganda which came from the Social-Revolutionaries. When Kolchak was chosen as Dictator, the Central Committee of the party sent out this confidential circular to their members: "Party organisations must continue their work as it was carried on before the Revolution and organise an unflinching struggle against the dictatorship, using every means at their disposal." The enormous extent of the Siberian territory and the lack of means of communications made supply of the armies extremely difficult. Discipline, both in the army and in the civil service, which had degenerated during the first period of the Revolution, came to be shattered altogether. The allied military and diplomatic representatives had no common programme for their actions, and while some of them supported the Siberian Government, others helped its rivals, thus encouraging party strife.

These and many other causes led to the collapse of the anti-Bolshevist movement in Siberia. I will not enter into the sad details of the action of Czecho-Slovak troops which handed over Kolchak to his enemies in accordance with an order of the French General Janin. Admiral Kolchak's deposition and the circumstances of his military execution by his enemies have already been described by Sir Bernard Pares in his review of Kolchak's examination by his judges (*Dopros Kolchaka*), published in *The Slavonic Review* (No. 22, p. 225). Kolchak died as he had lived, without fear and without reproach, and his memory will live for ever in the hearts of Russian patriots.

M. I. SMIRNOV.

FOUNDATIONS OF MAGYAR SOCIETY

THE Hungarian, or Magyar, is not by nature a town-lover. His civilisation has been founded upon country instincts and the possession of land. He has also an intense pride in the racial aspect of this civilisation. The Magyar is not directly related to any of his neighbours. Austrians, Slovaks, Roumanians, Serbs, all belong to the Aryan language group, of which the Hungarian is not a member. Research has established a belief that the Turkic peoples are his nearest blood-relatives, while linguistically he stands closer to the Finns and Samoyeds. Hailing originally from the Urals, of a stock related to the proto-Finns, Lapps, Ostyaks and Samoyeds, the Magyars were absorbed by a stronger people of Bulgaro-Turkish origin, with whom they migrated in the fifth century to the Caucasus, giving their Finno-Ugrian language to the conquerors. The Hungarians were thus a composite people before their emergence into the chronicles of the Dark Ages. Despite the fact that some of the greatest Hungarians had a mixed ancestry—King Matthias Corvinus, the “Happy Prince” of the Renaissance; Kossuth, the champion of Hungarian freedom; Petöfi, the national poet—the Magyar has kept a disdainful attitude towards neighbour peoples. His culture exists quite unmistakably for itself. The Magyar has chosen also to live in the plains. This has given an agricultural basis to his civilisation, and has been of profound moment in the Hungarian scheme. One hears it said that the social structure of Hungary resembles a pyramid (what social structure has not been compared to a pyramid?), but the image is too simple to meet the case. It does not allow for the Jewish element, nor can it take account of certain present-day movements, like the changing position of the gentry.

Taking the pyramid as an ideal form, the King would be at its apex. To-day there is no King. A retired Admiral plays the part of throne-warmer in the great Palace, with its hundreds of flashing windows above the Danube. Lying in Budapest is a crown which awaits the next Hungarian sovereign—the famous Holy Crown of Hungary. At the opening of the eleventh century, it was presented by Pope Sylvester to the great Stephen, with a pontifical blessing. This period was marked by the Hungarians’ acceptance of Roman Christianity, and by their abandonment of pillaging expeditions through Germany and France, in favour of a permanent home on

the soil of Hungary. The owner of the crown is, *ipso facto*, "owner" and King of Hungary. It is theoretically the crown which has power. Through the society owning allegiance to this supreme landlord runs a line associating it likewise with the land. It was his holding of land on an enormous scale which gave power to the Hungarian aristocrat. There is the tale of a Prince Eszterházy who claimed to possess more shepherds than his host, the Duke of Devonshire, had sheep. Some accounts credit him with ten times the number. The Eszterházys possessed castles of untold magnificence, and their estates covered an area equal to Ireland. Considerable properties exist even in the little Hungary of to-day, though every aristocrat has lost by the Treaty. More than half of the cultivated land is owned by about 1,200 people. Besides the young Prince Eszterházy, one thinks of Prince Festetics, whose palace, Keszthely, on Lake Balaton, has been compared with Versailles, of the Széchényi family, of the Archbishop of Esztergom, and a dozen others. On his estates, the Hungarian aristocrat enjoys the power and leisure of a petty prince. He is an enthusiastic sportsman, and would rather be visited by a crack shot than an intellectual. When he comes to Budapest, he plays polo and is to be seen at the Opera. The most famous club in Budapest, the Nemzeti Casino, of which King Edward VII was a member, exists only for him. He is self-centred and somewhat inaccessible, but has a reassuring manner towards foreigners. Beneath the aristocracy comes the lesser landowning class or gentry; under them again the educated Magyar middle-class who are not noblemen (very few in number), leading down to the workers and peasants of various ranks. The peasants were emancipated in 1848, but the vast majority are still without land and many of them in great distress, including some who have been landowners. They account for over five millions out of a population of eight. The stranger, unless he is very inquisitive, will see more than he hears of them. The future of the Hungarian peasants, as well as their ability to produce the national leader who seems desirable, remains in doubt. They have, up to the present, not found their voice. Successive revolutions have failed to enlist their sympathy. With the acuter suffering of the world crisis, however, certain expostulatory movements have shown themselves, even among the peasants. Perhaps their silence is at last to be broken. In the towns, extreme poverty and ghastly conditions (many hundreds of consumptive families in Budapest occupy ill-protected holes) have encouraged revolutionary feeling, which is kept down by a well-armed police force. The visitor to

smart, lovely Budapest will not receive the impression of suffering which Vienna conveys, but it will hardly be long before the terrible "Nincs kenyér!" ("We have no bread") resounds in his ears from a penniless beggar, or from a rabble faintly demanding justice. The re-assimilation of these houseless masses will offer a serious problem in the future.

"Beneath the rank of Baron," said a former Prince Eszterházy, "no one exists." The remark had little to recommend it as wit, and as social criticism it was an inanity. Conspicuous as were the great aristocrats, the social structure of Hungary rested until late years upon a basis of the lesser landowners. These formed a class known as the gentry or nobility, corresponding in many respects to the English squires. The parallel is the most striking perhaps of its kind to be met with in Europe, but it is not complete. As in England, the country gentleman undertook a magistrate's duties and controlled the lower House of Parliament. As with the English squires, a high percentage of the nation's illustrious men sprang from this class. In two important respects there were differences. In the first place, the Hungarian gentry were noblemen, and possessed the right to five points on their armorial coronet. They commonly took their name, like some English peers, from their estates or birth-place. In the second place, the Magyar gentry were not called upon, as in England, to reach a compromise with a business class of their own countrymen. The activity of Jews in Hungary altered these circumstances. In England, the country squires' ascendancy (1688-1832) was marked by the rise of English families through business, and the increasing prominence of commercial affairs. Cousins and even sons of squires were found making a career for themselves in business. The old order died hard, but Empire-building and other circumstances combined to overwhelm it. Eventually, it had become as great a distinction to own a celebrated office in the City as a backward estate, and much more profitable. The differences between Tory landowner and Whig merchant were more noticeable than profound. Both were Englishmen and reconcilable, as a gesture like the Continental system soon showed.

The Jews caused a different situation in Hungary. What little business was transacted in the old days—at least from the 17th century onwards—had been left by the nobility to such Jews as there were. These Israelites had earned a more or less precarious livelihood, shopkeeping and money-lending. Their trade was not a gentleman's occupation. They were useful, but in a social sense

pariahs. No avenue of preferment was open to them. The Magyar wanted for himself the country which he had conquered and defended. He placed severe limits on the Jew's activities, but had no objection to his performing a service which the Jew alone would undertake

By little degrees, the Jew's character enabled him to outwit his host. He used the inveterate gambling instinct of the Magyar nobility to press his continual loans of cash. The gentry, gambling more as they sank into the Jews' debt, found themselves obliged to forfeit their possessions. It was in the mid-nineteenth century that permission to become landowners was granted to the Jews, and with it the entry to large-scale business. This date coincided with the loss by the nobility of tax-exemptions which had maintained their power for over six hundred years. From now onwards, the process of Jewish advance was accelerated, and the nobility lost ground. In a few years of Jewish enterprise, the volume of Hungarian commerce trebled itself. An army of Jews came down out of Austrian Poland and began to control the trade of the country. They came also from the north Italian cities, from Germany and Bohemia. Their success strengthened the resistance to them of every Magyar noble family. Far from tempting the Hungarians into business, it merely served to increase their contempt. Soon the face of the capital itself began to change. So long as the true Magyars had had their way, Buda remained an intimate, charming little hill town, very circumscribed, very provincial. Its winding streets, made "as the cattle came home," and yellow cottages of one story, have even now little resemblance to Pest. With the coming of the Jews, who form a third of its population, Hungary's capital was enlarged until it became one of the most splendid cities in the world. The creation of Budapest is largely a Jewish achievement.

By our time, the break-up of the Hungarian gentry has reached an advanced point. They have been forced into the towns by financial pressure and the demands of modern life. The last connection they have with their landed estates is often their surname. They are civil servants, army officers, scholars, officials, owners of small banks or companies. You will find them at the University, both men and girl students, destined to become underpaid teachers. It is not easy for some of them to find their tuition fees, but their visiting card bears the proud coronet of nobility. Their history goes back often to medieval times, and they cherish memories—in some cases they still possess a fragment—of their ancient estates.

Their characteristics are a refined charm of manner, a conservative leaning in politics, and a profound admiration for England. Mihály Babits, Hungary's greatest living writer, is a member of this class. He has mourned its passing in the panoramic novel of Magyar life, *Sons of Death* (*Halálfiái*). He sees the origin of many of his country's misfortunes in this social change. The solid national culture of the gentry has been replaced by a flippant scepticism of Jewish colour. This opinion comes from a profound thinker who has associated all his life with Liberal circles. The most splendid recent achievement—albeit unconscious—of the Magyar gentry, perhaps their last on the grand scale, was to produce the poet, Endre Ady, whose death in 1919 removed one of the giants of European literature, and perhaps the supreme lyrical genius of the age. He also, and more violently than Babits, took his stand on the Left in politics.

Though they have lost money, and to some extent power, the influence of the nobility is still very strong on Hungarian life. There are departments like the army, the university staffs, the government offices, where a virtual monopoly remains to the Hungarians by birth. The thought process of the nobility has left its mark, and one meets with it at every turn in practical life. I remember when an English friend of mine was inquiring about a household where she thought of residing. A Hungarian acquaintance had answered one or two preliminary questions. It remained for her to inquire if the host's children would be at home. "And now, what about the family?" "Old, very old," said the Hungarian in a reassuring voice. It was the essential thing.

Nevertheless, the Jew's influence has been strong on a section of Hungarian thought. He came with few modern traditions into a land peculiarly rich in tradition. His influence has been rationalistic, disruptive. He is cosmopolitan, in contrast to the Magyar, who is rigidly patriotic. The Jew brought the study of sociology and the results of Western thinking in political science. He brought Freemasonry and Socialism. At the beginning of the century a movement started in letters to bring Hungary in touch with Western literary developments. To this end, a review was founded in 1908, under the title of *Nyugat* (*West*), for which the funds were provided by Baron Lajos Hatvany, a brilliant Jewish aristocrat. The *Nyugat* was able to surpass its rival, *Napkelet* (*East*), organ of the Conservative and Nationalist writers. It helped to draw together a group distinguished by their extraordinary interest and picturesqueness. Members of this circle have included the

genius Ady, and his wife, "Csinszka," now the wife and model of a celebrated artist; Mihály Babits, whose splendid achievement in poetry, fiction and philosophy should commend him to the judges of the Nobel Prize; Baron Hatvany himself, who, after a sensational career in politics, which included a trial for treason, has withdrawn into his library to write; the "Hungarian Voltaire," Ruzssem Vámbéry, son of the Central Asian traveller, a sociologist of international distinction; Frigyes Karinthy, Hungary's satirist of the modern world, who as an English, French or German writer would be a household word over Europe; Zsigmond Móricz, a supreme artist in the manipulation of peasant novel and story; the workman, Lajos Kassák, who took charge of literature during the Communist dictatorship, and has written the almost-classical *Egy ember élete* (*A Man's Life*) around his early struggles. To express the attitude of Radical thinkers in general, and of the Jews in particular, the word "destructive" was borrowed into Hungarian. There it possesses a significance many times greater than it bears in English. It epitomises all the Jew's scepticism, all the envy, meanness and alien habits of thought which his name connotes to a Magyar, the property-owner's dream of disaster for his possessions.

There is a hierarchy of Jews which is interleaved with the Magyar, but only mixes with it to a limited extent. The Jew has not succeeded in reconciling the Magyars to his presence. Feeling in Budapest is very bitter against him. Where possible, he is still excluded from privilege. By amassing wealth and becoming converts to Christianity, certain great families, the Herzogs, the Hatvanys,¹ the Kornfelds, have acquired aristocratic titles. They are looked upon, however, with varying degrees of reserve by the ancient aristocracy. Before the war, the fortunes controlled by great Jewish families never reached those of the hereditary landed aristocrats. There was a gulf in means as well as in pedigree. Since Trianon, such heavy losses have been sustained by the aristocrats that the relation must be different. It would be interesting to have details.

The Jew is not to be distinguished in all cases by his name. Those with German names often translated them. The Weiss's became Fehér, the Schwarz's Fekete, when they settled in Pest. Some greater Jews, who were able to buy landed estates, could take the name of their property like the traditional noblemen.

¹ The rise of the Jews has been best described by Baron Hatvany himself in his chronicle-novel, *Bondy Jr.*, of which an English translation has just appeared (Hutchinson).

This Jewish aristocracy may well contribute some of the great figures to Hungarian annals. Today there is perhaps no one family in Budapest so accomplished as the Hatvanys. I would add that the foreigner will discover no difference between the hospitality he meets with among Jewish Hungarians, whether converted or adamant, and that richly offered by the Magyars. He will find the same charm, the same inimitable kindness. The Jew's culture will be as wide, his grasp of foreign languages as astonishing.

It is only after long experience in Hungary that the Englishman begins to understand the complexities of the Jewish problem. He has not the Magyar's instant power of recognising a Jew by his gait and his accent. Many Hungarian Jews have little trace of what we should call a Hebrew appearance. An Englishman may be unburdening his opinions, quite unconsciously, to a Jewish acquaintance, for it happens not seldom that the converted Jew outdoes any Magyar in orthodox patriotic frenzy. He inveighs, also, in the most correct manner, against Jews.

Beneath the aristocratic families comes the Jewish upper *bourgeoisie*. The Jews in this stratum have some wealth, but no title. They fill the learned professions, and most successful businesses in Budapest are under their control. They are in finance, journalism, corn, machinery, textiles, timber, wine, leather, tailoring. Jews of this class reside most commonly in flats on the Pest side of the river. The richer Jewish apartments are furnished with culture and elegance, their pictures and books are chosen with an agreeable catholicity of taste, but they usually exaggerate the Magyar tendency to crowding and display. Nowadays, many Jews have taken houses across the Danube in Buda, on the beautiful slopes of the Svábhegy (Swabian Hill). The active Jewish life of the city remains, however, typical of Pest, like the great Israelite Club, Lipotvárosi Casino. It is still in Buda, near Maria Theresa's Palace, that one looks for the yellow houses with moulded armorial shields, and the cool interiors where an aristocratic tradition of centuries is living its St. Martin's summer. The intellectual level of the wealthier Hungarian Jews is extraordinarily high. Nothing could be more attractive than the pains they take to entertain a foreigner—not even the almost embarrassing kindness of other Hungarians. They have a nimble intelligence which glances from literature to the stage, from modern art to athletics. Beneath them again comes the hierarchy of the Jewish shopkeepers—and stallkeepers, as you may see them on the Teleki Square in Pest, shouting among their old bedsteads and scrap-iron. The number of Jewish workmen is

also considerable. From this latter class were drawn most of the Communists responsible for outrages in the Revolution. Hungary has never forgiven the Jews for the Terror of 1919, and has visited some of these crimes with horrible severity on the innocent. The Magyar's complaint is that the Jew, after accepting his hospitality, plotted under his roof to overthrow the Hungarian civilisation.

The minority problem, which was so serious for Hungary before the war, has been transferred by the Treaty of Peace to Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Jugoslavia. Austria's minority problems have been conferred on the Czechs, the Italians and the Poles, the difference being that today's minorities belong to the race formerly predominant, whether Hungarian or Austrian. Since the war, Hungary has no minority problem, unless it be the problem of her Jews. About 90 per cent. of her population is Hungarian-speaking. There is, however, a block of about half a million Germans. Many of these are Swabian peasants, who still speak German, though they have been settled a very long time in Hungary. None of them wishes to exchange Hungarian rule for any other. There are, in addition, many Hungarians whose ancestors came, at some time or other, from a German, or other foreign, country. These have lost all connection with their place of origin, and are merged into the appropriate Hungarian milieu.

We have seen that a Jew who wishes to make his way in official society can, under certain circumstances, diminish the offence of his birth by a discreet faith in the Church. For the souls of the eight million Hungarians, Rome and the Calvinist wage a fairly equal struggle. Roman Catholics have, in point of fact, a majority, but the Protestants are conspicuous and powerful. Among the recent celebrities who have been Calvinists, one thinks of Count Tisza, the remarkable Conservative Prime Minister who was assassinated in 1918, at the time of Count Károlyi's revolution. Following this revolutionary period, when Jews were conspicuous, many of their co-religionists feared revenge at the hands of a reactionary government. The churches were besieged by Jews who were willing to pay any price for baptism. These two revolutions—a Republican under Count Károlyi and a Communist under Béla Kun—were the most recent attempts to effect a change in Hungary's social order. Count Károlyi, an aristocrat who inclined to Fabian Socialism, found himself proclaimed President of the short-lived Hungarian Republic. He made arrangements to divide his enormous estates among the peasants who worked them. He also endeavoured, without previous experience of

government, to translate the theories of various social reformers into practice. The disasters consequent upon war and his own inadequate strength caused Károlyi to fail in his efforts. He fled from Budapest, leaving the Jewish agitator, Kun, to proclaim a Soviet. A Communist dictatorship of several months had achieved little in the way of constructive reform when the Roumanian army marched into Budapest, in defiance of treaty arrangements. Bolshevism fled from Hungary like its predecessor, and active reform has subsequently dropped out of the political programme.

The present would seem to be a time of few changes, but a social development which politics cannot control is, nevertheless, in progress. One may study the breaking down of Hungary's impoverished noble caste, the latter's efforts to retain a hereditary exclusiveness in the face of Jewish competition, and the effect of unrelieved suffering on her penniless masses. Modern tendencies, the problems of our time, are in certain respects concentrated in the small area of Hungary, and their effects are conveniently grouped for the investigator. Other factors, such as the striking semi-feudal political system, the Magyar's profound respect for the past and the comparatively low ratio of industrialisation, tend to make the case of the Hungarian nation one unique in its bearings. The entire spirit and structure of a people may be changing under the stress of this modern age, or we may see tradition and nationalism put up a successful resistance to the siege of contemporary life. Modernism, if it succeeds, will win a victory over unique forces; and if traditionalism comes off unscathed, the victory will be still more remarkable. In any case, a historical conflict of the most absorbing interest has entered its last stages on the Hungarian plain. The contribution which Hungary has yet to offer the world will depend on the result of this struggle. Future Hungarian civilisation may be strongly, perhaps predominantly, Jewish; or, again, the capacity of wealthy Jews to absorb local traditionalism may put the whole process back and lend a virtual success to the Magyars. It would seem as if the economic crisis will leave Hungary's Jewish population more material advantages, because of their remarkable flair for the vicissitudes of business—if, that is to say, it leaves anybody in Hungary anything. And on this point, the wiser opinion is silence.

VERNON DUCKWORTH BARKER.

WALTER SCOTT AND RUSSIA

I. *Introductory Remarks.*

THE year that has just passed was marked by the centenary of the death of Sir Walter Scott. This centenary suggests certain thoughts and comparisons which I now offer to the readers of the *Slavonic Review*

Walter Scott is an important phenomenon in the literary development of the world and at the same time a phenomenon of great historical significance. In one respect he certainly presents a striking difference from Goethe, the centenary of whose death, which also fell in 1932, has been marked all over the world as a date otherwise significant than from a merely historical point of view. Walter Scott, who at the moment of his death had been perhaps the most widely read and popular of writers, has become in the course of a century—at any rate in countries other than Anglo-Saxon—a writer exclusively “for children and youth.” Goethe may be but little read nowadays, yet he is read not only and even not chiefly by children. On the other hand, Walter Scott, who in his time was the originator and the mouthpiece of the Romanticist movement, has always been and is still felt to be a most unromantic personality. But as a writer, too, Walter Scott is inwardly alien to the most striking representatives of the genuinely Romantic spirit among his contemporaries; what is there, indeed, in common between him and, say, Novalis or E. T. A. Hoffmann?

At a certain age—as far as my generation is concerned, I think it was between the age of eight and fourteen—we all greedily devoured Walter Scott’s novels and revelled in them. In our hearts Jules Verne alone could perhaps compete with him. This juxtaposition is a striking illustration of Walter Scott’s destiny as a writer. Our grandfathers and fathers felt quite a different sort of enthusiasm for Walter Scott than we; they tackled him at a different age and in a different frame of mind. In their eyes he was a writer of genius who meant for them more or less the same thing as what Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy or Ibsen meant for us. This may be seen in the change of attitude towards Walter Scott which manifested itself in the world appreciation of that writer, as illustrated by the opinions which the two literary critics of the second half of the 19th century, who were internationally most influential—Hippolyte Taine and Georg

Brandes—held of the great Scotsman, opinions that differ radically from those of Goethe, Pushkin or Belinsky.¹

This involves a certain general problem of literary and æsthetic criticism and psychology. But in the present study I shall confine myself to historical facts and analogies, abstaining from a discussion of this general problem.²

The general meaning of Walter Scott for Russian literary circles and the reading public towards 1830 is thus characterised by one modern author :—

“It may be said without exaggeration that . . . in Russia Walter Scott began to hold towards the thirties a quite exceptional place—always ranked with the greatest geniuses of the time. Controversy on him acquired a ‘topical’ acuteness; witness is borne to this by all the magazines of the time, writers’ confessions, private memoirs, correspondence of all reading Russians. Particularly popular was the comparison with Byron (which had become a commonplace in Europe). These were the two paths—of poetry and of prose.”

And pointing to the numerous evidences of Walter Scott’s popularity the author selects from among them, as the most representative and authoritative, in the first place the opinion of Prince P. A. Vyazemsky, Pushkin’s friend and confidant in literary (and not only literary) matters, who had himself the intention of translating Walter Scott into Russian. This is what Vyazemsky wrote in 1927 :

“The poetry of the Scottish bard, the shining light of our age, like the light of day penetrates imperceptibly, or rather inexplorably, even there where the immediate effect of its rays is not obvious. . . . It seems impossible in our age for a poet not to echo Byron, just as for a novelist not to echo Walter Scott.”

Pointing out Pushkin’s love and esteem for Walter Scott (compare

¹ Taine’s and Brandes’s opinions are quoted and characterised (from his own point of view) by A. G. Gornfeld, a sympathetic and cultivated, though somewhat sentimental, Russian literary critic, in his very edifying article on Walter Scott entitled “The Last Minstrel” and included in his book *Novels and Novelists (Romany i romanisty)*, Moscow, 1930, pp. 128–155. A. G. Gornfeld is one of the few still active Russian critics of the age of freedom of the Press, a fine connoisseur of language, a pupil of the famous Kharkov philologist Potebnya, and a regular collaborator of the review *Russkoe Bogatstvo*, which used to be edited by N. K. Mikhailovsky and V. G. Korolenko.

² I have discussed it in my “Writer’s Notes,” published recently in *Rossiia i Slavianstvo*, No. 203, of October 15, 1932.

this with Pushkin's own judgments given below), our author cites the following curious facts:—

. . . Walter Scott's novels took root in our life; Karamzin, inspired in his work by Scott, dreamed of erecting a monument to him in his garden; Vyazemsky bore witness to the "fever of curiosity, yearning, avidity, enthusiasm" excited by "the reading of this writer, the most excellent perhaps of all peoples and ages", alongside with this, dresses in the *genre* of Walter Scott were spoken of with us, while the *Moscow Telegraph* announced a new Parisian fashion—"Walter Scott capes," and the names of his characters became common (Mme. Eichfeldt—Rebecca, Karamzin's servant—Caleb).³

II. *Walter Scott and Pushkin.*

Pushkin was very profoundly influenced by Walter Scott. It was alike in his capacity of a poet, of a collector of folk-songs and of the originator of the historical novel based on life that Walter Scott influenced Pushkin. We know that Pushkin's library contained not only Walter Scott's novels, but also his poetical works, namely, *The Lady of the Lake*, 8th edition, Edinburgh, 1810; *The Lay of the Last Minstrel*, 12th edition, London, 1811; *The Lord of the Isles*, 5th edition, Edinburgh, 1815; *Rokeby*, 6th edition, Edinburgh, 1815.⁴

In a letter from his rural exile (in Mikhailovskoe), written towards the end of October 1824 and addressed to his brother Leo, Pushkin asks the latter to supply him with books and writes: "Poetry, poetry, poetry. Conversations de Byron! Walter Scott! This is food for the soul." These words refer precisely to Walter Scott's *poetical* works.⁵

We know now, owing to the researches of Mr. D. Yakubovich,⁶

³ D. P. Yakubovich in his article "Reminiscences of Walter Scott in *Belkin's Tales*", in *Pushkin i ego sovremenniki*, vol. xxxviii (1928), pp. 101-103. Cf. also his "Introduction to *Belkin's Tales* and Walter Scott's narrative devices" in the miscellany *Pushkin in World Literature*, St. Petersburg, 1926, pp. 160-187.

⁴ See the bibliographical description of Pushkin's library by B. L. Modzalevsky. See the publication of the Russian Imperial Academy *Pushkin and his Contemporaries* (*Pushkin i ego sovremenniki*), vol. ix-x (double). St. Petersburg, 1910. Pp. 332-333, Nos. 1,362, 1,363, 1,364, 1,367.

⁵ As a poet Walter Scott exercised a much greater influence on Zhukovsky, Pushkin's master, "defeated," as he himself admitted, by the pupil. This influence, just as, generally speaking, the influence of the English poetry on the Russian, demands a detailed investigation and a generalised appreciation—even after the works of the brothers Veselovsky (Alexey Veselovsky, *Zapadnoe vliyaniye v novuyu russkuyu literaturu*. 3rd revised edition. Moscow, 1906. Alexander Veselovsky, *V. A. Zhukovskiy. Poeziya chuvstva i "serdechnago voobrazheniya"*. St. Petersburg, 1904, reprinted 1918).

⁶ See in *Pushkin i ego sovremenniki*, vol. xxxviii-xxxix (1930), his article entitled "Notes on Pushkin and Walter Scott," pp. 122-140.

that from *The Lady of the Lake* Pushkin borrowed the main theme of his fragment *Shumit kustarnik*, with its image of a hart suddenly startled on the top of a mountain. In the draft of a letter to Gnedich (dated 29 April, 1822) Pushkin speaks of the "poetical panoramas" and "magic pictures" of Byron and Walter Scott, fearing, with his wonted severity to himself, a comparison between his own pictures of the Caucasus and those "magic pictures" of theirs. Nor can there be any doubt now that Bulgarin was right when he said that the scene with the horse in *Boris Godunov* had been suggested to Pushkin by a motif to be found in *The Lady of the Lake*.⁷ But the poetical borrowings from Walter Scott remained in *Shumit kustarnik* in the stage of fragment. It is another matter when we come to the poem called *Two Ravens* or *Scottish Song*. Thematically this is not, of course, an original work of Walter Scott, but a popular ballad. But as this has been pointed out already by Belinsky, evidently on the ground of information supplied to him by one of his friends versed in foreign literatures, this poem which, thanks to Pushkin, has now become one of the pearls of Russian poetry, was borrowed by Pushkin from the collection of Scottish popular songs published by Walter Scott in 1802 under the title *Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border* and known to Pushkin in a French version of N.L. Artaud: *Chants populaires des frontières méridionales de l'Ecosse, recueillis et commentés par Sir Walter Scott, traduits de l'anglais par M. Artaud*. Paris (Gosselin et Sautet), 1826, pp. 216. There was a copy of this book in Pushkin's library,⁸ and he certainly used it for his "translation."

This irrefutably conclusive evidence definitely settles, I think, the problem which has occupied some Pushkinists: Pushkin's poem, *Two Ravens*, is a Scottish song (*The Twa Corbies*) borrowed by Pushkin from Walter Scott, as collector and editor of Scottish folk-songs, but borrowed through the intermediary of the French translator.⁹ Here are the three texts *en regard*:

⁷ This also has been established by Yakubovich, l.c., pp. 132-134.

⁸ Cp. B. L. Modzalevsky, *Pushkin's Library*, p. 333, No. 1,367.

⁹ On what ground Mr. D. P. Yakubovich, in his article on Walter Scott in the *Guide to Pushkin (Putevoditel po Pushkinu)*, Moscow, 1931, p. 332, regards *The Twa Corbies* as an original ballad of Walter Scott, I do not know. The question of the genesis and of the model of Pushkin's *Two Ravens* has been dealt with by Prof. N. F. Sumtsov (Kharkov) in his *Researches into the Poetry of A. S. Pushkin (Izsledovaniya o poezi A. S. Pushkina)*, published in the "Kharkov University Miscellany in Memory of A. S. Pushkin" (Kharkov, 1900, pp. 259-261), and after him by N. O. Lerner in his "Notes" to Pushkin's poems (Vengerov's edition, vol. v, p. xviii, note to No 556). Both of them ignore the existence of a French translation of Walter Scott's collection of

The Two Corbies

As I was walking all alane,
I heard two corbies making a mane,
The tane unto the t'other say,
"Where shall we gang and dine to-day?"

"In behint yon auld fail dyke,
"I wot there lies a new-slain knight,
"And nae body kens that he lies there,
"But his hawk, his hound, and lady fair

"His hound is to the hunting gane,
"His hawk to fetch the wild-fowl hame,
"His lady's ta'en another mate,
"So we may make our dinner sweet.

"Ye'll sit on his white house bane,
"And I'll pike out his bonny blue een
"Wi' ae lock o' his gowden hair,
"We'll theek our nest when it grows bare

"Mony a one for him makes mane,
"But nane sall ken where he is gane
"O'er his white banes, when they are bare,
"The wind sall blaw for evermar"

Les deux corbeaux

Comme je me promenais tout seul, j'entendis
deux corbeaux se parler, l'un dit à son camarade
"Où irons-nous dîner aujourd'hui?"

— Derrière ce vieux mur en terre, git un cavalier
nouvellement tué, et personne ne sait qu'il git en ce
lieu, excepté son épervier, son chien et sa dame

"Son chien est allé à la chasse, son épervier lie
pour un autre maître les oiseaux sauvages, sa
dame a pris un autre serviteur, ainsi, nous pourrions
faire un bon dîner

"Toi, tu te percheras sur sa blanche poitrine;
moi, je lui arracherai avec mon bec ses beaux yeux
bleus, et de boucles de ses cheveux blonds nous
boucherons les fentes de nos nids

"De ses amis plus d'un mène grand deuil, mais
nul ne saura jamais où il est tombé, et sur ses os
depouillés et blanchis, les vents souffleront toujours"

Шотландская Пѣсня

Воронъ къ ворону летить,
Воронъ ворону кричить :
Воронъ, гдѣ бѣ намъ отобѣдать ?
Какъ бы намъ о томъ провѣдать ?

Кѣмъ убить и отчего,
Знаетъ соколъ лишь его.
Да кобылка вороная,
Да хозяйка молодая.

Воронъ ворону въ отвѣтъ :
Знаю, будетъ намъ обѣдъ ;
Въ чистомъ полѣ подъ ракитой
Богатырь лежитъ убитой.

Соколъ въ рощу улетѣлъ,
На кобылку недругъ съѣлъ,
А хозяйка ждетъ милѣва.
Не убитого, живова.

But still greater was the influence of Walter Scott on the great Russian poet in his capacity of creator of the historical novel. We have a number of interesting utterances of Pushkin on Walter Scott as a novelist.

In 1825 Pushkin noted down for his own use, not for print :—

(Notes taken while reading books)—

The principal charm of the novels of W[alter] S[cott] consists in that we are made familiar with the past times not with the *enflure* of the Fr[ench] tragedies—not with the primness of the sentimental novels—not with the *dignité* of History, but in a contemporary, homely way—Ce qui me dégoûte c'est ce que—Here, on the contrary, ce qui nous charme dans le roman historique—c'est ce qui est historique est absolument ce que nous voyons—Sch[iller] Goethe W[alter] S[cott] have not the servile passion for Kings and Heroes—They—do not resemble (like the Fr[ench] heroes) servants mimicking la dignité et la noblesse—ils sont familiers

Scottish ballads and songs made by Artaud. They also ignore the fact that there was a copy of it in Pushkin's library, a copy cut by Pushkin.

Since writing the above, I learn that the same conclusion was reached in 1922 by Yu. G. Oksman in his article "Pushkin's Subjects" in the *Pushkin Miscellany* in memory of S. A. Vengerov.

dans les circonstances solennelles—car les grandes circonstances leur sont familières.

On voit que W[alter] S[cott] est de la petite société des Rois d'Angleterre.¹⁰

Writing about *The History of the Russian People* by his contemporary, Polevoy, Pushkin, in 1830, thus estimated the importance of Walter Scott:—

(On Polevoy's *History of the Russian People*, 1830)—

Walter Scott's effect is felt in all the branches of contemporary literature. The new school of French historians has been formed under the influence of the Scottish novelist. He opened to them fresh sources, unsuspected hitherto in spite of the existence of historical drama, created by Shakespeare and Goethe.

M. N. Zagoskin's historical novel, *Yury Miloslavsky* (dealing with the Time of Troubles), which became in the thirties and forties of the 19th century the most popular novel in Russia, gave Pushkin an opportunity of returning, in a special article, to the importance of Walter Scott and to a characterisation of his art in comparison with the writings of a host of his imitators.

(On Zagoskin's novel, *Yury Miloslavsky*, 1830. *Lit. Gaz.*)—

Nowadays the word "novel" is supposed to mean a historical epoch set forth in a work of fiction. Walter Scott has carried away a whole host of imitators. But how far they all are from the Scottish wizard! Like Agrippa's disciple, having exorcised the demon of the past, they knew not how to deal with him and fell victims to their own daring. They betake themselves into the age into which they want to transport the reader—with a heavy paraphernalia of habits, prejudices, and daily impressions. Under a hat adorned with plumes you recognise a head dressed by your own hairdresser; from behind a lace ruff à la *Henri IV* peeps the starched cravat of a modern dandy. Gothic heroes have been brought up by Madame Campan, while 16th-century statesmen read *The Times* and the *Journal des Débats*. What a number of incongruities, of unnecessary details, of important omissions! What refinement, and above all how little life! Yet these pale creations are being read in Europe. Is it because men, as Mad. de Staël used to say, know only the history of their own time and therefore are incapable of noticing the absurdities of romantic anachronisms? Is it because a

¹⁰ Such is the actual text of this note, reconstructed according to the recently discovered autograph once possessed by P. V. Annenkov and since thought to be lost. It has been published in the miscellany entitled *Atheneum*, a historical and literary periodical, edited by B. L. Modzalevsky, Yu. G. Oksman and P. N. Sakulin, Book I-II. (St. Petersburg, 1924), pp. 5-6 and 14-15 (notes). The last sentence, highly expressive, is wanting in the old text, which has evidently been cut down by Annenkov at his own will.

representation of the past, however feeble and untrue, has an ineffable charm for an imagination blunted by the monotonous variety of the present, the workaday?

In a note on Gogol, Pushkin says that the opening of Gogol's *Taras Bulba* "is worthy of Walter Scott," and in his article on *Milton, and Chateaubriand's translation of Paradise Lost* (1837), Pushkin, who, generally speaking, gave English and German literature a preference over the French, gives vent to his indignation at the fact that Alfred de Vigny, the author of *Cinq-Mars*, has been placed by the French critics "on the same level as Walter Scott."

But though Pushkin experienced the influence of Walter Scott and fully appreciated his historical importance, one must, nevertheless, not overestimate either the influence of the Scottish novelist on Pushkin or the affinity of their talents, as is done by Mr. Yakubovich in his above-mentioned interesting article on Walter Scott in the *Guide to Pushkin*, composing the sixth volume of the recent Soviet edition of Pushkin's *Complete Works*.

Pushkin's talent was much more tense and self-concentrated than Walter Scott's. This is something more than a mere outward difference of style or literary manner. Walter Scott was a remarkable observer and describer. Pushkin, with all his gift of observation and precision, was not at all an observer and describer, but a seer. Philarète Chasles, a remarkable French critic, said once of Balzac, whom he knew well and with whom he had even at one time been on intimate terms, that he was not an "*observateur*," but a "*voyant*." This characteristic may, on still better grounds, be applied to Pushkin, and, of course, in no lesser measure to Gogol and Dostoyevsky.

I am not going to dwell on the way in which the influence of Walter Scott reflected itself—apart from Pushkin—on the Russian *roman de mœurs* in its second stage, personified by Bulgarin, (Narezhy, who originated this *genre* in Russian literature, cannot be considered to have been influenced by Scott), nor on the literary activity of that long line of Russian imitators of Walter Scott, whether gifted or not, in the domain of the historical novel, which from the same Bulgarin takes us, through Zagoskin and Lazhechnikov, to the sympathetic figure of Count Alexis Tolstoy, the author of *Prince Serebryany*. Nor am I going to analyse the relation between the general influence of Walter Scott on his contemporaries and the original art of Gogol. In his case, of course, not a small part was played by the mediatory influence of Pushkin who, without unduly stretching the point, may in many respects be called Gogol's literary godfather and master. Nor shall I dwell on the influence exercised

by Walter Scott on Lermontov, Russia's next best poet to Pushkin. I will only mention that Lermontov placed Fenimore Cooper even higher than Walter Scott, in this high opinion of the American novelist entirely agreeing with the leading Russian critic of the time, Belinsky, with whom he had a spiritual affinity. It is necessary to mention that in the persons of Bulwer-Lytton, Dickens and Marryat the Anglo-Saxon world produced in the thirties and forties of the 19th century rivals to Scott. It is curious, however, that Belinsky treated Dickens as a "second-rate writer" compared to Scott.

III. *Shevyrev on Walter Scott*

It is interesting to note the judgment on Walter Scott of Professor S. P. Shevyrev, a Slavophil and the founder in Russia of both the historical study of national literature and the comparative historical study of literary evolution in general. This judgment was uttered by him in 1841 in the review *Moskvityanin*, edited by Pogodin.

These two forces [of England]—Shevyrev wrote—not so very long ago, under our eyes, were personified in two writers . . . after whose death she did not produce anything as great. they are Byron and W. Scott. It seems odd at the first glance that these two geniuses, quite opposed in spirit and tendency, could have been contemporaries and even friends. The secret of this lies in the life of England and even in the life of Europe.

Byron personifies for me the insatiable, tempestuous force of England, which lashes all the seas into foam and unfurls her flags to the winds of the whole world. Byron is a product of that infinite thirst from which England suffers, of that constant discontent which stirs her and pushes her into the world. He stands for the inexhaustible pride of her indomitable spirit.

Walter Scott, on the contrary, is the mouthpiece of her other force, creating inside, maintaining and preserving. It is the invariable faith in one's great past; it is the infinite love for it, verging on worship. Walter Scott's poetry springs from the principle that everything that is historically true is beautiful for the simple reason that it has been consecrated by national tradition. W. Scott's novels are the artistic apotheosis of history.

When in London, walking about the vast docks, you see ships ready to sail for all the countries of the world, then you begin to understand how in such a country the insatiable, tempestuous spirit of Byron could have been born and nurtured.

When you enter piously beneath the dark vaults of Westminster Abbey, or walk in the parks of Windsor, Hampton Court or Richmond, and rest under the oaks that are contemporaries of Shakespeare, then you

realise how the conservative genius of W. Scott could ripen on this soil of tradition.

Both these great literary phenomena of the present century could not have existed without each other. In them not England alone but the whole of Europe has manifested itself. The stormy spirit of Byron has found a reflection in the public life of the peoples and in the private life of men; it has been counteracted by W. Scott's tendency to preserve the past and to consecrate every nationality.

How little significant are all the phenomena of English literature after these two, which still continue to exercise a twofold influence on the whole writing world of Europe.¹¹

IV. *A Controversy on Scott between Senkovsky and Belinsky.*

In these notes I should like to dwell at greater length on a remarkable controversy between two famous Russian journalists on Walter Scott. O. I. Senkovsky, the founder (with his *Reader's Library*) of the Russian so-called "fat" review (monthlies), and V. G. Belinsky, whose influence as a literary critic on Russian literature and social thought is something unique in the general history of literature.

These two representatives of Russian literary criticism in its heroic period (1830-1850) held diametrically opposite views on Scott. Belinsky expressed a very positive and even enthusiastic appreciation of the great Scottish novelist and he held to it to the very end of his literary activity. Another view, rather negative and at any rate critical, found an adept in Senkovsky, *alias* Baron Brambeus. Belinsky's view represented the general attitude of his time towards the art of the famous Scottish novelist, while Senkovsky's opinion struck the great majority of his contemporaries as a cynical and provocative heresy, which was repugnant to them.

At the very beginning of his career as a literary critic Belinsky wrote in *Literary Dreams* in 1834 :—

It has somewhere been said that Goethe's *Faust* is the *Iliad* of our time, it is an opinion with which one cannot help agreeing. But in fact is not Walter Scott also our Homer, in the sense of an epic poet, if not the perfect mouthpiece of the spirit of the age?

Belinsky began his literary and critical work as a Muscovite; as an idealist, standing close in his moods and views to the then only incipient Slavophilism; and as an enthusiast, not only in his affirmations, but also in his negations.

In this threefold capacity of Muscovite, idealist and enthusiast,

¹¹ See *Moskvityann*, 1841, Part I, No. I, pp. 236-237.

Belinsky praised Walter Scott as against Senkovsky,¹² the Petersburg, positivist and sceptic, who, early in 1834, before the publication of *Literary Dreams* the first critical essay of Belinsky, gave in the *Reader's Library* a very interesting and brilliantly written estimate of Walter Scott.¹³

This is how Senkovsky represents Walter Scott's evolution. "A man of brains," "endowed with an extremely powerful talent," and also "with a still more powerful passion for astounding people," Walter Scott began to write poetry, using a new poetical technique and carrying away with him "hosts of imitators." But "he had no genuine poetical genius." "Seeing the decline of his fame" as a poet, he resorted "to a new and violent means of achieving fame, in plain terms, to quackery." He "made an artificial mixture of truth and fiction blended so cleverly that on the whole one was unable to discover whether it was truth or fiction."

In this invention Walter Scott "succeeded beyond all expectation," and thus "the historical novel came to life." The idea was suggested to the Scottish writer by the romances of the Round Table. And in order to "resurrect, refresh and ennoble" this kind of literature, Walter Scott "used all the power of his talent and all the wealth of his historical learning." "The novelty of the enterprise startled Europe. The enthusiasts proclaimed it to be the summit of artistry. The pedants at once created a system, and the invention of the Scottish author was made to suit precisely calculated rules: Walter Scott had the pleasure of experiencing during his lifetime the brilliant lot of Homer. . . ." There were even people who captivated by the theory of novel-writing deduced from Walter Scott's works, pretended to teach him, too, "not noticing that the inventor was deceiving them with his invention and instead of pure, lofty forms of art was selling them a dainty doll." "The *genre* was false, but Walter Scott's talent was enormous, genuinely adapted to this *genre*, or rather the *genre* itself had been invented on purpose for the talent and was the pure outcome of it."

Further, Senkovsky pointedly says that Walter Scott's training had been the training "of a historian and antiquary," and he proceeds to give the following sketch of him as a man and a poet:

¹² I have attempted to give a general idea of Senkovsky's remarkable figure in my article "Moscow and Petersburg," published in *Rossiia i Slaviansvo*, No. 165, 23 January, 1932.

¹³ See the *Reader's Library* (*Biblioteka dlya Chleniya*) for 1834, I, 1-44, over the signature O. O. O.; reprinted in *Collected Works*, vol. viii. St. Petersburg, 1859, under the title "The Historical Novel" (in connection with Bulgarin's novel *Mazepa*).

"his soul, without being poetical, was full of lofty poetry; his gift was, above all, narrative—narrative to the utmost, in the full sense of this word, narrative in all its shades and nuances (*izgibny*).” Among his imitators there were men “of incomparably greater and more powerful talent,” such as, for instance, Victor Hugo as author of *Notre-Dame de Paris*. But “no one could match him in the historical novel, which he drew from three principles belonging to him personally and in him alone combined.” But this “form of art was false,” says Senkovsky. “The historical novel is the product of an art tending to decline and still endeavouring to act upon men by false and indirect means.”

“Having dealt a death blow to art by inventing a false form of art, Walter Scott dealt a still greater blow to taste.” Having turned the heads of young writers, he “prepared the public for a monstrous mannerism.” “It was he who brought on to the scene, under the cover of all the charms of his gift of narrative, hangmen, gipsies, Jews; he opened up to the European public the ghastly poetry of gallows, scaffolds, executions, slaughter, drunken revels and wild passions.” “It is true that all these violent and anti-literary commotions of readers’ feelings were hidden beneath British primness,” but “young writers . . . began to dream that by assembling all the horrors in one book, by compressing them still tighter, by varying them still more . . . they . . . would become double or triple Scotts—and the fun began.” “Victor Hugo disfigured his excellent talent entirely owing to Walter Scott; it was owing to him, that he demoralised the lofty aspirations of his genius and is still unable to create a single story, a single play without a hangman, a Jew, a gipsy, or the gallows. The spirit of the present-day French school is the impure juice squeezed out in a frenzy of enthusiasm from Walter Scott’s novels over young brains, but squeezed out separately, without any of the beauties which have remained in his books; an experiment in Walter-Scottism seasoned with the philosophy of wild young intellects. Such is the history of the formation of the modern taste—the history of what is called the renewal of literature: it all consists of imitation, which has been carried to the extreme logical consequences of the principle that is imitated.”

His estimate of Walter Scott as a writer Senkovsky compresses into the following formula:—

“None the less Walter Scott is a great writer, worthy of admiration for the extraordinary art with which he has carried out and presented to the world the false *genre* of literature conceived by him.

He is inimitable in his forgery, but his forgery hardly deserves imitation."

This estimate of Walter Scott given by Senkovsky was dealt with by Belinsky not only in his *Literary Dreams* of 1834, but also in the review of a book in 1835 (in the same periodical, *Molva*)

"Walter Scott has created, invented, discovered or, better say, has divined the epic of our time—the historical novel. Many people bearing the stamp of great talent or even of genius have followed in his train; but in spite of this, he has remained a genius unique of its kind."

So far Belinsky agrees with Senkovsky. But the author of *Literary Dreams* goes on to challenge the rejection of the historical novel "as a powerful literary *genre*, insulting the dignity both of art and of history." People who speak thus, says Belinsky, do not understand "what is historical truth." Historical truth, in the highest meaning of the term, "consists not in a true statement of facts, but in a true presentation of the evolution of the human spirit in this or that epoch."

"But who has caught that spirit? Are not different conclusions to be drawn from the same facts? One historian says one thing, another—another, and both support their opposite views with the same facts. . . . Here art coincides with science; the historian becomes an artist, and the artist—a historian. What is the aim of the historian? To catch the spirit of the people or the society he describes at a certain epoch of its life, so that one could see the throbbing of that life, that beneath his story should palpitate the living idea which the people or the society had expressed at this or that epoch of its existence. In this sense Walter Scott . . . is a historian in the full and high meaning of this word, for in the . . . works of his vast genius he has painted for us the living ideal of the Middle Ages."

In the same year, in his review of the Russian translation of A. Cunningham's biography of Walter Scott, Belinsky once more joined issue with Senkovsky over Scott, championing the right of the historical novel to existence as an art. "Why," he asks, "is a poet not allowed to understand this or that historical personage in his own way and reproduce the figure in a work of art according to his conception of it, surrounding it with circumstances, partly true, but for the most part fictitious, which will characterise its historical and individual personality?" In particular he rejects as "absurd" any doubts as to the poetical talent of the author of *The Puritans* and *Ivanhoe*.

"It would be useless and out of place," he writes, "to dwell on this question, which has been long ago settled by the European or rather world fame of Walter Scott. Prestige is no proof, you will say. No, I do not agree. A people has a flair so unerring that it is never deceived either as to its favourites or as to the objects of its indifference. . . A people's verdict is God's verdict, and peoples and generations are the most infallible of critics. Walter Scott has long since been crowned with poetical fame by the people, by peoples and mankind; it remains for the ages and posterity to confirm this verdict of contemporaries—and so it will be."

And Belinsky ends his defence of Scott with a direct attack on Senkovsky-Brambeus in the form of a rhetorical question, as to whether "a self-styled baron will ever succeed in tearing this crown from the radiant head of the baronet-genius."

Belinsky remained true to his opinion of Scott. In 1844, in connection with the publication of the third volume of the Russian translation of Scott's works, he wrote:—

"Walter Scott is not one of those writers who are read once to be then forgotten for ever. More than once in his life a man can renew the unspeakable charm of the impressions given him by the reading of Walter Scott's novels. He is something more than a writer familiar to you; he is the invariable friend of all your life, whose charming conversation will always comfort and delight you. He is the poet of both sexes and of all ages, from adolescence with its consciousness only beginning to awaken, to old age. For everybody he is equally entertaining and edifying; the reading of his novels, carrying a man into a world of abundant but actual happenings, fills him with a vigorous and yet soothing and comforting feeling; fascinating one's imagination, it educates the heart and develops the mind, for the poetry of Walter Scott is neither eccentric nor dramatic, neither dreamy nor morbid; it is always down here on earth, in reality; it is the mirror of historical and private life."

None other than the young Gogol, then only a beginner, campaigned against Senkovsky in general and against his opinion of Walter Scott in particular. He did so in 1836, in Pushkin's review, *Sovremennik*, in a famous article which at the time made a great sensation, entitled *On the Movement of Magazine Literature in 1834 and 1835*. Indignantly and provocatively he here flings the following reproach at Senkovsky:—

"Walter Scott, this great genius whose immortal works embrace life with such fullness, Walter Scott has been called a quack. And

this was read by Russia, this was said to men who are educated, who have read Walter Scott."

It is curious that Pushkin, in a letter to the editor of his own review signed with the initials A.B., and of which his authorship has only quite recently been established,¹⁴ has described young Gogol's judgment on Senkovsky as "not very well founded."¹⁵

In our days it is possible to argue as to whose judgment on Walter Scott, Belinsky's or Senkovsky's, has been confirmed by "the ages and posterity." As we have already pointed out, Taine and his disciple Brandes have come, in the main, to the same estimate of Scott that had been given by Senkovsky thirty or forty years earlier. The point is not, of course, that the historical novel is a "counterfeit" literary *genre*, "a fruit of a scandalous adultery between history and imagination," "a monster composed of two different and contradictory principles, a verbal realisation of the enigmatic conception of the Egyptian priests—the sphynx," "a false form of art," where "the beautiful is humbled . . . to the condition of a painful and useless mystification, art is turned into the trade of a mender, a plasterer or reconstructor," as Senkovsky thought it to be; nor is it that, by tempting hosts of imitators, Walter Scott created a school of "furious literature."

The only question that can be argued is whether Walter Scott really had "a genuine poetical genius," whether his was a "poetical soul"? To the affirmative answer to this question (in Russian criticism it has been given by Pushkin and, especially, by Belinsky, who has been followed in our days by A. G. Gornfeld) is opposed another estimate, according to which the famous Scottish novelist was an entertaining writer for the great public of his own time and even had a fascination for many chosen minds of that time, but the public of our days has no use for him, and in the eyes of the majority of modern connoisseurs of art his writings lack that genuine poetry which alone ensures immortality to literary works of this kind.

PETER STRUVE.

Paris-Prague, November 1932.

¹⁴ By Yu. G. Oksman in *The Athenaeum* (see above), pp. 15-24.

¹⁵ I intend devoting a special study to Senkovsky, in which I shall characterise this remarkable figure in the history of Russian culture and literature

POLAND AND GOETHE

THE problem of mutual relations between an outstanding individuality and a definite social group has always two aspects, arising from the points of view of the two sides: from the psychology of the outstanding individuality on the one hand, and the currents of thought of the time on the other. This problem becomes the more interesting, the more limited is the area of convergence and the greater the necessity for reconstructing the picture, as in a mosaic, from small and apparently unimportant details. It becomes necessary to draw conclusions from minute, seemingly unimportant facts of which formerly no account had been taken. In the study of comparative literature, it very often happens that the reader becomes, in a way, one with the writer in creating new currents of ideas. Consequently, the history of culture, i.e. the history of the formation of the intellectual and emotional currents of a period, does not despise small details; on the contrary, it brings them out of an often perplexing obscurity into a clear light.

These remarks apply to the reception in Poland of the works of Goethe, which, especially at the outset, was not very warm. Before, however, we come to sum up what Polish literature owes to Goethe's poetry, we should, in a few words, note what, on the other hand, the work of the great poet may have borrowed from Poland. It would be too much to say that Polish literature—although undoubtedly interesting and original, and at that time already with centuries of tradition behind it, and reaching its apogee during Goethe's own lifetime—played a part in the poet's creative work in the same way that the English and French literatures had done. This cannot even be said of Polish folklore, although it has been proved that Slav folk-song did exert its influence on this master of modern lyric poetry. Despite the known fact that Goethe was interested in the anthologies of other Slav nations, there is no positive proof that he was acquainted with the inadequate, though painstaking, anthology of Bowering, *Specimens of the Polish Poets* (1827). The only work of Polish literature which Goethe knew directly through a French translation, and which he praised, was the then popular sentimental tragedy based on the history of Poland in the 13th century: *Ludgarda*, by L. Kropiński, the conception of which was entirely classicist. It is well known, however, that

this great admirer of the idea of a *Weltliteratur* was interested in the poetry of a language which, together with French and English, he included in the great cultural circle of Europe. His interest in it is shown by personal records of those eminent Poles whose acquaintance Goethe made and whom, as was his custom, he questioned exhaustively on matters concerning their country. One incident proves that Goethe had some rough knowledge of Polish history. To a Polish writer who came to visit him, he suggested a theme for a tragedy taken from it

Though not directly familiar with Polish literature, Goethe had opportunities of getting into personal touch with several outstanding representatives of it. During his visits to the health resorts of Bohemia, he came in contact with the social and intellectual élite of Poland, he admired the good taste of Polish women, and several topical poems witness to his friendly relations with Poles. He met there, among other literary celebrities, eminent statesmen and writers, Prince Adam Czartoryski and Count Stanislas Potocki, both of them outstanding advocates of the cause of education in Poland; the pre-romantic novelist, Mme. Jaraczewska (*née* Countess Krasińska); Count Fredro, brother of Poland's greatest comedy writer; not to mention others who were there at the same time, for instance, the "prince of Polish poets" of the period of Stanislaus Augustus, Bishop Ignatius Krasicki.

Among the pilgrims to Weimar, Goethe twice received a visit from K. Koźmian, the eminent classicist, who, though as a poet rather restricted within the narrow limits of conservatism, was, nevertheless, a man of broad spiritual culture. An opposite type was another guest of Goethe's, Vincent Pol, writer of ardent patriotic poems, a romanticist both in his life and work, who, dressed in the uniform of the Polish insurgents, came practically straight from the tragic battlefields of Poland's fight for freedom in 1831. For us, the most interesting incident is the meeting of the greatest poet of Germany with the greatest poet of Poland. Adam Mickiewicz, who in Poland played a part similar to that played in Germany by Goethe, and whose poetic genius was equally broad, the brilliant founder and *magnus parens* of modern Polish poetry, spent several days in Weimar during the celebrations in honour of Goethe's eightieth birthday. The letter of introduction from Mme. Szymanowska and the striking personality of Mickiewicz himself (who, even during one of the social gatherings at Goethe's house, gave proof of his psychic abilities) brought a warm welcome to the great Polish poet in a throng of visitors from all parts of the

world. His friendly relations with the Goethe family endured in after years. The German poet, Holtei, who was in Weimar at the same time, remarked that there was in Goethe's house even "*ein polnischer Kultus*"

Two Polish personalities are in particular connected more closely with the creative genius of Goethe. Marja Szymanowska, a pianist of European repute, had by the charm of her music and the noble womanliness of her nature brought comfort to the heart of the poet after the bitter disappointment of his love, conceived late in life, for Ulrika von Levetzow. She inspired and is pictured in the third part of his magnificent *Trilogie der Leidenschaft*, an autographed copy of which he presented to her, together with a copy of the French translation. Here are a few excerpts from the poet's correspondence: "A divine and tranquil peace has descended upon me . . . I owe much to this charming woman; thanks to her talent and her knowledge, I have found myself again." He sent her an eager invitation to Weimar. "J'espère," he wrote, "de me réjouir du plus beau talent et de la plus intéressante société qu'on puisse imaginer." He arranged a concert for her and gave the event universal publicity. The moment of parting brought tears to his eyes and words of lasting beauty. His description of her unveils the mystery of the spiritual charm of Marja Szymanowska, which overshadowed even the unusual beauty of her person, and which communicated itself to his own ardently passionate nature. "She is like the air," he wrote: "Jene sei wie die Luft, so fließend, so alsbald ansetzend, so überall, so leicht und gleichsam körperlos." With these words he described her personality; her music, he said in a letter to Schultze, cannot be described in words. His picture of her in his *Trilogie der Leidenschaft* was, to his mind, inadequate.

Music and Poland are associated in Goethe's mind in yet another way. Prince Anthony Radziwiłł, a Polish magnate, later governor of the Province of Poznań, was a composer of interesting incidental music for *Faust*, which, according to critics, was much more than the work of a mere dilettante. Goethe became extremely interested in Radziwiłł's work, "the first troubadour he had met"—and the more so since it was owing to his endeavours that *Faust* was produced in 1820 at the Court in Berlin. Germans admit that Radziwiłł rendered an undoubted service in the popularisation of their greatest masterpiece.

A little-known episode in the life of Goethe is his journey to Poland which, in the company of Prince Karl August of Weimar,

he made in 1790 from the camp near Breslau. The aim of this eight days' expedition is not definitely known. A Polish historian¹ who collected details concerning it, presumes that the Prince of Weimar, who during that campaign was a general in the Prussian Army, had been ordered to reconnoitre the territory which was soon to be occupied by the Prussians. We are not acquainted with the particulars of this journey; we only know that Goethe visited one of the most interesting parts of Poland, the centre of the Polish coal-mining district in Upper Silesia (Tarnowskie Góry), the immemorial shrine in Częstochowa, and Cracow, the ancient capital and coronation city of Poland, with beautiful Gothic architecture preserved in its medieval charm up to the present day, and finally the famous salt mines in Wieliczka. It would seem, however, that Goethe's real interest was centred not so much in medievalism (for which he at that time did not care), but chiefly in all that satisfied his recently-awakened preoccupation with natural sciences, for instance, the then perfectly-equipped mineralogical collection of Cracow University and the interesting geological structure of the environs of the city. Geological specimens, offered to Goethe by the professor of mineralogy of Cracow, also notes concerning the mines and plans of machinery—all these he took away with him as an enduring memento of this journey. On the other hand, his poetry bears no trace of the influence of his visit.

Proofs are not lacking that Goethe also endeavoured to obtain a grasp of Polish affairs through the medium of books. However, some of his assertions and his *Vorschlag zur Einführung der deutschen Sprache in Polen* (still in manuscript), which is but a naïve and impracticable project for the popularisation of the German tongue in a country which was purely Polish, supply ample testimony that the poet-statesman, brought up in the political ideas of the 18th century, had absolutely no understanding of the national aspirations of Poland which was undergoing the tragic experience of the loss of its independence.

These are a few details concerning the relations of Goethe with Poland and the Poles.² The relations on the other side, namely, the cultural interest of the Polish people in the works of the master-poet, were much more vivid. We do not as yet possess an exhaustive study, like the excellent work by F. Baldensperger, on the reception accorded to Goethe's works in Poland. Various notes and memoirs,

¹ Stanisław Krzyżanowski, *Goethe w Krakowie*. (Cracow, 1911.)

² G. Karpeles, *Goethe in Polen* (Berlin, 1890); S. Wukadinović, *Goethe und Polen* (Dantzig, 1930).

and a fragmentary bibliography,³ only allow us to give a general sketch of the subject.

At the time when Goethe was beginning to write, Polish literature and the prevailing æsthetic ideas were grouped under the flag of French classicism and pseudo-classicism (both simultaneously exerting their influence in Poland). German literature was disliked and looked down upon, and this attitude of mind grew more general after the first years of the 19th century. New literary currents made their way into Poland rather by the medium of English literature, a lover of which was J. U. Niemcewicz, comrade in arms and in exile of Kościuszko, who had several times been in England and in the United States. French translations of second-rate German poets, dramas of "chivalry" introduced on the stage towards the end of the 18th century—although among them passed unnoticed the works of Lessing and Schiller—did not at all assist in popularising German literature in Poland. The one exception was the poetry of Gessner. A more lively interest in German literature was not aroused till approximately 1814, after the publication of Mme. de Staël's work and of a French translation of the lectures of A. W. Schlegel—and then it was not Goethe but Schiller who stood in the forefront. His easy-going idealism and his gift of flowery rhetoric won for him an enormous popularity among those whose feelings were not necessarily profound but easily stirred at a time of great political and social changes. The interest in German literature reaches its zenith simultaneously with the highest development of romanticism in Polish poetry. The process is consequently analogous to that in other European countries: as elsewhere, German and English literature opened the way to new æsthetic, and in part social, ideas.

The way in which Goethe's work entered Poland, however, differs a little from the experience of most European countries. Political events in Poland were too serious and the personal tragedies connected with them too poignant to leave room for the passions of Werther. It is true that the first mention of Goethe (in the *Journal Littéraire de Varsovie*, 1778) relates to *Werther*. It is true also that we hear of the production of one of the French "*Wertheriades*" in the school theatre in Humań as early as 1785, and of the translation of one of the German "*Wertheriades*" in 1775. We do not meet with direct imitations, although the influence of this novel on Polish romance may be traced, combined with that of J. J. Rousseau, Macpherson, and later of Chateaubriand, beyond

³ E. Kołodziejczyk, *Goethe w Polsce*. (Cracow, 1913.)

the beginning of the 19th century, through the writings of Kraszewski, almost up to the time of Sienkiewicz

It was not *Werther*, however, with which Poland associated the name of Goethe, but *Faust*. After the first vehement attacks on Goethe as the representative of German "transcendental idealism" (in 1803), *Faust* began to be regarded as a most significant symbol of romantic poetry and Goethe as the head of the romanticists, whom literary opinion outside his own country did not as yet differentiate from the representatives of the so-called *Sturm und Drang*. In the controversy between periodicals, often carried on in the style of the English Anti-Jacobin, Goethe's name was the objective for the attacks of the classicists and gradually became the watchword of the early sympathisers with the new currents of literature. The latter, however, such as Szaniawski, Wężyk, E. Lubomirski, etc., had no influence on public opinion.⁴

The way was thrown open to Goethe in Poland by K. Brodziński, who was rightly called the "John the Baptist" of Polish romanticism. In his treatise on *Classicism and Romanticism* (1818), an ardent appeal for a national literature, he defined the new currents of thought and attacked problems which were then occupying the minds of the people. It was impossible to omit Goethe. Brodziński was the first in Poland to write an essay on his art and to draw a parallel between his work and that of Schiller. But, although he placed Goethe very high and first popularised him, Brodziński never achieved a full understanding of the great German poet. His preference was for Goethe's idyllic poetry, this being in sympathy with his own literary taste. He considered Goethe's lyrics to be the highest development of a sublimated folklore, and saw in them some Slavonic atmosphere. *Hermann und Dorothea*—the ideal of Homeric patriarchal feeling, to quote Brodziński's words—exercised a strong influence on the conception and partly on the presentation of his own masterpiece, the epic idyll, *Wiesław*. The motifs of this poem, however, following the social structure of Poland and its literary traditions, were taken from peasant life and not from that of the small *bourgeoisie* as in Goethe's poem.

Goethe's message was not fully comprehended until the advent of Mickiewicz, who, by the strength of his intellect and of his poetic genius, was great enough to understand it. Poland's great poet, before his talent matured, had passed through a period of

⁴ Z. Ciechanowska, *Die Anfänge der Goethe-Kenntniss in Polen*. (Germano-slavica, II. 1932.)

“Germano-” and “Britano-mania.” Endowed with a keen sense of hierarchy in the world of art, it was not long before he deserted Schiller in order to become an enthusiast for Goethe. In his first romantic ballads he owes several motifs to Goethe’s works of a similar kind, and all the poems in which he veiled his unhappy first love, including Parts II and IV of the great lyric drama, *Dziady* (*Forefathers*), sparkle with suggestions of *Werther*; it is true that the conditions in which these works were conceived were indeed Werther-like in character. But Mickiewicz not only entered into the world of thought in which Goethe moved, he opposed himself to it. Almost all his poetry of that period, and in particular *Dziady*, expresses sentiments contrasting with Werther’s religious indifference and philosophical negation, and testifying to a strong mystical faith in the ethical responsibility and metaphysical consequences of every human action.

Ten years later, directly after the national catastrophe of 1832, Mickiewicz wrote the concluding part of his drama *Dziady*, known as Part III.⁵ This powerful though fragmentary fantastic drama represents the preliminaries of the insurrection which ended in catastrophe; this picture, however, forms but a background against which beats with Promethean force the patriotic despair of the poet, to be in turn calmed by the vision of the future resurrection and a Messianic apotheosis of his nation—a vision raised up by an intense religious faith. Here we have no longer *Werther*, but *Faust* standing in the path of the Polish poet’s imagination. The poem of Mickiewicz, however, in spite of some magnificent echoes of *Faust* (Part I.), is a deliberate denial of the ideals of Goethe’s masterpiece. Particularly illuminating here is the relation of the two great soliloquies: the first monologue of Faust and the “great improvisation” of Konrad. Both convey the same intense strain of the soul ever searching to rise into realms beyond its scope; in the work of Mickiewicz this strain culminates even in a titanic rebellion, to collapse finally in defeat. But the intrinsic idea is as different as is the individuality of the two poets. On the one side, a passionate struggle for the power to obtain the happiness of mankind as symbolised in the nation of the poet; on the other side, the desire for the fullest development of the individual alone. On the one side a rebellion against God, which of itself proves an unshaken faith in this same God; on the other side—scepticism.

⁵ The opening scenes of Part III, edited in verse translation by George R. Noyes, were published in this *Review*, Vol. III., p. 499 (March, 1925) and Vol. IV., p. 2 (June, 1925), and were also issued separately.

Mickiewicz attempts more than Goethe; we find Faust reaching into the beyond by means of his intellect; Konrad by means of heroic feeling; and to Mickiewicz, feeling is one step higher in the hierarchy of the soul. The weapon of Konrad is more powerful than that of Faust, but to neither is victory vouchsafed. (Some critics, it may be added, compare Konrad's soliloquy for its general tone with Goethe's *Prometheus*.)

From whatever angle we consider the idea of *Dziady* as in contrast to the philosophical conception of Goethe—as faith opposed to scepticism; feeling to intellect; freedom to fatalism; altruism to egoism; or pantheism to theism—we can always appreciate the independence of Mickiewicz, who cast his images into his own moulds, no matter what the composition of his metal.

Some slight points in Mickiewicz's *Crimean Sonnets* which seem to be reminiscent of Goethe are of little importance, as is the fact that the poet's greatest achievement, *Pan Tadeusz*, was first conceived as an idyll in the style of *Hermann und Dorothea*. The work soon passed beyond the limited sphere first accorded to it, and assumed the scope of a genuine epic of modern times, showing an objectively true and at the same time a deeply emotional picture of nearly the whole nation at one of its momentous periods, against the background of a glorified picture of its country.

More attention should be given to Mickiewicz's essay, *Goethe and Byron* (written in 1826 and not published till after his death). Mickiewicz dedicated it to the two lights which shone at the birth of his poetry. In a beautifully developed parallel, he contrasts them in all points; he considers one the painter of the past, the other the bard of the present and the future; the one is to him, as we would express it in modern terminology, the type of the Apollo, the other of the Dionysus.

The victory of romanticism achieved by Mickiewicz in Poland is also the victory of Goethe and of *Faust*. All controversies concerning romantic and classic poetry which took place afterwards are unimportant in relation to this accomplishment of Mickiewicz, which, by liberating the forces latent in the spirit of the time, decided the path of Polish poetry for years to come. It is characteristic that from that time onwards, Goethe's name disappears almost completely from all controversy. What is written about him is only objective information, analyses of his work, and occasional expressions of admiration.

Simultaneously, the number of translations grows from very few in 1830 to more and more after 1863, when the call to reconstruct

the nation "from the foundations upwards" was united with the watchword of the widest and most universal culture.⁶

In a certain sense Mickiewicz may be said to have decided in what directions Goethe's poetry was to influence Polish literature. The "Faustian" element became almost indispensable in both the conception and the form of romantic drama, and sometimes also influenced other literary *genres*. This was increased by the fact that there exists in Poland an analogous legend to that about Dr. Faustus. Twardowski, the hero of the legend, a country squire and a magician who sells his soul to the devil, becomes the subject of many literary works: however, he loses his native characteristics and dons the mask of Goethe's Faust. And the Polish conception of Faust was rather profound. The philosophical anxiety, the Promethean elements, the problem of the struggle between good and evil, all these continually recur in the works of Polish romanticists. The influence of Mickiewicz and Krasiński, however, lent to all these problems a patriotic and social character which breaks away from the original conception of Goethe. In these works one can also trace sometimes the influence of Byron, the favourite poet of the period.

There is an interesting blend of all these influences in the drama, *Beniowski*, by Słowacki, the great rival of Mickiewicz. In this work the hero stands forth as the type of mankind in general: the preponderance of fantasy over feeling, the intense craving for fame—all that goes to make the element of the evil which fights for the soul of Beniowski as it had fought for the soul of the poet himself.

The third poet of the great romantic group, Z. Krasiński, had perhaps more than any other been influenced by Goethe, until he forsook him owing to the German poet's "lack of heart." I think we do not stray far from the truth when we ascribe Krasiński's great interest in the author of *Faust* to English influences. In his youth Krasiński had contracted a friendship with Henry Reeve, a talented publicist who later became the brilliant editor of the *Edinburgh Review*. Reeve had at that time met Thomas Carlyle, and was so struck with the latter's personality that, in his correspondence with Krasiński, he is said to have continually quoted Carlyle's words. Thus Carlyle, this great admirer and populariser of Goethe in England, had in consequence indirectly influenced the Polish poet in favour of *Faust*—especially of Part II of the masterpiece, which at that time was greatly underrated.

⁶ H. Sternbach: *Polnische Faust-Uebersetzungen* (in *Ostdeutsche Monatshefte*, Fg. 11, H. 7).

Krasiński placed Goethe above Byron and stressed the point that Goethe, like Dante and contrary to Byron, makes the principle of good triumph in the struggle between good and evil. This struggle which, to Krasiński's mind, was the essence of *Faust*, is the principal and ever-recurrent problem of his own creative work. He endeavoured to give its solution in his two dramatic masterpieces: the *Undivine Comedy*, an imposing picture of social revolution projected into the future, and *Iridion*, the history of a Greek dying in the hopeless struggle with the magnificent Rome of the last emperors. Both dramas gave expression to the pessimistic philosophy of the poet, a true son of his nation and of his times. At the side of *Iridion* we find *Massinissa*, one of the most majestic of the Satans of literature—evil incarnate, which means for Krasiński intellect without feeling. He does not resemble Mephistopheles, who lies in wait for one soul alone and fights in an underhand and treacherous manner. *Massinissa* is the "Satan of history" who retards the progress of mankind in general, who prostrates the positive endeavours of its best sons. An appeal to their most sensitive emotions is his method of action. But owing to the influence of Dante and Goethe, Krasiński was able to express a more hopeful outlook. The recurring downfall of mankind is, after all, but a temporary setback in an otherwise continuous progress. The optimistic conclusions of both dramas throw a light across the path of the future. In the *Undivine Comedy* there appears above the ruins of the world a vision of Christ, the symbol of love. In the concluding part of *Iridion* there is depicted, as at the end of the second part of *Faust*, the struggle for the soul of the hero. He is saved, "not because he strove and fought, but because he loved his country." But, more consistent than Goethe, Krasiński makes the hero achieve salvation, not as a reward for one moment of altruism, but for prolonged service. For that reason he sends him "to the land of tombs and crosses" and re-creates him a Pole so that he may fight not out of vengeance, as in his first existence, but out of the suffering and love of his heart until his people and his soul obtain their freedom. By thus leading them in the paths ordained by God, he would transform his nation into the Messiah of mankind. *Iridion* is, certainly, a very characteristic example of the transformation of literary motifs according to the individuality of the poet, to his own historical moment and his own environment.

An obvious proof of the triumph of *Faust* in the cultural world of Poland is the number of its translations. Fragments of it had already been published after 1826; the first complete translation

came out in 1844, and from that time onwards there has been a new translation about every ten years. After the war we may observe what might be called a renaissance of *Faust* in Poland, six new translations appearing within a comparatively short space of time.

Apart from the Ballads, several of which, e.g. *Der König in Thule*, *Der Fischer*, *Gott und die Bajadere* and, in particular, *Der Erlkönig*, won great popularity in Poland, and apart from *Werther* and *Faust*, the remaining works of Goethe did not make a deep impression on the country. *Gotz von Berlichingen*, *Clavigo* and *Stella* exercised but a slight influence, and at a very early period. *Wilhelm Meister* was early known and praised. But besides the lyric interpolations, which were eagerly translated, only the charming figure of Mignon remained fixed in the memory of the Polish poets; and her song of yearning, which had already been paraphrased into a love song by Mickiewicz, gave a stimulus to many poems which expressed in similar rhythm the longing for the lost fatherland—Poland—"the land where the wormwood blooms." It is scarcely possible to speak of any direct influence of *Iphigenia*, although this drama attracted no less than nine translators. The classic motifs of the romanticists—as, for instance, in the works of Norwid—derive rather from the *Irdion* of Krasiński. We may, however, suppose that the classic form of Goethe's tragedies did not fail to leave its stamp on that school of later Polish poetry which corresponds to the French "Parnassus."

After the period of active influence followed a time of closer study and more detailed analysis of Goethe's works. As early as 1841 there appeared a small but interesting study by Zieliński: a parallel drawn between *Gotz von Berlichingen* and *Egmont*; this was followed by a series of other studies, chiefly popular in character. As was the case in Western Europe, the problems of biography, Goethe's writings on natural science, and his philosophy, were studied in turn; but these studies appeared mostly in the form of articles. Poland has not as yet produced a separate monograph on the subject of Goethe. The excellent study by the leader of the Polish positivists, P. Chmielowski (1874), was not entirely original. Several articles by living scholars, Łempicki, Kleiner, Dyboski, who offer original treatment of the various sides of Goethe's individuality, arouse the hope that such a monograph may be forthcoming ere long.

Among recent writers interest in Goethe's work is not lacking. The most profound spirit and the most outstanding dramatic poet of modern Poland, Stanislas Wyspiański, who possessed the

versatility of a genius of the Renaissance, wrote during his school years, in rather mediocre German verse, a continuation of *Hermann und Dorothea*, and a dramatic sketch, *Weimar*, in which he attempted to portray a philosophic meeting of two great spirits: Goethe and Mickiewicz. W. Berent, a well-known novelist, author of a saga from the life of medieval strollers, translated and commentated Goethe's *Märchen* (1924). It would be difficult to estimate the influence of the philosophic lyric of Goethe on the lyricist Jan Kasprowicz, who translated *Tasso* and *Iphigenia*. Among poets of the present day, some influence of Goethe may be traced in the work of J. Iwaszkiewicz. These, however, are but very distant echoes of the master poet, and they have no bearing on the history of literary currents.

In final judgment we may say that, after J. J. Rousseau, Byron, Schiller, and in part also Shakespeare and Scott, Goethe was one of those forces that built up pre-romanticism and romanticism in Poland. And in Poland romanticism is, after the humanism of the 16th and 17th centuries, the period of the greatest flowering of literature and of its greatest importance in the national life.

In conclusion a few figures. As a rule, it is said that Polish interest in the poetry and the person of Goethe was small. Statistics, however, do not bear out this theory. In the period between 1800 and 1912, to quote a very incomplete bibliography, we meet with about seventy translators of Goethe's works and about forty-five authors who have written about him.⁷ Almost all the masterpieces of Goethe have been translated, many of them several times.

ZOFJA CIECHANOWSKA.

⁷ Literature on Goethe is discussed briefly by Z. Łempicki in *Ostdeutsche Monatshefte*, 1930.

THE ART OF IVAN BUNIN

I

By many people Bunin is regarded as the greatest of living Russian novelists, as the one whose posthumous fame is most unquestionably assured. Such is—or at least until recently such was—the opinion of Bunin's political antipode Maxim Gorky.

Born in 1870 at Voronezh, Bunin spent his childhood and adolescence in the province of Orel, where his family possessed a small estate—in that part of Russia which gave Russian literature such great names as Tolstoy, Turgenev, Leskov. Coming of an ancient and noble stock “whose origins are lost in the mists of time,” Bunin grew up amid the impoverishment and decay of the middle Russian gentry, and the twilight of this gentry often forms the social background of his fiction.

The countryside of Central Russia, with its typical monotonous landscape—“in winter (to quote Bunin's own words), a boundless snowy sea; in summer, a sea of cornfields, grass, and flowers”—has left a strong mark on Bunin's soul, and since Turgenev there has been no one, I think, in Russian literature, to give it a more poetical, a more poignant expression. As a painter of the Russian countryside, of nature, Bunin has no equal in contemporary Russian literature; his place is beside Turgenev and Aksakov.

Like Turgenev, Bunin began his literary career by writing verse; as with Turgenev, later his prose output definitely overshadowed his poetry. Yet in one thing he is unlike Turgenev: though he owes the place which he occupies in contemporary Russian literature to his prose work, he never stopped writing verse and—what is more—he is a genuine poet. Poetry is to him something more than a preliminary school, a useful training and discipline, as it was to Turgenev; it is an indispensable part of his artistic self-expression; and some of his best verse—both of the earlier and of the later period—is not inferior in quality to the best of his prose. His early poetry fills several volumes. Later on, from 1907, Bunin formed a habit of publishing his verse together with his prose, and most of his books of short stories contain a verse section at the end of each volume. In 1929 he published in Paris his selected poems ranging over a period of twenty-five years; the latest are dated 1925. It may, incidentally, be mentioned that Bunin is one of the least prolific of Russian writers; in the course of the last five years he has published only one book of new short stories and one big work.

Bunin's poetry has often been characterised as purely descriptive

and even less lyrical than his prose. This statement is much too sweeping to be accepted at its face value. There is a great deal of the descriptive in Bunin's verse, especially in his earlier work; endowed with an exceptionally keen visual sense, Bunin is often tempted to give full play to it, both in his poems and in his stories, and sometimes it is apt to oust all other elements from his poems; but in some of them, without ever becoming effusive or losing his sense of measure and of the supremacy of the logical element in words (in this he is a true "classicist," an heir to Pushkin's tradition in Russian poetry), he reaches a great poignancy of sustained lyrical expression. His craftsmanship, his purely verbal mastery, seldom fail him. In this Bunin showed himself akin to the Symbolists and to the whole of the modern school of poetry, though in substance he was quite alien and even hostile to them; and though keeping aloof from the advanced literary movements of the beginning of the 20th century, he yet shared in its revival of poetical craftsmanship, which was so striking after the utter decline of poetry in the last decades of the preceding century.

Numerically speaking, short stories represent Bunin's most important contribution to literature. Of these there are six volumes dating from the pre-revolutionary period, and four published since the Revolution outside Russia. It is also, perhaps, in the domain of the short story that lie Bunin's greatest and most perfect achievements: such stories as *The Gentleman from San Francisco*, *The Dreams of Chang*, *The Sunstroke*, *Ida*, *Ignat*, *A Goodly Life*—I choose on purpose stories written in different veins and dating from different periods—may be placed on a level with the best stories of Turgenev and Chekhov. Bunin's language is a marvel of richness and simplicity. A critic who cannot be accused of any partiality for Bunin, namely, Prince Mirsky, has said that "Bunin is probably the only modern Russian writer whose language would have been admired by the 'classics,' by Turgenev and Goncharov."

Bunin possesses also a great power of descriptive suggestion. In his stories there is that atmospheric quality which enables him to discard the plot, the outward incident, and to create a story out of nothing. A short tale of his called *The Snowman* is a good example of such stories created out of nothing. A man sitting late at night in his study in a snowbound, still country-house, hears one of his little nephews cry—he goes to the nursery to find out what is the matter and discovers that it is the snowman outside the window that disturbs the boy, whenever he wakes up, by his mysterious nocturnal appearance. He goes out, destroys the snowman and

wanders for a while in the courtyard. The description of that walk, with which the story ends, epitomises its whole atmosphere.

"Then he turns round and begins to walk up and down the footpath leading from the house to the cattle-yard. A slanting shadow moves at his feet, over the snow. On reaching the snow-drifts he makes his way between them towards the gate. The gate is locked with a padlock but stands ajar. He peeps through the slit, from which blows a keen north wind. He thinks fondly of Kolya, he thinks that everything in life is touching, full of sense, significant. And he peeps eagerly into the yard. It looks cold, but snug. Under the sheds there is a half-light. The sheep, sleeping while they stand, huddled in a corner, show grey. Grey are the fronts of the carts covered with snow. Over the courtyard is a blue sky with large scattered stars. One half of the yard is in shadow, the other is lit up. And the old, shaggy white horses, dozing in that light, look green."

There is perhaps more behind this story than in it; its effect is suggestive, evocative, and this is characteristic of the manner of many of Bunin's stories. It is wrong to regard him as an out-and-out realist indulging in "superfluous details"; Bunin's realism is of a poetical quality, and his details are seldom superfluous; they are always subordinated to the whole and play their appointed part.

On the face of it Bunin may seem cold, dispassionate; his coldness, his "metallic" qualities have often been referred to by critics. Yet, the secret of his art lies precisely in his capacity of stirring within us profound and troubled emotions, of striking deep chords, while keeping cold and unperturbed on the surface. Nothing could be more wrong than to regard Bunin as a soothing, quieting author. Himself at bottom unquiet, he is capable of acting disquietingly upon us—and this without resorting to any crude means, to any cheap verbosity, in a delicately suggestive way.

For a long time Bunin was known rather as poet and translator than as prose writer (he translated chiefly from English—among other things Longfellow's *Song of Hiawatha* and Byron's mystery dramas). On two occasions he was awarded the Pushkin Prize by the Russian Academy, and subsequently elected an Honorary Fellow. Although his first book of verse was published by "Scorpion," the publishing company that sponsored the work of the first Russian Symbolists, he, as I have said, kept aloof from the Modernist movement and gravitated rather towards the group of Gorky and the Realists. Intrinsically he was, however, even then alien to Gorky's school; his art developed along its own lines, and in Russian literature of the first quarter of the 20th century he holds a place of

his own; viewed retrospectively, Bunin's art reveals perhaps more points of resemblance with some tendencies of Modernism than with the pre-war Realist school; even as a poet, he, to a certain degree, anticipated some tendencies which, though they were a reaction against Symbolism, sprang up within the latter and were by no means its denial—I am thinking of the Poets' Guild and the so-called "Acmeism."

Bunin's all-Russian fame came upon the publication of his first long work—*The Village*. It is not a novel in the conventional accepted sense of the word, and it is not for nothing that Bunin gave it the sub-heading of "a poem." It is a large fresco, a dyptich, picturing Russian village life during the first Revolution (1904-05). In considering the social aspect of Bunin's *Village*, it is necessary to bear always in mind that it gives a picture of pre-revolutionary and revolutionary Russia—I mean, before the Revolution of 1905—of the village as it was before the agrarian reform connected with the name of Stolypin. In *The Village* there is no plot, almost no development; it is a picture of life in a Russian village, painted in dark, sombre colours—the author lays bare before our eyes, on one hand the cruelty and brutality, on the other, the lack of civilisation and the poverty of the Russian peasant. This social aspect of Bunin's work, this "invective" against the peasantry, called forth a fierce controversy in the Press and contributed towards the fame of the work. Gorky proclaimed *The Village* to be the most powerful and true thing that had ever been said about the Russian peasant. The Left wing of Russian journalism and literary criticism became a house divided against itself—the Social-Democrats, who always saw in the Russian peasantry an uncivilised force hampering Russia's political progress, welcomed the book; the Social-Revolutionaries and other "Populists," who were inclined to idealise the peasant, resented it greatly. Among the critics of the moderate camp there was no unity either. Some accused Bunin of lack of patriotism, of contempt for his own people. From the purely literary point of view Bunin was blamed for the abnormal development of his outward visual capacity and the lack of psychological insight. Nowadays, after the Russian Revolution of 1917, we are inclined to view many things in Bunin's *Village* as prophetic foresight. But, of course, *The Village* was never meant as a complete and exhaustive picture of the Russian peasantry. Cruelty and beastliness were not the only things Bunin saw in it—witness several of his other stories with their rich and varied gallery of peasant types; witness the story entitled *The Saint*, and to quote his own words reflecting the

"ineffable beauty" (as Bunin says) of the Russian soul. From the literary point of view *The Village* is, though not a perfect, a powerful and significant work; despite its apparent formlessness, it reveals a great constructive ability; despite all absence of plot and movement—a great inner force and impetus. The style, the language show the same force and firmness—a peculiar blend of realism and poetry. There are scenes where the grotesque and the uncanny intermingle in a kind of Goyesque visions.

In 1912 appeared the second of Bunin's longer works—*Sukhodol*. It is much shorter than *The Village*. In it the social strain in Bunin's work once more found its expression, though in a different aspect from that of *The Village*. From contemporary Russia we are taken back to the days before the emancipation of peasants, and instead of the peasantry attention is centred on the gentry. There appears the motif that could be met with before in some of Bunin's stories—the motif of the impoverishment and physical and moral decay of the country gentry. In Bunin's attitude to it there is a mixture of nostalgic love and regret with a sense of doom. *Sukhodol* (it is the name of an estate) is a story of the "fall of the house of Khrushchov"—we are shown the passing away of a family (and through it of a class), of its last cranky and half-crazy representatives, as they are seen in retrospection by their servant-girl Natashka, a romantically-minded creature who has imbibed some culture. A special colour is lent to her attitude toward her owners by her romantic infatuation for her master. Again, there is no plot; the temporal plane of the story is constantly shifted. Again the same blend of realism and poetry, still more effective than in *The Village*, because more concentrated, undiluted by reflections. In this work of Bunin, despite all its sombreness, there is a haunting, poignant beauty, a musical unity wherein the desolate natural surroundings, the disintegrating framework of social relations, the eccentric characters, and the romantic loveliness of the heroine are fused into a single musical note. For sheer terseness and concentrated power, *Sukhodol* and *Mitya's Love* are perhaps the highest summits of Bunin's work.

The years 1910-1916 were the most productive in Bunin's creative life. A year after *Sukhodol*, he published a book of stories and verse called *John the Weeper*, and in the following year—*The Cup of Life*. Two more years—and he gave us *The Gentleman from San Francisco*. Very simple in construction as all Bunin's stories, it has no plot in the real sense, though there is a story. Its theme is that of *Ecclesiastes*, and a motto from *Ecclesiastes*—"Vanity of vanities; all is vanity"—would have perhaps suited it better than

the motto from the *Apocalypse* Bunin chose for it. Its theme is precisely the vanity of all earthly things and the subjection of man to ever-watchful and watching death. The effect of this story is due to the extreme economy with which Bunin uses his artistic resources; to the detachment with which the story is told—that detachment has a biblical quality, and it is not the first time we meet in Bunin with biblical qualities of style or with a biblical spirit.

The Gentleman from San Francisco was the last book of stories published by Bunin in Russia. A bitter opponent of the Soviet régime, he lived during the Civil War in the South of Russia, and in 1919 left his country and went to live abroad. Since then he has lived in France, in the last few years chiefly at Grasse.

His first book of stories published outside Russia was *The Rose of Jericho* (1923). Like his earlier books it contained both prose and verse. Some of its stories have been translated into English, including one of the best, *The Dreams of Chang*, a story of a dog from China and of its master, a sea captain, partly seen through the dog's eyes, with just a touch of a Kipling strain in it.

In 1924 Bunin wrote a longish short story, a *nouvelle* called *Mitya's Love*—it was first published in a Russian review in Paris and then, in 1925, in book form, together with some other stories and poems. It stands somewhat apart among Bunin's other works for its more sustained, concentrated psychological interest. It is a simple, straightforward tale of first love and disillusionment leading to a tragic conclusion—the suicide of the young hero. There are only two characters in it that matter, the two partners in the love duel, Mitya and Katya, or even, I should say, there is only one character that interests the author, namely, Mitya, whose tragic love story is unfolded with the inevitability of doom—Katya we see only through Mitya's eyes. It is difficult to define wherein lies the spell of this book with its hackneyed, old-fashioned theme. There is in it a musical quality, an inner rhythm which produces a unique effect. The way in which the description of the awakening of nature in spring and of its gradual transition to summer, is worked into the fabric of the story and made to accompany the amorous torments of Mitya's soul, as he is alternately tossed between joyous expectation and despair, is very striking. The clarity and simplicity of Bunin's language here reaches its highest summit.

In *Mitya's Love* meet the two favourite themes of Bunin—love and death, their deep fundamental mystery.

Love is also the subject of the title-story of Bunin's next book—*The Sunstroke*—which appeared in 1927. With his usual skill, by

dint of a few suggestive details, without any overstressed realism, Bunin renders the atmosphere of all-pervasive, piercing love at first sight which like a sunstroke seizes his hero, a very ordinary, average Russian officer who, on board a Volga steamer, falls in love with a chance travelling companion, a young married lady. We are only told how they meet, how on the spur of the moment he suggests that they should alight at the next stopping place, how they spend the night at an unfamiliar hotel in an unfamiliar provincial town, how the next morning she leaves him and takes the boat, enjoining him not to follow her, to wait for the next boat, to forget her; how, after she is gone, he spends the day in that unfamiliar provincial town in the haze of his intoxicated and intoxicating, all-pervading love for this woman whose name he ignores, who has told him that she has somewhere a husband and two children, that nothing like this has happened to her before—"I am not like this, you know."

Once more, the quality of this story, apart from its fine verbal texture, is in its atmosphere, in its rhythm, in the invisible pulse throbbing in it. It is filled with sun.

The same book contains another story of love, called *Ida*, almost as beautiful, yet quite different in texture, one of Bunin's most Chekhov-like stories, both because he uses in it the device of a story told by a man to his friends at a supper-party, and because he introduces a contrast between the careless and perhaps affectedly vulgar manner of the speaker, and the unexpected, delicately, romantic climax of his story.

Bunin's last book of stories, entitled *God's Tree*, appeared in 1931. With the exception of the title-story, which adds a new portrait to Bunin's earlier gallery of curious peasant characters—a man with a peculiar philosophy of resignation and indifference to good and evil—with the exception also of some purely lyrical meditations, most of the stories in this book are inordinately short; they are rather poems in prose than stories, and often practically untranslatable, their interest lying in some peculiarity of the Russian language around which they evolve. One Russian critic has rightly remarked that the real hero of this book of Bunin is the Russian language. Some of the stories are short lyrico-philosophical meditations, like Turgenev's *Senilia* or Logan Pearsall Smith's *Trivia*.

I now come to the most significant, if not the most perfect, of Bunin's later works—to his *Life of Arseniev*. This book, published in Paris in 1930, is the longest Bunin ever wrote, and it is only the first part of a work conceived on a vast scale. It is not a novel in the usual sense of the word, but rather a novelised autobiography.

Though written as the life-story of a fictitious character and though quite probably not strictly autobiographical in all its details, there can be no doubt of the autobiographical nature of its groundwork. Yet it is primarily a work of art, and as such may be ranked alongside Aksakov's *Years of Childhood of Bagrov-Grandson* and Tolstoy's *Childhood, Boyhood and Youth*. *The Life of Arseniev*—an English translation of it is to appear next spring under the title *The Well of Days*, which corresponds to the Russian subtitle of the first volume, the only one so far written—is a more consciously artistic, a better-organised autobiography than either of the above-mentioned classical autobiographies, and at the same time it is more intensely introspective. Though it has some excellently drawn secondary characters (one of the best being Baskakov, little Arseniev's tutor), its interest, to a much greater extent than either with Tolstoy or Aksakov, is focussed on its hero. It is really a story of the formation of a man's personality from his early childhood to his youth, till he is about seventeen years old, a story told with a singleness of purpose and outlook, and reflecting the author's personality.

All the main elements of Bunin's art and outlook—artistic descriptions, lyrico-philosophical meditations and social analysis—are to be found in the *Life of Arseniev*. Parallel with the gradual unfolding and development of a human consciousness, of its awareness of the world, we are shown the outward surroundings amid which this unfolding takes place (descriptions of nature hold a large place in the book, but are closely related to the inner workings of the hero's soul) and the social and historical background of Russian life at the time. The dominant note of this social aspect of the book is once more the decay and impoverishment of the country gentry: it may be said that in the *Life of Arseniev* Bunin has portrayed the further destinies of the Sukhodol family (though his tone has grown milder, his attitude gentler, less accusatory) and the final detachment of its last representative—in the person of the young Arseniev—from his native soil, his *déclassement*, his first attempts to take roots in a new milieu, that of the urban progressive intelligentsia. As a whole the book produces no such effect of musical unity as *Sukhodol* or *Mitya's Love*, but some chapters of it belong to the best things Bunin ever wrote and all of the early part is written with unerring mastery—the early childhood, the description of the first trip to town, the first contact with religion, with death (there are several deaths in the book and, as is often the case with Bunin, they form its most hauntingly beautiful pages), the first experience of love in both its romantic and its fleshly aspects.

II

As I have said, historically speaking, Bunin's art is rooted in Turgenev, Aksakov, Chekhov, to some extent in Tolstoy and Goncharov. Least of all is he connected with Dostoyevsky, for whose art he seems to have even an aversion. But notwithstanding all these affinities, Bunin's place is really outside the general line of development of the Russian realistic and psychological novel. Bunin is not a novelist in the usual sense of this word. His work does not include anything comparable to the novels of Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky or Turgenev—I mean in form and *genre*, not in purely literary value. Unlike these authors or their Western European equivalents (take, for instance, such widely different, but typical, novelists as Balzac, Flaubert, Hardy, or Galsworthy), Bunin does not aim at creating and embodying new worlds instilled with a life of their own, existing as it were outside their authors, invested by them with an independent and spontaneous existence, in which the author participates only as creator, from the outside so to speak. Bunin does not transform the reality and thereupon exclude himself from it; he is never absent from his works. In this sense Bunin is a "subjective" writer, as was to some extent—though not in his novels—Turgenev, who often remained primarily a poet. The element of plot, of narrative interest, of movement is either absent or plays but a subordinate part in the great majority of Bunin's stories. It is likewise—or even to a still greater extent—absent from his bigger works. Neither *The Village* nor *Sukhodol*, as I have said, are novels. As for the *Life of Arseniev*, it is totally lacking in any element of invention, it is not fiction in the strict sense of the word. With the exception perhaps of Bely's autobiographical novels, it is the most introspective, subjective work in Russian literature.

Yet in another sense Bunin is an objective writer. His eyes are not only turned inwards, though he never tires of contemplating and studying himself, but are open wide to the whole world. Nature has endowed Bunin with keen senses. His vision, his sense of colours is something extraordinary. In the *Life of Arseniev* he says: "He (Baskakov) captivated me with a passionate dream to become a painter. . . . I became for ever imbued with a deep sense and consciousness of the truly divine meaning and significance of the colours of earth and sky. Surveying all that life has given me, I see this as one of the most important results. . . ."

Colour epithets in Bunin's works strike one, indeed, by their richness and variety. One Russian critic has counted, in one of

Bunin's Near Eastern travelling sketches, the adjectives denoting only *shades* of colour, and he found twenty-six of them. Bunin's objectivity shows itself also in the care with which he embodies his keen visual sensations and perceptions in his phrases, trying to give them the maximum of exact, concrete, objectivated verbal expressions—Bunin's descriptions strike us by their visual, materialised concreteness. Here is a characteristic instance of this. In one of his Palestinian sketches he speaks of his feelings and impressions in approaching the land where, 1,900 years ago, Christ had walked with His own feet. And Bunin says that in order to understand the feelings with which the pilgrims set their feet on that sacred soil he had to abstract himself from the general notion of Christianity and to visualise the "living Jesus—thin, slender, sunburnt, with bright black eyes, dark-purple withered hands and fine, heat-burnt feet." Another characteristic instance of this peculiarity of Bunin is the story called *Passing Away* (1918), describing the death of an old landowner on his manor. When the young Bestuzhev, through the prism of whose impressions we are made to look at this death and who is really a substitute for the author, tries to comprehend it, to feel terrified at beholding it, he fails:—

Bestuzhev, sitting down on the window-sill, kept gazing at the dark corner, at the bed on which the dead body lay. He kept trying to understand something, to focus his thoughts, to feel terrified. But there was no terror. There was only a feeling of astonishment, of inability to reason it out, to compass that which had happened. . . .

It is only at the sight of concrete and vulgar objects associated with death, of small trifles, such as a pail of water brought in by a servant girl preparatory to the washing of the dead body, of two old peasant women washing their hands, that Bestuzhev experiences the terror, the dread which the abstract notion, the idea of death, was powerless to call forth in him.

It would be in vain were we to look in Bunin for a minute psychological analysis, for an endeavour to penetrate deep into other people's souls. The analytical methods of a Dostoyevsky are entirely alien to him. In those of his stories which are something more than mere lyrical compositions, in which there is some semblance of action, of development, some *dramatis personæ*, the number of the latter is more often than not reduced to a strict minimum, and they are shown to us outwardly, with the aid of a few external traits, of a few suggestive details, or of the surrounding atmosphere. Whenever Bunin goes somewhat deeper in his psychological analysis, whenever

he sharpens his psychological lancet, he usually does so with regard to one only of his characters—showing us the others through the eyes of that one. He never shares his psychological attention between all his characters. Thus in *The Village*, which contains a great number of secondary characters, peasants for the most part, we see them through the eyes of the two main personages, the brothers Krasov, and even here Bunin keeps to his single-character construction of the story, dividing *The Village* into two parts and apportioning each of them to one of the two brothers as the main character and observer. Thus, in the first part we see Kuzma as he is seen by Tikhon, in the second part Tikhon as he is seen by Kuzma. Outside the field of vision of these two, the other characters have no life of their own. This method is directly opposed to the method of either Tolstoy or Dostoyevsky, to the realist method.

It is the same in *Sukhodol*. Here again there is no equality of rights between the many and varied characters of the story—they are all but a function of Natashka, even though the narrative is not conducted in her name (nor is it, for that matter, conducted in the name of either Kuzma or Tikhon in *The Village*).

In Bunin's later works the number of characters is very often reduced to two. To such stories *à deux* belong some of his best tales, especially those of which love is the subject, in the first place *Mitya's Love*. In his striving for the maximum of simplicity and lucidity Bunin eliminates all that is superfluous, achieving an almost algebraical bareness and transparency of construction. It is therefore entirely wrong to represent Bunin, as some of his Russian critics do, as erring on the side of superfluous minutiae, of overdone realism. In *Mitya's Love* Bunin again adopts the method of filtering one of his characters through the prism of another, even though the story is not told in that other's name. We do not see Katya from the outside, we see her only as a projection of Mitya's mind. The same story over again in *The Sunstroke*; the figure of the hero's travelling companion, barring a purely external portrait drawn with a few light pen-strokes, is left on purpose in the shadow, as if veiled by a cloud of mystery. The attention is focussed on the hero and his emotions, on his own sunny pervasion with love.

This peculiar feature of Bunin's art, this method of his, is rooted perhaps, on one side, in a certain subconscious subjectivity, an essential autobiographicalness of all his work—which, of course, must not be understood in the sense of absolute and gross fidelity to autobiographical facts. It is obvious that in showing us Mitya, who shoots himself in an attempt to escape from the disillusionment of

love, Bunin transcends autobiography, even if the story is ultimately grounded on personal experience.

On the other hand, this method of Bunin's may find an explanation in his characteristic conviction of the fundamental impenetrability and inconceivableness of another man's soul. In an extremely short story, instinct with uncanny atmosphere and relating or rather just alluding to a meaningless murder of an old Frenchwoman in a lonesome, desolate country house by two unknown individuals, Bunin lets escape him this highly significant remark: "The most terrible thing in this world is man with his soul."

Here we come to what, to my mind, is the real essence, the philosophical and psychological *leitmotiv* of Bunin's work, and which may be described as a marvelling perplexity before the mysteries of the world. What do we know, what do we understand?—this query seems to be ever present on Bunin's lips.

This motif did not appear in Bunin's works from the very outset, but already in his early stories and poems we may find some anticipations of it. The wonderment at the world, though as yet without that quizzical perplexity, is apparent in the poems and stories inspired by Bunin's extensive travels—he is one of the few major writers in Russia to have been to the tropics, to India, to have travelled extensively in the Near East, in Palestine, in Syria, inspired by Saadi's craving "to view the face of the earth and to leave thereon the impress of my soul. . . ." It is in *Sukhodol* that the note of marvelling perplexity is sounded distinctly; though not yet formulated with absolute clarity, it permeates the whole work and gives it its mark of haunting mystery. Inconceivable are things happening in this world and, confronted with them, helpless is our poor human reason. This sentiment is akin to that which underlies some of Turgenev's stories in the fantastic vein, but with Bunin it is more powerfully rooted, more genuine, I should say. In the later stories it is sounded more and more frequently, more and more persistently. In the story called *An Unknown Friend* (1923) Bunin expresses this philosophy of bewilderment, of marvelling perplexity, through the mouthpiece of his heroine, a woman writing letters (that are never answered) to a writer whom she does not know but whose work she admires. "We know nothing," she exclaims in one of her letters. "Everything is marvellous, everything incomprehensible in this world." "We do not even understand our own dreams, the creations of our own imagination." Yet the inconceivability is only one aspect of this attitude; marvelling—what the French call *merveillement*—is its inevitable complement. This is

what distinguishes Bunin from Turgenev who, in the last period of his life, also had that bewildered attitude towards the world, and with whom it led to a thoroughly pessimistic outlook. Bunin is by no means a pessimist "At bottom"—says the same woman in *An Unknown Friend*—"everything in this world is lovely . . ." In his foreword to the English translation of *The Village*, replying to the charge of pessimism, Bunin denied it and quoted the 42nd Psalm: "As the hart panteth after the water brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God!" And this quotation characterises most appropriately the whole attitude of Bunin.

It is in the story entitled *The Cicadas* that we find the fullest expression of Bunin's philosophy. Strictly speaking, it is not a story; it is a lyrico-philosophical soliloquy, somehow reminding one of some passages in Virginia Woolf's novel *The Waves*, a soliloquy inspired by the stillness and solitude of a southern night broken only by the incessant chirping of the cicadas and by the dull, primeval rumbling of the sea. But for the exceptional quality of its verbal texture, this poem in prose of about a dozen pages might appear tiresome. I will nevertheless translate a few extracts from it, for, in a way, I see in it the key to the whole work of Bunin.

" . . . It does not matter—Bunin soliloquises—of what exactly I thought—what matters is my thinking, an act quite inconceivable to me, and what matters still more and is still more inconceivable—is my thinking about that thinking and about my not understanding anything either in myself or in the world, and yet understanding my own not-understanding, understanding my bewilderment in the middle of this night and this magical murmuring, whether living or dead, whether meaningless or telling me something most intimate and most necessary—I know not which."

"Man alone marvels at his own existence And in this lies his main difference from other creatures who are still in paradise, in not thinking of themselves. But then men, too, differ between themselves—by the extent, the degree of that marvelling. Why did God mark me off so particularly by the fatal sign of wonderment, of 'reasoning,' why does it grow and grow within me? Do the myriads of cicadas filling with their nocturnal love-song the whole universe around me, do they reason? No, they are in paradise, in the blissful dream of life, and I have already awaked and am wakeful. The world is in them and they are in it, whereas I seem to look at it from outside."

The same motif, the same thoughts recur ever and anon in the *Life of Arseniev*. Speaking of his earliest childhood, Arseniev says:

" . . . Does a dormouse or a lark grow sad amid quiet, in seclusion? No, they ask for nothing, they marvel at nothing, they do not feel that hidden presence which the human soul always fancies in the world surrounding it; they know neither the call of spaces nor the course of time. And I knew all that even then, and it secretly tormented me."

"What does night mean?"—Bunin goes on soliloquising in *The Cicadas*. "It means that the slave of time and space is for a time free, that he has been divested of his earthly mission, his earthly name and title—and that a great temptation lies in store for him if he is awake: fruitless reasoning, fruitless striving towards understanding, in other words a peculiar non-understanding—non-understanding whether of the world or of himself surrounded by it, whether of his own beginning or of his own end." But then, there is no beginning and no end. "My birth is by no means my beginning . . . Nor have I an end"—says Bunin in *The Cicadas*. And Arseniev echoes him once more: "We are devoid of a sense of our beginning and end." And both Bunin and Arseniev, who is Bunin's *alter ego*, have a keen sense of having existed before, in immemorial times. Travelling in India, Bunin felt with an extraordinary acuteness, he says, that he had already been there once upon a time. And the boy Arseniev reading *Robinson Crusoe* and stories of tropical adventures feels, too, that once he had belonged to that world. And some tawdry woodcuts recall to him his "former, immemorial lives."

The wonderment which lies at the root of Bunin's conception of the world accounts for his preference for the themes of love and death—the two most wonderful and inexplicable things in the world. I have already said that death scenes are among the best in the *Life of Arseniev*; and they are numerous, they run through the whole book—from the first childish contact with the notion of death down to the beautiful pages describing the memorial service for the Grand Duke Nicholas, who died in exile in the South of France, pages that close the book on a note of poignant sorrow. Bunin-Arseniev says of himself that he is one of those people endowed with an acute sense of death. Yet in Bunin, this sense of death is indissolubly bound up with a sense of life that is just as keen, with the sense of wonderment at the beauty and mystery of the world. There is again something biblical in this mingling of a sensuous delight in life with a keen awareness of death. But the spirit of the Psalms prevails over the spirit of *Ecclesiastes*, leaving no place for pessimism. "As the hart panteth after the water brooks, so my soul panteth after thee, O God!"—such is, indeed, the motto of Bunin's work.

GLEB STRUVE.

A 17th CENTURY ROUMANIAN CATECHISM

THE Reformation brought forth a plentiful crop of Protestant Catechisms and Confessions of Faith. Luther's *Short Catechism* (1529) and Calvin's *Institutes* (1536) awoke echoes beyond the borders of those countries in which they were first published. Calvin's influence spread as far as Poland and Hungary, and from there into the northern part of Roumania. Lutherans and Calvinists settled in various towns of Transylvania.

It is stated that the first Roumanian catechism was printed at Sibiu (Hermannstadt) in 1544, and betrayed Lutheran or Calvinistic influence. In 1560, Coresi, a deacon of Greek origin, was brought by the Saxon reformers to Braşov: gospel-books, with commentaries, and psalters were printed, but no more catechisms appeared, as far as we know, till the beginning of the 17th century.

The Catechism, which we propose to examine in detail, was composed by Grigorie, priest of Mahaciu (Mohacz), in 1607.¹ It is, of course, written in Slavonic characters, which may be reproduced in Latin letters as nearly as possible.

It seems to exhibit Protestant influence which will become more apparent when its contents are examined. It is cast in the form of questions and long or short answers :

Q. What is the Christian man?

A. The Christian man is he who believes in Christ and lives according to the rules : he believes in the forgiveness of sins which will be given by grace through Jesus Christ.

Q. How many things ought a Christian man to know?

A. Five things.

Q. What are these?

A. (1) The ten commandments of God.

(2) The Christian faith.

(3) Our Father.

(4) Baptism.

(5) Holy Communion.

We notice that two sacraments only are mentioned, while in the treatise on the seven mysteries (şapte taine) of Eustratie the Logothete, dated 1645, seven sacraments are detailed.

¹ *Codex Sturdzanus*, pp. 196-216, ap. M. Gaster, *Chrestomathie roumaine*. Vol 1, pp. 398 ff.

The ten commandments are called "porunce" or "cuvinte" (words), which corresponds to the Hebrew name "debarim." The three benefits derived from them are: (1) that we may know our sins and humble ourselves and go to the physician, Jesus Christ; (2) that we may learn the good deeds and good life of Christians, and (3) that evildoers may turn to the Lord.

The right faith is taught by the Gospels—which are the good news (bună veste) and joy from God the Father, that He will forgive us all sins through Jesus Christ—and the Creed. The latter is said to be that which the twelve apostles made, but the Nicene Creed is given, probably because it is the only one which is well known in Orthodox countries. There are one or two small points to be noticed in the version of the Creed. At the beginning, "I believe" (crez) is said, but in the third part the first person plural is used. The clause about the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father, is followed by the words "that in the Father and the Son we may worship and glorify" (să ne închinăm și slavim), and later it is said, "we wait (așteptăm) for the resurrection of the dead." Can this be due to the fact that the Creed was originally recited in the plural?

The Lord's Prayer is called both by its Roumanian and Slavonic names. It has already twice been called "tatal nostru," and then the statement is made, "say 'oče-naš' in Roumanian that we may understand it." There are two or three words in this version of the Lord's Prayer which deserve special attention. The word for bread is translated by pita (food), which corresponds to the Slavonic pišta. This term varies in different MSS. The Harleian MS. of the Gospels, now kept in the British Museum, and dated 1574, renders bread by pâine in St. Matthew and by pita in St. Luke, but Coresi, in his *Teaching of the Gospel* (evanghelie cu învățătură) dated 1581 at Brașov, uses the word pita. In all early Roumanian versions of the Lord's Prayer, the adjective ἐπιούσιος (or its Slavonic equivalent, nasuštnij) is rendered by sațiosa, which generally means abundant. The Greek word ἐπιούσιος has been so variously explained, by St. Basil, as for our substance (οὐσία), or by Athanasius as that which is coming (τὸν μέλλοντα), or by others as of the coming day, that the interpretation of the Roumanian words is more than doubtful. However, Grigorie himself explains the words in his *Commentary on the Gospel* (evanghelie cu tâlc), dated 1619. Commenting on this clause in the Lord's Prayer, he says: sațiu—the noun corresponding to the adjective sațios—means that which is our substance (firea): so he appears to agree

with the interpretation of St Basil. Apart from this explanation, we should be tempted to surmise that ἐπιούσιος had been confused with περιούσιος, and then rendered by a word meaning "abundant." Once more, the word for temptation in Roumanian is năpaste, which corresponds to the Slavonic napast'. Lastly, the evil (one) is rendered by the word hîclen, which is borrowed from the Hungarian hutlen, the faithless one and so the devil.

The Catechism enumerates five things, which ought to be in prayer: (1) the commandments, as the Lord has commanded and allowed us to pray; (2) the promise that He will hear us; (3) faith that we may grasp all God's promises; (4) petition for the needs of soul and body; and (5) knowledge that we ought to ask only in the name of Jesus Christ. It adds that there are seven petitions in the Lord's Prayer, three for the things of eternal life and four for the life of this world.

On baptism, Grigorie is content to refer to the words of the Gospel, but he quotes the words of St. Matthew in an abbreviated form, "baptize in the name of the Holy Father," no doubt for the sake of conciseness.

The fifth and last part deals with the Holy Communion (cumenecătura dela prestol). Grigorie gives a very brief and composite account from the three synoptic gospels and St. Paul. It may be noted that the word used for bread is again pita. In both parts of the Institution he ends with the words "when ye will make remembrance of me" (când veți face pomena me).

It is difficult to determine the exact character of this catechism. The fact that it lays great stress on the forgiveness of sins through Jesus Christ and the mention of the two sacraments of the Gospel inclines us to suppose that it has been influenced by Lutheran rather than Calvinistic teaching. There seems to be no trace of specifically Calvinistic doctrine. But later developments made it necessary to combat these doctrines at the Synod of Jasi in 1642.

L. PATTERSON.

SOVIET AGRICULTURAL LEGISLATION (V)¹

(*Selection of Decrees and Documents*)

Resolution of the Kolkhozsentr of the U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R. regarding the Seed Funds in the Kolkhozy, of 4 February, 1932.

The collection of seed funds in the kolkhozy is proceeding rather unsatisfactorily; the conditions are especially intolerable in Kazakstan, Western Siberia, the Urals, the Central Black-soil region and Ukraine.

In order to guarantee the adequate collection of seed funds in due time in the kolkhozy, the Board of Directors of the Kolkhozsentr resolves:—

1. To instruct the chairmen of the Republican, Provincial, Regional and District kolkhoz unions, and also the chairmen of all kolkhozy, to take under their direct personal surveillance the collection of seed funds in the kolkhozy on the dates and in the quantities prescribed by the People's Commissariat for Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. and the Kolkhozsentr of the U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R.

2. To commence immediately the general stocktaking in all the kolkhozy of the quantities of seed collected, of the sorting of the seeds, of their quality and of their disinfection; special brigades formed of the members of the kolkhozy and of the officials sent to the kolkhozy to assist them during the spring sowing campaign, should be organised for this purpose.

3. In accordance with last year's experience, to develop the organisation work in the districts and provinces, urging those districts and regions with a surplus of seed to lend a part of their reserves to the kolkhozy which have not enough seed.

4. To organise and carry out during February a seed-loan among members of the kolkhozy for their kolkhozy by means of the surrender of a portion of the seed they possess.

5. To instruct the chairmen of the Republican, Provincial and District Unions of Kolkhozy to register those kolkhozy which are short of seed, and taking into consideration the data obtained, to issue corresponding instructions regarding the collection of the mutual-aid seed funds.

From the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Kolkhozsentr of the U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R.,

TATAYEV.

(Published in *Izvestia*, 5 February, 1932, No. 35, 4602.)

¹ See *Slavonic Review*, vol. xi. No. 31. p. 192.

Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, of 4 February, 1932, regarding the immediate organisational and economic strengthening of the Kolkhozy.

The Central Committee of the Party points out to all the party organisations that the task of the organisational and economic strengthening of the kolkhozy is, at the present moment, first of all the task of developing and consolidating the *Artel*² form of kolkhozy. The Central Committee is of the opinion that attempts to speed up artificially the transition from the artel form of the kolkhozy to the commune, at the present stage of the development of the kolkhozy, present a serious *danger*. The Central Committee warns all the Party organisations against this danger of *skipping over*³ the form of agricultural artel, which is not sufficiently developed and consolidated.

In connection with the preparation for the spring-sowing campaign and with the endeavours to raise the unit rate yield of the harvest, the Central Committee especially emphasises the following immediate tasks regarding the organisational and economic strengthening of the kolkhozy in the form of them which, at the present stage of development, *predominates*.

1. The most important link in the organisation of labour in the kolkhozy must be the *Brigade*. According to the experience of the best agricultural artels, the Central Committee thinks it expedient to organise the brigades in the kolkhozy with permanent personnel; such brigades must, as a rule, perform all the chief agricultural jobs throughout the season on the plots assigned to them. The kolkhoz must supply the brigades with all the machinery, tools and draught animals necessary for the work, and the brigades must be held responsible for the state of all this property. The valuation of the working day of the members of the brigade must be adjusted in accordance with the amount of work done by the brigade. The organisation of such brigades must not, however, exclude the possibility of assigning plots (in accordance with local conditions, the size of the kolkhoz, its organisation) to the brigades, not for the whole of the agricultural season, but only for a certain period of agricultural tasks (ploughing, harvesting).

2. The choice of the *Brigadiers*, removal of the causes of their liquidity and the adequate assistance in increasing their economic and political efficiency must form the most important task of the Party organisations. The practice adopted last year in the best kolkhozy of the remuneration of the brigadiers according to the final results of the work of the brigade, must be widely applied. The raising of the responsibility of the brigadiers and the transfer to them of many of the functions referring

² The *Artel* is a milder form of collectivisation, approximating more to Western Co-operation.—ED.

³ The italics are those of the original.

to the organisation of labour in the kolkhozy must be accompanied by the cutting down of the administrative expenses, which in many kolkhozy are inadmissibly high.

3. The practical realisation of the resolutions of the 6th Congress of the Soviets in respect of the introduction of *piece-work remuneration* and the improvement in the rate-fixing of the labour of each member of the kolkhoz according to the quantity and quality of work done, must remain the principal task.

At the same time, the Central Committee *warns* against superfluous detailing of piece work, the introduction of a system of progressive piece-work remuneration, the introduction of an individual system of remuneration where it is not dictated by the nature of the task (e.g. ploughing and threshing), attempts to supersede the remuneration in kind by wages in money, attempts to supersede the work of the managing bodies of the kolkhozy by administrative orders issued by Soviet or Party organisations, attempts to increase the contributions towards the various funds stipulated in the articles of association of agricultural artel.

4. The practice of the care of a group of animals by the same members of the brigade, a practice which gave good results in the best *Animal-breeding Kolkhoz Farms*, must be widely applied; the *Animal-breeding Brigade* and its members must be paid according to the results of their work (quantity of milk yielded by cows, increase in weight of young animals, size of litters, etc.).

5. The Central Committee considers that the most important political task of the Party and kolkhoz organisations must be the education of the active members of the kolkhoz, who are to be recruited from shock-workers, participants in socialist competition, brigadiers, etc. Local organisations must seek support in the active members of the kolkhozy in carrying out the principal measures—the increase in yield of grain, grain-collection programme, etc.—and also in the socialist education of the members of the kolkhozy.

6. The role and the responsibility of the *Machine and Tractor Stations* in the work of the organisational and economic strengthening of the kolkhozy, the education of the active members of the kolkhozy and the increase in unit yield, is especially great. In connection with this, the Central Committee instructs the Party organisation to increase the daily assistance to the Machine and Tractor Stations, especially in regard to their personnel, and also to pay more attention to the proper guidance of the economic activities of the Machine and Tractor Stations.

(Published in *Izvestia*, 7 February, 1932, No. 37, 4,604.)

Decree of the Council of the People's Commissaries of the U.S.S.R. and of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (B),⁴ regarding the Collection of Seed Funds in the Kolkhozy of the U.S.S.R., and Measures for the Relief of those Districts which have suffered from Drought, in Seeds and Food.

1. In connection with the approach of the sowing campaign, the Council of the People's Commissaries of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (B) direct the attention of all Party and Soviet organisations to the fact that the principal task of their activities in the villages during the next few weeks must be the collection of seed funds in quantities which will guarantee the fulfilment of the sowing programme. The Council of the People's Commissaries and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (B) instruct all Party, Soviet and Kolkhoz organisations to begin without delay the collection of seed funds in the kolkhozy.

2. To approve the schedule of collection of seed funds in the kolkhozy fixed by the People's Commissariat for Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. for the spring sowing, to the total quantity of 57,355 centners (detailed schedule follows). To fix the time limit for collection of seed funds for Ukraine, Lower Volga, North Caucasus, Crimea and Central Asia for 10 March, and for all other republics, provinces and districts, 1 April.

3. Owing to the fact that last year the eastern districts of the U.S.S.R. were visited by drought, on account of which many sovkhhozy and kolkhozy in these districts are not able to form out of their own reserves sufficient seed funds for the fulfilment of their spring sowing programmes, and as some of them are experiencing the same difficulties in regard to food supplies—to grant to the sovkhhozy and kolkhozy of these districts a loan in seeds and food products, without interest, on the condition that this loan shall be returned in autumn, 1932, in kind; the loan is to amount to 53,500,000 puds, the kolkhozy to receive 39,000,000 puds and the grain and seed-producing and cattle-breeding sovkhhozy 14,500,000 puds.

(Articles 4, 5 and 6 deal with the distribution of loans according to various districts and kinds of seeds; we omit them as non-essential.)

7. To instruct the People's Commissariat for Agriculture to grant the State seed loan only in correspondence with the collection of seed funds by the kolkhozy out of their own reserves.

8. To instruct the State Bank to provide the necessary facilities for financing the seed and food loan.

9. The Council of People's Commissaries and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) draw the attention of all Party, Soviet and Kolkhoz organisations to the fact that the collection of seed funds must be completed everywhere as speedily as possible in order to guarantee, by timely preparations for the sowing campaign, the

⁴ B = Bolsheviks (inserted as the alternative name of the Communist Party).

early termination of sowing and to achieve better and more plentiful crops.

10. The People's Commissariat for Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. is to establish control over the collection of seed funds and publish daily summary figures regarding the progress of the collection of seed funds in the kolkhozy in different districts, provinces and republics.

(Signed) Chairman of the Council of People's Commissaries,

V. MOLOTOV (SKRYABIN).

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union
Communist Party (Bolsheviks),

J. STALIN.

(Published in *Izvestia*, 17 February, 1932, No. 47, 4,614.)

*Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party
(Bolsheviks).*

Regarding the Compulsory Socialisation of Cattle.

It has been noticed that in many districts individual members of the kolkhozy have been forced by methods of compulsion to surrender their cows, pigs, sheep, etc., to the kolkhozy; this practice violates, in a most abusive manner, the repeated instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and also infringes the articles of associations of the agricultural artel.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (B) most decidedly emphasises that only enemies of the kolkhozy may permit the compulsory sequestration of cows, pigs, sheep, etc., belonging to individual members of the kolkhozy, for the benefit of the kolkhozy. The Central Committee explains that the practice of compulsory sequestration of cows, pigs, sheep, etc., from the individual members of the kolkhozy has nothing to do with the policy of the Party. The task of the Party is to provide each member of the kolkhozy with his own cows, pigs, sheep, hens, geese, etc. The further development and enlargement of the kolkhoz animal-breeding farms must be achieved by means of breeding young animals or by purchase of cattle, etc.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (B) instructs all Party, Soviet and Kolkhoz organisations:—

(1) To stop all attempts at compulsory sequestration of cows, pigs, sheep, etc., from the members of the kolkhozy, and to expel from the Party all those who may be guilty of violation of the directions of the Central Committee.

(2) To organise assistance to those members of kolkhozy who do not possess a cow, sheep, pig, etc., in purchasing and breeding young animals for their personal requirements.

(Published in *Izvestia*, 27 March, 1932.)

Decree of the Council of People's Commissaries of the U.S.S.R. and of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

Regarding the Programme of the Grain Collection out of 1932 Crops and regarding the Development of the Kolkhoz Grain Trade.

1. On the basis of the victory of the sovkhoz and kolkhoz economy over the system of individual economy and of the destruction of the *kulaki* in the villages the U.S.S.R., during the last two years, has reached such a stage in the development of grain-producing farms, in increase of area under cultivation, and in the increase of the grain production, that instead of 660,000,000 puds which were collected out of the 1928 crop when the individual economy prevailed, the State grain collections in 1930 reached the figure of 1,350,000,000 puds, and in 1931, 1,400,000,000 puds, notwithstanding the drought.

These successes must be explained by the fact that the kolkhozy as large economic units received facilities, through the Machine and Tractor Stations, to employ and make use of tractors and agricultural machinery, to increase areas under cultivation and to improve the agricultural and technical conditions generally, while the sovkhozy became very large grain-factories which guarantee an ever increasing grain fund for the State.

Owing to the carrying out of the policy of the Party of Lenin, the country has overcome the crisis of grain production and is fighting the difficulties resulting from the drought of last year in the eastern provinces of the U.S.S.R., more successfully than in former years of drought when small peasant holdings prevailed in our country.

2. Together with this, as a result of the successes achieved in carrying out the Five Year industrial programme, the possibilities of the Soviet Union in the sphere of industrial production destined either for the satisfaction of productive requirements of the kolkhozy or for personal use of the toilers are increasing.

In connection with this continual quantitative increase of industrial goods and increase in grain production, the possibilities of development of kolkhoz trade are also growing. The kolkhoz trade is becoming a more and more important supplementary source of supply of agricultural products to the towns.

In accordance with these circumstances the Soviet Government may now, together with collection of grain by the State, practise another method, the method of trading in bread stuffs by the kolkhozy and the members of the kolkhozy, for supplying the town population with food. The task is to couple these two methods in the interests of further development of the exchange of commodities between towns and country, and of the better supply of the town population with the foodstuffs, and to develop the kolkhoz grain-trade by some curtailing of the State grain-collection from the peasants, while increasing the quantity of grain to be surrendered by the sovkhozy.

Basing themselves upon these considerations, the Council of the People's Commissaries of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (B) decree :—

(a) To cut down the programme of the State grain-collection out of the 1932 crop in the kolkhozy and the individual peasant households, in comparison with the 1931 programme, by 264,000,000 puds, thus fixing the programme at 1,103,000,000 puds in case the crops prove to be satisfactory, instead of last year's programme of 1,367,000,000 puds.

(The details of the programme are omitted from the translation.)

(b) In accordance with the growth of the sovkhozy, to increase the 1932 programme of grain-collection in respect of the sovkhozy of all kinds up to 151,000,000 puds against 108,000,000 puds collected last year.

(The details of the programme are omitted.)

(c) To complete the fulfilment of the grain-collection programme not later than by 1 January, 1933.

(d) To complete the collection of seed funds in the kolkhozy not later than by 15 January, 1933.

(e) To consider it expedient, after the fulfilment of the present grain-collection programme and of the formation of seed funds, i.e. from 15 January, 1933, to allow to the kolkhozy and the members of the kolkhozy the unrestricted sale of their surplus grain at their discretion, whether at the street markets or in their own shops; local authorities are to be instructed to give every facility to the kolkhozy and the members of the kolkhozy and to take appropriate steps for preventing private traders and speculators from making the kolkhoz trade a source of private gain.

(Signed) Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissaries
of the U.S.S.R.,

V. MOLOTOV (SKRYABIN).

Secretary of the Central Committee of All-Union
Communist Party (Bolsheviks),

J. STALIN.

Moscow, Kremlin, 6 May, 1932.

(Published in *Izvestia*, 7 May, 1932, No. 125, 4,692.)

OBITUARY

ADOLF STRÁNSKÝ

(April 8, 1855—December 18, 1931.)

IN Dr. Adolf Stránský, who died in Brno last December in his 78th year, Czechoslovakia lost one of the most interesting and remarkable figures of her political history in what may be called her years of political re-awakening, a brilliant speaker and journalist, the first Minister of Commerce of the new Republic; but above all a man who will always be remembered as founder of the *Lidové Noviny*, today the undisputed leader of the Czech press.

Born in Habry on the Bohemian-Moravian border, a small town of which this broad-minded leader of the Czech element in Moravia ever remained a faithful son, he began his studies at the gymnasium of Německý Brod. Here, in Havlíček's town, was awakened his interest in public affairs, which increased during his studies at the Faculty of Law in Prague. For a time this interest outweighed the call of the Law to such an extent that he accepted an appointment on the staff of the *Narodní Listy* in Prague, and later of the German *Tribune* in Vienna, an organ of Skrejšovský, a former member of the "Old-Czech" Conservative party, at the time a political free-lance.

After this journalistic episode Stránský settled in the capital of Moravia, Brno, where he opened practice as a barrister and soon became very successful. Moravia in the early nineties was a "Musterland" according to the ideas dear to the Viennese administration. A province more than two-thirds of whose population were Czech, kept a solidly German outward appearance. The majority in the provincial diet (Landtag) was German, German were the posts of all the leading public functionaries, beginning with the Statthalter, German was the administration of all the larger towns, Olomouc and Brno in the first place. The people were so used to the fact that "páni" were Germans that they almost took it for a natural, predestined and unchangeable state of affairs. Even the life of the Czech element in Brno was somewhat stagnant, vegetating on the one side in the Čtenářský spolek (Readers' Club), where Czech Hofrats met over newspapers and a game of cards, on the other side cringing in the suburban periphery, shy and impotent.

In this comfortably stagnant pond Stránský soon came to play the

role of a real pike. He realised that the wide circles of the people could best be won over to the national idea through the medium of the theatre. On this he therefore centred his attention and his activity during the first years of his stay; and his efforts were crowned with success when the Czechs of Brno finally acquired a permanent stage with a good ensemble of actors in their own building. Suffice it to mention that it was here that the two best Czech exponents of dramatic art, Eduard Vojan and Hana Kvapilová, made their début. Later, even in his years of intensest political activity, Stránský did not lose his interest in the theatre, taking care that prominent actors from Prague were invited and himself acting as their affable host.

A theatrical idyll, however, as he realised, could not help the Czechs of Moravia in attaining their political rights. This aim required intense political work of enlightenment through public meetings and the Press. In a far-sighted appreciation of future political and social evolution Stránský from the beginning based his political work on the hitherto politically disinherited, on the "small" man. He took up—mostly without fee—their defence in their conflicts with the power of the State and of the almighty police, and it is characteristic of him as man and as politician that the only object which adorned his plain study when he was a practising lawyer was an honorary diploma of a Workmen's Club. Had the adjective "red" been already at that time in vogue, he would have been called the "red lawyer."

With the popularity and support thus gained among the widest circles, Dr Stránský came forward in the early nineties into the forefront of Moravian political life as deputy to the provincial Diet and founder of a new political daily, the original name of which, *Moravské Listy*, he, after two years, following the advice of Professor Masaryk, changed into *Lidové Noviny*. Almost simultaneously he was elected to the Austrian Reichsrat, and soon in both legislative bodies through his political perspicacity and his eloquence entered the front ranks of political leadership. He stood on the left wing of the Czech Liberal party, which, in Moravia, bore the name of "People's Party," and he fearlessly expressed his opinions not only in Parliament, but also directly to the Monarch in his "cercles." He used to be charged with inconsistency and opportunism for his tactics in elections, at which he did not hesitate to form agreements now with the Socialists, at another time with the Clericals. It was, however, an eminent political virtue of Stránský that he did not cling to mere watchwords, but strove primarily after a realisation

of political programmes, which was impossible without combinations of political parties. It was thanks to this method that it was possible to form a powerful progressive *bloc* in Moravia, and that in 1905 an "Ausgleich" could be reached which gave the Czechs in Moravia a majority in the Landtag and in the provincial administration.

In seeming contrast to the political opportunism of Stránský at home in Moravia stood his ever more radical position in the Vienna Reichsrat. This difference was, however, dictated by eminently political considerations. In Moravia skilful opportunism helped to strengthen the Czech element, while in Vienna the political "activism" of the Young Czech party, as represented by Dr. Kramár, fortified Viennese centralism and the interests of the Austrian Monarchy. On the advice of the editor of the *Lidové Noviny*, Stránský, in 1907, rendered possible the election of Professor T. G. Masaryk to the Reichsrat by refraining from putting up against him a candidate of the People's Party; in the end he left the Liberal (Young Czech) party altogether and formed a parliamentary club of seven independent members with Professor Masaryk at its head. To this club can be traced the origin of Czech political opposition against Austria, which, during the war, gave birth both to the great Czech anti-Austrian revolutionary action abroad and the silent but determined resistance at home.

During the war it required skilful prudence and caution in the management of the paper to save the *Lidové Noviny* from being stopped by the authorities; in this Dr. Stránský succeeded, even though his family was not saved from persecution. As soon, however, as the Reichsrat was called together, in 1917, after three years' silence, Stránský, in several powerful speeches and newspaper articles, gave open expression to the conviction of the Czech people that their place and hopes were on the side of the anti-Austrian revolutionary leaders abroad. His membership of the revolutionary National Assembly formed in Prague in October 1918 and of the first Czechoslovak Republican Government, in which he was given the post of Minister of Commerce, was only an acknowledgement of the great popularity which he enjoyed both in Bohemia and in Moravia before and during the war, and which his courageous behaviour during the war only enhanced.

After the completion of the work of the Constitutional Assembly in 1920 he was returned for the Senate, from which he resigned in 1925—following his son and a number of his political colleagues in their secession from the National Democratic party which, under the leadership of Dr. Kramár, was, in their view, assuming more and

more of the mentality of the former Young Czech party. And when, in the ensuing elections, the newly-founded party of National Labour, although gathering more than 100,000 votes, failed under the new electoral law to obtain a single seat in Parliament, he retired from politics altogether.

The picture of Stránský's personality would not be complete without a mention of his human qualities. The fiercest political battles of many years during which his opponents did not hesitate to use the meanest methods of attack, did not change him in the least; he always remained the same well-educated, good-humoured, affable and witty gentleman whose most effective weapon was a humorous phrase, a *jeu d'esprit* or an ironic jest. He was a true follower of the democratic ideal, and his greatest pride was in having been chosen by the people to be their representative. He faithfully represented the people's interests for thirty years, and the spirit of Adolf Stránský will never disappear from the annals of Czech political and national life.

PAVEL VÁŠA.

VÁCLAV NOVOTNÝ

THE death of Václav Novotný, on 14 July, has deprived the Caroline University of Prague of a historian who devoted his whole life to the study of his nation's past. The course of that life was simple. He was born on 5 September, 1869, and studied at České Budějovice, and later at the university in Prague, where, in 1893, he took the degree of Ph D. In 1898 he became lecturer, and in 1911 professor, in Czech history. He was a member of many learned societies and institutions and years ago was elected a corresponding member of the School of Slavonic Studies. At the university he accomplished a great work, for from his department there came a whole series of younger historians, who worked by his side in the field of Czech history. In 1929, on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, there appeared a collection of the works of his pupils, comprising 25 contributions, one of which (S. H. Thompson's "The Order of Writing of Wyclif's Philosophical Works") was published in English.

Parallel with his teaching activity went his literary and research work. His diligence and conscientiousness were equalled by few of his contemporaries. He was one of those historians whose ideal is the highest possible knowledge and who spare no effort or labour in their confirmation of details. His works are full of facts and provide a rich study of the history of the Czech nation. He liked to make use of everything he had verified from his sources and instead

of giving independent estimates, preferred to characterise past periods or individuals by detailed compilations of historical facts. He aimed not so much at active description of bygone epochs as at securing authentic and exhaustive information. In this respect he resembled many German historians of the pre-war period, with whom he also shared a fondness for the penetrating analysis of historical sources, particularly of those of the Middle Ages. In this field he was undoubtedly a master. From his pen came a series of short works in Czech and in German, which will remain excellent proofs of his critical powers and his ability to distinguish in a historical source the true kernel from the dubious additions of later periods. He was primarily a medievalist, and in his knowledge of and complete mastery over the methods of medieval research he was not far behind the famous scholars who were his contemporaries.

His scientific work centred in two spheres. One of these was John Hus and his period. His studies of Hus really mark the beginning of his scientific work, for the subject of his dissertation was Hus's safe-conduct (*salvus conductus*) from the Emperor Sigismund when he went to the Council of Constance. Later he wrote several shorter works and planned to write a biography of Hus, which was eventually finished in 1915 on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the burning of Hus. In collaboration with Vlastimil Kybal, Novotný then wrote a five-volume work, *M. Jan Hus*, in which was collected all the knowledge of Hus's life and opinions which has so far come to light. The first two volumes, which deal with the reformer's life and literary activity, are from the pen of Novotný. An introduction to the work on Hus is provided by *Náboženské hnutí české ve xiv a xv století*, in which Novotný described the rise and development of the movement for church reform in Bohemia. Here and in other works he seeks to prove that Hus's activity had its roots in his own country and that Hus inclined so much to Wyclif because he saw in him similar aims and ideas. Novotný definitely refuted the opinion set forth by the German historian Loserth in his work *Huss und Wyclif*. Novotný's Czech works on Hus and his period are not likely to find many readers abroad, but his two great editions of sources can hardly fail to find a place on the shelves of scientific libraries. The first of these, *M. Jana Husi korespondence a dokumenty*, published by the Czech Academy in 1920, comprises a collection of Hus's letters and the documents which form their complement. The second, which is just appearing as volume vii of *Fontes Rerum Bohemicarum*, gives the various reports on the stay of Hus and his friend Jerome of Prague in Constance and of their

execution at the stake in 1415 and 1416, respectively, as well as the sources by which the development of the tradition and veneration of both reformers in Bohemia and abroad can be followed.

The second sphere of Novotný's interest was early Czech history. He prepared the ground for his collective survey by a number of short studies. In 1910 his great work on the history of the Czech nation, *České dějiny*, began to be published by Jan Laichter. Novotný was the latter's chief editor and was to write the section dealing with the earliest period down to the year 1437. The sections on the later history he entrusted to his collaborators, R. Urbánek, B. Navrátil and V. Kybal. The work was to be on the one hand a revision of Francis Palacký's work on Czech history, *Dějiny národu českého v Čechách a na Moravě*, which goes as far as the year 1526, and on the other hand a continuation of it. In his views on the history of the Czech people, Novotný agreed with Palacký, and, like him, regarded the Hussite period as the greatest epoch. He wished, however, by his research to correct and replace parts of Palacký's work which had become out of date owing to the advance of historical study. He himself published three volumes, covering Czech history from the earliest times to 1254, but the fourth remained unfinished and ends in 1273. In the volumes published, Novotný gathered such a mass of facts concerning the fortunes of the Czech people during the earliest period that every future historian of that age will have to use his work as a point of departure.

Although Novotný did not live to complete his great work on Czech history, he did at any rate leave something in its place, namely, a two-volume *Československé dějiny*, published shortly before his death, by himself and his four collaborators (J. Dobiáš, R. Urbánek, J. Prokeš, and O. Odložilík). The work begins with the earliest period and reaches almost to the present day. It is well provided with illustrations and comprises a good and reliable survey of the past of the Czech nation.

By the premature death of Novotný Czech historical science has lost one of its foremost representatives; and it is extremely regrettable that it was not granted to him to write upon the Hussite period, a subject of which he possessed a unique knowledge.

OTAKAR ODLOŽILÍK.

DIMITER MISHEV

ON 27 January, the sudden death of Dimiter Mishev, at the age of 78, removed one of the leading publicists as well as one of the builders of modern Bulgaria.

Born in Vidin in 1854, his early education was received there and at Gabrovo. He was a pupil of the first Bulgarian Exarch, Antim I, who noticed his unusual mental qualities and sent him to the Bulgarian gymnasium at Constantinople. Mishev returned to his birthplace to teach and publish a newspaper. He was a teacher also in Sliven and Gabrovo. From the first he took a keen interest in politics, being closely associated with Petko Karavelov. After the restoration of the constitution in 1884 he founded and edited the *Trnovska Constitutsia*, but with the *coup d'état* of 1886 and the withdrawal of Karavelov, Mishev devoted more time to teaching and the writing of textbooks (with S. Kostov) on the Bulgarian language and literature. A good many school-generations since then owe their introduction to the classics of western literature to them and particularly to the famous *Chrestomatia*, a virtual literary encyclopædia, first published in 1888, which saw five editions.

Mishev's name is connected pre-eminently with the Macedonian question. As secretary-general of the Exarchate from 1890-98 and 1900-06, and through long and frequent travels in Macedonia, he acquired an unrivalled knowledge of the subject, a result of which was the detailed statistical study *La Macédoine et sa population chrétienne* (Paris, 1905, by D. M. Brancoff, his father's name). Before 1903, foreseeing the Ilinden revolution, he sent a warning to prominent European statesmen and writers with a demand for reforms. His solution of the problem was autonomy. In 1909 he was elected to the Sobranje, but not allowed to take his seat, so that he was unable to speak and vote against the treaty of alliance with Serbia, which involved the partition of Macedonia.

Mishev's knowledge of Balkan history was encyclopædic and equalled by few. He is best known for his *Bulgarians in the Past*, published in 1916 (French and English editions 1919), but written much earlier. His greatest activity, however, was as contributor to, and editor of periodicals. For many years he was editor of the *Tsrkoven Vestnik*, official organ of the Holy Synod. Among the numerous periodicals which he launched and edited are: *Svobodno Mnenje* (1913), devoted to rectifying the injustices of the Treaty of Bucarest; *Brezda* (1914), a literary monthly; and *Balkanski Sgovor* (1915), for the promotion of Balkan understanding. In it, just as in one of the last things he wrote, Mishev maintained that "the sincerest friend of the Balkan States is their *rapprochement*, their most powerful ally is their *entente*," but only on the basis of justice and equality. The years after the war he spent in Paris and Geneva, editing, writing and sending out pleas for the recognition of

Bulgaria's rights In 1928, when he was already 74, he organised (with Djaković) "Otets Paissi," now one of the foremost Bulgarian patriotic institutions, and became the editor of its organ of the same name.

But, above all, Dimiter Mishev distinguished himself as a public-spirited citizen. He was noted for his absolute integrity and unselfishness and his devotion to truth and justice. He always remained a democrat in politics, but he never sacrificed his principles for partisanship. To the last day of his life he was always ready, with his pen or on the platform, to support or defend any just cause, but as a convinced pacifist, not as a chauvinist. He died of heart failure while giving a report at a meeting of the Bulgarian section of the League for the defence of the rights of man, of which he was vice-president, as he was of the Association for Peace and the League of Nations, and of the Bulgarian delegation to the Balkan Conference. He was honorary member of the Slavonic Society and member of many other cultural organisations. From its formation in 1911 he was a member of the Bulgarian Academy. By his death Bulgaria loses a great moral force.

JAMES F CLARKE.

CHRONICLE : RUSSIA.

Foreign Affairs.

IN the domain of foreign affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the period under review, two events stand out.

One is the denunciation on 17 October by the British Government of the temporary Commercial Agreement concluded with the Soviet Government in London in April 1930. In a Note addressed to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in London, the Foreign Secretary informed him of the British Government's decision to terminate the Agreement at six months' date. The Note further stated that His Majesty's Government remained anxious for the furtherance of trade between the two countries and were prepared to enter into discussions upon the subject at the earliest convenience of the Soviet Government. The cause of this step of the British Government was explained to the House of Commons during the debate on the Ottawa Conference. As stated by the Dominions Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the denunciation of the Agreement with the U.S.S.R. which gave to Soviet trade the privilege of "most favoured nation" treatment became necessary to maintain the effectiveness of the Imperial preferences agreed at Ottawa against State action by any foreign country capable of frustrating them by dumping sweated goods. The measure did not imply any ill-will towards the Soviet Government and was taken

solely as a precaution. The British Government desired to maintain normal trade relations with the U.S.S.R., and all the Soviet Government had to do was to abstain from destroying the market in articles which were the subject of the arrangement with Canada. In Moscow the denunciation of the Commercial Agreement was received as a hostile act against the Soviet Government, and gave the signal for a renewal of anti-British propaganda in the Press.

The second important event in Soviet foreign affairs was the signing in Paris on 29 November of the Franco-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression and a Conciliation Convention, after two years of intermittent negotiations. The Pact, broadly speaking, is similar to those concluded by the Soviet Government with Poland and the Baltic States, and is expected to pave the way to increased trade relations between the U.S.S.R. and France.

The Polish-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression, initialled in January last, the ratification of which was made conditional upon the conclusion of a pact with France, was signed in July and ratified in November by the respective governments. With the exception of Roumania, practically all the European States bordering on the U.S.S.R., as well as France and Germany, have now concluded such bilateral non-aggression pacts with the Soviet Republic. Negotiations with Roumania, which had been opened, it is alleged, on the inducement of the French Government and had been going on intermittently for a considerable time, at the time of writing have again broken down, as no agreement could be reached on the question of Bessarabia.

The long drawn-out dispute between the U.S.S.R. and Japan over the rights of fisheries in Soviet territorial waters was settled by the signing in August of a new Fisheries Convention in conformity with the one concluded in 1928, and on the whole advantageous to the Soviets.

Internal Affairs : Industry and Transport.

According to official data, the all-round increase of industrial output during the first six months of 1932, as compared with the corresponding period of 1931, was 19·5 per cent., and in heavy industries 25·5 per cent. Nevertheless, production, particularly in the key industries, was and still remains considerably below plan, being roughly between two-thirds and three-quarters of the programme. In the coal-mining industry, in spite of mechanisation and other improvements, productivity per head had diminished, and the increase in the gross output was due to the larger number of men employed, while the cost of production was estimated to be 15 per cent. higher than a year ago. The all-round productivity of labour in the heavy industries had increased by 11·5 per cent., with a corresponding rise in wages of 23·4 per cent. The labour turnover and "fluidity" are still excessively high, and drastic measures are being introduced to stem the constant flow of workers from one concern to another. A number of "gigantic" new blast and Martin furnaces have

been started, including those at Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk, but the output of pig-iron remains at about two-thirds of the plan, partly owing to deficient supplies of fuel and to transport difficulties. The working of the railway system continues to cause grave anxiety to the authorities, and the coming of winter has not improved matters.

The huge hydro-electric power station on the river Dnieper was opened in October amid great celebrations, and several of the works composing the Dnieper "combine" have begun to function. The production of Soviet aluminium, nickel and fertiliser plant in Solikamsk potash mines has also been started.

Agriculture.

As no figures of this year's grain crop are available, the exact state of affairs as regards the harvest is difficult to determine. Reliable information tends to show, however, that contrary to the general official statements of a good average harvest, the amount of grain actually gathered is insufficient adequately to feed the population. Harvesting operations, in spite of various concessions to the collectivised peasants, were greatly protracted and accompanied by the theft of grain sheaves on an unprecedented scale, as well as by great waste of corn left lying in the fields. Special squads were told off to patrol the fields and threshing grounds, and arrest the plunderers, but without much success, so that a special decree has been published proclaiming all kolkhoz and socialist and public property "sacred and inviolable," and all persons plundering or speculating in the same to be "enemies of the people" and liable to be shot, or imprisoned for terms of no less than ten years without right of appeal. A number of death sentences have since been passed on "grain thieves," several of them women, and a still more energetic application of the decree (which includes all caught plundering grain or goods on the railways, in the stores, etc.) has been recommended in the Soviet Press.

The sowing of winter crops was likewise drawn out far beyond the proper season, and the way it was conducted offers no good prospects for next year. According to the official report of the Commissariat of Agriculture, the total area sown up to 15 November was 36,597,000 hectares, or 89.4 per cent. of the plan. As, however, owing to Russia's climatic conditions, autumn sowing for all practical purposes should be over by 1 October (except perhaps in certain southern districts where it might be carried on till the middle of the month), and the area sown by that date amounted to 26,476,000 hectares (3,000,000 less than last year), the remaining 10,000,000 represent a sheer waste of work and material, and the outlook for the future seems gloomy enough.

Food Supply.

The Government's grain-collecting operations are encountering serious difficulties, and although a number of districts are reported to have fulfilled their yearly quota, opposition in others is very strong, particularly

in Ukraine, Northern Caucasia, some of the Volga districts, etc. The hopes founded on so-called "collective farm-trade," i.e. on the sale of peasant produce in the open market, were still unfulfilled, as the quantity of manufactured goods which the peasants could buy in exchange was inadequate to the demand.

For months past the Government has gradually been shifting the responsibility for the workers' food supply from the State central distributing system on to what have been styled "self-supply" organisations. Each factory and concern has been told to "supplement" the Government rations by organising its own vegetable fields, piggeries, rabbit breeding, dairy and meat farms, etc., which were to supply the factory's "closed" stores catering for the staff and employees of the given concern. A further step has now been taken in that direction by the publication of several decrees, ostensibly aiming at combating "fluidity of labour," while at the same time shifting the entire responsibility for feeding the workers on to the factory administration. Henceforth all "slackers" who fail to report for work any day for no valid cause, and their families, are to be deprived of all their ration cards, evicted from the factory dwellings and dismissed. The ration system is to be controlled by the factory administration, and graduated according to the worker's record. To enforce stricter control, over two hundred co-operative factory stores in the largest concerns, catering for over 3,000,000 workers, are to be closed as such and handed over to the management of the factory director, who is held solely responsible both for the food supply of the workers and for any abuse of their ration cards. Any speculation or use of cards invalidated by their owner's dismissal from his place of employment may be punished by death.

The free sale by peasants of grain, flour and bread in the open market, which originally was only to be allowed from 15 January, has now been authorised in the Moscow territory and the Tartar Republic ostensibly because they had supplied their grain quota. In reality this was done to alleviate the acute shortage of food in Moscow and other places, where the "bread queues" are reported to be worse than ever.

From the consensus of information it may be gathered that Russia is again faced with one of the worst winters within the last ten years.

Books Received

- Acta et Commentationes Universitatis Tartuenssis (Dorpatensis). Tartu, 1930.
 ALLEN, W. E. D. A History of the Georgian People. London (Kegan Paul), 1932.
 ARGENTI, PHILIP P. The Massacres of Chios. London (John Lane), 12s. 6d. net.
 BULGAKOVA, ELENA. Tsarevna Sofya. Paris (Y.M.C.A. Press), 1933.
 ČUBRILOVIĆ, VASA. Bosanski Ustanak 1875-8. Belgrade (Serbian Academy), 1930.

- Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Dokumente aus den Archiven der Zarischen und der provisorischen Regierung.) Ed Otto Hoetzsch Reihe I. Band I, 14 Jan-15 März, 1914. Band IV, 28 Juni-22 Juli, 1914 Berlin (Reimar Hobbing).
- HUMPHREY, GRACE Poland the Unexplored Indianapolis (The Bobbs-Merrill Company), 1931.
- IGNATIEFF, NICH. The Russian Emerges Toronto (Macmillan Co.), 1932
- KERN, ELGA Vom Alten und Neuen Polen Zurich (Rascher & Co.), 1931
- KERNER, ROBERT J Bohemia in the Eighteenth Century. New York (The Macmillan Company), 1932.
- KINGMAN, HARRY L. Effects of Chinese Nationalism upon Manchurian Railway Developments, 1925-31. Berkeley (University of California Press), 1932 \$1 50.
- MILYUKOV, P., SEIGNOBOS, CHARLES, and ELSENMANN, L Histoire de Russie I. Paris (Leroux), 1932. 60 frs
- NAZAROFF, P. S Hunted through Central Asia. Edinburgh (Blackwood), 1932. 7s 6d. net
- NORWID, CYPRIEN. Le Stigmate Traduction et Introduction de Paul Cazin Paris (Nouvelle Revue Francaise), 1932.
- Poland. History, Culture, Civilisation. Warsaw (Polish School Children's Committee), 1932
- STANISLAV, JÁN. Liptovské Nárécia (Les Dialectes du Pays de Liptov, Slovaquie). Turčiansky Sv Martin (Matica Slovenská), 1932.
- Trudi V-go s'ezda Russkih Akademičeskikh Organizacii za Granicej Sofia (Izdanie Russkih Akad Org), 1932
- VUK-PAVLOVIĆ, PAVAO. Ličnost i Odgoj. Zagreb (Tipografija), 1932

REVIEWS

The Road to Ruin in Europe 1890-1914. By Sir Raymond Beazley. London. J. M. Dent & Sons. 3s 6d net xx + 114 pages.

IN this little book Sir Raymond Beazley sets himself the difficult task of a "rapid survey" of "War-causes," and it is scarcely possible to avoid the conclusion that in 88 pages (equal to about 35 of this REVIEW) he has attempted the impossible. It may at once be admitted that "the theory of exclusive, unprecedented German war guilt" against which he protests (p. 3) is no longer tenable and indeed has been abandoned by almost all serious historians; and again that it is no longer possible today to speak of Russian aggression against France, without admitting a French policy of aggression towards Germany during several centuries: and these two admissions involve a departure from the *simpliste* theories on war-guilt so often aired during the war. This leads logically to the distinction—drawn perhaps more clearly and logically by the French historian M. Renouvin than by any other writer—between *immediate* and *ultimate* causes of the war: and from this again it follows that *no* Power can be completely absolved from all share of responsibility for the final catastrophe. But this is a very different thing from acquitting Germany from a major share in provoking the final outbreak. It cannot be allowed to obscure the "astonishing un wisdom" of German policy after 1894 and the extreme perfidy of the Kaiser, as revealed by his

correspondence with Tsar Nicholas and with President Roosevelt, the almost pathological outlook of Holstein and the double dealing of Bulow, to which his own memoirs are an uncanny testimony. It cannot alter the root facts that but for the naval policy of William II and Tirpitz, consistently and deliberately pursued from year to year, an Anglo-German entente was quite as attainable as an Anglo-French or Anglo-Russian; that the leading German statesmen (as may be seen from their correspondence with a succession of ambassadors in London, in *Die Grosse Politik*) were perfectly well aware that "*Einkreisung*" was a myth and yet deliberately encouraged its acceptance by the German public, as a means of popularising the naval programme: and that during the three years before the war there was nothing so much desired by British statesmen—despite all their naval misgivings—as a *détente* with Germany, cutting across the hard lines of division between the two camps (as is abundantly shown by the agreements regarding Bagdad and the Portuguese colonies, actually initialled in 1914).

Sir R. Beazley is fully entitled to stress the blunder of France and Britain in ignoring Germany in the Moroccan question and again to condemn the "strangling of Persia" in 1907. But he assigns a much exaggerated role to King Edward, who had remarkable psychological insight and talent for creating "atmosphere," but did not initiate policy, either under Balfour-Lansdowne, or under C.B.-Grey. Nor does he do anything like full justice to London's repeated efforts to come to terms with Berlin (Churchill and Lloyd George no less than Grey and Haldane). He describes the Haldane mission as "a revolt against the Grey policy," whereas it had the fullest sanction of Grey and other colleagues. In the same way it is highly misleading to represent Lloyd George's famous Agadir speech as delivered without authority, whereas it was fully in accord with Cabinet policy.

Sir Raymond's whole thesis is of course anti-imperialistic, but he adopts the full-blooded pre-war imperialist attitude when he calls the Bosnian annexation "normal and natural." It was normal and natural in the light of the diplomatic bargainings of the Great Powers and of the secret Austro-Russian agreements and of Salisbury's motion at Berlin in 1878: but it was a clear defiance of the wishes of the population, of the principle of nationality, of the whole Yugoslav movement since the sixties, and not least of all, it was a defiance of the principle upheld by Britain in 1871 and by Austria-Hungary quite especially in 1878, that treaties cannot be altered by unilateral action. And it was carried through with such bad faith and cynicism by Aehrenthal as to justify Grey's and King Edward's suspicions. Sir Raymond is quite right in treating Izvolsky as one of those responsible for the war, but that is only half the truth: Aehrenthal was at least equally to blame, and his rôle has not yet received the emphasis it deserves.

He treats the Sarajevo murder as "fundamental" (p. 54), and yet

he leaves out almost bodily most of the essential preliminaries which explain it—the challenge to Serb aspirations in the occupation of Bosnia in 1878, Andrassy's deliberate policy of keeping Serbia and Montenegro apart, the vassalage of Kings Milan and Alexander to Vienna, the Croat-Magyar quarrel, the Zagreb and Friedjung trials, Masaryk's exposure of Aehrenthal and Forgách, the Cuvaj dictatorship, Berchtold's anti-Serb policy in 1912-13, Tisza's open encouragement of Bulgaria, the Ballplatz plan of war against Serbia in 1913 (till held back by Germany), and the spontaneous movement in all the Yugoslav provinces and especially among the Bosnian youth. Without all this the quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Serbia is simply incomprehensible. The earlier reference to the murder of 1903 (p. 19) shows that he has missed the significance of the whole movement. The removal of Alexander and Draga was of course a disgusting incident, but it was the removal of rulers who were a scandal and an obstacle to progress, and it ushered in a new and better era among the Yugoslavs themselves. Nor was it the beginning of the quarrel with Vienna, as is suggested: both Austria-Hungary and Russia were forewarned, did nothing to stop the tragedy, and recognised the new King within the first few days. The friction with the Dual Monarchy originated in the strengthening of high agrarian interests in Budapest and Vienna, and up to 1907 the Serbo-Croat Coalition was the close ally of the Hungarian Coalition.

The chapter devoted to the war is even more open to criticism. I readily accept his acquittal of Germany from the charge of "deliberate incitement to general war." But it is impossible to deny that she gave "a completely free hand" (her own phrase in the original White Book) to Austria-Hungary, and that this was absolutely decisive. The final proof of this lies in Tisza's change of attitude as soon as he knew that German backing had been secured. Once fail to grasp this, and the whole argumentation is vitiated: and it must be added that the narrative further omits a whole series of points which the present writer regards as quite essential even to the briefest possible sketch. But to demonstrate this with full effect would require almost as much space as the book itself, so many and so complicated are the issues raised.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

AN AUSTRIAN CRITICISM

[*The following review has been most kindly contributed, at our invitation, by Dr. Ludwig Bittner, Director of the Austrian State Archives and joint Editor of the eight volumes of the Austro-Hungarian Official Documents. We hope to return to the whole subject in a future number of the Review.*—ED.]

The Rôle of Bosnia in International Politics (1875-1914). By R. W. Seton-Watson. Raleigh Lecture in History. Proceedings of British Academy, vol. xvii. London (Milford). Reprint, 2s. net. 36 pages.

THE author begins by pointing out that within a space of fifty years three international crises found their origin in Bosnia and Hercegovina—

in 1875, in 1908 and in 1914. He then attempts, in an attractive narrative, full of ideas and based on archive material, to explain this momentous fact through the geographical situation and the history of the two provinces since their settlement by Southern Slav tribes in the 7th century. He ascribes to them an active part in the movement for Yugoslav unity and claims that especially the last crisis, which led to the Great War, was, in Bosnia and the other Yugoslav provinces of Austria-Hungary, "entirely spontaneous and original, and in no sense the work of outside organisation" (pp. 34-35). He does not seem to me to have fully succeeded in proving this. His own narrative shows that the two provinces had not been able to form a centre of national effort, being incapable of unity or concentration alike from a religious, national or social standpoint. Split up between Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Islam, unable to bridge the gulf between Serb and Croat, Bosnia-Hercegovina suffered, up to the most recent times, from the conflict between the propertied upper class of Moslem begs and agas, who, though Yugoslavs by race, were politically and intellectually the exponents of Turkish rule, and the oppressed masses of the rural population. This division also hindered the growth of an intellectual leading class, and the rôle of active leadership thus fell, not to Bosnia, but to Serbia. Why this happened cannot be summed up better than in the author's own words: "But Serbia, though her upper and middle classes were exterminated" [by the far greater severity of Turkish rule in Serbia than in Bosnia, as he makes clear later] "preserved within certain narrow limits a real unity of purpose and outlook; and when at last she threw off the yoke of 350 years, there were no complex issues to arrest her development, and she emerged as a free, if primitive, peasant community, strongly Orthodox in sentiment and led by her own national leaders." Serbia succeeded already in the first half of the 19th century in attaining self-government. In Serbia, above all, and then in Montenegro, where similar preconditions existed, and in the Serbian districts of the Habsburg Monarchy, which were freer to develop their own culture, the spiritual foundations of a movement for Southern Slav unity were laid, and this was soon taken up by the governing class in the Principality, the Serbian Piedmont, as the memorandum of Ilija Garašanin in 1844 and the political testament of Prince Michael show.¹ Meanwhile the population of Bosnia-Hercegovina, in so far as it had any share in the movement—which can really only be said of a section of the Orthodox Serbs—was entirely under the influence of this Serbian Piedmont. It was far more object than subject in the movement. The rising of 1875 was at first a movement of small peasants against the big Moslem landlords and only acquired its acute character and its international import-

¹ Cf. the cautious survey of Roderich Gooss, *Das oesterreichisch-serbische Problem bis zur Kriegserklärung Oesterreich-Ungarns an Serbien*, in *Das Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses des deutschen Reichstages*, 1st series, vol. x (Berlin, 1930), pp. 23-28; also Ernst Anrich, *Die jugoslawische Frage und die Julikrise 1914* (Stuttgart, 1931), pp. 23, 26.

ance through the intervention of official and unofficial Serbia.² Serbia's defeat at the Congress of Berlin and her close political attachment to Austria-Hungary led to a truce in the Bosnian movement. The second crisis, of 1908, after the annexation of Bosnia, was almost exclusively determined by Serbia's passionate resistance and by the intervention of the Great Powers. (In this connection Seton-Watson brings out effectively the clumsiness of Aehrenthal in not making full diplomatic use of Russia's concessions under the secret conventions of 1876, 1877 and 1881.) In the same way the revolutionary movement in Bosnia which led to the final crisis of July, 1914, is unthinkable without Serbian influence. No one would maintain that the movement would have been possible without the native Bosnians, and especially the Orthodox Serbs, taking an active share in it; but to explain this revolutionary current solely "by the very existence of Serbia and by recent military exploits" in the Balkan wars (see p. 34), is certainly wrong. A page later the author is more cautious when he denies Serbia's responsibility "for the *whole* revolutionary propaganda." She is not to be credited with it all, but she laid the fire and fanned the flame.³ Moreover, the movement drew its scientific apparatus from Serbia, notably from the writings of Miroslav Spalajković and Jovan Cvijić. The Serbian Press was constantly at work fanning the revolutionary flames. The Serbian political parties favoured a systematic undermining of the Southern Slav provinces of Austria-Hungary, and secret organisations worked in the same direction.⁴

In particular we may regard as proved the propaganda from Serbia among the secondary and high school students of the two provinces (cf. Gooss, *op. cit.*, p. 191), which led directly to the catastrophe. After

² See details on the rising in E. von Wertheimer, *Graf Julius Andrássy*, II, pp. 248-53. The well-balanced survey of the attitude of the Great Powers towards this conflict, as given by Seton-Watson on pp. 15-25, has a definite value of its own.

³ Seton-Watson says on p. 35 :—" This is not the place to treat a question in which the whole vast problem of war responsibility is involved; and I may be excused for referring my audience to my book, *Sarajevo - a Study in the Origins of the Great War*, in which the subject is dealt with in great detail. Nothing that has been published in the last five years affects in any way the main arguments then put forward." I do not know whether he is still of this opinion, in view of the new material put forward by Roderich Gooss, *op. cit.* It is naturally impossible for me also within the limits of a short review to deal adequately with Seton-Watson's contention. I can only refer the reader to Gooss's book and my review of it in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, Bd. cxliv, pp. 78-104, and the literature quoted there, in particular the writings of Prof. Uebersberger.

⁴ As regards the Friedjung Trial and the forged Slovenski Jug documents, referred to by Seton-Watson on p. 30, it may now be regarded as proved by the documents published in the official Austrian collection (*Oesterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik*), that it was not a question of forgeries by the Austro-Hungarian Legation in Belgrade, but of forged documents played into its hands from the Serbian side. See A. von Rappaport, *Rund um den Friedjung-prozess*, in *Berliner Monatshefte*, ix, pp. 339, *seq.*

the attempt of the Bosnian student Jukić on the dictator Cuvaj in 1912, it was proved that the bomb given to him in Belgrade and seized in Zagreb, came from a Serbian military arsenal. From the statements of a member of the secret Serbian "Black Hand," Oskar Tartaglia, we learn that the Serbian officer who gave the bomb to Jukić was the same Major Tankosić who supplied the murderers of Francis Ferdinand. (Cf. Gooss, p. 193, and Uebersberger in *Der Weg zur Freiheit*, ix, p. 405, x, p. 183.) Another member of the Black Hand, Colonel Čedomir Popović, relates in *Nova Evropa* for July, 1932, that since the annexation crisis numerous young men from Bosnia were given a military training in Serbia. The Serbian Government did nothing to check this propaganda; on the contrary, it furthered it both secretly and openly⁵ and worked with Russian help for the destruction of the Monarchy. Information from Serbian sources as to the Serbian Government's knowledge of the plot against the Archduke have to this day not been effectively refuted.⁶ From the strictly geographical standpoint it is true to say that three great European crises have arisen in Bosnia in the last fifty years, but their deeper causes are to be traced to the Pan-Serb movement encouraged by Serbia and promoted by Russia.

Vienna.

L. BITTNER.

Očerki po Istori Russskoy Kultury. By P. N. Milyukov. Vol II, Part II. Jubilee edition. Paris, 1931. Pp. 461-1011.

PROFESSOR P. N. MILYUKOV'S *Outlines of History of Russian Culture*, the first edition of which was published thirty years ago, are well known in Russia. It is a standard work which has served as a textbook for many generations of teachers of Russian history. There is no other work on Russian civilisation which can rival it in the mass of its material, the comprehensive elucidation of all sides of Russian culture and its scholarly and objective narrative. Only an historian of his enormous erudition and wide political experience could treat this subject with success.

The new jubilee edition of the second volume published last autumn can be regarded as a new work. The old second volume of 402 pages has grown into two volumes comprising 1011 pages. The reign of Nicholas II and the Soviet period furnish the main additions to the old contents, but the other parts have also been revised. The present

⁵ One example out of many. The anti-Austrian demonstrations on the occasion of the visit of Croat students in April 1912—during which the cannon were pointed against the Hungarian frontier town of Zemun (Semlin), took place in presence of the heads of the Serbian Government (cf., *Oest-Ungs Aussenpolitik*, iv, no. 3,456, and other documents there quoted).

⁶ We can distinguish quite clearly two currents in the Serbian publications on these questions. The one, consisting of men who played their part in the movement for unity, would like to place their achievements in the light of history and tell more than is agreeable to the other, which would like to uphold the theory of sole responsibility on the part of the Central Powers.

volume includes history of art and education. Two chapters deal with the history of Russian architecture, painting, music and theatre, and six chapters are devoted to the history of education.

Milyukov points out the main difference between the evolution of Western and Russian art. In the west of Europe the development of art was not stopped by the adoption of Christianity; the old Greco-Roman tradition was adapted to religious aims and continued to grow within the Church. Russia, on the contrary, accepted the new religion from Constantinople at a time when Byzantine art was fully developed and stabilised. The period of free activity was completed and the Eastern Church had established certain rules and types which dominated creative art. Architecture, painting and music were subjected to rigid regulations, which limited the imagination of the artists. This difference explains why the Russian national style in art took such a long time in coming. The author gives a detailed account of the evolution of a Russian style in church building, which culminated in the masterpiece—the Cathedral of St. Basil in Moscow. Unfortunately, for Russian originality, the restrictions imposed by the Russian Church impeded the further development of a national style.

The same tale has to be told about the evolution of Russian icon painting. After reaching its highest mark in the icons of Rublev, Russian iconography was centralised by the Moscow Patriarch and lost its originality and local character. Thus it came about that when the western world was opened for Russia by Peter the Great, there was no living national tradition to withstand its influence. Since the time of Peter, Russian art has imitated western models. The autocrats of the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries usually invited foreign architects to build the imposing palaces and government offices in St. Petersburg, foreign painters to portray sovereigns and courtiers, and foreign composers to stage new operas.

A revival of Russian originality in painting and music came only in the second half of last century. In music, the revival of Russian popular melodies was the work of Glinka, who broke down the ascendancy of foreign composers by writing the national opera *Zhizn za Tsarya*. The world-known composers of the following period, although influenced by Italian and German schools, succeeded in creating an original Russian music, without which no symphony programme is now complete. In painting, the society known as *Peredvizhniki*, the most famous representative of which is Ilya Repin, established an independent Russian school of painting.

In conclusion, Milyukov describes the unsuccessful attempt of the Soviet Government to create a new "proletarian" art after the Revolution. However, neither in architecture, nor in painting and music could they achieve anything outstanding. Their efforts were rather directed to imitation and exaggeration of the *dernier cri* in Western post-war art. The severe censorship and the demand of class consciousness

are not favourable to free creative activity. The best Russian artists emigrated to Western Europe and America.

Whereas the history of Russian art is viewed by the author as a gradual secularisation and emancipation from the restrictions of the Church, the history of education bears a different character. The Russian Church, unlike the Western Church, did not succeed in establishing a system of clerical schools. Thus, when Peter attempted to build up a system of secular schools, there was no rival system of the Church. When, in the 19th century an attempt was made to undermine the lay system by Church parochial schools the initiative came from the State and not from the Church. The Russian school system was from the start a State system and thus has no parallel in the West.

In dealing with the history of Russian education Milyukov quite consciously leaves out of his survey the schools of non-Russian nationalities. If the omission of education in Poland and Finland is justified because they never formed integral parts of Russia, the exclusion of the schools of the Dorpat and Vilna regions is more arbitrary. The Polish school system of the Vilna region existed under Russian sovereignty for forty years and served as a model for the rest of Russia. Evidently the same reasons explain why the author does not mention the schools of the Brotherhoods in the 16th and 17th centuries. But these schools, although on Polish territory, can hardly be regarded as non-Russian. On the contrary, by their educational and publishing activities, the South-western provinces were saved for Orthodoxy and Russian nationality from the danger of Polonisation. It almost seems as if the author identifies Russia with Muscovite Russia and mentioned the Academy of Kiev only because it was in fact the source of Moscow clerical education.

The third chapter on education describes the lay system of the 18th century. The unsuccessful attempt of Peter the Great and the institution of the Catharinian schools are the chief events. Milyukov points out the main defect of this system—the absence of elementary schools in rural districts. The ideas and intentions were democratic enough, but without a basis of elementary education among the peasants the elevation of the whole nation was impossible. The same mistake was made by Alexander I when he remodelled the whole system under the influence of Condorcet. The next autocrat, Nicholas I, changed entirely the established democratic tradition and replaced the ladder system of Alexander for one of rigid class compartments.

In describing the period of liberal reforms, Milyukov does not mention the project of 1862, which reflected the democratic ideas of the time much better than the actual statutes of 1864. Education of girls is only mentioned, and the establishment of the first Higher Courses for Women is entirely omitted. The reign of Alexander II Milyukov divides into a liberal period (1856–66) and a reactionary period (1866–80), following in this an established tradition. The writer of these lines has endeavoured

to show that both periods must be looked upon as progressive, as contrasted with the reigns of Nicholas I and Alexander III.¹

The reign of Nicholas II is a new addition to the work, and here Milyukov vividly describes the struggle between the Government and public opinion as represented by the *Zemstva* and later by the Duma. The rapid growth of elementary and adult education entirely changed the country during this period. A few more years with the same rate of progress would have so reduced illiteracy as to make compulsory education possible. To the short period of the Provisional Government only two pages are devoted, and the conclusions of Milyukov are negative. However, the Provisional Government enacted very important measures on the administration of schools and in the domain of higher education, besides introducing the new orthography, mentioned by the author.

The Soviet period is described in the two last chapters. Milyukov, however, deals with it as a whole and, therefore, the close connection of the first period of "utopianism" with the radical tradition of the Russian intelligentsia and the change of policy during the "absolutist" period is not very clearly shown. The political character of the whole system based on the Marxist principle of class policy is lucidly described.

By including the reign of Nicholas II and the Soviet period, the author has given a complete account of the old régime and its consequences. The work as a whole, in its fuller and revised edition, will serve future generations of Russian teachers as its predecessor has served the past.

In his conclusion, Milyukov gives his main conceptions of Russian history. He distinguished two stages of evolution: the "organic" and the "critical," or the "elemental" and the "conscious" stages. But this division is not a division by periods of progress and reaction. The development of a national culture into a modern civilisation is not a qualitative change from an original Russian source into a borrowed foreign imitation. It is an organic growth, which assimilated foreign elements without losing its national basis. And this is not peculiar to Russia alone, but is a general historic process. Although Milyukov compares Stalin to Peter the Great, he regards neither of them as the creator of a new Russia. Both revolutionary periods are not breaks in evolution, but only phases in national development. The historical process will continue, in spite of the enormous efforts of Stalin to change its course. The accidental features of the present régime are doomed to failure, and only what is essential for national progress will survive.

The whole book and this calm and objective conclusion will serve Russia much better than outcries of simple hatred of the Bolsheviks. In the unfavourable conditions of exile, the author has once more substantiated his undiminished belief in Russia's future.

N. HANS.

¹ N. Hans: History of Russian Education Policy Ch. V.

Soviet Russia and the World. By Maurice Dobb. London (Sidgwick and Jackson), 1932. Pp. 178.

THIS is perhaps the only book which gives a short exposition of the theoretical foundation of the Communist experiments in Russia. It is not an interpretation only; it is an attempt at the same time to justify the new doctrine.

In a very vivid narrative Mr. Dobb succeeds in presenting a compact picture of the first Five Year Plan, as seen by the Soviet authorities. The author takes for granted the official explanations of this or that partial failure of the Plan as being the result of the evil inheritance of the Tsarist Government, the effects of the Civil War, of the blockade, and of the general attitude of the capitalistic governments towards the Communist régime in Russia.

The most instructive pages of the book are perhaps those which deal with Russian foreign trade. The author disposes in a most successful way of the cry raised in this country against the dumping of Russian grain, timber, oil, etc., on British markets.

The chapters dealing with the planning system and the political system are, we think, too sketchy and will hardly satisfy the serious reader who seeks to find a sound theoretical doctrine underlying the economic and political life of Russia.

Mountains of literature have accumulated round the Five Year Plan in Russia, and it seems that the more books are published on this subject, the more difficult does it become to understand the real issue of the "Russian challenge" and the "Russian menace." Mr. Dobb's little book is very helpful in this respect.

There is no danger to the capitalist's world, according to the author, of immediate military aggression from Russia or of a serious trade challenge. "The challenge which Russia presents belongs to the less tangible realm of ideas. But if less tangible, that is not to say less patent. Two historical systems face one another: the gulf between them as great as that which separated capitalism itself from the medieval world. In a sense the gulf is deeper, since Russia throws down the challenge not of one property form to another, but a challenge to the very existence of a propertied class. . . . A collectivist order extols the subordination of individual rights to collective responsibility; a classless order extols collective labour, and not property and leisure, as the basis of social esteem. . . ." Nowadays "the issue between Capitalism and Communism becomes the major issue which each individual is forced to face, and on which he is forced by events to take his stand."

The 19th century was, according to the author, dominated by the ideas of 1789, the 20th century—by the ideas of 1917. And "the arena of disturbance is no longer confined to Europe, to be smoothed by a European conclave, in Geneva today rather than in Vienna. It is storming over Asia and America as well."

S. P. TURIN.

England, Russia and the Straits Question, 1844-1856. By Vernon John Puryear, Ph.D. Berkley (Univ. of California Press), 1931. Price \$5 net. Pp. 481.

It seems almost incredible, and yet it is literally true, that no serious diplomatic history of the Crimean War has ever been written in English. Kinglake's famous book is in many ways an English classic, but its main stress is on the military side, it is incomplete, and, above all, it is a mere travesty of the facts, inspired by a distrust of Napoleon III even more comprehensive and distorted than his hostility to Russia. Many essential documents have been published, but it is necessary to search for them in many different quarters, notably in Queen Victoria's *Letters*, in Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, and in the biographies of Clarendon, Aberdeen, Stratford, and other statesmen. A further handicap is the absence of anything approaching an adequate diplomatic study of Palmerston (Mr. Guedalla's is no more than a brilliant sketch, in which the Crimean War and our relations with Russia are only dealt with in passing). Even in such a work as the *Cambridge History of Foreign Policy*, Mr. Reddaway's chapter on the Crimean War is somewhat perfunctory and designed mainly as an apology for Palmerston.

Under these circumstances Professor Puryear deserves all sympathy for his gallant attempt to fill the gap, and it may at once be admitted that he has done more than any previous writer to collate all the British material and to supplement it from Russian and other foreign sources (though the Record Office is the only archive in which he has worked). His book thus contains much that is new to the English reader and helps to place the antecedents of the Crimean War in a new and juster perspective. None the less, the narrative is very unequal, omitting many essential incidents and gravely exaggerating or under-estimating others. To the first category belong his failure to explain the interconnection of the Hungarian and Polish refugee question and the despatch of the French and British squadrons to the Dardanelles in 1849; the virtual omission of the Leiningen mission and its influence upon Tsar Nicholas; the complete failure to bring out the arrogant and maladroit diplomacy of Prince Menshikov during his famous mission to Constantinople—so vital in producing the catastrophe, and such an instrument in the hands of the bellicose Stratford de Redcliffe; and again the failure to explain the Vienna Note (which is suddenly thrown at the head of the reader on p. 292).

Much more serious, however, is the exaggerated and one-sided part assigned to the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1844: Professor Puryear goes to the opposite extreme from most previous writers, who have quite unduly under-estimated its importance. (It is but fair to add that the full facts only became known through two articles in the *Russian Review* on the eve of the war, by Mr. S. Goryainov, and that their contents, like the revelations of the *Clarendon Life*, by Sir Herbert Maxwell, had presumably not yet been assimilated by historians when their attention was diverted to other and sterner things.) Professor Puryear is absolutely right in insisting

that the policy of Tsar Nicholas towards Turkey, as laid down in the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, was a reversal of that of Catherine, and rested upon the calculation that the maintenance of a weak Turkey was more advantageous than its partition. This doctrine was further applied at Unkiar Skelessi in 1833 (when the Tsar saved the Sultan from his victorious vassal Mehemet Ali), and extended by the secret agreement of Nicholas with Austria at Munchengratz in the autumn of that year. Nicholas and Metternich wished to reduce to a minimum France's rôle in the final settlement, and this aim—strengthened, of course, by motives of general European policy—inspired the quadruple agreement of 1840, the Tsar offering as bait to Palmerston the renunciation of the special privileges acquired by Russia at Unkiar Skelessi. The agreement reached verbally between Nicholas, Aberdeen and Peel in 1844, and confirmed in ultra-secret memoranda exchanged between the two Foreign Ministers, was on the Tsar's part a perfectly logical step forward on the path from Adrianople and Munchengrätz, and was interpreted by him as securing that Britain, like Austria, would not act without him in the Eastern Question, while his bugbear France would again be isolated and innocuous. He, of course, failed to see that while Aberdeen and Peel acted in good faith, they had Parliament to consider and could in no way bind their successors, and that for them, as for those successors, the value of a Russian understanding rose or fell according to their relations with Paris. The agreement could probably only have been implemented in the event of a rupture with France, which was actually imminent at the time of its conclusion. Thus Professor Puryear is gravely overstating his case when he affirms that "the agreement as arranged verbally in June 1844 was comprehensive enough to amount to an alliance on a world basis" (p. 53). It is hardly necessary to add that this view ignores many weighty constitutional aspects of the question.

On the other hand, Professor Puryear, while giving a very clear narrative of the attitude of Aberdeen's successors at the Foreign Office (Granville, Malmesbury, Russell and Clarendon) towards the secret agreement, does not explain the extent to which the situation had been transformed between 1844 and 1853 (when Nicholas, all the more when he saw his old friend Aberdeen as Premier of a seemingly all-powerful Coalition Ministry, thought the time had come for joint action in Turkey). Never did public opinion—uninformed and supersentimental, but for that very reason all the more reckless and explosive in its new-found strength—play so great a part in international quarrels, and hence the attitude of British opinion towards Nicholas, owing to his repression of Polish and Hungarian liberties and his grossly reactionary policy at home, had become a fundamental factor of which he himself naturally could not judge, but which seriously affected the outlook of British statesmen.

Another fundamental factor was the growth of British trade with Turkey, in the Black Sea and in the Levant generally, and the parallel decline of Baltic trade, owing to Russian prohibitive policy. A great

deal of light is thrown on this by Professor Puryear's third chapter, which is in many ways the most interesting in the book.

In chapter IV, Professor Puryear has interesting details to show that Napoleon III, in April 1853, was talking of a possible occupation of Belgium; but it is difficult to take seriously his contention that "England upheld Turkey simply because its fall would involve France in Belgium" (p. 253). This is not of course to deny the French *vellété* towards Belgium, which crops up at intervals between 1830 and 1870, and especially during the Luxemburg affair in 1867.

In assigning to Stratford de Redcliffe so large a share of the responsibility for war, Professor Puryear seems to the present writer to be fully justified; but he leaves out a great deal of the most conclusive evidence of this, as provided by the letters of four or five Cabinet Ministers and diplomatists, to say nothing of the Queen and Prince Albert.

Other highly doubtful theses are that by the end of 1853 it was "a toss-up whether France might not even take the side of Russia" (p. 317), and that "early in 1854 it appeared that England might have to bear the financial support of a French war against Russia" (p. 318). On the other hand, Professor Puryear brings out more than one point too often slurred over by other writers—e.g. on p. 346—"Although the British never admitted it, Nicholas was just as much interested in obstructing a possible British seizure of the Straits as were the British to prevent him from doing so"; and again, on p. 433—"The map of Europe today shows that the proposals of Nicholas I to England and Austria in 1853 embodied substantially the conditions as they now exist."

There is a most full and scholarly bibliography, and mistakes are very rare (Auplick for Aupick on p. 181, Buchannon for Buchanan on p. 100, Brailov for Braila on p. 93, Bendetti—several times—for Benedetti). Unfortunately, the language is often involved and obscure, notably in the passage summing up four main causes of the Crimean War (p. 303): phrases such as "a rather factual presentation seems inescapable" (79)—"the problem involved in the crux of world politics" (the concluding phrase, p. 433)—or "Having really been injured, the circumstances of the treaty evasion disarmed censure" (p. 290) are quite common. These and other blemishes do not, however, alter the fact that the book is a real contribution to a great subject still awaiting its historian.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

The Partition of Turkey: a Diplomatic History, 1913-1923. By Harry N. Howard. Norman (University of Oklahoma Press), 1931. \$5 Pp. 486.

PROFESSOR HOWARD is to be congratulated on his mastery of the vast mass of disjected and ill-digested diplomatic material relating to the final downfall of Turkey as an Imperial Power. His narrative is sober and unadorned, avoiding all fireworks or appeals to sentiment; but its impartial

realism speedily inspires confidence, and it is both well-proportioned and singularly accurate.

The first two chapters give a very fair survey of the breakneck course of Balkan events from 1912 to 1914 and bring out very clearly the facts, so often slurred over by superficial or interested writers, that as a result of the defeat of Turkey's German-trained armies in 1913, "German prestige was involved to a major degree" in her rehabilitation; that the Liman von Sanders Mission was an attempt to re-establish that prestige by a combined military and economic control of Turkey and was an incident of capital importance in the Near East; that Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1913 were actively discussing designs for the partition of Turkey into spheres of influence (*cf.* the Jagow-Forgách conversations, the reports of Pallavicini, and Berchtold's offer to Venizelos, to quote only a few of the significant details revealed in the Austrian war documents), and that Russia's attitude under Kokovtsev and Sazonov at the same period was in essence that of Nicholas I from 1829 to 1853—viz., that a weak Turkey was more advantageous to Russia than partition, and that the much-denounced Russian Councils of January and February 1914 were directly inspired, not by aggression, but by acute alarm at the Sanders Mission and culminated in the conclusion that Russia could not face a war before 1917 at earliest.

Chapters iii-v describe: (1) Turkey's entry into the war, in the three successive stages of the secret German alliance of 2 August (which the Allies failed to detect), the Goeben-Breslau affair, and the Turkish-Russian negotiations, intended by the Porte as dust in the eyes of the Allies and offering an analogy with Sonnino's treacherous parallel negotiations with the two rival groups; and (2) the discreditable bargaining and deep-seated dissensions among the Allies themselves, first as to the fate of Constantinople and the Straits, and then to win over, by hook or by crook, all or any of the three minor States—Greece, Bulgaria and Roumania. In passing, Mr. Howard makes the interesting point that France's attitude during the Straits negotiations is "most conclusive proof not only of lack of unity of Franco-Russian policy in the East, but of any pre-war collusion based on the alliance, for the settlement of the question of the Straits and that of Alsace-Lorraine" (p. 132). To use his own studiously moderate phrase, "Allied diplomacy during the war can hardly be viewed as an edifying spectacle" (p. 142); it lacked unity, principle, firmness, it rested on lavish promises of other people's property and absolute inability to concede their own, and this was, of course, even more true of the various Balkan Governments. Hence the British Government, for instance, banked at first upon Greece, and then, when King Constantine showed a well-grounded scepticism as to our methods of tackling the Dardanelles problem, switched over to Bulgaria and allowed itself to be duped time and again by the treacherous King Ferdinand and Radoslavov, while unwilling to pay Serbia the only price which could possibly have won her consent. Thus, in the end, tragedy and farce were well

blended when the Allied Ministers left Sofia on the very day when the German-Austrian forces crossed the Danube into Serbia in agreement with the expectant Bulgarians. Among the many interesting points brought out by Mr. Howard's rigidly sober narrative, and generally overlooked, are the facts that *one*, of course, only one, ingredient in the Dardanelles expedition was a direct Russian appeal for a diversion on behalf of the Armenian front; that Russia was mainly responsible for our early failures in Greece, and that Bratianu, after astute and complicated manoeuvring for two whole years, eventually missed his supreme opportunity during the Brusilov offensive in June 1916. The formal assurances which he and King Ferdinand gave to the Central Powers only two days before they entered the lists against them, are a worse blot on the Roumanian scutcheon than their exaggerated claim to the Banat and the Tisza frontier. It is only too true that "Allied Balkan policy proved to be a fiasco" (p. 176).

Chapter vii deals with the five secret inter-allied secret treaties of the Great War, recognising Russia's claim to Constantinople and the Straits, defining Italy's share of the booty and partitioning the greater part of Turkey between the four conspirators. These treaties, the Sykes-Picot and Grey-Cambon agreements and the astonishing parallel, but contradictory, negotiations conducted with Hejaz and Nejd by the British and Indian Governments, are very succinctly narrated; and Mr. Howard, wisely realising that the facts speak or rather shout for themselves, scarcely employs an adjective, though every sentence is an implied criticism of the Allied (not excluding this time the Associate) statesmen.

Three further chapters survey the Turkish problem as posed at the Peace Conference, the Treaty of Sèvres, the Greco-Turkish struggle and the overthrow of the Sèvres settlement at Lausanne in 1923, and the book closes with a consideration of the mandate principle as applied to the Middle East, Arab relations since the war and the transformation of the decaying Ottoman Empire into a virile if materialistic Turkish Republic. There is an excellent "selected" bibliography, followed by eighty pages of detailed footnote references, which enables the reader to check almost every one of the endless inevitably contentious statements in the book, and, indeed, without this the whole value of the book would have been destroyed. In short, Mr. Howard has performed a most valuable service, and his book may be confidently recommended as the only full picture of these events hitherto available in English.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

The Making of Roumania : A Study of an International Problem, 1856-66.

By T. W. Riker, B.Litt. Oxon., Professor in University of Texas.
Oxford (University Press), 1931. Pp. 592.

Two years ago we reviewed Mr. W. G. East's valuable little study of the diplomatic dispute in which the problem of Roumanian unity involved Europe in the years immediately following the Crimean War. The present

volume covers the same ground, in somewhat fuller detail up to 1858, but carries on the narrative not merely to the final achievement of unity, but to the end of the reign of Alexander Cuza and the election of Prince Charles in 1866. Indeed, it is much the fullest account of Cuza's reign in English, and being based on a careful study of the British, French and Austrian diplomatic records of the period, may fairly be claimed as the best account in any language of the *international* aspect of Roumanian history in ten specially eventful years. Enough had already been revealed to make it impossible to vindicate Stratford de Redcliffe from the charge of complicity in the Porte's scandalous opposition to Roumanian unity, and even of risking a European war rather than give way. Professor Riker, however, provides many interesting additional details, not hitherto published, illustrating the personal rivalry between Stratford and his French colleague Thouvenel. For instance, in March 1857, Stratford writes to Clarendon: "It would be a real humiliation to follow in the wake of a Power who loses no opportunity of influence or ascendancy at our expense", and yet this was the Power at whose side we had only recently fought a victorious war. In May he writes to his chief that the Grand Vizier's "fear of France is quite puerile. It is only by acting like a bully that I can at all keep him up to the mark" (p. 105). Here he uses the very word not unjustly applied to him by his critics. In July again he writes: "If Thouvenel be not curbed, he will ride roughshod over the whole of us" (p. 123)—a phrase which stands in amusing contrast to Thouvenel's and Clarendon's own comments upon Stratford. It is not, of course, suggested that Thouvenel's conduct was blameless, but the friction between him and Stratford must be judged in the light of the fact that a long succession of his predecessors as Ambassadors and *Chargés d'Affaires* had all found Stratford equally impossible. Professor Riker does not go an inch too far in speaking of the "ineptitude" of the British Ministers and of "Stratford's folly" in the Roumanian question and in emphasising the importance of the Osborne meeting as promoting a *détente*. The fact that Queen and Emperor met when they did was, in Clarendon's own phrase, "a godsend."

Perhaps the most interesting section of the book is the chapter entitled "A Benevolent Dictatorship," and few will quarrel with Professor Riker's estimate of Cuza as "a ruler with ideas but without the other requisites of statesmanship. . . . He aspired to become a Napoleon III by the methods of a Joseph II. But he had neither the country nor the qualities that would make the hope attainable" (p. 470).

In the early pages there are a few unfortunate misprints; for instance, Bukovina was ceded to Austria in 1775, not 1779 (p. 8), and the Convention of Akkerman was in 1826, not 1827 (p. 12). Vogorides was a Phanariot, not a Bulgarian, and son of the Prince of Samos, not of a Roumanian Hospodar (pp. 89 and 190). Ploëști is much more than 10 miles from Bucarest (p. 236). On p. 125 the phrase "ballots" is used, where obviously "voting papers" are meant. It is surely to be regretted that Mr.

Riker should have adopted the somewhat slipshod and often illogical French spelling of Roumanian proper names—Balsche (which is neither Roumanian, French, German, nor English), Philippesco for Filipesco, etc. But all these are entirely minor blemishes, and Professor Riker is to be most heartily congratulated on a work of great learning and scholarship, written in a spirit of true criticism, and yet of strong and discerning sympathy.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems: a study in modern Nationalism. By Joseph S. Rouček. Stanford (Univ. Press) and London (Milford), 1932. 18s. net. Pp. 422.

Roumania: Its History, Politics and Economics. By George Clenton Logio. Manchester (Sherratt and Hughes), 1932. 6s. net. Pp. 208.

THESE two books, written from widely different angles, will, if read in conjunction, provide the attentive reader with many clues to the complex and still extremely fluid situation in post-war Roumania. The first is by an American professor of social science of Czech origin, the second by a British business man, of Greek origin, both are friendly to Roumania, but the latter has far greater personal knowledge and probes the wounds with a surgeon's ruthless but steady hand. In both cases the historical introduction is very perfunctory and not always accurate (for instance, Mr. Rouček says that Austria restored "Russian Moldavia" (*sic*) to Turkey in 1739 and that she received Bukovina by the famous Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji in 1774, though this was, of course, between *Russia* and Turkey).

It is only for the post-war period that the two books become a serious guide, and even then Mr. Rouček's survey of the parties and their chief leaders is often somewhat suggestive of a gazeteer and rarely attempts to be critical. This is still more true of the chapter entitled "Internal Policy," where in a survey of successive cabinets the causes of the dismissal of the first Vaida Cabinet in 1920 are altogether omitted. The same applies to the appointment and dismissal of the short-lived Stirbey Cabinet in 1927 and again to the appointment of Professor Iorga in 1931. Yet without a clear account of these three classic incidents and of the Crown's peculiar rôle in them the whole development since 1918 remains quite unintelligible. Despite this excessive caution he occasionally jumps to the opposite extreme, as when he compares Ionel Bratianu to "Cavour, Bismarck and Gambetta"! (p. 115).

There is a long chapter on minorities, but no attempt is made to show in what particulars theory and practice differ; and a list of books, dealing with the question (some of them hardly worth quoting, while other much more serious contributions, such as Dr. Arthur Balogh's *Der internationale Schutz der Minderheiten*, are omitted) closes with the remark, "And so the discussions probably go on to the burdening of authors' postmen" (p. 186). There are two very serious errors: "nearly all Roumanians are adherents of the Greek Orthodox Church," in other words, the Uniates

are ignored, and in any case it is surely high time to get rid of the anachronous phrase "Greek Orthodox," dating from Austrian statistical practice in the middle of last century. And again, "the minorities are not so numerous as those in other European States," whereas they are the most numerous in any European State except Poland and Russia.

The chapter on "Constitution and Administration" contains a useful analysis, but again only the most perfunctory criticism. The remaining chapters on economic and commercial policy and finance are probably the most useful section of the book. The very elaborate bibliography of 28 pages is necessarily of very unequal value, being restricted to material in English, French and German.

Mr. Logio's book, on the other hand, is based on a long and intimate personal acquaintance with the country and the language and is fortified by constant quotation from the Roumanian Press and recent political writings. His criticisms are levelled in every direction—for instance, he explains Ionel Bratianu's xenophobia by "the extraordinary attitude of the Paris Conference towards Roumania" and has some scathing remarks about "the partiality of the Supreme Council for Béla Kun"—in both cases, with very considerable justice. On the other hand, while facing the grievances of the minorities much more frankly than Mr. Rouček, he is careful to insist on the point so often overlooked outside Roumania, that those grievances are above all due to "general maladministration" and to the centralising mania, and not to natural intolerance, of which the average Roumanian (as opposed to certain party hacks) is singularly devoid. He has some very frank speaking on the low standards of commercial morality and the disillusionment which this has caused to the foreign investor and exporter; but here again he does full justice to the appalling strain of the war upon the financial and economic system of Roumania—greater perhaps than in any other country, in proportion to its actual resources and reserves of strength. What he has to say on the causes of discontent in Bessarabia and Dobrogea, on the impossible franchise introduced by the Liberals, on official corruption and on the haphazard methods of agrarian reform, and again his plea for good relations with Bulgaria, deserves special attention. There is strong meat in this book, but it is obvious that its writer believes in the future of Roumania, when normal times return to Europe as a whole. Since the fall of the unconstitutional Iorga-Argetoianu Government last spring her destinies are once more in the hands of statesmen pledged to reform and democratic progress and capable, we trust, of preventing any dangerous relapse.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

George D. Herron and the European Settlement. By Mitchell Pirie Briggs, Ph.D. Stanford, Cal. (University Press): London (Milford), 1932. \$2. 178 pages.

ONE of the most curious features of President Wilson's campaign to "make the world safe for democracy," was his reliance upon the

investigations and reports of unofficial agents whose rôle was scarcely suspected at the time, but who sometimes exercised decisive influence behind the scenes. Of these the subject of this study was the most remarkable: and Dr. Briggs has added a valuable footnote to the later history of the war, based mainly upon the Herron Papers in the Hoover War Library. Herron had originally been a Congregational minister in the Middle West, but as a result of matrimonial troubles gave up his post and went to live in Europe, where he established many contacts with leaders of advanced political thought, developed a somewhat crude, though highly idealistic creed of "Christian Socialism," and while a declared enemy of capitalism, emphatically rejected the dogmatic materialism of Marx and Engels and sought among French thinkers the true Socialist evolution. During the war he keenly espoused the Allied cause and at the same time set himself to defend and interpret Wilson's policy. His book *Woodrow Wilson and the World's Peace* was so uncannily prophetic in summarising the President's mental processes and his transition from neutrality to war, that Herron, not unnaturally, came to be regarded as an intimate friend and confidant. As a result, he gradually found himself from the end of 1917 to the middle of 1919 in the curious position of informal intermediary between Washington and a long procession of emissaries from the Central Powers. and his reports, with their almost photographic precision and their skilful psychological backgrounds, unquestionably had a great effect upon the State Department and upon the President himself, who was doubtless flattered by the high note struck by Herron and indeed may be said to have shared the latter's "habits of theological thinking and homiletic writing." Dr. Briggs only states the bare truth when he asserts that there is "no better source than the record of Herron's conversations with representative Germans for discovering the phantom character of the hope for a negotiated peace." (p. 35.) While, however, Herron's talks with Muehlton, Haussmann, Quidde, Foerster and others were of great value, his decisive rôle is to be found in the negotiations with Professor Lammasch (acting secretly for the Emperor Charles) for a separate peace with Austria-Hungary; for this, more than any other incident, convinced Washington, and more indirectly London and Paris, of the hopelessness of disentangling Austrian from German policy or of reconstituting the Dual Monarchy in time of war upon a federalist basis.

The book deals consecutively with Herron's German, Austrian and Hungarian negotiations, and there are interesting chapters dealing with the Succession States, the abortive project of a Conference at Prinkipo (where Herron and William Allen White were to have been the two American delegates) and Herron's attitude to the Treaty of Versailles, which inspired his remarkable little book *The Defeat in the Victory*. The contrast between Herron's idealism and the hard realities of the post-war settlement will provide many clues to the future historian of Wilson's combined triumph and failure. There is, however, one side of Herron's

activities of which Dr. Briggs tells but little—his curious illusions as to Italian and Roumanian policy at the Peace Conference: he was not the only one to revolt against the proceedings of Clemenceau and Lloyd George, only to swallow blindly the far more questionable tactics of Sonnino and Bratianu.

R. W. SETON-WATSON

Jadwiga, Poland's Great Queen. By Charlotte Kellogg. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931, xxvi + 304 pp.) \$2.50

IN December 1930 I had the honour and privilege to present Mrs. Kellogg's manuscript to the National Congress of Polish Historians. Everybody agreed then that Mrs. Kellogg could not have made a better choice in order to familiarise the English-speaking countries with the most brilliant period of the Polish past. Although far removed—Jadwiga died in 1399—this period is not without striking parallels with Poland's present situation, as Mr. Frank H. Simonds admirably explains in his introductory remarks. M. Paderewski's preface, again, makes it quite clear that Jadwiga's glorious tradition is still today a living reality for the Polish nation. Her life did not last much more than twenty-five years, but, nevertheless, one could scarcely find any important problem of Poland's historical development which was not strongly influenced by her strenuous activities. Finally, it is not at all an exaggeration to call her the Polish Joan of Arc. Without herself fighting on battlefields, she none the less sacrificed her life and happiness for her country and for the progress of Christian civilisation in Eastern Europe.

All this is well understood by Jadwiga's American biographer. Full of enthusiasm and conscious of her responsibility, she made a long pilgrimage to all the various places in Hungary and Austria, in Poland and Lithuania, where this Hungarian Princess of French origin, promised as a child to an Austrian Prince, made Queen—or rather *King*—of Poland in her eleventh year, married to the pagan Grand Duke of Lithuania, lived and suffered more than five hundred years ago. Before visiting these places, Mrs. Kellogg had carefully studied almost everything she could find published on Jadwiga and her times, and during her long travels she was always anxious to examine in libraries and archives the original documents concerning Jadwiga's reign. Her book has an undoubted scientific value, and even for a specialist it is not easy to discover more than one or two slight errors which were unavoidable under the given circumstances.

At the same time her book has all the charm of what one usually calls a "vie romancée." In order to obtain such a result, she did not require to alter in any way the historical facts, because Jadwiga's life was, indeed, something like a marvellous romance. Mrs. Kellogg brought to it a remarkable talent for writing and a delicate sensibility, which give a completeness to her work.

She has an unquestionable right to the gratitude not only of the Poles, who are preparing a translation of the book into their language, but also

of American and English readers, to whom she has shown an unexpected outlook on an impressive and important event of European history

O HALECKI

Bonfire: Stories Out of Soviet Russia. An Anthology of Contemporary Russian Literature Edited by S. Konovalov, M.A., B Litt. London (Ernest Benn, Ltd.). Pp. viii + 320. 7s. 6d. net.

"To show the Russia of today through fiction, and to give at the same time representative examples of its literature, is the object of this anthology," says the Editor of *Bonfire* in his preface to it. And on the whole it must be agreed that the book does fulfil this twofold aim. It is obvious, of course, as Professor Konovalov himself admits, that it is difficult to fulfil both these aims simultaneously to the same extent. It is also obvious that the Editor's chief intention was "to show the Russia of today through fiction." It was this that guided him in his choice of specimens rather than purely literary considerations, and made him, in selecting twenty-four representative authors, chiefly of the younger generation, rely for the most part on *extracts* from longer works rather than give whole stories (though some are to be found in full, including one of the best stories of Zamyatin—*The Cave*—in a very good version by Prince D. S. Mirsky, originally published in this *Review*). Some of the authors have certainly suffered from this method, but this seems inevitable, though I doubt whether in view of this it was, for instance, advisable to include an extract from Yury Olesha's *Envy*, a very remarkable book, but one which can only be understood as a whole. There are some omissions in the list of authors represented, but most of them are explained by the Editor as either due to technical reasons or intentional—he did not include "writers of the older generation and tradition who have said their say before the revolution," though one may ask why include Alexey N. Tolstoy and omit Sergeyev-Tsensky. On the whole, the selection is very good and representative. The English of the translations is good, too (most of them had to be done specially for the purpose by several persons), though I must say that in the extract from Olesha's *Envy* I discovered several inaccuracies.

It is to be very much regretted that in the case of extracts no mention is made of the work from which they are extracted, and for the names of the authors of all the pieces contained in the anthology one has to refer to the table of contents. The titles given here are often fictitious, so that, taking, for instance, the same Olesha, the reader of the anthology will never learn that his *Conspiracy of Feelings* is merely an extract from his novel, *Envy*, which is never so much as mentioned. Notwithstanding these defects, important as they are, everyone who is interested in present-day Russia and her "complex and contradictory problems," will find this anthology highly instructive. No political tendency presided over its compilation.

G. S.

The Slav Anthology: Russian, Polish, Bohemian, Serbian, Croatian
Translated by Edna Worthley Underwood. Portland, Maine (The
Mosher Press), 1931. Pp. xviii, 346.

MANY satires have been written by American authors on the care-free attitude of their countrymen towards differences of decades and centuries in European history. The best of these are recalled to us when Miss Underwood, having mentioned Kościuszko with the date 1792, continues. "History has recorded the bloody Turkish wars, the Pugatshev Rebellion, the uprising of the Zaporogian Cossacks, and the Polish Confederations. And with the 19th century came the Napoleonic Wars"; or when she puts the Goncourt brothers into the list of writers representative of the Paris of the July monarchy. Of course, in such wide historical matters the reader may easily make his own corrections. It is more dangerous when Miss Underwood practises the same chronological licence in points of a more special character; and she does so continually in her essays preceding sections given to various Slavonic languages. Her selection follows her individual taste only; many great names are absent, whereas one Glinka and one Shcherbina are included.

The translations are free, in the full sense of the word. Mickiewicz's sonnet "Mountains from the Kozlov Steppe," for instance, which has a dialogue form, becomes here a monologue, not to the advantage of sense. But all records of freedom are beaten when we come to Pushkin's "Serenade." Instead of translating the text of the poet ("Nochnóy zefeér strooyít aifeér"), Miss Underwood seems to have translated a few verses of the famous parody by "Koozma Prootkov" (*Zhelanie byt Ispantzem*). One verse at least is worth quoting:

"I'll wake thee if sleeping,
With swirling strings' sound,
Old white-head watch keeping
I'll strike to the ground."

This surely ought to delight all admirers of "Koozma Prootkov," though devotees of Pushkin may be less easily satisfied.

W. BOROWY.

Russian Grammar and Self-Educator. By Louis Segal, M.A., Ph.D.
4th ed., revised and enlarged, 1932. *British Russian Gazette*. 6s.

THE use of the new spelling and the introduction as conversation and translation matter of political and geographical snippets of a topical, post-revolutionary character will no doubt serve to make this book known to some teachers and learners. In view, however, of the numerous English manuals of Russian already on the market, some good and scholarly and others in their own way also good but with a more popular appeal, a new venture certainly requires to combine exactness and clarity, though not necessarily fullness, of exposition with the attractiveness of format Dr. Segal's book has, before it can justify its claim to be the "best book on Russian, best as a self-educator and best for class-room."

In some respects at least this boast—though boost is perhaps a fairer description, for the words quoted appear on the publisher's jacket—cannot be substantiated. Considering that the edition in question is “completely revised,” something better and fuller on Russian pronunciation than the miserably inadequate and misleading opening pages might reasonably be looked for. It is true that “Russian pronunciation is not very difficult” in the sense that an English speaker can learn to pronounce Russian very passably, and that even without hearing it spoken, if he uses the excellent manual of Trofimov and Jones; but to learn to do so, it is imperative that he have presented to him a detailed and, above all, correct account of the divergences between the printed and the spoken sounds.

Phonetics being entirely beyond his ken and details abhorrent to him, the simplification Dr. Segal adopts is necessarily false, and perniciously false. It is wrong to say that “Russian vowels . . . very rarely change their original sounds,” and even wronger to say that “if the first syllable of the word has an accented *o*, the following syllables formed (!) with *o* retain the original pronunciation” Again, the reader is baffled by the statement that *ъ* has “no sound, soft pronunciation of the preceding consonant.” With nothing to guide him, he will naturally ask himself whatever the “soft” pronunciation means. And will the key word *Rushchuk*, which, incidentally, is spelt in atlases in a variety of ways, help him to pronounce a *и*? Even if he finds a Russian, and not a Bulgarian or other Balkan speaker, to pronounce it for him, he may be sharp enough to say—why in the world not choose something from English, for example, “fresh cheese”?

Criticism of the grammatical part of the book and the style of the exercises accompanying it is really superfluous, but a few general remarks may serve as a warning for future compilers of similar textbooks. If Dr. Segal's intention is to write for those who are devoid of all grammatical training—as is implied by his considering it advisable to define a noun and explain what is meant by declension—he should be careful either to avoid altogether the technical phraseology of grammar or at least provide it with an interpretation in something like everyday language. Those who do not know what a noun is will not make much of the rule that “after a negation the genitive follows as a direct complement instead of the Acc.” And those who find it helpful to be misinformed that “words that tell us something about the subject of a sentence are called verbs” will be anything but enlightened by the bald statement that “verbs are inflected by number, person, tense, and mood.” Nor is it easy to see what useful purpose is served in an elementary book by dishing out the present tense of *быť*, of which “only the third person(s) . . . are occasionally used,” or by including the declension of the singular *ди́а*, which, in conversation, is as dead as its gender. The exercises rarely rise above the gardener's watering-can order and are assuredly not exhilarating. The sentences for translation into Russian remain as dull as ditchwater to

the end of the book and seem always to consist of a single principal clause. The same strictures may be applied to the Russian sentences; our yearnings for excitement on reading that "he leads the elephant to town" remain ungratified.

To sum up, the *British Russian Gazette* is not to be congratulated on having ushered into a heartless world this newest of Russian grammars.

N. B. JOPSON.

Linguaphone Conversational Course: Polish. Text by Dr. T. Benni.

Recorded by T. Bocheński, Dr. K. Górski, Mlle. K. Rychter, F. B. Czarnomski, J. Zarański. London (The Linguaphone Institute). 1932. £6 6s.

ALL teachers and students of Polish will welcome with enthusiasm the appearance of this set of sixteen 10-inch gramophone records and two companion booklets. Like all the Linguaphone courses, it consists of a series of talks on everyday life in which all the words and phrases of most common usage, as well as the principal rules of grammar, are gradually introduced. The narrative passages alternate with questions and answers. Graphic illustrations in the text facilitate the identification of words and objects. The vocabulary assists the learner by giving him translations not of single words, but of phrases used. Still greater assistance to the study will be given when the third publication which, we understand, is being prepared—a short grammar of the language—appears in print.

A virtue to be particularly stressed in this course is that it provides an opportunity for hearing Polish spoken by five different persons, which is by no means frequent in records of this kind. The chief announcer of the Warsaw broadcasting station, an actress, a university lecturer and two diplomats share the speaking parts. The last two are less effective, naturally enough, for lack of phonetic training; in their evident efforts to be distinct they lay too much emphasis on nasal vowels and on the *w* of adjectives, such as *krakowski*, etc. We have noticed also two small differences between the printed text and the recording, in lesson 27: *już* for *tu*, and *zachodnim* for *wschodnim*. There are also some misprints, easy, however, to correct. Some mistakes in spelling occur in the plan of Warsaw on p. 44, but in the printed explanation to it everything is correct. Clementine Sobieska who married James Stuart, the Pretender, was not John Sobieski's daughter (as is said on p. 45), but his granddaughter.

On the introductory record containing sounds and their combinations the sound *s* in a few cases is rather weak, but, on the whole, the recording is very distinct. Of course, it is difficult to avoid solemnity in such recitals, but on the whole this danger has been avoided, and one reciter in particular, Dr. Górski, has shown himself a master of naturalness with occasional touches of humour. His talk on clothes and his questions as a waiter in a restaurant are small masterpieces of their kind.

W. BOROWY.

Dialektološka Karta Slovenskega Jezika. By Prof. Fran Ramovš Ljubljana (University Press), 1931.

EVEN in Slovenia, the country of beautifully printed and artistic books, this strictly philological and technical work must have been a surprise. No expense has been spared to make the appearance attractive in the highest degree: the paper is first class, the margins large, the printing a delight to the eye, and the maps are magnificently neat. The present reviewer is unable to give the price—Professor Ramovš having kindly made him a present of the book—but he shudders to think how much a publisher would ask for it, had it been printed in England.

After briefly enumerating the distinguishing characteristics assigned by philological theory to the Slovenian spoken in the period immediately preceding the earliest records, Ramovš makes the illuminating remark "But the chief difference (between the primitive Alpine Slovenian and the other Slavonic languages) was one which we cannot demonstrate from the sources; it consisted in subtle shades of articulation and in tendencies. New surroundings and a new way of life . . . gradually intensified the originally slight distinctions and . . . gave an independent stamp to Slovenian." Just as there never was a uniform Common Slavonic, so there never was any stereotyped Slovenian; even in the earliest period many of the features existed which now differentiate the various dialects.

This insistence on fine distinctions which do not appear in the early written word and cannot be fully captured in print even today when phonetics is a universally recognised necessity in language study is reiterated on page 7: "but we must above all stress the early different colouring of the whole articulation, the difference in rhythm and tempo."

As the author shows, the development towards the modern language progressed quickly, and the texts of the 14th century even show little difference from those of the present day.

After tracing the work done in the field before him and paying a tribute to Tesnière's recent monumental work, Ramovš elaborates the meaning of what a dialect is, and ultimately arrives at a total of thirty-six dialects with twenty-nine sub-dialects, all of them sprung from seven original types.

This seems a surprisingly large total for an area so small as Slovenia, but it has long been known that Slovenian is dialectically very much differentiated, far more so than, for example, Russian, which is spoken over an incomparably greater extent. In mountainous districts considerable linguistic variation seems very much the rule, as those who have, for instance, looked into Gartner's handbook on the Rhaeto-Romansch dialects will appreciate. And, after all, the degree of dialect distinctions is a variable quantity. Did not Lorentz in his grammar of "Slovintian" (in 1903 known to about 200 persons who were, however, too old or decrepit any longer to speak it) distinguish numerous sub-divisions and dialects with, in some cases, less than ten representatives? After that, anything is possible.

N. B. JOPSON.

Këndime anglisht-shqip or Albanian-English Reader. Sixteen Albanian Folk-Stories Collected and Translated, with Two Grammars and Vocabularies. By Margaret M. Hasluck. Cambridge (University Press), 1932. Pp. xl + 145.

MRS HASLUCK has pressed a great deal into her small book, and for the purpose which she has had in view, the learning by speakers of Albanian and English of each other's language, the compression is practical and efficient. In a preface written with disarming modesty and just a hint of banter she sets out the conditions under which the texts forming the bulk of the book were written down, and then launches out into a short grammatical sketch of the two languages. The essentials of formal English grammar are explained in Albanian and, *pari passu*, on the same page, those of Albanian in English. It might have been well to give some warning of this unconventional treatment, but the intelligent reader will hardly be inconvenienced. In the Albanian half, while the pronunciation is indicated only briefly (the *o* of *only* is not a good parallel for Albanian *o*, by-the-by), considerable attention is paid to the declension of the noun, adjective and pronoun; this is wise because the pronoun, like the attributive article, presents real difficulties. The verbs, on the other hand, even the numerous and common irregular ones, are fairly easy.

It is presumably because space, and therefore expense, was a very important factor, that Mrs. Hasluck has not included a syntax. This is rather a pity because, even with the help of the translation of the texts, the notes and the good vocabulary, the learner will often have trouble in making out exactly the grammatical function and literal correspondence of the words in the original text and the English translation. The typically Balkan word-order, in particular—(1) the bringing forward of a subject or object from out of its relative clause, and (2) the putting of the verb before its subject in dependent clauses, even after the word for *and*—might have been spared a page or so. As it is, the learner will not always have an easy task in determining the precise equivalence of such sentences as *po ke kúngulli, tyke e çame, i dulë një mi* and *but as she was cutting it up a mouse came out of the pumpkin*. On the whole, however, the translation is very well done. It is kept as literal as possible, but is always in natural, colloquial English of the present day. In view of her desire to produce an English version which can be taken as a model by Albanians, Mrs. Hasluck is to be sincerely congratulated on having rendered her stories in a simple but dignified language, which has not borrowed any of the trappings of the conventional fairy-tale phraseology. The texts themselves which, as the preface tells us, were written down by school-children or dictated to them by their elders, are less influenced by the somewhat artificial, West-European syntax of the newspapers and school grammars than might have been expected, and for that students of the dialects and peasant speech will be grateful. The numerous foreign words of Greek, Serbian and Italian origin which occur in the talk of unlettered

Albanians, especially in districts bordering on foreign countries, are noticeably absent, having presumably been expunged by Mr. Leŕ Nosi, to whom Mrs. Hasluck acknowledges her indebtedness. Might he not also have removed some of the clumsy *i cili* constructions, for which there is a more natural equivalent in the spoken language?

The dialect chosen is the central one of Elbasan. As this dialect is now official, few will quarrel with the choice, but there will be many to take objection to Mrs. Hasluck's rather cursory dismissal of other dialects and grammars of them. If we omit textbooks and works written by teachers or officials, the Elbasan dialect has fewer literary productions to its credit than some of the others, notably those of South Albania (which are comparatively uniform). Not only are there excellent stories from various southern districts, with grammatical accounts of the dialects and translations of the texts into well-known languages, but many good and original writers hail from the south. In addition there is in America the influential Vatra Society, which uses for its literary medium the Korçe dialect, and there are grammars such as Leotti's in Italian and Pekmezi's in German which are thoroughly adequate for practical and scientific purposes. Mrs. Hasluck was no doubt quite right to base her book on the Elbasan dialect, but she is hardly justified in saying that other grammars than those she quotes—the excellent but short German one of Weigand and Leotti's Italian adaptation of it—are inadvisable for beginners, because they are written in "local dialects of short range."

Another and rather more meaty bone which can be picked with her concerns the phonetic system adopted in the vocabulary for reproducing English pronunciation. As her basis she takes *Chambers's Twentieth-Century English Dictionary*. The phonetic one of Professor Jones would have been a far better guide, and the symbols of the *Association Phonétique Internationale* little more complicated than those she uses. As Mrs. Hasluck caters for Americans as well as for Britons and wishes to retain in her figured pronunciation as much as possible of the Elbasan-Albanian spelling, she is entitled to represent *arm* by *armè*, *after* by *ăftër* or *bore* by *bor*, but she is open to the charge of inconsistency when she denotes *charm* by *çarm*, *answer* by *ănsër* or *borne* by *börn*. Nor is her distinction of *ll* and *l* clear; *ll* is generally used, and so the words with *l* may be misprints (e.g. *llip* for *leap*, but *lipă* for *leaped*), though this seems unlikely in view of the great care with which the proofs have obviously been gone over. Other examples of inconsistencies are to be found in such words as *ărro*, *kărixh*, *méseixh*, where the *r* of *arrow*, *carriage* is differently transcribed; and a concession to the conventional spelling is made in the notation of the identical final syllables of *carriage* and *message*.

Nevertheless, such criticisms need not be taken too seriously. The book is sound and clear and supplies a real want, and pioneers must expect some knocks.

N. B. JOPSON.

Polish Literature in English Translation. A Bibliography with a list of books about Poland and the Poles. Compiled by Eleanor E. Ledbetter. Foreword by Dr. Tadeusz Mitana. New York (H. W. Wilson Co.). 60 cents. Pp. 45.

THIS pamphlet is addressed not to Slavonic scholars, but to the librarians, especially the reference librarians, of public libraries, and to the average reader, equipped only with the English language, who visits a library in search of information about Polish literature and about Poland in general. For all such persons it will be of the greatest value. Mrs. Ledbetter has made her list of English translations from the Polish practically complete, giving references to periodical literature as well as to separate works, and she has added serviceable lists of books on Poland, its history, its customs, and its culture. On the more important books she gives competent descriptive notes. The occasional errors and omissions will not interfere with the usefulness of the work for the persons whom it is intended to serve.

G. R. NOYES.

Marko, the King's Son : Hero of the Serbs. By Clarence A. Manning, in collaboration with O. Muiriel Fuller. Illustrated by Alex. Key. New York (Robert M. McBride & Co.) \$2.50. 294 pages.

To any reader who is in search of "something Slavonic for a present" this book is most cordially commended. It re-tells in admirable prose eighteen of the principal legends with which Serbian ballad poetry has surrounded the shadowy figure of Marko Kraljević. The book is full of atmosphere and romance, and Professor Manning is to be congratulated.

R. W. S.-W.

To readers desirous of introducing an English classic to their Slav friends or of using it themselves as a linguistic exercise, we can warmly recommend two admirable Czech translations of *Alice in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking Glass*, by Dr. Jaroslav Césař. They originally appeared in the leading Moravian daily *Lidové Noviny* and are now issued in book form, with some of Tenniel's illustrations, under the title *Alenčina Dobrodružství v Podzemní Říš* (Prague, Elzevir).

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RUSSIAN PUBLICATIONS.

(Compiled by S. P. TURIN.)

Children's Books on the Five Year Plan.

THE young people of Russia—the children, the pioneers, the Komsomols—are naturally an audience about which the State cares a very great deal. Publications for them are as numerous as those for the grown-up workmen, Party men and Red Army soldiers. Textbooks, novels, poems and

other publications for children all have as their *leitmotiv* the Five Year Plan. Here, as an illustration, are some of the children's books which will give our readers an idea of the character of present-day children's literature, dealing with the economic problems of Russia in the past, present and future.

S. Besborodkov. Bolshevniki otkryli Sibir (The Bolsheviks have discovered Siberia). Illustrated by M. Rasulevich. Ogiz, 1932. 170 pp. The best part of this book is the illustrations, consisting chiefly of views of Siberia and of photographs of the works undertaken in connection with the Five Year Plan. The text is written by a confirmed Communist who has a great hatred of Tsarist and capitalist policy in the colonisation of Siberia. From the historical point of view it is on the whole an incorrect interpretation of the economic development of Siberia.

M. Il'in. Rasskas o velikom plane (Moscow has a Plan). Illustrated by M. Rasulevich. Ogiz, 1931. 213 pp. This is a popular description of the Five Year Plan which in addition gives a distorted picture of life in capitalist countries like the United States and others. The illustrations consist of photographs of work and views of the country. This book is now published in English.

E. Khazin. Ruda (Ore). Illustrated by A. Lagunov. Ogiz, 1931. 30 pp. This is a good description of the development of the mining industry. The book, simply written and nicely illustrated, has, we are sure, great success among children from 10 to 12 years of age. One page only is devoted to the Five Year Plan and to the decay of capitalist countries. The remainder would appeal to the children of this country and would be very instructive to them.

S. Marshak. Voina s Dneprom (War with the Dnieper). Illustrated by G. Bibikov. Ogiz, 1931. 16 pp. 32 kopeks. A collection of pictures of the construction works on the Dnieper, supplemented by a poem praising the achievements of the Five Year Plan.

N. Misslavsky. Magnitogorsk. Gosizdat, 1931. 32 pp. 30 kopeks. The first chapter, only, makes quite good reading for children. The remaining chapters are propaganda in favour of the Five Year Plan with a vast collection of figures. America is charged with having huge unemployment and treating workmen not as human beings, but as necessary tools for making profits. The future of Magnitogorsk is painted in very bright colours.

N. Misslavsky. Dneprostroy. Illustrated by V. Lanzetti. Gosizdat, 1930. 31 pp. This is a book with hardly any text. The illustrations consist of numerous photographs of the Dnieper and of works undertaken in connection with the Five Year Plan. These illustrations are supplemented by slogans, printed in big and small type, which remind one more of an advertiser's circular than of a children's book.

Pyatiletka (The Five Year Plan). Illustrated by A. Loptev. 85 kopeks. This is a poster about the Five Year Plan with a text vigorously advertising the Plan.

V. Shklovsky. *Turksib* (The Turkestan-Siberian Railway). Gosizdat, 1930. 32 pp. 25 kopeks. This little book is very well written and can be recommended as good reading on the Turkestan-Siberian Railway. The absence of the usual boasts about the Five Year Plan ought to make a good impression on the young reader and create an interest in the economic geography of the country.

E. Ulrich. *Detsky sad v beresovoy roshche* (The Kindergarten in a birch forest). Gosizdat. Second edition. 18 pp. This is a good book for children of 7 to 9 years old. It describes a kindergarten in a village, and shows how children can spend their time in a useful manner. The propaganda of the Five Year Plan is introduced here in a mild form and, with the exception of one or two pages, is objective and interesting. The illustrations are good and entertaining.

TRANSLATION BUREAU

The Bureau accepts materials, whether academic or commercial, for translation from and into Russian. The ordinary charge is 3/- per folio of 72 words. Special terms by arrangement for :

- (i) Technical work, including patents and specifications (minimum supplementary charge of 25 per cent.);
- (ii) Research work and summaries;
- (iii) Documents in manuscript.

Terms are reduced for translations of over 1,000 words.

Accuracy and confidence guaranteed.

The Bureau is also prepared to receive applications for a reader's opinion on publications in Russian.

It is hoped shortly to publish terms for translations from and into other languages of Slavonic and Eastern Europe.

SCHOOL OF
SLAVONIC AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES
(UNIVERSITY OF LONDON)

40 Torrington Square, London, W.C.1

Telephone: MUSEUM 9738

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

An American Quarterly Review

Hamilton Fish Armstrong—Editor



THE world's leading statesmen, economists and financial authorities write for FOREIGN AFFAIRS. They keep the readers of this important American review informed about the basic causes of the great events which today are making history.

CONTENTS OF THE JANUARY ISSUE.

SOME FOREIGN PROBLEMS OF THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION	<i>Edward M. House</i>
THE PERMANENT BASES OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY	<i>Viscount Kikujiro Ishii</i>
THE ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY POWER OF GERMANY	<i>General E. Réquin</i>
AN AMERICAN FARMER LOOKS ABROAD	<i>F. B. Nichols</i>
FRANCE AND GOLD	<i>Paul Reynaud</i>
BRITAIN AND THE GOLD STANDARD	<i>T. E. Gregory</i>
THE ISSUE IN HAITI	<i>Ernest Gruening</i>
THE PROSPECT FOR BRITISH LIBERALISM	<i>Ramsay Muir</i>
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE	<i>E. J. Phelan</i>
THE UNKNOWN FRONTIER OF MANCHURIA	<i>Owen Lattimore</i>
AFTER THE OTTAWA CONFERENCE	<i>J. M. Macdonnell</i>
THE SECESSION MOVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA ...	<i>Edgar H. Brookes</i>
IRAQ: THE END OF A MANDATE	<i>Rupert Emerson</i>
THE GREEK IMPASSE	<i>William Miller</i>
SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS...	<i>William L. Langer</i>
SOURCE MATERIAL	<i>Denys P. Myers</i>

—also the usual maps and notes, bibliography of new books in the international field, index of treaties and trade agreements, etc.

Subscriptions \$5 a year post free to any address.

Use form below for special offer.

TEAR OFF HERE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 45 East 65th St., New York.

Please enter me for a year's subscription and include *without charge* the issue described above. I enclose \$5 in payment.

Name
 Street
 City

January

THE SLAVONIC AND EAST EUROPEAN REVIEW.

VOL. XI. No. 33.

APRIL, 1933.

THE NEW CRISIS IN RUSSIA

AMONG informed people there is practically universal agreement that the present crisis through which Communist Russia is passing is the most serious that it has yet had to face. This is the only impression that can be gathered, whether from really serious students of Russia who have recently returned from there or from the Communist Press itself. It is, then, all the more extraordinary that the crisis should be almost completely ignored in England.

This ignorance can be explained. There is in the first place a selection of those whom the Russian Government is willing to admit to the country, and it is at once much more rigorous and more general than at any time that can be remembered under the rule of the Tsars. This is, of course, due to the fact that the Communist Government is virtually in a state of active conflict with the non-Communist world, which it wholeheartedly intends whenever possible to bring under the action of Communist principles. In a virtual state of war those who are most naturally excluded are those who know most about the antecedents of the country. But beyond that, there is the very real obstacle of finance. One of the most distinguished foreign authorities on Russia, a university man by no means hostile to the Communist Government, could not find the living conditions necessary to study and to freedom of enquiry at a less expense than ten dollars a day. Meanwhile, in its active propaganda of Communist principles in other countries the Government has organised on a large scale regular excursions at an amazingly cheap price: for instance, £25 for a journey of three weeks, with visits to the three chief cities or with a trip down the Volga, inclusive of food, accommodation and the journey out from England and back. The result is simple. As for persons without large means, which

includes most students, the expense of anything like prolonged study is prohibitive or nearly prohibitive, the thread of such work is practically snapped. And on the other side, our country is full of tourists returned from escorted journeys, in nearly all cases without any earlier serious knowledge of Russia, and publishers have to depend largely on the records of such journeys. There can hardly have been any time at which the supply of day-to-day knowledge on the course of events in another country has been so completely monopolised by that country.

In consequence, never has the importance of a knowledge of the Russian language been so strongly emphasised. The travellers themselves can achieve nothing serious without it. At all times it was necessary in Russia to escape at the outset the close supervision of the authorities, or in other words, to get lost among the Russian public; at all times particular care was taken about the organisation of interpreters to communicate the view desired; and at no time have these features been more marked than at present. Yet, all the while the Communist Press, which is, of course, the only Press of the country, and is in all cases either directly or indirectly official, is courageous in its frankness, as there is no intention of leaving any doubt with the Russian public as to the conflict which is in process for making the world Communist. There was never an occasion when every printed pronouncement so directly reflected the view of the Government, and it was therefore never so easy to know exactly its intentions and the fluctuating successes and failures of its policy; but always on one condition—that one could read Russian.

Meanwhile, it is of the very first importance that there should be no indifference to the colossal issues which are at this very time being fought out in Russia. If it had ever been possible to leave one-seventh of the world in an African darkness, it would be unpardonable at a time when what is taking place in Russia is in the long run as important to every other country in the world. The Communist Government gave full warning of this when it struck the word "Russia" out of its title and adopted instead the formula of the "Union of Socialist Soviet Republics," into which it is its declared intention, actively prosecuted in every department of life, to bring the whole of the rest of the world.

The present crisis in Russia had to come. The first attempt to realise in all their purity the principles of Communism was made from 1917-21 in conditions of civil war, foreign intervention or blockade, drought and famine, with a machinery of State which for the time being had almost completely broken down. The attempt

failed, and further efforts had to be postponed till renewed relations with the capitalist world, marked on both sides by the completest insincerity, had enabled the Communists to draw breath and to put their house into some order. It is very significant that the NEP or partial return to Capitalism was proclaimed by Lenin on 15 March, 1921, just three days before the disastrous Treaty of Riga, which closed at any price the period of foreign war. In the seven years or so that followed, to quote a phrase attributed to Rakovsky when he visited the Genoa Congress in 1922, a traveller to Russia "would find Communists, but no Communism." The change which a triumphant band of idealists had tried to enforce on this great agricultural country was so much at variance with all its historical instincts that the withdrawal of the pressure was bound to lead in ordinary life to a reaction as far as possible away from Communism; and in this period the peasant population, which is, of course, the staple of the country, showed a greater energy in the organisation of individual farming than it had ever shown in the long centuries of communal land tenure under the rule of the Tsars. Indeed, the Government, which had now to be content to follow to a great extent the tendencies prevailing in actual life, in 1923 issued a land code based for the most part on individual farming. This, of course, was a complete retreat from its principles on the most vital point of its programme, and it was inevitable that the sincerest members of the Party (and they were very many) would be just the ones to feel most the contrast between power achieved and power not used. In the meanwhile, the interval had been utilised to obtain the greatest success which has yet been won for the Communist experiment in Russia in the education of a new generation of something like two to three millions of young folk devoted even more ardently than their seniors to the world revolution and to the fight for Communism in Russia. Ultimately the period of truce was brought to an end when the Government finally realised that the new individual tendency in peasant agriculture was at once creating a new type of peasant yeomen and at the same time leaving the food supply of the towns at the mercy of this new element. Thus, in various stages came the splits in the Party, the exclusion of Trotsky and the Lefts, the reduction of the Rights to silence, the motto that even without a world revolution there could be a self-sufficing Communist Russia, and the Five Year Plan that followed from this motto.

Of the two main objects of the Communist Party, to communise Russia and to communise the world, the second was now prosecuted systematically but less wholeheartedly and with a choice of the more

suitable areas and occasions. But the first was resumed with all possible vigour and an offensive all along the line. On the Five Year Plan, with all its aspects and ramifications, were concentrated all the energies of the Party and under its driving and compelling force those of the whole country. On the industrial side, the declared aim of overtaking America in five years or less seemed ridiculously unattainable, but it was really rather a target to shoot at than anything else. Success depended on enlisting the co-operation of foreign capital and foreign experts; and on this side the Communists had to wrestle as best they could with the obvious contradiction of inviting the help of those whom no less than before they aimed at ultimately destroying. The question of experts was really the easier of the two; all that had to be done was to give remuneration and conditions of work which could never be granted to the Russians and to keep the specialist rigidly within the sphere of his speciality. Unquestionably very great results were achieved, though the very haste of the programme was the chief prejudice to their stability and permanence. As in all other matters, the Government relied on a combination of the enthusiasm of the new generation of young Communists, with the most rigorous compulsion of the rest of the population. And the Soviet Press was throughout full of indications of failures on those sides of the work in which compulsion has least success; for instance, in wastage and poor quality. These so-called "breaches" in the front were from time to time made good, as far as possible, by organised excursions of young Communists on the largest scale. The enthusiasm and self-sacrifice of these young folk, with their entire indifference to privations, commands the highest respect; but the very fact that they had so constantly to make good what was left undone by the regular workers called in question a plan which needed such haphazard efforts for its execution.

Infinitely more important was the agricultural side of the programme, for here the Party was in conflict with the great mass of the population. Infinitely greater, too, was the need for drastic action by the Government if Communism was to be achieved in Russia. It had to start by challenging and checking wholesale the tide of individual farming which had swollen to such great national proportions during the NEP. The most threatening of its results was that the peasants, who had now more or less got their own way again, were in command of the food resources on which the towns depended and that a Russia of small peasant holdings both might, and very possibly would, hold up the necessary supplies. With this

situation the Government dealt drastically. Life and work were made unendurable for individual farmers by disfranchisement, super-taxation, and every other means available. Then a crusade was started for driving the peasants wholesale into collective farms. But when it became compellingly evident that the national food supply was in danger, the attackers were called off directly by orders of the Communist Party, short-circuiting the usual communication through its organ the Soviet Government; in fact, precisely by those who had initiated the campaign. There were other later occasions when the central authorities had to call a halt, but the programme was persistently pursued and at least 60 per cent. of the peasantry were more or less permanently established on State or collective farms. The Government's ideal remained the State farm; but tactical directions, while restating this ideal, in the main stopped short at the collective form, which in moments of retreat always approached nearer to the very possible and attainable form of simple agricultural co-operation. These moments, however, were few, and the pace at which the Government itself went and the ruthlessness of its methods were something tremendous. A population of about five million prosperous farmers was definitely earmarked for extermination, and this part of the programme in one way or another was definitely carried out. Thus was reached the next stage of the struggle, which is now in sharp progress. The Government found again on the collective farms all those instincts which it had tried to exterminate outside them, and practically all its last measures relate to this new conflict. It was found necessary for the success of the programme over and over again to displace managers of collective farms, who inevitably and almost for their own skins were driven in some measure to make common cause with the peasants among whom they lived, to appoint inspectors to look after managers, and even ultimately to displace whole masses of the population.

It must always be remembered that serfdom in Russia was not established on the principle of the possession of the man by the master, but, before all things, for reasons of state. The Russian population was always fluid and had enormous backgrounds into which, when life was too difficult, it could escape. This is how Siberia came to be Russian, and this is how the Cossacks came into existence as escaped fugitives from the centre who became armed freebooters on the frontier. The peasant's one refuge from impossible conditions was evasion culminating in escape, and the whole of his history has taught him to seek this way out. Thus, what we are

seeing now is over and over again a detailed repetition of the main features of the centuries of serfdom, with the application of much the same old remedies by the central Government; for instance, the re-establishment of the internal passport system, which was one of the greatest grievances of the pre-revolutionary peasant.

The difficulties which the Communists have had in disposing of the old educated class in Russia, always lacking in initiative and already depleted and weakened by the casualties of the war, are in the long run not to be compared to this age-long fluidity of the peasants, which was always the principal embarrassment of the Russian Government in the days of serfdom; and this is now the peasants' reply to a policy which, after encouraging them to seize the remaining cultivated land, has deprived them of the disposal of its products. The word fluidity, therefore, is now constantly on the lips of the Communist spokesmen, and it is yet to be seen whether the Government will find effective means to carry through a policy which is bound to arouse a more or less universal recourse to this last resort of the peasants. It must be remembered that the Government's arm in effect only reaches as far as it is carried by the resources of the public services, such as railways and telegraph, and therefore by police action. So efficient is the government system that it has surprised not only Russia but the whole world by the effectiveness of its control; but it is calling for difficulties which must tax that control in the highest degree, and already first-hand reports of various travellers, testifying, for instance, to an unusual freedom of movement and a breakdown of the regular machinery for checking it, would indicate at least a partial lapse of this control.

Side by side with this goes the urgent threat of a new great famine, due to the general unwillingness of the agricultural workers and to their displacement. The most serious of American observers—hardly any really serious British observers have of late visited Russia—men who know their Russia thoroughly, whether by long-continued residence or by frequent contacts, only differ in debating whether such a famine should be described as practically inevitable or as having already begun.

Such appear to be the circumstances in which Stalin addressed the main organs of the Communist Party (the Central Committee and the all-important Central Control Commission) on 7 January. His speech, which lasted about five hours, was a wholesale review of the situation and an admirably clear and incisive statement of policy; and far the most important part of it is the last part, which announces in the plainest terms the most vigorous reinforcement of

sheer compulsion and a determined onslaught on all who stand in the way of the execution of his programme.

A government necessarily requires definite objects of attack and punishment, and Stalin assigns a leading role to remnants of the "dying classes" who, he maintains, "creep in (to the collective farms) under the mask of workers and peasants and some of them even get into the Party." He accuses them of definite and organised wrecking, even of poisoning cattle. "For the organisation of thefts they take advantage of the private capitalistic customs and habits of the collective peasants, yesterday's individual farmers and today's collective members . . ." As to these, "their consciousness is still the former one, that is, that of the private capitalist. . . . The basis of our regime is public property, just as the basis of capitalism is private property. . . . Our Soviet Government acted on this when it recently issued a law for the protection of socialistic property. This law is the basis of the revolutionary code at the present time" (it includes even shooting for the abstraction or secretion of grain). "The duty of carrying it out most strictly in practice is one of the first tasks of every Communist, every worker and every member of the kolhozy. . . . For this reason, the fight for the protection of socialistic property, the fight with all means and measures placed at our disposal by the laws of the Soviet authorities is one of the chief tasks of the Party. . . . It is needless to say that such people can have nothing in common with our Party. They are degenerates who must be chased out of the Party. The destruction of the classes will not be attained by the elimination of class warfare, but by its intensification . . . by its strengthening to the maximum extent which is required in order to overcome entirely the remnants of the dying classes and to organise a defence against capitalistic elements, which are still far from destroyed and will not be destroyed so soon. . . . If our comrades do not arm themselves with revolutionary vigilance and do away with the good-natured attitude towards acts of theft and robbery of socialistic property, the *cidevant* can do not a little damage. It must be remembered that the growth of power of the Soviet State will strengthen the resistance of the last remnants of the dying classes."

Let us enumerate some of the principal acts of legislation which led up to and followed from Stalin's pronouncement of policy. The most important of all are printed in full in this number of the *Review* (pp. 692-710). They relate, of course, alike to industry and agriculture.

A decree of 7 August, 1932, dealt with the integrity of socialist

property. Enukidze, Secretary of the Central Executive Committee, said that there was not a single branch of the national economy where acts of sabotage had not been discovered in respect of goods, machinery, tractors, etc. "These enemies of the Soviets, the enemies of the kolhozy," he said, "must be subject to the severest reprisals. Persons convicted of thefts, pilferings, etc., must be punished by the supreme penalty" (that is, death).

A decree of 22 August provided for the imprisonment in concentration camps with compulsory labour for a term of from five to ten years of those declared guilty of "speculation." No amnesty was to apply to offenders under this decree.

A very important decree of 15 November (printed on p. 692) orders that a worker should be dismissed even for a single day's absenteeism from work without sufficient reasons and be deprived of his food and goods card. It may be noted that this punishment could, for instance, be assigned for absence to attend a church service on Sunday.

Of first importance is a detailed decree of 4 December (printed on pp. 693-6) which transfers the distribution of food from co-operatives to the factory managements in order to make it dependent on continuance of work. Supplementary regulations to this decree were issued on 19 December.

Of equally great importance is the decree of 27 December re-establishing the system of internal passports (printed on p. 696) for all residents over 16 years of age in towns, workers' settlements, transport enterprises, sovhozy and new centres of construction. The drafting of detailed regulations on this subject is entrusted to the OGPU. Zones are created of 100 kilometres round Moscow and Leningrad and of 50 kilometres round Kharkov. Within these rings the closest police supervision is introduced, accompanied by a detailed and vexatious system of registration. Those residents in these areas to whom passports are refused are to be deported; (it has been calculated that their number may amount to about one-third of the whole); and though they are "entitled to live unrestrictedly" in all other localities in the USSR, no arrangements seem to be made for their accommodation in such parts.

On 14 January, 1933, was passed an equally important resolution of the Plenary Session of the Communist Party, which in this case seems again to have short-circuited its orders without reference to the official Government of the country (printed on pp. 699-702). The resolution, which is of the most precise and detailed character and is accompanied by a complete and full exposition of its objects,

establishes political departments in all machine and tractor stations and sovhozy. Our readers will do well to make a careful study of this impressive document. Again, as in Stalin's speech, the initiative of resistance to the execution of government decrees is attributed to the remnants of the disfranchised classes. But it is clearly recognised that there are large masses of the peasants who are taking the same action or offering the same resistance. And the new political departments are to organise around them as far as possible nuclei of better disposed peasants, regarding quality in this matter as much more important than quantity and making rigorous exclusions of those who will not follow their lead. In this case, we have a particularly striking example of the absolute precedence which the needs of Communist theory take over those of agriculture as such.

A decree of 19 January fixes the quantities of grain to be delivered to the State for each hectare of the "planned" (not actual) area under cultivation and the time limits within which it is to be delivered. The penalty for non-fulfilment is for the kolhozy a very heavy fine and for the individual farmers criminal prosecution.

A resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Party of 30 January ordains as follows:—If a member of a kolhoz refuses on insufficient pretext to carry out a task assigned to him, the kolhoz management must fine the culprit to the amount of the equivalent of wages for five working days, and in case of a repeated refusal must expel him from the kolhoz. The resolution applies the decree of 7 August, 1932, on the integrity of public property "to all persons convicted of sabotage of agricultural operations, pilfering of grain seed, malicious decrease of the amount of seed normally sown per unit of land, negligent work during ploughing and sowing operations resulting in damage to the fields and in the decrease of crops, malicious wrecking of tractors and machinery, destroying of horses." It gives unlimited power for applying the death penalty.

In his speech of 7 January, Stalin has defined the question as follows: "The present task consists of stabilising the collective farms by organised methods, of eliminating from them all elements of danger, of attracting to the collective farms genuinely tried Bolshevik strength and making the collective farms truly Bolshevik. This is now the main thing." But however evident the necessity of devoting attention to the quality of the work, this policy runs to such extravagant lengths as to defeat its own purpose when it results in such action as has been lately taken in the Kuban region, where, according to the Soviet paper *Za Mir i Trud* (For Peace and Labour), of 4/5 January, 1933, the population of whole

Cossack settlements, amounting to over 45,000 persons, has been deported wholesale to the northern provinces of Russia.

The devastation that has already resulted from the very programme which is now being sharply intensified is pictured vividly in a report which has reached us from the distant maritime province of Siberia, showing its results in even that farthest corner of the Soviet State.

"The individual farm is coming to nothing. Its owner has to leave his native nest and join as a working force one of the future combinations or pass to the town and turn altogether into an industrial worker. The old villages have a forsaken look, the huts are ruined or going to ruin, the gardens are abandoned or destroyed, most of the population has departed. Only rarely does one see the hut of an individual farmer, with all the signs of a dying husbandry. It is mournful and distressing to look at this picture. . . . The pulse of life beats in the kolhozy which have sprung up. But their life is inconsolably dreary, like an autumn day. Artificially created by union on the basis of community of labour and property, without any kind of economic perspectives, without any interest in their work, they leave the impression of colonies of forced labour. The disillusionment of the men in their work and situation is complete, and if there were any possibility of going away then they would all leave their kolhozy and go wandering wherever their steps took them. That this is the precise situation is clear from the fact that the Government tries by every means to hold fast the 'kolhoz nucleus,' throwing into the village Party men and Young Communists, mobilising them for a definite period of work. But those dispatched thither regard their mission to the kolhozy as a real misfortune, a punishment for some offence. It is only by the strength of this nucleus or, as people call it here, the 'kolhoz *active*' that the kolhoz economy holds on. The '*active*' pushes the remaining members to work for the execution of the tasks required of the kolhoz. . . . Thanks to the weakness of production of kolhoz labour, in the end the situation is that the kolhoznik, especially if burdened with a large family—and that is very usual in kolhozy—is working for a food ration issued to him in advance and nothing more. The result is a definite bondage from which he cannot in any way extricate himself; as he has no possibility of working off the pay and food advanced and other debts, bound hand and foot by his family, he is compelled to remain in the kolhoz and to continue to drag out his wretched existence there. His legal exit would bring with it the repayment of all debts, the return of clothing, boots and

everything else which he has acquired during his stay in the kolhoz, which for a family kolhoznik is quite impossible. There remains only 'desertion,' to which the kolhozniki resort at the first opportunity. There are so many cases of desertion in the kolhozy that those who come into the towns are generally regarded as men who have left the kolhozy. The methods adopted to combat this phenomenon are numerous, but they fail in the main to achieve their purpose. For instance, it is forbidden to engage a kolhoznik for work without the agreement of his kolhoz, and the kolhozy themselves have to supply industrial workers from themselves, providing, in accordance with the contracts concluded, a corresponding number of workers for institutions and undertakings. Individual farmers are also required to present papers from their village Soviets to establish whether the given person belongs to the category of the 'alien element.' But all these obstacles cannot prevent both individual farmers and kolhozniks from streaming from the villages to the towns and thence further to other works."

That there has been the same difficulty in holding fast industrial workers is sufficiently clearly shown by the decrees to which we have alluded on the distribution of food at the factories and on the introduction of a rigorous passport system. Stalin in his speech could with justice refer to very impressive achievements on the industrial side. He claims that "industrial production has increased from 48 per cent. at the beginning of the Five Year Plan (1928) to 70 per cent. at the end of the fourth year of the Plan (1932)." "The face of the country," he says, "is literally changing beyond recognition. . . . This is the case in Moscow, with its hundreds of newly asphalted streets and squares, its new suburbs and its girdle of new factories in the suburbs. This is the case in the smaller towns, too. New towns have sprung up in the steppes and waste districts, and not merely a few towns, but at least fifty with a population of 50,000 to 250,000 persons. All these towns have grown up during the last four years; each is the centre of a new industry or a number of new industries, built up to exploit the natural wealth." All visitors to Russia will confirm this picture. On the other hand, Stalin is equally explicit on the poor quality of work, on the great scarcity of trained men and on the fluidity of labour. It is not so long since he felt it necessary to come out with what seemed a new and much milder programme for remedying these evils, with the promise of much more favourable treatment of Russian experts and much better food and housing conditions for the workers. He continues to make it clear that these objects will be regarded as of primary importance

in the next Five Year Plan, which is to go at a much easier pace in the matter of construction. Indeed, it is quite clear that this is the right policy to follow on the hectic endeavours of the first Plan. But so far, these are promises for the future. It is clear that a much more modest pace is set in construction, and the estimates concerned have been reduced a good deal. But the simultaneous emphasis thrown on to measures of sheer compulsion is at least in the most striking contrast with such a policy. It would perhaps seem that the decision to defer for the present the actual execution of the second Plan and to present only a plan for the current year is a sign of some uncertainty as to the future.

Financially, the Communist Government has inevitably to continue to struggle with very great difficulties, with which so far it has been able to deal. As was shown in an article in our last number by Professor Bernatsky, a recognised expert of long standing, who was Minister of Finance in the Provisional Government after the fall of the Tsar, the principles of Communist finance are in open conflict, which is clearly seen on both sides, with those of finance as they are understood elsewhere. Ordinary financial terms have different meanings in Russia and elsewhere, and the only part of Soviet finance to which we can apply our accepted standards of judgment is that which is concerned with foreign trade and foreign currency, where necessarily there has to be a working compromise between the two systems. Stalin maintains that "the stability of the Soviet currency system is assured above all by the enormous quantities of goods in the hands of the State which come on the market at fixed prices." Whether this is an adequate substitute for all the ordinary guarantees of stability in other countries is a matter which requires further proof than has so far been given, and it is unlikely that financiers of other countries would take it as such or accept Communist financial principles at the value claimed for them. A matter of practical and even urgent importance is the ability of the Soviet Government to discharge the obligations undertaken by it to foreign finance, and one of the most convincing of its achievements is that it has unquestionably so far been able to do so. At the same time, it is a great strain to meet engagements with stronger foreign currencies while not able to secure more help from abroad than short-time loans; and the immense variety of the value of currency inside Russia itself cannot be expected to carry conviction of stability to foreign creditors. The vast increase of paper money in circulation in recent years must have a similar effect.

More critical is the question that is specially prominent in the

Soviet Press at this time relating to the effects of Communist education. On this subject we print an article by Mme. K. D. Kuskova, whose sympathetic survey of the work and enthusiasm of the Komsomol we published in an earlier number. There have unquestionably been, and naturally had to be, striking changes from time to time in the mood of the Communist youth, which has played an all-important part in the two principal achievements of Communist construction: the industrial Five Year Plan and the collectivisation of agriculture. Indeed, it would seem impossible that the present results should have been achieved without this work, devotion and self-sacrifice of the Komsomol. The Soviet Press is asking with anxiety whether this mood is changing for one of disillusionment and inertia and a relapse, such as certainly took place in the interval between the two great Communist offensives, into something like a pursuit of ordinary bourgeois comforts. Such answer as can be given to this question—and certainly no answer will at present be definite—is given in the article of Mme. Kuskova. But the all-importance of the question will be clear to everyone. Some of the indications in the Soviet Press are very interesting: for instance, the emphasis on the teaching of ethics and a drastic revision of educational programmes for the securing of practical results by methods which would not be unfamiliar in non-Communist countries.

The crisis lies before all things in the domain of agriculture. It would not be far wrong to assert that so far in this domain everything that can be achieved by sheer compulsion has been or is being achieved and that everything which cannot be achieved by sheer compulsion is not being and is not likely to be achieved. It must never be forgotten that perhaps the most important reasons of all for the abolition of serfdom were not humanitarian, but economic; serfdom did not pay. Russian serfdom was always something totally different from Polish serfdom or from such elements of serfdom as have obtained in England. As has been stated earlier, up to the last hundred years of Russian serfdom, the occasion for it and the reasons for it were reasons not of individual property, but of State requirements, and it is just the same at the present time. That is why there has been an actual return in present-day Russia to some of the principal instruments of serfdom, for instance, the hated passport system in a more acute form and worked out with far greater ability than ever before. The results, again, are a direct reminder of all the forms of reply to which the peasant population resorted in the past—forms with which hundreds of years of bondage have made it only too familiar. Peasants do not conspire, organise

means of military resistance, and march on the towns; anything of the kind is totally and utterly impossible. They evade or they escape, often into nowhere and almost without thought and without hope. Under such circumstances, the work does not get done. In the pre-revolutionary period—say, for instance, in the province of Vyatka, inhabited totally by peasants, where there were never estates or serfdom, only direct bondage to the Government—Nicholas II might, and did, smash up the work of the splendid peasant *zemstvo* (county council) and remove some of the outstanding personalities; but this did not make anything. What was done in Vyatka was done by the peasants or not done at all. We have before us a number of peasant conversations with a British visitor to Russia in this last summer, full of pith and shrewdness, but also full of despair. The burden throughout is that life is not worth living, that any change or convulsion, any new revolution could not be unwelcome. Typical of all of them is the reply of a twelve-year-old boy to the question, What did he expect to happen in this next year? His answer was "Death." Worn-out horses that fall by the countryside—in one district almost at every mile (the question has been the subject of a special edict of the Communist Party)—the prevalence of ropes in lieu of harness, complete shortage of such things as sugar and meat—for the colossal slaughter of animals which preceded the forced entry of middle peasants into the *kolhozy* has been followed up by a hardly lesser depletion from ill-nourishment and death—even among some a cynical indifference to money, these are just some of the features that rise sharply out of these accounts. Fear and evasion, widespread and everywhere. And Russia is still predominantly an agricultural country. Stalin was perfectly right when he defined the question that confronted the Communist Government: "The Soviet Government cannot exist on two opposing foundations, the large socialist industries which have destroyed the capitalist elements, and the small peasant individual farms, which give birth to capitalist interests. . . . So long as the small peasant farms are not run with a view to production on a large scale, so long as they are not converted into large collective farms, the danger of re-introduction of capitalism in Russia is the most acute of all possible dangers. . . ." That is the reason, and the soundest of reasons, for the new Communist offensive; but he would be a daring man who would venture to prophesy its final results.

BERNARD PARES.

IS RUSSIAN COMMUNISM TAKING ROOT?

I

THOUSANDS of foreign tourists of all nationalities want an answer to the question whether Russian Communism is consolidating itself or coming to its logical end. Journalists, workmen, industrialists, scholars, and even psychiatrists travel through Russia with the same persistent thought: Is the fabulous order of things established in the east of Europe doomed to perish, or will it set an example to the world of Capitalism, suffering from ills of its own? One has heard some foreigners say: "At least, let *this* system show some solidity. But Communism in Russia is continually changing its face, and at any given moment it is impossible to define whither this mad Russian sphinx will move."

In their turn, Russian scholars, suppressing their feelings of distress by an objective analysis of the processes taking place in a country with 160 million inhabitants, try to fix the lines of development, the curves of rises and falls.

Some answer, perhaps only indirect, to this question can give an idea of the state of mind and moods of the Soviet youth and of the "new life" which has been established since the Revolution, and whose merits are specially extolled by the Soviet Press. The youth play an enormous part in Russia; they carry ever more weight in all branches of the national economy. The working youth up to twenty-three are 40 per cent. of the sum total of Russian industrial workers, and the number of young persons as compared with the total of the workers in all the national economy, including administration, is 32 per cent. In mining, they number more than 50 per cent. Two and a half millions are being taught in the higher schools and technical colleges. All Russia has been "youthened." The old Bolsheviks who won in October remain only on the surface of administration; most of the old guard do not play any great part; some of them have died, others are worn out, others have "gone to pieces."

It is specially important to observe the changes which have taken place in the active section of the Komsomol¹—this executor of the "testament of Lenin." Do the ideas of Communism hold firm in this active section, and do Communist principles come into their whole everyday life and being, and not only into the

¹ League of Young Communists

speeches of agitators? In answer to this question, special interest attaches to the young folk of the second relay of the Komsomol.² The first relay, which began work ten years ago, was still tinged with the education of the old regime—was still, so to speak, in an atmosphere of the old Russian culture. The second relay is of solely Soviet education. This relay is much rougher; it has become accustomed to many privations, and has known little of the charm and care of the family. The oldest of the present Young Communists were born in 1908; the youngest in 1917, that is, in the year of the October Revolution. The Revolution came upon the present Young Communists as children in the age period of 1 to 8 years. These new generations have grown up in quite different conditions from their predecessors of 5 to 10 years ago. Firstly, they have only been taught in Soviet schools and have never known any others. Secondly, they enter a new life, new conditions; out of them should be moulded quite new human material.

Meanwhile, general and summary observations show that the first Young Communists, in spite of being affected by traditions of the old culture, were filled with far greater faith in the saving character of Communism than that new generation which was born in October and has been educated entirely by the Soviet regime.

How are we to explain this undoubted weakening of the influence of the ideas of Communism, and why was this influence so strong in the first years after October in all countries, and especially in Russia?

II

Three factors have an immediate influence on the character and cultural type of a new generation: the family, the school, and the surroundings of the child and youth. Pedagogues have for a long time hotly discussed which of these three factors most powerfully influences the formation of a human being. Various answers have been given to this question. However, since the war of 1914, there has been less dispute; all are agreed that the war and the great or little revolutions which followed it have driven back and weakened the influence of the family and the school and, on the other hand, have strengthened the effect of the environment, the social background which is so full of unusual and new events. In no country, not even in the neutral countries which were only indirectly affected by the conflagration of the war, has life remained after it in the old

² The Komsomol was organised in 1922. Up till that year, young people followed the Communists without any special organisation.

framework. Everywhere the war has produced the greatest changes not only in order of State, in economics, in the relation of classes; but also in morals, in the relations of parents and children, there has everywhere taken place a greater or lesser undermining of the old foundations and traditions. But the whole art of education consists before all things in handing on traditions, in consolidating a certain connection of the young generation with the past of their country and with the aspirations of the nation for definite ideals of the future. And the stronger the confidence of the educators in the firmness of these traditions, in the clearness of the future line of conduct of the citizens of a given class and of the country as a whole, the stronger is the effect that they leave on those whom they educate. After the war, it was precisely this firmness of traditions that ceased to exist. It was as if everything were shaken. The paths of the future became obscure; there was a tendency to novelty, an easy attitude towards the destruction of the old and a great tendency to experiments, to such innovations and transformations as before the war would have been called revolutionary. Radical changes do not now frighten even the most conservative, and the search for the "new city" for all mankind, after it has almost drowned itself in blood, captures an always greater and greater number of adepts³

The soul of youth is an instrument sensitive in the highest degree. A revision of the past, uncertainty in views of the present, and obscurity as to the future—all these moods which have seized on present-day fathers and mothers, school teachers, university professors, do not escape the attention of the young, and undoubtedly weaken and sometimes even undermine the authority of adults, of persons who are fully formed. The present-day youth does not feel any firm support in the old generation, and therefore allows

³ America is regarded as the country which has most recovered from the destructions of the war. However, the crisis which has followed later and has created a population of 15-17 millions unemployed, has broken the tranquillity of even that most self-confident nation. The *Weltbund-Nachrichtendienst* of Geneva, for February 1933, gives an account of the restlessness which has sprung up among the youth of America. Extensive groups are formed, seeking a "renovation" of the life and order which have led to such economic catastrophes as the present world crisis. "The weak ought to be supported by the strong. The present system is unjust. Capitalism, when it asserts that it is built on the foundations of Christianity, discredits religion." The leaders of these young folk go to Soviet Russia and there seek support for their views on the necessity of radical changes in the capitalist system. The young folk of America at present reject any idea of a bloody revolution or a fight against religion, but in the Russian experiment they seek *general lines* for the transformation of the community and for the organisation of young folk who wish to devote themselves to this object.

himself far more independence in his views and conduct than earlier.

These processes reveal themselves in the post-war life of all countries. But they have taken peculiarly sharp forms in those which were most ruined by the war and therefore least defended from internal revolutionary movements and the sharp civil war associated with them. These processes found their highest form of development in Russia. The war and revolution led in Russia not only to the shaking of the old foundations and traditions, but to their complete collapse. The cataclysm in Russia destroyed whole classes, and at the same time brought to the top rungs of the social ladder representatives of other classes which were in former times called the lower.

In the sixties of the 19th century, the revolutionary movement among the young produced the type of "nihilist"—the denier of the existing order, its morale, its whole way of life, its social content. This type was immortalised by Turgenev in his remarkable novels, *Fathers and Sons*, *Virgin Soil*, etc. But then the "nihilists by conviction" were units amidst a system and its conditions that stood firm. The collapse of the Empire and of the democratic Provisional Government in October 1917 led to a wide extension of the nihilist type among the young. This new nihilism was, however, sharply distinct from that of the sixties and seventies. The old nihilist adopted a series of negations which followed from logical conclusions from the social and anarchical theories which he had created. However, at the age of thirty or forty, these theories usually blew away, and the former nihilist became a model father and State servant; the firmness of the existing order of things broke up his extreme theories, and life, flowing more or less quietly, captured him with its everyday demands and interests.

Perfectly different was the origin and destiny of the post-revolutionary nihilism. The young man saw how everything was breaking down around him—the army, in which he had just been fighting for his country; the throne, towards which the majority of the people had so lately been loyal; the new Government, which he sincerely wished to support; and finally the family, in which he now found people astray, morally broken, who were with difficulty surviving their impotence, their inability to resist the impact of the terrible forces which had suddenly risen from the depths of their own people.

And unwittingly there was born a new psychology: Nothing has any value, anything can be destroyed, the ideals of yesterday are a mirage. Honour, patriotism, love for one's neighbours, learning, which has not been able to foretell or to stop this storm

before our eyes, are all empty words. From this soul-corrupting psychology, part of the young folk wished to save themselves by entering the organised anti-Bolshevist movement in South Russia, or in the North, or in the East. "The honour of Russia," "Russia, one and indivisible"—to the defence of these watchwords went young men of seventeen or eighteen with arms in their hands. But this hope failed too. The collapse of the White armies, the shooting of Admiral Kolchak, the evacuation of the southern armies of Generals Denikin and Wrangel, killed the last faith in the possibility of resistance. Apathy, hopelessness, unbelief, became the dominating moods of the widest circles of the Russian public and of Russian youth. Nihil! Nothing! Everything is ruined!

This was the most convenient soil for the conquests of Communism. The old Russia, the old life, the old traditions, were smashed; the family and the school had ceased to exercise their educational influence on the young generation before the Communists made their direct attack upon it as the bearer of the old traditions.

And at this time from every tribune came firm and definite watchwords. It was as if Moses the prophet had come down again from the mountain and called the people to the promised land, promising to lead it through all the seas of difficulties, through the darkness of sufferings, to the kingdom of joy and universal happiness.

And the young folk followed the prophets of Marxism into the promised land of all-saving Communism. Militant Communism sent forth many heroes in the civil war who sincerely believed that at the end of this war, after victory over the enemy, the bourgeoisie, there would be a new era, and that the prophets knew for certain how universal happiness was to be attained. That is why the first relay of Young Communists were so active and followed so obediently after the prophets of Communism; all other organised forces had been broken, and only these promised renovation and happiness.

III

But even the prophets were not really certain about the road to happiness. Events threw them from side to side and forced them to retreat abruptly from the straight line of Communism. Militant Communism led to the fearful famine of 1921-23, which cost the Russian people five million lives. The sharp turn of Lenin to the New Economic Policy (Nep) brought disintegration and disillusionment into the very support of Communism, the hearts of the young. In prison, where I was sent as a member of the committee of help to the starving, I happened to meet two young Communist

girls who had been sent there for some breach of the party discipline. This was the beginning of the Nep. These Communist girls were quite unwilling to believe us, who had been imprisoned much later, when we told them that people now had to pay on the tramways; that private traders—that is, “the former capitalists”—had set to work in Moscow; that the ration system was being hastily abolished; and that in general the old principles of economic life were returning. One of them, an austere and obstinate Lett, wept like a child and, sobbing, said: “If you are not lying, and all that has come back again, I shall end by committing suicide. All this blood has been shed for the bourgeois order to come back again.”

Before I was imprisoned, I had already observed moods of this kind. A Communist woman whom I knew, holding a very high post in the Commissariat of National Instruction, left her post, frankly telling the Party her reasons for this decision: “Why have we cut to pieces the officers and destroyed the class of the bourgeoisie; why these terrible sacrifices and crimes, if a Communist system is not to be established? I cannot direct a department of schools, for now I don’t know what we Communists are to say to the young generation on this turning back.”

But the turn back took place and prevailed for eight whole years till the end of 1928, the period of the new Communism of Stalin. In that period the youth of the Party and the Komsomol, to quote the Soviet press, “demagnetised itself” and willingly gave itself up to the “enjoyments of the bourgeois regime,”—and not only the enjoyments. The young peasants recklessly turned to bread and butter interests. The Nep led to the flourishing of private peasant husbandry (*kulak*, according to the Bolshevik expression). Even town workers understood the advantage of a free market, at which “you could buy anything.” It seemed that life was resuming its normal rights. Sorely distressed by the militant Communism, the population literally gave itself up passionately to “the production of comforts,” and in its dreams it began to go too far. Very openly people said: “According to Marx, the political superstructure is bound to follow the new economic basis.” Tendencies grew up which were dangerous to the whole Soviet system and to its leader, the Communist Party. An end had to be put to these quickly-growing tendencies, and it was put by Stalin at the beginning of 1929, when he struck at the peasantry with his collectivisation and “dekulakisation,” and afterwards at the specialists, and finally at the intelligentsia, which had been indulging too freely in dreams of a “new superstructure.”

Simultaneously with this new attack of Communism began the industrialisation of Russia, the carrying out of the first Five Year Plan. Both these tasks, the breaking of the peasantry and industrialisation, the Soviet Government achieved with the most active participation of the Komsomol, of which we have already spoken in the pages of the *Slavonic Review*.⁴ In that article I described how the fascinating perspectives of the Five Year Plan called forth a real enthusiasm among the young and frequently made them achieve truly heroic exploits in the construction of the giants of industry, in Magnitogorsk, at Dneprostroy, in the mines of the Don Basin and the Urals : wherever the physical strength of young workers was needed, or their supervision over the execution of the most difficult "lessons." Since then only a year and three months have passed; the article was written in December 1931. That is not long; but what profound alterations have taken place in the conditions of construction and most of all in the moods of just these young people. These alterations can no longer be concealed by the Soviet Government, and we propose not to use any other sources.

These alterations may be shortly characterised as the breaking of illusions. Yes, the giants have been built, a marvel of industry. But the whole Plan, with its unnatural rate, has quickly exhausted the national economy wholesale, and again, like the militant Communism of 1918-21, has brought the country to a sharp crisis of the food supply and finance. Of course, even the best thought out plan could not in five years have regenerated the country; this naive belief could only have been inspired in the young by ignorant or dishonest propaganda. Even the most civilised of nations could not in five years have achieved the regeneration of a ruined country. But anyhow the young had believed these fairy tales, and now came a profound disillusionment. It is described in striking colours in the Soviet Press, which speaks of "the disarming of the active element," "the apathy among the young," (Komsomol), and phenomena which are dangerous to "the interests of the Party." Thus, describing the conduct of the young in an important region of production, the coal basin Gorlovka, *Komsomolskaya Pravda* states the impotence of the young Communist in face of other forces which are there at work : "Agitation, continual, lively and sharp, is a completely abandoned sector of the Komsomol work in Gorlovka. *In the region of Gorlovka, which contains 15,000 Young Communists, there is not a single permanent agitator, whether on the*

⁴ Vol. x, No. 29, p. 301 : "The League of Communist Youth."

town committee or the mine committees. On the other hand, the Baptists keep 22 regular preachers and 'apostles,' who all day engage in most active anti-Soviet agitation among the young."⁵ It is known that without agitation and agitators Communism cannot live. It must constantly raise the spirit of its active section and give it work. Otherwise all the facts of non-Communist life will seize on it, and it cannot deal with the crying contradiction between life and propaganda. These contradictions are already reducing the young Communists to silence; they cannot explain them. Thus in the workers' lodgings of Gorlovka, the young are only discussing such questions as this: "When was life worse, before the Five Year Plan or now?"

Sharp discussions are going on. Some argue indignantly: "Why, what is the use of talking? Look, we are always starving and go barefoot." The Young Communists present at these hot discussions maintain an obstinate silence. They have nothing to say, they have no arguments against the results of the Five Year Plan. Such discussions are going on all over Russia and are raising acute doubts in the minds of the young. At the Komsomol Congress, the Communist Bukharin thus explained these phenomena: "Our young folk understand the general meaning of our construction far less and are more susceptible to our ills and ailments."

And, as these ills and ailments widen and deepen with the new assault of Communism, it becomes always more and more difficult for the young to understand "the construction." This understanding it is particularly difficult to communicate to the Young Communists of the country districts, where collectivisation has resulted in a direct resistance of the peasants to the surrender of grain to the State, there being anyhow much less from the application of the kolhoz system of agriculture. The whole foreign press has been filled with news of the disorders in Kuban and North Caucasus. We do not yet know exactly what has happened there, whether it was a direct rising or only sabotage, concealment of bread, as the Soviet press says; but it is the Komsomol that is now answering for these events; it has not been able to prevent them. Numerous commissions which have come down from Moscow and Kharkov are purging the Komsomol organisations, and the result of this purge is leading to a diminution of the support of the Party by almost 50 per cent.

In twelve Cossack villages of the Kuban it has been established that in February of this year there were 97 Komsomol cells with

⁵ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, No. 229, 1932: the italics are in the original.

1,675 Young Communists. 558 have been expelled (40 per cent). "More than that," writes *Komsomolskaya Pravda*,⁶ "in some cells, since the commission has done its work of purging, there is not a single Young Communist remaining or there are only a few persons. Thus in the Voroshilov kolhoz, out of twenty young Communists sixteen have been expelled. The secretary of the cell (the most important post) was the son of an active White Guard of Kornilov who had been killed." "The purge shows," writes this paper, "that many Young Communist organisations have not conducted any kind of struggle for the organisational and economic consolidation of the kolhozy and sovhozy. They have not fought for the preservation of socialist property; they have not been keen sentries, preserving its sanctity and inviolability."

The country districts in general do not understand "socialist property," and it is doubtful whether they will soon understand it. Up to this time they had been taught that "the sanctity and inviolability of property" was only a bourgeois prejudice. The State has only now circulated this idea of socialist property. Its obscurity for the country population has none the less remained in full; in these same kolhozy there is private property, which the kolhoz peasants can realise "freely" on the market after the State contribution has been taken. How can the Young Communist now conduct agitation when even the regal character of the so-called "socialist" property has not been accurately fixed? "The young folk of the Party," writes the Moscow correspondent of the *Kölnische Zeitung*, Herr Just, "has lost faith in the infallibility of Stalin's guidance."

This loss of faith in the nearness of an improvement in life and the growing "ills and ailments of the system," has also spread disillusionment and apathy among the young folk of the Party. They have been taught to read, they are given newspapers and books on Marxism and Leninism, and they write in the "enquête": "I do not read the papers. It is better to know less and to live quietly. I have been in the Komsomol seven months." Another young Communist writes in the same enquête: "I have been in the Komsomol since 1932. I have registered, but I have not read the instructions. What is the difference between a non-party man and a Young Communist, I do not understand. I do not read the papers."⁷

⁶ No. 35, February 1933.

⁷ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, No. 299, 1932, article on "The Disarmament of the Active Section." In the last relay of the Komsomol there are very

[Continued overleaf]

There are many such answers, and in the language of the Government, it is just this attitude of the Komsomol that constitutes "the disarmament of the active section." It is apathy. "The new order" has become unattractive; there is not enough agitation to implant Communism; it is necessary that good results of this teaching should continually be shown in life. If life sharply contradicts the mottoes and the very theory, enthusiasm dies down, and again the young folks fall into nihilism and disbelief after the ardent faith of yesterday. After faith in the Five Year Plan, there has now come a period of such unbelief.

IV

So far, we have spoken exclusively of the young folk of the Party or close to it. But it must be remembered that this is only a part of all the youth of Russia—about a fifth, if we take the Soviet figure for the Komsomol as 5 million.⁸ What are the feelings, the thoughts and the attitude towards the construction of Communism of the remaining 20–25 million young folk?

Unfortunately, we know very little of the disposition of this non-party youth. The cause is simple; the Soviet press calls them "the silent." The only people who can talk in the Soviet Union are those of the Party and the Komsomol. The non-party maintain an obstinate silence. Of their dispositions we know only indirectly from Soviet literature and from critical articles of various kinds addressed to these silent ones. We also learn from reports of trials in which these young people are the accused. The non-party young folk are glad to join the Baptists and other religious organisations, but they are particularly enthusiastic about education.

many such quite ignorant young folk. They only want to get taught, without any politics. Meanwhile, they are entrusted with responsible branches of the national economy, and consequently with power over the older generation. One of the most cultured travellers in Russia, Mrs. Beatrice Webb, says in her account of her journey (article "What I have learnt about Russia," in the *Listener*, vol. viii, p. 194): "But as a method of lifting the peoples of Russia out of the dirt, disease, apathy, superstition, illiteracy, thieving and brutishness of pre-revolutionary days, the self-governing democracy of Comsomols appears to be magnificently effective." It was painful to read these and other lines in the report of Mrs. Webb. We Russian democrats were accustomed to respect this remarkably discriminating writer, who, with unusual depth, has investigated the social questions of England. In Russia she has quite trusted her guides and their clever suggestion. Thus, "to lift them out of the dirt," the peoples of Russia are far more in need of just a little freedom and "self-government" than of instruction by young persons who ought still to be studying themselves.

⁸ Account must be taken of the recent extensive purges mentioned elsewhere in this article.—ED.

Here it should be noted that this general keenness for knowledge shows a colossal rise in Russia since the Revolution. The Soviet writer, Efim Zozulya, thus describes contemporary Russia : " Everyone is studying, the whole country is studying, and all feel their lack of knowledge . . . Adults come to discussions, gather in groups, attend lectures and seminars, and study. Engineers who have reached a high standard often study over again. The respectable commanders of large units of the Red Army are studying. Some of them wear decorations on their chests, but they are studying, are studying patiently and carefully like school boys. The workmen are studying, the employees are studying."⁹ And still more ardently are the non-party young folk studying. For them study opens up the possibility of a struggle for existence. The non-party are citizens of the second class; the first places are occupied by Party men. One has to be an outstanding specialist or to have exceptional talent if non-membership of the Party is not to prevent one from taking one's place in life. Even only to get a place in a higher educational institution, one has not only to keep silence as to one's real convictions, but even to tell lies. One must, above all things, lie as to the social origin of one's parents. There have been a number of trials, ending with prison and exile, because young men and girls have lied as to their social origin, saying that their fathers were " small peasants " or " workmen " One has to begin lying from the very earliest age of childhood. Very often quite small children are asked about the conduct of their parents. If the child has fallen under the influence of the school agitator, he gives evidence against his parents. If the family keeps him firmly under its influence, he lies in order to save or cover his parents. The necessity of lying often, of evading or even of simply keeping silence where one ought to have spoken to defend oneself or one's comrades, breaks the heart of the child or youth and often converts him into the unamiable type of that hero of the old régime, the Molchalin of Griboyedov. The consciousness of their lack of rights works oppressively on children. In 1931-32 the number of children of workers in higher educational and technical schools reached 50 per cent., and in some institutions 75 per cent. The children of non-workmen have hardly any chance of a place in a higher school. This lack of rights implants in the young a hidden illwill against the whole system and helps to form in the Republic a gunpowder-chamber which in favourable conditions might explode with extraordinary force. In any case, these millions of rightless non-party

⁹ Efim Zozulya, *Property* (*Krasnaya Nov.*, Book x, 1932).

young folk cannot serve as a support of the system. We can only be surprised that the Government, continually expecting attacks from outside, can thus kindle the passions of the young who are specially sensitive to any injustice. This injustice is all the more amazing because now those concerned are not children and youths bound to the old order by a certain tradition, but children who have been educated by the Revolution, who have already the right to equal citizenship in the new Republic. But they are deprived of rights, wronged, and secretly hostile; the passions of hatred burn in them.

V.

In April, 1929, appeared a book published by Chicago University and written by Professor Samuel N. Harper, who has made a good study of Soviet Russia (*Civic Training in Soviet Russia*). In it he showed what efforts are being made by the Soviet Government to create the new man, the Communist, devoted by conviction to the new order. The school, literature, the theatre, numerous political platforms for agitation and propaganda, action on the family—everything is to serve one object, to engraft on Russian citizens the ideas of Marxism and Communism. Professor Harper, with exhaustive fullness and abundance of material, has shown by what various methods the Communists want to attain this end. The author has, however, left it an open question whether this end is being attained. It is true that fifteen years, and years passed in unceasing struggle with the remains of the old régime, are not a very long period for the re-education of human nature. But it is still long enough to show clearly the tendency of the development: whether the ideas of Communism are consolidated in new men, or whether all the efforts of the educators must be regarded as in vain.

These successes of re-education must be shown clearest of all in the school and in life. It is in the school that the future Communist forms his principles, and it is in life that he realises them. The school is in general a powerful weapon in the hands of the State, especially such an "all-powerful" State as the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

However, literally the whole Soviet press acknowledges unanimously that the school has not achieved this task; that the new generation is not only not consolidating itself in the ideas of

Communism, but on the contrary is strongly infected with "individualist aspirations" and with a keen desire for a "personal career."¹⁰

The Soviet school has tried to attain its object, the creation of Communists, by every day emphasising the following principles :— (i) In the past of Russia there were only oppressed and oppressors, "enemies of the people"; there was nothing else in this past, no traditions which were worth preserving. (ii) The capitalist world persecutes, and only the proletariat can create a new world and a new culture. (iii) We must aim at the creation of a classless community, but till classes are destroyed we must everywhere seek out and expose the enemies of the workers and peasants; all questions of the community and of learning are to be settled exclusively from this class point of view. (iv) The individual, personality, are only screws in the grandiose machine of the State; we must all therefore be entirely subordinate "to the will of the mass of the labourers." This will is realised only in one country in the world, in the Republic of the Soviets; in all other countries it is crushed. (v) Only Marxism, Leninism (and latterly also Stalinism) are scientific; all other science which has not passed through the prism of these principles, is not science, but only an auxiliary of the bourgeoisie.

Every teacher of a village school, together with literacy, has to implant these principles in the children. Every secondary school teacher must demand a knowledge of these principles of every pupil. Every professor is bound to "bow before the masses" in loyalty to these principles; otherwise he will not only be deprived of his Chair, but subjected to heavy punishments, as has been the lot of hundreds and thousands of scholars—historians, even scholars in natural sciences, mathematicians who, one would have thought, would not have to allude to these social conceptions in their teaching.

This action of the school can only be counted as unsuccessful. All these principles have not worked a transformation in the type of pupils, but have been adopted by them just as the parrot adopts

¹⁰ In this article I am only dealing with questions of education and not of instruction. The latter subject deserves a special study. Here we can only notice in short that in fifteen years in the work of instruction the Soviet school has made a complete failure; the result of "class knowledge" has been, that the Soviet school has sent out quite illiterate persons. At the present moment the higher organs of the Government are conducting a furious campaign against the Commissariat of Public Instruction, demanding a radical change in the school programmes, in the type of scholars, in the system of teaching, etc. Whether the system can be changed while the "class principle" dominates instruction, will be shown by the near future.

words frequently repeated. It is characteristic that other innovations of the Soviet school have been adopted, both by the staff and pupils with enthusiasm and have very quickly taken root. Thus, school self-government by the pupils has been engrafted and gives good results; excursions, the labour principle, choirs and sports clubs have become an accessory of every school. Particularly flourishing are sport, gymnastics, all kind of competitions ("co-emulation") in physical exercises. All these have been adopted with enthusiasm both by children and youths. Sport in Russia has reached a high development.

We have a quite different picture when we turn to the influence of the school on the "front" of ideas. Not only is Communism not engrafted, but the Soviet press ever more frequently notes other features in the psychology of the pupils: a sharply expressed inclination to evade the so-called "social freight," unwillingness to take part in the various kinds of school clubs, Lenin corners, meetings and conferences, which impede study. Schoolboys and students are accused of "academism" in their wish "only to study" and not to live the social life. Sharply expressed also even among students from the working class is the unwillingness to live in communes and various Soviet hostels. "One must have something of one's own, if it is only a corner": thus argue those who fly from the hostels. Extremely few schoolboys and students take part in the propaganda of godlessness, in the various kinds of blasphemous and anti-religious processions; this is left to the young men of the Party and the Komsomol, and they, too, often evade it.

How are we to explain this powerlessness of the school to implant the ideas of Communism even in an environment where all other ideas and their propaganda are forbidden? It would seem that the child and the youth should have been infected with the ideas preached; and meanwhile we note, especially in the last few years, a movement in the opposite direction, a revulsion from them, a kind of natural unity of the non-party youth and even to a certain extent of the Party youth, and a "retreat into oneself," a self-defence from the Soviet social life.

This is explained by a whole number of causes. As is known, after the Communists seized power they set themselves the object of "statifying" (nationalising) education. The child was to belong to the State from his birth; crèches, kindergartens, schools with hostels, higher schools also with hostels. From birth a child was to be surrounded by his sculptors, and out of him, as out of clay, would be moulded the Communist. This plan has failed completely.

A director of the Komsomol, the Communist Kosarev, has sadly stated that "there are difficulties not only for the conquered, but for the conquerors. Victory has not only to be won, but to be consolidated"¹¹ But it appears that Communism could be consolidated only by violence and terror, not by education. The first and most serious difficulty was the absence of a staff of educators "convinced of the truth of Communism." Such educators are not to be found in the Soviet Union even today. The authority of the educator can be firm and inviolable only when he is himself convinced of those truths which he is to inspire in his pupils. Meanwhile, the position of the teacher in the Soviet school is really tragical. Thus, on one side he must teach "the brotherhood of all peoples," and on the other, in the same school, he must teach "class hatred" and a ruthless struggle with enemies. Who are these enemies; it is difficult to explain. To start with, he is himself an enemy, if his social origin is not from the workmen or peasants. He is bound to teach that learning cannot be "unpolitical," that learning must be on a class basis, though he all the while knows that learning penetrated with politics is not learning.¹² Finally, he dare not have any other view of the world than Marxism and Leninism, though he all the while well knows the obsolescence of the teaching of Marx and the complete obscurity of the "methodology of Leninism." Consequently, in the posts of pedagogues there sit "persons in masks," persons who carefully conceal their real views, but have not adopted the catechism of Communism. It is not difficult to imagine the effect of such a staff on a young and sensitive generation.

But there are also features of an even more alarming kind. Not long ago the Soviet writer, Marietta Shaginyan, exclaimed: "In the Soviet Union there is a savage poverty of culture." This absence of culture is expressed before all things in the absence of an educated class in any way adequate for the work of teachers. The Soviet Government is trying extensively to cover Russia with a system of children's homes, schools, technical schools and universities. But they have, especially in the provinces, to take

¹¹ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, No. 283, 1932.

¹² Probably a European will not understand the meaning of the idea "class learning." In one of the numbers of the *Krasnoye Studenchestvo* (No. 21, 1932), there is given a precise explanation: "The proletariat does not recognise 'pure' and 'unpolitical' learning. By astronomy he storms the heaven and the fairy tales of the popes (priests); by chemistry he multiplies tenfold the crop of the kolhozy, these grain giants; by the hands of the geologists he conquers for Soviet petrol world markets; by mathematics he builds Soviet aeroplanes; by biology he arms the cattle-breeding kolhozy, etc."

anyone that happens for teachers. In this matter there are often real tragedies.¹³

Another fundamental cause for repulsion from the ideas of Communism is the contradiction between them and life. In words there is one thing; in facts something quite different. There is contradiction literally in everything. The teacher says that the conquering class of the proletariat has destroyed the privileged classes, and in life the pupil sees the consolidation and growth of a new privileged class, of a new "nobleman from the machine and the plough" who looks down on all other mortals. The teacher says that property is a crime, but the pupil sees that there is an extensive class of persons possessing their own motors, all the comforts of life; he sees that this property is valued by it and that it is defended by the Soviet legislation. The teacher says that man must live by his own reason, that religion is "opium for the people." But here they are drugging the pupil with the opium of the religion of Marx and Engels, and forbidding anyone to think "with his own reason." The teacher explains that trade and money are obsolete attributes of the rotten capitalist world, but the pupil sees that nothing is so valued in Soviet Russia as money currency, and that Lenin himself said: "Learn to trade."

And there are a number of other contradictions which are seen by the pupil of the Soviet school, and his young mind cannot explain them; nor can his teacher control this mind, oppressed by doubts. And perhaps the worst defeat which the Communists have suffered is on the "front" of instruction: here, least of all, could the principles of Communism be consolidated, and most of all has triumphed the universal and not the class meaning of learning, and "class-conflicts" have often subsided in the friendly and comradely union of both Party and non-party pupils. Not seldom there has been formed a united front in defence of unpolitical learning and the unity of interests of the pupils.

VI.

Still fewer are the victories which Communism has won in actual life. Here we meet failures at every turn. Let us enumerate only some of them.

The failures on the "front" of "social education" have

¹³ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 3 December, 1932, relates that the manager of one of the Soviet children's homes in the town of Balakhna, Sidorov, made a harem of the home. He was tried, but the examining judge decided to stop the trial. There have been several such instances.

unwittingly revived the family. The family, smashed by the Revolution and the Soviet legislation—"momentary" marriage and equally "momentary" divorce¹⁴—has come to consolidate itself for the education of the children. The Soviet "children's homes" frighten even the Communists. They prefer, after the old fashion, to have a nurse and even a governess if means allow. If there are no means, the mother must give all her attention to the children. On this footing we note curious phenomena: the most convinced Communist prefers to marry a non-party girl. The non-party girl has not to carry the social freight, that is, the Party duties, and can make for her husband a shelter and rest from his hard life and work and give care and education to the children. The non-party girl, in her turn, wants to marry a Party man: he has a privileged position! Soviet humorists remark that there is nothing new under the moon; in old times a girl used to dream of a fairy prince, now of an all-powerful commissary. The equality of women and men is also relative. Woman is admitted everywhere, even in the role of police. But, on the other hand, apart from these duties, she has to look after the "home," as she did before. Women, it was supposed, would be greatly relieved by the organisation of the so-called "social feeding." This social feeding is the alpha and omega of Communism. But, as with the school, there has been anything but success in this matter. The famous cooking factories are dirty, unhygienic; their stores are of the most various kind and beneath criticism.

On all sides dirt, theft, queues, quarrels, absence of the most elementary things, such as spoons and forks. The "emancipated woman" again prefers her own nest, less comfortable than before through the overcrowding of present-day towns, but all the same her own and safer. There are excellent restaurants for foreigners (the hotels of Intourist), but there are no healthy and cheap eating-houses for the average employee or for the workman. Healthy eating-houses are the exception; dirty and dangerous ones the rule. The "socialisation of the means of feeding" has

¹⁴ Momentary marriages and divorces, which were so common in the first years of the Revolution, are now condemned by the Soviet legislation. A sharp protest of the young has expressed itself also against abortions. The mother, the wife and the family are again coming on the scene of life and are crowned with a certain aureole. On the other hand, short marriages are becoming an object of satire. Thus we have an admirable satire on the "short marriage" from the Soviet writer Valentine Katayev, *Squaring the Circle*. This comedy is being played in the Soviet theatres and provokes homeric laughter, not only at the morality of the short marriage, but at the Party organisers of the youth.

led to the same results as the "socialisation of the means of production": to unheard of bureaucracy, absence of management, and theft in all its forms.

Just the same is the result obtained both in the construction and in the preservation of communal homes. The old are not repaired or are falling to ruin. New ones are being built at such expense and so poorly that any private enterpriser who had not "national-State" means would long ago have been ruined and gone bankrupt.

VII.

What principles of Communism could the young absorb in such an environment of uninterrupted reverses and uninterrupted retreats on all the fronts of education, management, life and morality? The Russian Communists, in the period of their rule in Russia, have unquestionably won certain achievements. By carefully examining the series of achievements and of reverses, the investigator cannot fail to come to a quite definite conclusion: the achievements take place only where the principles of Communism are abandoned and where there is some room for personal independence and personal initiative. Traditions of Communism are not formed, and there is nothing to hand on to the next generation. But in view of the fact that the part taken by the young in the construction of life is so immense, they win from this transitional period an enormous experience and a firm temper in the struggle for a new Russia. What this new Russia will be, no prophet could at present tell. But even a superficial observer can already not fail to come to the conclusion that it will not be Communist. Russian life passes at present in endless contradictions. But the fundamental contradiction, or rather the veritable abyss, is between the principles proclaimed and the life that is shaping itself. These contradictions have a painful influence on the young. One part, the weaker, is lost in confusion in them, and again falls into apathy and nihilism. Another, the stronger, talented and rich in native sense, in the nearest future will undoubtedly throw off what is not necessary to it, what has been imposed on it, and will create an ideology which corresponds with creative work and does not destroy it.

But as yet a precise ideology of this kind, which could be opposed in ideas to the bankrupt Communism within Russia, has not yet shaped itself. The conditions are hard for the work of ideas. It is slowly, therefore, that the recovery of the country is proceeding.

For a negation of Communism is not enough. It must be replaced by new principles, not worked out in theory but drawn from the experience of life and its great lessons.

Great is the influence which will be exercised on the formation of this ideology of the new young Russian by the solution, whatever it is to be, of the present world crisis. No one, of course, is now following the universal contradictions of the present day with such profound attention as the young folk of Russia, who have been taught not to believe in the creative sense of capitalist countries and of private property, but who at the same time also see the complete impotence of Communism in their own native country.

KATHERINE KUSKOVA.

MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION OF U.S.A. (SLAVONIC GROUP).

The annual meeting of the Slavonic Group of the Modern Language Association was held in conjunction with the meeting of the Association at Yale University, New Haven, Conn., on Thursday, December 29, 1932. There was an attendance of about thirty persons and the following papers were read and discussed:—

Some Influences of English Literature on Russia—Ernest J. Simmons, Harvard University;

Chekhov's Harbingers of Hope—George Z. Patrick, University of California;

Justice and Mercy in Dostoyevsky—Clarence A. Manning, Columbia University;

Problems of Russian Teaching—Agnes Jacques, University of California;

Kotzebue and the Czechoslovak Stage—Arthur P. Coleman, Columbia University;

Notes on the Situation of Czechoslovak Language Teaching in the United States—Rev. Ernest Žižka, O.S.B., St. Procopius College.

CLARENCE A. MANNING,
Chairman.

PROBLEMS OF SOVIET FINANCE

[In our last number we published an article entitled "The Problem of Soviet Finance," by Professor M. V. Bernatsky, the well-known Russian authority on finance. The following brief criticism of his views, by the Cambridge economist Mr. M. Dobb, is written from an opposite angle.—Ed.]

IN commenting on Professor Bernatsky's article in the last issue one is victim of some embarrassment, first because the writer seems to adhere so rigidly to that pre-war school of thought which regards budgetary stability and unflinching devotion to the rules of the gold standard and the trade balance as the *sine qua non* of healthy economic activity, and secondly because of his so evident desire to demonstrate that a "regime of planned economy brings about results less favourable than is the case with the competitive system of economy." True, he admits that at times "the most solid States reveal colossal deficits" and that "a temporary well-being of the Treasury is logically compatible with a decline of national prosperity." But his argument throughout seems to rest on the assumption that to prove budgetary deficit in Soviet economy is to demonstrate imminent ruin. Moreover, *obiter dicta* are so numerous, and so frequently related neither to cited fact nor to proof, that one is uncertain how to comment upon them save by an equally dogmatic scepticism and denial.

Professor Bernatsky does right to point out that in contemporary Russia the concept of a unique "price-level," or "value of money," can have less meaning than elsewhere. The fact that there is no unique "price-level," and that index numbers are at best arbitrary averages which may be valid for some purposes and not for others is today being recognised by most monetary theorists. In Russia the position is further complicated by the deliberate multiplication of price-levels for the same commodity under the system of rationing and privileged categories. Hence, in correcting rouble-values for changes in the price-level there is the difficulty of what system of index-numbers it is appropriate to adopt. But, while this dispersion of prices complicates the problem and renders any such calculations imperfect approximations, it does not render the problem unsolvable, as Professor Bernatsky implies. In Russia the problem is greater; but it is a problem which exists, similar in kind, in other countries, owing to the multiplicity of separate prices out of which any "average price-level" has to be composed; and I see no reason to suppose that an index-number based on a weighted average of the prices ruling in the various grades of co-operatives, in open shops as

well as in the private market (as is the Gosplan index), does not serve as at any rate an adequate *approximation*. Professor Bernatsky quotes a German correspondent's estimate of the purchasing-power of the rouble on the *private* market; and leaves it to be implied that this is a correct measure of the depreciation of the rouble. But this is clearly not so. Only a fraction of transactions takes place on this private market; and here the prices are abnormally inflated precisely by the fixation of prices at relatively low levels in State shops and co-operative stores. No more does the "black Bourse" quotation of the rouble in terms of foreign *valuta* represent any "true" ratio. Such dealings, being illegal, are as far from affording any significant index as are prices of smuggled goods or stolen jewellery.

Again, it is true that in recent years there has been a considerable increase on the monetary circulation (in the course of 1931 some 30 per cent, and in 1932 somewhat less). But it by no means follows from this that "the population avoids paper money" and that "the only thing that remains to the population is a flight from the rouble". Nor have such extravagant statements any basis in fact. What seems to have led Professor Bernatsky to such strange deductions is a conception that money can only fulfil its function and have a "basis" on "a free market," and that in the absence of a "free market" "the money mechanism loses its unity" and becomes useless as a unit of account. Later (in making a retort to Professor Elster) he declares that in the distribution of goods by the State "no real market exchange of goods takes place; the free market trade is the only mainstay of currency." Has money, then, no function, unity or "basis" in Germany, where free competition has been so largely superseded by monopolistic fixation of prices by cartels? Were index-numbers useless and contemporary statistical calculations invalid in England during the war because so large a range of articles was rationed and prices so widely subjected to State control? Professor Bernatsky would seem to regard anything that is not "free competition" as necessarily "natural economy" where money has no place. Does he mean to suggest that roubles are not used to buy rationed goods, to purchase at the co-operative counter, and never in transactions connected with State trade—that money *only* has purchasing power in the private market?

Still less can I follow him when he applies his critique to the figures of the Soviet Budget. He does not make it clear whether he intends to maintain that these considerations apply exclusively to the income side of the Budget, so as to reduce the figures of this alone; or that they apply equally to *both* sides of the Budget, and

merely reduce the absolute figure of the Budget total. If he is maintaining the former, he certainly adduces no reasons to support it; and there seems no particular reason to consider it true. If he is merely maintaining the latter, then his argument has no relevance to the question of Budget stability, and, since absolute figures in such matters have little meaning, has little significance at all. When it is suggested that the Soviet Budget should be drawn up "*in kind*" instead of in money, my perplexity is increased. A budget is the construction of a balance expressed in a common unit of account. If there are difficulties at present in reducing the items to the common unit of a rouble, how are such difficulties surmounted in any single particular by constructing a balance *in kind*? What is to be gained by expressing expenditure on education or on official salaries or income from the turnover or income tax in terms of wheat, or caviare, or vodka, instead of in money? Does not the same problem of relative valuations apply to the former as to the latter?

Professor Bernatsky then deplores the "inordinately great" proportion of the national income which the budgetary figure represented—a proportion which he calculates at about 60 per cent. He refers to "tribute levied upon the population," which "is simply tantamount to a constant diminution of the consumption fund, which is scanty as it is." The reader is left to infer that a vast bureaucracy fattens on the country, swallowing into its maw a proportion of the current resources which must be nearly double what any State apparatus has ever swallowed, at least in modern times.

How fallacious this method of presentation can be, when it is applied to the Budget of a Socialist State, may be seen from a simple example. Let us imagine a State in which all the inhabitants of the country count as Civil Servants (whether employed in an office or as workers in a factory); that their salaries are paid by a central grant, voted from the national Exchequer; and that this Exchequer is in turn fed from the gross receipts of State industry and trade. Then in these circumstances the Budget total would amount to 100 per cent. of the national income; the Budget and the national income, in other words, would be identical. Of course, conditions in the Soviet Union to-day do not approach this state of affairs; industries are largely autonomous financially, and the incomes of the agricultural population lie outside the State Budget. Nevertheless, in a socialist economy it is obvious that a very much larger proportion of the national income will pass through the State Budget (national and local) than in an individualist economy. For instance, in Russia today the major part of new capital accumulation, which in a

capitalist world passes through the Stock Exchange, building societies or the internal reserves of joint-stock companies, passes through the Budget. Similarly with educational expenses, the maintenance of a large part of house property, medical services, social insurance and pensions, etc. If we take comparable items of expenditure in this country, we shall find that the total does not fall far short of 40 per cent. of the national income ¹ True, this is a proportion smaller than the Russian by a third. But Russia is admittedly passing through a transitional period of abnormally high capital accumulation and industrial construction. To make any equitable comparison with other countries it would be necessary to take similar periods of emergency in the latter. In our own country I imagine that during 1914-18 the figure which I have mentioned would have risen above 50 per cent., and in many belligerent countries quite possibly exceeded 60 per cent. There may well, of course, be several opinions as to whether such a high rate of capital accumulation is desirable. But I see no criterion which justifies Professor Bernatsky in denouncing it as monstrous. When he makes the discovery that the Soviet Budget is built "at the expense of the private consumption of the population," he seems to forget that *all* saving and investment, from its nature, is at the expense of present consumption; and that in capitalist countries capital accumulation only flourishes by virtue of the relative impoverishment of the proletariat. Perhaps he condemns such a rate of capital construction on the ground of hedonism. If so, he ought to admit, on grounds of hedonism, that the abolition of wide inequalities of income in Russia today, by the abolition of a propertied class, causes a given volume of consumption to yield considerably more welfare, and goes a considerable way to compensate for any restriction of the gross volume of consumption. (To close ten shops in Piccadilly and to open five in the Mile End Road would probably impose less hardship than it removed.) Moreover, if he applies the same principles logically (as, for instance, has been done by the late Mr. F. P. Ramsay, the mathematician, in *The Economic Journal* for December 1928), he is likely to find that these call for a much higher rate of "sacrificing the present for the future" than capitalist

¹ The chief items in this total work out approximately as follows (I have taken fairly conservative estimates and figures for the pre-crisis year of 1929) —New investments, £350 million; National Budget, £815 m., Local Rates, £170 m.; Employers' and Workers' contributions to Social Insurance, £63 m.; part of maintenance of houses, £70 m., half of the annual payment of life insurance benefits, £40 m. These items reach a total of £1,500 million out of a national income of £4,000 million.

society customarily achieves, and may justify rather than condemn the high rate of construction for the future which is represented in the Five Year Plan.

But because capital construction must necessarily be purchased at the expense of present consumption (in the sense that you cannot both eat your cake and have it), it by no means follows that there must be an absolute reduction in the standard of life. The latter proposition, however, Professor Bernatsky seeks to maintain by virtue of certain questionable estimates published by the Birmingham Bureau of Research into Russian Economic Conditions, and by an appeal to the amounts issued on ration cards. It should suffice to say that the figures of the Birmingham Memorandum were only reached by quite arbitrary deductions amounting to 30 per cent. from the consumption of recent years on account of "deterioration of quality." For its figure of 30 per cent. it did not give any reason. It quoted statements from the Soviet Press incidental to a campaign for improvement of quality, which illustrated some of the worst cases of poor quality and spoiled work. There is no indication, first that such cases were typical of the whole, nor, secondly, that allowance for some of these cases was not already made in output figures (for instance, "spoiled work," if noted and rejected at the factory or warehouse, is customarily either not counted in output figures or is "written down" in value) Without such deductions the figure for 1929-30 becomes 85 instead of 67; and if the exclusion of excise and transport revenue on definitely disputable theoretical grounds is disallowed, the figure becomes 100. With regard to rations we are left to infer that these represent the exclusive total of consumption, whereas it is, surely, common knowledge by now that the ration in Russia represents the amount to which a consumer is entitled at the limited prices; additional quantities can, and customarily are, purchased at higher prices either in the co-operatives themselves or in the open market. Professor Bernatsky makes the astounding statement that "a high tax on poor official products diminishes the ration, which thereupon is still further reduced by money contributions" (State loans). How does a tax reduce a ration? How can a ration be "further reduced by monetary contributions"? The position is that the demand of the Russian consumer is in excess of what the ration allows him to buy at the limited prices, and he spends the surplus on additional supplies, outside the ration quota, at higher prices. Taxation or loans may reduce the surplus which he has to spend in these directions; but it does not reduce his purchase of rations—if it did, there would be no purpose in rationing.

With such a change in the distribution of income since the Revolution, and with the large dispersion of prices of different goods and different categories, it is, of course, very hard to give any quantitative significance to the concept of "the standard of life," particularly in comparison between today and pre-war. Any figure is apt to be a somewhat meaningless average, like the averages at which Professor Bernatsky sets out to tilt in the beginning of his article. But this at least it seems possible to say. Sweeping statements, such as are so common, about the standard of life having been *reduced* since the advent of the Five Year Plan seem inconsistent with a number of relevant facts. Indeed, there are a number of facts which have precisely contrary indications. It is doubtless true that the consumption of certain categories of persons has fallen, and that a casual shopper today can find much less to buy in the open shops in Moscow than he could have found in 1928-9. But to generalise on this basis is entirely misleading. The American journalist, Mr. Knickerbocker, in *The Five Year Plan*, gave the answer to this two years ago, when he pointed out that, having witnessed empty shops in Moscow, he then went to places like Magnitogorsk and found where all the industrial goods had gone. True, supplies of meat and dairy produce, at least in the towns, are less than in 1929, owing to the slaughter of cattle in 1929-30. To make any accurate estimate of the grain consumption of the peasantry is almost impossible; but my impression is that their average consumption must be larger than before the war. Urban consumption is probably reduced some 5 to 8 per cent. this year as a result of the partial failure of grain collections last autumn; but there is no indication that the consumption of the preceding three years showed any decline. On the other hand, the output of light industry, while it has increased at a much slower rate than "heavy industry," has shown a rate of growth which in most other countries would be regarded as indicative of "boom" conditions.² The fact that the output of boots and shoes has doubled since 1928, the output of the clothing industry has increased four times, and of the food-canning industry over five times, is hardly consistent with a lowered standard of life; no more is the fact that urban workers are now so largely demanding wheaten bread in their diet, and that villagers are so widely taking to the use of leather boots

² The output figure for industries producing consumable goods shows an 87 per cent. increase between 1928 and 1932; and this figure is estimated in a way which renders it independent of price-index comparisons. *Some* of this increase, of course, has been exported to purchase machinery; but no more than a *part*.

With regard to the foreign trade balance, it is perfectly true that USSR (not alone among nations) has suffered during the last two years from a sharply unfavourable balance. This, as Professor Bernatsky indicates, has been due to circumstances, arising outside Russia and connected with the world crisis, which have caused the world value of her exports to fall in much greater proportion than her imports. As a result, Soviet Russia has suffered from severe "valuta difficulties." But there is no reason to suppose that the position is anything like so catastrophic as Professor Bernatsky would have us believe; and his estimate of Russia's foreign indebtedness would seem to be seriously exaggerated. His assertion that Russia is unable to curtail her import of machinery and that her export possibilities are reaching their limit seems to have no very sure foundation. The news comes to hand at the time of writing that the Plan for 1933 provides for a very large reduction in machinery imports. Oil (which we are told is limited by the maximum loading of its pipe-line) is an industry which has already fulfilled its 1933 quota by the end of 1932 (Russia now takes second place in the world as an oil producer); a new pipe-line has recently been built, and important new oil areas surveyed and opened up to exploitation; and only part of the oil uses the pipe-line outlet. On the contrary to the "supply of timber becom[ing] every year more and more difficult," the exploitation of timber, so far as one can gather from timber authorities, is not even keeping pace with the natural growth. For his estimate of the trade balance, Professor Bernatsky rather unwisely relies on the disputed estimates of Mr. Shenkman, which were recently subjected to keen criticism by my friend Mr. D. Barber, of Trinity College, Cambridge.³ If Mr. Barber is right, the estimate of short-term indebtedness ought to be written down by half. I know of no evidence for the statement that "the greater part" of the State Bank's gold reserve has been exported abroad.

We are left, then, with two things as the substance of Professor Bernatsky's critique: that in USSR there has been a measure of inflation and an "unfavourable trade balance." In neither of these matters is Russia unique; and with the world in its present plight—moreover, with the imminent threat of war on her Eastern frontier—it would, indeed, have been matter for surprise had Russia avoided

³ Mr. Barber's criticism was published in *The British-Russian Gazette and Trade Outlook* for June 1932; and Mr. Shenkman's estimate in Memorandum No. 4 of the Birmingham Bureau. Mr. Barber's chief criticism applied to the improper inclusion of contraband imports and parcel-imports and of certain administrative expenses.

entirely such signs of financial strain. What is unique and striking is that, despite a world crisis around her, Russia has been able to maintain over the last four years a rate of industrial development such as other countries hardly reach in exceptional boom years and with the aid of foreign capital. Indeed, in view of the growing voices on both sides of the Atlantic which claim that a measure of "reflation" is the only cure for chaos and decline, it might look as though Soviet Russia in her monetary policy had been much wiser than the capitalist world.

MAURICE DOBB.

THE PRESS IN SOVIET RUSSIA

DIFFERENT both in structure and in objectives from every kind of Western journalism, the Soviet Press is, without doubt, one of the most interesting and significant features of New Russia.

From its beginnings, the Bolshevik régime has paid particular attention to the printed word. Taking for its foundation the Marxist theories of the rôle of the press in the class war, every party Congress since 1919 has concerned itself with the functions of the press in construction and organisation of the Soviet State. Tasks are undertaken on a scale which is quite unknown elsewhere, and their accomplishment, though it is always behind the programme outlined in advance, has made the press one of the vital forces of Russian Bolshevism.

The final liquidation of Trotskyian opposition has eliminated, from both the framework and the content of the Soviet Press, the last vestiges of ideological divergence. Party doctrine, codified in the resolutions of Congress and interpreted by the General Secretariat—whose chief, Stalin, is, in fact, if not in name, the head of the Soviet hierarchy—is an inviolable dogma, the faithful guardianship of which must be the first duty of the press. But although there can be no question of laxity on any point of doctrine, which as we know neglects no factor of life, be it intellectual or material, criticism of the bureaucratic framework of the régime is not merely permitted, but invited. A disillusioned traveller, Panait Istrati, was able, with the sole support of quotations from Soviet journals themselves, to formulate one of the most vehement indictments of the régime.¹ Russian emigrant newspapers abroad often borrow from the Soviet Press their particulars of the abuses and setbacks of Soviet control.

Such criticism, however, is not entirely without limitations. The press, according to Leninist conceptions principally an instrument of propaganda, is, in fact, an institution of the Communist Party,² which, in its turn, is the source of all real power. As such an institution, the press is likewise subject to the control of the

¹ Panait Istrati. *Vers l'autre Flamme*. Tome III. *La Russie nue*. Paris, 1929.

² The ideological supervision of the press is exercised by the Press Section of the "Cultural and Propaganda Department" of the Party. The Press Committee of the Council of People's Commissaries is concerned solely with the material organisation of the Press. The Press régime, whose proper appreciation requires an intimate juridical and administrative knowledge of the Soviet State, has been clearly explained by Professor Mirkine-Getsevic in his article on "The Regulation of the Press in Soviet Russia" in the *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, 1928, and in his book, *Das Pressrecht der Sowjetunion* (Berlin, 1929).

State. Its strict dependence upon orders, which often concern the most insignificant details, together with the fear of publications to invite trouble or the preventive censure of the *Glavlit*,³ secure that criticism does not exceed that measure which is considered opportune.

The publication of periodicals is in theory free to any person who obtains preliminary authorisation, but in practice a wilfully prohibitive exaction by means of taxes has done away almost completely with private initiative. As a result, 95 per cent. of the editorial work is in the hands of the State, the Party, the Syndicates, and the Co-operatives.

The purging of opposition in the heart of the Party itself, and the rigorous unification of its "general line," have caused the press to abandon its previous preoccupation with politics, which used to have first place, and to turn its principal attention to social and economic problems. The five year plan of the press, in its revision or increase of personnel and services, etc., has paid particular attention to this expedient change of front.

Supervised by the Party, and directed by the State in conformity with a theoretical plan which leaves no room for the imponderable or unforeseeable, the Soviet Press grows and evolves in a schematic framework, allowing of no personal character. Each paper is thus found to be a more or less faithful copy of its prototype.

Let us enumerate them. The first place belongs, in conformity with the whole structure of the Soviet State, to the central organ of the Party, the *Pravda*, which is supported, each one in its particular sphere, by newspapers directing the workers (*Robochaya Gazeta*), the peasants (*Krestyanskaya Gazeta*), the Komsomoltsy or Young Communists (*Komsomolskaya Pravda*), and the army (*Krasnaya Zvezda*). After the Party comes the Government, the executor of its will. The central governmental organs are the various *Izvestia*. The principal Commissariats publish special papers (*Za Industrializatsiyu*, *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, *Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie*). Equally emanations from the central government are *Trud*, the organ of the central council of Trade Unions, and *Kooperativnaya Zhizn*, the organ of the central administration of the Co-operatives. All these newspapers are published in Moscow, the seat of central power as well as the capital of the Federated Russian Republics.

The administration of these republics coincides with that of the Union (U.S.S.R.), and they consequently have no need of separate

³ Glavnoe Upravlenie po delam literatury i izdatelstva (Central Administration for Press and Literary affairs).

organs. But the other Socialist Soviet Republics (of Ukraine, of White Russia, of Transcaucasia, of Uzbek, of Turkmen, of Tadzhik) have newspapers fulfilling the same functions as those we have cited; first, a party organ, then directive newspapers for workmen, peasants, young Communists and army, a central governmental organ, an economic organ (usually for all branches of national economy). Thus, in Ukraine, to give an example showing the details of the structure, a *Kommunist* corresponds to the *Pravda*, the *Visti* to the *Izvestia*, a *Selskaya Gazeta* to the *Krestyanskaya Gazeta*, a *Komsomolets Ukrainy* to the *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, a *Chervonaya Armia* to the *Krasnaya Zvezda*, etc.

The headquarters of a province (*Krug*) and of a region (*Oblast*) have usually, in addition to a paper published conjointly by the Party, the Government, and the Trade Unions, papers for workmen, peasants, young Communists and the army. The same situation holds in the smaller formation, the *Okrug*, comparable to the German *Landkreis*. The subsequent replacement of this administrative unit by one of smaller dimensions, the *Rayon*, or district, will result in the creation of further papers in the new administrative branches. The present ratio of 50,000 inhabitants to each journal published will probably fall to a figure between 20 and 40 thousand per journal.

In addition to, and sometimes confused with, this press, which is principally destined for party members, functionaries and administrators, there is a popular press, whose business it is to spread communist ideas among the people. This press for the masses, carefully nursed by those in power, is developing rapidly. For example we may cite the peasant press, whose circulation has risen during the five years from 1923 to 1928 by more than a 1,000 per cent.

Despite this prodigious development, the peasant newspapers, which communicate with a population forming on an average 85 per cent. of the whole, form but a third or a quarter of the total Soviet Press. The circulation of local peasant papers is small. The two big peasant papers published at Moscow, the *Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie*, which incorporated the *Bednota* in March 1931, and the *Krestyanskaya Gazeta*, alone comprise 25 per cent. of the printed matter in this category.

The importance of the industrial workers' press lies perhaps less in the big dailies than in the factory newspapers. In these modest sheets the campaign for the Five Year Plan has one of its most precious auxiliaries. Their number—we count only the printed newspapers, though there are also multi-copied papers, a link

between the wall sheet and the genuine printed newspaper—increased in 1929 alone from 200 to 1,000. It is now actually 1,700. These periodicals, usually appearing from twice to eight times a month (67 of them are dailies), limit their range of influence and their field of expansion to the factory where they are published, but in that domain there is nothing which escapes them: success of a special shock gang, laziness of a foreman, inadequacy of machinery, bad ventilation of a dining-room, all the numberless details of a Soviet factory. And, never-failing *leit-motiv*, every number of every paper repeats that the success of the Five Year Plan depends essentially upon the intensity of each person's work. The circulation of factory newspapers, depending partly upon the number of hands working in the establishment but even more upon their intellectual level, is quite variable. Thus, for example, the same circulation is achieved by the *Krasny Putilovets* (Red Worker of the Putilov Factory) for a staff of 13,000, and by the *Krasny Treugolnik* (Red Triangle) for one of 21,000. One of the most successful of these factory newspapers is that of the electric power station of Moscow, *Elektrozavod*.

This kind of functional newspaper has overflowed the limits of the factory.⁴ The *Kolhoz* (collective farms), modelled on the "Giant" and formed for the execution of the plan, have also their own newspapers, directed, like those of the factories, by the secretaries of the cells (Communist nuclei).

This "Lower Press" (*nizovaya pechat*), as the Soviets call it, and to which they attach the greatest importance in organisation, continues to increase. According to the estimates of the Five Year Plan, it should attain in 1933 a total circulation of 116,000,000.

Within the general scheme which we have thus adumbrated, certain newspapers, either by virtue of their circulation, their influence, or their exceptional level, represent the "Great Press" which is quoted abroad, but whose value and reliability as a source of information is subject to certain reservations.

To take first the oldest of the Bolshevik newspapers, the *Pravda* (Truth). This paper was founded in 1912, and is the official organ of the Moscow Central and Regional Committee of the VKP (b)—Vsesoyusnaya Kommunisticheskaya Partia (bolshevikov) (Bolshevik Pan-Russian Communist Party). Though ostensibly the spokesman

⁴ Propaganda of the Third International has likewise spread this type of newspaper abroad. In almost all the great factories, be they in Germany, France or elsewhere, there is a news sheet, usually of Communist inspiration and often circulating in secret.

of the Workers and Peasant Party, it is not precisely a people's newspaper. It is scarcely comprehensible to those who are not thoroughly acquainted with Communist terminology, which is often very obscure and contains many abbreviations. Ideological discussions take up a good deal of space. Everything—politics, economics, literature and art—receives treatment, sometimes with a total contempt of actual data, strictly from the viewpoint of the doctrine and interests of the party. Numerous columns are filled with the various doings of the Committees. Speeches of directors are given *in extenso*, and these items, during the period of Congress, take up double and treble the normal number of six pages.

A jealous guardian of the purity of Communist dogma, the *Pravda* authoritatively decides all questions of Soviet life. Its leader gives the word for the day, which is taken up by the whole press, whose echo, returning to *Pravda*, enables the latter to affirm the splendid unanimity of public opinion in Soviet Russia.

The full name of the *Izvestia* is *Izvestia Tsentralnogo Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Vserossiiskogo Tsentralnogo Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta Sovetov Rabochikh Krestyanskikh i Krasnoarmeiskikh deputatov* (Newsheets of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. and of the Pan-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workmen's, Peasants' and Red Army Delegates). These *Izvestia* are concerned chiefly with politics. Their foreign information is often based upon the official reports of Soviet representatives abroad. The communications of foreign news agencies, transmitted by the *Tass*, are given more space than in any other newspapers of the Union. As regards interior politics, the official organs of the Government are obviously less concerned with Leninist theory than with the necessities of the hour. Questions regarding nationalities, by virtue of their importance to the central power, are assured of careful attention in the *Izvestia*, particularly with regard to Central Asia and the Far East.

The *Izvestia* may be regarded as forming the official Press of the Union, publishing all laws and decrees⁵. All the numerous administrations use them in this way. Their circulation was 701,000 in 1930, 1,315,700 in 1931, and now amounts to 1,650,000 copies.

The Five Year Plan conferred an exceptional rôle upon the *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, the organ of the Council of Work and Defence (S.T.O.—Soviet Truda i Oborony) of the Economic Council of the U.S.S.R. By virtue of its detailed news of the "workers'

⁵ We may note in passing that, unlike the custom of Western legislatures, publication of a law is not indispensable for its entry into force.

front," coming from its worker correspondents, and its statistics and graphs, this paper gives a systematic account of the progress of the plan.

Za Industrializatsiu (For Industrialisation), formerly the *Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta* (Industrial and Commercial Gazette) pursues analogous ends. Not only is it an organ of liaison between different branches of Soviet production, but also an organ of control, ceaselessly comparing the effective output of factories with the figures forecast in the Plan. An illustrated supplement, appearing five times a week, brings pictorial expression to give a complete idea of the immense workroom of the Soviets. Despite its dry subject-matter, which is treated in a lively enough tone, and having no fear of controversy—a rare phenomenon in Soviet Russia—*Za Industrializatsiu* achieves the respectable circulation of 300,000 copies.

Although during the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP) it was a true enough source of information about economic Russia, the economic press, since the putting into execution of the Plan, has become a well-disciplined instrument of tendentious propaganda. News, always enthusiastic, from the working front, has taken the place of statistics and economic studies. We may remark in this connection the recent disappearance of numerous economic reviews and the suppression of several institutes of economic and financial study.⁶

All of these newspapers, having a comparatively high level and a difficult terminology, are read principally by members of the Party, who are obliged to subscribe to at least one paper, and by functionaries and "specialists." The mass of workers and peasants need a more digestible pabulum.

The most important of the masses' newspapers, of the kind created since the end of the war period of Communism, is the *Rabochaya Gazeta* (Workman's Journal) of Moscow, which has a circulation of a million. All political, economic and literary matter is here treated in plain language, with a deliberate simplicity which, in fact, is often exaggerated, but which conforms to the ordinary workman's capacity for comprehension. Drawings, which form part of the text, further augment the "readableness" of this prototype of the workmen's press.

The expansion over the whole of Russia of the *Rabochaya Gazeta* is, however, more and more impeded by the growth of provincial workers' journals, created and developed in execution of the Five

⁶ Cf P. Czechowicz. *Die Krise der Wirtschaftlichen Information in der S.S.R. II. Wirtschaftsdienst*, 1932, 7 pp., 214-218.

Year Plan as it applies to the press. One of the most successful of these is the *Vyshka* (Derrick) of Baku, which is very well circulated among the workers of this centre of the petroleum industry.

If the *Rabochaya Gazeta* may be said to address itself to all workers without special distinction, the *Gudok* (Hooter) is read exclusively by transport workers, who may be regarded as the élite of the Russian proletariat. Out of 800,000 members of the Rail and Transport Workers' Union, more than half are subscribers to *Gudok*—surely a very high figure. The paper, though giving the greater part of its space to the particular interests of the profession, does not neglect politics. It is from every point of view less primitive than the *Rabochaya Gazeta*.

The extraordinary success of *Gudok* has encouraged the spread of popular journals destined for a distinct category of workers. There is now a *Postroika* (Construction) for bricklayers, a *Pishchevnik* (Food-supply Worker), an *Uchitelskaya Gazeta* (Schoolmasters' Gazette), etc.

Of a still lower level than that of the workers' press is the peasant press, whose enormous progress during recent years we have noted above. The *Bednota* (Poverty—a term which in Russia designates the mass of landless peasants and farm labourers), now united with the *Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie*, was the oldest peasant newspaper. It was an instrument of propaganda during the years when a rapid bolshevisation of the peasant classes was still believed to be a possibility, and at that time it showed a hysterical hostility towards the kulak (well-to-do peasant) and *serednyak* (average peasant). Since that time the *Bednota* has evolved and transformed itself into a party paper, finding its public chiefly among the village cells.

The successor of *Bednota*, and after its disappearance the only large peasant journal, the *Krestyanskaya Gazeta*, or Peasants' Journal, is addressed chiefly to the small peasant, who has now been in favour for some years. Ignoring the life of the Party, paying little attention to politics or news, this paper concerns itself with all the small problems of the Russian peasant's daily life. Together with its numerous supplements it forms a veritable peasant's encyclopedia. *Na Strazhe* (On Sentry) is concerned with military instruction of the peasants; *V pomoshch Kolkhozniku* (The Collectivist's Help), a review concerned with agricultural production on the collective farms, appearing thrice monthly; *Lapot* (lapot is a peasant's shoe made of birch-bark); *Krestyanka* (The Peasant Woman); *Gazeta Druzhnykh Rebyat* (Young Comrades' Newspaper); *Zhurnal Krestyanskoi Molodezhi* (Review of Peasant Youth),

Kolkhoznik (The Collectivist); *Vzaimopomoshch v Kolkhoze* (Mutual help in the Kolhoz); *Promysly i Remesla* (Trades and Handicrafts); *Druzhnie Rebyata* (Young Comrades); *Izba-chitalnaya* (The reading room), a review for directors of reading clubs; *Selkor* (The Peasant Correspondent); *Iskusstvomassam* (Art for the Masses); *Sputnik Kommunist v Derevne* (Guide for the Village Communist); *Na Mezhdunarodnom Fronte* (On the International Front). Its organisation comprises over fifteen thousand correspondents, of whom twelve hundred are in telegraphic touch with the paper, also a judicial department, and an agricultural laboratory which supplies advice and information, and has given between 1924 and 1925 about 25,000 free consultations.

Childhood and youth were soon endowed with a special press, but only in a systematic manner since 1925. The most widespread newspaper is the *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Truth for Communist Youth), with a circulation of about 200,000 copies. The generation of "Pioneers," from 10 to 17 years of age, have the *Pionerskaya Pravda* (Truth for Pioneers), a daily whose circulation equals that of the *Komsomolskaya Pravda*.

The army, that band of soldiers, specialists, organisers, propagandists, which is the strongest support of the régime, has the *Krasnaya Zvezda* (The Red Star), a paper of original enough character: one page of politics, one page concerning military tactics, two pages of varied news about the different garrisons. At present too erudite for the simple recruit and read chiefly by officers, political commissaries and under-officers, it gives place in the soldiers' favour to regional military papers of a more popular kind.

The newspapers hitherto mentioned are published in Moscow, but circulated throughout the Soviet Union. This latter fact is borne in mind when making up contents, and the local news of Leningrad, for example, receives equal attention with that of Moscow.

The local press, whose uniformity we have already described, includes a few remarkable newspapers. In Moscow there is the *Rabochaya Moskva*, which reflects the life and activity of the neighbourhood more fully than the central organs. Its evening edition, appearing as an independent sheet under the title of *Vechernaya Moskva*, is the only Russian paper of the "tabloid" type. Its 125,000 copies are sold in the street, unlike the other journals, which are circulated chiefly to subscribers.

Leningrad, the second city of the Union and the centre of a region equally important strategically, economically and politically,

has the *Krasnaya Gazeta*, one of the best Soviet papers, and the only one which appears twice a day. Very popular and in close contact with the readers, it keeps a relatively high level corresponding with that of the Leningrad workers, among whom the revolutionary tradition is particularly strong. It is liberally illustrated, but the poor quality of the paper and defective stereotyping common to the Soviet Press spoil its effect. Illustration is used as an integral part of news and editorial comment. The circulation is 180,000 according to the figures for 1931.

Another important Leningrad newspaper is the *Leningradskaya Pravda*, published by the Regional Committee of the Party, whose chief organ it is after the *Pravda* of Moscow. It was the influence of this paper, coupled with the popularity of the *Krasnaya Gazeta*, that enabled the opposition of the Right, led by Zinovyev and Kamenev, to attack the central power at the Party Congress in December 1925. As a result, there was a radical "cleaning out" of the editorial personnel of both papers, which eliminated the opposing elements.

At Tiflis, the *Zarya Vostoka* (Dawn of the East), a Government and party organ, with its good news organisation covering Central Asia and Asia Minor, is one of the best sources of information relating to that part of the world. The central political paper for Siberia, *Sovetskaya Sibir* (Soviet Siberia), published at Novo-Sibirsk, is always well informed regarding Chinese events, and has its own information agencies in that country. Its statistics of Siberian production and export show the important place which Siberia holds in the commercial world.

The complex Manchurian situation is closely observed by the *Krasnoe Znamya* at Vladivostok. The *Tikhoo-okeanskaya Zvezda* (Star of the Pacific), of Khabarovsk, partly written in English, fulfils a well-defined propagandist task beyond the Soviet frontiers.

The press of the national minorities, systematically favoured since 1923 in accordance with Lenin's ideas, is an ardent defender of the autonomous rights of all the peoples of the Union, and is barely inferior in number of journals to that printed in the Russian language (333 as against 390). No less than 60 of the 140 tongues spoken on Soviet territory have their periodical press.⁷

The greater part of the small nationalities living on Soviet

⁷ 31 in 1925, 62 in 1930. The progress is constant. In order to indicate the Soviet share of linguistic development in world journalism, it is pertinent to note that in the whole world only about 200 languages find expression in periodical publications.

territory would never have been able to create a native press without very considerable support from the central power. A special section of the Press Department of the Party concentrates the efforts made in that direction. The chief end of this minority press is the propagation of Communism. Very often it is in advance of actual needs, for despite all efforts, the number of persons knowing how to read and write increases very slowly, for lack of teachers and schools. The contents have no special interest, excepting perhaps the local news of distant and obscure territories not usually covered by western news agencies. Politics, economics, and general news remain the concern of Russian journals, which are published in all the republics and autonomous territories, and whose circulation exceeds that of the native periodicals.

An exception should, however, be made in the case of the Ukrainian Press. The Ukrainian is the most powerful nationality after the Russian. In this country there exist a culture equal to that of the Russian people, a well-developed national sentiment, and a journalistic tradition dating from the beginning of the 19th century, which all efforts at Russification have been unable completely to destroy. These have been the factors of a prodigious growth of the Ukrainian Press since the creation of an autonomous Ukrainian Republic. This growth is detrimental to the press in the Russian tongue, as the following figures show :—

1923. 65 periodicals, of which 12 were in Ukrainian. Total circulation 385,000. In Ukrainian 40,000.

1929. 99 periodicals, of which 76 were in Ukrainian. Total circulation 2,070,000. In Ukrainian 1,484,000.

The Russian journals are chiefly destined for the workers in large towns. The peasant journals, those for youth, for the army, for the "lower press," are printed almost exclusively in the Ukrainian language.

The nationalist rather than Bolshevik tendency of the Ukrainian Press seemed heretical to the Party directors. The campaign undertaken since 1926 for the "liquidation of the middle-class mentality" of the Ukrainian Press, conducted with the usual rigour, has destroyed these signs of ideological particularity. Today it is only the language used which differentiates an Ukrainian journal from a Russian publication of the same type.

In closing this too brief account of minority journalism we should not fail to emphasise the rôle played by certain of these national presses in foreign propaganda of Communism. The White-Russian papers, the Polish (partly written in Yiddish, with Minsk

as centre), the Finnish at Leningrad and in Soviet Karelia, the numerous Turkish periodicals of Azerbaizhan, do not owe their existence solely to local needs. Communism, the bugbear of the countries bordering the Soviet Union, finds refuge and support in these journals, which, thanks to the community of language and despite a sharp outlook at the frontiers, spread through a thousand channels to the Polish, Finnish, Turkish, and other partisans of the creed.

The national minority variety is not the only non-Russian press in the Union. Foreign Communists, refugees from Hungary, China, Greece, etc., have created their own newspapers. Others (the English daily *Workers' News*, for example), were born owing to the presence on Soviet territory of numerous foreign specialists, collaborating in the execution of the Five-Year Plan. In these, also, pro-Bolshevik propaganda does not altogether lose its rights.

A word should be said about the organisation of news. In addition to the *TASS* (Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Soyuz, or Telegraphic Agency of the Union), which is alone authorised to bring foreign news into Russia and to give out Russian news abroad, there are the *ROSTA* (Rossiiskoe Telegrafnoe Agentstvo or Russian Telegraph Agency), the *RATAU* (Radio-telegrafnoe Agentstvo Ukrainy (Ukrainian Radio-telegraphic Agency)), and the *ZAKTAG* (Zakavkaskoe Telegrafnoe Agentstvo—Transcaucasian Telegraph Agency) collecting and spreading news relating to their respective territories.

In contrast to the customs of other countries, where provincial newspapers of any importance have an editorial staff or at least a representative in the capital, only the *Krasnaya Gazeta* maintains a special service at Moscow.

The system of rigorous State control, an economy peculiar to the Soviets, has greatly reduced the functions of publicity, which seemed, under the NEP, to have a certain renaissance. Only the *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, which publishes the balance-sheets and accounts of the big companies having a separate existence, and the *Izvestia*, have a publicity section of more than one page. Small advertisements, whose reason for existence continues to diminish (few goods to sell, no permission to quit appointed employment), are more numerous in the local sheets than in the great central newspapers. The *Vechernaya Moskva*, which we have mentioned as the only Russian newspaper resembling our own, is in particular favour for announcements of that kind. Publicity for books and periodicals is relatively well developed, the State publication (*Gosizdat*) playing the part of a regular and valuable announcer.

Two institutions, peculiar to the Soviet Press, and powerful factors of the mass propaganda so highly developed by the Communist Party, have aroused a lively interest outside Russia. These are the wall-sheet newspaper, and the worker and peasant correspondents.

The wall-sheet is a child of chaos. The disorganisation of transport, the lack of ink and paper, the absence of trained personnel made it impossible, during the years of civil war, to publish regular newspapers. The Government was concerned to set off this absence of information, which gave room for the most fantastic rumours, by pinning up in the most frequented places—stations, factories, town halls, etc.—news of the front, official communications, etc. These were printed in small numbers or simply typed or hand-written. The 13th Congress of the Party sanctioned their existence. Private instructions keep them closely attached to the Party, and place them under the direction of the local cells.

The appearance of these journals (of which the number is very great—official figures vary between 100,000 and 250,000) has been made familiar by the numerous photographs in illustrated papers and books about Russia. A huge placard, headed most usually by the title painted on wood or engraved in metal, is covered with written or typed notices, cuttings from newspapers, photographs, caricatures and drawings. The get-up sometimes shows a certain amount of artistic taste and a sense of typographical effect. The wall-sheet is not confined to the factory. The village, the block of houses, the sporting club—every place which comprises a collectivity in the Soviet sense—finds in this poster method the most convenient form of communication. The content is strictly confined to the life of the particular unit concerned.

An accessible tribune to all those who wish to write, even though it be in the most primitive style, the wall-sheet, like the factory journal, is the nursery of the "worker and peasant correspondents," the most democratic institution of the Russian press. Although its ideological basis may be found in the writings of Lenin, its origin is rather capitalistic in kind. The abolition of press endowment, which was in force until the period of the NEP, obliged newspapers to rationalise their methods, that is to say to anticipate the reader. Thus they had recourse to all the "tricks" of the western press: prize competitions, advice services of various kinds, appeal for readers' collaboration, as an efficacious means of popularisation.

The appeal to participate in the magic of printing was not without effect. Letters poured in, giving a thousand details of factory

and village life, criticising functionaries, showing up abuses. The Party, in 1927, sanctioned the movement, which since that time has not ceased to grow: 15,000 correspondents in 1924, 140,000 a year later, half a million in 1929, and two and a-half million in 1931.⁸ Submerged by these letters, the newspapers had to form special departments to sort out and verify the incoming complaints. Every sufficiently-detailed and signed document leads to a comprehensive inquest, and is transmitted to the competent authorities.

Obviously, only a small proportion of this mass of letters can be published (the *Krestyanskaya Gazeta* received about 220,000 in 1928 alone). But that does not diminish the usefulness of the institution, which enables newspapers to give an exact account of the particular interests and preoccupations of their readers. These latter have quickly realised that a venture in publicity is not only the most efficacious, but at the same time the least dangerous form of criticism. The Party, taking into consideration the heavy slowness of the bureaucratic machine, gave the word in 1927-8 for self-criticism and did not impede the free expression of discontent.

This institution provides the only valid expression of public opinion. Workers and peasants are merely the most important, and not the only, groups which avail themselves of the liberty to write. Youth, soldiers, all folk are free to correspond. But this practice, which arose in total independence of the State and Party bureaucracy, is sometimes an embarrassment to authority, and cannot long escape supervision. Various measures, taken ostensibly for purely educative interests, already tend to eliminate the independent elements in favour of correspondents who are at the same time collaborators of wall-sheets or factory journals. As such, these latter are under the direct observation of the local Party cells.

The situation in Soviet Russia, the governmental tendencies, and the general line of action of the Party, are in constant flux and evolution. Consequently, in giving a sketch of a single branch of Soviet activity, one must anticipate the possibility of being contradicted on certain points by facts which may occur at the time of writing. It therefore seems desirable to conclude our study with this reservation.

MARC JARYC.

⁸ This figure from official statistics should be taken with caution. It is possible that correspondents writing to several papers are counted more than once.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND CENTRAL EUROPEAN TARIFFS

II.—THE POSSIBILITIES OF PREFERENTIAL TARIFF SCHEMES.

I. THE PRINCIPLES OF TARIFF POLICY.

THE static conditions of economic life in Czechoslovakia—pressure of population, complete utilisation of raw material resources, bad transport connections—described in a previous article, impose severe limitations on economic development. The economic system of the Republic has undergone no sudden or rapid expansion; on the contrary, it has had to adjust itself to changes in the size of the Customs area. But its production is so widely diversified, both industrially and agriculturally, that no definite line of tariff policy is indicated. It is not political obstacles but its economic structure which makes it difficult for Czechoslovakia to range itself on the side of either of the two groups of countries, the industrial exporters and the agricultural exporters, which have been drawing together in the last three years. At the Stresa conference in September, 1932, the attitude of the country towards preferential tariff schemes was still undefined: the French plan put forward there contemplated the granting of preferences on agricultural exports to Czechoslovakia and Poland as well as to the grain-exporting States; the German plan excluded Czechoslovakia and Poland from the agricultural preference scheme and offered preferences only to Hungary, Jugoslavia, Roumania and Bulgaria. This double classification is quite justifiable, since Czechoslovakia exports agricultural products as well as industrial, although she imports meat and corn. But Czechoslovakia must necessarily be the keystone of any Central European tariff construction, and if the country is to play a part in economic reconstruction in Central Europe corresponding to its importance, it will be necessary in the future to shape some definite line of tariff policy.

Up to the present the tariff policy pursued has been a more or less unsystematic protection of producers. Since the destruction of any branch of employment, under the static conditions described, means that the workers thrown out of employment cannot find other work, tariff policy should aim at maintaining branches of production which offer possibilities of employment without great capital investment; in which class, of course, agriculture takes the first place. As in most Continental countries, a considerable measure of protection has been extended to agricultural producers. Up to 1930 the duties on agricultural imports were low, but since then higher rates have been introduced, and in the course of last year

the imports of the chief agricultural products were put under the control of syndicates which regulate their amount in accordance with the prices ruling in the home markets. Though high protection is accorded to farmers, it cannot be said to be higher than is justified by the economic importance of agricultural interests to the State, as it certainly is in Germany.

In industry the principle of protecting the branches which give the greatest possibilities of employment has been neglected. The most highly protected branches of industry are those in which capital investment is large in proportion to the number employed. As the rate of capital accumulation is slow, the tariff has been used to foster artificially the growth of capitalistic enterprise. By contrast with Jugoslavia, Roumania, and Poland, which impose high rates on imports of manufactured goods in general, Czechoslovakia accords high protective duties to certain industries only, as appears from the following table.

The most highly protected goods are iron and iron goods, chemicals, metal goods, vehicles and machines.

AVERAGE TARIFF BURDEN ON FINISHED PRODUCTS.¹

Import Duty in Per cent. of Price—July, 1928—June, 1929.

	Czecho- slovakia	Roumania.	Poland.	Jugoslavia	Hungary	Germany.	Austria
Iron and iron goods	61	55	64	46	57	17	25
Chemicals	53	30	39	51	16	19	21
Metal goods	48	69	78	40	49	20	30
Vehicles ²	47	28	22	21	33	10	23
Clay goods	45	40	40	36	32	48	17
Machines	43	23	30	24	36	7	22
Glass and glassware	27	42	133	31	20	37	10
Textiles	25	77	68	23	25	20	16
Stone	24	8	33	17	14	39	16
Wood	22	64	46	147	21	36	12
Jewellery	18	58	26	15	15	21	10
Paper	15	56	21	52	5	9	5
Leather	11	89	32	20	32	8	9
Musical instruments	7	15	27	12	16	6	4

¹ These figures are taken from a calculation made by the State Statistical Office.

² In the "vehicles" class, the high level is due to motor-cars, on which the import duty is now twice as high as it was in 1928. The present rate excludes imports almost entirely.

The policy of "protection of producers" has not so far come into very marked conflict with exporting interests. The amount of foreign capital invested in the Republic (in 1931 estimated at 10 million crowns) is low in proportion to the population, compared with the amount invested in other Danubian States. To meet foreign obligations a commodity surplus equal to 1½–2 milliard crowns yearly must be exported. Until recently little difficulty has been experienced in maintaining this surplus. The circumstance that the greater part of the exporting industries of the old Monarchy were located in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia enabled the Republic to realise this amount easily in the ten years 1919–28. Three or four commodities—sugar, textiles, shoes, glass—form the staple exports, but for the most part the export surplus is maintained by a great variety of small products in continually changing varieties. In 1929, for the first time since 1919, imports exceeded exports; this change was due to the decline of two big items in the trade balance, sugar and cotton, resulting from world market conditions, and to an all-round increase of imports from Germany, due to general trade revival. In 1930 and 1931 an adequate export surplus was again achieved. The full force of the economic crisis was not felt until 1932, for the German and Austrian financial crisis of 1931 had extraordinarily little repercussion in Czechoslovakia. But in 1932 the volume of exports declined to 8 milliard crowns (compared with 20 milliard in 1929), and the year closed with a small import surplus, due to all-round losses in the export markets.

This stable and sound trading position is due, in the first place, to the low wage level and the lower cost of living compared with the West. The Republic lives by export of its craftsmanship and the products of labour, by a continuous struggle to conquer the world market in small portions, and not by export of corn or raw materials, as do the other East European States, which have encountered such insuperable obstacles in recent years in marketing their products.

The ease with which the export surplus has been maintained up to the present has obscured the necessity of obtaining preferential tariff agreements, and the Republic has not yet decided in which direction these are to be sought, whether in the States of Eastern Europe, or in Germany and the West. But, as more and more comprehensive measures of agricultural protection are applied, it is inevitable that a conflict of interests should arise between industry and agriculture. This, however, is not simply a conflict of interests between industry and agriculture, or between producers

for the home market and exporters, but between different groups of interests in agriculture and in industry: in agriculture, corn and meat producers who require protection, barley and hop growers who require preferences; in industry, iron and steel producers who require protection and textile producers who require preferences. But in the near future the Republic must inevitably determine whether the productive system, industrial and agricultural, identifies her economic interests with the industrial countries of Western Europe, now perpetually raising their duties on agricultural products, but offering secure markets for Czechoslovakia's industrial exports; or with an East European *bloc*, to which Czechoslovakia would stand in a twofold relation, offering concessions on agricultural imports from the agrarian States in return for their concessions on manufactured goods, and at the same time aligning itself with them in demanding preferences on its agricultural exports from the countries of Western Europe.

2. THE TARIFF ON INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS.

(1) *Czech and German Industry*.—It might be assumed that German industry with its high technical efficiency, its advantageous transport position and its strong organisation could not feel any serious effects from Czech competition. The Czech productive system is divided up into many small branches not fully capitalistic in structure. There does not seem to be much prospect of further industrialisation: electrification progresses steadily and slowly; the new industries, artificial silk, new branches of chemical production and motor-cars, have only taken root with difficulty behind tariff walls. Germany, on the other hand, has industrialised rapidly since the war. Not only have the new industries made rapid progress, but the whole character of the old Central German industrial district, north of the Bohemian frontier, formerly much the same in character as Bohemia, has been changed by the construction of the great electrical power system and the nitrate works.

Yet the peculiar character of its economic system enables Czechoslovakia to compete successfully. Trade between the two countries follows two directions, according to whether labour or capital is the dominant element of cost. In the industries where capital costs are high and where technical skill plays a great part, the Czech industries are definitely inferior, and can only continue to exist if very highly protected. These include coal, iron, steel, and machinery. In hard coal there is really no serious competition, as, owing to the distance between the coal seams, only small

quantities cross the frontier. Czechoslovakia's imports and exports roughly balance each other. Bohemian brown coal, on the other hand, has been injured severely by the development of the Central German seams since the pre-war period and export has declined, although Czech capital has not been injured, since the principal mines in the Central German seams are owned by a Jewish financier of Bohemian origin.

The iron and steel industries do not compete, since both have reserved the inland market to themselves since 1926, under the international steel pact. The control of the Czech market is a comparatively easy matter, since the output of iron and steel is controlled by three large firms. These firms have also under their control the output of machinery and automobiles, which in spite of extremely high protection and financial amalgamation feel the pressure of German competition severely. (Both German and Czech industries have to face a big excess of productive capacity)

In the industries where labour costs are the most important cost element, the Czech industries are able to compete owing to low wage rates. Certain statistics may seem to contradict this statement. A calculation made by the International Labour Office of real wages in 1929 gives the real wage rate for Czechoslovakia as high as the German, at 77 per cent of the British rate. This calculation is based on a very narrow range of trade union rates, which is wholly misleading, since such rates are far less representative than they are elsewhere. Not only is the proportion of organised to unorganised labour much lower, but the gulf between rates fixed in individual works is much greater. For instance, small groups of workers in the textile industries whose wages are regulated by collective agreements, may earn as much as 200 crowns a week (24s. at the gold rate of exchange) while thousands in branches not covered by agreements earn 80-90 crowns (10s.) weekly.³ The International Labour Office comparison may correspond to some real relationship so far as the few well-organised groups are concerned, but can have no meaning if used to compare wage rates in industry in general. If great sections of the working class do not earn more than 100 Kč (12s.) weekly, which may be assumed to have a purchasing value of 18s.-20s. weekly, it is obvious that the general level must be lower than the German and considerably lower than 77 per cent. of the British wage level.

It is chiefly the textile branches which are enabled to compete by means of the lower wage level, which is far below the average

³ See Jirásek, *Skutečná mzda* (Real Wages). Prague, 1926.

Czechoslovak wage rates, owing to the weakness of trade union organisation. The Czech industries have not as a rule been able to combine, so that price-cutting, particularly in the Brno cotton industry, is prevalent. The linen branch, which is organised in both countries, has not so far reached a national agreement to regulate production. In paper, glass and porcelain, the Czech industry shows itself as efficient as the German, and the national cartels have in some branches reached agreements to reserve the markets. Only in one case has competition led to amalgamation under one financial control: the two great pencil manufacturers, Hardtmuth of České Budějovice in Bohemia and Faber of Nürnberg have amalgamated.

Two branches of production in Czechoslovakia, glass and shoe-making, have shown themselves definitely superior to the German, with a superiority based on organisation, not only on a lower wage level. The Gablonz glass jewellery industry, which has developed as a home industry, an organism of thousands of individual *entrepreneurs* working independently, introducing new patterns and new types in rapid adaptation to the fashion, supplies a world market with its product and meets no serious competition from the German industry.

The rapid expansion of the shoe industry in Moravia has severely injured the German factories. The Czech industry is now entirely dominated by Thomas Bafa, who constructed an enormous integrated works for the manufacture of shoes from the raw material to the finished product, in Zlín, a small and remote Moravian village. In 1921 his works was comparatively small, producing 5,000 pairs of shoes daily; in 1931, the Zlín works produced 130,000 pairs daily and employed 20,000 men.⁴ Bafa claimed that his success was due to the principles on which the works have been constructed: specialisation, mechanised methods and mass production, but yet the rationalisation programme alone does not seem to have accounted for the conquest of the market; Bafa revolutionised costs of production by using cheaper materials, as well as by rationalising production.⁵ Low wages were not responsible for his competitive power, for wages in Zlín are extremely high for Central European conditions. By these cost reductions Bafa could adapt prices to the wants of the Central European consumer, whose low income forces him to buy a lower quality article at frequent intervals rather than a

⁴ Until 1931 expansion was limited to Bafa's own works: at the beginning of that year, however, he purchased the control of the Busi works, the principal competitor in the home market, from the Moravian bank.

⁵ The workers receive a premium if they can use a bigger percentage of the hide than is usually used.

better quality article less often. By rapidly adapting cheap models to changes in fashion Bata brought shoes of a sort previously considered a luxury within the reach of the wage-earner.

The whole of Europe has been inundated with Bata shoes, but, owing to the high level of duties in Eastern Europe, the increase in export has been principally taken by Germany. According to a report of the Economic Advisory Council export of shoes from the territory now forming Czechoslovakia had increased in 1928 by 40 per cent. compared with the pre-war period; the export to Germany was seven times as great, while export to territories previously part of the Monarchy had declined by 26 per cent. Tariffs have been raised all round, and to avoid them Bata, a year or two before his death, began to build his own works in Germany, Poland, and Jugoslavia. The German shoe industry, hitherto entirely unorganised, has been driven to combine against him: the large retail trade concerns have combined and reduced prices, forcing reductions and modernisation of methods in the factories.

But Bata stood alone—not alone in the use of rationalised methods but alone as an *entrepreneur* who applied the new methods to an old industry and transformed it, at the same time creating a new adjustment of prices. He never relied on credit at any time, but built up the works from its own profits. There is no sign of any similar driving power in other branches of Czech industry which could transform other branches to produce for an expanding market.

If tariff policy were to be directed towards reciprocal reduction of duties on industrial products between Czechoslovakia and Germany, the branches with lower wage costs, chiefly textiles, and those with competitive superiority, glass, shoes (and possibly porcelain) would be able to increase their exports to Germany. But the other industries, iron and iron goods, chemicals, metal goods, machines, and sugar, which are entrenched behind the tariff barriers in cartels and maintain a higher level of prices in the home market than the German, would not be able to face unrestricted German competition. It is these industries, concentrated in a few hands and owned by the leading banks, which are able to exercise most influence on tariff policy and which direct their power towards maintaining high import duties.

If, however, Czechoslovak industries should ever have to compete with a united Austrian and German Customs territory, they will find their exports to these countries seriously reduced by the competition of German and Austrian industries, particularly

as regards the chief export industries, textiles, glass, and shoes, 'nion would find their best prospect of maintaining their export trade to by joining the Customs Union. But as any Customs Union with Germany is wholly out of the question on political grounds, both compensation for a loss of this kind would have to be sought late the Danubian markets.

(2) *Tariffs on Industrial Products in Eastern Europe.*—Where the other Succession States pointed out that Czechoslovakia benefited unduly from the peace treaties because the lands which fell to the new Republic—Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia—contained at least 60 per cent. of the industries of the old Monarchy, Czechoslovak industrialists pointed out that their industrial equipment was a handicap rather than an advantage when the duty-free purchasing public for Czech manufactures was reduced from 50 to 14 millions by the erection of tariffs. It is true that there has been some loss of markets. Almost all the industries of Czechoslovakia are obliged to export a large proportion of their output—a proportion varying from half to as much as three-quarters of the whole. But Czechoslovakia did not make an attempt to secure the preferential rates in the old markets which the treaty would have permitted to come into force up to 1925. In justification of this policy it was asserted that foreign trade was taking a new direction, turning towards the markets of the West.

Neither of these assertions was quite exact. Czechoslovakia did not suffer nearly so much by the loss of the markets for manufactures as the agricultural countries suffered by the loss of the markets for wheat and livestock. On the other hand Czechoslovak exports were cut off from the Eastern markets to some extent, and were not able to find compensation by turning to the West. In the first post-war years, before currencies were stabilised and when the trade and finance of the Danube countries was in a state of chaos, Czechoslovakia's exports to Austria and the Danubian lands undoubtedly decreased, while exports to Germany increased chiefly owing to the prohibitive rates which these countries imposed on industrial imports. A calculation made by the State Statistical Office of the tariff burden on 306 important export commodities shows that the percentage unweighted arithmetical average of the tariff to the price was in 1928:—

Germany	19·7
Austria	18·9
Poland	74·6

betw	Roumania	68·3
to	Hungary	27·7
con	Jugoslavia	36·5

since that date many of the rates have been raised; in Hungary probably stand twice as high since the lapse of the commercial treaty in 1930, which has not so far been renewed. But since normal conditions have been restored no definite trend Westwards can be observed. From 1925 to 1930 the share of total exports (about 30 per cent.) taken by the Danube markets remained steady, while the share taken by Germany tended to decrease; the share of total imports from the Danube lands is increasing, while imports from Germany fluctuated in amount. In 1931, owing to the intensification of the crisis in the Danubian States, the share of exports taken by them declined more than the share taken by Germany.

Direction of Export Trade of Czechoslovakia.

Per cent. to	1920.	1921.	1922.	1923. ⁶	1924. ⁶	1925.
Austria	35·10	28·6	21·95	—	—	17·28
Hungary	9·11	11·23	8·78	—	—	6·26
Roumania	2·66	4·31	2·89	—	—	4·52
Jugoslavia	3·92	7·35	4·32	—	—	4·36
All Danubian Lands ..	50·79	51·4	37·94	—	—	32·42
Germany	12·08	11·21	18·84	—	—	22·49
Poland	—	—	—	—	—	—

Per cent. to	1926.	1927.	1928.	1929.	1930.	1931.
Austria	16·26	15·2	14·7	15·0	14·0	13·7
Hungary	6·88	8·06	6·9	6·4	5·7	2·2
Roumania	4·67	4·6	4·1	3·8	3·4	2·6
Jugoslavia	5·40	4·5	4·5	5·6	8·8	6·3
All Danube Lands ..	33·21	32·3	30·2	30·8	31·9	24·8
Germany	19·90	24·1	22·1	19·3	17·0	15·6
Poland	—	—	4·0	4·4	3·6	2·9

⁶ No figures.

Direction of Import Trade.

Per cent. from	1920.	1921.	1922.	1923. ⁷	1924. ⁷	1925.
Austria . . .	13.01	8.84	15.62	—	—	7.34
Hungary . . .	2.80	4.12	5.39	—	—	6.36
Roumania . . .	1.32	2.15	3.38	—	—	2.10
Jugoslavia . . .	1.45	1.64	2.11	—	—	2.85
All Danubian . . .	18.58	16.75	26.50	—	—	18.65
Germany . . .	23.96	26.13	27.85	—	—	31.20
Poland . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—

Per cent. from	1926.	1927.	1928.	1929.	1930.	1931.
Austria . . .	7.37	7.1	7.5	7.8	7.7	7.2
Hungary . . .	6.73	5.3	4.4	4.8	5.9	1.1
Roumania . . .	3.16	3.69	2.80	2.4	3.6	4.8
Jugoslavia . . .	3.83	3.1	2.35	1.7	2.8	3.2
All Danubian . . .	21.09	17.19	17.0	16.7	20.0	16.3
Germany . . .	21.22	20.9	24.9	25.0	25.4	28.0
Poland . . .	—	—	6.6	6.5	5.6	5.3

There has been no general turning away from the Eastern countries to the West. The Western markets are more important than the East, as they were before the war, for the three or four principal export commodities—glass, shoes, and sugar—but for others, the standardised branches, the Danubian markets must retain their importance. The division of the market affected the exporting capacity of Czech industry and the direction of export trade in certain branches only. The exporting industries can be divided into two groups, the smaller specialised high-value products—glass, porcelain, leather goods, gloves, glass jewellery—and the larger standardised branches of production—textiles, paper, wood, and sugar.

In the first group are included branches which already exported a large proportion of their output before the war, and which have therefore only been slightly affected by the division of the Monarchy and the increase of tariffs in Eastern Europe. This group includes

⁷ No figures.

linen (over 60 per cent. exported before war), enamel ware (60-70 per cent.), glass jewellery (80 per cent.), shoes, porcelain and pottery, gloves, glass (over 50 per cent.), and hats (33 per cent.). The proportion of output exported has in most cases increased in the post-war period by about 15-20 per cent., so that most of these branches now export 70-80 per cent. of their output.

Of this class, three industries⁸—shoes, porcelain⁹ and glass—have been able to maintain their exports at the pre-war level by finding new markets in the West.

Other speciality exporting branches have encountered difficulties due to a general market crisis, but have not been able to change over from East to West. Chief of these is linen. Production has fallen to 50 per cent. of the pre-war level as a result of the contraction in consumption and the loss of the Russian supply. The break-up of the Monarchy was the more serious in that it meant the loss of the flax supplies from the Alpine provinces, Galicia and Hungary. Certain smaller branches have lost ground by competition with Germany; for instance, artificial flowers and leather gloves. These are more important than elsewhere, because the Czechoslovak foreign trade balance is composed of such small items.

It is the second group, the staple industries, which suffered most under the post-war readjustment, and which were not able to make good their losses in the Danubian markets by finding new markets in Germany or Western Europe. Foremost among these are the textile industries. All have been severely injured by the high duties imposed by the new States. Although the German tariff on imported fabrics remains at about the pre-war level (15-18 per cent.), exports to Germany have gained little ground. The various attempts which have been made to estimate the extent of the loss can hardly be regarded as trustworthy, since the real origin of the fabric and direction of export were concealed by centralisation of the textile trade in Vienna and Budapest. These

⁸ This statement is based on estimates made by Dr. Uhlig in a series of privately printed memoranda for the Advisory Economic Council (Poradni sbor), and though they do not claim to more than rough calculations of the loss of the old markets they are an advance on mere generalisations.

⁹ *Exports of Porcelain from Czechoslovakia in 1,000 tons*

			Total	To "old" foreign countries	To "new" foreign countries.
1913	37·1	20·9	16·2
1926	31·6	23·1	8·5
1927	37·4	27·1	10·3

estimates show that the loss has been most severely felt by cotton. Exports from the territory now Czechoslovakia had declined in 1927 to 40 per cent. of the pre-war level, and the Succession States took only one-third of what they used to take before the war.¹⁰ Much of this decline is due to the loss of Galicia, which has been supplied with coarse yarns from the Polish industry of Łódź since it became part of Poland. The woollen and worsted industries have also lost heavily: in 1926 total exports from Czechoslovakia only reached a third of the pre-war level. Before the war, three-quarters of the total export went to the Succession States, now the total amount exported is less than the amount exported to these States only before the war. The clothing industry has suffered from a similar loss; it is estimated that only one-tenth of the pre-war amount in 1927 went to the Succession States.¹¹

Next to textiles the most important industry affected by the loss of the old home market has been paper.¹² Exports have declined by about 50 per cent., and the share taken by the Succession States has declined from 75.3 per cent. of the total in 1913 to 54 per cent. in 1927.

The beet sugar industry, the backbone of agricultural production in Bohemia, has also lost markets without being able to find others.

The only staple industry which did not immediately suffer by the loss of markets is timber. After the war it succeeded in increasing the volume of its exports, and sent about the same proportion to Germany (50 per cent.) and Hungary (40 per cent.) as it did before the war. It has been able to increase its exports to Germany because the German duty on timber is low, in order to secure cheap supplies for the wood-working industry. Since 1930 it has suffered severe losses by the lapse of the commercial treaty with Hungary. For two years the trade with Hungary has been reduced to a minimum, but recently a "compensation agreement" for exchange of Hungarian pigs against Czechoslovak timber has been made, which will enable the industry to regain a large proportion of its normal export to Hungary.

* * * *

¹⁰ Uhlig, Report for *Poradní sbor* (Economic Advisory Council) on production and consumption of cotton goods in Czechoslovakia before the war and at the present time, 1928.

¹¹ Uhlig, Report for *Poradní sbor*, 1928. Exports of the Clothing Industry.

¹² Exports are estimated to have been 1,332,504 tons in 1913 and were 509,274 tons in 1927. M. Raab-Freiwalden, Report for *Poradní sbor*, Production and consumption of cellulose and paper in Czechoslovakia, 1929.

From the industrial standpoint, tariff preferences on export of manufactured goods from the East European States would offer the greatest advantage to Czechoslovakia, since these States are the markets for the industries employing large numbers of workers, rather than for the smaller speciality branches and the highly capitalised heavy and chemical industries. The question whether these advantages would be enough to compensate for the concessions on agricultural imports which Czechoslovakia can offer in return, and how far such concessions would go towards disposing of the Danube corn and meat surpluses, will be discussed in a subsequent article.

DOREEN WARRINER.

IGNATYEV AT CONSTANTINOPLE

II.

It is no wonder that Ignatyev painted a gloomy picture of Russia's position following on her grave defeat at the Paris Conference over Greece in January and February 1869. The Balkan Christians were bitterly divided among themselves. The Turks were elated over their suppression of Crete and their humiliation of Greece. Their confidence and energy were increased and their pride flattered by the visits of the Emperor Franz Joseph and Empress Eugénie.¹ With unaccustomed vigour they pushed on their reform plans, army reorganisation, and naval building, turning their faces to the west, counting on the steady support of England, and above all looking to Napoleon III. To Russia they were frankly hostile. (*Iz.*, 1914, iv, 76-82.)*

One serious loss they sustained, Fuad Pasha dying at Nice after a short illness in February 1869; a loss particularly to Ali Pasha, despite their rivalry and certain differences in their views. Ali had become Grand Vizier, with Fuad as Reis Effendi, in January 1867—a duumvirate admirably fitted to throw dust, in the shape of pseudo-liberal reforms, in the eyes of Western Europe (*Iz.*, 1914, iii, 98). At the same time Ignatyev recognised that they were remarkable men. Between them they controlled Turkish policy. Looking back, perhaps for once with a certain triumphant detachment, he described Ali as a serious statesman; as, despite his European externals, in essentials a Turk and hostile to the Christians. Fuad he thought more of a cosmopolitan than a Turk, without prejudices, superficial, many-sided, adaptable. Ali, though less brilliant, had the deeper qualities; Fuad, initiative, energy, suppleness and presence of mind; no one knew better than he how to cover up the errors of his Government and to support Turkish prestige before Europe. In his attitude towards Russia he varied, but was not hostile in his last years. On Fuad's death Ali was faced with a solitary

* NOTE.—The following abbreviations are used: *Iz.* for *Izvestiya ministerstva mostrannykh del*; *I.V.* for *Istorichesky Vestnik*, 1914, vol. 135.

¹ Ignatyev was characteristically alarmed that the Empress's visit would bring demands on behalf of the Catholics and an increase of Latin influence; see his letter to Archimandrite Antonin Kapustin, head of the Russian Church Mission in Jerusalem, a very active and ambitious cleric and a close ally of Ignatyev, in A. A. Dmitrievsky, *Graf N.P. Ignatyev kak tserkovno-politichesky deyatel' na pravoslavnom vostoke* (St Petersburg, 1909), p. 70.

struggle against his numerous opponents, but he succeeded in concentrating all power in his own hands and removing from Constantinople his two most dangerous rivals, Midhat and Namik Pashas. The leaders of the Old Turkish party, Mehemet Rushdi (the Grand Vizier before Ali), Riza, Kibrizli, lost all influence. The Ministry was composed solely of Ali's adherents, he himself combining the posts of Grand Vizier and Reis Effendi. He held on grimly until his death, in September 1871 (*Iz.*, 1914, iv, 89-90.)

By then the year 1870 had brought decisive change. Ignatyev, as has been seen, had long hoped for the Franco-Prussian War, which he had regarded as inevitable. But, for him, it came too late and was over too soon. The days of 1867 when the Russian Foreign Office seemed not to have set its face definitely against the idea of a general conflagration in the Balkans were past, and the revision of the 1856 treaty was now to be effected only by peaceful means (*Iz.*, 1914, iv, 96).

The Turks, however, were greatly alarmed when the war broke out, that it would extend to the east if it were not quickly finished, and the Roumanians shared their fears that Russia would take the opportunity to fall upon Turkey.² The news of French defeats was all the more serious for the Turks in that the Balkan Christians were convinced that a French victory would worsen their position and therefore ardently hoped for the success of Prussia, if possible after a protracted struggle which would give Russia the opportunity to fulfil her historic mission. They firmly believed that there was an alliance between Russia and Prussia for simultaneous action in the east and west. The rapid collapse of France caused an equally rapid change of attitude on the part of the Turkish Government, which promptly tried to draw close to Prussia and nervously to

² For Roumanian nervousness as to a Russian stroke and their inquiries at Vienna as to the Austrian attitude see N. Iorga, *Correspondance diplomatique roumaine sous le roi Charles I^{er}*, nos. 150, 154, 156. The Roumanians were deeply committed in negotiations with the Turks for joint military resistance to the Russians, though they do not seem to have actually concluded an agreement with Constantinople; see the controversy as to this between E. Adamov and N. Iorga in *Le monde slave*, 1928, no. 1, p. 94; no. 4, pp. 142-5. Rumours were also spread from Constantinople of a Turco-Greek alliance, E. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours*, vol. 3, p. 334. According to Prince Gregory Trubetskoy "Les préliminaires de la conférence de Londres" in *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 1909, vol. 23, p. 127, the Turks proceeded to a partial mobilisation, called up 50,000 reservists, and hastily placed munitions orders abroad. Trubetskoy apparently bases these statements on information from Ignatyev's despatches. Frokesch-Osten in *Deutsche Revue*, April 1880, p. 13, confirms the fact of Turkish military and naval preparations.

maintain good relations with Russia. They were particularly anxious lest the mission of Thiers to St. Petersburg, late in September, might lead to concessions at their expense, and later lest the war might be ended by a Conference at which Russia would demand the revision of the Treaty of Paris (*Iz*, 1914, iv, 91-5)³

She did, of course, demand a revision of the treaty, but not in quite such an alarming form as the Turks had feared. The first move came from Ignatyev. From the outbreak of the war he pressed St. Petersburg to act; then, having failed to extract the instructions he desired, he took the initiative himself and informed Ali Pasha personally that Russia must have back the Bessarabian districts ceded in 1856 and must no longer be saddled with the ignominious clauses limiting her naval strength in the Black Sea. At the same time he maintained that there was no intention of invalidating the collective guarantee of the Ottoman Empire or of attacking the principle of the integrity of the empire. Ali did not appear to raise great difficulties as to Bessarabia, provided that Turkey kept the delta of the Danube and that the international regime for the Danube were continued, but he was extremely reserved as regards any alteration of the naval clauses and was fixedly opposed to any opening of the Straits. He gave the impression that negotiations might have some chance of success and that he was desirous on general grounds of a *rapprochement* with Russia, but that his principal object was to gain time and to remain on good terms with England.⁴

Ignatyev obviously realised that this bid of his to initiate a great diplomatic success on his own ground at Constantinople

³ This review of Ignatyev corresponds very closely with the extracts from his despatches during July, August and September quoted by Prince Gregory Trubetskoy in "Les préliminaires de la conférence de Londres" in *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 1909 vol. 23, pp. 124-36.

⁴ Text of Ignatyev's despatch of 16 August recounting his conversation with Ali in Trubetskoy, *ib.*, pp. 271-77. Ignatyev's version of this in *Iz.*, 1914, iv, 98-102, is substantially the same, though it implies that Ignatyev initiated discussions rather than that he merely had one conversation. There is, naturally, no mention in *Iz.* of Ignatyev's repudiation by Gorchakov and of the ensuing bitterness. The very brief mention in *I.V.*, p. 70, adds nothing. Ignatyev ascribes Gorchakov's subsequent instructions to him not to touch the subject as due to his jealousy of the initiative having been taken from him. He does not suggest in any way that his *démarche* was intended merely to force his Foreign Office to seize the favourable moment for a *coup*, and not in reality to win a victory for himself. For doubts as to how far the credit ascribed by Gorchakov to himself for the declaration of 31 October is justified see Kurt Rheindorf, *Die Schwarze-Meer (Pontus)-Frage 1856-1871* (Berlin, 1925), pp. 81-3, 153, 158-59.

would be extremely distasteful to Gorchakov, and he attempted to palliate his *démarche* by suitable generalities and by emphasis on its having been made "d'une manière purement académique et personnelle, en ayant soin de dépouiller mes paroles de tout caractère officiel." Gorchakov's first reply, in a personal letter, showed obvious annoyance: the bulk of it was of a general character; only in the closing paragraphs did he refer to Ignatyev's *démarche*, underlining the non-committal attitude of Ali Pasha and, with obvious relish, pointing out that the conversation provided very slight grounds for hopeful negotiations.⁵ To this Ignatyev protested, "qu'il n'est jamais entré dans sa pensée que cette abolition pût se consommer sur le terrain local. . . J'ai uniquement eu à coeur de faciliter par des efforts locaux, une tâche que le cabinet impérial n'a jamais cessé de considérer comme l'une des plus importantes dévolues à ses soins. . ."⁶

This barbed verbiage did not, of course, soothe Gorchakov, and before receiving it he was angrily disturbed by circumstantial rumours, mainly originating from Vienna and Budapest, that Ignatyev was preparing for the abrogation of the Treaty of Paris.⁷ He wrote again to his unruly subordinate, on 13 September: "Ce que vous avez dit au grand vizier était parfaitement juste en principe, mais je crois que la choix du confident était moins heureux. Nous ne pouvions pas supposer qu'Aali Pacha s'abstiendrait d'en faire part aux Cabinets sur l'appui desquels il croyait pouvoir compter ou dont il était certain d'exciter les défiances. . . . J'éprouve quelques regrets que l'éveil ait été donné localement et vous le dis avec ma franchise habituelle. Ce n'est pas à Constantinople, ni avec le concours de la Turquie que nous pouvons espérer l'abolition du traité de 1856."⁸ Two days later Gorchakov informed Ignatyev that the Turkish *chargé d'affaires* had insisted on seeing him in person and had officially broached the question of Ignatyev's overture; and that he had whittled it away as being "une conversation strictement académique" and had declared positively that Ignatyev had acted without instructions from St. Petersburg. "Vous connaissez déjà, mon cher Ignatieff," the letter went on, "mon opinion sur l'opportunité de cette causerie, qui a fait en

⁵ Text in Trubetskoy, *ib.*, pp. 279-82. S. Goriainow, *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles*, p. 151, gives its date 28 August.

⁶ Despatch no. 228, 14 September: long extract from the text in Trubetskoy, *ib.*, p. 283.

⁷ Trubetskoy, *ib.*, pp. 284-5; Goriainow, *ib.*, pp. 149, 152.

⁸ Extract from the text in Trubetskoy, *ib.*, p. 285-6.

Europe beaucoup plus de bruit que nous n'eussions désiré et qu'il ne nous est profitable."⁹

Upon this, early in October, Ignatyev left Constantinople on leave, nominally for family reasons, in order to explain in St. Petersburg the false position in which he had been placed (*I.V.*, 70). Gorchakov was only too ready to have him absent from Constantinople, but not at all anxious to have him present in St. Petersburg. An accident delayed him and he reached the capital too late (*Iz.*, 1914, iv, 101). On 31 October, Gorchakov had despatched his circular declaring that Russia no longer considered herself bound by the 1856 treaty as regards her sovereign rights in the Black Sea, that she denounced the special Russo-Turkish convention regarding naval limitation, and that she recognised the full rights of the Sultan in respect to the Black Sea in conformity with Russia's reassuming her full rights.¹⁰

With the issue of this circular any doubts as to the Chancellor concentrating negotiations in the hands of himself, and Brunnov in London, were removed. Ignatyev was in the background. The Turks, pressed by Bismarck, unsupported by an uncertain Austria, could only wait for stiff action from England. This proved not to be pushed to extremes. Gladstone himself had always disapproved of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris, and it was the form, rather than the content, of the Russian declaration to which he took strong objection. Brunnov, despite his alarms, was right in his prediction that the British Government would prefer to negotiate rather than fight, unless it were over-ridden by irresistible pressure of public opinion.¹¹

In fact, the Turks seemed to have expected that the Russian declaration would have been more drastic and would have attempted

⁹ Extract from Gorchakov's letter, 15 September, in Trubetskoy, *ib.*, p. 286.

¹⁰ The text of the circular is in Martens' *Nouveau recueil général de traités* . . . , vol. 18, pp. 269-73. The fullest account of the whole question, including the London Conference, is in S. Goriainow, *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles*, pp. 144-302. Trubetskoy covers a much smaller ground, using the same documents, but gives full texts or much longer extracts. There is important German material in *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. 2, pp. 3-23, and in Kurt Rheindorf, *Die Schwarze-Meer (Pontus)-Frage 1856-71*. See also the article of A. F. Meyendorff on the question of the Russian guarantee of neutrality in the Franco-Prussian War and the *quid pro quo* from Prussia in *Sbornik statei posvyashchennykh P. N. Milyukovu* (Prague, 1929), pp. 497-512. The text of the protocols of the London Conference, and of the 1871 Treaty, are in Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'empire ottoman*, vol. 3, pp. 301-37.

¹¹ Lettre particulière of Brunnov to Gorchakov, 14 November; text given in Trubetskoy, *ib.*, pp. 368-71.

to lay down the principle of opening the Straits.¹² It caused, indeed, an immense impression in Constantinople, and de Staal, the *chargé d'affaires*, was awkwardly placed by the late arrival of the official text of the declaration and of his instructions, but Ignatyev, when he returned to his post just before 23 November, found Ali Pasha mainly preoccupied with the question of form and not inclined to stir up immediate complications.¹³ It appears that the Turks, in their nervousness that the scope of a Conference might become so enlarged as to open up the whole Treaty of Paris, would have preferred a direct agreement with Russia, but in view of the British attitude they agreed to a Conference, with the express request that it should deal only with the articles of the treaty denounced by Russia¹⁴—a limitation that Bismarck was most anxious to assure.

The Conference duly met in London, and on 13 March, 1871, was signed the treaty which relieved Russia of "the indefinite pressure of so humiliating a yoke."¹⁵ She was untrammelled by any neutralisation of the Black Sea and free to build as she pleased, although, in fact, during the next eight years she did hardly anything to construct a Black Sea fleet. In effect the content of her unilateral declaration of 31 October had been accepted. One novelty which had caused highly involved searchings for a formula appeared in the treaty: the Sultan was to have the right of opening the Straits in time of peace to war vessels of friendly and allied powers if he considered it necessary for the safeguarding of the Treaty of Paris. The other stipulations of that treaty and its annexes were solemnly re-confirmed by the signatories. Gorchakov could undoubtedly plume himself on a great diplomatic success.

For Ignatyev, though he claimed that the treaty represented what he had attempted to concert in August alone with Ali (*Iz.*, 1914, v, 137), it was not enough; nothing had been said of Bess-

¹² Trubetskoy, *ib.*, pp. 381-2, 385, quoting from de Staal to Gorchakov 15 November, and Ignatyev to Gorchakov 23 November. De Staal received the circular and his instructions 15 November. Gorchakov was, in fact, keeping the principle of the opening of the Straits as a final card to play if British opposition were pushed to extremes; only Brunnov was originally informed of this and he was instructed to use it in the last resort if he thought it necessary; Goraiinow, *ib.*, pp. 164, 218.

¹³ Ignatyev's despatch no. 286, 23 November: text in Trubetskoy, *ib.*, p. 385.

¹⁴ Ignatyev's despatches, nos. 291 and 295 secret, 29 November and 6 December, reporting information from Keyserling, the Prussian Minister: cited in Trubetskoy, *ib.*, p. 394; *Iz.*, 1914, v, 131-34, quoting from despatch of 6 December and from the Turkish instructions for the conference.

¹⁵ Stratford de Redcliffe, *The Eastern Question*, p. 15, in a reprinted letter to *The Times* of 16 May, 1876.

arabia,¹⁶ and Russia had expressly bound herself to the remainder of the Treaty of Paris, what he urged should have been done was to set about quietly building cruisers in the Black Sea and to come to a direct agreement with Turkey (*I.V.*, 71). His real objection was that it was not he who had rid Russia of humiliating conditions.

In one essential respect, however, it is difficult to see that the outcome did not satisfy his own requirements. He had written: "Il serait, en effet, très important que l'Angleterre ne pût pas se prévaloir d'avoir sauvé la Turquie d'un prétendu danger, en nous faisant reculer."¹⁷ And Russia had not withdrawn. He had expressed his general attitude in the following terms: "Si les prétentions britanniques prévalent, l'Occident conservera la haute main en Orient, la France venant se joindre à l'Angleterre et à l'Autriche après la paix. Si c'est nous qui l'emportons, ce sera au contraire un indice pour les Turcs qu'il est de leur intérêt de s'entendre directement avec la Russie et de ne plus trop compter sur l'Occident."¹⁸ Russia had, in fact, gained the day, and her position at Constantinople in 1871 was very different from what it had been at the close of the last London Conference two years before. For this she had not only herself to thank: the collapse of France had transformed the situation.

The Franco-Prussian War and the London Conference's acceptance of the Russian *fait accompli* ushered in a new period on the Bosphorus. France was now, of course, politically effaced, and Ignatyev proceeded to build up for himself a predominating position based upon excellent personal relations with the Sultan.

His task was the easier in that the death of Ali Pasha in September 1871 removed the strongest single figure among the leading Turks and was followed by a long series of rapid changes and intrigue, during which there were no fewer than six different Grand Viziers in two and a half years, with still more frequent changes among the provincial governors; the Sultan, nervously suspicious as to his own power and popularity, appearing to be deliberately lowering the importance of the Grand Vizirate¹⁹ (*Iz.*, 1915, i, 145-6).

¹⁶ According to Prokesch-Osten, *Deutsche Revue*, April 1880, p. 15, Bessarabia had originally figured in Gorchakov's proposals for the declaration, but had been omitted owing to Prussian desires. He does not state whence he derived this information.

¹⁷ Ignatyev's despatch, no. 286, 23 November; in Trubetskoy, *ib.*, p. 385.

¹⁸ Ignatyev's despatch, no. 295, secret, 6 December; in Trubetskoy, *ib.*, p. 383.

¹⁹ The following were the Grand Viziers, and Ignatyev's comments upon them as given in *Iz.*, 1915, i, 146-57. Ignatyev does not suggest the best explanation of the Sultan's chaotic behaviour, viz., that he was not sane.

[Continued on next page]

The increase of Abdul Aziz's power and particularly his squandering of the finances were powerful factors in the growth of the Young Turk constitutionalists, led by Ignatyev's enemy, Midhat Pasha, who aimed at replacing the Sultan's centralisation by their own. But Midhat's day was not yet come. It was Ignatyev's star that first rose, and he did not have much difficulty in killing a curious project, concocted by Midhat and mainly by Halil Sherif, to reinforce the military strength of Turkey by a reorganisation in imitation of the new German Empire, whereby the tributary States would become again effectively linked to Constantinople (*Iz.*, 1915, i, 170-2).²⁰

(i) Mahmud Nedim Pasha. Old Turk, pro-Russian, he had no personal dislike of the Christians, and appointed them to important posts; very popular among the Orthodox, especially the Bulgars and the Armenians. His attempts at economy and unwise severity against some of his main enemies brought about his downfall.

(ii) Midhat Pasha. from 31 July, 1872; Young Turk, immediate reaction from Mahmud's regime; large expenditure planned for railways, army, administrative and educational reforms. Ignatyev did his best to undermine his relations with the Sultan, since his foreign policy was pro-British and anti-Russian. The Reis Effendi was Halil Sherif Pasha, who became a bitter personal enemy of Ignatyev and dangerous opponent in his foreign policy. (Halil Sherif was a rich Egyptian, who had lived long in Paris and had a thickish veneer of European civilisation; while Reis Effendi he married Ismail's niece, the beautiful Nasli Hanum, for long a notorious centre of intrigue in Constantinople, Radowitz, *Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen* . . . , vol. i, p. 240)

(iii) Mahmud Rushdi. an upright, capable man, halfway between the Old and the Young Turks. Halil (who remained Reis Effendi), Midhat and Mustafa Fazil were planning a "constitutional ministry" which would bind the Sultan's hands and prejudice the position of the Christians and fling Turkey into the arms of the West. Ignatyev's revelations and intrigues with the Sultan frustrated their plan.

(iv) Essad Pasha. 14 February, 1873; for fifty-eight days only; had been Seraskier; a young officer, rapidly risen; quite incompetent for the post of Grand Vizier. The Sultan took a good deal of his work into his own hands, but quickly became bored with it. The one good thing Essad did was to turn Halil Sherif out of the Porte.

(v) Mahmud Rushdi Shirvanidze: had been Minister of Finance, and continued to incline towards England, though on good personal terms with Ignatyev. The new Reis Effendi, Rashid Pasha, was pro-Russian. Intrigues and finance caused yet another change.

(vi) Hussein Avni Pasha. 17 February, 1874; he kept his previous post as Seraskier, and had always previously occupied nothing but military posts, previously pro-French, now appeared to believe in Germany; had always been personally on excellent terms with Ignatyev, energetic, brusque and a fanatical patriot. He quickly quarrelled with Rashid and replaced him at the Porte by Aarifi Pasha, a well-intentioned nullity.

²⁰ The scheme was regarded by the Roumanians as owing much to the influence of Andrassy, and was indignantly repudiated by them as a fatal blow at the political existence of Roumania; it was more cautiously disapproved of by Belgrade, see N. Iorga, *Correspondance diplomatique roumaine sous le roi Charles I^{er}*, nos. 227-30, 232-5, 237-9, under date November-December 1872.

This borrowing from Germany by the Young Turks was symptomatic. Ignatyev notes, in discussing the general position of Germany at Constantinople between 1870 and 1874, that the Turks turned to Germany thinking her the one disinterested power, the Young Turks and Halil Sherif especially harbouring the idea of Germany and Austria combining with them against the Slavs and Russia. This idea was, however, weakened by the evident continued closeness of the German and Russian courts and the excellent relations maintained between Ignatyev and the German Minister Keudell, which were in no way impaired by serious difficulties which arose over the anti-Russian intrigues of Alten and Kalisch, the German consuls at Jerusalem and Rushchuk.²¹ Keudell supported Ignatyev against them, and Alten was removed from Jerusalem. Keudell himself left in 1873, and though his successor, Eichemann, was pro-Turkish and in close relations with the Austrians his stay was very brief, and Werther, who followed him, caused Ignatyev no difficulties (*Iz.*, 1915, i, 158-60).

Although Ignatyev had so far little to complain of in the attitude of Germany he was encouraged by his opposition to the shackles of the *Dreikaiserbündnis* to look ahead—far ahead—with a prophetic warning as to the possible dangers of the great military and economic power on the Spree. "Il serait à désirer que les intérêts matériels de l'Allemagne ne soient pas trop engagés en Orient, ainsi que le voudraient les turcs dans l'espoir d'obtenir par ce moyen la protection efficace de cette Puissance. Les commandes si considérables de canons Krupp faites dernièrement par la Porte, la présence des instructeurs prussiens dans l'armée ottomane, l'augmentation considérables (*sic*) du nombre des ingénieurs allemands employés à la construction des chemins de fer—sont déjà autant de liens qui attachaient la Turquie à l'Empire Germanique et que ce dernier pouvait exploiter le jour où il voudrait exercer un rôle actif en Turquie. Vu les dispositions du Sultan, des dignitaires de la Porte et même des populations il serait facile à l'Allemagne d'acquérir en Turquie une influence prépondérante contre laquelle il nous serait beaucoup plus difficile de lutter qu'avec celle des autres puissances occidentales" (*Iz.*, 1915, i, 160).

On the Austrians at Constantinople Ignatyev in 1874— is

²¹ Bismarck at the time of his 1873 visit to St. Petersburg with the Emperor was anxious to impress upon Stremoukhov that strict instructions had been given to the German Consuls in the Orient not to meddle with political affairs; report of Stremoukhov to Gorchakov, 6 May, 1873; text in *Russko-Germanskie otnosheniya* (Moscow, 1922), pp. 14-16, reprinted from *Krasny Arkhiv*, vol. 1.

comparatively mild. He complains sharply of the influence of Magyar anti-Slav intrigues, and of Ludolph, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, for several years Consul-General at Warsaw, young and active; but he was replaced by Zichy (a cipher in the diplomatic world who rapidly fell completely into Ignatyev's hands), and relations were smooth enough in Constantinople (*Iz.*, 1915, i, 160-3).

Ignatyev's full bitterness is reserved for England, and especially for Elliot: "homme bilieux et passionné . . . Appartenant à l'école palmerstonienne, il s'attaque systématiquement à notre influence légitime en intervenant dans des affaires où l'intérêt anglais n'est nullement engagé, comme par exemple, dans la question gréco-bulgare, dans les affaires du Mont Athos." After vain efforts to direct secretly the Bulgars through his consuls at Adrianople and Salonika, Elliot turned to exploiting the Greeks against Russia (*Iz.*, 1915, i, 163). The English railway schemes in Anatolia also aroused Ignatyev's determined opposition. He heartily disliked Turkey having any railways at all;²² and most of all he feared them in Asiatic Turkey under English control, with projected routes to Erzerum and Van threatening Transcaucasia, with political and strategical advantages that would accrue to England, with economic rivalry from a developed Anatolia, the harvest of which would be ready a month earlier than the Russian harvest (*Iz.*, 1915, iv, 234-6).

Hardly less violent than his attacks on the English are his diatribes against the Greeks and "la grande idée." The Athenian Government was accused of working against Russia on every occasion, and he signalled out the special hostility of the Synod at Athens and the Greek Minister at Constantinople, a violent Russophobe who sponged for the support of England and Germany.²³

²² The Sultan's European tour in 1867 had inspired him and Fuad with a vivid idea of the importance of railways for Turkey, and there followed a period of feverish railway projecting Ignatyev opposed, with much skill, all such plans. "Je ne me suis jamais fait illusion quant à l'avenir et aux conséquences de l'établissement des voies ferrées en Turquie. J'ai fait mon possible pour enrayer la marche de cette entreprise, en appelant par tous les moyens en mon pouvoir l'attention des hommes d'État turcs sur les dangers politiques et financiers, que son exécution préparerait à l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, en la livrant à l'exploitation de l'Occident." (*Iz.*, 1915, iv, 231.)

²³ In fact the Koumoundouros Ministry appears to have tried to keep on good terms with Russia. It resigned in October 1871. Bulgarias who succeeded as Prime Minister in January 1872 was actively anti-Russian, and he appointed as *chargé d'affaires* at Constantinople, in place of Rhazis who was regarded as closely bound to Ignatyev, Kalergis, who, like his successor as Minister, Simos, was determined to combat Russian influence. E. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours*, vol. 3, pp. 346-52, 357.

In the eyes of the Greeks (and the same might have been said of the Bulgars and their Church): " . . . l'Eglise Orthodoxe n'est qu'un drapeau politique et un moyen d'action . . . L'idée nationale subsiste seule et utilise tous les éléments subversifs qui existent en Turquie." Among such subversive elements Ignatyev detected freemasonry, the modern equivalent for the Greeks of their out-of-date *hetairiai* (*Iz.*, 1915, i, 164-6).

Ignatyev's struggle with the Greeks was, of course, primarily over the furiously contested Bulgarian Exarchate, which came into being during the three heated years 1870, 1871, and 1872 and left a permanent mark in many quarters against Ignatyev as the creator of an artificial, Pan-Slav-manipulated, Bulgar nationality. In fact, Ignatyev was neither the creator of Bulgarian nationalism nor the initiator of the struggle for a Bulgarian Church independent of the Patriarchate. The origins of both go back to the generation before the Crimean War. After 1856 Russian educational and cultural propaganda increased steadily, thanks to the advocacy of the Moscow Pan-Slavs, to official support, and to the continued energy of the Bulgar colony in Odessa, while the Church struggle was resumed in 1858.²⁴ Thus, when Ignatyev arrived in Constantinople he found

²⁴ There is a very informing article by N. Bobčev on the Slavophil movement in Russia and the rise of Bulgarian nationalism in *Proslava na osvoboditelnata voina 1877-1878g.* (Sofia, 1929), pp. 156-244. In the same anniversary number V. N. Zlatarsky and Y. Trifonov have articles on the attitude of Alexander II and Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow to the Bulgarian Church question (pp 131-143, and 144-155). But none of these deals with Ignatyev. He treats the extremely complicated question of the Bulgarian Exarchate in *Iz.*, 1911, i, 124, iii, 110-11, vi, 156-63; 1915, ii, 173-87. It is passed over in *I.V.* I can only very briefly refer here to some of his points. Ignatyev also has a good deal to say in *Iz.* on the other religious quarrels of the time, e.g. the Armenian Churches and the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. On Ignatyev and the latter, see also A. A. Dmitrievsky, *Graf N.P. Ignatyev kak tserkovno-politichesky deyatel' na pravoslavnom vostoke.* I am omitting these questions in this article.

There is a very useful and full account of Bulgarian nationalism and of the Church question in Alois Hajek, *Bulgarien unter der Türkenherrschaft*, with much reference to Russian influence, though not to that of Ignatyev himself. C. Jirček, *Das Fürstenthum Bulgarien* (Prague, 1891), pp. 301-15, gives a good brief outline of 1856-76. A detailed and important account of the struggle for a Bulgarian Church is supplied by T. St. Burmov in his *Blgarsko-Grtskata tserkovna rasprya* (Sofia, 1902). Burmov had been educated at Moscow University, and during the fight for the Exarchate was one of the leading Constantinople moderates among the Bulgarian nationalists, in close touch with the Russian Embassy. His book is, however, conspicuously silent as to the part played by Ignatyev and as to Russian influence in general. Much more information on Ignatyev is given in V. Teplov, *Greko-Bolgarsky tserkovny*

[Continued on next page.]

Greek-Bulgar relations already bitter and entangled. The use of Bulgarian in church services, Bulgarian bishops for Bulgarian dioceses, the territorial extent of these dioceses, the degree of dependence upon the Patriarch, the organisation and functions of a Bulgarian synod, the financial claims of Constantinople upon the Bulgars, and, less directly involved, the composition and powers of the Patriarch's Synod—these were the essential questions round which the struggle swayed

Ignatyev's own account represents him as trying to exercise a moderating influence and to effect a compromise, and it is certainly true that the extremist Bulgars, led by Chomakov, P. R. Slaveikov, and Dragan Tsankov, maintained in public a continuous and violent hostility to Ignatyev and the Russophil moderates among the Bulgars—the *chorbadjis*, "the old party," who disbelieved in the possibility of building up Bulgar nationalism on the basis of a violent break with the Greeks.²⁵ And it was the Bulgarian extremists who finally won the day. Ignatyev worked hard to secure the election of his candidate, Gregorios VI, as Patriarch in 1867, and he thoroughly

vopros po neizdannym istochnikam (St. Petersburg, 1889). This was completed in 1881 at Buyuk Dere and, although there is no statement as to what Teplov's unprinted sources were, it seems clear that they must have been largely drawn from the Russian Embassy, in which he had served.

No information is contained either in Ignatyev's memoirs or in his 1874 memorandum on the question of the Pan-Slav activities in Bulgaria and elsewhere of his consular agents and the Moscow Slavonic Benevolent Committee. These were exposed in explicit detail in the incriminating documents, said to have been stolen from the Russian Embassy in Vienna, published by the Turks at the beginning of 1877 and including ostensibly genuine correspondence of Ignatyev mainly in 1872 (G. Giacometti, *Les responsabilités*; English translation by Edgar Whittaker, *Russia's work in Turkey*). Indispensable material is contained in the two bulky volumes of the private papers of Naiden Gerov, the Bulgarian nationalist leader and Russian consul at Philippopolis, *Iz arkhivata na Naiden Gerov* (Sofia, 1911, 1914), and in Gerov's official correspondence, *Dokumeniy Za Blgarskata istoriya* (Sofia, 1931; vol. 1), which goes only as far as the end of 1870

²⁵ For the opposition of the Bulgar extremists in Constantinople to their own moderates, the *chorbadjis*, and to Ignatyev, see particularly Simeon Radev, *Sivotehite sremenna Blgariya* (Sofia, 1911), vol. 1, pp. viii-xiii (based mainly on the extremist contemporary Press), and 90-92. Ignatyev describes them thus: "Malheureusement, le parti avancé parmi les Bulgares, qui n'a aucune conviction religieuse et aucun principe, vise à perpétuer la rupture avec la Grande Église et songe même parfois à l'union avec Rome, qui lui semble utile au point de vue politique et nationale." Roman Catholicism in Turkey was one of Ignatyev's bugbears. There had been a notable Unionist movement among the Bulgars in 1860-1, and some threatened revival of it in 1869-70, perhaps with the deliberate intention of frightening Ignatyev and the Russians into supporting extreme Bulgar claims.

approved, though not very hopefully, the far-reaching concessions which Gregorios proceeded to offer.²⁶

In the following year he strongly criticised the much more drastic proposals which the Bulgarian extremists extracted from Ali Pasha (substantially they amounted to a first draft of the 1870 *firman*), though it is symptomatic that the Patriarch suspected him of being really responsible for them.²⁷ He did, however, urge on St. Petersburg—without success—the acceptance of the Oecumenical Council proposed by Gregorios in December 1868; but from 1869 onwards Gregorios became more and more unaccommodating and correspondingly alienated from the Russian Embassy.

It is, however, by no means certain that the *firman* of March 1870, which precipitated the final crisis, did not go much farther than Ignatyev either expected or desired.²⁸ The Turks had naturally been making the most of the tortuous zigzags of Russian policy to discredit Ignatyev in the eyes of Bulgars and Greeks alike. Finally, under Ali Pasha's direction, and in fear of the Cretan rebellion giving birth to some kind of alliance among the Christians of the Balkans, they came of themselves to grant the Bulgars far more than the Russian Embassy was urging. Chomakov, the Russophobe Bulgarian extremist, who was an influential official in the Turkish administration, succeeded in his arguments that the best safeguard against Russian influence on the Bulgars was for the Turks themselves to promote the setting up of a Bulgarian Exarchate within which a healthily anti-Russian national Bulgarian feeling could be developed.²⁹

The *firman* of 1870 provided for the setting up of a "Bulgarian Exarchate" (the first official use of the word Bulgarian for five centuries), the constitution of which was to be settled by subsequent regulations, but which was to be in effective independence of the Patriarch, and was to include all dioceses with a purely Bulgarian

²⁶ "Je bâtis de mes mains," said Gregorios to Ignatyev, "un pont à l'indépendance politique des Bulgares." Extract from despatch of Ignatyev, no. 128, 14 May, 1867, quoted by Prince Gregory Trubetskoy in his article on the Bulgarian schism in *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 1907, vol. 21, p. 176. His proposals involved the setting up of an Exarchate to include Bulgaria north of the Balkans and the Nish region, but to be dependent on the Patriarchate. For Russian support of these proposals see also T. St. Burmov, *Blgaro-Grishkata tserkovna rasprya*, pp. 350, 353.

²⁷ Trubetskoy in *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, vol. 21, pp. 181-3.

²⁸ Trubetskoy, *ib.*, pp. 396-7, represents that Ignatyev did not know how far-reaching the *firman* was, and when it was published had to make the best he could of it. Cf. E. Haumant, "Les origines de la lutte pour la Macédoine (1855-1872)," in *Le Monde Slave*, October 1926, pp. 57-8.

²⁹ S. Radev, *Stroitelite na sremennna Blgariya*, vol. 1, p. 92.

population and in addition any other districts two-thirds or more of whose inhabitants so desired.³⁰ The dioceses included in the territorial minimum of the Exarchate were enumerated in the *firman*. It meant that at the least the Exarchate would cover almost the whole of Bulgaria north of the Balkan range, including the Sofia and Nish regions, and in addition parts of the upper Struma valley and of the dioceses of Philippopolis and Slivno. The two-thirds provision obviously would entail a bitter intensification of the struggles between the Bulgars and Greeks, particularly over the westward extension of the Exarchate in Macedonia. The whole made almost certain an entire break between the two peoples.

Ignatyev's immediate reaction to the *firman* was to expatiate to Gorchakov on the Porte having now admitted the principle of nationality which it had previously denied, and to sum up gratulatorily: "il était permis de considérer l'issue que la question venait de prendre comme un couronnement heureux de cinq années d'efforts de notre part."³¹ But it does not appear that Ignatyev had been working for any such drastic rupture with the Greeks as was involved by the *firman*. It is evident from his own official account put together four years later that his official policy was to attempt to secure a compromise to the advantage of the Bulgars which would not entirely alienate the Greeks. "L'exarchat, même dans sa forme la plus restreinte, offrait un noyau national qu'on serait libre de développer ultérieurement." (*Iz.*, 1914, vi, 159.) In writing of the effect of the *firman* he thus described his aims: "Ma principale préoccupation dans la question, qui se débattait, a toujours été de procurer aux bulgares, *sans rompre avec les grecs*, un corps national en les préservant des efforts de la propagande catholique et protestante et en les conservant aussi à l'orthodoxie et à notre influence" (*Iz.*, 1914, vi, 161; *my italics*).

There is no doubt that this was the official Russian policy and that Ignatyev devoted the most ingenious efforts towards attaining it. It remains questionable, however, even allowing for the continued violence of the extremist Bulgarian Press against him, whether the popular belief was not unfounded that he himself finally desired to see created the nucleus for a Bulgaria even at the cost of breaking with the Greeks, if such a rupture was unavoidable. The *firman*

³⁰ The French text of the *firman* of 11 March, 1870, is in Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'empire ottoman*, vol. 3, pp. 293-5.

³¹ Despatch no. 63, 22 March, 1870, quoted in Trubetskoy, *ib.*, p. 397. Gorchakov had the foggiest ideas as to what had happened and seems to have believed that the *firman* meant that the whole question would be quietly settled; *ib.*, p. 398.

made this almost certain. Ignatyev was not a man for whom the Orthodox Church meant any deep religious experience or mystical communion. He viewed the struggle purely from a political aspect. The breaking away of the Bulgars from the Oecumenical Patriarch and the defiant setting up of a national opposition Church could hardly fail to lead to a schism, to further internecine struggles among the Eastern Churches and to a general lowering of the prestige of Orthodoxy which would not be at all to Russian interests. Ignatyev's aim was to prevent these consequences by some agreed settlement between Bulgars and Greeks. After 1870 that involved substantial acceptance of the *firman* by the Greeks—an exceedingly difficult if not impossible task, especially for a man so suspect as Ignatyev. As the possibility of any success receded so he began to tip the scales more decisively in favour of the Bulgarian extremists.

Overjoyed with the *firman* the Bulgars proceeded to set about the organisation of their Church. The Patriarch Gregorios insistently revived his proposal for an Oecumenical Council; it was again, in effect, vetoed by the Russian Holy Synod. This time Ignatyev had lent him no support. Gregorios resigned (1871), and Ignatyev secured the election of a reputed moderate Anthim VI. He proved, from Ignatyev's account, to be but a broken reed. With the assistance of the Russian Embassy, he began by negotiating with the Bulgars on the battleground of the dioceses and the two-thirds provision of the *firman*. Ignatyev claimed that twenty-three bishoprics, including Veles and Ochrida, were allowed to the Bulgars, but he could not prevent this concession leaking out prematurely, and the extremists on either side carried the day.³² Feeling ran to fever pitch in Constantinople. Incidents were multiplied. In February 1872 the Bulgars elected one of their bishops as Exarch, Anthim I, educated at Moscow and Kharkov,³³ and the candidate of

³² V. Teplov, *Greko-Bolgarsky tserkovny vopros po neizdannym istochnikam*, pp. 98-100, gives the list and agrees with Ignatyev's statement and his general account. Burmov, *Blgarsko-Gritskata tserkovna rasprya*, pp. 524-6, is in substantial agreement, except that he does not mention Russian influence. Ignatyev claimed that he subsequently prevailed upon the Turks themselves to deal with the question of the mixed dioceses, and that he succeeded in securing for the Bulgars those of Ochrida and Skoplje, both of course, far in "Macedonia," and both included in the Bulgaria of the 1876-7 Constantinople Conference and of San Stefano. Mahmud Nedim, who was Grand Vizier from September 1871 to June 1872, was very favourably inclined to the Bulgars and was at the same time closely linked with Ignatyev. There is a full account in Burmov of these negotiations between the Bulgars and the Turks, but without reference to Ignatyev.

³³ *Russky Vestnik*, 1881, vol. 151, p. 314, in an article by A. Muromtseva on Anthim.

Ignatyev. In April this appointment was confirmed by the Sultan. The Greeks retaliated by holding a Church council, which in September, according to Ignatyev's description, after dubious and unruly proceedings declared the Bulgars schismatic, stigmatised as heretical the doctrine of philetism, and launched major excommunication against the Exarch and the Bulgarian bishops by name and against all those in communion with them. The rupture was complete. "Long live the schism," shouted the Greek crowds in the streets of Constantinople, "We won't be absorbed by the Slavs; we won't let our children be bulgarised."

With the Exarchate and the schism modern Bulgaria was born, and she owed much undoubtedly to Ignatyev and the Pan-Slavs. Unable to prevent the Greeks from unyielding opposition, Ignatyev now stood out undisguisedly as the main protagonist of the new current in Russian foreign policy, which thought primarily in terms of Slavdom and no longer in those of Orthodoxy. Russia, as the champion of the Orthodox, was pitted mainly against Turkey. Russia, as the champion of the Slavs, was pitted equally against the Habsburg empire—now the dual monarchy, a stronger power than Turkey. Ignatyev necessarily was to find in Andrassy his most redoubtable opponent unless, indeed, that claim should be reserved for his own superior and his own Foreign Office. Gorchakov, personally disliking and increasingly jealous of Ignatyev, had embarked with enthusiasm in 1872 on his policy of *rapprochement* with Andrassy. If Russia and Austria were to go hand-in-hand together in the Balkans, where was there place for Ignatyev? His only chance of success was to wean the Tsar from Gorchakov and his policy of tying Russia's hands by working in agreement with Austria-Hungary. He was to fight hard for the capture of Alexander, but in the end he failed.

Meanwhile, in 1874, he occupied without dispute the first position among the diplomats on the Bosphorus. Brilliantly aided by his seductive wife; himself combining great physical energy, unabashed self-confidence, ingratiating charm, jocular brusqueness, and unappeased talent for intrigue; supplied with a fantastic medley of agents and informers: Ignatyev, with ten years' experience of Turkey behind him and in the closest relations with Abdul Aziz, could feel that he was deservedly styled "*le vice-Sultan*."

Balliol College, Oxford.

B. H. SUMNER.

THE RECOGNITION OF ROUMANIAN INDEPENDENCE.

II.

WITH the handing over of Bessarabia and the settlement of the Dobrogea difficulty Roumania may be said to have disposed of the problems involved in Article XLV of the Berlin Treaty, and therefore to have fulfilled the first condition on which independence was based. The question of Jewish emancipation was still, however, for practical purposes, untouched. The conditions which were to regulate the summoning of a Special Assembly remained under discussion in the Roumanian Chambers throughout the winter of 1878-9, and it was only after the dissolution of the Chambers in April 1879 that the elections for the Special Assembly could be proceeded with. The Government's proposal to the Chambers to call a Special Assembly was made on 29 January, and agreed to by the Chamber of Deputies on 9 March and by the Senate on the 12th. An attempt by the Moldavian deputies to carry a proposal that the naturalisation should be made not *en masse* but by special and individual laws was defeated,¹ and the Chambers were finally dissolved on 6 April.² Prince Charles viewed these dilatory proceedings with disapproval and complained in his diary that the Government's unwillingness to come to a decision on the point was giving it a reputation for vacillation which would have serious results.³ Meanwhile, the railway question had also proceeded at a snail's pace.⁴ On 16 December the Cabinet had decided to take up again the project of purchasing the railways, and to renew negotiations with the Berlin bankers,⁵ but little progress was made during the next few months, and Bismarck's displeasure became increasingly marked.⁶

During the winter the British Government continued to make some efforts to discover positive formulas satisfactory to the Powers,

¹ *Damé*, p. 322. *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 163, 178-9.

² *Ibid.*, iv, 186.

³ *Ibid.*, iv, 160, 184. Waddington: "some of the laws proposed for the purpose seemed to interpose such difficulties in the way of establishing the nationality of the Jews, as to make the concessions nugatory in their case" (F.O. 27/2361, Lyons to S., 3 January, no. 9). Cf. White's more sympathetic comments (F.O. 104/6, White to S., 3 March, no. 75; 6 March, no. 81).

⁴ *Op. cit.*, iv, 189.

⁵ *Ibid.*, iv, 150.

⁶ *Ibid.*, iv, 181.

with a view to hastening the formal recognition. From the end of November 1878, Salisbury kept to his agreement with France and Germany, and the three Powers were able to persuade Austria-Hungary and Italy to join in some of the remonstrances with the Roumanian Government;⁷ but his uneasiness remained.⁸ One or two further attempts were made during the winter by the Roumanian Government to persuade the Powers to be satisfied with the measures already taken, but without success.⁹ At the end of December two prominent Roumanian statesmen, C. A. Rosetti and D. Bratianu, were sent to make a further onslaught on the determination of the Western Powers.¹⁰ But when the two missionaries returned to Bucarest in March they had nothing to show for their labours.¹¹

On 28 January, Salisbury made an attempt to clarify the problem by instructing Odo Russell and Lyons to inquire if the German and French Governments were disposed to be satisfied with measures in Roumania giving complete rights to indigenous non-Christians and leaving aside altogether the question of those who were of alien birth, a solution which London was inclined to favour.¹² Bülow replied at once that he did not consider the proposed measure as satisfactory or sufficient, nor could the German Government be satisfied with less than a full and formal recognition by Roumania of the principles laid down in the Treaty of Berlin in regard to the removal of Jewish disabilities, as had lately been the case in Serbia.¹³ Owing to the political crisis in France, following the resignation of President MacMahon, Lyons was not able to raise the matter with Waddington until 1 February. Waddington promised to give a reply as soon as possible, but his manner was not encouraging,¹⁴ and after a further refusal by Germany to accept the proposal,

⁷ *Ibid.*, iv, 151. *Acte și Documente*, p. 618.

⁸ *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 204.

⁹ F.O. 27/2317. Lyons to S., 12 December, no. 1006; 24 December, no. 1065; 28 December, no. 1080.

¹⁰ F.O. 104/6. White to S., 2 January, no. 3; 3 January, no. 6. F.O. 104/5. S. to White, 19 February, no. 32; 3 March, no. 44, accounts of interviews with Bratianu. "He asked me to undertake to urge the French Government to join with England in that course without waiting for the assent of Germany. This promise, however, I declined to give" (no. 44). F.O. 27/2361. Lyons to S., 4 January, no. 12; 5 January, no. 14; 12 January, no. 35; F.O. 27/2362, 25 January, nos. 83, 84. *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 160, 170, 168-9.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, iv, 180.

¹² F.O. 64/929. S. to Odo Russell, 28 January, no. 48, following a telegraphic suggestion from White (F.O. 104/6, White to S., 27 January, no. 20). Suggestions on these lines had been made earlier by White. Cf. F.O. 104/1. White to S., 12 October, 1878, no. 191.

¹³ F.O. 64/931. Odo Russell to S., 29 January, no. 51.

¹⁴ F.O. 27/2362. Lyons to S., 1 February, no. 119.

no more was heard of it. On 19 February, Münster explained to Salisbury that "the policy of his Government on this head was that, whether as respects native-born or immigrant non-Christians, the question of religion should make no difference in the civil rights they were competent to enjoy." Salisbury replied that he did not differ from this in general terms, but thought that "with respect to immigrants the Treaty of Berlin could not be supposed to have had their case in view so much as those who were born in Roumania, and we should be disposed to receive the propositions of Roumania on their part of the subject with every desire to make allowance for their difficulties"¹⁵

Salisbury was soon to be given a clearer insight into Bismarck's real feelings. In a secret despatch recording a conversation on 2 March, Odo Russell wrote that the Chancellor had expressed his aversion for the Roumanians in language too violent to be placed on official record. "He accused them of dishonesty in regard to the stipulations of the Berlin Treaty, of arrogance towards Russia, and of insolence towards Germany, and deplored that they were not within his reach, so as to administer the whipping to them they so richly deserved." It proved impossible to get him to discuss the conditions necessary for the recognition of independence. He declared that he would have nothing to do with the Roumanians until they learnt how to behave themselves honestly and respectfully towards Germany. "Other persons besides myself have been struck by the excessive hostility of Prince Bismarck towards them, but I have not yet found anyone able to account for it." But he suspected that the railway question had something to do with it, and promised to make inquiry.¹⁶ A few days later he reported that his suspicions as to the railway question had been fully confirmed. The Roumanian railways had been under German supervision since the Strousberg Railway bubble burst, and it appeared that the Roumanians had not shown the German Emperor and Prince Bismarck the amount of respect and gratitude due for their action in the matter. Germany now held between three and four hundred millions of Roumanian railway stock; the object of the Roumanians was to buy the railways as cheaply as possible, and they had thought to attain their object by assuming towards the German agents in Roumania, who belonged to the banks concerned and who were all

¹⁵ F.O. 64/929. S. to Odo Russell, 19 February, no. 92.

¹⁶ F.O. 64/932. Odo Russell to S., 2 March, no. 139 (secret). On 20 March White wrote that, "about a fortnight ago" Hoyos had been instructed to speak to the Roumanian Government on Germany's behalf about the Jewish and railway questions (F.O. 104/6. White to S., 20 March, no. 99 (secret)).

of the Hebrew faith, a bullying tone which they would not have ventured upon had they been Christians. Accordingly Bismarck, to mark his displeasure, had instructed Hansemann and Bleichröder to suspend negotiations for the sale of the railways, which the Roumanians had hoped to purchase out of the proceeds of the sale of their tobacco monopoly to an English company, and to offer the railways secretly both to the Russian and Austrian Governments.¹⁷ A minor cause of annoyance, according to the French Ambassador in Berlin, Saint-Vallier, was the fact that Prince Charles had given Bismarck great offence by preferring the advice of his father and of his friend, Baron von Roggenbach, whom Bismarck looked on as a personal enemy.¹⁸ At the same time relations with Russia continued to be so strained that Baron Stuart left Bucarest on 4 March without even presenting a letter of recall; while the position of the Roumanian Minister at St. Petersburg was stated to be almost untenable.¹⁹

In this frame of mind Bismarck found a ready means of coercion in Roumania's eagerness for independence, and as time went on it became more and more obvious that an impartial adjustment of her difficult social problems was by no means his sole preoccupation. On 3 March, Münster informed Salisbury that Germany had resolved to recognise Serbia, and they expected by so doing to encourage Roumania to accept the conditions of religious liberty prescribed by the Treaty. Salisbury pointed out that the two Principalities were apparently in exactly the same position, as in each case the Government had promised conformity to the Treaty and had obtained the sanction of the existing legislature; and in each a more important assembly than the existing legislature had still to make the necessary constitutional amendment.²⁰ On the 6th, after further inquiry, he said that the Serbian legislature had passed a bill through all its stages for summoning the Skupština, whose assent was necessary to alter the Constitution; the British Government was perfectly ready to accept this as sufficient pledge, but it must be on the understanding that whenever Roumania had carried the execution to the formal stage he would hold that it was open to Britain also to recognise Roumania.²¹ At the same time Bülow in Berlin made a strong appeal for British support, saying that Bismarck most

¹⁷ F.O. 64/932. Odo Russell to S., 8 March, no. 152 (secret).

¹⁸ F.O. 64/932. Odo Russell to S., 8 April, no. 199 (secret).

¹⁹ F.O. 104/6. White to S., 3 March, no. 78.

²⁰ F.O. 64/929. S. to Odo Russell, 4 March, no. 113.

²¹ F.O. 104/5. S. to White, 6 March, no. 45; F.O. 64/939. S. to Odo Russell, 10 March, no. 129.

earnestly hoped that Salisbury would consent to join Germany and France in recognising the independence of Serbia, who had behaved in an honest and straightforward way respecting the Treaty stipulations, and thereby give a lesson to Roumania, who had sought by dishonest subterfuge and tricks to befool the contracting Powers.²² The matter appeared to be satisfactorily settled when Münster, on 10 March, told Salisbury that his Government quite accepted the view that, as soon as Roumania had placed herself in the same position as Serbia, recognition on the same principle should be accorded to her. He found, however, that the telegram "which he read to me appeared to make some reservation in respect of the greater sincerity which was believed to animate the counsels of the Servian statesmen." Salisbury guarded himself against any future ambiguity on this point by making it clear that the British Government "necessarily must attach paramount value to formal acts," and explicitly reserved the liberty of recognising Roumania as soon as she had done as much as Serbia.²³ On 12 March he instructed Lyons to inform Waddington that the British Government would act in precisely the same way towards both Roumania and Serbia; as a matter of public policy these recognitions should not be delayed by the Western Powers longer than was absolutely necessary for the execution of the Treaty, and they proposed at once to recognise Serbia.²⁴ Waddington replied that France had already recognised Serbia.²⁵ Bismarck, on 2 April, told Saint-Vallier that he was anxious not to recognise Roumania at this stage, and the French Government accepted this lead.²⁶

No further official steps were taken by the Powers until the meeting of the special Chambers in the summer once more brought the Jewish question into the foreground. Bismarck had made it perfectly clear to Bucarest in the spring that the recognition of Serbia before Roumania was due to the desire to differentiate against a State that appeared anxious to evade its obligations,²⁷ and Prince Charles was justified in his pessimistic views as to the future relations of his country with Germany.²⁸ The British and Italian Govern-

²² F.O. 64/932. 8 March, no. 149.

²³ F.O. 64/929. S. to Odo Russell, 13 March, no. 138.

²⁴ F.O. 27/2355. S. to Lyons, 12 March, no. 325.

²⁵ F.O. 27/2364. Lyons to S., 13 March, no. 299.

²⁶ D.D.F., Saint-Vallier to Waddington, 4 April, no. 71.

²⁷ *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 183, 185, 189.

²⁸ "It appears from conversations I have had with several of the Ministers that these have given up as hopeless the prospect of a recognition of their country by Germany and the Western Powers." F.O. 104/6. White to S.,

ments had both shown some uneasiness at Bismarck's passionate and apparently vindictive conduct, without, however, being able to separate themselves from it. The Italian Ambassador in Berlin had, according to a report from Odo Russell on 8 April, been instructed by his Government to read to and to leave a copy of a note with the German Foreign Minister, urging the recognition of Roumania and arguing that Germany "scarcely did justice" to the Roumanian Government in refusing to admit the international difficulties they had to overcome in emancipating the Jews, native or foreign. Bülow, on hearing that Italy called the sense of justice of the German Government in question, interrupted, declined to listen to such inadmissible insinuations, and refused to accept the proffered copy of the Italian Note.²⁹

The special Chambers were opened on 3 June, and after a cautious opening speech from the Prince, proceeded to appoint a commission to examine the Jewish question.³⁰ Their main conclusions were based on the principle that there were not, and that there never had been, any Roumanian Jews; there were merely Jews who had been born in the Principality, but who had never been assimilated either in speech or custom by the Roumanian nation. Accordingly, any foreign Jews could secure naturalisation, without distinction of creed, individually and by special law; the form in which naturalisation should take place should be set out in the constitution; and the right to acquire landed property should be regarded as a political and not as a civil question.³¹ The Government announced its inability to accept these proposals, and put forward a scheme whereby several categories of Jews, including those who had done military service since 1864, or fought in the war, should receive civil rights immediately.³² When the Chambers accepted the commissioners' proposals the Government resigned, and a reconstructed

15 March, no. 96. Cf. F.O. 104/7. White to S., 11 April, no. 113 (secret and confidential). He wrote on 29 April that the Roumanian Ministers considered Bismarck's attitude to be governed mainly by schemes of the Berlin bankers (*ibid.*, 29 April, no. 129 (very secret)). Cf. also *Add. MSS.* 38939, Layard to White, 27 January, 1879. F.O. 64/932. Odo Russell to S., 8 April, no. 199 (secret). "Persons who know Prince Bismarck intimately are of opinion that he would gladly withdraw Prince Charles from Roumania . . . Bismarck would like Germany to be absolutely without a tie or interest in the East of Europe which could ever clash with those of Austria or Russia."

²⁹ D.D.F., Saint-Vallier to Waddington, 4 April, no. 71, F.O. 64/932, 8 April, no. 189 (secret).

³⁰ *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 203, 210.

³¹ *Ibid.*, iv, 214.

³² *Ibid.*, iv, 215. F.O. 64/934. Walsham (Berlin) to S., 16 July, no. 356 (most confidential).

Ministry expressed its general agreement with the decision of the majority (23 July), but at the same time prorogued the Chambers for a month. The Prince noted the bad impression made by these delays abroad, and especially at Berlin.³³

During these proceedings the Powers had made a further attempt to force a solution on the Roumanian Government. The attempt originated with Salisbury, who continued to display alarm at the danger of provoking the Roumanians too far. On 16 June, after the Count de Montebello had referred to Waddington's opinion that a serious guarantee for the execution of the provisions of the Treaty should be enacted, Salisbury replied that a too exacting standard might lead the Government to dispense with recognition. His proposal was that the Powers should agree among themselves at once upon the exact terms which they looked upon as indispensable, and communicate them quite privately to the Roumanian authorities.³⁴ On the following day he spoke in the same sense to the German Ambassador, and asked him to submit to his Government a proposal to inform Roumania in strict confidence that the three Powers would be satisfied with a measure conferring the rights of citizenship on all native-born Roumanian Jews.³⁵ A week later, on 26 June, after consulting White, who was in England, he told Münster that he thought on the whole the best policy to adopt was for the Western Powers, with Italy, if she would join, to urge Roumania to include the language of Article XLIV in Article VII of their own constitution. This would be a formal acceptance of the Berlin Treaty; it would be almost impossible to settle all the details as a preliminary to recognition, and they must therefore be left to be urged, as opportunity offered, by the representatives of the Powers at Bucarest. Münster thought his Government would be prepared to recognise Roumania on these terms. But as the Roumanian Chamber was reported to be showing considerable sensitiveness with respect to foreign interference, Salisbury suggested that if the Austrian representative brought the views of the Powers to the knowledge of the Prince, the suggestion would come before the Roumanian Government in a more acceptable form.³⁶ Odo Russell reported after seeing Radowitz on 27th, that the acceptance by Roumania of the conditions laid down in Article XLIV appeared "to be about the minimum with which the German Government

³³ F.O. 7/963. Elliot to S., 12 July, no. 430. *Op. cit.*, iv, 216-222.

³⁴ F.O. 27/2357. S. to Lyons, 19 June, no. 777.

³⁵ F.O. 64/929. S. to Odo Russell, 18 June, no. 318.

³⁶ F.O. 64/929. S. to Odo Russell, 27 June, no. 337.

would be content."³⁷ Salisbury made the proposal to France and Italy, and by the beginning of July the three Powers had agreed to this mode of procedure.³⁸

Elliot received Salisbury's provisional instructions by telegram on 30 June, but before this, Reuss, the German Ambassador, had already mentioned to Andrassy that the British Government intended to invite Austria-Hungary to convey a message to Roumania on behalf of the Powers which had not yet formally recognised its independence. Andrassy, on receiving this information, immediately telegraphed to Bucarest urging Roumania in the most pressing terms at once to adopt measures calculated to satisfy the other Powers, and intimating that a hesitation to do so would in all probability be followed by the adoption of a collective action which they would do well to avoid. On 3 July, Orczy told Elliot that Andrassy, had not learnt of the proposed invitation, with much satisfaction. Elliot remarked to Salisbury that it was evident that Austria was unwilling to sacrifice any of the sympathy that recent events had directed from the Western Powers to herself.³⁹

Andrassy's prompt communication to Hoyos was probably an attempt to evade the unwelcome honour that the Powers proposed to thrust on him, and on 4 July he told Elliot that until he received an answer to his communication to Bucarest it would be impossible for him to accept the duty.⁴⁰ Elliot had been instructed by Salisbury on 30 June to await Italy's answer before taking any definitive step, and it was not until 4 July that the Ambassador was finally requested to proceed at once. Italy, though agreeing to recommend the insertion of Article XLIV, reserved its liberty of action in the event of the vote of the Chambers being unfavourable.⁴¹ On receipt of these instructions, Elliot at once communicated with the representatives of the Powers, and at a meeting on the morning of 5 July all were of opinion that it was not advisable to take any step until an answer had been received to the communication made by Vienna to Bucarest.⁴² Reuss had already been instructed to delay any action

³⁷ F.O. 64/933. Odo Russell to S, 28 June, no. 322 (confidential).

³⁸ F.O. 27/2358. S. to Odo Russell, 27 June, no. 816; 29 June, no. 835. F.O. 64/930. S. to Walsham, 2 July, no. 340. D.D.F., Waddington to Saint-Vallier, 29 June, p. 528.

³⁹ F.O. 7/963. Elliot to S, 3 July, no. 398.

⁴⁰ F.O. 7/963. Elliot to S., 4 July, no. 404.

⁴¹ F.O. 7/957. S. to Elliot, 4 July, no. 445. D.D.F., no. 437. Saint-Vallier to Waddington, 23 June. He reports that Radowitz had told the Italian Ambassador that Italy could not expect to be consulted in the Egyptian negotiations "après avoir tenu si peu de compte des désirs de l'Allemagne dans la question de la reconnaissance de la Roumanie."

⁴² F.O. 7/963. Elliot to S., 5 July, no. 410.

pending news from Bucarest, and Salisbury sent similar instructions to Elliot on the 6th.⁴³ On the 5th, Elliot had tried to persuade Andrassy that in acting for the four Powers "he could with truth represent to the Roumanian Government that he did so not for the purpose of adding to a pressure upon them, but with the object of giving them an easy way of escaping from a pressure of a severer character"; if Roumania did not accept the suggestions of the four Powers, Austria would not be bound in any way to identify herself with any future action to be taken. Andrassy gave the impression of being "decidedly moved" by these arguments.⁴⁴

As the month of July went on, it became clear that the procedure proposed by Salisbury was going to make little progress. Roumanian comments were uniformly unfavourable, and Andrassy appeared to be evading the task he had half promised to undertake. On 8 July, Calice communicated confidentially to Elliot a careful summary of the situation written by Hoyos after making his communication to the Roumanian Government. He pointed out that the unsatisfactory report of the commission was not approved by the Ministers, but that the maximum of the concessions which Bratianu represented as possible still remained very far short of what was requisite. His language upon the question of allowing Jews to possess land appeared to have been altogether unsatisfactory; no government, even if it passed such a law, could enforce it on a population unanimous in a determination to resist it. Bratianu had asked Hoyos if the Powers would be satisfied if the right of holding land were to be withdrawn from all foreigners, but was at once told that the suggestion could not be entertained. It was clear from this report and from other sources that the Roumanian Government had no means of carrying out the complete and unqualified emancipation on which the Powers would have liked to insist; and that the Powers accordingly ran the risk of a somewhat humiliating deadlock if they persisted.⁴⁵

While the tendency in diplomatic circles in Vienna was on the

⁴³ F.O. 7/957. S. to Elliot, 6 July, no. 448.

⁴⁴ F.O. 7/963. Elliot to S., 6 July, no. 413 (confidential).

⁴⁵ F.O. 7/963. Elliot to S., 8 July, no. 423 (confidential). Balatchano pointed out that the treaty gave the powers no right to threaten force, and "they ought to be aware that by the pressure they were exerting to force the Government to measures to which the populations are opposed they run the risk of provoking massacres or even revolutionary disturbances." *Ibid.*, 12 July, no. 430. Cf. 26 July, no. 464. White reported "the progress made in Roumania in a sullen disposition of the people to ignore to a great extent the demands of the Powers concerning the Jewish question" (F.O. 104/7. White to S., 30 July, no. 176 (secret)).

whole to give due recognition to Roumania's difficulties, in Berlin an uncompromising attitude continued. Towards the end of June Bismarck had proposed to Waddington and Andrassy that the question of religious liberty in Roumania should be treated by the representatives at Constantinople, and that, in the event of the Roumanian Government proving obstinate in refusing to perform the Treaty obligations, the Porte should be called upon to resume the suzerainty of the Principality.⁴⁶ In commenting on this to Saint-Vallier, Bismarck said that Austria, notwithstanding the fact of her having accredited an agent to Roumania, would now be prepared to support the representations of England and France, and, if necessary, to take part in the negotiations which, in the event of Roumania declining to listen to those representations, should be undertaken at Constantinople, "with the object of obtaining from her a settlement of this question in the sense desired by the four Powers."⁴⁷ Elliot nevertheless reported on 8 July that Andrassy had refused to entertain the idea of a Turkish resumption of sovereignty, a suggestion which he regarded as a threat that could not possibly be put into execution.⁴⁸ Walsham, in Berlin, was struck by the fact that Andrassy appeared, according to Radowitz's account, to be showing more willingness to co-operate with the Western Powers than Elliot's recent despatches suggested,⁴⁹ and the French Ambassador confirmed this view.⁵⁰ In commenting on Walsham's reports, Elliot wrote on 26 July, that he had been informed that the answer returned by Andrassy to a communication on these matters from Bismarck was that he would support those governments which, not having yet recognised the independence of Roumania, were insisting on the fulfilment of the Treaty; and if the Principality refused to carry out its obligations he would recall the Austrian envoy from Bucarest; but he entirely deprecated the proposal for negotiating on the subject at Constantinople.⁵¹ Everything went to indicate that Andrassy had the greatest reluctance to move against Roumania, but he did not yet feel it wise to separate from Germany on this issue.

Bismarck's extreme interest in the Jewish question led Salisbury to ask on 8 July if it was true that Germany was making "some

⁴⁶ F.O. 7/963. Elliot to S., 8 July, no. 422.

⁴⁷ D.D.F., p. 528, Waddington to Saint-Vallier, 29 June. F.O. 64/934. Odo Russell to S., 1 July, no. 328.

⁴⁸ F.O. 7/963. Elliot to S., 8 July, no. 422.

⁴⁹ F.O. 64/934. Walsham to S., 16 July, no. 356; 18 July, no. 359 (most confidential).

⁵⁰ F.O. 64/934. Walsham to S., 18 July, no. 359 (most confidential).

⁵¹ F.O. 7/963. Elliot to S., 26 July, no. 465 (confidential).

conditions of a commercial character " a *sine qua non* of German recognition ; but Münster assured him that his Government had never mixed the railway question with the question of recognition.⁵² Walsham also believed that Germany would not allow the railways to influence its decision with regard to recognition.⁵³ It was not until the end of the year that Bismarck made it clear that his primary demand was for a satisfactory settlement concerning the railways. During July the railway negotiations had come once more to a standstill, for although the purchase price offered by the Roumanians was accepted, the company wished to retain the direction of affairs in Berlin for some time to come, and thus they were unwilling to concede.⁵⁴ In order to facilitate the negotiations the Roumanian Minister of Finance, D. Sturdza, came to Berlin in the middle of the month.⁵⁵ On 26 July he told Walsham that the difficulty was still the refusal of the German company to allow the direction to be transferred at once to Bucarest. Walsham asked him " whether the German Government had in any way mixed up this business with the question relating to the emancipation of the Jews, or made the settlement of it a condition of their recognition of Roumania's independence. He said that they had made no such condition."⁵⁶

Sturdza brought with him to Berlin a scheme for emancipation by seven categories, more liberal than Bratianu's.⁵⁷ He concluded his visit with an interview with Bismarck at Kissingen, and before leaving Berlin on 31 July signed the convention for the purchase of the railways.⁵⁸ Bismarck declined to discuss questions of detail, but made it clear that there was no divergence between the interested Powers. It was agreed that Sturdza should propose to his Government the recognition of the principle laid down in Article XLIV, together with the immediate emancipation of the seven categories, and that a law should be introduced granting to all foreigners who had been born in the country the right to apply at once to Parliament for naturalisation, while the period within which those not born there might apply was to be shortened.⁵⁹ It is difficult to see what

⁵² F.O. 64/930. S. to Walsham, 14 July, no. 354.

⁵³ F.O. 64/934. Walsham to S., 19 July, no. 360.

⁵⁴ *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 215.

⁵⁵ F.O. 64/934. Walsham to S., 17 July, no. 358; 22 July, no. 368.

⁵⁶ F.O. 64/934. Walsham to S., 26 July, no. 372 (confidential). Cf. on the other hand, *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 214-5, 216.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, iv, 232. F.O. 64/934. Walsham to S., 26 July, no. 375 (confidential).

⁵⁸ F.O. 64/934. Walsham to S., 2 August, no. 384 (confidential).

⁵⁹ *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 233-6. F.O. 64/934. Walsham to S., 31 July, no. 382 (confidential).

point Sturdza can have had in coming to such an agreement, as it had been clear by the middle of the month that even the less ambitious plans of Bratianu had little chance of acceptance.⁶⁰ The Roumanian Government almost immediately decided to modify Sturdza's scheme. The Foreign Minister, Boerescu, was dispatched on a visit to the three Western Powers, and on 7 August explained to Elliot that the chief object of his mission was to induce Germany not to insist on that part of Sturdza's project which provided for the removal of all restrictions on all persons comprised within certain stated categories. Instead, the Government hoped to persuade the Chambers to adopt a law that would sanction the rights of citizenship being granted to at least an equal number of Jews, by means of a nominal list of persons whose qualifications would be those mentioned in Sturdza's project. He admitted that, if the Chambers accepted this law, it would be because they believed that it would restrict the numbers who would have come under the former scheme; but he was "convinced that the calculation would be found erroneous, as the Government was determined to emancipate as large a number as possible" of the Jews who possessed the necessary qualifications. He mentioned also that he proposed before proceeding to London to visit St. Petersburg "on a purely complimentary mission, there being, he says, nothing for him to do there." Elliot regarded this as merely a means of wasting time.⁶¹

Boerescu's reception was quite unfavourable. Andrássy told him that Austria would support the other Powers, that the visit to St. Petersburg was quite unnecessary, and that Sturdza's project was preferable to the new scheme.⁶² He arrived in Berlin on the 9th and the German Government, after seeing the proposals, decided that they were unsatisfactory.⁶³ On 10 August he left Berlin for St. Petersburg, and on the same day Salisbury informed Elliot that he would be out of London when Boerescu arrived, but that the "proposals of which I understand he is the bearer are so unsatisfactory that I think a visit to England would not in any case produce any result."⁶⁴ On 12 August, Salisbury told the German *Chargé*, von den Brincken, that he considered the proposals "to be wholly unsatisfactory, and that their acceptance would

⁶⁰ Cf. V. Liteanu's remarks to Walsham. *Ibid.*, 16 July, no. 356.

⁶¹ F.O. 7/963. Elliot to S., 7 August, no. 485.

⁶² F.O. 7/963. Elliot to S., 9 August, no. 494 (confidential).

⁶³ F.O. 64/934. Walsham to S., 9 August, no. 395; 11 August, no. 398; 11 August, no. 400.

⁶⁴ F.O. 7/957. S. to Elliot, 10 August, no. 526 (to be communicated to Berlin).

amount to a surrender of the position to which the Western Powers had hitherto adhered on this subject."⁶⁵ On 15 August he wrote in the same sense to Paris. "The plan which is now submitted appears to amount to little more than the colourable assertion of a principle, which is immediately afterwards to be neutralised by the definition of the words in which it is expressed."⁶⁶

On his return from St. Petersburg, and before starting for Paris on the 20th, Boerescu visited Bleichröder at Hamburg and endeavoured unsuccessfully to persuade him to approve the project. The French had already rejected the proposals,⁶⁷ and after a further visit to Vienna Boerescu ended his journey early in September by visiting Rome.⁶⁸ Some weeks later Bleichröder gave Walsham in confidence details of his correspondence with the Roumanian minister. After leaving Paris, Boerescu wrote to Bleichröder asking him to specify the conditions which he considered would be acceptable to the Jewish community. Bleichröder's conditions were that: (1) the principle of religious liberty should be acknowledged; (2) Israelites born in Roumania, and not under foreign protection, must obtain full privileges of citizenship on attaining their majority; (3) children of Jewish parents should hereafter be considered Roumanian citizens; (4) non-Roumanian-born Israelites were to acquire naturalisation after ten years; (5) a certain number of Jews were to be at once placed on a footing of Roumanian citizenship. Bleichröder told Walsham that "if the Roumanian Government were willing to agree to the other conditions, it might be advisable to make some concession as to the mode of selection and to allow the term 'Nominal Lists' to be substituted for 'Categories,' so long as it was clearly understood that as a matter of fact the persons who were to profit by the immediate application of the principle of equality were to be chosen from among those who possessed the qualifications which would have included them in the 'Categories.'"⁶⁹

There is something of an air of anti-climax about the closing stages of the question, and the explanation is perhaps not far to seek. Germany's alliance with Austria-Hungary in September inevitably placed Bismarck's relations with Roumania on a new footing; the anxiety of the Austrian Government for a *rapprochement*

⁶⁵ F.O. 64/930. S. to Walsham, 13 August, no. 416.

⁶⁶ F.O. 27/2359. S. to Adams, 15 August, no. 1073. Salisbury spoke in this sense to Boerescu and Callimaki-Catargi on 27 August. (F.O. 104/5. 27 August, no. 97.)

⁶⁷ F.O. 64/930. S. to Walsham, 20 August, no. 430. Cf. D.D.F., no. 453.

⁶⁸ F.O. 7/964. Egerton (Vienna) to S., 6 September, no. 570.

⁶⁹ F.O. 64/935. Walsham to S., 20 September, no. 460 (confidential).

with Roumania was hardly one that Bismarck could ignore, although on the other hand Austria could hardly object to Bismarck's insistence on the satisfactory settlement of immediate causes of dispute. This meant, in reality, the satisfactory settlement of the railway question; and from the beginning of October there was a frank abandonment in Berlin of the cause of the Jews.

Sturdza was expected in Berlin on 21 September to continue his negotiations with the German bankers;⁷⁰ and after some delay, due apparently to the intention of the Roumanian Government to withdraw certain of the securities which Sturdza had offered to the shareholders as a guarantee for the purchase money,⁷¹ he arrived on the 26th. By 3 October, however, he was able to come to terms with the company on this question, and a fresh agreement was accordingly drawn up and signed by him and by the bankers representing the company. By this Roumania was to undertake not to alienate for a certain period any of the lines of railways and to give as additional security to the shareholders a mortgage on the revenues of the tobacco monopoly.⁷²

The debates in the Special Chambers on the Jewish question dragged on for the greater part of September and October.⁷³ The Chambers reassembled on 2 September, but action was postponed pending Boerescu's return, and discussions recommenced only on the 16th. On the 23rd two resolutions, one refusing to modify the Constitution, the other granting naturalisation by a law for each individual case, were both defeated. The Government then brought forward its own proposal, which gave rights of naturalisation under certain conditions to indigenous Jews and was accompanied by a nominal list including some 1,000 names.⁷⁴ White telegraphed on 26 September that he was strongly of opinion that it was hopeless to expect any larger measure of concession from the present legislature.⁷⁵ After long debates the Government bill was further modified to suit the demands of the minority in the Chambers, and in this amended form was adopted by 133 votes to 9 on 18 October.⁷⁶

⁷⁰ F.O. 64/935. Walsham to S., 20 September, no. 459.

⁷¹ F.O. 64/935. Walsham to S., 27 September, no. 471.

⁷² This security had been offered by Sturdza, but owing to the opposition of public opinion in Roumania the Government had endeavoured to discover some alternative. F.O. 64/935. Walsham to S., 3 October, no. 479. F.O. 104/8. White to S., 10 October, no. 245.

⁷³ *Aus dem Leben*, iv, chap. 13.

⁷⁴ F.O. 104/7. White to S., 25 September, no. 228.

⁷⁵ F.O. 104/7. White to S., 26 September, no. 234.

⁷⁶ F.O. 104/8. White to S., 20 October, no. 258. Text in *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 254-5.

After the principle of individual naturalisation had been reluctantly accepted by the ministers a great effort was made, though without success, to require a majority of two-thirds for every individual case.⁷⁷ The bill passed the Senate on 23 October.⁷⁸ The views and self-justifications of the Roumanian Government were officially set forth in a circular to the Powers dated 24 October.⁷⁹

This patently imperfect settlement, which a few months earlier would have drawn biting strictures from Bismarck and obediently echoed indignation from his two supporters, now received little criticism from the three Western Powers. Walsham reported on 3 October that although the German Government considered the proposals most inadequate they would not, for the present, be prepared to take the initiative.

"They are just now unwilling to take any steps with respect to Roumania which might give rise to an ill-feeling towards Germany and so prevent an immediate settlement of the Railway question, and they are equally anxious, I imagine, to avoid being the first to propose any line of action which might be calculated to increase the difficulty of Austria's present position in the Principality. But although objecting to take the lead in suggesting fresh proposals to the Roumanian Government the German Government would I am convinced be ready to follow that of any of the Powers with whom they have hitherto been co-operating."⁸⁰

On 18 October Walsham again wrote that Germany, in spite of her annoyance, would be unwilling to take the initiative and remonstrate about the project now before the Chambers, though she would gladly co-operate with the other Powers in any effort to obtain better terms.⁸¹ At the same time Germany began to display publicly her somewhat belated anxiety to avoid embarrassing the Austrian Government. "They know that Austria would wish if possible to be spared the necessity of doing anything which might create any ill-feeling towards her in Roumania and to place her at a disadvantage with respect to Russia."⁸²

Germany's abrupt change of front on the emancipation question

⁷⁷ F.O. 104/8. White to S., 20 October, no. 259.

⁷⁸ F.O. 104/8. White to S., 24 October, no. 267.

⁷⁹ F.O. 104/8. White to S., 25 October, no. 270, enclosing copy of circular.

⁸⁰ F.O. 64/935. Walsham to S., 3 October, no. 481 (confidential). Cf. D.D.F., Saint-Valher to Waddington, 27 June, 1879, p. 523.

⁸¹ F.O. 64/935. Walsham to S., 18 October, no. 506 (confidential).

⁸² *Ibid.* Cf. F.O. 104/8. White to S., 27 October, no. 275, in which White gives details of Germany's "most cordial support" of Austria. "This change is attributed chiefly to the desire of Austria to rivet this Principality to its future plans." S. to Odo Russell (F.O. 64/936. Odo Russell to S., 7 November, no. 538 (confidential)).

removed the one possibility of real opposition to the new law, but no immediate steps towards recognition followed. At the end of November Salisbury called Münster's attention to the still unsatisfactory state of the Roumanian question and "reminded Count Münster that any influence which was abandoned by us would be made use of by others."⁸³ Saint-Vallier, after conversations at Varzin, "thought Prince Bismarck less inclined to recognise the independence than he had been led to believe by M. de Radowitz in Berlin. The Prince admitted that the time was approaching for recognition, but said that a few weeks more of 'strangulation' would do the Roumanians good, before they were allowed to enjoy an independence which they had done nothing to deserve."⁸⁴ It had become pretty obvious by the beginning of December that Germany was simply holding back the three Powers until the railway bill had been forced through. Radowitz now openly admitted the primacy of the railway question, and told Odo Russell that "Prince Bismarck hoped that he might continue to reckon upon the support of Her Majesty's Government, but even if England and France were unable to postpone their recognition until Germany was ready to act simultaneously with them, the German Government could not modify the course they felt bound to pursue, until the railway question was definitely settled."⁸⁵ He probably had little fear that France and Britain would separate from Germany at this late stage.⁸⁶ On 10 December, Radowitz told Odo Russell that Bismarck would be personally very much indebted to London if Salisbury would instruct White to deny reports at Bucarest that Great Britain intended to separate from France and Germany.⁸⁷ Salisbury, on 12 December, replied that he had invariably told the Roumanians that Britain would act in concert with the other Powers, and he again instructed White to use this language. But he added bluntly that it was desirable that the German Government should arrive at a final decision on the point as soon as possible, as the result of

⁸³ F.O. 64/930. S. to Odo Russell, 24 November, no. 582.

⁸⁴ D.D.F., p. 589. Saint-Vallier to Waddington, 14 November. F.O. 64/936. Odo Russell to S., 26 November, no. 566.

⁸⁵ F.O. 64/936. Odo Russell to S., 9 December, no. 594. Cf. 9 December, no. 592. F.O. 64/930. S. to Odo Russell, 8 December, no. 611.

⁸⁶ The Italian Government undertook to proceed to the formal act of recognition simultaneously with the other three Powers. At the same time the French Government volunteered to repeat its promise not to separate its action from that of Germany. F.O. 64/936. Odo Russell to S., 9 December, no. 592. On Bismarck's request Waddington communicated this to Bucarest. D.D.F., pp. 597-8, n.i.

⁸⁷ F.O. 64/936. Odo Russell to S., 10 December, no. 598 (confidential).

delay might be the loss of considerable advantages from which the Western Powers might be shut out to the detriment of their trade.⁸⁸

Bismarck's attitude remained in doubt until the very last. Odo Russell remarked on 13 December that the question "may lead to an unexpected issue . . . If the Roumanian Senate confirms the amendment lately adopted in the lower house, and insists on modifying and altering the Berlin draft of the Railway Convention, then Prince Bismarck will certainly decline to have anything further to do with a Government that has broken faith with him, and will proceed to a complete rupture of diplomatic relations with Roumania."⁸⁹ He reported further, on 15 December, that Bismarck had sent a telegram to request Haymerle to make it known that, if the railway convention were not adopted by the legislature unchanged and as settled at Berlin, he would be compelled to act in concert with Russia for the purpose of depriving Roumania of Arab Tabia.⁹⁰ Elliot, after seeing Reuss on the same day, confirmed Odo Russell's reports as to Germany's determination to make recognition depend on the railway settlement.⁹¹ On 25 December, Odo Russell wrote that Bismarck had forbidden the subject to be even alluded to before him, verbally or in writing, until he had recovered from the severe bilious attack from which he was suffering.⁹²

The treatment of Roumania at the Congress of Berlin is not infrequently dismissed without argument as one further example of the peculiar indifference and even brutality displayed toward smaller nationalities by those Great Powers whose interests have been crossed; but something may be said for the view that Roumania had done little before 1878, and did even less afterwards, to foster among the Powers a less selfish frame of mind. She had played her

⁸⁸ F.O. 64/930. S. to Odo Russell, 12 December, no. 628. White had pointed out on 3 November that although there had been "a marked and satisfactory improvement" in commercial relations between the two countries these advantages were due to temporary arrangements, and the real impediment to a commercial treaty was the delay in the establishment of regular diplomatic relations. "A further delay can only be detrimental to British interests, while Austria and Germany would see probably with satisfaction our trade deprived of an opportunity to compete with theirs on equal terms" (F.O. 104/8. 3 November, no. 287 (secret)). Cf. Cioriceanu, pp. 161-3.

⁸⁹ F.O. 64/936. Odo Russell to S., 13 December, no. 603.

⁹⁰ F.O. 64/936. Odo Russell to S., 15 December, no. 610 (confidential). He adds that he has heard on good authority that the threat is due to Shuvalov, at the moment visiting Bismarck at Varzin.

⁹¹ F.O. 7/966. 15 December, no. 808, " . . . this open avowal that the recognition on the part of Germany does not depend upon the question of religious liberty, but upon a matter in which other Governments have no concern, appears to merit Your Lordship's attention."

⁹² F.O. 64/936. Odo Russell to S., 25 December, no. 631 (secret).

cards singularly badly in an admittedly difficult situation; her one faint hope of obtaining some control over her own destiny had lain in her position as a diplomatic, and possibly a geographical, buffer State between conflicting European interests in the Near East; but she had been unable to stimulate any noticeable competition for her meagre favours. Even at the beginning of 1880, when all Europe was anxious to settle the question as speedily as possible, the Roumanian Government found, during the discussions on the railway bill in the Chambers, that it could look for no sympathy in any quarter. Even Haymerle, as a result of pressure from Berlin, informed Roumania that he could take no steps for carrying out her wish that he would facilitate the recognition by the other Powers as long as she continued to show a disregard for her engagements.⁹³ Accordingly, with a not very good grace, the Chambers were forced to submit to the inevitable; and the railway bill was voted at the end of January.⁹⁴ Three weeks later, on 20 February, the three Powers presented identical Notes recognising the independence of the Principality.⁹⁵ The necessary formalities were commenced by an invitation from the Austrian Government to the three Powers to take the question of recognition into friendly consideration.⁹⁶ and after a further grumble from Salisbury as to the danger of delay⁹⁷ the three Powers agreed to adopt the Note as to the conditions of recognition drafted by the French Foreign Minister.⁹⁸

W. N. MEDLICOTT.

⁹³ F.O. 7/966. Elliot to S., 19 December, no. 817.

⁹⁴ *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 287, and chap. 15, *passim*.

⁹⁵ Hertzslet, iv, 2790. *Aus dem Leben*, iv, 289-291.

⁹⁶ F.O. 64/958. Odo Russell to S., 30 January, no. 52; 2 February no 62, 5 February, no. 64.

⁹⁷ F.O. 64/958. Odo Russell to S., 5 February, no. 65.

⁹⁸ F.O. 64/958. Odo Russell to S., 11 February, no. 72.

WITTE AS MINISTER OF FINANCE, 1892-1903

IN attempting to estimate the importance for modern Russia of Witte's career as Minister of Finance from 1892 to 1903, one is confronted at the outset by the fact that during the first years of his Ministry, or, to be more exact, from 1892 to 1899, he was engaged primarily in promoting policies which his predecessors had initiated. He must therefore be denied any credit due to originality of conception in connection with these achievements. Moreover, Fortune has dealt somewhat generously with Witte. Developments that came simply in the fullness of time have been hailed as his achievements. The widespread conception of Witte as the father of the industrial revolution in Russia is to be ascribed to the vagaries that attend reputations. Not that the Russian statesman was at all averse to assuming the mantle thus thrust upon him; on the contrary, throughout his *Memoirs* he is constantly referring to the directing rôle he had played in the industrialisation of Russia. But such claims call for the closest scrutiny before they can be granted.

In reality there are two distinct problems involved. First, did Witte actually conceive or formulate a scheme for creating an industrial state such as that of the present five-year plan of the Soviet regime in Russia? Or, secondly, did the industrial development which characterised the last decade of the 19th century come as a result of the measures he promoted, or did this growth come from the operation of forces that lay beyond his control? With reference to the first of these questions, the *Memoirs* provide no evidence that Witte conceived or formulated in advance at the beginning of his Ministry any clearly-defined scheme for the industrialisation of Russia. The problems which he was called on to face were largely administrative and concerned with carrying into effect policies already laid down. Only gradually did the vast changes taking place in Russia's economic life begin to stand out as a single programme of interrelated measures. But, while it is natural that these changes should be associated with the name of Witte, who quickly identified himself with the new order, the evidence hardly warrants us in concluding that he foresaw or was directly responsible for them.

The second problem involves for its solution an examination of the extent and nature of the developments in the national life of

Russia under Witte's regime. Though official statistics for the whole of Russia at this period must be used with some caution, the evidence drawn from widely independent sources affords ample proof of the feverish growth of industries and of the increase of population in the industrial centres.

With reference to the increase of population, the tables printed by Lenin in his *Development of Capitalism* justify us in concluding that there had been a phenomenal growth in the urban centres of Russia since the Emancipation, and that the absolute increase was most substantial between the years 1885 and 1897, that is, just prior to the taking of the first census of 1897.¹ It is only reasonable to assume that this shift of population from country to city was already well under way before the nineties, the rapid increase in that decade being merely the culmination of a steady and long-continued growth. What aroused special interest in this phenomenon among members of the *intelligentsia* was the new revolutionary movement which arose at this time in the towns, and which gradually overshadowed the "Narodniki" movement among the peasants, which had hitherto been chiefly fostered by the intellectuals.²

But even more impressive than the statistics that record the growth of population in the towns are those showing the increase in the output of industrial products, particularly in the period from 1893 to 1897. If we consult the tables given by Tugan-Baranovsky, we see that between 1887 and 1893 the total output in industry increased from 1,334,499,000 roubles in the former year to 1,734,997,000 roubles in the latter; the increase in this case being 30 per cent.³ In 1897, however, industrial products totalled 2,839,144,000 roubles, the increase over the production of 1893

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Razvitiye Kapitalizma* (Development of Capitalism) (Leningrad, 1926), Vol. III of Lenin Works, the Russian edition. The statistics are compiled from various sources, the most recent and authoritative being the census of 1897. This table shows an increase of urban dwellers in Russia from 6,105,100 in 1863 to 12,127,100 in 1897. The growth from 1863 to 1885 was almost exactly equal to that from 1885 to 1897, though the former period was almost double the latter. The figures cited are given in a table that appears on p. 436 of the above work.

² This complete change in the character of the revolutionary movement in Russia at the beginning of the nineties is stressed by M. N. Pokrovsky in his *Russkaya Istoria* (Moscow, 1923), IV, 277. The success of the movement is ascribed to the fact that the revolutionary leaders concentrated their efforts on the new proletarian class in the cities and abandoned or relegated to a secondary place their work among the peasants.

³ M. Tugan-Baranovsky, *Russkaya Fabrika* (The Russian Factory) (St. Petersburg, 1900), p. 342.

being at the rate of 60 per cent. The workmen employed in industrial undertakings in 1887 numbered 1,318,048; in 1893 there were 1,582,904, the increase over the previous figure being approximately 20 per cent. By 1897, however, the number of workmen in industry had mounted to 2,098,262, about 32 per cent. larger than their number in 1893. If we compare the figures for the different branches of industry, we find the largest increases to be in mining and metallurgy, the former almost trebling its production during the period from 1887 to 1897, and the latter increasing its output by about 250 per cent. In mining the sharp rise seen in the earlier period declines somewhat in the second, suggesting that the metallurgical output during these later years was maintained by imports of raw iron and other metals from abroad.⁴ The phenomenal increase in the output of the metallurgical industry manifested itself especially in the production of iron. The following table illustrates the growth in this industry from the year 1882 to 1899⁵ :—

Year.			Thousands of puds.	Year.			Thousands of puds.
1882	28,237	1891	61,340
1883	29,407	1892	65,432
1884	31,106	1893	70,141
1885	32,206	1894	81,347
1886	32,484	1895	88,665
1887	37,389	1896	98,951
1888	40,716	1897	114,782
1889	45,160	1898	135,636
1890	56,560	1899	165,150

It is perhaps worth noting that the rate of increase for Russia between the years 1886 and 1899 in the production of iron was about 500 per cent., the highest for any country in the world. Despite this rapid rate of increase, her production was about one third of that of Germany (which country occupied third place in the smelting of iron), and about one fifth that of the United States, the world's greatest producer of raw iron. If the smelting of iron be any criterion of a country's progress in industry, Russia could not in any sense be called an industrial country. Nor does it appear that there was any decided change in the rate of progress to be noted after the introduction of the high protective tariff of 1891. While popularly credited with having wrought a radical

⁴ Tugan-Baranovsky, p. 313.

⁵ *Ibid.*

change in Russia's economic life, the tariff appears to have been but one of a number of factors working towards the same end.

Of these factors, the first to be noted is the great activity in railway construction directly due to State initiative. Orders for rails and rolling stock set the wheels of industry moving at an unprecedented rate in the steel and iron mills of Russia. The momentum thus gathered in steel and iron production was communicated to other branches of metallurgy, and in turn to all lines of production.⁶ What an important part was played in the national economy by the placing by the State of vast orders for rails and other requirements for railroad construction, was seen when the great programme of construction in Asia came to an end in 1900. In 1899 the State had been taking two fifths of the total production of raw iron; the following year State orders fell off by 10 per cent. There was at once a sharp drop in the price of iron and corresponding stagnation in the iron trade.⁷ Thus the stimulus given to the Russian metallurgical industries by the great scheme of railway construction by the State in the nineties helped to bring about the extraordinary prosperity of the period; the withdrawal of this stimulus undoubtedly aggravated, though it may not have produced, the depression which set in throughout Russia toward the close of the century.

But we must be careful not to exaggerate the effectiveness of such a stimulus to industry provided by the State. If Witte's policy of stabilising the currency had done nothing more for Russia, it had at least facilitated the flow into the country of foreign capital and had given foreign investors a feeling of greater confidence. Witte claimed that during his regime Russia had secured from abroad by way of foreign investments not less than 3,000,000,000 roubles.⁸ But this movement was only part of the general flow

⁶ Tugan-Baranovsky, pp. 341, 364, discusses this problem without coming to any very definite conclusion. In the former passage he seems to make railway construction one of the chief factors, while in the second general economic conditions are held responsible. See also Bogolepov, *Gosudarstvennoe Khozyaistvo*, "Obshchestvennoe Dvizhenie" (St. Petersburg, 1901), I, 171; also Migulin, *Russky Gosudarstvenny Kredit* (Russian State Credit) (Kharkov, 1904), III, 1162. The latter insists on the exotic character thus acquired by industry in Russia.

⁷ Emil Zweig, *Die Russische Handelspolitik* (Staats-und-Sozialwissenschaft-Forschungen, Heft 123, Leipzig, 1906), p. 135.

⁸ This estimate appears to be excessive. According to P. V. Ol' Inostrannyye Kapitaly (Foreign Capital) (Leningrad, 1925), a careful estimate gives the total of foreign capital invested in Russia in 1900 as 911,000,000

of money from countries where there was a surplus of capital in search of an outlet to countries that needed it and offered large returns on investments. This movement to Russia continued until it was halted, not by the cessation of State orders to the steel industries or any other purely local occurrence, but by altered world conditions. The surplus of capital of Western Europe was then drawn off to support its own industries or to finance the numerous wars that at this time disturbed the general peace⁹

But by no means without effect was the direct intervention of the State itself. This took the form of loans or subsidies extended to various private enterprises through the channels of the State banks. After Witte's retirement, the loans were the subject of serious charges against him, made by the State Comptroller.¹⁰ Migulin, who is on the whole favourably disposed to Witte, censures him severely for what he considered a misuse of State funds.¹¹ Personal motives may have played their part in determining his

roubles, by 1915 it had risen only to 2,203,500,000 roubles. Of course, when Witte speaks of 3,000,000,000 roubles as representing the amount of foreign capital invested in Russia in pre-war times, he may intend to include State loans, but his language in the passage cited certainly conveys the impression that he is referring only to investments in private enterprises. S. Y. Witte, *Vospominania* (Memoirs), I, 448. This is the Russian edition published at Berlin in 1922 in two volumes. A supplementary volume published in 1923 covers his early life down to the accession of Nicholas II. The English translation of the Memoirs by Yarmolinsky, published at New York in 1921, is a very incomplete version of the Russian original

⁹ S. Y. Witte, *Rapport du Ministre des Finances sur le Budget de 1901*, p. 10. These were, of course, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the Spanish-American War of 1898, the war in South Africa, 1899-1902, the Boxer revolt in China. But Witte did not hold the wars alone responsible, he saw that profitable fields of investments had been opened up elsewhere

¹⁰ See the *Times* (15 November, 1903). The amount of these illegal advances and subsidies to various companies was given as approximately 100,000,000 roubles. This Witte denies, claiming that the total did not exceed fifty to sixty million. Witte further claimed in his own defence that these loans were in most cases granted to court favourites, the inference being that he made them under pressure. *Vospominania*, I, 452. In this connection, Witte's characterisation of a certain class among the Court nobles and the manifest feeling with which it was written, strongly suggest that these favours were not given voluntarily, but only granted under compulsion to people who inspired him with distrust and contempt. *Vospominania*, III, 223. The advance of 2,000,000 roubles made to Bezobrazov in 1902, and never accounted for, is an example.

¹¹ P. B. Migulin, III, 1080-1081. "On the contrary, he (the Minister), making illegal use of the State Bank for the issue of industrial loans, erected our industrial system on a shaky foundation, brought on a crisis in the State Bank by loading its accounts with long-term loans of doubtful value and destroying the confidence of powerful financial interests abroad in the stability of our financial system."

policy. The Minister who controlled the vast financial resources of the State must have been tempted to use this means to buy his way into St. Petersburg society.¹² But our interest in these loans lies in the fact that they formed part of a comprehensive policy for the promotion of industrial enterprises by State direction and by the use of public funds. While followed to some extent in industry in European Russia, this policy found larger scope in the Far East, where the Minister of Finance, through the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Russo-Chinese Bank, initiated far-reaching schemes for exploiting Manchuria and Northern China.

By the introduction of the State spirit monopoly, the production and sale of vodka and other alcoholic products came under almost complete Government control. This measure, while originally proposed by Alexander for social reasons, was, of course, quite in keeping with the paternal system of government which was slowly taking shape under Witte.¹³ It became in time not only the source of the greater part of the State's revenues, but also one of the greatest industries in Russia, whose operation by the officials of the Government gave the latter a great leverage on the economic life of the country.

But while the flow of capital into Russia, attracted by the possibilities of profitable investments in private undertakings there, is not without its significance, its relative importance must not be exaggerated. Investments of foreigners in private enterprises in Russia amounted in 1900 to 1,000,000,000. On the other hand, the State Debt in this same year totalled 6,000,000,000, largely raised abroad. Of this vast sum, not less than 3,000,000,000 roubles was invested in railroads.¹⁴ This takes no account, moreover, of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the construction of which, while not financed directly by foreign loans, was made possible by the support

¹² Wladimir von Korostowetz, *Graf Witte, Der Steuermann in der Not* (Berlin, 1929), pp. 46, 47. It must be borne in mind that Witte had seriously prejudiced his official career by his marriage in 1892 to Matilda Lisanevich Nurok, a Jewess. Witte's first wife had just died, and this new attachment, which he contracted for a married woman on whom the breath of scandal had blown, threatened to end the career of the new Minister of Finance. But Alexander drew a nice distinction between Witte the man and Witte the statesman. He told Witte that he wished to retain his services and ordered the Procurator of the Holy Synod to procure a divorce for Mme. Lisanevich. But the Court refused to recognise her; only after Witte's triumphal return from Portsmouth did she make her appearance at Court and was recognition of his second marriage granted.

¹³ *Vospominania*, III, 345-352.

¹⁴ Migulin, III, 1147.

extended by French banking interests.¹⁵ The cost of this one venture to the State was alone equal to the total foreign investments in private enterprises¹⁶

We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that the rapid industrial development of Russia during the nineties is not to be explained by the inauguration of new policies consciously directed toward this end. Since 1861 large-scale industries of Russia had been slowly adapting themselves to the new conditions imposed by the emancipation of the serfs. Their progress prior to the nineties would have been more rapid but for the setbacks caused by grievous mistakes in foreign policy or internal administration.

By the nineties, large-scale industry in Russia had developed sufficiently to profit by the favourable conjuncture of circumstances that arose at this time. These were the introduction of a protective tariff; the establishment of Russian currency on a sound basis; the flow of foreign capital into Russia attracted by possibilities of profitable investments, the stimulus given by the State, directly and indirectly, to industry—directly by bounties, loans and advances from the State banks, and indirectly by the inauguration of various enterprises, financed by foreign capital and requiring, in the case of the railways at least, vast quantities of industrial products.

But the many-sided activity of the Minister of Finance found itself more and more absorbed in that most fundamental of Russian problems—the peasant question. On this question, however, the

¹⁵ The Chinese Eastern Railway was built, not by the State directly, but by the Russo-Chinese Bank. But despite this concession to China, which enabled the Chinese Government to "save its face," the distinction between the Trans-Siberian, which was built by the Russian Government, and the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was built by the Russo-Chinese Bank, was purely a formal one. The two were integral parts of one enterprise. The funds required for their construction were provided directly by the State Treasury. As these expenditures involved deficits which had to be covered by foreign loans, one can say that, at least indirectly, the cost of these roads was met by loans. See B. A. Romanov, *Rossia v Manchchuru* (Russia in Manchuria) (Leningrad, 1928), p. 44.; B. B. Ginsky, *Prolog Russko-Yaponskoy Voiny* (Prologue to the Russo-Japanese War) (Petrograd, 1916), pp. 28-29; Diary of Kuropatkin, *Krasny Arkhiv*, II, 17.

¹⁶ According to *Bulletin Russe* (1904), *Livraison* 1, p. 163, the total cost of the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway up to the end of 1903 was, roughly, 1,000,000,000 roubles. But if one includes the auxiliary undertakings, this total would be greatly increased. Witte himself, in 1909, estimated it at 2,500,000,000 roubles. This, of course, far exceeds the 1,000,000,000 roubles of foreign capital invested in private enterprises in Russia. We have not mentioned the funds which the Minister of Finance disposed of, by his control of the Russo-Chinese and other banks in the East, whose funds went to develop Manchuria.

whole system for which Witte stood, as well as the specific policies which he pursued, found itself definitely on the defensive in the face of contemporary criticism. Yet it is only fair to state at the outset that it is questionable whether any of those who so bitterly attacked the Minister at the time, or later, for his alleged neglect of the peasant, had any real interest in him or any practical scheme to propose on his behalf. But, unfortunately, Witte came to a knowledge of the peasant question comparatively late, and then his approach was the purely fiscal one. These shortcomings he afterwards admitted quite frankly in a passage which deserves to be quoted:—

When I was appointed Minister of Finance, I was acquainted with the peasant question most superficially, as any so-called educated Russian might be. During the first years, I had some vague leanings towards the "commune," as was natural to one of my Slavophil sympathies.

Little I knew of the real Russia, the Russia of the peasants. I was born in the Caucasus, and later I was employed in the South and the West. But after becoming driver of the complicated machine called the finances of the Russian Empire, I should have been a fool not to understand that, however that machine may be built, if you want it to run for any length of time, and to increase its usefulness, you must provide reserves of fuel, though that did not lie within my immediate sphere. This fuel is the economic life of Russia and, as the chief part of the population consists of peasants, one must look carefully to that. In this I received much help from conversations I had with a former Minister of Finance, N. Bunge, a highly-regarded expert who had participated in the peasant reform of the sixties. He had directed my attention to the fact that the greatest drag on the economic development of the peasant class was the medieval commune, which did not permit improvement. He was strongly opposed to the commune.

But, above all, the truth was borne in on me by the figures which every day came before my eyes and, which formed a subject for my study and analysis. I soon acquired quite an accurate understanding of the true state of affairs, and during the next few years I formed the conviction that in the existing condition of the peasantry the machine on which every year heavier and heavier demands are made would in time no longer be in a position to satisfy the demands made of it, because there would not be any fuel.

So I made up my mind quite definitely what the trouble was and how it could be remedied. A government cannot be strong if its chief bulwark—the peasantry—is weak. We are always proclaiming the fact that the Russian Empire constitutes one fifth of the land surface of the globe and that we have a population of about 140,000,000; but of what use are these when much the greatest part of the surface which

the Russian Empire covers is a complete wilderness or in a half-cultivated state, and much the largest part of the population, from an economic point of view, cannot be counted as units but only as halves or even quarters?¹⁷

Witte's neglect of the peasant problem is all the more difficult to understand when we bear in mind that, in 1892, it was the acute distress among the peasants and the resultant crisis in the State finances that had led to his selection for the post of Minister of Finance. But he seems to have adopted Alexander's view that the cure for Russia's ills lay in the development of her manufactures. It is true that the promotion of emigration to Siberia to relieve the economic pressure in the more congested peasant regions was one of the original purposes that lay behind the building of the Trans-Siberian Railway. But it was soon relegated to a secondary place in the scheme of things. Obstacles were put in the way of colonisation, and it was not till after the end of the Russo-Japanese War that the State really attacked the problem with energy.¹⁸ During the first years of his tenure of office, Witte's mind was absorbed with financial problems and railway construction to the exclusion of other questions. Moreover, these were years of comparative abundance after the acute crisis of 1892, and there were, in any case, no agrarian disturbances. Hence the peasant problem was neglected. Reassured by the appearance of prosperity on every hand, Witte probably convinced himself that, with the growing industrialisation of the country, good times would come also to the Russian villages.

The first note of warning was sounded by the State Comptroller in his report to the Tsar on the public accounts for the year 1896. He pointed out that the peasant population, particularly in the central provinces, was rapidly becoming exhausted owing to the excessive demands made on it by the State.¹⁹ On the margin of the report the Tsar had written, "I agree with this." A grim confirmation of this view of things was afforded by the famines of 1898-99 which affected the region of the Middle Volga. Witte bestirred himself to ascertain the exact causes of this crisis. He

¹⁷ *Vospominania*, I, 446-447.

¹⁸ Though officially approved, this policy was opposed by the land-owning gentry, who feared that emigration to Siberia might make labour scarce in the rural districts of European Russia. The Ministry of the Interior effectively blocked the scheme by putting administrative obstacles in the way—probably by passport restrictions. See *Vospominaniia*, III, 399.

¹⁹ See Report of the Comptroller for 1896, printed in an appendix to Witte, *Samoderzhavie i Zemstvo* (Autocracy and Zemstvo) (Second Edition, Stuttgart, 1903), p. 213.

dealt with the questions raised in the report of the Comptroller in a report of his own entitled, "On the exhaustion of the (tax) paying powers of the population," which he addressed to the Tsar in 1898. In this report he admitted that there was some evidence of the progressive impoverishment of the peasants in the central provinces, but stated his belief that this condition was by no means general throughout European Russia. He held that the chief cause of the ills of peasant life was "the juridical and economic disorder in the life of the peasant population." By this he seems to have meant that by the failure to grant the peasant the full status of citizen and to recognise his right to hold private property, individual enterprise and thrift were being discouraged. To correct this unsatisfactory state of affairs, Witte advocated that he be freed from the commune and granted the same civil rights as other members of the community. The same ideas were developed in a personal letter which he addressed directly to the Sovereign, who was at that time staying in the Crimea.²⁰ But largely owing to the opposition of Plehve, nothing further was done to reach a solution of the peasant problem for some years.²¹

It was not till 1902 that the issue became a live one. In this year there were serious agrarian disturbances, which again focussed attention on the peasant. A step forward seemed to have been made when a commission was formed under the chairmanship of Witte to study the problem. But this effort to lighten the burden of the peasant at once called forth the bitterest opposition of the reactionaries among the bureaucrats and the gentry, who saw the coveted privileges of their order menaced. Witte urged the monarch to carry through to completion the work begun in 1861 by his grandfather and grant the peasants full rights as citizens. Anticipating a determined resistance from his opponents, he endeavoured to disarm them by inducing the monarch to assume the chairmanship of this new commission, as he had in the case of the Siberian Commission in 1895. But Nicholas listened to the promptings of the "die-hards" and emasculated Witte's commission by the creation of a rival body under Sipyagin, "to examine the conditions created by the decree of 19 February (3 March), 1861."²²

²⁰ *Vospominania*, I, 467-473.

²¹ V. K. Plehve was an important figure in Russian official circles under Alexander III and Nicholas II. He became Minister of the Interior after the assassination of Sipyagin in 1902. See *Vospominania*, I, 27-31.

²² An account of the atmosphere of intrigue in which these commissions were born is to be found in Korostowetz' *Graf Witte*, pp. 80-86. The "Diary

In this way the question of the legal and juridical status of the peasant was removed from the competence of Witte's commission, which was left to deal with purely economic matters only, such as the low standard of productivity of peasant agriculture in Russia. On one point, namely, the question of collective responsibility for peasant taxes, the Minister of Finance did obtain a victory. He managed to secure the support of Solsky, President of the Council of State, for a proposal to make the peasants individually responsible for the taxes levied on them. This measure threatened the control exercised over rural life by the so-called "land-captains," the local agents of the central administration.²³ I. L. Goremykin, probably supported by the Tsar, attacked the proposal.²⁴ But Witte took up the position that this was purely an economic measure, vital to his Ministry, and by threatening to resign he carried his point.

On the question of the breaking up of the commune, an insuperable obstacle was encountered in the opposition of Sipyagin, the newly-appointed Minister of the Interior. Though the Tsar endeavoured to reassure Witte by saying that he would have all measures for the amelioration of the peasant's lot submitted to himself by both commissions jointly, it was evident to all that the monarch had laid down a *ne plus ultra* for Witte, and that there would be a further attack on the rights of the peasant population.

To facilitate the work of the commissions, provincial and local committees were formed to prepare evidence for submission to the central bodies. The work was continued for four years, badly hampered, however, by the preoccupation of the Government with questions of foreign policy. After the assassination of Sipyagin in 1902, the latter was succeeded by Plehve, who did everything in his power to take the settlement of the peasant question into his own hands. As a result, Witte adopted a waiting attitude, and the activity of his commission was limited to the discussion of quite

of Polovtsev," *Krasny Arkhiv*, III, 116, describes the interview of Witte with the Tsar on 29 January, 1902, in which the former was plainly told that his commission was not to touch the status of the peasant. One is at a loss to explain why Witte had apparently supported the appointment of Sipyagin to the post of Minister of the Interior despite the fact that the latter was opposed to the abolition of the commune. See further *Krasny Arkhiv*, III, 103-104, entry of 19 August, 1901.

²³ In 1889 the civil rights of the peasants were considerably abridged, and they were subjected to the control of the local representatives of the bureaucracy, the so-called "land-captains." The land-captains were usually members of the gentry. For Witte's characterisation of these officials, see *Vospominaniya*, III, 374.

²⁴ Goremykin was Minister of the Interior from 1895 to 1899.

innocuous matters.²⁵ On Plehve's death, Prince Svyatopolk-Mirsky became Minister of the Interior; and, with his more favourable attitude toward peasant reform, the commission was able to take up the question of the legal status of the peasant without, however, succeeding in bringing its deliberations to fruition.²⁶

It was apparent that it was all but hopeless to carry on these deliberations in such an atmosphere of intrigue and amid the clash of conflicting class interests. To the movement to improve the lot of the peasant, opposition developed both within and without the commission. With Witte's dismissal from the post of Minister of Finance in August, 1903, the work of the commission lost momentum, and it declined in prestige. Finally, by a decree of 30 March, 1905, it was dissolved. Obviously, the peasant could expect nothing from the Government except what was wrung from it by force.

On other more purely political questions Witte had decided views, but his contribution towards the solution of these problems is somewhat more difficult to determine. Politics were not his *métier*, and his want of precision in his views or consistency in his practice scarcely allow us to include him within this or that school of political thought. By his birth he was connected with the gentry, and he had been reared in an atmosphere of devotion to the principles of orthodoxy and autocracy. His loyalty to the absolutist regime was further strengthened by the relations of mutual confidence that grew up between himself and Alexander III. The result was that he never swerved from the conviction that an autocratic government was the one best suited to Russia.²⁷ Yet his experience taught him that the arbitrary exercise of authority by either the autocrat himself or his servants was the surest means of undermining its power and prestige. During the agrarian revolts of 1905-06, Witte protested against the illegal methods adopted for their repression.²⁸

²⁵ *Vospominania*, I, 478.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 480-481.

²⁷ "Diary of Polovtsev," *Krasny Arkhiv*, III, 139. The writer reports Witte as saying: "I am opposed, on principles inculcated in me in childhood, to all forms of constitutionalism, parliamentarism; in fact, to every grant of political rights to the people."

²⁸ *Krasny Arkhiv*, III, 136; *Vospominania*, II, 137, 138. Witte seems to have talked very plainly to the Tsar on the question of the punitive expeditions, especially on that of the notorious Captain Richter: "You are making a great mistake if you think that the evils that are rampant can be rooted out by police severity. The Government has departed from the path of legality and has given the people an example of lawlessness. Oppressive measures, which could not possibly have been carried through the Council

[Continued overleaf.]

But in constitutional matters, Witte showed a lack of consistency as between theory and practice. It was remembered how on one occasion, in his determination to carry through a measure, he had ignored the regular channels of legislation by securing an exercise of the autocratic power²⁹ When, in 1903, Nicholas took far-eastern affairs out of the hands of his responsible Ministers and turned them over to the favourites, Bezobrazov and Alexeyev, the principle was the same, however Witte might complain about the irregularity of the procedure. The truth was that Witte could not see that a constitutional autocracy based on law was a contradiction in terms. The autocratic power of the Russian Tsar was the modern survival of the absolute monarch of the 16th century, which Bodin described as "absolute power unrestrained by law."³⁰ To have attempted to turn the autocracy into a limited monarchy by defining in advance the way in which this power could be exercised, would have been to stultify it.

Witte pursued his loyalty to the principle of absolutism even in his attitude towards the *zemstva*, the local elective governing bodies, which was one of hostility. Here his course, at first sight, seems difficult to reconcile with his attitude toward the village commune, which he was desirous of freeing from bureaucratic control. He himself justified his hostility on the principle that self-government, even in local affairs, could not be combined with autocracy in the Central Government. This thesis he defended in a memorandum he wrote for the monarch in 1899; he sums up his position in the following words:—

But such an administration is possible only where one or the other of these principles (i.e. the autocratic or the democratic) is applied throughout all its institutions; effective government depends on the uniformity of structure in all parts of the executive and administrative machinery. Departure from this uniformity may be tolerated only in case of necessity, and then only when such changes do not conflict with

of State, have been proclaimed by the Committee of Ministers under the pretext of the existence of an emergency, and have continued in force in some cases for more than twenty years. There does not exist a single court that is above reproach. On every important occasion the sentences record only the rulings of the Minister of Justice. . . . Everywhere it is the arbitrary conduct of the officials to which the population replies with violence." *Vospominaniya*, II, 138.

²⁹ In connection with the introduction of the gold standard in 1897. Witte had forestalled the almost unanimous opposition of the members of the Council of State by putting the gold standard into effect piecemeal and by administrative measures.

³⁰ Ioan Bodini, *De Re Publica*, Book I, Chapter VIII.: "Diximus potestatem legibus solutum congruere majestati."

the spirit of the whole Government structure. He who is master of the Government must also be master of the whole administration. . . .

This truth we must ever bear in mind . . . it is impossible to create liberal forms unless we fill them with a corresponding content.³¹

It is probable that Witte approached the problem rather from the point of view of an administrator than from that of a statesman who has to take into account political and social forces. The introduction of the State monopoly in alcohol deprived many of the municipalities of much-needed revenue. This sore was continually kept open by the extension of the system to the whole Empire. In the same spirit he secured an edict in 1901, limiting the taxing powers of the *zemstva*, and thus prevented them from competing with the Central Government in this field. He also opposed the scheme whereby the *zemstva* should choose representatives for the provincial committees that were to collect information for Witte's commission on the needs of agriculture, and succeeded in having these nominated by the Governor.³² He obviously conceived government as a vast business organisation under a centralised control. While the interests of the whole population would be consulted on every question and no class would be permitted to enjoy exclusive privileges, this did not mean a slackening of the bonds of discipline. Measures of reform were to be introduced from above, and not as a result of pressure from below. "Constitutionalism is the great lie of our time." This aphorism, which summed up the creed of the Slavophil, he adopted as his own.³³ He thought it possible to build up a great industrial and commercial nation on political principles opposed to those current in the Western world: in which the Sovereign would fulfil

³¹ *Samoderzhavie i Zemstvo*, p. 196. The circumstance that gave rise to the writing of this pamphlet was the proposed introduction of elected *zemstva* into the so-called Western Provinces, i.e. those with a mixed Russian and Polish population. This measure was sponsored by Goremykin. It brought to light at once how great was the confusion in which local self-government and all rural administration were at this time involved. It turned out that schools were being built and maintained by three different authorities—the *zemstva*, the Holy Synod and the Ministry of Public Instruction. It was easy to show that this overlapping was conducive to waste and inefficiency. But Witte's own Ministry was also establishing and maintaining schools of its own (i.e. the higher technical schools), whereby the confusion was increased. Witte certainly had no scruples about invading the province of a fellow-Minister. See A. N. Kuropatkin, *The Russian Army and the Japanese War* (London, 1909), II, 34.

³² Diary of Polovtsev, *Krasny Arkhiv*, III, 92.

³³ *Samoderzhavie i Zemstvo*, p. 211. Witte repeats this epigram without giving its source. It is undoubtedly an echo of Pobedonostsev in his *Moskovsky Sbornik*, Chapter III, of which the title runs: "The Great Lie of our Time."

the functions of an enlightened despot, while a bureaucracy, purged of its corruption and inefficiency, would direct the whole economic life of the people. Witte thus joins hands, as it were, across the intervening years with the Communist Party, with their policy of a planned economy.

The failure of Russia to realise the destiny which Witte had marked out for her was charged by some of Witte's enemies to the failure of the Government, of which he was the leading Minister, to take account of the peasant problem. But this is far too simple an explanation of a phenomenon that is extraordinarily complex. In the first place, it must be borne in mind that Witte's reforms were for the most part administrative measures and designed to meet a concrete situation. Their net result was on the whole favourable to the development of capitalistic industry and the growth of a middle class. At first, Witte thought that Russian life would be gradually assimilated to the economic and social forms of the West, and he looked with satisfaction on the rise of a class of well-to-do peasants with intelligence and initiative.³⁴ In this class he saw the hope of the Russian countryside, and he insisted that they should be freed from the chains of the village commune which, he held, was stifling individual enterprise and thrift.

But in the case of industry and commerce, Witte seems to have been somewhat sceptical of the immediate and spontaneous growth of a progressive middle class, at least among the population of Russian stock.³⁵ And in this respect he was merely following in the footsteps of his predecessors. Russian industry, from the time of Peter, had experienced a forced growth in which monopoly and generous State assistance played a conspicuous part. *Laissez faire* and freedom of trade had been toyed with during the liberal regime of Alexander II, but had failed to strike their roots deep. With the spread of the economic doctrines of List in Europe, the reaction was immediate in Russia in the direction of the promotion of nationalism in the economic life of the State. On this issue there was a complete want of harmony between the theory and practice of Witte. While he was not responsible for the introduction of the protective tariff of 1891, the duties it imposed were further raised during his regime until by 1900 the average was over

³⁴ See Witte's *Report on the Budget for the Year 1896*, pp. 7-8.

³⁵ Witte's patronage of the Jews was well known. See *Vospominania*, I, chap. XVI, where Witte discusses his feud with Plehve over the question of nationalities. Much of the ill-feeling against the various non-Russian nationalities was due to the prosperity which they enjoyed under Witte's regime; see Kuropatkin's *Diary*, *Krasny Arkhiv*, II, 55; also A. N. Kuropatkin, *Zadachi Russkoy Armii* (Tasks of the Russian Army) (St. Petersburg, 1910), II, chap. XXX.

100 per cent.³⁶ Yet Witte saw clearly the abuses to which a protective system inevitably gave rise, and maintained that this protection should be withdrawn, once the national industries had become established.³⁷ In his view, Russian history showed that it was through government intervention that the native industries (at least large-scale industries) had been able to survive; and, as we have seen, he extended generous assistance to them by grants from the State treasury as well as by Government orders. Yet, in spite of this, it was to individual initiative that he looked as the future hope of the economic life of the Russian people.³⁸ It seems hopeless to attempt to reconcile all these inconsistencies of thought and policy. All we can do is to keep in mind that the problems of Witte were essentially administrative; that his measures dealt with concrete and pressing needs. The most important of these needs were—the greatest possible measure of industrial self-sufficiency and financial resources commensurate with the tasks of the State. He bent his energies towards the securing of these ends. The more remote problems of stimulating new social and economic forces within the community did not lie within his province.

It can, therefore, be stated in summary that Witte's activity was concerned primarily with financial and fiscal matters. This was inevitable under the system of individual responsibility of Ministers to the Sovereign. The securing of harmony and of a proper balance of forces within the State, even within the highest administrative bodies, could only be attained by some authority in close touch with all sides of the public life which could minister to the needs of the time and could co-ordinate all the activities of the people. Such an institution would be the monarch, who was in this case quite unequal to the task. But then, even if Russia had been successful in realising her "historic mission," in spite of the antiquated form of her Government and the feudal character of her social structure, these tasks had taxed and were continuing to tax her resources to the limit.³⁹ The attainment of a higher standard of life and efficiency among the common people was now,

³⁶ The Russian tariff provided for an average of 131 per cent on goods imported from England. See Great Britain, Board of Trade, *Series of Memoranda, Statistical Tables and Charts* (London, 1904), p. 213.

³⁷ *Vestnik Evropy* (1899), IV, 786. Speech delivered by Witte before the Commission for the regulation of the grain trade in March, 1899.

³⁸ *Vospominania*, I, 442-443. He here sets forth the view that the true basis of the economic life of a people is individual initiative.

³⁹ The term "historic mission" was usually applied to the expansion of Russia's power into the Balkans, together with the occupation of Constantinople.

as Witte saw, the great need of the time.⁴⁰ As to what political and economic measures were essential to the securing of these ends, there might be some divergence of opinion. But nothing was to be gained by shutting one's eyes to the needs of the hour or repeating the old shibboleth—autocracy, orthodoxy and nationalism. Persecution of religious and national minorities only further weakened the State by stifling the growth of the very classes and groups which might have brought new blood into the body corporate.⁴¹ But the blind policy of the bureaucracy in attempting to achieve a superficial uniformity and a complete subservience to the autocratic power, roused the dormant nationalism of the minorities and destroyed the political harmony of the State. But of much greater importance was the external policy of the Government. Internal disorder might bring the State to ruin; external complications were bound to do so. It is to the credit of Witte that he appreciated the benefits that had accrued to Russia from the thirteen years of peace which the country enjoyed under Alexander III, and strove to prevent his successor from placing the country's destiny at the hazard of a foreign war. But it was a cruel irony of fate that the first of the wars of the new century in which Russia was to be engaged arose out of far-eastern complications for which Witte, as Minister of Finance, had to bear some share of the responsibility.⁴² Defeat abroad and revolution at home were the prices paid for failure to face and solve the political problems with which Russia was confronted.

The rôle played by Witte in negotiating the Treaty of Portsmouth with Japan in 1905, and still later in forming Russia's first responsible Government, however brilliant, was but an epilogue to his real career, which came to an end with his dismissal from the post of Minister of Finance in the summer of 1903. His genius displayed itself in the field of finance; when he ventured beyond, he seemed unable to gauge accurately the currents of public opinion, both in Russia and abroad. But even when he failed, the breadth of his views and the immense scope of his activity made an indelible impression on his contemporaries and left behind a heritage that will never completely be effaced.

University of Chicago.

STUART R. TOMPKINS.

⁴⁰ Diary of Polovtsev, *Krasny Arkhiv*, III, 103-104, entry under date of 19 August, 1901, in which Witte is credited with this utterance.

⁴¹ For Witte's views on the Jewish question, see *Vospominania*, I, 188-189. Also Korostowetz, *Graf Witte*, pp. 104-105. Witte was espousing an unpopular cause when he defended the Jews and other non-Russian elements who benefited from the industrial prosperity of Russia.

⁴² Yet Witte always specifically distinguished between an economic and a military policy in the Far East, and regarded the aggressive advance of Russia southward from the Trans-Siberian to Port Arthur as a fatal mistake.—Ed.

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

It was the amiable little fad of this most simple and selfless man that he liked to be called by his full name; he was " Archie " to his many junior colleagues and friends, and " Our Archie " to the students of Harvard.

In 1924, when I arrived for the first time in Boston, I was invited to dinner at The Harvard Club, in the old house with the magnificent fireplace. In the chair was the most brilliant of the younger Slavonic scholars of America, Coolidge's most promising pupil—Robert H. Lord—and on the other side of me a quiet man with a singularly young and fresh face, who had been, one way or another, the teacher of nearly all the best Slavonic scholars in the country. In the warm discussion on Russia which followed the dinner, questions were often, as if by nature, addressed to him; but he always referred them on to me as if I could give a better judgment of them, which was, of course, the reverse of the fact.

I think that it was in something of this way that Coolidge had come to hold the unique position which he occupied among Slavonic scholars in the English-speaking world. He encouraged all who worked with him or under him to go forward; and his judgment, never prematurely uttered and fully weighed and considered, remained for them the final criterion. " If Archie Coolidge has said that, it goes," said a colleague in a distant university who was not his pupil; and it was because he had this unclaimed but so freely-given authority that I was able to realise every one of the objects which I had in view when I set out for America to get the close collaboration of the scholars in my field.

How this position was won by Coolidge is a subject to which it was more than worth while to devote a book, and the task has been performed in just the spirit which Coolidge would have desired and welcomed by his brother, Mr. Harold Coolidge, and Professor Robert H. Lord.¹ Except as to what is distinctive in the angle and method of approach, one sees no difference between the two authors; and what they have written retains much of the same atmosphere as the many quotations from Coolidge himself. It was a remarkable life; and the course of the narrative illuminates the most various interests and touches almost every part of the world.

The tasks which Coolidge had before him at the outset were singularly like those of our own school and of his colleagues in this country, so that one compares notes instinctively at one

¹ *Archibald Cary Coolidge : Life and Letters*. By Harold Jefferson Coolidge and Robert Howard Lord. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston and New York, 1932; pp. xiv, 368.

point or another, and in every case the comparison will go to show how far more he was able to do than we have yet done here. And yet at the outset his chances of success might have seemed less than ours. He was essentially a university man, and although he worked in the university with the greatest tradition in America, he had to start practically out of nothing. The American public, having far less direct interest in East European affairs than our own, was also much less impregnated with the university ideal; in a population of such mixed races there was no common standard of education on which to rely. The principal aspects of Russian life with which the American public was most familiar were both of a nature calculated rather to bias judgment than to inform it. America was the asylum on the one hand of emigrant revolutionaries, and on the other of great masses of the Jewish race; and the abominable treatment which the Jews as a race underwent in Russia was the greatest prejudice to anything like cordial relations between the Russian and American Governments.

On the other hand, Coolidge had very great personal advantages peculiar to himself. His family was of the highest standing in his country, and it was with a pardonable pride that he claimed descent on one side from Thomas Jefferson, one of the most distinguished of American Presidents, and on the other from Princess Pocahantas, the Red Indian wife of John Rolfe, one of the first pioneers of colonisation in Virginia. In this way, or through his connection with Harvard, he had easy access to the principal public men in the States. Throughout life he was in possession of large means, which gave him free scope for wide travels and of which he made the most munificent use. Throughout life he remained a bachelor.

All this did no more than give him a start; and I think he owed his success in the first place and throughout to the way in which he always approached any task. The proper way of describing it to persons familiar with university work would be to say that it was always in the highest degree the realisation of what is understood under the word "academic." He approached every task and every subject with an absolutely open mind; he never hurried; he was indefatigable, not merely in his exploration of all the facts concerned, but also in the slow and constant revision of them, which produced at any time so much of an ultimate judgment as he ever allowed himself to formulate. "*Nihil humanum a me alienum.*" His interest was always fresh and absorbing for any aspect of life and things which came before him, and his greatest quality was a complete generosity to others, which enabled him to understand and

take over the best of anything they had to give him, and made him the best of teachers or collaborators.

As to method, his ideas were simple and unquestionable; to put them in the words of his biography: "Books, always more and more books." "Travel, always more and more travel." The story of how he combined and unified these two different means is at once the picture of the man and the charm and life of his biography.

As to travel, we may quote the simple summary of his biographers:—

When it comes to summing up what these travels as a whole were, a beginning can be made by listing those parts of the world which he never visited. These were Australia, New Zealand, and the South Sea Islands to the East of Java, South and Central Africa and the west coast, Mexico and Central America and the wilder parts of northern Canada and northern Siberia.

On the following page is a brief and practical list which gives the positive result. There are thirty-one entries dating from 1870, when the traveller was four years old, to 1926, a year and a month before his death. Some of them read like this:—

1889—Paris, Algiers and back to America and westward around the world by way of Japan, Shanghai, Hong-Kong, Canton, Singapore, Java and India.

1908, Spain and South America including Brazil, Uruguay, Argentine, Chile (Pan-American Scientific Congress) and back by the west coast.

Russia is entered for 1889, 1890, 1891-95-98-1902-1918-21-22; and Russia, as indicated in the shorter and more drastic summary of negation, includes Siberia (again round the world) and Central Asia. The last-named was one of Coolidge's more daring journeys, for he arrived without the necessary permit and quietly asked to be arrested and carried on to his destination. Equally challenging of dangers were his solitary climbing of Mount Ararat, his trip to Archangel during the period of intervention in 1918, and his visit as guide-in-chief to the American Relief Association in the famine of 1921.

Few journalists can show such a record; but Coolidge was no journalist. Where his travels were not made for national service, they were invariably planned as a means of study of the countries in question, their conditions and their political questions, such as few journalists have time to make. Coolidge was a thorough believer in the value, the facilities, and the responsibilities of the study of contemporary history, and his travels were throughout a lively supplement to his wide and careful reading. In his later years he

sometimes took with him a younger student of his choice—so to speak, a temporary nephew who always became a permanent one; and some of these companions have expressed their delight at the simple way in which, when the immediate object of study seemed to be blocked off, the unfailing resource of their guide found some way round or some adequate substitute; and the net result of all this was a knowledge of the world and its leading public men such as has seldom been obtained, a kind of useful and living dictionary which the memory could consult in the course of reading.

One entry which is very properly included in the travels reads as follows: 1913—Gore Hall, Cambridge to Randall and Widener, Library back and forth; incidentally, the entry for that year includes also, West Indies, Berlin (exchange Professor). Like everything else in this unselfish life, Coolidge's love of books included the provision of books for present and future students, and on so large a scale as to represent a separate and great achievement. Coolidge was never trained as a librarian, but his achievement in this field was one that would make the mouth of a librarian water. He was the creator of one of the greatest libraries in the world—the Widener Library at Harvard University, founded by the munificence of the mother of one of the younger victims of the great disaster of the "Titanic." Coolidge's devotion to this work was such as might have well left no room for any other; he made his own way into every technical question of librarianship and proved himself a guide to be consulted by others on all the policies and details of such work. In particular, the lines which he laid down in a memorandum to a colleague, Mr. Ernest H. Wilkins, Dean of the University of Chicago, is an ideally simple and full definition of the proper relations between main and departmental libraries. On the other hand, he retained throughout a remarkable freedom and mobility, capable of dealing in the most direct and practical way with immediate difficulties, even of the most overwhelming kind. The entry referred to above relates to a vacation during which he personally superintended and himself led the actual moving of all the books from their temporary quarters. This task was for Coolidge and all who took part in it a kind of sport or adventure, and one of his letters includes a humorous illustration of the details in a quotation from *The Lark*—

"I wish that my room had a floor!

I don't so much care for a door.

But this walking around

Without touching the ground

Is getting to be quite a bore!"

The same letter contains the record : " So far I have got about three hundred and fifty thousand volumes moved."

The arrangement of the books when completed was admirably simple and effective : in the centre the main stacks accessible to passages all round, and outside a number of small seminar rooms, equipped with those books which were most necessary for the study of each given subject. Coolidge did not explain all this to me as he showed me round ; he simply let me see it and waited at each point with an occasional quiet word of explanation. It was only from others that one was likely to learn of his love for this wonderful child of his. Almost throughout the tenure of his chair, he returned his salary for the purchase of—"books, always more and more books : " at first, specially on that enormous field of East European, Asiatic, and African study which he was himself practically introducing for the first time into a great American university, and later, during his librarianship, with an even more extended reference. By 1910 he was able to write : " For the Far East we have perhaps the best working library out of Washington ; for Russia and the other Slav countries the best (not in Slavic languages) in the United States ; for the Ottoman Empire and the Near Eastern question perhaps the best collection in the world." On his death the university received the greater part of his very considerable fortune for a chair endowed for the continuance of these studies.

One other side of Coolidge's many-sided university life should be mentioned here. He was throughout a students' don, with the result, inevitable in his case, that there can seldom have been a don who was so beloved. The new courses which he boldly introduced at the outset, lived, flourished and ramified. As a young man, he began the teaching of Russian history in America, in 1894, with a course on the history of Northern and Eastern Europe, and his next innovation (in 1896) was another on the Eastern question. The enjoyment which his classes gave to his students may be illustrated by an amusing extract from the *Harvard Lampoon* of 21 May, 1903, in which his typical lisp is amusingly and kindly parodied :—

"Chawlemagne (S-H-A-W-L-M-O-R-N, Chawlemagne) so incweased the powew of the Fwancs that one fwanc was worth a dollar duwing his weign. Pleath turn to the Puthger—page one hundwed. Thpwt colored wed ith where he had his houth. Notith, pleath, how the wiver wuns awound the houth. Quiet !! (Q-U-I-T-, quiet.) No pwimary school twicks, or thewe will be an hour-exam on Fwiday. Will the gentleman in the fwont wow pleath wake up or leave the woom—There will be no lecture yester-

day, ath usual, but on Fwiday I shall expect a M-A-P of the wandwings of the Iswaelites, and I shall NOT accept blank space as a wepwesentation of the lost twibes."

But the courses are only one part of his student's life, and a special chapter is devoted by his brother to his other activities among his men, headed by the title which they gave him, "The King of Clubs." It was he who inspired and made possible, as much by his own generosity as by his active work, the erection of the Randolph Hall for Students, in which the bachelor professor himself lived, accessible to all; and in spite of the sometimes strange vicissitudes through which the settler carried his little colony, its history is very pleasant reading, with its sacrifices and enthusiasm and its adventurous exploits in amateur planning and management.

It has been mentioned that Coolidge by his standing had practically from the outset many connections with American public men, and to these all the work at Harvard which has been described, of course, added indefinitely. One who was so attracted by the observation of contemporary history and politics and who interpreted his study on such broad and liberal lines was likely to have often thought what part he himself could take in public life; but here, as in other things, Coolidge went slow, carefully considering each step that he took and never committing himself further than he saw his way, and came in the end to take up a clearly defined position. Throughout he had always a certain hankering for diplomacy, and at one time showed more than usual activity in obtaining a diplomatic appointment at St. Petersburg, but even then he was more or less deliberately filling up a certain interval of preparation before the life-work to which he looked forward at Harvard. In later life, in a letter to a nephew who had consulted him on the subject, he gave a singularly clear and lucid estimate of diplomatic work, which was certainly not flattering to that form of activity or to those engaged in it. There were certain times, more than others, when this hankering was strong; but his independence of judgment was dear to him, and also the freedom to take his own time in forming it; as a result, he became a natural consultant of many people in very important positions, ultimately extending upwards in importance to the first public men in the country; and they, on their side, understood his reticences and reservations and asked him only for that which he could give.

The sudden outbreak of the Great War raised up for Coolidge exactly the same tasks as for so many other public-spirited scholars and experts all the world over, and by his whole character and preparation he was exactly in the right position to know what it

was that he had to offer and to have it accepted as such. Till the United States entered the war, he had plenty of time to watch from Harvard as one new great development pressed on the heels of another. His first war adventure was an expedition to Archangel in 1918. This was to study and report on the Allied intervention in Russia, a phase of the war which raised the most delicate questions and demanded the best knowledge and the greatest tact and independence. Coolidge saw in the clearest detail everything that passed before his eyes and, though never one-sided or unsympathetic, could hardly from the start hope any success for the Archangel episode. He did not stay long, and his next enterprise did not follow until after the Armistice. But he obtained a far better field for his exceptional qualities when he was appointed Head of the American Mission to deal with immediate post-war problems in Vienna. In this work he showed to the full his wide understanding and his generous sympathies, which were at once evident to the unhappy populations with which he had to deal and seemed to them like a great ray of hope. He was admirably served by colleagues largely of his own choice and devoted to his leadership. The problems with which he had to deal were at certain moments such as even to defy the greatest tact, and at one time he received instructions from his chiefs in Paris which might have angered many men and deterred others from serious effort; but in his part of a task which sapped the forces and ruined the reputation of many foremost men Coolidge managed to steer a wise course, doing good things of the highest value which might easily have been left undone, averting crises which might have caused infinite trouble, and leaving everywhere a memory of gratitude. From this task he was summoned back to Paris in time to take an important and valuable part at the Peace Conference; and in the ability which distinguished so much of the work of the American Delegation his share must not be limited to his own personal action, but must take account also of the effects of his long life-work in preparing his country for so unprecedented an emergency. It is interesting and characteristic to note that Coolidge, though he saw at once and at the time mistakes that were being made and the dangers that might spring from them, never afterwards succumbed to the bitter and complete reaction of so many others as to the value of the work that was done in Paris and especially, as his biographers note, "of the vast remaking of the map of Europe on the basis of the principle of self-determination."

If Coolidge's wisdom, tact, and courage were highly tried in his Austrian Mission, they came equally triumphantly through a task of

even greater delicacy when he was sent to Moscow to act not as the head but as the brain of the American Relief Administration (September 1921-January 1922). The invitation and appointment came direct from Mr. Hoover who, while not making Coolidge responsible for the direction of this Mission, fully recognised that the task which he was assigning to him was even more difficult and responsible. Hardly on any one of Coolidge's travels did he have to undergo more personal discomforts and privations; but these he faced and made his comrades face in exactly the same joyous spirit as that in which he led his little band of helpers when moving the books of the Widener Library. In a rare interval in the stress of work we find him even playing the principal part in a musical entertainment at headquarters; and on the other hand he dashes off himself up country to see how the distribution of food is working. There were not more than two or three other Americans who had the knowledge to judge what, exactly, the Mission could insist on, where it must take things as they found them, and how it could successfully repudiate any charge from a suspicious Government of crossing the dubious line between famine relief and interest in Russian local affairs.

This was Coolidge's last foreign adventure, though not the actual end of his travels. But in the nine years that passed between his crowning work at Vienna and Versailles and his death, years which were spent in rounding off his work at Harvard and organising the future regular information of the American public on foreign affairs, Coolidge enjoyed the results of all his life-work and the standing which it had given him in world opinion. Sometimes his actual importance was over-rated, much to his amusement; for when his namesake and distant relation, Calvin, was elected Vice-President of the United States, many in Europe naturally jumped to the conclusion that the christian name was one which they knew very much better. For instance, the *Kreuzzeitung* of Berlin for 15 June, 1920, wrote:—

The Republican Candidate for the Vice-Presidency far surpasses Harding. Archibald Cary Coolidge is a scientist, politician, and statesman . . . He is professor of History at the University of Harvard . . . At present he is Governor of Massachusetts [!] . . . In any other country it would be Coolidge who would be nominated President and Harding Vice-President. The Americans seem at present to be imbued with a certain dislike for mentally superior presidents.

On this Coolidge writes to a friend, "They talk of people who have greatness thrust upon them. The German Press seems to be

thrusting greatness upon me; I can only blush sweetly and say how intelligent these Germans are." Meanwhile, from his well-known namesake he receives the following: "Enclosed is a letter evidently intended for you, as I find after having it typed for my easier reading. . . . but I feel sure that the letter is intended for you. Very truly yours, Calvin Coolidge." The enclosure is addressed to Vice-President Professor Coolidge, Washington, U.S.A. But, though Coolidge's tenth cousin certainly counted for much more than he did in American politics, it was certainly Archibald and not Calvin who was the principal American consultant for statesmen and public men in Europe. Meanwhile, several of his friends and former pupils held some of the highest posts in American diplomacy.

These and innumerable other communications he employed for the foundation of two institutions which aimed at keeping the American public in regular contact with world affairs. One was the Council of Foreign Relations, and the other the periodical *Foreign Affairs*, of which, as Editor, he shaped all the beginnings in such a way as to secure for it from the outset a world reputation. Here, as so often before, the charm of Coolidge's character and methods gave him a peculiarly able and devoted second in Hamilton Fish Armstrong. As to university studies in his field, it has already been said that nearly all the best men were directly or indirectly his pupils. The present head of the first-class school in California—George R. Noyes—was at one time his pupil. Samuel N. Harper, of Chicago, the best authority in America on contemporary Russia, though I believe he never actually studied under Coolidge, always accepted his leadership. Robert H. Lord, the closest of all his collaborators, was outstanding in his brilliant promise. Robert J. Kerner, first of Missouri and then of California University, was his devoted pupil, and so was William H. Langer, who has supplied a particularly able survey of current books to *Foreign Affairs*. Some of his students, for instance, Lord and Kerner, like their chief, rendered national service in the work of intelligence connected with the Treaty of Versailles.

We have seen how that singularly gracious personality, with its complete unity of character and of action, developed of itself without fret or hurry to its full stature. This natural unity of Coolidge himself served to unify and give direction and effect to every department of his work and also to the work of his colleagues. Not the least of his charm and of his strength was in his reticences. In all my most pleasant conversations with him there was nothing to mark that he was telling me something which it was most important

for me to know. The Widener Library he left to explain itself with only a few incidental footnotes. In the same simple and almost casual way he called my attention to the work of Leo Wiener in his Russian Anthology and to that of Kerner in Slavonic bibliography; his way was to give me these books. I learned only from others that in several such cases the expense of publication was defrayed by Coolidge himself. He also just showed me Langer's notes on books in *Foreign Affairs*, leaving me to draw my own conclusions. He chose the American contributing Editors of this *Review*, in which he allowed us to print his own verse translation of *The Demon* of Lermontov, written, as he told me, practically *d'un sol fiato* in a night at Naples during one of his earlier travels. When I came back from the West Coast to take part in the Conference at Williamstown, Sidney B. Fay, in spite of a considerable difference in our outlooks, chivalrously invited me to take his seminar one morning on Contemporary Russia. I was a little anxious as to how I should get on; but when we met, there I found Archibald Coolidge, who must have instinctively felt that I should like to have his support and had of himself taken train from Boston in order to sit next to me. Then in the afternoon he took me for a walk in which we settled with the most perfect ease every remaining question for our further co-operation, including the thorny one of transliteration which has given so much trouble elsewhere and in which Coolidge was himself the first authority in America as drafter of the plan of the Library of Congress. We made one simple concession from each side, and unity was for all necessary purposes achieved. This was Coolidge as I knew him. He came again to England in 1926 for the Congress of British and American Historians in London and was the ideal chairman at one of the most difficult of the debates, that on historical bias.

Coolidge, by his quiet and unceasing work, did far more in our field than we have achieved on our side of the Atlantic and has helped us greatly to achieve as much; and it is for that reason that his memory will always be before us as a model in all the policy and technique of Slavonic studies.

BERNARD PARES.

WYSPIAŃSKI

(1)

THE three leading Polish writers of the beginning of the 20th century, Kasprowicz, Żeromski, and Wyspiański, give in a sense a complete social image of their country. For Kasprowicz was a peasant;¹ Żeromski descended from the gentry and was in many respects representative of its character; and Wyspiański was a townsman. He was not only born and brought up in Cracow, but by his later life, by the greater part of his work and his inspirations he was closely connected with the tradition and with the atmosphere of his native town. It was a small and quiet town in his time, with no hint of modern commerce and industry. But it was full of art and historical memories, and Wyspiański, from his early childhood, absorbed the charm of old buildings and monuments.

He was born in 1869 as a son of a modest sculptor, who soon surrendered artistic ambitions for the sake of trade. But his workshop had an artistic atmosphere about it; it was situated beneath the hill of Wawel on which rises the historic castle of the Polish kings, as well as the cathedral in which these kings were crowned and most of them lie buried. The peals of the cathedral bells were heard in the sculptor's room. These views and sounds, and the room itself full of white statues of more than life-size were to form the little boy's imagination (as he himself confessed many years later in one of his lyrics). And to this influence, of course, the influence of the town itself must be added: with its medieval churches and renaissance houses, with its solemnities and popular feasts which attracted not only the local inhabitants, but also many people from villages near by, and made the market-place glitter with their coloured costumes, and the narrow streets resound with songs. All of it penetrated deeply into the memory of the future poet, as well as of the future painter. For Stanisław Wyspiański was to be not only a poet, but also a painter of high rank, and his importance in Polish art is perhaps even more considerable than in literature.

(2)

In his school days designing was his favourite study, and he was under the spell of the great historical painter Matejko, whose tableaux illustrated moments glorious and dramatic in Polish history. Accordingly, Wyspiański registered at the Cracow School of Art,

¹ See the present writer's essay on him in *The Slavonic Review*, vol. X, No. 28, p. 28.

and he found it possible to combine with these studies some courses at the university. For some years he seemed to be totally pre-occupied by art. He studied ancient architectural monuments of the country and aided Matejko in his work of restoring the 15th-century church of Our Lady. He made a long artistic journey to Italy, France and Germany (1890), and spent about four years in Paris. He was not much interested in contemporary debates on impressionism and *plein-air* painting. He was more affected by Puvis de Chavannes' frescoes, by the Japanese art, and by Gauguin. But he elaborated a style of his own, and already in the works of this early period made it apparent.

Painting was his first interest for some time, even after he had returned from abroad and settled down again in his native Cracow. Later on, his pictorial works were to share his artistic energy with poetry. Both these activities run parallel for a longer period. Only in his last years, when illness had made painting physically difficult for him did the balance swing over to poetry.

His artistic achievements ranged over stained glass, book illustrations, portraits, landscapes, stage designing and decorative art (chiefly furniture). All his works are highly memorable and original, although some of them bear traces of the bad influence of the contemporary "secessionist" manner. The stained-glass windows, most of them done for the Franciscan Church in Cracow, perhaps best express Wyspiański's daring fantasy. The subject of one of them is the biblical "Fiat" of the first act of Creation, and it is a majestic vision, gleaming with colours. Ascetic figures of saints in other windows are tinged with something really mystical. Still more striking are cartoons destined for the Cracow Cathedral and never executed in glass: princes and saints are represented there as crowned skeletons in royal purple or death-masks encircled with haloes, and yet their greatness and saintliness is manifest and imposing over the world of the living.

In vivid contrast with the grim character of these compositions are Wyspiański's flower motifs, so often recurring in his stained glass as well as in his wall paintings and cover designs for books; they are the very impersonation of health and vigour, and seem to reveal some rich and energetic fullness of life. There is no subtlety of detail in them; Wyspiański only brought out the most essential traits, but in these traits there is a masterly precision of design and an impeccable sense of construction.

Wyspiański's portraits (chiefly in crayons) are characterised by thick outlines which sharpen individual peculiarities of models in a

way sometimes approaching caricature. There is something acute and violent in their expressiveness. It is difficult, on the contrary, to imagine anything more delicate than his landscapes, executed in pastel technique, and perfectly adapted to it. The best-known of them is a series of pictures representing the same view from the painter's studio on the outskirts of Cracow—in different seasons of the year and in different hours of the day. In all his works there seems to be a clearly-marked intention to suggest something beyond the picture itself, something more than the means of plastic art, rich though they might be, are capable of saying directly.²

(3)

His fancy and his creative impulses, indeed, went far beyond the limits of pictorial art. From his very childhood he was an ardent reader; as a boy of ten he knew by heart long passages from Polish poets; at twelve he was already familiar with the *Divine Comedy* and Shakespeare. Some years later, while still a schoolboy, he made his first attempts to write poetry. He soon became acquainted with the works of Richard Wagner and his theories of musical drama. They charmed him. He began to dream of a new theatre which would be a union of poetry, architecture, painting and music. Of all these arts music alone proved to be technically inaccessible to him. But he planned some intimate collaboration with his friend and schoolfellow, the composer Opieński, and hoped that they could produce a sort of synthetic theatrical work by their joint efforts.

Appropriately to these ambitions, the first of Wyspiański's more mature literary endeavours had the form of opera librettos. Opieński was to complete them by music, according to the very detailed directions his friend gave him. Some of these directions were not so much in the manner of Wagner, but rather in that of Hector Berlioz and his "programme music." And, of course, it was soon evident to both artists that this kind of partnership is impossible. Wyspiański understood that he must work alone.

In 1897 for the first time one of his dramas was published. Without neglecting his activity as a painter, he claimed public attention more and more as a poet. He worked feverishly. At the time when his first book was being printed, an incurable disease declared itself in Wyspiański. He was doomed to an early death, and he knew it. He lived ten years longer, to die in November 1907. These ten years were a continuous stream of energy, and

² A succinct survey of his artistic activity has been recently given by Tadeusz Szydlowski (*Stanisław Wyspiański*, Warsaw, 1930).

astonishingly rich in achievements. Up to his very last weeks he wrote, and even tried to design—with a pencil tied to his fingers. He had much to say, and he felt he had no time to waste. A sense of the richness of life is always present in his writings as in his flower ornaments. And with it, the shadow of death is present also, as in his stained glass windows.

(4)

But not only time was lacking to Wyspiański. There were many other difficulties impeding his literary expression. As a painter he was not only gifted, but skilled and trained. In the field of literature his very gifts were strangely incomplete. His tendency to co-operation with music was instinctive in him. He felt that his purely literary means were too poor for his high aims. And so they were. There is a painful disproportion between his imagination and his diction. In the sense of "pure poetry"—as it has been defined in our days by Henri Bremond—it was satisfactory in rare moments only. His feelings for the resources of the language was not sure. His archaisms were often arbitrary. His neologisms were very often unfortunate. His metaphors were either weak or too complicated, so that he often abandoned them half-way. His syntax was sometimes obscure. His verse forms vacillated between classic patterns and something new, not quite definitely crystallised. We have proof that traditional forms could not serve him sufficiently in his epic rhapsodies (two of which only he published himself). It was the more evident because Wyspiański had chosen a stanza reminiscent of Słowacki, and the subject itself of the rhapsodies was connected with Słowacki's great poem, *The King Spirit*. The comparison from a purely formal point of view was crushing for Wyspiański. He probably felt it, and seldom reverted to the epic form. All the rest of his literary works, if we do not count some small occasional lyrics, were to be in the dramatic manner, which by itself passes beyond the limits of "pure poetry," as it requires the aid of the stage. But Wyspiański brought into this form a host of innovations, and created a literary kind and diction of his own as he created his individual external book format in which all his works were printed.

His creative ardour defied all obstacles, as it defied his failing health. In ten years he published seventeen dramas, and some unfinished fragments were collected after his death. In all of them passages are to be found which will irritate and discourage anyone who holds rigidly to the classic criteria. And yet Wyspiański is

unquestionably a great poet : probably a unique phenomenon of a great poet who was not a great writer. This strange greatness explains the strange fact that while many people are so completely refractory to his dramatic works, there are many others who do not seem to remark anything objectionable in them.³

His works being so numerous and so individual, it is impossible to deal with every one of them within the scope of a single essay. All that can be attempted here, is to give an idea of the most essential elements of his dramatic art and to quote each time a different play to illustrate them. This method seems to be the more allowable as there is a great internal unity in Wyspiański's works. They were all written in so short a time and the mood which underlay them was so constant in its essentials, that it would be hardly possible to trace a history of his mind after the chronological order of his publications

(5)

He never turned away from music altogether. Though he failed to express a larger part of his imagination by it, he made use of every literary means which approached to music, few though the points of approach might be. He likes onomatopœic rhythms. He is fond of repetitions. There are some passages in his works which seem to be constructed after the principles of Wagner's *leitmotivs* (and this is particularly striking because otherwise his style is rather concise and sparing of words). He introduced into some of his dramas popular airs which assured him an unmistakable effect of creating a certain atmosphere. Purely literary means of expression were thus supplanted with a great artistic economy.

One of his dramas is even called "a song," and bears the title *The Varsoviennne*, which is, indeed, the title of Casimir Delavigne's famous song, analogous to *The Marseillaise*, by which the French poet had saluted the Polish rising of 1830.⁴

Not only is this song sung several times during the play, but the whole drama is based on it and derives from the feeling it conveys; from 1830 onwards the song became popular and is regarded as one of the national songs of Poland. The scene presents the very moment when the song first came from France. It is the moment of a severe and crucial battle outside Warsaw. This coincidence is expressive

³ Examples of such wholesale enthusiasm may be found in Professor Roman Dybowski's *Modern Polish Literature*, and in Professor Stefan Srebrny's study on Wyspiański published in *The Slavonic Review*, vol. II, No. 5, p. 359.

⁴ An analysis of that drama is given in an excellent article by Miss M. M. Gardner in *The Slavonic Review*, vol. IX, No. 26, p. 361.

of a dramatic irony. Among people who are at the head of the rising there are old soldiers who had fought under Napoleon and were ready to die at his order; so confident were they of his goodwill towards their country. Now, when the very existence of this country is at stake and when help from France would be of such vital importance to it, they are sent no more than a song. This contains *in parvo* the tragedy of a whole period. And at the same time this romantic war-song is symbolic of the young generation which had, in fact, created the rising: of that generation, which has more imaginative feeling than power of will and real confidence in victory, which thinks more of a beautiful gesture than of the risks to which it exposes the nation. The actual words of the song breathe a foreboding of disaster. They are full of dramatic contrasts; they speak of "glory" as identified with "bloodshed," and foresee either "triumph" or "death" as the end of the revolutionary enterprise. By a simple repetition stress is laid on the possibilities of disaster, for we, the modern audience, know that the rising failed. It is of particular interest to observe how many purposes Wyspiański serves with this one song, although his method seems to be so very plain. He simply illustrates the song by scenes from life. We see young enthusiasts going to battle proud of their heroic stature, and we see the cold leader, who for the sake of a strategic diversion sends them to death without any firm belief in the necessity of such a hecatomb. But the tragedy of the moment is most fully mirrored by the opposition of the war song and a soldier come from battle. It is the last soldier of the sacrificed regiment. He brings a report to the general. He says nothing. There are no words in that scene. But if played by an actor who is equal to it, this is a scene of irresistible and tremendous effect. This silent rôle is duly regarded as one of the great parts in the Polish theatre. The song is played on the piano, and the soldier in a torn uniform passes through the room, with perdition in his eyes, and nearly falling from fatigue; an impressive contrast between real war and war literature. And this contrast is only prolonged and deepened in following scenes. There is a young girl whose fiancé has fallen in the last military operation. She guesses his fate, and suddenly realises the whole horror of the moment. Her own profound suffering makes her feel for all the nation. Like a new Cassandra she prophesies a catastrophe. And this terrible prophecy is accompanied by the notes of *The Varsovienne*, which is sung once again behind the scenes, leading fresh detachments to a new battle. It is easy to see that the meaning of the play passes far beyond the meaning of the popular song. Yet it is true

that this song proved to be for Wyspiański the principal vehicle of expression, and we cannot imagine how otherwise he might have reached his aim.

(6)

Another of Wyspiański's dramatic means are visions. An instance may be given by his most famous play, *The Wedding*. It is a satirical picture of the poet's own generation. The scene is in a peasant's cottage near Cracow. A wedding occurs, and an unusual one. An artist from the town marries a peasant girl. The event is regarded as a symptom of the new brotherhood of classes, and as a good omen for their union in the future. People of the town and people of the country meet on the stage. They appear, to the incessant dreamy tune of a dance, most often two persons at a time, and exchange opinions on every-day subjects as well as on the position of the nation and the community. The intellectuals are full of the sense of their importance as leaders. They quote noble *dicta*, and appeal to historic symbols of the past. And towards midnight, after all this flow of talk, visions appear to the most eloquent of the wedding guests: visions which correspond with the preoccupation of each. The Poet who wrote a dithyrambic poem about a medieval knight sees this knight face to face and realises the inadequacy of his feeling and his ideas. The Journalist is given a meeting with a wise Renaissance jester who convinces him of his own foolishness. The Painter (the host of the house) meets a bard of old to whom legends ascribed a prophecy concerning the destinies of the nation. He obtains a message from him. He is to be the leader in a great national resurgence. As a symbol and as a guarantee of his position, he receives a golden bugle; its blast is to be the signal for the great enterprise. All this forms the second act of the play. But in the third act the same people to whom intimations of great truths had been given by visions return to their empty *clichés* and petty amusements. The Poet is flirting and talking about literary effects; the Journalist is discussing whist, supper and evening dress; the Painter, after having scolded his friends, falls asleep, and forgets the mission with which he has been entrusted. The golden bugle is lost, though already some direct and simple peasants have heard its blast and gather around the spell-bound house. There is nobody to lead them. All the people in the house sink into a sort of lethargy and move drowsily in a sluggish wedding dance, like puppets in a dumb show. It is as if visions were really living, and living people rather leading a mock existence, subject to a fatality of their shallow interests, as puppets to their strings. This fatality is even personi-

fied here by a "man of straw"—the winter covering of a rose bush. If it is allowable to speak of the "leading idea" of a work of art as of something separate, we may say that the idea of *The Wedding* seems not absolutely to require these visionary means of expression. The satirical portrayal of a powerless generation loaded with reminiscences of a great past and bartering those reminiscences into petty phrases; the contrast of a weak and dreamy life with glorious and vigorous memories; all this could probably be seen in many different ways; but this one alone was the way of Wyspiański, in which he was able to convey his *poetic* view of the idea. It must be added that almost all the visionary figures in *The Wedding* are known to the Polish public, either from historic tradition or from art. So every one of them brings certain emotional associations with it on to the stage.

(7)

But visions of the type found in *The Wedding* are not the only type of fantastic *dramatis personæ* in Wyspiański's works. In some others statues from tombs, figures from tapestries and from pictures step down on to the stage and speak. Most often such fantastic characters derive from the locality of the drama and express its spirit. For the scene of action is always an important factor in Wyspiański's dramas. He represents it by diverse personifications which carry with them certain historic or legendary contents; he enriches these contents during the peripeteia by different and sometimes strange juxtapositions, and thus he achieves this particular texture of emotions and associations which correspond to his poetic aims. The results were theatrical expressions not to be compared with any others. We find a splendid example in *The November Night*, another drama of the Polish rising of 1830.⁵

Its historic content is simplicity itself. It is a succession of ten scenes presenting some of the events of the first night after the outbreak of the revolution, and in every one of them there is a foreboding of a disastrous end. But human actors mingle with Greek deities. Athene and Ares rival one another as in *The Iliad*. Persephone repeats her eternal mystery in the Warsaw Łazienki Park as if it were Eleusis. One of the ponds in that park is seen as the Styx, and Charon's boat appears on its waters. To place those mythological scenes against a landscape of a Polish autumn, to connect them with the events of 1830, and to surround them with

⁵ For an excellent analysis of this drama once more the article of Miss M. M. Gardner in *The Slavonic Review*, vol. ix, No. 26, p. 361, may be consulted.

a metaphysical atmosphere—this was to create a peculiar system of means of expression, combining the capacity for meaning of literature, the plasticity of sculpture, and a subtle suggestiveness similar to that of music. We shall find the reason for the introduction of all this Greek world in the classic statues and the classic architecture of the Łazienki palace and its park in Warsaw, and the fact that that park was the meeting place for the revolutionaries at the beginning of the rising. But let nobody think that Greek gods are here objective allegories. There is a symbolic and somehow “musical” relationship between the mythological character of the deities and the powers which are displayed in the rising. Persephone may repeat the mystery of her descent into the earth because the rising which is doomed to a fatal end is a sort of descent of the nation to the lower world. Sometimes even the mythical stories of the gods are combined with those of the human actors. Ares, for instance, finds a new Aphrodite, in the person of the young Princess of Łowicz, a woman with a very dramatic personal story, in many respects representative of her contemporaries, and in some measure representative even of her whole country. She speaks sometimes for Aphrodite, sometimes for herself, sometimes for the romantic youth of 1830, and sometimes for Poland. This is quite natural in the atmosphere of Wyspiański’s drama. A character obtains here the manifold significance of a musical phrase. Thus, in another way, a very personal one, Wyspiański returns again to music.

(8)

Of course, the effects of Wyspiański’s artistic methods fully manifest themselves in the theatre only. His dramas have to be seen on the stage. They are disappointing in those parts where they fall into normal informative dialogues. But suddenly a tune is sung, a rhythm changes, a statue speaks, a fantastic being appears, a wave of something irrational passes across the scene; and we feel that we are in the presence of an extraordinary artist. He was conscious of the importance of purely theatrical means for his works. He gave very detailed instructions for actors and very often himself designed the costumes and scenery.⁶

But it would be quite wrong to conclude that his imagination could move only in a fantastic world. He knew how to bring on to the stage the reality of life. The subject of *The Wedding* was

⁶ Specimens of his drawings of this kind are to be found in the great album of his pictorial work published in 1925 under the title *Dziela malarckie*.

suggested to him by a real wedding at which he had assisted. The bridegroom himself was one of Wyspiański's close friends. In the first version of the play personages were even called by their real names. And afterwards Wyspiański developed the idea of this play in another work, *The Deliverance*. To do this he introduced one of the heroic characters of romantic literature into the contemporary Cracow theatre and made him arrange there a *commedia dell'arte* which was to show the dreaminess and weakness of the new generation. The theatre is presented here in its bareness without decorations or setting. The hero meets workers, mechanics, actors and stage-managers and discusses with them technical points in the performing of plays, and at the same time problems and troubles of contemporary life.

Wyspiański was able to base his drama even on an ordinary event from the criminal reports in newspapers. Such is his play *The Judges*. The scene is set in a provincial Jewish tavern. A Christian maid-servant has been seduced by one of the innkeeper's sons. But now the old Jew is planning a rich match for this son, and the girl who has been betrayed stands in the way. And the difficulty is all the greater because she does not want money. Neither does her father, a beggar with a doubtful past, but ennobled by sufferings. He threatens the old Jew with the punishment of God both for the wrong done to his daughter and for injuries committed on himself. The Jews, father and son, decide that the girl must be done away with. And soon afterwards she is killed, but her murder takes place behind the scenes during a brawl between the young Jew and her brother, a soldier who has just come home on leave. Each accuses the other of the murder. The dying girl says nothing. A judge, assisted by two people from the village, comes down for the inquest. But they are as clumsy and limited as the representatives of justice in Shakespeare's *Much Ado about Nothing*. There seems to be no prospect of finding who is the murderer. But at that moment the younger son of the Jewish innkeeper enters the room, a delicate and artistically gifted child, the Benjamin of the family and their greatest hope. He has heard what his father and his brother have been planning. He sees the truth. And filled with the spirit of the prophets as he is, steeped in the atmosphere of religious visions, he cannot tolerate the crime committed in his own family. He denounces them, curses his father, and overpowered by the terrible weight of his own words, dies suddenly. The last scene is acted in silence. It can be fully expressed only in the theatre. A priest with the viaticum passes through the room, going to the dying girl,

followed by the old beggar who shuffles forward on his knees. And on the other side of the room the old patriarchal Jew is lamenting over the body of his best-beloved little son.

(9)

It has been many times observed, and with some justice, that Wyspiański's spirit as a dramatist has much in common with that of the ancient tragic poets. All his plays are penetrated with the sense of tragedy. It was in order to convey his tragic conception of life that Wyspiański employed all his artistic methods. Values at polar extremes: Triumph and Disaster, Merit and Guilt, Happiness and Renunciation, are united in the world he sees indivisibly and inevitably. The poor peasant girl in *The Judges* loves and hates her seducer at the same time; she loathes her surroundings, yet is unable to leave them; she cries, though ashamed of crying. But in this order of things there are not equal measures in the human sense. In *The Judges* the supreme justice is effected by the death of the most noble of all the characters. In *The Varsoviennne*, somewhat similarly, the best, those who are most ready to do their duty and to make voluntary sacrifices have to perish or suffer most. The same is true of *The November Night*, though here the sense of loss is allayed by the metaphysical assurance that everything must die which is to live in the future. *The Wedding*, though it has more of the character of a satirical comedy, is nevertheless tragic in its foundation, in the idea that what is actually alive in the community is futile, and what is strong is only a memory or a vision. The application of tragic laws to mythological and legendary heroes shows that they are valid for the highest and mightiest in the world. On the other hand, such a drama as *The Judges*, with its humble characters, seems to suggest that these tragic laws are omnipresent and invade every sphere where life exists. "Even over that den," says M. S. Kołaczkowski in his thorough study of the tragic spirit of Wyspiański,⁷ "over that abject nest of vile instincts, a vault of metaphysical governance is hung. Even in the most miserable dwelling, the same universal cause is displayed, there is the same account to settle between the things of earth and the things of infinity."

This was what essentially interested Wyspiański. He used to read his own interest even into the text of other poets. In his translation of Corneille's *The Cid*, he emphasised the metaphysical

⁷ Stefan Kołaczkowski: *Stanisław Wyspiański: rzecz o tragediach i tragizmie* (Poznań, 1923).

background of its tragic conflicts and introduced many of his own characteristic expressions, chiefly concerned with Destiny (which word in his vocabulary has rather the sense of tragic vocation). He wrote a curious study on *Hamlet* in which he developed a hypothesis that the version of *Hamlet* we know is the result of a compromise between Shakespeare's individual plan, the theatrical tradition of his days, and the taste of his public. The individual Shakespearean *Hamlet*, according to him, was to be a drama of readiness in the face of death. The central scene in it was to be that of the cemetery. "It was to show Hamlet's intelligence among the graves," to represent "his accord with them and with the other world—and the appeasement of his soul"; it was to exhibit "a *man* who has taken in his hands a *skull* . . . and looks into its empty eyes "

(10)

With his views on tragedy Wyspiański could do without realism. Scanty details were enough for him, if only symptomatic and suggestive. His drama, as a rule, is condensed and concentrated around one cause which involves the tragic element. That is the reason why he preserved in most of his works the traditional unities of the classics. They assured him a speed of movement and of climax which only threw into relief the tremendous power and inevitability of metaphysical forces.

Once again, these are not psychological tragedies, any more than they are realistic. There is, as a rule, only one thing that interests Wyspiański in his hero; it is his attitude towards the tragic element in his vocation, his "Destiny" as he most often calls it (though this term does not imply any fatalistic element in his conception). Thus, even statues can be his heroes, if only they are symbolic of something tragic. When historic personalities are his protagonists, he never bothers about chronological order. He looks usually at the life of a historical person as a whole and only accepts its essential dramatic line; he "turns it into a myth" (as Kołaczkowski puts it). Such, for instance, is Wyspiański's drama of Mickiewicz (*The Legion*); the time is the year 1848, but some of the earlier conflicts of Mickiewicz's life are also presented as actual, as well as some of his later tendencies; moreover, Mickiewicz here knows the tragic future of his ideas amongst later generations. This is typical of other cases. While concentrating his attention only on one group of dramatic facts in his hero's life, Wyspiański, on the other hand, prolongs the hero's drama far beyond the range of his time, and gives it interminable

perspectives which show up the more poignantly its universal significance. As an instance of this procedure of Wyspiański we may take one of his latest works, *The Return of Odysseus*, one of four dramas on classical Greek subjects.⁸ It is a tragedy of homelessness. Wyspiański does not keep to the Homeric version of his hero's story, any more than he keeps to the textual version of *Hamlet*. For him Odysseus is above all an incarnation of criminal instincts. And, in particular, a curse of patricide hangs over him. He knows his nature and he fears the curse. That is the reason for his wanderings far from his beloved island and his family. He is a voluntary exile, and we are persuaded that his fear is well founded. His return to Ithaca in its very first hours is marked by crimes. He kills the good old shepherd who sheltered him. He slaughters savagely his wife's wooers without any visible necessity for such cruelty. And when the old Laertes appears and denounces him as a bloody tyrant, we see he is one who might well kill his father. And this he himself realises. He has strength enough to repress his first criminal impulse; but he feels he cannot be sure of himself another time. So he leaves Ithaca, though he has yearned for it through long years, and though there is nothing dear to him outside this island. When victor over all obstacles, he goes away because he fears himself. To keep the calm of his soul, to free himself from his terror of the most horrible crime, he must resign all that is precious and valuable to him. And every future day of his life must be an effort to resist the temptation to return. The third act of the play projects his drama on to a plane of infinity. It becomes a symbolic tragedy of eternal human wanderings and hesitations. The hero is here no more the Odysseus of flesh and blood whom we have seen during the first two acts, with a club or a bow in his hands; he is now something like a ghost wandering without end. The yearning after his dearest land and the feeling of the necessity of exile become a perpetual conflict in his soul. This act is a series of soliloquies and visions. Fragments of Odysseus' earlier life are repeated. Chronology has no more meaning on this plane of existence. Calypso, the Syrens, a Harpy appear—all now receiving a symbolic value—to make of Odysseus' story an eternally revolving tragedy. Death alone can be its solution; and death, indeed, comes on the scene in the shape of the boat of Hermes. These are the theatrical means by which, once again, Wyspiański delivers his poetic message and makes us feel its lyric quality.

⁸ The others are . *Protesilaus and Laodamia* (the English translation of which is being published in *The Slavonic Review*), *Meleager* and *The Achilleus*.

(II)

For everything he wrote was highly personal. During ten years he constantly faced death, and he did not interrupt his work, although he might feel that it would not be given to him to express himself completely. And he was sure of his vocation. To live up to his "Destiny," to answer in action its inner call; not because of its force, but because of an understanding reached by gradual spiritual effort; that was the attitude which Wyspiański ascribed to Hamlet. This attitude of ripeness to accept his fate was his own conquest. It gave his life its magnitude. It resulted in a kind of light which permeates all his work. The presence of this light makes us often forget the shortcomings of his purely literary expression, which constitutes one more tragical element in this great tragedian.

WACŁAW BOROWY.

SLOVENE MYTHS¹

THE Slovenes are sometimes referred to as a people without a history. It is a misleading statement, and in view of its implications unjust. For centuries before the rise of the Frank Empire they enjoyed independence, had their own tribal principalities and organisations, and were—this much one can gather from the various traditions—a courageous people, but peace-loving and not aggressive. I take it that it is by no means settled whether the Southern Slavs were already more or less established in their present territory at the time of the Great Migration. Certainly they suffered much from the Huns and, later on, from the Avars during that age of unrest. It was Charlemagne, as the first exponent of the German "Drang nach Osten," who definitely occupied their lands in or about 802. As a matter of fact the Franks and Bavarians came to the Slovene lands for much the same reason (i.e. more or less by invitation) as the Angles and Saxons came to Britain. Southern Slav territory in the Eastern Alps and northern Adriatic littoral remained part of the Holy Roman Empire, subsequently became attached to the Habsburg lands and shared in all the vicissitudes of the Habsburg Empire until its dissolution in 1918. Its fate since then is modern history and lives in all our memories and knowledge.

Thus it came about that the most western of the Southern Slavs grew up under the permanent shadow of alien domination. But in the safe seclusion of little-known Alpine valleys old traditions and beliefs lived on in spite of political and religious oppression. Echoes and shadows of pagan divinities haunt you to this day on lonely *planine*,² by the shores of torrential rivers, about the orifices of unexplored caves, in the depths of forests practically virgin, and in every peasant custom.

In spite of the long centuries of German domination, the Slovenes preserved the old racial name, their language, and racial characteristics. They even (in later ages) developed a literature in the native idiom, and their sense of nationality was never quite obscured—all of which is a great testimonial to the vitality and tenacity of the Alpine Jugoslavs. Hence it is also not surprising that a fairly large stock of native myths, tales, and customs should have survived.

¹ *Bajke in Pripovedke Slovenskega Ljudstva*, edited by Jakob Kelemina. (Popular Myths and Folk Tales of the Slovenes. Published by the Družba Sv. Mohorja, Celje, Jugoslavia. Price, 46.- Din.)

² (Alpine pastures; the German "Alm"—not hills or mountains, as in Serbo-Croatian.)

It is only recently, however, that Slovene scholars have begun to take a scientific interest in this national treasure, and comparatively little was done to rescue it from oblivion. Every student of folk-lore knows how excessively difficult it is to collect material stored mainly in the memories of old men and women in remote villages and lonely cottages where ancient dialects are still spoken and the natives scarcely less shy of a stranger than the wild creatures of forest and mountain. In the former Austrian provinces of Jugoslavia there is the added difficulty that the culture of the educated classes was almost exclusively German and in itself constituted a regrettable barrier between them and their own people.

In *Bajke in Pripovedke Slovenskega Ljudstva* Dr. Kelemina has stored the results of practically all that has been done so far in the way of collecting Slovene myths and folk-tales in a single book, which is so highly compressed as to correspond to a much larger volume.

Dr. Kelemina groups his tales and myths according to subject, viz. I, Spirits; II, Fairies and Beings akin to them; III, Demoniatic Beings; IV, The Ruler of the Heavens; V, the World and World Order; VI, Heroic Themes. The motives and manner of his classification may not please everybody. Owing to the typical development of folk-lore the same entities appear in different categories, e.g. as divinities, then as fairies or demons, and finally as national heroes or notable enemies. But the entire book is in such a handy form, the wealth of information it contains is so vast and so liberally given, that this is a detail, besides being a matter of opinion. The sole and supreme purpose of the book is to rescue the traditions of the Slovene common people from oblivion and not at all to give literary shape or coherence to these traditions. Dr. Kelemina gives his material exactly as he found it, often in mere scraps and remnants of tales, not unlike the impression left by an imperfectly remembered dream, sometimes, but unfortunately all too rarely, in the form of coherent stories. The bald phraseology of Dr. Kelemina's narratives is not altogether a learned affectation. It corresponds to the slow speech and limited vocabulary of the original narrators. In actual life I have known such recitals supplemented by some simple gesture, impressively dramatic because of its brusque contrast with the subdued monotony of the narration. One day I was walking up the hillock in Kamnik, which is the site of the *Mali Grad*, and the old town clerk told me the story of the wicked countess who use to live there—the Snake Woman of the folk-tale. "May I be turned into a snake on the spot if I give a penny piece to the poor," said the

countess. And scarcely were the words out of her mouth than she began to turn into a snake, from her feet upwards. And when she was a snake up to her waist, she laid hold of the stone jamb of the door—here——” and suddenly the old gentleman fitted his hand into a natural hollow in the stone which exactly fitted the thumb and extended fingers of a human hand. Not a word, not a dynamic accent to stress the despair which gave the soft hand of a delicate lady strength to mould the stone like dough—only a pause to let me fill that in mentally for myself. Then he finished the sentence: “and the impression of her hand has been there ever since . . . But in another moment she was all snake and wriggled away into *this* hole——” Then he wound up regretfully: “The impression used to be much clearer; but some Croatian tourists chipped away bits of the stone and the thumb mark has lost its shape.” In this part of the world acts of tripper vandalism are for preference laid to the charge of Croatian visitors. It does not mean anything and the accusation is often unfounded, of course. I remember that when I was a small girl in Aberdeenshire we used to credit all visitors “*frae the sooth*” with corresponding enormities.

In compiling his book Dr. Kelemina has tapped every source available at present, modestly expressing the hope that others will continue the work he has carried on to this present point. His notes and bibliography occupy 27 pages in very small print. Of his authorities I will mention only three, not so much because of their importance for Dr. Kelemina's book as because they are the most likely to interest the average reader, and because every one who knows anything about Slovene Yugoslavia is already familiar with their names, viz., Valvasor, whose monumental work *Die Ehre des Herzogthums Krayn* (published in 1689) contains many references to Slovene beliefs and traditions; Fran Levstik, the centenary of whose birth was recently celebrated and who is by no means to be confused with the now living Vladimir Levstik, author of *Gadje Gnezdo* (An Adder's Nest); and F. Kocbek, whose *Savinjske Alpe* is an excellent guide-book for that Alpine range north of the Sava which is commonly spoken of in Ljubljana as the Kamnik Alps and as the Savinja Alps in Styria. This rugged mountain complex has to this day remained comparatively impervious to modern influences and the population on its habitable fringes is very conservative. Kocbek's book contains valuable information for the botanist, the geologist, and, above all, the folk-lore student, no less than for the mountaineer.

The first part of Dr. Kelemina's book consists of an Introduction,

which is, in fact, a monograph on the entire subject of Slovene mythology and folk-lore, and compresses a vast amount of exceedingly interesting information into the small bulk of 30 pages. With this compendious Introduction as a guide and the plain uncorrupted text of the myths and folk-tales as given in the body of the book it is possible to get a fair idea of Slovene mythology in olden times and of the beliefs and traditions in which its survivals are embodied to this day.

The most comprehensive collection of Slovene folk-tales previous to Dr. Kelemina's book was Kotnik's *Storije I*, published in 1924 by the Družba Sv. Mohorja. This book was compiled solely for scientific reference, and one of the purposes of Dr. Kelemina in writing his own book was to continue and supplement what Kotnik had begun. Another frequently quoted source is Štrekelj's collection of national ballads.

The word "bajka" is used in the sense of "myth" as generally understood, i.e. a tale dealing with pagan religious ideas, with gods and demi-gods. Very few true myths have survived among the Slovenes, the most important being that of *Kresnik* (or *Krsnik*), whose name Kelemina derives from the same root as that of the Slav word meaning "resurrection." This is most probably correct. Popularly, the name is sometimes connected with "kres." A "kres" is a bonfire, and more particularly the bonfire lighted on midsummer night. The original Kresnik was of divine origin, son of the Lord of the Universe, and delegated by him to be the special divinity and saviour of the Slovenes. With the advent of Christianity the divinity of Kresnik was explained away. He became the Slovene Prince of a legendary age, a scholar wise in white magic, and eventually a national hero, a peasant youth who fought the terrible Huns or Avars, the "dog-headed men" of Slovene popular tradition.

The old myths were set forth in verse and developed into ballads which were often of considerable length. Notable examples of Slovene national ballad poetry are the ballad of Triloglav and Marjetica, the ballad of Vida the Fair, and the heroic Kralj Matjaz cycle. The oldest of Slovene legends were all handed down in verse, and it was only after the poetic form was forgotten that the shorter, unadorned prose form took its place. In these ballads it is interesting to study the progress of the central figure from divinity to national hero. Folk-tales and fairy-tales represent later stages in the development, but, of course, in practice it is impossible to draw a hard and fast line between myths, folk-tales, and fairy-tales. Speaking generally one may accept Dr. Kelemina's definition that the true fairy-

tale has this in common with the myth, that its chief characters are likewise of the supernatural order. But the fairy-tale is more highly developed; the myth has become embellished, it has become art fiction, often with a definite distinctive style. On the other hand the topic of myth and folk-tale alike is a matter of fact for the people. The *Vile*, the *Povodni mož* (Water Man), the *Pošasti* (ghosts, apparitions), *Volkodlaki* (werewolves), and *vampires*, etc., are real beings and what is told of them took place—nay, perhaps still takes place—here in our midst, among those ruins, in that cave, that pool, that forest . . . The domain of the fairy-tale is the “Ninth Country” of Slav speech, the land for ever round the corner, where the rainbow ends, the realm of imagination.

The fact is that folk-lore was, and is, made and carried on by people belonging to types not easily understood and still more easily misunderstood by their fellow-creatures. The original myth, I take it, was created by sages who preferred to teach in parable. Later generations took the parable literally, and perhaps forgot the teaching. The supernatural element in folk and fairy tales is not exclusively due to the mythological background. Folklore is largely created and kept alive by poets and psychics. I use the term “psychic” without prejudice, so to say, in the sense in which it is generally employed, i.e. implying an ability to perceive matters not perceptible to the majority of people. All explanations of this are beside the mark here. If the Green Hunter has been seen by X or N in one of his traditional haunts in the glens of the Kamnik Alps that is good enough foundation for a new folk-tale about him. Presently someone with imagination will embellish the tale, and the oftener it is repeated and the more a romantic belief in it is diluted with a realisation of its physical improbability the less will the narrator scruple to elaborate and embroider it. Besides this psychic element there is that of outstanding historic events and persons, looming monstrous and shadowy in the far-away past. It is not absolutely certain when the Slovenes came to their present home. If the evidence of place-names goes for anything it was at a date far more remote than the usually accepted “some time during the 6th century A.D.” Confused traditions and distorted memories of their predecessors in the land haunt their folk-lore without giving anything like a precise clue as to the extent of time during which the two populations must have lived side by side, the Slavs growing stronger and more settled, their predecessors decreasing in numbers, retreating into mountain fastnesses, caves, and forests, and finally disappearing in so far as they were not assimilated. The Huns,

Avars, Hungarians and Pechenegs contributed a special chapter to Slovene folk-lore, which makes no distinction between these different peoples. The Slovenes were struck by the bulldog physiognomy of the ferocious Tartar invaders, and where we should speak of "simian" types they coined the term *pesoglavci*, i.e. dogheads. Their chief, of whom I shall say more later on, was (according to Dr. Kelemina) a legendary personality based upon the historic Attila.

As the folk-lore of the Slovenes is deeply rooted in the pagan mythology and religion of their forefathers, Dr. Kelemina has a good deal to say about both in his Introduction. The Slovenes believed in a large number of gods. Some of their most ancient divinities got lost, so to speak, during long wanderings before they reached their present home, and do not concern us here. To one deity with a triple aspect of "three heads" a certain pre-eminence was given, and to this divinity the Slovenes assigned the loftiest mountain in the land for his high seat and abode. If you ask a Slovene—any Slovene—who was the chief pagan god of his people the unhesitating answer is invariably "Triglav." And hereby it is not the mountain that is meant but the god, although in course of time the divine abode and the divine entity became more or less identified, especially for purposes of worship. Dr. Kelemina suggests that this chief divinity of the Slovenes was worshipped under the name of *Svarog* (Tvarog), Ruler of the Heavens. Svarog had a son, *Svarožič* (dim. of Svarog), also called *Božič*, i.e. Little God. The winter solstice was the festival of Svarožič or Božič. Dr. Kelemina says that to this day the yule-log is locally called "božič" by the Slovenes. The Yugoslav term for Christmas ("Božič"), therefore, goes back to pre-Christian times, and the Divine Infant of that festival was originally a pagan deity, whose very name and feast could be transferred without difficulty to the Christ Child of the new faith. Other divinities mentioned by Dr. Kelemina are *Netek*, *Jutрман*, *Kurent*, *Belin*, *Zora* (the Dawn), and *Deva* (sister-bride of the divinity of spring).

Opposed to the gods were the spirits of evil, *Bes*, *Črt*, *Vrag*, *Vedi*, *Mora*, and a host of other unpleasant beings. Of course, the terms "good" and "evil" are not used here with reference to any moral qualities but merely to indicate a friendly or unfriendly attitude towards mankind. As a matter of fact every spirit or divinity has a good and evil aspect, an obverse and a reverse, as it were.

Dr. Kelemina quotes a charming story of the Creation. He calls it pagan, but it is strictly monotheistic:—

From the beginning of things God slept. In the fullness of time

He awoke and looked about Him. And as He looked His glances created the visible universe. And God was so pleased with His work that He journeyed forth to visit it. But the journey was long, so that He grew hot and the sweat started from His brow. And as He returned to His own place a drop of His sweat fell to the earth, and from this drop the first man was born. Man is born of the sweat of God and in the sweat of his brow he must earn his bread.

Among these divinities, *Kurent* (Korant, Kore) was held in especially high honour by the Slovenes. He is essentially Slav and Aryan, and stands for the inextinguishable life-force which wanes only to wax again. He was associated with the moon, which is sometimes given as his ultimate abode. Popularly he was (one is almost tempted to say *is*) the god of merriment; but he was also the Slovene Dionysus. The vine was sacred to him. Tuesday was his day, and his season that which is now our carnival—a time of merry-making and courtship in preparation for the great revival of spring-time. It was from the moon that Kurent looked down upon the earth, when the Ruler of the World had overwhelmed it with the Flood because of the wickedness that prevailed therein. And there Kurent saw a man who had laid hold of a vine to steady himself in the midst of the waters. And Kurent was glad that the man should have turned to the plant that was sacred to himself. So he drew up the vine and caused it to grow right up to the moon. And the man climbed up the vine and was saved, and became the forefather of the Slovenes.

It is not illogical that in the last of the metamorphoses which the advent of Christianity caused this divinity to pass through he should take service with Kralj Matjaž as his armourer. For the great king and his host are not dead but only bound in magic slumber in the heart of a mountain until the supreme moment shall arrive when they will come forth to do battle once more in the cause of right and freedom. The new faith could deprive Kurent of his divinity but not of his vitality. In medieval fairy and folk tale we recognise him in the Mighty Smith, or the magic fiddler, to whose tune all the world must dance. He laughs at death, and sets Hell at defiance.

Specifically Slovene in this Jugoslav pantheon is *Kresnik* (Krsnik), and Dr. Kelemina claims for him that there is no figure quite like him to be found elsewhere. Kresnik has distinctly both a divine and a human aspect. In his divine aspect he was the god of the spring sunshine, of the great annual rebirth of nature. He was the dragon-slayer, who delivered his people and his sister-bride from the monster. He was really identical with Svarožič, and his true home

was in the Ninth Country, where he dwelt in the Golden Palace on the Crystal Mountain, and the apples of immortality grew in his garden. In so far as Kresnik was a *tribal* divinity he later on became "rationalised" into a great Slovene prince of olden time. He cleared the Slovene lands of monsters, slew the dragon (the dragon can still be seen in the arms of the city of Ljubljana) and delivered the Maiden (Deva, *Vesna*), his sister and fore-ordained spouse, from magic captivity. With her he lived happily and gloriously until he was beguiled into unfaithfulness and fell a victim to the outraged love of his wife. This legend has points in common with the Sigurd Saga. As a Slovene prince, skilled in magic but human, Kresnik was supposed to have lived at Vurberk, in Styria. As a matter of fact "Kresnik" is not a personal name but a term employed to designate the tutelary tribal demi-god, and it is a mystery name. The Kresniki were destined from birth for their mission as rulers and protectors of their tribe; they were instructed in magic by the *vile* and later on exercised their powers to defend their tribe against the attacks of hostile magicians, such as the wicked Count Vidovina, who appears in several tales given by Dr. Kelemina. After the introduction of Christianity the Kresniki were still credited with a knowledge of magic, but were supposed to have acquired it at the School of Black Magic in Babylon. Yet even as student of the Black Art Kresnik does not belie his original character, and usually plays the part of a generous and powerful friend of the poor.

Vesnik is obviously the deity of spring (*Vesna* = spring). Dr. Kelemina says of him that it is not at all easy to keep him separate from Kresnik. Judging by the material in Dr. Kelemina's book and the myths and legends about these two beings I think one might say they are two aspects of one and the same divinity. *Vesnik*, however, does not seem to have a human aspect at all. He is something of a Slovene Baldur. The advent of spring was his festival, which used to be celebrated about the end of April. He had a mortal foe in his own younger brother (sometimes it is a half-brother), who is referred to as *Jarnik*, would fain supplant him, seeks to slay him and usually succeeds. This brother is supposed to stand for the fierce midsummer sun which ousts the gentler sun of spring. He might be called the Slovene Phoebus, and like him his weapon was the bow and arrow, which in later ages he discarded for the gun. His feast was midsummer, and is still celebrated with much lighting of bonfires. When the Slovenes became Christians the legacy of *Vesnik-Kresnik*—spring festival, protectorship of the Slovenes, dragon, and all—was taken over by St. George, who in this capacity

is always called *Zeleni Jurij* (Green George). Dr. Kelemina is probably right in assuming that it is his jealous brother and supplanter who eventually evolved into the *Zeleni Lovec* (Green Hunter), hero or villain of innumerable tales and legends. As the mortal enemy of the patron of the land, the Green Hunter often even gets mixed up with the Devil. In any case the Slovene Devil is not black or red, but *green*. "A hundred thousand Green Ones!" is a common expletive. Dr. Kelemina complains that these three entities, viz. the genius of spring, the tutelary saint, and the Green Hunter (*Jarnik*) are apt to get hopelessly confused in Slovene folk-lore as regards their festivals and even their attributes. I venture to suggest that this may be partly the fault of the Slovene climate. In Alpine Slovenia, in especial, spring and summer are very often, to all intents and purposes, one season—a long, beautiful spring, cut short by our early autumn. Very rarely can the "Green George" of spring be celebrated on St. George's Day. The open-air entertainment at Ljubljana Castle, which is the chief attraction of the feast, is always advertised as going to take place "weather permitting." And as a rule the weather does not permit until a good deal later in the season.

One often hears of a "lost" goddess of the old Slovenes, *Živa* or *Siva*, goddess of Youth and Love. Although Dr. Kelemina does not even mention her, he gives much information regarding *Deva* (the Maiden) sister and spouse of the Sun Hero or the genius of spring, as the case may be. And he speaks of *Zora*, goddess of the dawn, and occasionally of the sunset, too. The Slovene, it must be remembered, has only one term for the red of the sunrise and that of the sunset. In the *Kresnik* Cycle, *Zora* is the daughter of the Snake Queen, i.e. the Night. In the pathetic folk-tale of *Zarika*, Queen of Spain in the West, and *Sončica* (Little Sun), her younger sister, who comes to her from the Land of the Morning, *Zora* (*Zarika* is only a diminutive) is surely the setting sun.

Netek is a restless, greedy person, but well disposed towards those who entertain him hospitably. Dr. Kelemina suggests that he probably stands for the terrestrial fire—or even for fire or the sun warmth in general.

One gains the impression that the personalities of many of the old Slovene divinities are exceedingly nebulous—possibly they always were so. Often it is impossible to determine whether two or more of them should be regarded as separate entities or as aspects of one. Probably it did not matter in the least at the time. The phenomenon is by no means unique in mythology.

The principal malevolent spirit (or spirits) went by the names of *Bes*, *Črt*, and *Vrag*. *Bes* is more or less forgotten, but *Črt* and *Vrag* are now two of the many names for the Devil, who quite naturally filled the same rôle with ill-will and all, when the Slovenes adopted Christianity. The Slovene hell, by the way, was originally not hot and red, but dark, cold, and somewhere underground on the far side of subterranean rivers. There is a suggestion of the cave world of the Slovene *Kras* in this ancient conception of hell. It was not a place of pain and punishment so much as a dismal abode where victims of enchantment languished in a sort of twilight death-in-life.

A personality as complex as that of the genius of spring or the young sun is that of his foe, whom Dr. Kelemina always (to simplify matters) speaks of as *Jarnik*, although in the different legends of the slaying he appears under different names. As the Green Hunter he is condemned to haunt the wild woods for ever. In this capacity he is decidedly what I for convenience sake (and in an entirely non-committal sense) prefer to call an elemental, and an evil one at that. But he must on no account be confused with the Wild Huntsman, who is Wodan and a German immigrant, a poacher in the preserves of the Slovene Green Hunter. The Green Hunter herds wolves as a shepherd herds sheep, wherefore he is sometimes called *Volčji Pastir*. It is because of him that the Slovene Devil is usually supposed to be green.

Dr. Kelemina is of opinion that the well-known folk-tale of *Zlatorog* is a variant of the myth of *Vesnik* and *Jarnik*. The good divinity appears in the form of the golden-horned buck chamois *Zlatorog*. His enemy and would-be slayer is the young hunter. In this case it is the hunter who is destroyed. Nevertheless, the region where the slaughter of *Zlatorog* was to have been compassed is laid waste and doomed to barrenness.

As time went on, the Green Hunter evolved into the Warlock Marksman (the German *Freischütz*), who by blasphemous spells possesses himself of bullets that cannot miss. Slovene folk-lore knows no end of tales about the Devil and the Green Hunter. Dr. Kelemina gives the gist of some of the most characteristic.

A place among the divinities should be accorded to the *Sojenice* or *Rojenice*, who correspond to the Greek Fates or the German Norns. One might call them the Queens of Destiny or Birth. Judging by the destinies these mighty ones usually allotted to the unfortunate infants over whose birth they presided, they should either be classed with the malevolent divinities or regarded as an expres-

sion of Slav pessimistic fatalism. Nevertheless, piety and common sense were sometimes too strong for fate. The lad who had been taught to undertake all that he did "in God's name," could not end as a melancholy suicide. The youth who would sooner trust himself to God's will in an open field than to the refuge of a strong tower of iron and stone was not slain by the flash of lightning that was to have brought death to him. But the strong tower was struck and reduced to atoms. Somebody, it seems, had got quite a good idea of what attracts lightning.

Speaking of inevitable destiny or innate fate, one might as well mention in this connection the curious popular custom—it amounted to a law—which decreed that if ten sons, no daughter between, are born to the house, the tenth, i.e. the youngest, was turned out into the world to shift for himself. The same thing applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to the tenth daughter. That such *desetniki* or *desetnice*, compelled to lead what is more or less the life of a pariah, should eventually develop a roving and eccentric disposition was only natural. The result is that a person of restless temperament is often spoken of as a "tenth brother." The type is not uncommon among the Slovenes, and accounts for their being found, like the Scots, among immigrants and colonists all the world over.

It is not easy to draw a dividing line between former pagan divinities and a host of good and evil spirits who possess supernatural powers but cannot lay claim to divine rank. For the great majority of spirits Dr. Kelemina employs the collective Serbian term *zduha* or *zduhač*, a word intended to convey that the spirit—*duh*—can leave its body and go about business of its own without it, usually evil business and at night. A Slovene cognate term is *dahovina*, which conveys the idea of exhalation. Our old acquaintances the werewolves and vampires come into this category. According to Dr. Kelemina, even the great and good Kresnik, being restless in his grave, became a vampire after death. I wonder whether Bram Stoker got hold of something of this when he built up his novel *Dracula* out of the miscellaneous legendary material about vampires. The belief that even a person who was virtuous in life may be a noxious vampire after death may be based on the experience that it is unwholesome to meddle with spirits. "The ghost of the living is good, but the ghost of the dead is evil," said a Japanese friend to Lafcadio Hearn, precisely with reference to vampire manifestations. The Dead Lover, who comes by night for his sweetheart and wants to carry her off to the grave with him, has something in common with the vampire.

An interesting class of unpleasant beings are the *Vedomci*. A Vedomec is a human being, but born to become an evil warlock, just as a Kresnik is born to become a protector of men. The first peculiarity of a Vedomec is that he is born feet foremost. A newborn child may even be saved from the fate of growing up into a minister of evil by being passed into the bake-oven immediately after the new bread has been baked in it, and then passed out again head foremost. Or the child may be passed head foremost through the loops of a twisted vine. I fancy this ceremony is intended to represent a corrected birth. The association with bread and wine may be Christian or pre-Christian. It must be remembered that the vine was sacred to Kurent, always the great friend of man. In later life the Vedomec may be known by his heavy black eyebrows, and, according to some traditions, by his smooth, beardless face as well. There must be a reason why this particular type was fixed upon, but this is not the place for me to go into that.

The Vedomec—there is a female of the species as well, by the way—is a cross between a warlock and an evil elemental. At night his spirit leaves its body and he forgathers with others of his kind in hideous merrymaking, usually at a cross-roads. The Vedomci, male or female, flourish blazing torches; they butt each other like goats, and finally indulge in an unholy repast. Their favourite dish is human blood. If some unfortunate mortal should come across a pack of Vedomci at their nocturnal gathering, they catch him, skin him, and devour his flesh. Then they toss the bones about. In the end they collect the bones, piece them together, stuff them back into the skin, and restore their victim to life. But it will be a pallid, exhausted traveller, with a confused memory of ghastly happenings, who will continue his journey in the morning. If, however, he should carry some pointed object with the name of Christ engraved upon it, and cut the sign of the Cross on the ground with it, the Vedomci would have no power over him.

One of the local names for a sorcerer is *Vidovina*, the name of Kresnik's arch-enemy. All names for these warlock beings—*vešče*, *vida*, *vidovina*, *vedomec*, etc.—hint at *knowledge*, and perhaps *apparition* as well. Bald persons used to be suspected of being Vedomci who had butted off their hair at their nocturnal entertainments! Black-browed persons were also suspect, and, of course, sleep-walkers.

The *Mora*, our *nightmare*, is the best known of a class of evil spirits who seem to have no occupation or aim in their existence save to oppress people in their sleep.

A notable gathering-place of witches was Slivnica Hill, near Cerknica, famous because of its beautiful periodic lake. There is a cave near the top of the hill where the witches were supposed to brew the weather—mostly bad weather, of course

A mysterious figure, dignified and not at all unattractive, is the Snake Queen, in some legends called Dark or Sorrowful Mara. Her kingdom was the kingdom of twilight or night, perhaps of death. She possessed a wonderful crown which was coveted by the princes who ruled in daylight. Her steward was a serpent with a dragon's head—Kačec. The rape of the Snake Queen's crown is a favourite theme in Slovene folk-tales; but only a hero of exceptional mould could hope to come through the adventure successful and alive. The daughter of the Snake Queen was almost as desirable as her crown. Query: is the Snake Queen in any way related to Mozart's Queen of Night in *The Magic Flute*?

Snakes are, anyhow, uncanny creatures. In Slovene folk-lore we sometimes find a snake as mystic guardian of the home, a good familiar who must on no account be harmed. Is it perhaps the vehicle of the spirit of some ancestor? On the other hand, heartless princesses and other noblewomen have a way of getting themselves turned into snakes. Snakes are sometimes guardians of treasure.

Finally, the Slovenes have tales of haunted spots, especially caves or castles or ruins; of ghosts doomed to guard treasure until some chosen mortal shall break the spell, inherit the treasure, and leave them to rest everlasting; of ghosts of unbaptised children, of familiars and spooks of all sorts of appearances and kinds.

Fairies and goblins form a special chapter, and a very rich one, in Slovene folk-lore. A goblin is called *Škrat*. The *škrati* are little fellows, not unlike our brownies. They know all about the wealth that is buried in the earth. Because of their underground interests they every now and again get mixed up with the Devil, which is neither just nor correct. But you can make a pact with a *Škrat* to supply you with worldly wealth (gold and gear) and you will do better with him than with the Devil, because at the worst he will only stipulate for your shadow; he has no use for your soul. It is true that persons who have bartered their shadow away to a *škrat* are apt to go off in a decline, but his power over them does not extend beyond death.

Speaking generally, fairies and goblins correspond more or less to the nymphs and fauns of the Greeks. They are pure elementals, who never were and never will be human. Fairies are sometimes called *Vile* (the usual Yugoslav term), sometimes *Božje deklice* (God's

handmaidens), *Bele žene* (White women, or rather ladies), *morske dekllice* (mermaids), and very often *žal žene*. The word *žal* is a corruption of the German word *selig*; a *žal žena* is therefore one of the blessed, the beautiful, and the term implies much the same sort of meaning as *Božje dekllice*. Dr. Kelemina says that all the fairies were originally water fairies, and that their queen is the spouse of the Ruler of the Universe and the prototype of all fairies. Here one finds oneself looking down a fascinating vista of mystic possibilities, which cannot be explored here and now. Common to all fairies is a radiant appearance.

The Slovene fairies often take an interest in human affairs. The White Ladies of the Triglav Range taught the Slovene settlers various arts of peace. Of course, they knew all about the herbs that grow in the forest and on the mountains. Sometimes a fairy would fall in love with a handsome mortal—farmer or hunter. The lucky man was usually bound over to keep the origin of his sweetheart (or wife) secret, on pain of losing her for ever. But the fairies were usually kind, and did not quite desert those to whom they had once given their love.

The Wild Men of the woods—*Divje Možje*—were often associated with the *žal žene*, or fairies. But they were savage, uncouth fellows, even suspected of cannibalism and of having dealings with the Wild Huntsman. Perhaps some of the tales about the lovely women and wild men of the woods are not so much legends of supernatural beings as garbled traditions of real men and women, of alien race, inhabitants of the sequestered glens and sheltered forests of the mountain ranges which the early Slovene settlers—thus much is abundantly clear from all their folk-lore—regarded as impenetrable and impassable for ordinary mortals.

A well-known Slovene elemental is the *Povodni Mož*—the Water Man of many a river, lake, or mountain tarn. A variant of the most widely spread legend of the Water Man is very pathetically told in Matthew Arnold's *Forsaken Merman*. Even the name of the merman's bride—Margaret—is correct. In Slovene folk-lore almost all the maidens and princesses who are kidnapped or kept prisoner by dragons, winter and water demons, sorcerers or demon lovers, etc., are called *Marjetica*, i.e. Margaret or *Daisy*. Could the bride of the genius of spring or of the sun have a better name?

The Water Maidens, too, incline to fall in love with human beings. Does anybody still read de la Motte Fouque's *Undine*? Because there we have the typical story of a Water Maiden who wedded a human-being. Of course, the legend as it is handed down

by the people is not nearly so elaborate; but the gist of it remains the same.

The Slovenes around Udine (*beneški Slovenci*) know a very unpleasant type of female forest elementals, the *Krvopetlje* (Reversed Heels). Their feet are reversed—hence the name. They cause storms, steal children and eat them, and they live in caves.

Demons form a class by themselves in Slovene mythology and its legitimate development, folk-lore. Dr. Kelemina deals with them in one chapter with the giants. They have the monstrous stature in common, and the nebulous, overwhelming presence. Apart from that, and according to origin, they belong to widely different categories.

Some of the demons are unquestionably divinities. Their demoniac quality is not intrinsic but due to the way in which they are regarded by men. First in this order I should place the *Bela Žena*, who was at once the Queen of the Water Fairies, the Great Mother, and Spouse of the Ruler of the Universe. In all Slovene mythology I have found no image more grand or full of occult significance than that of the White Lady, as she washes her silvery feet in the clear spring by moonlight, on Christmas Eve, the night Our Lord is born, and the water is turned to wine about her feet.

Dr. Kelemina finds in the legend of Vida the Fair of Slovene and Croatian ballad poetry traces of a moon myth. Vida herself is the inconstant moon, and yet another aspect of the Spouse of the Ruler of the Universe. His reasons for this theory are quite convincing, but for the ordinary reader the ballad of Vida the Fair is interesting and attractive without any mythological interpretation.

Of a different, lower order are demons who obviously represent the untamed forces of Nature—elemental catastrophes or disturbances. *Ježi Baba* and *Jaga Baba*—the lady has several names and all of them indicate rage and hurry—is a storm fiend. All the winds are demons. From some tales one gathers that each day of the week has its genius or demon, which may be propitiated by honouring that day. The honour, be it noted, consists in not doing any work! *Torklja* or *Torka*, a horrible female demon who tears her victims to pieces and devours them, belongs more or less to this class; she has power over women who spin on a Tuesday. Legends of these demons are purely nightmarish, and remind me of Japanese demon stories as rendered by Lafcadio Hearn. They are winter fireside stories, and intended to make the flesh creep. *Mokožka* is a marsh demon. Mrs. Ivana Brlić-Mažuranić introduces her in one of her fairy tales in *Priče iz Davnine*.³

³ *Croatian Tales of Long Ago*. Allen & Unwin.

Vuorek is identified by Dr. Kelemina with *Orko* (*l'Orco*). He is also called *Podlegaj* by the Slovenes, from his trick of manifesting himself as a small beast of burden, a little donkey who gets between the legs of the benighted traveller and wants to be ridden. Once the man is astride the creature grows and grows . . . The remedy is to put a bridle or at least a halter on him, when he at once becomes tame and manageable. Dr. Kelemina suggests that *Orko* (*Vuorek*) possibly represents sudden gusts of wind. Judging by the kind of spot haunted by *Orko* I incline to think that he stands for the mountain streams that are apt to grow suddenly from tiny brooks into torrential rivers, but can be made useful to man if their power is properly harnessed. I was given a very fine version of the *Orko* story at Orebić (Peljesac, Dalmatia), with all the proper atmosphere and detail. A certain type of dragon is rightly classed with these demon elementals. They haunt caves, causing the subterranean waters to burst forth; earthquakes and thunderstorms are their work.

An interesting entity connected with natural phenomena is *Škopnjak*. He is primarily a meteor—a “falling star.” The Jugoslavs say that when a star falls somebody dies. Hence *Škopnjak* is a harbinger of death. He is also especially dangerous to babies, whom he likes to smother, or steal and exchange. He is supposed to fly across the sky on a blazing broomstick. His name is derived from *Škop* = a sheaf of corn. In some parts of the country it is a Shrove Tuesday custom to fix a sheaf of corn on a broomstick and then set fire to it.

Some giants are likewise elementals, for instance, the mountain giants. They pile up rocks, and so build up the mountain ranges. They are enormously strong, and if they choose to assume normal human proportions and to associate with ordinary mankind they get through a prodigious amount of work and display an appetite to match. With few exceptions they are a good-natured lot. The most recent version of various giant legends is the story of Martin Krpan, the strong man of Holy Trinity on the Hill. Fran Levstik's rendering of the story is exquisitely humorous and altogether masterly. It is one of the most delightful classics of Slovene literature.

Of a totally different order were the legendary “giant” peoples—the Ajdi, Romans, and Greeks (*Rimljani* and *Grki* or *Graki*), and the tales about them should often be classed for preference with what I have called distorted or garbled historic tradition. Of the Ajdi very little is known in fact, except that they built duns and

barrows. I am not an expert in the precise nomenclature of these structures, but I know that similar works at home are usually called by those names. The Slovenes were good farmers, a stock-raising and agricultural people, but had no idea of engineering. The "castles" of the Ajdi, the high roads of the Romans, and the massive masonry attributed to Greek and Roman troops and colonists, seemed to them too large to be the work of ordinary mortals; so they assumed these peoples to have been giants and have fathered a number of giant legends upon them.

The territory of the Slovenes is remarkably rich in unusual geological and geographical features. Of course, these have given rise to very many legends in which the origin of these freaks of nature is ascribed to supernatural agencies. Usually they are the work of witches, warlocks, or even the Devil himself. Sometimes they are due to a divine miracle. Of this type are the legends of the petrified woman not far from Bled (the Slovene Frau Hitt); of the Stone Hunter above Sv. Primož, near Kamnik; of the Devil's Wood above Kranj; the story of the Lovers of Cerknica (a Slovene version of the tale of Hero and Leander), and that of the origin of the Blood Pool near the summit of Krvavec (1,900 m.), near Kranj, with its semi-historic background, and any number of other tales.

The legends of the Flood might be included here. Dr. Kelemina quotes two. In one of them the pagan god Kurent plays a leading part, the other perhaps betrays a Christian influence. The description of the Slovene Flood is strikingly like the annual filling of any one of the periodic lakes of the Kras, only on a grand scale.

By the adoption of Christianity an entirely new set of names and personalities was introduced into Slovene legendary lore. In many cases the parts remained the same, and only the actors were changed. The Slav pagan thunder god was Perun. His place was taken by Sv. Ilij (St. Elias), doubtless because of the fiery chariot in which the prophet went up to heaven. Sv. Ilij loves to make play with the heavenly artillery, and therefore none of the saints or angels will tell him when is his name-day; because he would celebrate it with such a letting off of thunderstorms that the very babes in the womb would be shaken up! Are we to suppose that they would get *addled*?

A very curious legend, in which Christian and very ancient pagan elements are inextricably mixed, is attached to Sv. Matija (St. Matthew). He is not at all our St. Matthew the Evangelist. At his birth the Rojenice foretold of him that he would slay his father and mother. In spite of all precautions taken by the youth, who

was of a pious and gentle nature, the hideous prophecy was fulfilled to the letter, of course quite unintentionally. As a penance for this, his only crime, which he abhorred and had no desire to commit, Sv. Matija was commanded by God to build the "Roman" bridge, i.e. the rainbow. The epithet "Roman" is here tantamount to "titanic." During the building of the bridge the Devil made a supreme effort to get the saint into his power. Sv. Matija certainly outwitted the Evil One, but in revenge the Devil broke away the half of the bridge . . . and nobody has ever been able to replace it. And that is why we can never reach the spot where the rainbow ends, and there are so many precious things to be found there! Both Sv. Ilij and Sv. Matija are meteorological saints, so to say, but the real clerk of the weather is St. Peter. When we are told of a Barbara or Perperuna who produces rain or otherwise influences weather, I fancy we have to do with a being to whom the name and functions of Perun were transferred in a somewhat garbled fashion.

Among legends which belong distinctly to the Christian era while preserving pagan elements, Dr. Kelemina quotes one which would have delighted the heart of the old Scottish minister who concluded his prayer with the appeal: "An' noo, ma freens, let us pray for the Deil; there's naeboddy prays for the puir Deil." Because in this tale the Devil is not only converted but redeemed and brought back to salvation. But he is no longer the cold, green Devil of ancient Slovene folk-lore; he is a red Lucifer in a flame-red palace, and there are points about the story which recall the Tannhäuser legend.

With the establishment of Christianity in the Slovene lands we are well in historic and even comparatively recent times. In folk-lore we find legends which have an historic foundation, and new versions of old myths in which these have been elaborated into fairy tales or rationalised into stories about real or imaginary historic personages or events.

The historic era begins with the Coming of the Huns, extends over the subsequent ages of Avar predominance, the Frank occupation, which led to the German domination, the Turkish wars, and the slow preparation for our own age. To Slovene folk-lore it contributed, besides a host of lesser ones, one figure of titanic proportions and quality, *Kralj Matjaž*. The historical Kralj Matjaž was Mathias Corvinus, of Hungary, famous for his administrative genius and his successful campaigns against the Turks. Mathias Corvinus was adopted whole-heartedly by the Slovenes as their national hero. At the end of his reign, Kralj Matjaž did not die, but—like others of his kind—he retired into a mountain where he

sleeps unto this day with his Black Host of warriors around him. When the Mighty Smith had done with this earth there was no place for him in heaven and the Devil would not have him. So he betook himself to his old master, Kralj Matjaž, in the mountain, and there he still is, fashioning arms against the day when they will be needed. For the day will come when Kralj Matjaž will issue forth from the mountain with his host. He will defeat the enemies of the faith of his people, and all will be well. Some say that when the end of the world will be at hand . . . within seven years . . .

So far as I have heard, the king sleeps in at least four mountains. We in Upper Carniola (and the mountaineers and ski-runners in particular) favour Mount Bogatin as his residence. It should be noted that all his mountains are important strategic points on the Slovene frontier.

Beyond being a legendary enlargement of his historic self, Kralj Matjaž is undoubtedly the shadow and latter-day counterpart of Kresnik, of the tribal god, from the dawn of a people's memory until—yes, to this very day.

Dr. Kelemina suggests that the opposite to King Matjaž was an equally remarkable semi-historic personality, to wit, the King of the Dogheads. It seems safe to assume, with Dr. Kelemina, that the historic character underlying that of the legendary King of the Dogheads was Attila, the Scourge of God. Most of the legends and traditions about him quoted by Dr. Kelemina in his book are taken from the Italian border or from Croatian tradition. It does not follow at all that the Slovenes had no traditions about him. It seems more likely that they are lost or have not yet been traced again. Unfortunately, Dr. Kelemina suggests no explanation why, in one legend, the chief of the Dogheads should bear the name of *Marko*. It is not a Slovene name. In view of the origin of the legend quoted, it may be connected with the patron of Venice—another arch-enemy of the Slavs—but certainly has nothing whatever to do with the Serbian national hero, Kraljević Marko. The King of the Dogheads, whether Attila or Pes (i.e. "Dog") Marko, is the typical Tartar as the Slovenes saw him. The Goths believed the Huns to be descendants of witches who had been banished into the desert and there had unholy intercourse with the demons of the wilderness. The Slovenes fully endorsed this view, and the Tartar king was to them not only a man with a canine cast of countenance but the accursed offspring of an unhappy woman and a dog.

It is in this category of semi-historic tales and traditions that Dr. Kelemina gives several versions of the theme of the Maiden's

Leap. The site of this act of desperation is always a great cliff rising sheer from the water. The origin of the story may be threefold : we may be dealing with a true myth with occult significance, with a legend which is a "rationalised" version of the myth, or even with an historic incident, the three elements being inextricably blended in one narrative.

A curious mixture of archaic features and relatively modern detail appears in tales in which the (German) noble is almost invariably the ruthless tormentor and oppressor of the (Slovene) serf. As often as not, the wicked nobleman is the Devil himself in a new guise.

Finally, Dr. Kelemina has something to say about superstitions. He mentions the curious belief that fern seed, especially if come by unwittingly, confers the power to understand the speech of animals.

Of course, one meets a fair number of old friends among these popular myths and tales of the Slovenes ; but I, for my part, have found fewer than I expected. The story of Big Claus and Little Claus (only the names are naturally not the same) occurs in a form very similar to that given to it by Andersen. Several tales are to be found in Grimm's collection. Kurent's vine was surely grown in the same nursery garden as Jack's beanstalk. One or two giants are ogres of the familiar "Fee-fo-fum" species. But one is struck by the fact that very few of the tales have a happy ending. Over and over again, the fortunate one who ought to have raised the treasure and broken the spell that binds its guardians loses courage at the critical moment and the golden opportunity is gone for ever. A people ignored and belittled, at the worst hewers of wood and drawers of water for their overlords, and at the best held in political and intellectual tutelage, knew little of the "living happily ever after" which is the ideal conclusion for fairy-tales. One misses the exquisite optimism of the *Beauty and the Beast* or *Cinderella*. Only one tale in Dr. Kelemina's book is reminiscent of these, and that is the lovely story of Kozorog, the young count with the Steinbock's horn.

I have not even attempted here to do more than give an indication of the wealth of material collected and hinted at in Dr. Kelemina's book, despite its modest dimensions. Still less should this paper of mine be taken as the work of an expert in Slovene folk-lore, although in writing it I have had the benefit of assistance from Slovene friends who are well versed in the traditions of their people. In compiling his book Dr. Kelemina has undoubtedly rendered an inestimable service to the cause of folk-lore study among his

immediate countrymen and to lovers and students of folk-lore all the world over.

A slightly abridged English version of Dr. Kelemina's interesting Introduction, with footnotes by myself, will appear shortly in *Folklore*.

Mrs. Ivana Brlić-Mažuranić's *Croatian Tales of Long Ago* (Allen & Unwin) give a valuable insight into mythological traditions among the Jugoslavs of the north-western part of the kingdom. Several of the Slovene ballads, notably that of *Vida the Fair*, have been translated into English by Mr. James Wiles.

FANNY S. COPELAND.

THE following are two of the most characteristic of Slovene Folk Tales, in so far, especially, as they deal with specifically Slovene traditions.

My translation of "Zlatorog" follows the version given by Dr. Kelemina in his *Bajke in Pripovedke Slovenskega Ljudstva* pretty closely, and wherever my text differs from his, it is because I have preferred to make use of local tradition, obtained from friends who are well acquainted with it.

In my version of the "Desetnica" I have combined Dr. Kelemina's text with that of Miss Manica Kumanova, so as to embody all the most characteristic moments of that *motif*. I am assured, on good authority, that the "tenth brother" and "tenth sister" were *compelled* to leave home, and that there was originally no question of their leaving—as both Dr. Kelemina and Miss Kumanova assume—of their own accord, and because of some mysterious wander fever on their own part. The traditional temperament of the "tenth brother" was the result of the custom, not the cause of it. In my English version I have carefully avoided ambiguity on that score.

ZLATOROG

(A Slovene Folk Tale)

THREE thousand feet above beautiful Lake Bohinj in Upper Carniola lies the high-level valley called *Zajezerska Dolina*, which means *The Valley of the Lakes*. The upper part of it, in especial, is a sad wilderness, all limestone rocks and boulders, like an immense untidy furrow ploughed all the way down the southern slopes of the Triglav Range. It is the track of the prehistoric Triglav glacier, and the "lakes" from which the valley takes its name are little

glacier lakes, wan waters at the bottom of stony hollows. From this valley you look out over the *Komna*, a rolling table-land to the southwest of the Triglav Range. The name of *Komna* is derived from *kamen* = a stone. The *Komna* is a great arid limestone plateau, shut in between the summits of the Triglav Range in the north and east, and a serried chain of its own peaks along its western edge. The most beautiful of these is called Bogatin (1,900 metres or about 6,500 feet), i.e. the Rich One. At the bottom of a cave in the bowels of this mountain there lies a fabulous treasure, guarded by a hundred-headed dragon. The approach to the cave is difficult and dangerous, nor can any one perceive it unless he be possessed of the sole talisman that reveals it. So the treasure is very hard to come by.

Once upon a time the Zajezerska Dolina and *Komna* were not barren and desolate, but an Alpine paradise of forest and pasture, the domain of the *Bele Žene*, the White Ladies. These White Ladies were very wise and kind. They told the men of the villages when to sow, and what crops, and where. They taught shepherds the use of the many medicinal herbs that grow on the mountains. They were good to the poor, and, above all, they were helpful to women in childbirth. And the child that was born under their auspices remained under their protection all its life.

But although the White Ladies were so kind to human beings, they resented curiosity or interference. Any overbold mortal who ventured into their realm was sure to be driven back by sudden storms or avalanches of stones.

On their Alpine pastures these White Ladies tended a herd of wild goats (chamois). They were not mousy-brown, like the pretty chamois you can see nowadays with luck almost any day in the Slovene Alps, but milk-white. The great buck chamois who was in charge of the herd was white, too, and his horns were pure gold. Therefore he was called *Zlatorog*, which means *Goldenhorn*. Now the golden horns of *Zlatorog* are the key that reveals the way to the treasure in Mount Bogatin, the treasure that is guarded by the hundred-headed dragon. Therefore the White Ladies thought it well to protect *Zlatorog* by magic arts. He was not exactly invulnerable, but from every drop of his blood that fell to the ground, if he chanced to be wounded, there grew up immediately a beautiful little flower with dark-green leaves and crimson blossoms, the Triglav Rose.¹ And no sooner had *Zlatorog* eaten of the leaves than he was whole and sound as before.

¹ According to an old Slovene botanist, the "Triglav rose" is *potentilla nitida*, which is fairly common on Triglav.

Once upon a time, long ago, there stood an inn beside the high road that runs up the Soča² Valley to this day, and the innkeeper's daughter was the prettiest girl in all Trenta-side. She had many wooers, but had given her heart to a young hunter of the Trenta. He was the only son of a poor widow who was almost blind; but he was the best hunter and tracker far and near, and it was said that he stood under the protection of the White Ladies. Certainly he would roam all over Komna and the Triglav slopes, never losing his way or coming to any harm

In springtime, when the traders from Venice used to go north with their wares, parties of them would sometimes put up at the inn in the Soča valley. And so it befell on one of these occasions that a wealthy Italian merchant, young and handsome, was at pains to make himself pleasant to the pretty daughter of the house and did not stint valuable gifts to go with his flattering words. The upshot of it was that the girl quarrelled with her sweetheart, the hunter, and ended by telling him that the Italian was a much finer gentleman than he, because he had given her a pearl necklace on the very first day of their acquaintance, whereas *he*, the hunter, who knew the way to all the treasure of the hills, had so far not given her even a paltry Triglav Rose, let alone anything more valuable.

"Well do I know how to lay hands on the key to Bogatin's treasure," retorted the hunter, angrily. "If I were to raise that, I could buy up the lot of your Italian merchants."

So he went off in a rage, and whom should he meet but the Green Hunter. Now the Green Hunter enjoyed a very evil reputation, and it was known that he hated the White Ladies and all their works. To him the young hunter of Trenta confided his troubles, and he could not have chosen a worse friend in his need. For the Green Hunter painted the treasure in Mount Bogatin in such glowing colours, and persuaded him so cunningly to possess himself of the magic key to it, that the youth agreed to join with the Green Hunter that very night, to go up the Komna and stalk Zlatorog for the sake of his golden horns—and the crimson Triglav Rose.

At dawn they sighted the great buck. The lad from Trenta fired; but Zlatorog was only wounded, and at once headed away towards the crags, with the two hunters in pursuit. Even in his haste the hunter of Trenta noticed the pretty red Triglav roses springing up between the rocks and patches of snow, and near them the velvety *očnice* or *planike* (edelweiss), with which his mother prepared a

² Isonzo

lotion for her poor failing eyes. The sight of these flowers caused the young man to think of his mother, and he was almost resolved to desist from his evil purpose. But the Green Hunter scoffed, and egged him on, till he felt ashamed of his remorse and followed up the blood-stained track afresh. Meantime Zlatorog had nibbled the leaves of the magic rose and sped on ahead of them with redoubled strength, leaping upwards upon the rocks with gigantic bounds.

On a narrow ledge on the face of the crag the hunters caught up with their quarry—sheer cliff to the right, sheer drop to the left. Zlatorog turned to bay. The young hunter wanted to fire, but the golden horns flashed before him like fire in the morning sunshine, dazzling him so that he could not take aim. His heart failed him, his knees shook, he swayed where he stood. For a moment he clutched the air in a frantic effort to regain his balance. Then he hurtled down the precipice, down, down, ever so far. . . .

Early next spring, when the streams came down in spate, the Soča washed the body of the young hunter ashore beside the inn where his sweetheart was waiting for him in vain. One hand of the dead still clasped a sodden bunch of withered Triglav roses.

When the shepherds went up to the Komna and Zajezerska Dolina that summer, they found a stony wilderness in place of the former Alpine paradise. The White Ladies had quitted the land for ever, and neither they nor their herd of white chamois have ever been seen by man since then. As for Zlatorog, his wrath was so great that he ploughed up and buried every patch of blossoming pasture, and on the naked rocks you can see the traces of his great horns to this day.

NOTE.—In so far as I have not kept strictly to Dr. Kelemina's text, I have followed popular tradition obtained from M. M. Debelak, the well-known Slovene mountaineer, who has for several years past made a special study of the Komna and the Lakes Valley. He has also drawn an excellent mountaineer's and ski-runner's map (the only reliable one, so far) of that interesting part of the Julian Alps.

THE TENTH SISTER

(A Slovene Folk Tale)

IF ten sons be born successively of one mother, then the tenth of these brothers must leave home to shift for himself in the world. Therefore if any one should refuse God's charity to a tenth brother he would be guilty of a great sin, because such a one is a homeless

wanderer all his days through no fault of his own. And a tenth sister is in a like case.

Once upon a time there lived a peasant and his wife. They were not rich, of course, but not badly off either, for plain peasant folk. They had nine daughters, and they greatly desired to have at least one son. But their prayers and their wishes were in vain, and when the peasant's wife bore a tenth child it was another daughter. This tenth daughter was a sweet little girl, prettier and better than all her nine sisters, and the parents loved her more than all the rest. Therefore it seemed a very hard thing to them that the poor child should have to wander forth into the world according to the fate of the tenth sister or brother, and often, as the peasant's wife cut bread for her youngest daughter, she could not restrain her tears. Then the child would ask: "Mother, why do you always weep whenever you give me my bread?" But the mother kept her counsel and would not tell her the reason; because she still hoped that something would occur to save her darling from the doom that was in store for her.

When the little girl was just ten years old, she happened to go to the wood for berries. All of a sudden she saw a beautiful lady, all white and radiant. "What a pity, you sweet, beautiful child," said the strange lady, "what a pity that you will have to enter into the hard heritage of the Tenth"; and with that the lady was gone—for she was surely a fairy.

The little girl was frightened. She ran home and told her mother what she had seen and heard in the wood. The mother was greatly distressed, because she knew that the time had come for her youngest daughter to go away from home. Still, she put off the evil day and refused to give up hope.

A few days after the child had seen the fairy, an old beggar came to the farm and asked for alms. The peasant and his wife were kind folk, fed him well and gave him shelter for the night.

"God reward you for your charity," said the beggar gratefully. "I will not forget to pray for you and yours as long as I live."

"If your prayers are likely to be heard," said the peasant, "you may be able to help us in our sore distress." And then he told the beggar how their favourite child was a tenth sister, and that the time had come for her to leave home and become a homeless wanderer all her days. "And, indeed," said the peasant, "there is not one of the nine other daughters whom I would not miss more easily."

"That is a very hard case," replied the beggar, "and it is not often that a man or woman can turn aside fate or escape it. But

you can try. Here, take this ring. It is the only valuable thing I have kept in spite of poverty. Bid your wife put it in the dough for a cake. When the cake is baked, she must cut it in ten pieces, one piece for each daughter. And the one who finds the ring in her piece shall be the one to leave home."

The peasant thanked the beggar from the bottom of his heart, and the old man went his way.

The peasant's wife took the ring and baked it in the cake as she was bid. Then she cut the cake in ten pieces and gave each of her daughters a piece.

Suddenly, as they were eating, the youngest called out : " Look, mother, what a lovely ring I have found in my cake."

The mother started and turned pale.

" It is of no use to fight against fate," she said. " Your time has come, my child, when you must leave home and enter upon the bitter heritage of the Tenth-born."

" If that is so, then it is no good struggling against it, and the sooner I go the better," said the girl. And she rose from the table, tied up her belongings in a bundle, and made ready to go.

" Good-bye, father," she said, " good-bye, mother ! Good-bye, my dear sisters all ! It may be that I shall come again when the eldest will be a bride."

And with that the girl went out and away into the world.

By nightfall she reached a great forest, very far from home. She saw no houses anywhere near ; the sky was full of dark clouds, and it looked as if there were a storm coming up. So she picked out a large tree and prepared to spend the night in its shelter. But scarcely had she lain down than all the leaves began to rustle at once, and the tree said : " Don't seek shelter with me, tenth sister ! Tonight there will be a terrible storm, and the very first flash of lightning will strike me."

So the girl got up and went to another tree. Again the leaves began to rustle, and the tree said : " Don't sleep under my branches tenth sister. Tonight there will be a terrible storm, and the second flash of lightning will strike me."

So she got up again and went to a third tree. The leaves rustled, but this time the tree said : " Rest and sleep in peace, tenth sister, No flash will strike me, and no evil will befall you under my spreading branches." So the girl slept while the storm raged round her, and the first tree and the second tree were struck by lightning and split to the roots.

Next day, the girl went on till she came to a lonely farm, and there she took service. She was capable and a good worker, so everybody liked her. But she could not help feeling restless and unhappy, so that it was not very long before she went away to another place. There it was the same thing, and in a third place also, and so on. And the more she changed, the more unsettled she became, till people did not care to hire her, for all her good work and nice ways. So she became very poor indeed. Her clothes were in rags, and she herself unkempt and untidy.

When ten years had passed since she had left home, she felt a great longing to see her people once more, and went back to her father's house.

She found the house crowded with people—her own family and guests. Everybody was in holiday clothes, everybody was in high spirits, and the tables were loaded with good cheer, for the eldest daughter of the house was a bride.

The girl, all ragged and barefoot as she was, went up to the mistress and humbly begged for a night's lodging. But sorrow and poverty had so changed the tenth sister that nobody recognised her, not even her own mother, whose favourite child she had been.

"My good girl!" said the peasant's wife, none too kindly, "How can you expect a night's lodging here? Our eldest daughter is getting married, and we can't do with tramps and gipsies like you among our guests."

The poor girl begged for a second time to be allowed to stay—just for this one night.

The farmer's wife got angry: "You are dirty and untidy," she said. "Go away, and don't let me have to tell you a third time!"

At that the poor girl burst into most bitter tears.

"God keep you, mother!" she sobbed. "God keep you, sisters! God keep you, dear home of mine that I shall never see again! Little did I think when I came here that my own mother would not know me!"

And she went out as she had come, crying bitterly.

But even as she went, it seemed to the peasant's wife that the voice was familiar, and on the hand of the stranger she recognised the ring that the beggar man had given her long ago. So she knew it was her own unhappy tenth daughter whom she had turned from her door with hard words.

With a cry of remorse the wretched mother started after her child. But her strength failed her. She fell to the ground, and when

they went to raise her up, they found she was dead. Her heart was broken. Grief had killed her.

The tenth sister went out into the world again—and her home and her people saw her no more.

(Translated by FANNY S. COPELAND.)

STRAIGHT AND CROOKED

Translated from the Russian by ELIZABETH HILL and DORIS MUDIE.

THERE were once two brothers. One lived by crooked ways and deceived people and made a fortune; the other lived by truth and worked and toiled. Straight did not deceive people but lived in poverty, and he was sometimes so poor that he had no bread to eat.

The brothers often argued. One said it was better to live in the world by straight ways, while the other praised crookedness and said it was much wiser to live in the world by evil ways. They argued and argued until Crooked suggested that they should set out on the road and ask whoever they met which was the better way to live—by right or by wrong, and if they were told three times it was better to live by wrong ways, then Crooked should put out Straight's eyes.

They came to an agreement and set out.

On the road a lean, thin dog came running towards them.

Crooked said :

“ Brother, look at this dog.”

The dog stopped and said :

“ Yes, I used to serve a master and guarded his home and sheep. Now I am old and he has chased me away. I have to live by luck and I am always hungry.”

“ Well? ” said Crooked, “ you saw that, didn't you? Come on, let us go further.”

They moved on, and presently a horse came ambling towards them. He was lean and thin and old. He could hardly drag one leg after the other.

“ O! what a poor old hack! ” said Straight.

“ Yes,” said the horse, “ I wasn't always like this. I served a master with faith and truth, and you should have seen the money I earned for him with running around. Now I am old and I cannot work, so he has driven me out.”

"You see," said Crooked, "there's another fellow living by evil."

They walked along and met a man. They stopped and said to him:

"Tell us, by your conscience, good man, which is the better way to live, by right or by wrong?"

"What next! What a thing to ask me! Why, there isn't any Truth left on the earth. No rumour of it either, and if there is a ghost of it anywhere, it certainly is not walking round in peasant's shoes."

The brothers moved away

"Well?" said Crooked. "You heard that?" He dragged Straight into the wood, put out his eyes and went home.

Straight was alone and could not see where to go, and he did not know what to do. Night was falling. He began to grope round and at last he felt the stump of a tree with his hands. It was high and it was dry, so he climbed up on to it so that the wolves might not reach him. Night fell, and, as he sat perched up there, he dosed off.

Presently he heard voices:

"Oho, there you are! Well, what have you done to-day?"

"I was at the mill and pulled it all down again as soon as he tried to build. What did you do?"

"O, I managed to do a fine thing. I got a man to put his brother's eyes out."

"That's good! Can what you did be put right? Can any one heal the eyes so that he sees again?"

"Oh, it can be done. All he has to do is to roll round in the dew on the grass at dawn three days running."

"But where is the grass?"

"The grass isn't far away. It grows on the bank between the two streams, but no one has ever thought of that. Well, and your mill, can the miller build it up again?"

"Yes. He has only to see that the wood is crossed before he saws it."

The voices died down, and everything was still. At dawn, Straight slid down from the stump and set off. He heard running water and the splash of a stream. He groped his way along the stream and came to a river. He followed the river bank until he found another stream. He was glad, and sat down. When it was morning, he rolled round in the dew. On the second and the third mornings he did the same, and at last he could see the world again.

But he did not go home; he went to see the miller who could not finish building his mill. And Straight put things right for him. Then he walked home.

His brother was amazed that Straight could see again, and he was still more amazed when Straight began to grow rich. He lacked nothing in his home. He built a new house and bought cattle, while Crooked grew poorer. His cattle kept dying, and whatever he tried to do failed.

One night Crooked went to Straight and began to ply him with questions about what had happened after he had been left in the wood. Straight told him everything, and the idea fell into Crooked's head that he, too, would go into the wood. He, too, would perch on the tree stump, and perhaps he, too, would hear something and would grow rich. That night he set out. He found the same wood and the same tree stump, and he climbed up on to it. Presently he heard a rustle and he saw some one swoop down, and then another:

"Well?" said one.

"Well?" said the other.

"What are you going to do next?" asked one.

"I don't know," answered the other. "I got into dreadful trouble over that mill. They made me sit in a cauldron of boiling pitch for a whole year. Next time I shall have to think out something more cunning than that. But what about you?"

"What about me? Oh, friend, I had to hang by my tongue on a nail for a year, because I let it wag too much. It gave the secret away, and a blind man was able to see again."

"I am sure some one must have been eavesdropping and spoilt our little game."

"Let us look round and see if there is any one listening now."

Crooked took fright and fell off the tree. The little devils clutched hold of him and poked out his eyes.

A day came and went, but there was no sign of Crooked. His wife ran to Straight and told him that his brother had gone to the wood the night before but had not returned. They went into the wood and found Crooked blind and leaning against the tree stump. They led him home, and Straight fed him and his family until Crooked died. Then only did Crooked agree that it was better to live by Truth in this world.

CAPTAIN GEORGE

Translated from the Greek of ARGYRIS EFTALIOTIS by N. B. JOPSON.

THERE are many villages, hills, woods, chapels, and towers that are haunted, and if you go into it deep enough you'll find that every house has its ghost. Disease or death or drunkenness poisons the air in which you fondly believe prosperity and happiness reign. In the island village I shall take you to, the local ghost for many years was Captain George. The poor fellow has now passed away and has left another ghost behind him.

Let us go back then some twenty years and tread that sacred soil, standing on the cape where once was a State famous for its fleets and its fortresses and its marble columns—all crumbled away now. The citadel has become a redoubt with a little hut on the top, and part of the town is now a graveyard, while the rest is fields thick with limestone boulders. How often have I gone down after it has rained to gather snails and seashells and returned with my hands full of old rusty medals and broken bits of lamps. The village I mean is on a slope, up on the hillside. Throw open any window up there and your heart opens out, for on the right there is the limitless sea, opposite you the bay, beyond it again the hamlet-dotted mountains, and on the left the plain with its olive trees and a river flowing through it. It is the very plain where Orpheus fell of old and hung his lyre upon a willow tree; ever since, the nightingales have sung there with peerless sweetness, until a few years ago when the Turks cut the willows down, stripped the river and drove the poor nightingales away from their thirty-centuries-old sanctuary.

But to come to Captain George. Picture to yourselves a middle-aged man of medium height and regular features, but so sun-tanned that you might take him for a negro. And it was not his face only—all his body was the same, for he did not wear anything but tattered rags. Whenever he was given clothes to put on he would go and sit by a rock, cut them up into shreds, tie them up with string and wear them like that. He never told us why he did so, but then we all knew, and now I will tell you : he was mad.

Captain George spoke in a language which was quite his own. Here and there you could make out a word, but most of the words rolled off his lips like a cascade of pebbles falling to the ground. He always looked serious, and seemed buried in thought. Even his laugh (and he laughed very seldom) had a strange seriousness, as though it were saying "Don't worry, Lady Joy, I know what a cheat you are, but you won't catch me."

He only came to the village when he was hungry, and, of course, people gave him food. His real haunt was outside, with the four winds of heaven, near the old City-State. There he loved to roam, and often enough, when I would see him amid the ruins, I could truly think he was the ghost of some forbear risen again to mourn the pitiful state of his country.

But who was Captain George? I had never been able to discover from my countrymen, and whenever I asked him himself he would turn his face to the sea and mumble some meaningless words. He would have remained an everlasting mystery had not a drag-net come one day into the bay and had not I gone down to the shore to buy some fish. A drag-net! A big business in those days, like an Austrian liner of today! And all on account of the quivering fish that the hawkers took up afterwards to the village, screaming out their wares so that the windows shook again. I loved the fish, but, truth to tell, I preferred the sight of the net. Something always drew me to it. I would stand and gaze at the oars hitting the water all together, rising and remaining level and motionless in the air, and then plunging in again, all as evenly as if the stalwarts pulling on them had been wound up. Then came the round sweep carved on the still waters by the nets, and I fell to thinking of the evil being wrought in the depths. What dreams had the luckless fish dreamt the day before? Methought I saw them scudding to and fro as though possessed, and still being caught. And when I thought that even if they had not known what a net was and had not budged it would have grappled them in its embrace just the same, I could have cried aloud to the men to stop hauling and give the fish time to escape. Half an hour later the craft was anchored and the sailors, divided into two lines on the shore, were slowly pulling at the two cables from their waists. With backward leaps they returned, one by one, again they rolled up the rope with its cork on the end, and grasped the cable for yet another heave and pull. It was a joy to look at them. I have never had the luck to see a picture of them. Why don't our painters depict for us a Greek drag-net? We should see manly beauty, grace and strength; muscles to be jealous of, bronzed chests, necks, and heads cast in a mould and turned seawards as theirs were, with their hands lying along the cable. Another half hour and the drag is nearly out, the fish quivering and glistening on the net like the stars in the sky. The men had gathered round and were shaking the nets into the baskets. Mulletts, sardines, gurnets, cuttle fish, and all manner of sea gifts. And down in the bottom of the net a three-pound John Dory. Captain George, who

seems to know me, picks it up, thrusts a bit of reed through its gills, ties it up and offers it me with a smile. He refused to be paid, so I asked him along to my house to repay him in good red wine, and he accepted.

Captain Jack was at our house that evening with his gold earrings and his tall fez and the red handkerchief under his waistcoat. He took his slippers off on the doorstep and came in. He would be fifty or so, but was as bashful as a girl. After the usual questions, out comes the platter "Here's to you—the same to you," and down with the gin. Then he takes a few almonds, cracks them with his teeth, peels them with his gnarled fingers, and enlivens us with his talk. Two or three more gins and we sit down to table. Captain Jack, with a corner of his napkin tucked into his collar, ate like a hero, but like the good sailor he is he did even better with the wine. When we rose from the table, his eyes flashed and sparkled. His first shyness had gone, and he kept us amused with a fund of stories and jokes. From one thing and another the talk came round to Captain George. Our guest then seemed embarrassed. Realising that he must know something about our ghost I began to egg him on. He was unwilling to open his mouth at first, but, after much cajoling and promises not to pass the story on, he began as follows, after the women had left the room.

"He was from my part," he said, and took out his handkerchief and mopped his face. "He was from my part, and I am his brother-in-law. He was the son of a fisherman, but he had it in him and wanted to become somebody. And he had his eye on a girl from a well-to-do family, and she was fond of him, too, for he was a fine-looking lad. But, before he could ask for the girl's hand, he had three sisters to get dowries for and marry off, besides making his own way. So they agreed to wait a few years before sending the marriage brokers along. So George launched out into the world, and throwing his heart into his work he managed to own a smack of his own within the year. Another year and the smack was a proper boat. As every twelve months came by, Captain George would be back from his trips and marry one of the sisters off. What a pothor the weddings were, to be sure! The happiness of the bridegroom and his bride was only half the happiness he felt, for every one of the marriages brought him nearer to his own beloved. I was the bridegroom of the third wedding, and it will be enough if I tell you that the scoundrels kept me away for a whole day and night from my wife with their carryings-on. He wanted to make his offer then, poor fellow, and would to God he had done so. You will

say that all his money had gone on the dowries, but everyone knew by then how reliable he was, and, besides, she would have set him up grandly. But, there you are, his boat was mortgaged through having to be building houses for his sisters. So we said to him 'The girl's father is a proud man, so make one more trip and when you come back next year ask for her.'

"I can still remember the evening when he passed by under her window with his guitar and, without stopping, so that her parents, who were not in the secret, should not suspect anything, sang this couplet to her :—

Farewell, my golden dove, for now I speed away.

Look down from thy window and bid me good day.

And a window peeped open on the floor above. On the next day the boat weighed anchor and Captain George took leave of his dear one by firing off his rifle.

"Eleven months went by and we had had no word. The twelve months were up, and there was terrible news going round our district. The girl had become engaged to a rich stranger, who was going to marry her right away and whisk her off to his own country. And rumour did not lie. The thing was done in a twinkling. The lassie wept and screamed, entreated and threatened. But all in vain. It was away post haste to the priest. Within a week the foreigner had taken her and her dowry away and had poisoned our little home without sweetening his own, for the poor lamb became consumptive and died in a few months.

"The pair went off in style in one direction on the morning of the day when the captain's boat entered our bay at dusk from the other. It was a quiet evening, and once again the rifle echoed in the mountains round about. No one went down to the landing stage but me, for I knew how to handle him, and I was afraid that the others might prove his undoing. How was I to know?"

Captain Jack pulled his handkerchief out again and mopped his face.

"Ay, that was an awful evening, sir. The sailors had begun to reef the sails, George was letting off his gun and singing away, and there was I standing alone by the landing stage and my heart ready to break. The boat was standing off the harbour, waiting for some fishing craft to clear a passage. Then George came close up in his smack and in a while we were face to face. Seeing me so dull and wrapped up in my thoughts, he outs with :—

"'Well, Johnny, what's the matter? Anyone dead? Out with it, and let's get it over.'

"After I had stammered out that no one had died, he caught me up with :—

" 'What is it? Got married, has she? '

"And then I broke down. He looked into my eyes, his face as yellow as sulphur, and the words would not come out. He bit his moustache in a frenzy, leapt into his smack, and was off.

"I lost my head and was too late to jump in after him. I shouted to him and implored him on the soul of his parents to come back, but heed me, not he! By the time I had found another smack and was after him, he was at the wheel of his boat and heading for the sea.

"That much I saw with my own eyes. The rest I'll cut short, for time is going on and the lads will be overdoing things at the tavern. I will tell you the rest of the story as we heard it a few days later from the sailors. Captain George let his boat drift with the wind, and it was a nor-wester that drove him straight here to Broad Shore, as you call it. It was night, and about two miles from land the captain called the sailors, paid them off, and ordered them to take to the smack and make for where they liked. They stared at each other dumbfounded and would have refused, but he grasped his rifle and let them see that he wasn't joking. So they manned the smack and made for the shore. But they kept their eyes open behind them, for they saw that there was something amiss with the captain. After a while they saw the boat with all sails spread dash against a rock about half a mile beyond the cape. Back went the smack straight towards the rock. But when they had got there the boat was at the bottom and the captain gone down with it. As soon as ever he appeared again, half-dead, one of them grabbed hold of him, pulled him into the smack, and brought him ashore. The breath came back to his body again, but neither his reason nor his speech ever came back.

"And now, sir, you know everything," added Captain Jack, his eyes all moist.

"Only one thing," I said, "why didn't you get him away? "

"It proved impossible. He must have gone a bit off his head before he sent his boat to the bottom, and after he had been saved and brought back to shore he was quite off it. They tried to get him into a house till one of us came up, but he wouldn't move from down there. When I found him lying at full length on the pebbly beach and told him to come back with us I might as well have spoken to a stone. He began to mumble very softly as he does now, and I could see from his clipped speech that the disease was past

mending. One day I got him by force into a boat, but he jumped overboard as light as a cat and swam ashore. I go and see him now once or twice a year. I meet him down below by the gravestones, because, mad though he is, he doesn't want anyone to know that I am a relation. He wants to remain unknown about here. I take clothes with me and he always tears them into rags before putting them on. He, too, is a wreck, like his boat, sunk with all his faculties on board."

And now Captain Jack's lips were trembling.

"A glass, captain, to wash your sorrow down? It's a rotten world."

"Your good health, sir, and to our next meeting."

And he drank the stirrup cup stubbornly, as though he were trying to drown his grief.

The next day the drag-net went away and I saw Captain George tearing up an overcoat as he mumbled away and looked out to sea.

PROTESILAUS AND LAODAMIA

A TRAGEDY, by STANISŁAW WYSPIAŃSKI

Authorised translation from the Polish by ELIZABETH MUNK CLARK
and GEORGE RAPALL NOYES.

CHARACTERS

LAODAMIA	OLD MAN	SERVING MAID
BARD	HOUSEKEEPER	
	CHORUS	

The action takes place in Phylace.

[*Protesilaus, knowing that the first Greek to land before Troy was doomed, had courted this fate. His young devoted wife seeks to call up his spirit.*]¹

PART II

SETTING

A pillared portico ; through the pillars in the background a grove of cypress trees is visible, in the midst of which a white sepulchral stela may be seen. In the background are cliffs along the seacoast and the sky still in the afterglow of sunset.

(The maidens of the Chorus pass through the room and see Laodamia falling asleep ; they approach, gazing on her a moment.

The maidens disperse through the room. The proximity of Sleep has its effect on them ; after a moment of whispering conversation they lie down sleepily upon the ground at the foot of the curtain and drowse. Sleep calls forth Nightmare.

Nightmare (Oneiros) descends from the upper air as a frightful figure in gray colours ; with the filmy wings of a downy moth, decorated with strange geometric patterns, with a great moth mask on his head, and with restless white eyes ; on his peplos are vertical purple stripes. Sleep speaks with Nightmare, pointing to the sleeping Laodamia, then disappears behind the white curtain, parting it lightly—the sleepers indicate the departure of Sleep by light movements.

Nightmare, hovering in the air above the sleeping girls, calls forth visions on the curtain.

The plaited curtain parts :

¹ Slavonic Review, No. 32, p. 249.

The dream of Laodamia is played as a lively scene in bright blues : On the background of a sapphire sea glides, on the waves in the foreground, a great ship, painted red, with rudder, rowers, mast ; it glides on, under full sail, amid darts and arrows, sent forth by unseen hands. In the vessel stand warriors, raising aloft spears and shields.

In front, at the prow of the boat, a young hero in full armour of gold holds high above his head several darts ; on his left arm he has a shield, studded with nails.

Across the bridge, which they lower to the shore, the hero runs, flying blindly against the darts and arrows.

No one hastens after him ; the men in the ship lift high the bridge immediately and withdraw it to the deck of the vessel.

Protesilaus is cut off, left alone—tumult of battle ; the hero falls)

VOICE OF PROTESILAUS

Laodamia ! Laodamia !

(The men on the ship raise their hands high in thanksgiving. In the distance many vessels are seen, sailing ahead)

LAODAMIA *(tossing in her sleep)*

Before thee is a cloud of darts and javelins :

Stop ! . . .

Behind thee they draw in the bridge !

Treason ! ! !

Help ! Help !

.

Ah . . . the oracle !

VOICE OF PROTESILAUS *(growing faint)*

. Laodamia ! . . .

(Over the bridges many heroes descend to the shore ; the uproar of throngs)

LAODAMIA *(lets herself down from the bed, and half kneels on the parapet ;—as she touches the cold flagstone, she comes to herself. She clasps her hair with both hands over her temples, and gazes wide-eyed in front of her.*

The visions disappear and the uproar subsides. The curtain parts. Laodamia rises, stiff and erect ; she arranges her hair at the back of her head ; she raises a light veil to her waist, and before she wraps it around her face, she advances with this half-finished gesture a few steps towards the door at the left.

Through the closed bronze door at the left comes towards her along the same crimson path—Hermes.

Hermes is naked, save for a short cloak falling from his shoulders ; he wears a winged cap and carries his caduceus in his left hand. He stops when Laodamia checks herself, recognising him.

Hermes stands in a stiff posture, once he has assumed it.

Laodamia stands overwhelmed by the vision, holding the veil in her hands far from her face, moving with a half step)

LAODAMIA

— A grief-stricken woman am I, wife of the hero Protesilaus.

— In thy figure, O messenger of Hell, I see the herald of the triple kingdom of the underworld.

— Thou hast escaped from Night and overpowered the guards of Hades, and behold thou art before me, fleet-footed, with thy terrible and twisted serpent-staff in thy hand.

— In thy far-seeing eyes, I read a message unheard for long ages—a message like the tales of one's dreams—yet through thy presence living and full of happiness for me :

— Behold, my tears—thou say'st to me—and my sorrow in a love unsated with caresses, and the constancy and faithfulness of my longings and desires for the husband whom I have known—these have won over the will of Orcus, uninclined to pity, with a great compassion—so that, O messenger radiant with a happy order for me, thou seemest to tell me :

How my consort will return to me, for a few fleeting moments. . .

HERMES (*with a slow movement of his left hand, bends toward her his serpent staff*)

LAODAMIA

— Son of Maia, who dost cleave the blackness of night with thy terrible staff entwined with serpents,

— Behold, when night with darkness shrouds the shores of Phylace—from the underworld thou thyself shalt lead him, for whom I yearn, to me, who yearn for him.

HERMES (*disappears*)

LAODAMIA (*stands in the same attitude for a short moment, then passes from smiling meditation to eager joy and gladness, until she bursts into laughter, and turning quickly, when she sees the sleeping girls, she runs to awaken them all ; when they are awakened, she gathers them around her and still all the while she is unable to speak*

a word from excessive joy : only, laughing and happy, she indicates that the dwelling must be adorned with flowers)

CHORUS

And whence to thee doth gladness come
That thou art glad
And wouldst adorn thy chamber bare?

LAODAMIA

Hark ye my bidding, maidens fair :
Garlands prepare,
For I today am glad.

CHORUS

Rejoicing, thou dost smoothe thy troubled brow.
Whence art thou glad,
That so gladly thou
Makest gay thy cheeks with blushes rare?

LAODAMIA

A joyful voice within me calleth now ;
My heart is glad,
No longer sad,
Plait garlands then, I bid you, maidens fair.

CHORUS

A tender voice within doth summon thee :
Is it but to deceive? . . .
Can ruinous fate more woe for thee conceive?
And lead thee round in circles helplessly? . . .

LAODAMIA

Hark ye, maidens, maidens fair :
Place candles in the glistening holders there,
And light them. . .

CHORUS

But now hath set the sun ;
White day hath but begun
In shadowed darkness to decline.

LAODAMIA

For the pangs that start
From my aching heart
The day of freedom hath begun to shine.

(She advances with the Chorus to the front of the stage)

On the coals that burn
In the copper urn
Some cypress throw,
A ball of flax, of myrrh a measure, so
The sweet scent of the misty steam
Will softly float, and charms invoke
Of visions in a dream.

CHORUS

Her dreamy visions thus disturb her rest,
Shadows and Night!

LAODAMIA

My visions thus with songs thy harp invest;
'Tis Eros' might!

(Several maidens of the Chorus occupy themselves with the discharge of the orders of Laodamia; others bring for her costly necklaces, earrings, headdresses, a girdle, ribbons, perfumes, and fragrant ointments)

LAODAMIA

On granite slab of black,
A rain of roses, roses, fragrance rare!
The light of the pale Dawn drive back!
Let not Aurora with her colours fair
Suffuse the heaven!
Hold back those steeds by Phœbus driven!

Eros! Eros! . . .

Pluck from the garden the hyacinths
And pluck the jasmine spray;
Gather the blossoms fresh and white
And twine them into wreaths this night!—
Flowers! Flowers gay!

Eros! Eros!

With scarlet blooms let my pillow burn;
Spread the soft couch of wool
To bring me the dreams for which I yearn.

(The maidens meanwhile adorn the hall and bedroom)

LAODAMIA

Eros, Eros, mine art thou,
 Thou rosy child;
 My couch for me thou deckest now
 In blossoms wild.
 With wreaths and blossoming garlands gird the bed
 Of one who loved and wed;
 This lonely breast
 With longing now is sore distressed,
 But thou hast set apart
 For me, thy chosen one, the golden dart.

CHORUS (*withdraws, after finishing the decoration of the room; the maidens bow one after another.*

Laodamia looks after each, and smiles at each in farewell; one after another they depart in this manner, until all are gone.

Night falls, night misty and moonlit.

The white curtain is parted to the whole width of the room; the garden of the palace may be seen, with its avenues of cypress trees; in the midst the grave of Protesilaus, the stela facing front; in the far background the wall encircling the garden; the rocky shore—the sea. Close at the threshold rises the Old Man, who has been sitting there, waiting)

OLD MAN

O thou most lovely, thou hast summoned me
 That I should come.
 Behold me now before thee, child, my queen,
 Thy slave and guardian once
 In that dear homeland—far from here.

LAODAMIA (*meditatively*)

So far from here. . . .
 Ah, how I have forgotten them,
 My childhood years!—
 Approach then, father!

OLD MAN

So thou hast summoned me that I should come. . . .
 I fear for thee.

LAODAMIA

Here, more than elsewhere, I divine my power;
 And yet thy knowledge also I require,
 For thou dost know the sorcerer's magic art.

OLD MAN

But child, dost thou not fear the wrath divine !

LAODAMIA

Only today I find this faith of mine ;
Till now a secret fear held me in thrall
And at the very thought of witchery I quaked.
.
But thou alone art near me here.

OLD MAN

From fatherland with toilsome steps I followed thee,
On that, thy wedding day,
When, snatched from out thy father's house,
Thy lover-husband bore thee off to Phylace.

LAODAMIA

My wedding day !

OLD MAN

Thy father cursed those marriage vows ;
And with his malediction blocked the way
For all return. . . .

LAODAMIA

My story will accompany thee there,
And my last blessing thou wilt thither bear —
Homeward, where is my country and thine own,
To fair Iolcus, ruled by Pelias' son,
The King Acastus who did give me life
For the slow ruin of my happiness —
I stand already by my grave.

OLD MAN

. . . So thou hast summoned me that I should come.

LAODAMIA

And in my sleep I heard a voice so clear ;
My name repeated oft I seemed to hear —
That voice lives in men's memory today
As but an echo faint and far. . . .

OLD MAN

And doth thy heart a secret hide from me ? . . .

LAODAMIA

Thy secret oracles I fain would know.

OLD MAN

The secret message of my oracles
Will drive the last hope from thine aching breast,
When its sad notes begin to sound their woe.
But what to thee are empty syllables?

LAODAMIA

My heart with secret longing is consumed. . . .
To thee I offer freedom, rest.

OLD MAN

So old, and yet in fear I mark thy words,
So lightly thou thy certain fate dost weigh,
Thou in the flower of thy youth.

LAODAMIA

My certain fate I comprehend today.
For this through loneliness I came to know:
My house a prison bare;
Ah, I have witnessed tender love despised
For praises sung in empty air;
Now for another, better land I yearn,
I in the flower of my youth.

OLD MAN

Return, entreat thy father for forgiveness, so
To live among thy loved ones there. Return
With me—and there that freedom sweet bestow
Upon me then.

LAODAMIA

The grave I vow to serve in love; and since
My father curses me, I him revile.

OLD MAN

My frightened heart within me needs must burst;
A daughter now forgets her father, while
She raiseth high her hand, and curses sound.

LAODAMIA

Because my father doth forget me first.

OLD MAN

Thy sorrow will thine erring sense confound.

LAODAMIA

I fain would happy be—I am accurst. —
But in the pleasure of my love tonight
I shall forget how once we two did part.
The son of Maia hath appeared to me
And he shall later lead my consort forth.
A gift of wheaten flour, snowy white,
An offering of honey, milk, and wine
Must we prepare.

OLD MAN

The fire of hellish flames now seizeth thee.

LAODAMIA

But thou dost know the force of secret powers.

OLD MAN

Now to the living art thou lost, I see.

LAODAMIA

Ah, may the gods condemn my soul to Hell!
No threats restrain one who is passion's slave.

OLD MAN

Madness hath seized on thee, for thou dost rave.

LAODAMIA (*pointing to the grave*)

Behold the gifts made ready there!
What must be done, instruct me, step by step;
What gifts should first be placed around —
The gift of bread?
And what libations poured first on the ground —
The milk or honey sweet —
Until the spirits gathered there to eat
Have satisfied with blood their hunger pangs?
And how to know my consort there amid the host?

OLD MAN

Thou art trembling

LAODAMIA

When the sad ceremony is complete,
 Then haste thee through the garden to the gates
 That I myself today
 Have left unbarred. . . .
 Thither each day, going forth to the cliffs,
 I gaze on the sea :
 from those distances, the boat did carry me
 Upon my marriage day. — —
 And at the landing-place wilt thou perceive
 A vessel, spacious, large,
 And two strong slaves.

(She takes a bracelet from her arm and gives it to him)

Show thou to them this coral set in gold.
 Then will they bear thee with them far from here
 Unto thy fatherland and mine.

OLD MAN

There do my sons and grandsons dwell !
 I thank thee, queen !

(Laodamia and the Old Man retire into the background and stand close beside the tomb)

OLD MAN

Take thou the knife thus in thine hands
 And cut a channel in the sands,
 Two spans wide and long.
 In it the jar of mead pour thou,
 And separately the cruse of wine
 And the cup of water from the well ;
 On top with wheaten flour now
 The whole libation strew. —
 And then wilt thou begin thy spell :
 Three prayers, three charms, and three demands
 Of souls now sleeping in the peace
 Of underground.
 — And then, taking a snow-white lamb, unblemished, thou wilt
 place it with its forehead towards Erebus. Slash thou it with
 a knife.
 Let the black blood flow every drop into the pit.

— And then, taking a black ewe, unblemished, thou wilt place the animal with its forehead towards Erebus. Slash thou it with the knife.

Let the black blood flow every drop into the pit.

— Turn thou thine eyes from the sacrifice, and extend thine arms above the sacrifice.

(In the course of his speech Laodamia has performed all as he has directed; the souls rush up from under the earth and circle around the pit)

LAODAMIA

But see, but see, who now are they
That weep and wail alway?
Girls and children, see, both young and old!
How the crowded retinue doth throng
The yawning pit to stand along! —
See, in their eyes there is a gleam of mould! —
Above the pit they bend,
Drinking without end. —
— I fail to find my husband there,
Mayhap he is not in their midst?
And ere he comes,
These alien souls will drink up all the blood.

OLD MAN

Have courage, seize a staff, and drive away
These aliens from the pit!

LAODAMIA

In vain! I drive them back, and yet
They throng about, an ever-widening crowd,
With whistling, hissing, and with roaring loud.
I fail to find my husband there!
Mayhap he is not in their midst.
Sleep hath deluded me,
For only alien souls are drinking here.

OLD MAN

Turn rather to thy home, unhappy one!
For vain is now the sorcerer's magic art.
Thy husband will not come to thee again.

LAODAMIA

Soul doth summon soul in vain,
 And all unmindful of the pain
 Of punishment, it vainly doth the knot unloose
 Of frightful secrets.—Ah, poor heart,
 All is in vain, unhappy me !

.

OLD MAN

I pray thee, cease thy weeping, cease thy tears,
 For vain is now the sorcerer's magic art.
 Return thou to thy chambers. I depart —
 But heed my warning : These thy sighs
 For him are torture, and his soul confined
 By thy too constant tears and sorrowing gloom
 Across the wilderness of Hell doth race —
 Reviving but to seek again the tomb. —
 Thy yearnings lead it wandering on the wind —
 Within the blessed grove hath it no place.

*(The Old Man goes out into the garden ; he is visible in the distance
 as he departs by the little gate, behind which he disappears)*

LAODAMIA (*leaning against the tomb*)

Within the blessed grove hath he no place,
 Held captive by my tears and sorrowing gloom ;
 My yearnings lead him wandering on the wind,
 He doth revive to seek again the tomb.
 So let me then in tears be left behind ;
 But let that dear beloved soul again
 Return to me but for a moment, when
 I call, freed by enchantments kind.

*(In tears she stands leaning against the tomb—and her tears and
 sobbing slowly grow silent within her ; terror overpowers her.—She
 trembles with fear, she looks about her, scarcely moving. A vague
 silence has fallen round about, and prevails as a night mist. Through
 the mist shines the moon over the whole garden.)*

The tomb opening becomes a dark pit.

Hermes comes out, leading by the hand Protesilaus.

*Protesilaus walks with bent head ; he is dressed like a warrior in
 shining armour and coat-of-mail, a bronze girdle, and greaves.*

Hermes gives Protesilaus' hand into the hand of Laodamia and departs, disappearing into the garden)

LAODAMIA

Behold me here thy consort,
And thou mine!

.

Thy coat-of-mail glitters,
And gleams thy helmet, thy girdle, and sword.
So thou art thyself my glorious hero —
Only thy cheeks are pale.
Thy black eyes look upon me with the depths of night;
Upon thy forehead black ringlets; black curls
On thy temples, fastened with golden bands;
Only thy forehead is white as the tombstone,
Thy forehead is calm even as the grave,
Covered with a slab of marble.
Thou hast not on thy forehead serenity,
Neither dost thou have restlessness. . . .

.

(She places both hands on the breastplate of Protesilaus)

This is thy coat-of-mail, thickly studded with golden nails in zigzags and circles.

The gorgeous tufts of hair on thy helmet are dipped in red resin; the hair of the steed that thou thyself captured on the broad meadows of Ptelea,¹ on the meadows rustling with luxuriantly growing grass.—This is thy cunningly wrought girdle, proof against the most powerful blows and not yielding even to the darts of Apollo; a gift of my father.

Warrior, behold thou art before me in Glory and Fame!

PROTESILAUS *(touches her forehead with his hand)*

LAODAMIA

Thy palm is white and cold;
Thou comest from afar
To me thy wife, who yearns for thee,
Who is eager for thy embraces, and young.
Husband, thou hast left me alone in the freshness of youth.

¹ Homer (*Iliad*, ii, 697) mentions "meadowy Pteleos" among the towns ruled by Protesilaus, but "the broad meadows of Ptelea" seem to be Wyspiański's own invention.—*Translators*.

Behold Fame has brought thee back to me.
 Fame nestles in the gleams of thy helmet, of thy corselet;
 only the lustre of thine eyes is dimmed, only thy cheeks are
 pale.

(She touches him with the tips of her fingers, with both hands on his face)

Thy cheeks are cold. —
 Thou comest to me from afar.
 From thy broad breast,
 From thy heart, a chill hath touched me;
 My arms are stiff with cold.

PROTESILAUS *(stretches out his hand to her)*

LAODAMIA

My heart stops within me, I listen intently.
 Doth thy heart beat?
 Thy heart is silent.

(she throws herself into Protesilaus' arms)

Oh, love me, love me, hold me, caress me, clasp me! . . .
 How long I have been alone—oh, how long!
 The words of love I had meant to say on my lips have faded
 unspoken;
 Oh, clasp me in thine arms! Ah, hold me, ravage me with
 thine embrace! . . .
 Oh, delight! . . .
 Ah, how long, how long the words of love have been for me
 a scourge and a mockery! . . .
 Thou returnest from the war
 Thou returnest to me!

PROTESILAUS *(embraces her)*

LAODAMIA *(faints in the arms of Protesilaus, striking her forehead against his metal armour; immediately she comes to herself)*

How dully thy corselet answers me,
 As if it did not enclose within it a man's breast, and a warrior's
 might!
 In empty sounds my words are lost.
 Art thou living?—Art thou near me?

PROTESILAUS *(bends his head slowly over her)*

LAODAMIA

On thy face pale gleams —
 Are they the reflections of thine armour? . . .
 The black abyss of thine eyes — —
 Into the caverns of thine eyes do I enter. —
 Night—my thoughts die away.

PROTESILAUS (*kisses her*)

LAODAMIA

I have kissed thy cold lips;
 The cold has pierced into my breast —
 My soul is lost in the kiss,
 And is united to thy soul:
 I am now a woman who never knew love before.

1. What depths are before me,
 Obscurities unpenetrated;
 In the distances move fleeting visions of mists
 They reel and turn in circles and dissolve into light
 The lights pursue one another they put on
 garments of mists—they chase one another, glowing in the
 darkness—far from me, they sink away like shadows.

 I have entered into Eternity.
2. Behold the river, these glassy waters, which stretch out behind
 me into the night; I have already crossed the vast distances
 of these waters.
 A stifling mist hovers over the waters.

3. Under my hand I feel granite, stone, virgin rock.
 Behold, how I reach out with my palms; the stones, the sharp
 crag.
 — The straits encompass me —
 I can no longer extend my arms. —
 Cliffs, cliffs
 The narrow path is surrounded by rocks
 I must go on . . . behind me they come,
 Before me they go, unknown men. —
 Eternity

4. Behold the gates, triumphal arches, built of hewn stones of the
whiteness of milk : is it thither Helios wheels his golden chariot,
when he goes to his rest? . . .
Many gates—the work of giants with a hundred arms.
. . . . Behold I pass by the last.
.
5. Blue, blue . . . a drowsiness . . .
I know that I must go farther, and farther,
And the drowsiness of blue colours bends my knees
And folds my arms to my face for a pillow . . .
To rest even for a moment !
. Eternity
6. A meadow, a meadow . . . all filled with golden flowers
. . . a meadow without an end. —
Who are they, who hover above the blossoms, like myself?
How mighty is this world !
They seem to pluck the flowers—no, they do but absorb their
fragrance.
And what a sweet scent, so satisfying . . . I may enjoy it
also—and I am already with them . . .
To remain . . .
Already here am I on the brocaded meadows, myself a dweller
in these meadows, whither I see that the souls of those who
died long ago, animated by speech, pass unrestrained. . . .
This is the other world, and I in it—a soul.
.
Whose shoulder touches my thighs? And who with his arm
presses my neck to his breast? . . .
Is it thou, my lover, my husband, whom I have caressed?
We shall remain so, inseparable for all time. . .
.
. . . . Ah, there in Phylace, whither thou broughtest me,
snatched from the home of my father . . .
There I was alone, wasting in vain;
But here . . . here, thou art with me,
Willing, obedient.
I am dear to thee, as never before.
.
. . . . There it was, in Phylace, that thou didst build a home
for thyself and for me : a palace of marble and bronze, of
beech rafters and pole plates of fir, artfully trimmed; there

was our sorrowful love —

. . . And so many tears and much bitterness, so much
strangled me, choked my breath —

until I feel today on my lips such lovely sweetness and fragrance,
that I have perhaps attained Happiness.

— My sweet, behold, on our love gaze heroes and their maids;
gaze kings, whom I know from the stories of my nurse and the
teachings of my father—gaze those of whom stories were told
by his nurse and aged parents to my father when he was a
child. Behold there pass around us those of whom they sang
to me songs—and I myself was wont to hum such songs, and
my serving maids and companions would accompany me on
strings made of the entrails of lambs, which were stretched
across the skull of a black-horned bull. . . .

Only that sound of the strings under the hands of my companions
—already is far from me—already I have forgotten it. . . .

But there, in Phylace, it has remained, and through the rooms
it runs like a rumour—but me, the daughter of a king and
the wife of a king, it no longer will lull to sleep, on pillows
covered with purple, under linen woven in patterns, redolent
of the fragrance of balsams . . .

For behold the time of dreams is ended now for me,
And I have passed into reality, unchanging;

.
And thou art with me, near me, thou, mine own.

.

*(Clasping with her arms, she grasps only the empty air—three times
she strives to embrace the shade of Protesilaus, which fades away and
disappears amid the cypresses of the garden) -*

*(The maidens of the Chorus come forth from the room and surround
Laodamia)*

CHORUS

With a joyous smile thou makest glad thy face,
And with thine arms outstretched now dost thou play.
What dost thou seek to capture, to embrace? . . .

LAODAMIA

Mine arms grow weak now in the unstable air,
My body is consumed with love's desire.

CHORUS

Whose form dost thou discern beside thee there?
 Thy pupils burn with love's mysterious fire,
 Now as they gaze.
 Thy fainting hand doth droop in empty space.

LAODAMIA

I grope thus with my hands, but all in vain,
 After a vision I may not attain;
 Mine arms grow weak now in the unstable air.

CHORUS

Thy laughter now hath ceased to sound,
 And from thy cheeks the rosy flames depart.
 Thy vainly striving hand doth grope around;
 Thou findest nothing there, poor heart!

LAODAMIA

Into delusion's erring circle have I come;
 My laughter now hath ceased to sound —
 And on my lips, now muted, dumb,
 The lovely word of passion lieth dead;
 And I find nothing in my hand, poor heart;
 Mine arm doth fainting droop in empty space.

CHORUS

And now in sorrow thou dost bend thy head,
 Cold drops bedew thy marble brow,
 Thy voice grows faint, thy blushes all depart;
 And in thine eyes the gleaming fire burns low.

LAODAMIA

My heart doth tremble like a dove in fright.
 Delusion's circle have I entered now;
 My sight grows dim, the flames of love depart,
 Cold drops bedew my brow. . . .

CHORUS

In sorrow, sadly thou dost bend thy head;
 Thy heavy hair doth hide thy frightened face
 With midnight veil of curling raven locks.

LAODAMIA

I held my hands before me, but in vain !
 In vain I strove to clasp the fleeting shade ;
 Three times already have I grasped the air,
 And three times now my arms seek vainly there,
 Trembling in love's pain.

(Here she advances to the front of the scene ; the Chorus follows her)

LAODAMIA

So give me now the shroud of white
 To deck my black, curled hair ;
 Let these loose garments be obscured from sight
 By heavy drapery there !
 Forbidden love's desire, despair
 Hath seized me in its Harpies' grasp —
 My terror-stricken heart doth gasp. —
 Yet in the thrill of passion let me hide
 My soul, affrighted, terrified.
 Let me beneath the veil
 Look on my shame, my sorrow, and my tears.
 With this that doth assail,
 This that doth kill,
 Now let me solitary dwell.
 For now shall none assuage my fears
 With tender love, or still
 With spoken word—not even though
 Thou whisper low,
 Even with a Grace's voice sublime
 And with the lute borne in Apollo's hand
 Unite the music with the rhyme.

CHORUS

Thy couch awaits thee all in scarlet dressed ;
 With woolly softness it will thee enfold
 And lull thy rounded form to peaceful rest.

LAODAMIA *(tearing off her ornaments and casting them away)*

Take from my breast
 The tinkling rings of gold !
 A strangling weakness now
 Hath fallen on my heart ;

The snake rings burn;
The diadem of crystals set in bronze,
Too heavy, doth oppress my brow;
And at my thighs the turn
Of knots, with chilly thrill, doth make
My heart to leap.
It doth provoke desires. . . .
And yet my empty passions keep
Fading away—like a forgotten fire. —
I am alone.

CHORUS

The fragrant incense from thy room
Doth rise;
The flame of love's most holy secrets now
Will all consume:
Behold above thy pillow to the skies
From circling smoke the shadows rise.

LAODAMIA

Mine arms, sated with lilies white,
My bosom drenched in perfumes rare,
My hair, dishevelled and unbound,
Bedewed with essence sweet
Of hyacinth and rose,
My peace confound.
The memory of passion in the night
Doth torture now my body with desire;
Remembrance tortures one who knows
Love's fire —
This fragrance wearies me.

CHORUS

Thrice now entreat,
Drive off the visions which thy maddened brain
Hath conjured up. Take then a poppy stalk
And with its dry bulb touch thy saddened brow
Four times:
Thus thou wilt call forth Sleep.
Behold Sleep doth all sorrows soothe;
He will come gladly now.

LAODAMIA

The sleep of one alone . . .

 He will no longer clasp me in embrace,
 My ardent lover-husband. See,
 His spirit now
 Before mine eyes hath floated off in mists,
 Diffusing sorrow from his face.

CHORUS

Thy thought doth lead thee wearily astray
 Into delusion's erring circles. Go,
 Into thy waiting chamber make thy way.
 Call not aloud—nor wring
 Thy hands in anguish so.
 Vain sorrows speak thy lips so fair.

LAODAMIA

My chamber now is bare.

 Be merciful to me.

CHORUS

Thou spurnest mercy, . . . Yet how may
 A woman sad and bowed in grief
 Stray into darkest night?

LAODAMIA (*retires to the back of the stage, gazing towards the sea*)

CHORUS

The mist spreads forth a robe of pearly dew,
 From ocean's billows Notus' chill blasts come.
 Whom dost thou seek for, whom dost thou divine,
 Gazing afar into the misty gloom?

LAODAMIA

Through distant mists it seems,
 Through black sea waves,
 A ship doth quiet sail in dreams.

CHORUS

A marble statue now our lady stands.
 Her breath within her bosom is caught fast.
 She hears the echoes of the stormy blast.

LAODAMIA

I hear the echoes of the stormy waves
 And from the sea now chilly Notus blows.
 The waves the vessel toss
 And in the boat towers the misty shade . . .
 It tosseth on the roaring surge.
 A rower old, with blood-shot eyes,
 Swift plies the oars, an old man grey. . .
 'Tis Charon! — This is Charon's boat!
 Hold, ancient shade! Thou spirit, hear!
 Bear me with thee away! . . .

CHORUS

Ah, woe! Whom doth she call?
 Hell hath sent messengers for her! . . .

(On the curtain, which the Chorus has pulled together, can be seen in sombre colours a sort of great lake; the foaming waves glisten amid the darkening depths.—A great boat is gliding forward and in it stands grey-bearded Charon, with burning eyes, plying the oar. . . The shades of souls, dressed in white shrouds, stand in the boat, assembled in one compact group, and wail sorrowfully)

LAODAMIA *(gazing at the apparitions, as if crazed)*

What is this retinue of spirits here,
 All clothed in shrouds of white,
 That thou dost in the moon's elusive light
 Bear off into the wastes of hellish night?
 The luckless phantoms moan and whine
 Like flocking bats that veer
 And sway beneath the arches of a cave
 When gathered there.

(The vision disappears)

LAODAMIA *(tearing herself free from the grasp of the Chorus)*

The ruler with his three-horned prow
 Doth cleave the broad sea now.
 But Fame cuts short his life;
 He hath the laurel on his brow.
 Yet, sobbing in my room I question how
 Love may be overcome by Death in strife.

Great Orcus, god of mystery,
 Doth thus return my love to me.
 Today a sorrow, greater thrice, and more,
 With dark despair doth rend mine aching heart.
 Today my prayerful plaint is passing sore.
 Ah, Hera ! I am sad
 Today my loneliness is greater thrice, and more,
 And with despair doth rend mine aching heart
 Diké doth heap upon me threats profuse,
 And veileth these sad eyes in dark of night.
 Most holy art thou in the bed of Zeus
 When secret clouds shield thee from sight.
 Today my pain is greater than before. —
 Ah, Hera ! I am sad !
 I love a warrior from a foreign land ;
 A tender maïd, he beareth me away,
 Leadeth me from my father's dwelling here.
 My father cursed my wedding day. —
 When shall I cease from sorrow,
 From tears and from dismay?
 Was I to blame?
 Ah, Hera ! I am sad. —
 The warrior tore himself from my embrace
 To seek the blue depths of the sea
 He cared more for his shield, his sword, his dart ;
 He heeded not at all my tearful face.
 The omens his first death foretell :
 He, eager gloriously thus to die,
 Doth straight forget the darling of his heart,
 And so my home doth empty now remain
 But it is terrible alone to dwell —
 So young am I !
 When shall I cease to sorrow, to complain?
 Ah, Hera ! I am sad !

 Grim Fate doth play with me —
 A mortal woman is deceived by Dreams,
 And all the sorcerer's magic art.
 With threat of heavenly punishment, it seems,
 The gods pursue, and drown in tears my heart.

Rushes to the front of the stage)

· · · · ·
'Tis Death alone for me!

· · · · ·
(She pierces her breast with a knife—and falls)

· · · · ·
(The maidens lay her on the bed ; they part the curtain, in order to call the servants of the house. The servants rush in ; all, seized with terror, assemble around the corpse of the queen.

In the distance, through the garden, the spirits of Protesilaus and Laodamia pass, clasped in each other's embrace ; they go slowly towards the tomb and disappear in the dark opening of the stela ; the bronze doors crash after them.

At the clang of the closing doors of the tomb, all the maidens of the Chorus turn their heads suddenly in the direction of the garden)

OBITUARY

MAXIMILIAN VOLOSHIN

ON 10 August, 1932, there died at his home in Koktebel, in Crimea, where he had been living for the last twenty years or so, Maximilian Alexandrovich Voloshin, one of the minor, but genuine and gifted, poets of the age of Russian Symbolism. Born in 1877, Voloshin began as a painter. He was a good and original painter, too, especially in the fantastic *genre*, though his subsequent notoriety as a poet eclipsed his pictorial achievements. The years which preceded the first Russian Revolution of 1905 he spent in Paris, working as a painter and writing his first poems. He was a great connoisseur of modern French literature and of poetry in particular, and during his years of Bohemian life in Paris he imbued the spirit of French Symbolism, and himself translated Mallarmé and other French poets. Of the Russian poets, Vyacheslav Ivanov seems to have influenced him most. His first book of verse appeared in 1910 under the simple title *Poems* (*Stikhotvorenya*). A great attention to form and a keen sense of colour, a truly pictorial vision of the world mark these early poems of Voloshin. Yet they are never purely descriptive. There is present in them an intense lyric quality and a strong intellectual strain—this latter he was to develop as years went by, and in some of his latest verses it dominates everything else, though in the best of his productions it is very successfully combined with that pictorial vision of the world. An instance of this combination is the long poem *Cosmos*, of which a very good English version by S R Tomkeyev was published a few years ago in these very pages.¹ His first book was followed, in 1916 and 1918, by two others—*Anno Mundi Ardenti* and *Yvezny*. Several widely different influences, or rather, I should say, elements, can be traced in Voloshin's poetry.

A strong mark has been left on it by the "desolate and ancient" Cimmerian landscape of Crimea—his first book of poems contains a whole section entitled *Cimmerian Twilight*, dedicated to the painter Constantin Bogayevsky, who had also a predilection for that Cimmerian landscape. Of the French influence I have already spoken; it may be more generally described as Latin, and it showed itself in Voloshin's attention to form—his poems remind one of chiselled works—and in his sense of measure, which was most peculiarly blended with his undoubted tendency towards anarchism and maximalism of every description. Last, but not least, in his poetry

¹ See *The Slavonic Review*, vol IV, 147.

comes the Russian national element. It makes itself felt even in his early work : side by side with poems describing his beloved Paris or dealing with some ancient and exotic subjects, we find a remarkable sonnet entitled *Thunderstorm*, inspired by *The Tale of Igor's Host*; Voloshin uses its images, its vocabulary, but succeeds in giving to it a very personal and poignant accent. Later on, this national element became peculiarly strong in Voloshin's poetry. His latest two books, *Demons Deaf and Dumb* (*Demony glukhonemye*) and *Poems about the Terror* (*Stikhi o Terrore*) are full of historical reminiscences and parallels and of poetical discourses on Russia and the Revolution. But the historico-philosophical problem of the Russian Revolution began to interest Voloshin much earlier. In 1906, after the first Revolution, he wrote a poem called *The Angel of Vengeance* (*Angel Mshcheniya*), remarkable for its powerful rhetorical eloquence. Writing of it at the time, Professor Peter Struve said that in it Voloshin "laid stress with a remarkable force" on one of the motifs of the Russian Revolution, namely, "its feeling of hatred and its thirst for vengeance." In some of his latest poems about Russia, Voloshin showed the same powerful eloquence; they are rhetorical in the best sense of this word. There is no doubt that some of his poems, both of the earlier and the latter period (however different they may be) will remain in Russian literature as a contribution of permanent value.

G. STRUVE.

SOVIET LEGISLATION (VI)

(*Selection of Decrees and Documents*)

Decree of the Central Executive Committee and of the Council of People's Commissaries of the USSR regarding the Dismissal of Workers and Employees for Absenteeism from Work without sufficient reasons.

Having in view that the existing Labour Code (paragraph "e" of Article 47 of the Labour Code of the RSFSR and the corresponding paragraphs of the Labour Codes of other allied republics) permits the dismissal of a worker for absenteeism from work without sufficient reasons, if such absenteeism occurred for a total period of three days during a month, which, under the present condition of the absence of unemployment, tends to encourage absenteeism, infringes the normal process of production and is detrimental to the interests of the toilers generally,

the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissaries resolve :—

1. To cancel paragraph " e " of Article 47 of the Labour Code of the RSFSR and the corresponding paragraphs of the Labour Codes of the allied republics.

2. To order that a worker be dismissed from the services of a factory or establishment even in case of one day's absenteeism from work without sufficient reasons and be deprived of the food-and-goods card issued to him as a member of the staff of the factory or establishment and also of the use of lodgings which are allowed to him in the houses belonging to the factory or establishment.

3. To instruct the governments of the allied republics to amend correspondingly their Labour Codes.

President of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR,
M. KALININ.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissaries of the USSR,
V. MOLOTOV (SKRYABIN).

Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR,
A. ENUKIDZE.

Moscow, Kremlin, 15 November, 1932.

(Published in *Izvestia*, 16 November, 1932, No. 316-4886.)

Decree of the Council of People's Commissaries of the USSR and of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), regarding the Granting of more Power to Factory Managements in respect of Workers' Supplies and regarding the Improvement of the Food-card System.

Aiming at further improvement in organisation of workers' supplies, at a fight against distribution of food products and industrial goods among those absentees and " flyers " who do not actually work at the factories, and also in order to augment the rights of directors in respect of the personnel of their factories, the Council of People's Commissaries of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) decree as follows :—

(i.) *Regarding the transfer of Shops and Subsidiary Undertakings from the closed Co-operatives to the Factory Managements.*

(a) To hand over the business of supply of food products and industrial goods to the workers employed at the first category of important industrial undertakings (*see* Supplement) directly to the factory managements, and to transfer to them the whole apparatus of the closed Distributive Co-operatives and, on the condition of long-term loan, their shops, cash, stock, canteens of the Vsekopit (The Co-operative Feeding Company) with the exception of the canteens belonging to the Narpit (People's

Commissariat for Food), and also subsidiary undertakings, such as kitchen gardens, rabbit-breeding farms, pig farms, dairies, poultry farms, fish ponds, etc.

(b) To organise, in order to replace the existing closed Distributive Co-operatives, special departments of Workers' Supply attached to the factory managements of the undertakings enumerated in the Supplement. Special vice-directors should be placed at the head of these Departments. The vice-directors, as a rule, should be chosen from the present presidents of the closed Distributive Co-operatives.

(c) To regard the material means received from the closed Distributive Co-operatives, savings, deposits and special contributions of the workers and of the State economic organisations, as the working capital of the factory shops, canteens and subsidiary undertakings; to conduct the financial management of the factory shops, canteens and subsidiary undertakings on an entirely self-supporting basis; each of the corresponding branches should have its own balance sheet, the departments of Workers' Supply should draw up the general combined balance sheet of all the operations.

(d) To preserve for the factory shops which must serve only persons employed at the factory, the existing system of receiving food products and industrial goods through the co-operative and State organisations under responsibility to and guidance of the People's Commissariat for Supplies of the USSR.

(e) In order to safeguard the participation of the workers in the organisation of supplies and in exercising control over it, to organise special conferences attached to the departments of Workers' Supply; these conferences must be composed of delegates from workshops and of representatives of the Shop and Canteen Committees, etc.

(f) To regard the workers employed in the factory shops as the employees of the factory to which they are attached, in order to enable them to enjoy equal privileges in respect of supplies and social services.

(ii.) *Regarding Subordination of the closed Distributive Co-operatives to the Factory Managements.*

In respect of all other important undertakings and of the railways and undertakings managed by the People's Commissariat for Transport, in which undertakings the closed Distributive Co-operatives remain in the system of consumers' co-operation, it has been found necessary :—

(a) To increase the rights, responsibility and practical participation of the factory managements in the organisation of the supplies of the workers and in distribution of the principal goods among them; the activities of the closed Distributive Co-operatives must be subordinated to the factory managements as well as generally to the Centrosoyuz and its local branches.

(b) While preserving co-operative forms of management (membership, meetings and conferences of shareholders, election of managing and

controlling bodies), to establish that the chairman of the closed Distributive Co-operative must be appointed to the post of the vice-director of the factory and charged with special duties to watch over the supplies of the workers.

(c) To instruct the factory managements that while superintending the activities of the closed Distributive Co-operatives they should give these co-operatives, as far as their finances allow it, financial and other material assistance for improving their organisation and development of co-operative economy, i.e. trading premises, means of transport, kitchen gardens, rabbit-breeding farms, pig farms, poultry farms, etc.

(iii.) *Regarding the Organisation of Supplies at Undertakings where there are no closed Distributive Co-operatives.*

To charge the committee composed of Comrades Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Yurkin, Pyatakov, Lyubimov, Zelensky and Shvernik to work out new schemes for the supplies in all other industrial, agricultural (sovhozy) and transport (river and local) undertakings which do not possess closed Distributive Co-operatives, and present their conclusions to the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissaries within the next three months.

(iv.) *Regarding Food-cards and Counterfoils.*

In order to improve the organisation of the issue of food-cards (counterfoils) and to prevent the misuse thereof, to establish the following system of the issue of food-cards (counterfoils) at the factories where closed Distributive Co-operatives are to remain, as well as at the factories where the departments of Supplies are to be organised :—

(a) The factory managements must be entrusted with the issue of food-cards (counterfoils) for the workers employed at the factories and for the members of their families; the food-cards must bear the names of their holders and be numbered consecutively.

(b) Food-cards (counterfoils) must be issued through gate-keepers, cashiers and their assistants in accordance with the pay-sheets and pay-books, on the dates of payment of wages; directors of the undertakings must see to the adequate increase in the number of gate-keepers, cashiers and their assistants and remove all unreliable elements from the ranks of these officials.

(c) When a worker is discharged from the factory he must be deprived, in accordance with the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and of the Council of People's Commissaries of the USSR, of the right to hold food-and-goods cards given to him by the management as an employee of the factory or establishment, and also of the right to have a lodging in the houses belonging to the factory or establishment.

(d) In view of possible illegal traffic in cancelled food-cards (counterfoils), to order the factory managements to make the discharged workers surrender their food-cards (counterfoils) and to regard speculation in

food-cards as a criminal offence (Articles 58, paragraphs 7 and 105 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and corresponding articles of the Criminal Codes of the allied republics).

(e) To establish that newly employed workers and clerks and also the members of their families can receive food-cards only upon the presentation of a certificate from the authorities of their former place of residence or work that they have surrendered the food-cards (counterfoils) issued to them.

(f) To establish that food-cards (counterfoils) are to be issued to the workers who are attached to the factory shops or to the closed Distributive Co-operatives.

To complete the transfer of the closed Distributive Co-operatives of the first category of industrial undertakings to the factory managements and also the introduction of the new system of issue of food-cards (counterfoils) and the organisation of supplies at the undertakings served by the closed Distributive Co-operatives not later than 1 January, 1933.

To instruct the Central Committees of the national Communist Parties, provincial and district Party committees, corresponding Executive Committees of the Soviet and Trade Union organisations to strengthen the personnel of the departments of Supply attached to the factory managements, and of the closed Distributive Co-operatives, to appoint proper persons to the posts of vice-directors managing the departments of Supply, and to improve in every respect the personnel of the gate-keepers, cashiers and their assistants.

President of the Council of People's Commissaries of the USSR
V. MOLOTOV (SKRYABIN).

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks),

J. STALIN.

Moscow, Kremlin, 4 December, 1932.

Supplement :—

A list of 262 factories and groups of industrial undertakings, such as coal trusts, etc., included in the first category of undertakings at which the departments of Supply are to be established.

(Published in *Izvestia*, 5 December, 1932, No. 335-4905.)

Decree of the Central Executive Committee and of the Council of People's Commissaries regarding the Introduction of the Uniform Passport System in the USSR and regarding the Obligatory Registration of Passports.

In order to obtain better statistics of the population in towns, workers' settlements and the settlements built around the newly constructed factories and also in order to secure the deportation from these places of persons who are not connected with industry or with work in the offices

and schools and not engaged in socially useful labour (with the exception of infirm persons and pensioners), and also in order to cleanse these places from kulak, criminal and other anti-social elements which find a refuge there, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissaries of the USSR resolve :—

1. To establish, throughout the USSR, a uniform passport system on the basis of specially issued Passport Regulations.

2. To introduce the uniform passport system with obligatory registration of passports throughout the USSR in the course of 1933, and, first of all, in Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa, Minsk, Rostov-on-Don and Vladivostok.

3. To empower the Council of People's Commissaries of the USSR to fix the time-limits and order in which the passport system should be introduced in all other localities of the USSR.

4. To empower the governments of the allied republics to make the necessary amendments in their legal Codes in correspondence with the present Passport Regulations.

President of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR,
M. KALININ.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissaries of the USSR,
V. MOLOTOV (SKRYABIN).

Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR,
A. ENUKIDZE.

Moscow, Kremlin, 27 December, 1932, No. 1917.

(Published in *Izvestia*, 28 December, 1932, No. 358-4928.)

PASSPORT REGULATIONS

1. All citizens of the USSR above 16 years of age who permanently reside in towns, workers' settlements or are employed at the transport undertakings, sovhozy and new construction schemes must have passports.

2. In those localities where the passport system is introduced, the passport is the only document which serves as an identification of the bearer. All other documents and certificates which used to serve for identification purposes are declared non-valid. The passport must be produced : (a) upon the registration of the bearer ; (b) upon entering the employment of a factory or office ; (c) upon the request of the police and other administrative institutions.

3. The registration of the inhabitants in those localities where the passport system is introduced, is obligatory. Citizens who change their addresses within the confines of the places where the passport system is introduced, or persons arriving at such places, must submit their passports, through the house managements, for registration with the police within 24 hours after arrival at a new address.

4. Persons below 16 years of age are entered on the passports of those persons in whose care they are. Persons below 16 years of age who are cared for by the State (in children's homes, etc.) are entered on the lists compiled by the corresponding institutions.

5. For persons who are in active military service in the ranks of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the documents issued by corresponding military authorities are accepted in lieu of passports.

6. Passports are issued by the organs of the police. Citizens who permanently reside in places where the passport system is introduced, receive passports without applications; citizens arriving at these places from elsewhere must apply for the passports.

7. Citizens who permanently reside in places where the passport system is introduced, receive passports for a period of three years. Organs of the police are permitted to issue temporary certificates for a period of three months upon registration of newly arrived persons before the passport system is introduced throughout the USSR.

8. The fee for the issue of a passport is 3 roubles and for the issue of a temporary certificate 1 rouble.

9. The passport must contain the following items (a) christian name, patronymic and surname, (b) time and place of birth, (c) nationality, (d) social position, (e) place of permanent residence, (f) place of employment, (g) persons entered on the bearer's passport, (h) list of documents upon which the passport has been issued.

NOTE.—The list of the documents upon which passports are to be issued is to be determined in a special instruction.

10. Passport books and forms are to be prepared according to a specimen common form for the whole of the USSR. The text of passport books and forms for citizens of the various allied and autonomous republics is to be printed in two languages: Russian and the language commonly in use in the corresponding allied or autonomous republic.

11. Persons obliged to have passports and found without them or without temporary certificates are liable to a fine not exceeding 100 roubles imposed by administrative order. Citizens who arrive from other places without a passport or temporary certificate and who do not apply for a passport or temporary certificate within the time limit fixed in the Instructions, are liable to a fine not exceeding the sum of 100 roubles and to deportation by order of the police.

12. Persons found guilty of non-registration of their passports or temporary certificates are liable to a fine not exceeding the sum of 100 roubles imposed by administrative order, and in case of a second offence against the regulations of passport registration, to criminal prosecution.

13. Persons who are responsible for registration (house managers, porters, house-owners, householders, etc.) are liable, if found guilty of infringement of these regulations, to the penalties fixed in Article 12 of the present regulations.

14. Forgery of passport forms is to be prosecuted as a criminal offence in the same manner as forgery of State Bonds in accordance with Article 22 of the Code of State Crimes (Collection of Laws of the USSR., 1929, No. 72, Article 687).

15. Forgery of a passport and possession of a forged passport or of somebody else's passport is a criminal offence prosecuted in accordance with the legislation of the USSR. and of the allied republics.

16. To instruct the Chief Board of the Workers' and Peasants' Police attached to the OGPU. of the USSR. to present in 10 days' time a draft instruction regarding the putting in effect of these Regulations for confirmation by the Council of People's Commissaries of the USSR.

President of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.,
M. KALININ.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissaries of the USSR.,
V. MOLOTOV (SKRYABIN).

Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.,
A. ENUKIDZE.

Moscow, Kremlin, 27 December, 1932.

(Published in *Izvestia*, 28 December, 1932, No. 358-4,928.)

Decree of the Council of People's Commissaries regarding the Approval of the Instructions on the Issue of Passports.

The Council of People's Commissaries of the USSR. decrees: To approve the Instructions on the issue of passports to the citizens of the USSR. domiciled in Moscow, Leningrad and Kharkov and in the 100 kilometre zones round Moscow and Leningrad and in the 50 kilometre zone round Kharkov.

Vice-Chairman of the Council of People's Commissaries of the USSR.,

V. KUYBYSHEV.

Assistant Secretary of the Council of People's Commissaries of the USSR.,

I. MIROSHNIKOV.

Moscow, Kremlin, 14 January, 1933, No. 43.

(Published in *Izvestia*, 15 January, 1933, No. 15-4,946.)

Instructions

1. To begin on 20 January and to complete not later than on 15 April, 1933, the issue of passports in Moscow, Leningrad and Kharkov and also in 100 kilometre zones round Moscow and Leningrad and 50 kilometre zone round Kharkov.

2. To instruct the Presidiums of the Moscow, Leningrad and Kharkov Town Soviets to divide the towns into an adequate number of districts,

and to establish a passport-issuing office in each district. Not less than 400 such offices should be established in Moscow. The passport-issuing offices in the 100 kilometre zones round Moscow and Leningrad and in the 50 kil. zone round Kharkov should be established by the corresponding provincial executive committees.

3. Workers and clerks employed at industrial undertakings where the number of workers engaged exceeds 2,000, are to obtain their passports from the Workers' and Peasants' Police at the offices opened for the purpose at the works. The provincial offices of the Workers' and Peasants' Police are allowed to make other arrangements in correspondence with local conditions.

4. The following documents are to be accepted as fundamental for passports (a) a certificate in respect of permanent residence issued by the house managements, (b) any document certifying the date and place of birth; (c) a certificate issued by the establishment at which the bearer is employed; (d) a military registration certificate (for all those persons who must possess it in accordance with the Military Conscription Law).

NOTE.—The offices of the Workers' and Peasants' Police may make exceptions in individual cases in respect of documents certifying the place of birth (Paragraph (b), Art. 4).

5. The central offices of the Workers' and Peasants' Police in Moscow, Leningrad and Kharkov and the corresponding provincial central offices of the police must immediately fix time-limits for the issue of passports.

6. Seasonal workers are to receive temporary certificates for the period of the issue of passports (Art. 1) in the same manner, in accordance with their place of residence.

7. The prolongation of temporary certificates of seasonal workers is effected by the local police stations on the representation of the administration of the corresponding economic organisations.

8. All persons who, during the period of the issue of passports (Art. 1), are temporarily absent from their permanent place of residence, are to obtain their passports in the district police stations within ten days after their return to the place of permanent residence.

9. To instruct the Board of the Workers' and Peasants' Police attached to the OGPU of the USSR. to devise the manner in which the persons below 16 years of age under the care of the State should be registered (Art. 4 of the Passport Regulations).

10. Passports are not to be issued to persons who are under permanent medical treatment or under the care of the State and public organisations, nor also to the mentally deranged. All these persons are to be registered in a special register devised by the Board of the Workers' and Peasants' Police attached to the OGPU of the USSR.

11. Passport departments must be organised in the provincial and town police stations and the passport bureaux in the local police stations.

12. Address bureaux must be immediately organised in Moscow, Leningrad and Kharkov.

13. To instruct the Board of Workers' and Peasants' Police attached to the OGPU of the USSR. to immediately define the structure and the working methods of the passport departments, passport bureaux and address bureaux.

14. To establish that the registration of the newly-issued passports in Moscow, Leningrad and Kharkov and in the 100 kil. zones round Moscow and Leningrad and in the 50 kil. zone round Kharkov must take place between 1 February and 1 May, 1933.

15. The registration of persons who come for temporary residence in Moscow, Leningrad and Kharkov from the localities where the passport system has not been introduced, is to be effected on the basis of their credentials, which are to be countersigned by the Central Executive Committees and the Councils of People's Commissaries of the allied and autonomous republics, if the persons in question are sent by republican People's Commissaries and by the central republican offices, and also by the provincial executive committees or town soviets in all other cases. Credentials not countersigned by the corresponding offices are not to be registered.

16. Registration of seasonal workers is to be made upon the presentation of temporary certificates (Art. 6).

17. To instruct the Board of the Workers' and Peasants' Police attached to the OGPU of the USSR. to give directions to the republican, provincial and town offices of the police regarding the technique and manner in which the passports should be registered.

18. The fee for the registration of a passport is one rouble.

19. Persons who would not be given passports in Moscow, Leningrad and Kharkov and in places situated within the 100 kil. zones round Moscow and Leningrad and the 50 kil. zone round Kharkov and who would be refused registration in these places, are not permitted to stay in these towns and places. These persons are to be deported by the police, if they should not have left on their own account, within ten days in case of the refusal of the passport, and within 24 hours in case of the refusal of the registration.

20. Persons who are not permitted to stay in Moscow, Leningrad and Kharkov or within the 100 kil. zones round Moscow and Leningrad and the 50 kil. zone round Kharkov (Art. 19) are entitled to live unrestrictedly in all other localities of the USSR. They are to be given passports in their new place of permanent residence as soon as the passport system is introduced in these localities. To instruct the Board of the Workers' and Peasants' Police attached to the OGPU of the USSR. to issue corresponding instructions to the provincial police.

21. To instruct the undertakings and offices to demand the presentation of passports or temporary certificates from all citizens entering their

employment, and also to enter the date of employment on the passports and temporary certificates.

Assistant Secretary of the Council of People's Commissaries of the USSR.,

I. MIROSHNIKOV.

Moscow, Kremlin, 14 January, 1933.

(Published in *Izvestia*, 15 January, 1933, No. 15-4,946.)

Aims and Tasks of the Political Departments attached to the Machine and Tractor Stations and the Sovhozy.

Resolution of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee and of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) passed on 11 January, 1933.

I

On the Weakness of the Work in the Villages and the Necessity of Organising Political Departments attached to the Machine and Tractor Stations and Sovhozy.

The struggle for the further progress of agriculture and for the completion of its social reconstruction is at present the most important task of the Party.

The collectivisation of the main body of the poor and middle peasantry, the broadening of the technical and productive basis of the kolhozy and the development of the sovhozy have created the necessary conditions for the further progress of agriculture, for strengthening the basis of food and raw material for industrialisation, and for the uninterrupted growth of income of the kolhozy and their members.

The anti-soviet elements among the peasants desperately resist the successful realisation of these tasks. The kulaks, economically ruined, but not yet deprived of their former influence, former "white" officers, former priests, their sons, former stewards of landowners' estates, former policemen and other anti-soviet elements, bourgeois and nationalist intelligentsia (Socialist-Revolutionaries and adherents of Petlyura), who have found refuge in the villages, are doing their utmost to destroy the kolhozy and wreck the measures taken by the Party and the Government in the domain of agriculture; they make use of the non-conscious portion of the kolhoz members for their fight against the interests of socialised kolhoz economy, against the interests of the kolhoz peasantry.

Worming their way into the kolhozy as book-keepers, managers, store-keepers, foremen, etc., and, very often, as leading members of the kolhoz managing bodies, the anti-soviet elements are trying to organise sabotage; they wreck machinery, sow badly tilled land, organise the pillage of seeds, secret hiding places for grain and sabotage of grain collections. Sometimes they succeed in dissolving the kolhozy.

Worming their way into sovhozy as managers, book-keepers, agronomists, storekeepers, branch managers, etc., these anti-soviet elements are doing great damage to the sovhozy by premeditated wrecking of tractors and machinery, by poor cultivation of soil, by bad minding of live-stock, by infringement of labour discipline, by pillage of sovhoz property and, especially, of the sovhoz products (grain, meat, milk, butter, wool, etc.).

All these anti-soviet and anti-kolhoz elements prosecute one common aim : they want to restore the power of the kulaks and landowners over the toiling peasants, they want to restore the power of capitalists over the workers.

The Communists and non-party sympathisers must develop special watchfulness in order to organise resistance to these anti-social elements and to destroy them completely.

Meanwhile, in many places the village Communist and Komsomol organisations, including the Communist cells in the sovhozy and the machine and tractor stations, often deprived of revolutionary spirit and watchfulness, not only do not set against these anti-soviet activities of hostile elements their class watchfulness and Bolshevik intrepid struggle for securing the soviet influence over non-party masses of kolhoz members and sovhoz labourers, but sometimes fall themselves under the influence of the wreckers and of Party members who have joined the Party out of selfish motives ; they side with the enemies of the kolhozy, sovhozy and Soviet Government and organise together with them the pillage of seeds during sowing, harvest and threshing operations, the storage of grain in secret hiding places, the sabotage of grain collection, and, consequently, make kolhozy, groups of kolhoz members and backward labourers of sovhozy fight against the Soviet Government.

This, especially, refers to the sovhozy, where often the directors, falling under the influence of anti-soviet elements, are affected by bourgeois degeneration, do not carry out the orders of the Soviet Government, openly deceive the Party and the Government, and dispose of the State sovhoz production as if it had been their own personal property.

In connection with this, the village Communists and the members of the Komsomol are faced with the task of organising and leading the genuine pro-Party and pro-soviet active elements in the kolhozy and sovhozy, with the task of obtaining the majority in the kolhozy and sovhozy and expelling from the kolhozy and sovhozy the anti-soviet elements which have wormed their way into them, and, first of all, all managers, book-keepers, clerks and storekeepers ; with the task of resolute and merciless application of the soviet laws regarding administrative and punitive measures against organisers of pillage of kolhoz and sovhoz property and of sabotage of the measures adopted by the Party and the Government regarding the collection of seeds, harvesting and threshing and the execution of programmes of grain collection, meat buying, etc.

The chief levers of the reorganisation of agriculture on the socialist

basis, of the uninterrupted strengthening of the soviet influence on kolhoz members are the machine and tractor stations and the sovhozy, as the largest factories of socialist agriculture.

The machine and tractor stations and the sovhozy have obtained an important place in socialist agriculture as the organisers of the system of collectivist economy. But, in spite of the important economic rôle and influence which the machine and tractor stations exercise on the technical re-equipment and socialist reconstruction of agriculture, their political influence on the kolhoz members is absolutely insufficient. The machine and tractor stations very often have no political face (physiognomy). In the machine and tractor stations, very frequently, flourish criminal negligence towards State property, pillage and plunder of kolhoz goods and of State property. Hostile elements sometimes worm their way into the machine and tractor stations and conduct their work of strengthening anti-soviet influence on the kolhoz members from inside.

This, to a considerable extent, refers also to the sovhozy. In spite of the leading rôle of the sovhozy in the technical re-equipment and socialist reconstruction of agriculture, so far their political and economic influence over the kolhozy is inadequate. Instead of exemplary work in utilising the technical equipment of the sovhozy and in demonstrating the advantages of large agricultural undertakings in comparison with small individual farms, capitalist tendencies sometimes make themselves felt in the sovhozy; there flourish criminal negligence towards State property, barbarous treatment of tractors, automobiles, combines and livestock; products are pillaged and wasted; the Government programmes regarding the delivery of products are not fulfilled.

In order to strengthen the machine and tractor stations and the sovhozy politically, to increase the political influence of the machine and tractor stations and the sovhozy over the peasants and to improve the political and economic work of our cells in the kolhozy and sovhozy, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party has decided to organise political departments in all the machine and tractor stations and the sovhozy, at the head of which departments should be placed the assistant directors of the machine and tractor stations and of the sovhozy.

II

The Tasks of the Political Departments of the Machine and Tractor Stations and of the Sovhozy.

The Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and of the sovhozy, on one hand, by means of developing mass political propaganda in kolhozy and sovhozy, and on the other by economic strengthening of the kolhozy and sovhozy, must supplement the economic and technical work of the machine and tractor stations and the sovhozy regarding the raising of the fertility of the fields, the better breeding of livestock, the timely organisation of the autumn and spring sowing, the timely

organisation of harvesting and threshing, the timely and complete fulfilment of obligations undertaken by the kolhozy and sovhozy in respect of the State.

The Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and of the sovhozy must provide for the Party control over all branches of work and life of the machine and tractor stations and of the sovhozy, as well as of the kolhozy served by the machine and tractor stations. The supervision of the quality of seeds during the sowing period, the prevention of pillage of seeds, the control over efficient threshing, the struggle against pillage of threshed grain, the struggle against absenteeism from work, the securing of the proper treatment of livestock and machinery belonging to the kolhozy and sovhozy, the expulsion of all unreliable anti-soviet and anti-kolhoz elements from kolhozy and sovhozy, the selection of the best and tried workers for kolhozy and sovhozy—all these and similar matters should engage the attention of the Political Departments.

The Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and of the sovhozy must secure political control over the organisation and utilisation of labour of kolhoz members and sovhoz labourers, always remembering that the security of public sovhoz and kolhoz property and the success of the kolhozy and sovhozy depend on the workers who mind the drill-ploughs and threshers and who are employed in cattle-breeding, in storing grain, and in tending all the kolhoz and sovhoz property.

The foremost task of the Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and of the sovhozy is the securing of accurate and timely fulfilment by the kolhozy and kolhoz members of their obligations towards the State, and, especially, the decisive struggle against attempts on the part of directors of the sovhozy and their assistants to contrast the narrow interests of their sovhozy to the general interests of the State, and the struggle against the tendency to conceal surplus products instead of delivery of such surplus to the State.

The Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and of the sovhozy must secure persistent, correct and timely application of the laws issued by the Soviet Government regarding administrative and punitive measures in respect of the organisers of pillage of public property and of sabotage of the measures passed by the Party and the Government regarding agriculture.

The Political Departments must inform the kolhoz members of all these punitive measures and of sentences passed by the courts upon the offenders, and organise around and on the basis of such facts mass propaganda and educational work among the kolhoz members and sovhoz labourers.

The Political Departments must carry out all this work by developing party, political, and educational work among the members of the Party and Komsomol in the sovhozy and machine and tractor stations by mass propaganda among the kolhoz members and sovhoz labourers, by a proper selection and appointment of the Party and Komsomol members in the

kolhozy and sovhozy, and also of the non-party kolhoz members devoted to the kolhozy, by promotion of the most advanced, unquestionably devoted and active kolhoz members to the responsible and important posts in the kolhoz administration.

While disclosing facts of sabotage on the part of accountants and managers of the kolhozy, revealing the capitalist tendencies in the sovhozy, discovering the kulaks and their satellites and the organisers of pillage in the kolhozy among the members of the kolhoz managements, making decisive war on the pillagers in the kolhozy and sovhozy, on the loafers and idlers, on the negligent and bad treatment of livestock and machinery belonging to the kolhozy and sovhozy, the Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and of the sovhozy, basing their work on the facts of everyday life in the kolhozy and sovhozy, must organise the broad masses of kolhoz members and sovhoz labourers for the struggle for the economic strengthening of the kolhozy and sovhozy, for the security and integrity of public sovhoz and kolhoz property, for the increase of incomes of the kolhozy and kolhoz members, for the timely and complete fulfilment by kolhoz members and by the sovhozy of their obligations towards the State

The Political Departments must prevent the infringements and misinterpretation of the decisions of the Party and of the Government, conduct a fight against these infringements and against methods of purely administrative pressure, always remembering that the solution of all the above-mentioned tasks will be possible only under conditions of all-round improvements and strengthening of the administrative and economic management, the application of all levers of the proletarian dictatorship against the kulaks and their agents in the kolhozy and sovhozy, development of mass political and educational work among the kolhoz members.

The Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and of the sovhozy should in no case replace the directors of the machine and tractor stations and of the sovhozy in their work, always remembering that the economic management of the stations and of the sovhozy is carried on by the directors upon their sole responsibility and authority, and that the Political Departments must assist the directors in solving the problems of management by means of political, party, and educational work.

The first problem of the Political Departments and their chiefs at the present moment is to unite the active members of the Party and of the Komsomol within the machine and tractor stations and of the kolhozy served by the stations and also within the sovhozy and their branches; it is necessary to pay more attention not to the quantity, but to the quality of the members, to their devotion to the Party and to their ability to lead the kolhoz members and sovhoz labourers.

The second problem which is to be solved, in close connection with the first, is to unite the non-party active kolhoz members around the Communist and Komsomol cells; it is necessary not to alienate the non-party

kolhoz members and sovhoz labourers, but, on the contrary, to establish close connection and collaboration with them, in order to achieve the aim that all the kolhozy without exception may be truly Communist as far as their leadership goes.

The Political Departments and the members of the Party and of the Komsomol must strive to gain the support of the best non-party kolhoz members and sovhoz labourers, admit them to their open meetings, educate them politically, discussing with them practical problems of the kolhoz and sovhoz administration, and, generally, create inside each kolhoz and sovhoz a united nucleus composed of the members of the Communist Party and of the Komsomol and non-party kolhoz members and sovhoz labourers, for the struggle against wreckers and anti-social and anti-kolhoz elements in the kolhozy and sovhozy.

The members of the Party and of the Komsomol must not be afraid of the struggle inside the kolhozy and sovhozy for the isolation and expulsion of anti-social and anti-kolhoz elements, because of the erroneous idea that such a struggle may infringe the unity of the kolhozy and sovhozy. We want, not any kind of unity. The unity in the kolhozy and sovhozy we want must be such as guarantees the predominance and supremacy of the Bolshevik nucleus supported by active non-party men. And it is impossible to accomplish such a unity without a bitter struggle for the expulsion of anti-social and anti-kolhoz elements from the kolhozy and sovhozy. Therefore the struggle of the Party and Komsomol Bolshevik nucleus for the creation of an active non-party body in the kolhozy and for the expulsion of anti-social elements, to secure the majority in the kolhozy and sovhozy, is at present the most urgent task.

The Communists in the district centres and in the villages must take into consideration the fact that our kolhozy and sovhozy are young, not sufficiently strong organisations, that they are passing through approximately the same period of reconstruction which our factories and works passed through in 1920-1921, when they were weak internally. During the last three years we have been able to organise over 200,000 kolhozy and 5,000 sovhozy; that is to say, we have created entirely new undertakings which have the same importance for agriculture as the factories and works have for industry. History does not know of any other country which could have succeeded in the course of three years in creating not 205,000, but 25,000, new large-scale undertakings equipped with new technically perfect machinery. Only the USSR, only our country of the Soviets, has been able to perform this miracle of creation. With this in view, it would have been ridiculous to claim that all these numerous new large-scale agricultural undertakings, created under the conditions of cultural and technical backwardness of the peasantry, should become at once, in the course of one year, exemplary and economically solvent. Evidently some time is required—persistent, patient and careful work is necessary—in order to make the kolhozy and sovhozy really exemplary organisations. It is necessary to strengthen the kolhozy and sovhozy, to

expel wreckers from them, to carefully select and organise new tried Bolshevik elements in them. And, undoubtedly, they will become exemplary in the same way as many factories and works, which in 1920-1921 were weak and poorly organised, have become exemplary.

As to the cases of wrecking and sabotage in the kolhozy and sovhozy, they must, in fact, play the same beneficial role in the organisation of the new Bolshevik cadres for the kolhozy and sovhozy which the sabotage and the Shakhtinsky trial have played for industry. The Shakhtinsky trial was a turning point in the strengthening of the revolutionary watchfulness of the Communists and in the organisation of Red specialists for industry. There is no reason to doubt that the cases of wrecking and sabotage in some of the kolhozy and sovhozy which took place this year, will serve as the turning point in the development of revolutionary watchfulness of the Communists in the villages and in the district centres and in the selection of the new Bolshevik cadres for the kolhozy and sovhozy.

The sooner the machine and tractor stations and the sovhozy become centres of mass political and educational work, the centres of our work among the peasants, the sooner will this come about. Thus, the Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and of the sovhozy must secure the conversion of the machine and tractor stations and of the sovhozy, which at present are, in the main, the economic and technical centres in the countryside, into centres of political and educational leadership and influence on the masses of the kolhoz members, as well as economic and technical centres.

The whole of the political, party, and educational work of the Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and of the sovhozy must be directed towards paralysing the influence of class enemies in the kolhozy and sovhozy and overpowering the petty-bourgeois atavistic conceptions and proprietary tendencies of the kolhoz members, who only yesterday were individual small capitalists.

The Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and of the sovhozy must adjust the whole work of the stations as well as of the kolhozy served by the stations to the general tasks of social reconstruction by developing Party activities, by the Leninist education of the members of the Party and of the Komsomol, and by developing mass propaganda among non-party kolhoz members and explaining the measures passed by the Party and by the Government regarding the technical re-equipment and progress of agriculture, the industrialisation of the country and the improvement of her ability to defend herself, the betterment of material and social conditions of the workers, Red Army soldiers, and kolhoz members.

The most important pivot of all political and educational work among kolhoz members and sovhoz labourers must be popularisation of the measures passed by the Party and by the Government regarding the integrity of public kolhoz and sovhoz property. It is necessary to explain to the members of the Party and of the Komsomol and also to the broad

masses of kolhoz members and sovhoz labourers that these measures are directed against idlers, pillagers, and thieves who are the agents of class enemies, who are the enemies of the workers and kolhoz members.

The Political Departments must have in view that it will be possible to secure lasting political influence over the kolhoz members and set this influence against the intrigues of anti-soviet elements only if the Party and Komsomol organisations in the kolhozy are ideologically united, politically educated, and enjoy authority over the masses of kolhoz members.

The Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations must disclose and expel from the Party and Komsomol organisations the opportunist elements and agents of class enemies who have managed to worm their way into these organisations and who conduct their insidious work under the cover of Party or Komsomol membership.

The Political Departments must extend the Marxist and Leninist education of the Party and Komsomol members in the villages, systematically cleanse Party and Komsomol organisations of the kolhozy and sovhozy of unstable careerist and decomposed elements and also of those who have established contact with class enemies, must conduct a decisive struggle against attempts to limit the work of the Party and Komsomol organisations, must ideologically unite the members of the organisations for the struggle for political Bolshevik leadership and influence over the broad non-party masses of kolhoz members and sovhoz labourers

The most important and foremost task of the Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations is the organisation, around the Political Departments, of a strong nucleus composed of genuine active members of the kolhoz and sovhoz Communist cells and the creation, around these cells, of non-party active groups composed of those kolhoz members and sovhoz labourers who are devoted and tried in the fight for the power of the Soviets. The Central Committee emphasises once again that there is no need to try to achieve numerical strength; a small but politically educated and strongly cemented nucleus will always be able to lead the whole mass of kolhoz members and sovhoz labourers. The Political Departments, while developing educational and explanatory work in the kolhoz Communist cells and among non-party kolhoz members, must, first of all, secure political efficiency of the active elements.

The Political Departments must strive to bring about a healthy growth of the Party and Komsomol organisations, recruiting genuinely advanced and active kolhoz members tried in the struggle against the kulaks and their agents in the kolhozy. The Political Departments must take into consideration the fact that the Party and Komsomol organisations in the villages can carry out their duties of Bolshevik nuclei and lead the kolhoz masses if they are composed of Bolsheviks intrepidly devoted to the Party, ideologically united and tempered in the struggle against class enemies, however small their number may be.

While carrying out these tasks, the Political Departments of the

machine and tractor stations and of the sovhozy must not infringe the authority of the local district Party committees and conduct their work in full contact with these committees. At the same time, the district Party committees must realise that they are not relieved of the tasks and responsibility imposed on them by the Party on account of the establishment of Political Departments in the machine and tractor stations and the sovhozy.

[*EDITOR'S NOTE.*—Divisions III and IV of the Resolution contain detailed instructions regarding the composition of the Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and of the sovhozy, the subordination of these Departments to various Communist Party and Soviet Government institutions, and also the relations between the Departments and the managements of the machine and tractor stations and the sovhozy. We omit these instructions owing to lack of space. They add very little to the general principles set forth in divisions I and II of the Resolution.]

(Published in *Izvestia*, 13 January, 1933, No. 13, 4,944.)

THE TREATMENT OF SCHOLARS IN USSR.

"The liberation of learning from subserviency to private interests and utilisation of its achievements for the common good are the most characteristic feature of Soviet Science."—A. Karpinsky, President of the All-Union Academy of Sciences (since the expulsion of a number of Academicians and the communising of the Academy).¹

"People were not arrested in the Soviet Union without good reason."—Litvinov to Sir E. Ovey, as reported in *The Times*, 17 March, 1933.

(The document which we reproduce below in extract originally appeared in *Poslednia Novosti*, a Russian daily paper published in Paris under the editorship of Prof. P. N. Milyukov. The author, Prof. Vladimir Vyacheslavovich Chernavin, of the Petrovsko-Razumovskaya Agricultural Academy, Faculty of Ichthyology, occupied important posts under the Soviet Government as a highly qualified specialist in ichthyology and the fishing industry. In September 1930, he was arrested in Leningrad, accused of "wrecking" and "sabotaging" government plans, and by an administrative order of the OGPU deported to the Solovetsky concentration camp for ten years. In September 1932, he succeeded in escaping to Finland with his wife and nine-year-old son.)

. . . Ichthyology is a young branch of science, especially in Russia. The number of trained specialists has always been insufficient to meet the requirements of the country. Therefore the question how the Soviet Government has treated these specialists is of some interest.

¹ *Pravda*, 7 November 1932.

During the period 1930-1932 only, 22 experts in ichthyology were shot by order of the Soviet Government and 20 deported to concentration camps. All these men were personally known to me. Two (Prof. A. N. Derzhavin and M. P. Somov) were imprisoned in Vladivostok for two years, and one (Mr. Pivovarov, who, up to 1930, was living in London, where he was employed by Arcos) was arrested in 1930 and disappeared without any trace.

Besides, three more men were shot and six deported to concentration camps; these men were employed as consultants on various matters relating to ichthyology and the fishing industry, and were also personally known to me.

Thus, out of the total number of 51 scientists and highly-qualified specialists in ichthyology and the fishing industry, whom I knew personally, 25 were shot and 26 deported to concentration camps within the short period of three years.

. . . I shall produce here a few names out of thousands which should be included in the list. I will produce the names of only those men and women whom I met personally in OGPU prisons and in the Solovetsky concentration camp during my two years of imprisonment (September 1930-August 1932). . . Besides, I limit my list by the names of those men and women who, thanks to their scientific work and reputation, might be known outside of Russia.

I have been only in two OGPU prisons, and there are hundreds of such prisons in Russia. I have been only in one concentration camp (Solovetsky), and there are at least twelve such camps in the USSR.

Furthermore, my list is composed, almost exclusively, of persons who lived in Leningrad. They represent, of course, only a very small proportion of the total number of Russian scientists and qualified experts murdered or imprisoned by the Soviets.

I cannot recall many names owing to terrible overcrowding of all the prisons in the USSR, usually over one hundred people were kept in a cell intended for twenty prisoners. It was very difficult, in the constant confusion and ceaseless change of prisoners, to learn the names of all who had passed through the cell in which I was kept, and whom I met in prison yards, etc. . . .

Names of Russian scientists and qualified specialists, known personally to me, who were murdered, deported to concentration camps or exiled by the Soviet Government in 1930-1932.

1. M. K. Lyubavsky—professor, academician, historian (the first Russian authority on the history of Lithuania, formerly elected Rector of Moscow University), aged 73, was imprisoned in Petrograd for one year, and in August 1931 exiled for five years.

2. S. F. Platonov—professor, academician, historian (the most distinguished of Russian historians), aged 73; was imprisoned in Petrograd

for 19 months, and then deported to Samara (Volga) for five years. Died in exile on 10 January, 1932.

3. *N. P. Likhachev*—professor, academician, historian, archæologist, aged 71; the only living expert in old Russian manuscripts and charters; gathered an exceptionally rich collection of old manuscripts which he presented to the Academy of Sciences; was imprisoned in Petrograd for one year, and in August 1931 exiled for a term of five years (to Ufa?).

4. *D. N. Egorov*—professor, academician, historian; was arrested together with Platonov; kept in prison for one year; exiled to Tashkent for a term of five years, where he soon contracted typhoid fever. For two months Egorov had no ration card and was deprived of the right to eat in public restaurants . . . he died suddenly in the third month of his exile (November 1931). His age was 53.

5. *P. P. Lazarev*—professor, academician; speciality—molecular physics; aged 54; was kept in the OGPU "Inner Prison" in Moscow; in the autumn of 1931 was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment in a concentration camp. His wife, on learning of her husband's sentence, hanged herself, owing to special representations to Stalin, his sentence was commuted to ten years of exile.

6. *E. V. Tarlé*—professor, academician, historian, aged 59; was imprisoned in Petrograd for one year; in August 1931, exiled to Aulie-Ata (Turkestan) for five years.

7. *J. V. Gauthier*—professor, historian, archæologist, librarian of the Rumyantsev library, aged 60; was imprisoned in Petrograd for one year; in the autumn of 1931 exiled to Volga region (Syzran?) for five years.

8. *S. V. Rozhdestvensky*—professor, historian, assistant to Prof. Platonov in the library of the Academy of Sciences; was imprisoned in Petrograd for 19 months; exiled for five years to Tomsk (Siberia).

9. *S. V. Bakhrushin*—professor, historian; was imprisoned in Petrograd for one year, in August 1931, exiled for five years to Minusinsk (Siberia).

10. *Zaozersky*—professor, historian, was imprisoned in Petrograd for one year; in 1931 deported to the Solovetsky concentration camp for ten years.

11. *V. A. Butenko*—professor, historian; aged 55; was imprisoned in Petrograd for six months, in 1931, deported to a concentration camp for ten years, all his property was confiscated; his wife, having learned of his sentence, hanged herself; when Butenko was informed of this, he fell ill and soon died.

12. *Borodin*—professor, historian; was imprisoned in Petrograd for one year; in 1931, was deported to the Solovetsky concentration camp for ten years.

13. *Gabayev*—military historian; in 1927 exiled to the Komi province (Northern Urals) for three years; in 1931, was brought back to Petrograd, where he was kept imprisoned for over a year; in 1931, was deported to a concentration camp (I do not know for how long).

THE TREATMENT OF SCHOLARS IN USSR. 713

14. *Mehervart*—historian, orientalist; was imprisoned in Petrograd for over one year; shot in the spring of 1931.

15. *A. G. Vulvius*—professor, historian, formerly headmaster of the Peter-Schule in Petrograd, aged 51; was imprisoned for one year, in 1931, deported to a concentration camp (I do not know for how long).

16. *Borovko*—custodian of the Hermitage (Department of Scythian antiquities), specialist in classical art, was imprisoned in Petrograd for one year; in 1931, deported to a concentration camp for the term of ten years.

17. *E. V. Erenshied*—senior assistant-conservator of the Hermitage (Department of Classical Antiquities); was imprisoned in Petrograd for one year; in 1931, deported to the Pechora concentration camp for ten years.

18. *M. P. Smirnov*—custodian of the Russian Museum of Alexander III (Department of old Russian Art); was imprisoned in Petrograd for six months; in 1928, deported to the Solovetsky camp, where he soon died of spotted fever.

19. *N. V. Izmailov*—custodian of the "Pushkin House" Museum; was imprisoned in Petrograd for two years; in 1931, deported to the Pechora concentration camp for five years.

20. *Engelhardt*—custodian of the "Pushkin House" Museum; was imprisoned in Petrograd for four months; in February of 1931, deported to the Solovetsky concentration camp for ten years.

21. *Beliayev*—custodian of the "Pushkin House" Museum; was imprisoned in Petrograd for one year; deported to a concentration camp for ten years.

22. *N. E. Lanseré*—architect and painter, custodian of the Russian Museum of Alexander III (Department of Social Culture); was imprisoned in Petrograd, sentenced to ten years' hard labour; kept in a Petrograd prison, and is employed by the OGPU as an architect.

23. *V. V. Starostin*—professor, Vice-Rector of the Institute of Civil Engineers in Petrograd, engineer and architect; was imprisoned in Petrograd for about a year; sentenced to ten years' hard labour; kept in Petrograd prison and is employed by the OGPU as an architect.

24. *M. I. Nazarevsky*—professor, ichthyologist; was imprisoned in Moscow for seven months, in 1931, sentenced to ten years' hard labour and deported to the Solovetsky concentration camp; seriously ill.

25. *N. N. Alexandrov*—professor, ichthyologist; was imprisoned in Moscow for six months; in 1931, sentenced to five years' hard labour.

26. *Popov*—professor of Kiev University, economist, in 1931, was sentenced to ten years' hard labour and deported to the Solovetsky camp.

27. *A. A. Belyanitsky-Birulya*—professor, zoologist, director of the Zoological Museum of the Academy of Sciences in Petrograd, aged 69; was imprisoned in Petrograd; in 1931, sentenced to five years' hard labour, first in the Solovetsky camp and afterwards in the Belomorsko-Baltiysky camp.

28. *B. E. Raikov*—professor, zoologist; was imprisoned in Petrograd for about a year; in 1931, sentenced to ten years' hard labour (Solovetsky camp, afterwards Belomorsko-Baltiysky camp).

29. *S. F. Tsarevsky*—zoologist, director of the Herpetological Department of the Zoological Museum of the Academy of Sciences in Petrograd; was imprisoned in Petrograd; in 1930, sentenced to hard labour (I do not know for what term).

30. *A. L. Benning*—professor, director of the Volga Biological Station, hydrobiologist, one of the prominent authorities on fresh-water animals in Russia; in 1931, sentenced to five years' hard labour.

31. *I. G. Farmanov*—professor, a specialist of the Moscow Scientific Institute of the Fishing Industry; aged over 70; was imprisoned in Moscow; in 1931, sentenced to ten years' hard labour and deported to the Solovetsky camp; fell ill in prison; for over two years was unable to leave his bed.

32. *Prokhorov*—professor, geologist; was imprisoned in Petrograd; shot in the spring of 1931.

33. *Wittenburg*—professor, geologist, chief of the Yakutsk expedition of the Academy of Sciences for five years; was imprisoned; in 1931, was sentenced to death; sentence commuted to ten years' hard labour in the Solovetsky camp.

34. *Mme. V. A. Balts*—woman professor (chemistry of soil), aged over 60, was imprisoned in Petrograd; sentenced to ten years' hard labour and deported to the Solovetsky camp.

35. *Stern*—geologist of the Petrograd Geological Committee; was imprisoned in Petrograd for over six months; in January 1931, was deported to a concentration camp for five years.

36. *Solonino*—professor, chemist; aged about 70; was imprisoned in Petrograd; in 1931, sentenced to several years' hard labour (I do not remember the exact term).

37. *A. V. Sapozhnikov*—professor, chemist; aged 65; was imprisoned in Petrograd for about a year; in the spring of 1931, sentenced to ten years' hard labour.

38. *V. V. Bazilevich*—professor, physicist, lecturer at the Military Technical Academy; was imprisoned in Petrograd for seven months; in 1931, sentenced to three years' hard labour.

39. *S. S. Baranov* (Galperson)—astronomer and publisher; was imprisoned in Petrograd for about a year; in 1931, sentenced to five years' hard labour and deported to the Solovetsky camp.

40. *Goncharov*—professor of the Naval Academy; in 1931, sentenced to ten years' hard labour.

41. *E. B. Furman*—professor, physician; was imprisoned in Petrograd for over a year; in 1931, sentenced to ten years' hard labour and deported to the Solovetsky camp; property confiscated.

42. *K. K. Gein*—physician, well-known gynecologist; aged about 70; imprisoned in Petrograd in 1931; his fate is unknown to me.

CHRONICLE : RUSSIA.

Foreign Relations.

No important events marked the close of the old and the beginning of the new year in the domain of the Soviet Union's relations with foreign Powers. The pact of non-aggression and the arbitration convention signed in November last between the USSR and France were ratified by the President of the French Republic and by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR in February. In the Far East relations with Japan, apart from diplomatic bickerings on the subject of alleged "provocative allegations" on either side, remained correct, and the speeches of responsible Soviet leaders at the Plenary Conference of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party and at the session of the All-Union Central Executive Committee emphasised the Government's intention to maintain peace and avoid interference in the dispute between China and Japan.

At the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, M. Litvinov, delegate for the USSR, during the discussions on the French disarmament plan in the General Committee, delivered a big speech, in which he pointed out the difficulties of safeguarding the rights of nations not included within the scope of the French plan or non-members of the League of Nations from outside aggression. He urged the necessity of the proclamation in the name of the international conference of a "Charter of the Rights of Peoples" to the absolute inviolability of their frontiers under any circumstances from any form of outside aggression on the part of another country. No considerations, whether political, economic, strategic or other, could justify any act of force as between one country and another. To this end the Soviet delegation presented a draft declaration defining an "aggressor" in an international conflict and expressed the wish that it should be discussed, together with the French plan, as a logical corollary to the latter.

Reports and Plans of the Communist Party.

Internal official political life was chiefly centred round the joint Plenary Conference of the Central Executive Committee and the Central Commission of Control, which met in the beginning of January, and the session of the All-Union Central Executive Committee (TSIK) held almost immediately afterwards. The main points on the agenda of the joint conference were the reports on the fulfilment of the First Five Year Plan and the plan for 1933, for presentation to the session of the Central Executive Committee. In a speech lasting five hours, M. Stalin, Secretary-General of the Communist Party, summed up the results of the Five Year Plan in four years. These, he said, "had exceeded the most sanguine expectations." From a backward agricultural country Russia had emerged into the forefront of the industrial nations of the world. New industries had been set up and equipped with the most modern plant, production had increased by 334 per cent., compared with pre-war, and

the country was rapidly approaching complete independence from foreign imports of machinery, etc. The view held abroad that Soviet currency was valueless was based on the outworn theory that only gold presented securities. The numerous power stations, tractor and motor works, new factories, hundreds of thousands of State and collective farms, built up and paid for with Soviet currency, were a better security of Soviet solvency than any gold reserve. If the output of some industries during the period was below plan, this was due to the refusal of certain foreign Powers to conclude pacts of non-aggression with the USSR and the strained situation in the Far East, which had made it necessary to divert a number of factories for the production of modern war material, such as tanks, aeroplanes, artillery, etc. Now the Red Army was fully supplied with all the modern instruments of defence and able to hold its own against any imperialist attack. Had not the Soviet Government seen to this, the USSR would long since have fallen a prey to imperialist intervention.

Stalin's speech, however, was not entirely given to extolling the achievements of the Five Year Plan. He severely criticised its shortcomings, the lack of labour discipline, technical inefficiency, and the low quality of the manufactured produce. In the next Five Year Plan attention would be mainly devoted to the perfecting of these items and the rate in the increase of production would be lowered. So far the country had been "whipped up and driven" to catch up with the capitalist world, but now the necessity for this was passed. As compared to 22 per cent. in the annual increase of production during the First Five Year Plan, this was now fixed at 13-14 per cent., with 16 per cent. in the first year of the "second Pyatiletka." In another speech, Stalin spoke at length of the defects of party work in the countryside, especially on the Soviet farms. The local party officials by their "criminal slackness" had given a new lease of life to the "kulaks," who were exploiting the individualistic instincts of the peasants and trying to wreck the collective farms from inside by posing as "friends of collectivisation" and subversively undermining the work of the collective farms. All the official speakers, both at this conference and later in the Central Executive Committee, were most emphatic in urging the necessity of "a war to a finish" against the "kulaks" in order to convert the collective farms into "genuinely Bolshevik" communities.

Budget of the USSR

The session of the All-Union Central Executive Committee had three main points on its agenda: the Budget, the national economy plan for 1933, and the report of the Commissary of Agriculture on the results of collectivisation during the Five Year Plan.

The Budget estimates were passed as follows:—

Revenue	35,010,920,000 r.
Expenditure	33,230,920,000 r.
Surplus (State reserve fund)	1,780,000,000 r.

The anticipated national income for 1933 was fixed at 51,000,000,000 r. In spite of the fact that in such important industries as the coal, oil, pig iron, steel and rolled metal the output was considerably below the programme, the "victorious achievement" of the First Five Year Plan in four years was proclaimed by the official speakers, MM. Molotov, President of the Council of People's Commissaries, and Kuibyshev, Chairman of the State Planning Commission. Capital investments for 1933 in heavy industries were fixed at 8,527 mil. r., and in light industries at 1,581 mil. r., and the increase in output, as compared to 1932, at 21.2 per cent. and 10.5 per cent., respectively. Capital investments in "black" metal industry amount to 2,197 mil. r., and the programme provides for the starting of 15 new blast and 45 martin furnaces and other big plant, in spite of which the planned output of pig iron, steel and rolled metal is the same or even below that of the original plan for 1932 (which was not carried out). The average all-round increase in the productivity of labour is fixed at 14 per cent., the cost of production lowered by 4 per cent., and the average all-round rise in industrial wages fixed at 6.8 per cent., as compared with 1932.

Agriculture.

The report on the results of collectivisation presents some extremely illuminating data concerning the actual status of the peasant population as a whole. From the figures quoted by M. Yakovlev (Commissary of Agriculture), it appears that 62.4 per cent. of the total peasant population or 14½ million households are banded in 200,000 collective farms with a total acreage of over 90 million hectares of arable land (more than three-quarters of the total under peasant cultivation). These same 14½ million households in 1928 tilled only 60 million hectares. The present additional 30 mil. h. consist of 12 mil. h. confiscated from the so-called "kulaks," 8 mil. h. "abandoned" by individual peasants other than "kulaks," who refused to join the collective farms, and 10 mil. h. of newly opened up land. It follows, therefore, that more than one-third of the Russian peasant population (exclusive of "kulaks"), who remain outside the collective farms, are reduced to cultivate less than a quarter (23 per cent.) of the remaining inferior arable land under conditions of heavy economic pressure and extra taxation. The well-nigh desperate position of these peasants is further aggravated by the fact that in the corn-growing territories the difference in the proportion of land per collective and individual household is much greater, the former in some districts having four or five times as much land as the latter. It is not surprising that under the circumstances many collective farms are now adverse to admitting new members, as this would proportionately reduce the amount of land per household. On the other hand, these practically landless peasants form a huge human reserve from which the Government is able to draw an almost unlimited number of "hands" for its schemes of industrial construction.

Several important and extremely drastic decrees were published by the Soviet Government during the period under consideration, but these are reproduced in other parts of the *Review* and so are not included in the chronicle.

The grain-collecting campaign should now be over, but its progress this season, according to official statements, was not nearly as smooth as in the preceding year, particularly in Ukraine and the northern Caucasus, where the Government agents encountered stubborn resistance on the part of the peasants, often abetted by the local authorities, including Communists, and stern reprisals had to be employed to force the peasants to yield up their grain.

Information as to the food situation is very scant, but the general impression is that it is growing worse, in spite of the reforms introduced at the end of the year and dealt with in the last chronicle.

REVIEWS

The End of the Russian Empire. By Michael T. Florinsky (Carnegie Endowment, Russian Series in Economic and Social History of the World War). (Yale University Press, 1931.) Pp. xvi + 272.

THIS book, up to its date of publication, is a remarkably good study of materials relating to the fall of the Russian monarchy. Already one passes from the contemporary records as such to history. The passage is not complete. The author himself fought in the Russian army in the war; also, of course, there are many more materials to be awaited. But, when one takes this into account, one is struck by the remarkable objectivity which he has attained. His detachment sometimes almost seems to lose too much of the colour of the actual events. This is what strikes me in particular in his sketch of the Russian army in the war. As one who lived with it almost throughout the fighting, I do not recognise this atmosphere of pessimism and despondency. Certainly the data for such a mood were there in excess; but in my opinion, in general, till late in the story the mood itself was not. The writer gives a few lines of warm and heartfelt recognition of the spirit in which the Russian army fought; but the book is, as a whole, a post-war study—a study made in the main from the rear.

The arrangement is not chronological, but by subjects, and therefore one necessarily loses sight more or less of the process by which the drama moved forward; for all the different aspects of it were united and at different times presented a different picture, with moments at which hope might be and was strong. Those who lived through that story were aware throughout that the ultimate decision of the issues lay somewhere behind closed doors, that is, with the Sovereign. But his personality and those which surrounded him seemed so infinitely small in presence of the colossal events which were proceeding, that one could hardly

believe that they would prove the determining factors. It seemed so easy for that door to be pushed open without the convulsions of a revolution, and for the history of Russia to resume its normal course in line with all that had been happening since the emancipation of the peasants in 1861.

And, indeed, this might easily have happened. Let us imagine, for instance, that Lord Kitchener had reached Russia in safety, that he had met the Emperor, as he would normally have done, at the headquarters and not at Tsarskoe, and only after seeing the front, that he had spoken, as he was sure to do, with soldierly plainness, and it is far more likely than not that the weak and well-intentioned Sovereign would have put up no serious resistance to the only way in which the war could be won, that is, by a real union with his people. In this connection, it is not without reason that we read in the letters of the Empress: "Our Friend says it is good for us that Kitchener died, as later he might have done Russia harm" (5 June, 1916). There was more than one striking occasion when Nicholas II testified in full to the immense satisfaction which he felt when at unity with his people. It was the force on the other side that was accidental, though it was simply the influence of his own wife; and once he had not her to lean on, he abdicated without a murmur. Her reading of the position is the true one; when she learnt this news, her comment was: "Et lui tout seul là-bas."

Mr. Florinsky devotes an early chapter to "The Eclipse of the Sovereign," in which this, the most essential, part of the story is traced throughout; and he has made the most careful and understanding study of it; but it cannot well be isolated in this way, for it is the axis of the whole. Each of the subsequent chapters suffers to a certain extent from this arrangement. The Duma rises and falls in one chapter, and so does labour awaken. The army is left till close to the end. This is a wrong order. As the book itself shows, the awakening of labour can hardly be said to have begun before the actual Revolution. It is as if the last chapter of all, "From the Downfall of the Empire to Bolshevism," had disturbed the perspective of what preceded; and this would be likely to happen in any survey based on the same divisions and including this aftermath.

This, however, is all that I can find to say in criticism of this really excellent book. The range of materials utilised is very wide; the analysis of cause and effect is sound throughout. Particularly valuable is the detailed picture of the growing disorganisation of all the economic life of the country under the tremendous stress of the Great War, which, if it was not the cause of the fall of the monarchy, was at least the cause of the final outburst that overthrew it, a movement of the streets of the capital, purely elemental and led by no one. The style is admirably clear and natural, and the judgment is, in general, broad and just throughout.

BERNARD PARES.

Vizantiyskie Otsy V-VIII v. By Father G. V. Florovsky. Iz chteniy v Pravoslavnom Bogoslovskom Institute v Parizhe Paris, 1933

THE new book of Father G. Florovsky, Professor at the Orthodox Theological Institute in Paris, constitutes a natural sequel to his first book on patrology. Its object is to state, in an easily accessible form, the most difficult problems confronting Christian theology in the 5th to 9th centuries, viz., the problems of *Christology*. The author has coped well with his task—his sketches are bright and full of relief, his formulas clear and exact. Some chapters seem to us to go far beyond the scope of "lectures"—one feels them to be the results of original research. The first chapter, entitled "The Paths of Byzantine Theology," contains much that is valuable, though sometimes open to dispute. One may also mention the excellent chapters devoted to the Corpus Areopagiticum, to the Ascetics, and in particular to Maxim the Confessor. The exposition in this last chapter is original, and it is only to be regretted that Father Florovsky does not base his interesting conclusions on a sufficient foundation. It is true that, since it represents "lectures" at the Theological Institute, the book is deprived throughout of any critical apparatus, the exposition being dogmatic and not critical. The author himself regrets this, as may be gathered from his remark at the end of the bibliographical section, but it will be no less regretted by those readers of his book who would like to learn more about his reasons for this or that assertion, as well as to know what view the author takes of other works. The chapter on St. John Damascene seems to us to be the least successful of all.

In spite of this serious drawback, due to the plan adopted by the author, one must welcome the publication of Father Florovsky's new book. It offers, in a form easily digestible by the reader, considerable dogmatic and patrological material, and represents an important contribution to Russian theological culture, familiarising large circles of Orthodox opinion with most important theological problems, which still preserve their topical interest even in our days. The ease of style and the serious and thoughtful interpretation of the most difficult subjects in patrology are the more valuable because the author has his material well at his command; he himself, as one feels in many a passage of the book, lives an intense life of theological thought. We would, nevertheless, recommend him most urgently, in case he should publish new books or reprint the two that have already appeared, to supply them with an adequate apparatus of scholarly criticism. This would serve his own interests, inasmuch as it would give a stronger foundation to his researches and original conceptions. The great merits of Father Florovsky's new book entitle us to make higher demands upon it.

V. ZENKOVSKY.

Metternich. By Algernon Cecil. (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode.)
9s. net. 344 pages, 5 illustrations.

LIKE Castlereagh, Metternich has had to wait the best part of a century for an adequate biography, but when at last it came from the pen of Ritter von Srbik, it filled 1,269 pages of text and 140 more of notes, and its chances of translation, it is to be feared, are small. An American writer, Mr. Arthur Herman, doubtless realising this, had the not very happy idea of boiling down the results of Srbik's work and of other post-war research, but his book on Metternich cannot be said to add to our knowledge, and its value is still further reduced by an extraordinarily exasperating style. It is not surprising that Professor Srbik should have given vent to his annoyance in a review in the *Journal of Modern History* in Chicago.

It should be unnecessary to state that Mr. Cecil's scholarly volume belongs to quite another category, though not apparently based upon any original research in the Austrian archives, which remain a largely unworked mine even for the age of Metternich. He has drawn liberally upon the statesman's own memoirs; but while these are full of vivid touches and contain many clues alike of character and of policy, they are also full of significant silences and omissions and require to be used with a certain caution. It is curious that Mr. Cecil should have used as motto for his interesting introductory chapter one of those many extracts from the memoirs which reveal Metternich in his most self-satisfied and pontifical mood, and, indeed, he sometimes pushed such moods to the point of fatuity, as, for instance, in his famous comparison between himself and Canning (quoted on p. 213).

The book is crowded with effective epigrams, but exception may surely be taken to the charge against Abraham Lincoln of "enriching all democratic dogma both with cynicism and with grace" (p. 312). And while Metternich may fairly be compared with Palmerston in the solitary sense of being "no good judge of Eastern affairs" (p. 248), this most emphatically does not apply to Bismarck, who for all his professions of indifference steered with great skill through the shoals of the Eastern question. Again, the attempt to ascribe Guizot's failure to a failure of Protestantism is as far fetched as would be an attempt to hold Catholicism responsible for the downfall of Metternich, with whom, as Mr. Cecil realises, Catholicism was skin deep and who not merely dabbled in the sciences in his leisure hours, but found himself so attracted by Voltaire that he and his third wife read the great sceptic aloud in the evenings. The fact is that Metternich—again like Palmerston, though this time in an utterly different way—had in him a large admixture of 18th-century scepticism and cynicism. When it is claimed that "his Christianity grew with political experience," the cynic might well rejoin that Metternich regarded Christianity, and especially the Roman Church, as a most convenient bulwark of conservative principles.

It seems to me that Mr. Cecil does less than justice to Castlereagh, who was at least as good an European as Metternich and saw the world as a whole in a way that could not reasonably be expected of Metternich. There is nothing in Metternich's career that can compare with Castlereagh's efforts to end the slave trade, and Castlereagh would never have uttered such hatefully cynical phrases as Metternich about Turks and Greeks. If Castlereagh eventually developed certain "insular hesitations," it was because even his essentially Tory, not to say reactionary, nature could not swallow the creed of almost unrestricted interference in the interests of absolute government, propounded by Francis and Alexander with Metternich's full approval. There is no reference to the all-important State Paper of May, 1820, which Professors Webster and Temperley have shown to be a legacy of Castlereagh to Canning, not a departure of Canning from his great predecessor's policy. Another point which is left obscure is the reason for Metternich's refusal of George IV's invitation to London in 1825. In this case discretion was the better part of valour, and Canning was ready to hit hard at this last attempt to combine with the King for his overthrow. Again, it is impossible to accept Mr. Cecil's defence of the Karlsbad Decrees or his mild treatment of Dom Miguel, one of the worst tyrants of last century. And poor Gentz must have turned in his grave when a compatriot of his idol Burke referred to him as a Jew! (p. 119).

The weakest point of the book, however, is the failure to bring out the causes of 1848—the utter negation and obscurantism of Francis, who not merely blocked the progress of Austria for wellnigh two generations, but continued to govern from his grave, by his criminal action in permitting his poor weak-minded son to accede to an autocratic throne, thereby accentuating still further the stagnation and paralysis. That Metternich had little to say in internal politics, especially under Ferdinand, cannot exonerate him from condoning such a régime; and there is ample evidence that he saw what was wrong and failed to assert himself. Far the most damning facts about Austria in the first half of last century are to be found, not in the pages of the liberal malcontents, but in the secret admissions of such men as Kübeck, Andrian, Hartig or Grillparzer, none of whom had one jot of sympathy with revolution. But none of these are quoted, and the name of the all-powerful Police Minister, Count Sedlnitzky, is not even mentioned.

Mr. Cecil's very pronounced views need not deter the reader, who will, indeed, find himself forewarned and forearmed by them. It is a book of very great charm and literary distinction, and its imaginative flights will help to interest in the great Austrian statesman many who would never open Professor Srbik's *magnum opus* (even if it were translated, as it so richly deserves to be.)

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

L'Archiduc François-Ferdinand. By Maurice Muret, membre de l'Institut. Paris (Grasset), 1932. 347 pages. 20 frs.

SINCE the war more than one study of the enigmatic and tragic figure of Francis Ferdinand has been published—notably the books of Sosnosky and Chlumetzky: and much more may be culled from other sources. M. Muret seems to have examined every available source, sifted many legends that have gathered round Belvedere and Konopisht and collected much oral evidence from many persons in different ranks of life who were connected with the Archduke. His results are put together with equal artistic skill and critical judgment. No romantic detail is omitted, but each is relegated to its true place, and the necessary notes of interrogation—and they are many—are added with very special care. Indeed, the figure of the Archduke himself gradually emerges from the book as a vast note of interrogation, to which the Archduke's own friends and intimates are made to contribute: and at the end we are left with the fundamental question unanswered. In this M. Muret again proves himself as a master of historical sense and artistry: for it will always remain one of the greatest riddles of history, whether "Francis II" would have proved equal to the vast problem of reconstituting the Habsburg Monarchy on durable lines, or whether his efforts would merely have precipitated the very catastrophe which he saw to be impending.

Francis Ferdinand is justly portrayed as the strongest Habsburg personality since Joseph II—"more explosive than impulsive," full of violent likes and dislikes (especially the latter), affectionate in his home life, an ardent Catholic, a loyal friend, possessed with an intense desire to promote the greatness of his House and of the Monarchy, ready to shrink at nothing, curiously open to criticism if administered in the right form, but ruthless, inconsiderate, avaricious, detested by the "small man" on his estates, and brutally unrestrained in his prejudices. He "*dédaignait les nuances, coupait dans le vif et ne ménageait personne*," to quote but a single penstroke out of many. M. Muret is inclined to think that this violence of temperament is sufficiently explained by his Bourbon and Este blood, by his early illness and neglect, and by the intense and sustained irritation of his situation in the years preceding the war, when he saw his uncle growing feebler and risking utter disaster and yet found himself powerless to apply any remedy.

There are admirable chapters on the Archduke's attitude to the Magyars, to Italy, to the Southern Slavs, to the army, to constitutional reform. He is shown to have been quite definitely opposed to war and to have aimed at the reconstitution of the Three Emperors' League. M. Muret has nothing new to say on this point, but here, as on every subject throughout the book, he is at once lucid and suggestive and leaves a most vivid picture. Nowhere is his habitual caution better

shown than in the chapters on the murder and the plot that evoked it; the various fantastic theories on the subject are propounded one after the other, only to be dismissed or reduced to more fitting and sober proportions.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

Moja Podróż do Rosji (My journey to Russia). By Antoni Słonimski. ("Roj," Warsaw), 1932. Pp. 197.

AMONG the books on Soviet Russia appearing nearly every day in all languages, this volume is to be singled out for many reasons. It is written by an outstanding Polish poet and critic well known for his gift of keen observation as well as for his independence of mind. He went to Russia equipped with a thorough knowledge of the language and of things Russian. He is far from having any nationalistic prejudices, and his attachment to Socialist ideals was an indication that his curiosity about the Soviets was a rather sympathetic one.

He does not discuss political matters, economic planning, the construction of new industrial towns and similar questions. The sole object of his curiosity is life itself. He is not easily impressed by new factories, knowing well that a few hundred miles westwards there are numbers of similar ones lying idle. His method, as he defines it, was simply to look into people's eyes. He recognises that the Soviet experiment has been a gigantic one: "Never before in the history of the world has man been kept at such a temperature and under such a pressure." The primary question is how far the nature of man has been affected by it.

Słonimski visited the new Soviet laboratories and institutions, such as, for instance, children's homes and the Palace of Labour, he saw their new museums and official show-places, but he was particularly anxious to find his way into private lodgings, to penetrate into courts of justice and to talk with chance acquaintances in the street. This was by no means easy, as he had to evade by stratagem his Communist hosts who looked after him with embarrassing attention. He has shown himself also to have been critical about inspired statements and suggestions, in pronounced contrast with the "Anglo-Saxon tourists," whom he mentions, who are so easily deluded because of their implicit trust in the truthfulness of any informant.

Cautious though he was, however, he found many things to admire, more perhaps than his reader would admire with him. He liked the woman's welfare clinic, he was greatly impressed with the Park of Recreation and Culture, he enjoyed the performance of an excellent educational film. He acknowledges the earnestness and ardour of the Communist Russian youth, of the girls in particular, serious, hard-working and ecstatic about their work; girls after whom the existence of frail, silky and lipstickky Western creatures seems to be a dream. Here and there he finds things superior to those of the West, and his book is not lacking in sarcastic observations about Western countries. His attitude towards

the Soviets is in a great measure shaped by his understanding that they are a hope for masses of the injured and exploited all over the world, and that they possess that rare and precious thing, a belief in an ideal. This recognition gives Slonimski's book an unmistakable mark of honesty.

And yet we see that at a very early stage of his journey he had to divide himself into two separate beings : an enthusiast and a sceptic, and these two appear in turn before us or meet to debate between themselves. Today the whole world is sick—he says in one of his characteristic comparisons—but the Western crises and depression are rather like suffering in one's own bed, with a cup of tea at one's elbow and an old novel under the pillow, whereas in Russia the patient is lying on the operating table and undergoing surgical treatment without anæsthetics. The question is whether this painful operation is being performed with adequate precision and in an atmosphere free from bacteria. At almost every second step of his wanderings through streets, offices, law courts, schools, hospitals, museums, literary societies, collective and individual flats, the author is forced to notice the teeming life of these bacteria. They are of different kinds, and one has to go through the absorbing pages of the book to see their variety and distinctions. The complete absence of any privacy; the constant interference of the agents of the State, the new class hierarchy and marked scales of privileges; the all-pervading bureaucracy; the personal insecurity, the strict prohibitions not only of writing, but of reading also; the complete lack of public opinion and the impossibility of any general criticism : these are only some typical examples. The very enthusiasm of the Soviet youth shows another aspect against its background of tremendous responsibility for every spoken word, of the imminent danger of losing one's food-ticket for any rash remark.

"A land of great slogans, great bluff, great oppression and great misery!" We find these words in the book, but they are not its final conclusion. More general thoughts are expressed in the author's observations on the hatred animating the life of the Communist masses and his query whether despairing proletarians, moved by a feeling of revenge, are an appropriate medium for introducing new formations into human society.

In fact, the description of the journey—after having carried us through a number of the author's different moods, of which humour is not the least noticeable—ends in a dialogue between the Sceptic and the Enthusiast. The level of individual life is now in the Soviets still much lower than in Western Europe. They are supported by hope in the future. Shall we, who resent the injustice so powerful in the old world, go with them? Perhaps stubborn humanity is unable to follow other ways but those of violent revolutions? The Sceptic does not deny it. But in any case, replies his partner, we have to defend from degradation those human values without which life is not worth living. "We shall defend the simple idea of goodness and consideration, we shall fight for the value of the words which the Revolution has impatiently struck out from its

vocabulary. We shall champion scepticism without which no real creation is possible and which shelters us from fanaticism. We shall defend the individual's right to life, and we can do much to weaken the feeling of vengeance and to increase the purposefulness of work."

W. BOROWY.

Attitudes et Destinées. Faces et profils d'écrivains polonais. By Z. L. Zaleski. Paris (Les Belles Lettres), 1932. Pp. 374.

THIS book goes far to fill a noticeable gap; until lately there has been no large survey of contemporary Polish literature in any Western language. Kleiner, in his *Polnische Literatur* (1929) had, of necessity, to be over-concise; Wolfango Giusti's *Aspetti della poesia polacca contemporanea* (1931) is limited, as its title indicates. Both these books, besides, might give rise to considerable discussion as to their methods and scales of value. Nor does M. Zaleski's own treatment commend itself without reservations. He is a little too amiable and too much inclined to use the vocabulary of praise. He certainly might have left unmentioned some of the writers with whom he deals. But apart from this excess of cordiality and lavish distribution of kind regards, his book is really valuable for its collection of essays on the majority of important literary figures of post-war Poland. Masters of the older generation, Zeromski and Kasproicz, are given foremost attention; their contemporaries of lesser talent though wide following, Reymont, Berent, Weyssenhoff, Przybyszewski, Sieroszewski, are analysed reverently, neatly and substantially. A number of portraits of younger writers are sketched in a larger essay entitled "Sur le chemin du roman polonais" (we find here vignettes of Mme. Dabrowska, J. Kaden-Bandrowski, F. Goetel, J. Powalski, J. Iwaszkiewicz, and many others). The book is packed with information and attractive for its clarity. It begins with a few essays of a retrospective character on the great romantic inspirers of modern literature in Poland. Rather outside the main scope of the work is the interesting and detailed study "Les relations polonaises de Flaubert."

W. BOROWY.

Vliv Mickiewiczův na českou literaturu předbřeznovou. Studie srovnací (The Influence of Mickiewicz on Czech Literature before the Revolution of 1848: a comparative study). Vol. I. By Julius Heidenreich. Prague (published by Slavonic Institute), 1930. Pages vii + 181.

THIS study by Heidenreich may be placed on the list of successful achievements in comparative research. It is true that the influence of Polish romantic literature on the renaissance of Czech literature in the 19th century is a well-known fact, but up to the present it has not been exhaustively studied. The present work is, in accordance with the intentions of the author, only the first part of a projected study of the general influence of Mickiewicz on Czech poetry. The writer intentionally avoids the echoes which are awakened in the Czech mind by the *Paris Lectures* of Mickiewicz, and he speaks exclusively on his influence as a poet. The method of research chosen by Heidenreich is worthy of all praise. The

author begins by showing the spiritual relation between the intellectual currents of thought in Poland and Bohemia and the particular conditions under which the influence of Mickiewicz has worked on the various creative individualities among the Czech poets. Having drawn vivid portraits of the principal Czech poets, e.g. Čelakovsky, Macha, Erben and others, he explains why Mickiewicz exercised his influence on Čelakovsky and Erben almost exclusively as the author of *Ballads* and *Sonnets*, and why to the poet Macha he is important mainly as the author of *Konrad Wallenrod*, *Dziady* (part 3), and as the translator of Byron. It is noteworthy that in the period of Czech literature studied in Heidenreich's work there is practically no evidence of the influence of *Pan Tadeusz*, as Polish literature was followed by the Czechs with considerable delay and, their poets coming under the influence of the works of Mickiewicz's earlier days, they did not yet duly appreciate his most mature masterpieces.

One of the great merits of this book is the comprehensiveness of the comparative analysis, which is not limited to a study of the elements of plots, but includes analogies of form and in particular of the rhythm of verse and poetic syntax.

The book calls for few critical comments. It is, however, impossible to pass over in silence such a mistake as the attempt (very cautious, it is true) to trace the influence of *Dziady Part I.*, with which Czech poets could not possibly have been acquainted before 1848, as it was not till after the death of Mickiewicz that it was published from a posthumous manuscript (pp. 62 and 86). We must also remark that though the author is thoroughly cognisant with the works of Mickiewicz himself, his knowledge of Polish critical literature about the poet is limited to but a few works, especially the monograph by Kallenbach, from which he even quotes fragments of Mickiewicz's letters, ignoring the printed editions of the latter's correspondence. There are also some omissions and misspellings in the bibliography which, however, can easily be corrected in the next edition and do not in any way lower the general value of the book. It is to be expected that the author, in his further researches on the influence of Mickiewicz in Bohemia, will impart to us many more facts no less valuable and interesting than those contained in the present study.

KONRAD GÓRSKI.

The Massacres of Chios. Edited, with introduction, by Philip P. Argenti. London (John Lane), 1932. 242 pages, illustration and maps.

THE wanton destruction of Chios, the wealthiest Greek community outside Constantinople itself, outraged the sluggish conscience of Europe and did more than any other event to advertise the cause of Greek liberty. Mr. Argenti, himself the great-great-grandson of a prominent victim of the massacre, has had the original idea of collecting contemporary material from all the archives of Europe, and this, together with a scholarly introduction, enables us to reconstruct the main course of events. The pretext for the massacre was a madcap raid upon Chios

by 1,500 Samians, who had no plan of action and fled at the first approach of the Turkish fleet, leaving the unhappy islanders to bear the whole brunt; 4,000 troops were landed to burn and lay waste the island, and Vaid Pasha, the civil governor, gave the order in writing, "Innocent or guilty, all are to die." Finally the hostages, unable to collect the huge ransom demanded, were hanged in the public square of Chios. Mr. Argenti estimates the population of the island at 120,000 before the massacre and at 30,000 after it, but he gives no authority for this. The population in 1928 was 75,000.

Lord Strangford's reports were deservedly outspoken, and Lord Londonderry in reply referred to "the painful and disgusting recital of bloody scenes" which had "filled the British nation with horror and disgust" (p. 26). According to Strangford the British was the only Government "to brand the transactions with the indignant and fearless expression of its abhorrence." Of special interest is the long report of the French Vice-Consul David, dated June 1824, which contains a survey of Chian history and social conditions in the period of Turkish rule as an introduction to the final tragedy. From the Prussian report it appears that the Sultan's sister drew a considerable revenue from the island, and on its complete ruin procured the overthrow of the Admiral and the Governor; but the mischief was by that time irreparable. A final section of 30 pages contains interesting extracts from contemporary Levantine newspapers.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

Immer Wieder Serbien: Jugoslawiens Schicksalsstunde. By Florian Lichtträger. Berlin (Verlag für Kulturpolitik), 1933. 203 pp.

THE fact that this book is published under a pseudonym must not blind us to its real value and importance: for the complete denial of political liberty in the Jugoslavia of King Alexander makes it quite impossible for any of his subjects to publish so frank a survey under his own name and remain inside its frontiers.

The book gives an admirable summary of the events which led to the dictatorship and, above all, of the causes of its failure. Internal evidence suggests that before the war its author leant towards the Habsburg orientation, but he is relentless in his criticism of Austria-Hungary, and makes it quite clear (for anyone who does not know it already) that no return to the old situation is even remotely possible, even if it were desirable. He is not afraid to criticise the political blunders of Stephen Radić, and while laying great (perhaps undue) stress upon the difference of tradition and mental outlook between the eastern and western sections of the Yugoslav race, deriving from Byzantium and Rome, he has the fairness to challenge a certain superficial Croat tendency to treat the Serbs as exclusively oriental. On the contrary, he is right in pointing out the strongly west European

orientation which has affected many of the most representative Serbs of the century following liberation.

The chapter on the economic situation is thoroughly realist and does not fall into the cheap error of throwing all the blame on to the dictatorship, but it shows very clearly how the situation has been aggravated still further by the efforts at stabilisation, the wheat monopoly and the well-meant but disastrous law of 20 April, 1932, for the protection of the peasants. He has no difficulty in showing that the proclamation of the dictatorship produced a momentary relief, because it was assumed that the King intended to use it to solve the unsolved Croat question, but that instead of this he sought to consolidate the state by still greater centralisation and so aggravated the Croat question still further. The catchword of "bankrupt party leaders" who had to be eliminated is shown to be false, since the regime chose many of its chiefs among those very party leaders whom it denounced for the failure of the previous ten years!

The thesis of the closing chapters is that Yugoslav unity is an European interest, both in itself and owing to the international dangers which a collapse might conjure up; and that only Federalism can avert that collapse. He leaves the dynastic question open, while making it clear that King Alexander's position is gravely compromised.

Special interest is imparted to the book by a long preface of Dr. Friedrich Thimme, one of the three joint editors of the 54 volumes of German War documents (*Die Grosse Politik*). In it he fully associates himself with the thesis that the maintenance of Yugoslavia is in the interest of at least three Great Powers—France, Britain and *Germany*—and while disclaiming any idea of interference, reminds his own public how dire was the result of its pre-war neglect of the Southern Slav question. I may perhaps without egotism note that in this connection he quotes with approval my pre-war book on that question, which was written with the same warning purpose, and the German edition of which I prefaced in 1913 with an appeal to German public opinion, in the fear that "Germany might have to pay the bad debts of Austria" in this very question. It is, I trust, legitimate to assume that Dr. Thimme would not at this juncture have publicly endorsed a thesis which was unacceptable to German official circles. I can but express the earnest hope that the three Governments will, before it is too late, reach a joint understanding as to what course should be pursued in certain grave contingencies which the near future might bring.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

Umsturz in Mitteleuropa: Der Zusammenbruch Oesterreich-Ungarns und di Geburt der Kleinen Entente. By Jan Opočenský. Hellerau bei Dresden (Avalun-Verlag), 1931. 464 pp.

THIS very important book on the collapse of Austria-Hungary has hitherto only been available in Czech, and it was well to make it known

to the German public, to whom so much of its theme is quite unfamiliar. Its author is one of the chief officials of the Prague Archives and his work rests upon close study, of many documents not yet accessible to the general public, and in particular on the Ballplatz material copied by the Czechs immediately after the war. It is admirably written, but the omission of documentary references was a serious blunder and detracts from its value. If, as is to be hoped, an English edition should follow—and some such book is much needed as a corrective to existing interpretations of the great year of Revolution—it is essential that this omission should be remedied. Meanwhile the book may be profitably read in conjunction with Colonel Glaise-Horstenau's *Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire* (the best Austrian presentment).

R. W. S-W.

Ochrona Zabytków Sztuki (La Protection des Monuments Artistiques), Fasc. 1-4, Part I. Warsaw (J. Mortkowicz) 1931. Zł. 40 (= 120 frs.), xii + 240 pp.

THIS is a new review under the editorship of George Remer, devoted to the protection of monuments in Poland. Though written in Polish, each article is followed by a full summary in French. The first law, passed in 1918, established regional commissions and started an inventory. A more flexible law was passed in 1928. By "monument" is understood "every object, fixed or movable, characteristic of a definite epoch, and officially recognised as having an artistic, cultural, historical, archæological or palæontological value." The details of the law are here set forth and will repay study. There follow accounts of two men who have rendered distinguished service in the preservation of national monuments, Stanislas Tomkowicz, now aged 82, and Vl. Demetrykiewicz, who lately completed 70 years.

The bulk of the volume consists of reports by various specialists on the restoration, reconstruction or preservation of various important buildings; among the churches mentioned are those of Our Lady in Cracow, of Our Lady of Victories in Lublin, and churches in Wiślica and Sandomierz. Other buildings mentioned are the "Maison du Roi" and the Royal Arsenal at Lwów, ruined castles in the districts of Wilno and Nowogródek and at Czersk, and the towers of the collegiate building of Tum near Łęczycza; the process of grouting these last is fully described and illustrated.

Those interested in mural paintings and their restoration will find articles on those of Wiślica, of a former church of the "Brethren of Pious Schools" at Łowicz, built in 1680, and the 14th-century paintings in the church of St. John at Gniezno. The method of preserving the last-named was the same as that employed in the Chapter House of Westminster, as described in full in the *Museums Journal* for June 1929, namely, spraying with wax.

F. A. BATHER.

SCHOOL OF SLAVONIC AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

(UNIVERSITY OF LONDON)

Telephone :
Museum 9738

40 TORRINGTON SQUARE,
LONDON, W.C.1.

(5 minutes from Goodge Street, Russell Square,
British Museum and Euston Square stations)

TRANSLATION BUREAU

The Bureau accepts materials, whether academic or commercial, for translation from and into the principal Slavonic and East European languages. The scale of charges per folio of 72 words is as follows :—

	Russian	Polish	Czecho- slovak	Serbo- Croat	Bul- garian	Hun- garian
	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
Non-technical from print or type -	3 0	4 0	4 6	4 6	4 6	5 0
Non-technical from MS. - - -	3 9	5 0	5 8	5 8	5 8	6 3
Technical - -	3 9	5 0	5 8	5 8	5 8	6 3

SPECIAL CHARGES

Terms are reduced for translations of over 100 words, in accordance with the length.

Terms by arrangement for :—

Verifying translations. All précis work.
Readers' opinions on MSS. for publication.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

An American Quarterly Review

Hamilton Fish Armstrong—Editor



THE world's leading statesmen, economists and financial authorities write for FOREIGN AFFAIRS. They keep the readers of this important American review informed about the basic causes of the great events which today are making history.

CONTENTS OF THE APRIL ISSUE.

BASES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE PAST FOUR YEARS	Henry L. Stimson
NECESSARY CHANGES IN OUR COMMERCIAL POLICY	F. W. Taussig
THE TASKS OF THE WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE	Sir Walter Layton
POLAND'S SO-CALLED CORRIDOR	Ignace Jan Paderewski
GERMAN MILITARY POWER SINCE VERSAILLES	General Wilhelm Groener
OUR WHEAT SURPLUS	E. G. Nourse
THE BALANCE SHEET OF THE FIVE YEAR PLAN	William Henry Chamberlin
CHINESE PUBLIC OPINION	T. F. Betts
UNION OR DISUNION IN CENTRAL AMERICA ? ...	Raymond Leslie Buell
PRINCE ITO'S CONFIDENTIAL PAPERS	K. K. Kawakami
THE PROGRESS OF SOCIALISATION IN ENGLAND	William A. Robson
DEPRECIATED CURRENCIES AND WORLD TRADE	William O. Scroggs
THE AMERICAN STAKE IN THE PHILIPPINES...	Harriet Moore
THE PERSIAN-BRITISH OIL DISPUTE	A. C. Millspaugh
SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	William L. Langer
SOURCE MATERIAL	Danys P. Myers

—also the usual maps and notes, bibliography of new books in the international field, index of treaties and trade agreements, etc.

Subscriptions: \$5 a year post free to any address.

Use form below for special offer.

TEAR OFF HERE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 45 East 65th St., New York.

Please enter me for a year's subscription and include *without charge* the issue described above. I enclose \$5 in payment.

Name
 Street
 City.....

April